


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**Doomed to Failure?  
The Czechoslovak Nation Project  
and the Slovak Autonomist  
Reaction 1918-38**

**Department of  
Political Science**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO**



# *Doomed to failure?*

## *The Czechoslovak nation project and the Slovak autonomist reaction 1918–38*

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# Foreword

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People have all sorts of reasons for doing the things they do. Most of us emphasize the rational ones. In view of the time and effort involved, writing a doctoral dissertation is hardly an entirely rational thing to do in any case, and even less so when it involves learning a new language and studying a period long gone in a country far away. In my case, it all started with an infatuation with a city, the Golden City of Prague, as it used to be called in the travel brochures issued by *Čedok*, the state tourist company. At the time the city was all but golden, but magic nevertheless! My scholarly interest in Czechoslovakia was aroused even before my first visit in 1987 and rekindled by new visits in 1988, 1990, and 1992. By then I had an application ready for a grant from the Norwegian Research Council (NFR).

Without the infatuation, first with Prague and later with Czechoslovak history and society, I doubt that it would have been possible to complete the manuscript. It has often been emphasized how finishing a thesis is lonely work, and hard going. I have also felt that way at times, but most of the time it has been a joy and a privilege to be working on something that has interested me so much and given me so much pleasure. I would therefore like to take the opportunity to thank some of the people who have made this venture possible.

In the first place, I would like to thank the institutions that financed me: A grant from the NFR took care of the first three years of the project, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, financed one year. The Department of Political Science has been my place of work the whole time, and kindly provided me with office facilities and nice colleagues for a whole year after my financing ran out. My mentor has been Professor Øyvind Østerud at the Department of Political Science. In addition to helping me get the NFR grant, he was my supervisor and support throughout the whole process. For this he deserves special thanks.

Without the help and inspiration of Czech and Slovak scholars who have shared their knowledge with me, my task would have been much harder. I would like to thank Professor Miroslav Hroch of the Department of World History at Charles University of Prague for inspiration, valuable comments and lively discussions throughout the process. I would also like to thank Dr. Eva Kowalská of the History Department of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava for her thorough comments, especially on the chapters in Part Two, and for her enthusiasm. Dr. Alena Bartlová, also of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, went out of her way to help me with literature, and gladly shared her great knowledge of the First Republic with me on several occasions – also through letters. Dr. Dušan Kováč of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Professor Robert Kvaček of the Czech History Department at Charles University and Dr. Jan Rychlík of the Masaryk Institute in Prague took the time and patience to meet with me and answer my many questions. Dr. Rychlík also read the penultimate version of the manuscript thoroughly (including proofreading of Czech and Slovak quotations) and saved me from some embarrassing mistakes. For all this I am truly grateful. *Děkuji moc/d'akujem pekne!*

Several of my Norwegian colleagues have read parts of the manuscript. Participants at the annual Norwegian conferences in political science at Geilo in the years 1994–98 have read bits and pieces. For this I would especially like to thank Pål Bakka, Knut Heidar, Lauri Karvonen, Hanne Marthe Narud, Henry Valen, and Bernt Aardal. Aardal deserves special thanks for taking the time and effort to read the entire manuscript in the final stages. Thanks also to Professor Trond Nordby for advising me on historical method, and to my anonymous referees in *Nations and nationalism*, who read an earlier draft of Chapter 4 and offered valuable if not always very welcome comments. The remaining errors are my responsibility alone.

I would also like to thank the staffs of the various libraries I have visited for their help. In Prague, this includes the Czech National Library, the library of the Department of World History at Charles University, the library of the Czech Bureau of Statistics, the Pedagogical Library and the library of the Czech Parliament. Special thanks to Tomáš Samek and Jindra Vačková, who also helped me out via the internet, and to Jordan Leff, who, in addition to being a good friend, roamed the libraries of Prague for me. In Bratislava, I would like to thank the staff of the Comenius University Library, the Slovak Pedagogical Library, and the library of the History Department of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, especially Danka Schwarzová.

I am indebted to Dr. Karen Gammelgaard at the Czech Division of the Department of East European and Oriental Studies, University of Oslo, for introducing me to the Czech language and assisting me with various Czech and Slovak language problems along the way. My teachers at the Czech summer school of Masaryk University in Brno, Eva Černá and Dr. Zdeňka Hladká, deserve credit for bringing me a large step forwards in the mysteries of the Czech language. Thanks are also due to other scholars at the University of Oslo: to Professor László Keresztes of the Department of East European and Oriental Studies for helping out with Magyar language problems, to Bohunka Stříteská of the Czech Division for her assistance in finding literature on Czech and Slovak language questions, and to Professor Geir Hellemo at the Faculty of Theology for helping me out with Catholic holidays. Finally, I would like to thank my language editor Susan Høivik for her thorough work in correcting the English of this unwieldy manuscript.

Last, but not least, warm thanks to my "support crew" – my family and my partner Kristen Bjørndal-Riis who believed in me, and to my hosts in Prague, Libuše and René Pavlík for their hospitality and friendship. Without those many enjoyable moments of beer drinking and chatting with friends in Prague (especially at the "Lůza net") and in Oslo along the way, my life would have been much more boring. Special thanks go to Sindre Viken for his impertinent e-mails from the edge of the civilized world. They cheered my days up.

All translations from Czech, Slovak, German and Norwegian in the text are my own, unless otherwise noted.

Oslo, October 1998  
*Elisabeth Bakke*

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## *A short note on names*

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In English-speaking countries, it is common to Anglicize the names of persons and places. This is not a tradition I am very fond of. I have thus tried to use the native names of people, at least where persons of Czech, Slovak, German and Magyar origins are concerned. A special problem arises when the Czech and Slovak spellings differ. As a rule I have used the Czech spelling of the names of people from Czech history and the Slovak spelling for people from Slovak history. Thus, the Czech king Karel IV is referred to as Karel, and not as Karol (Slovak), Karl (German), or Charles.

There are some cases that defy this rule. The Slovak-born Czech awakener Pavel Josef Šafařík wrote his name in Czech, and I have therefore elected to use the Czech spelling, except when quoting Slovak scholars and politicians, who naturally spelled his name in the Slovak way: Pavol Jozef Šafárik. An especially tricky case concerns two of the rulers of Great Moravia, a state that united the forefathers of the Czechs and the Slovaks in the 9th century. Their names are respectively *Rostislav* and *Svatopluk* in Czech and *Rastislav* and *Svätopluk* in Slovak. Here I have opted for the Slovak spelling, except in quotations with a Czech original.

As for place names, I have used the local names, except in cases where the English form is well established, as with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Lusatia, Slovakia, Transylvania, Prague, Constance and the Danube. English names are of course also used for the various states. I have chosen to use the term Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia<sup>1</sup> to refer to those areas of present-day Ukraine that formed a part of the First Czechoslovak Republic. I have consistently used Bratislava for the present-day Slovak capital, even though Prešpurk (Czech/Slovak), Pozsony (Magyar) and Pressburg (German) have been more common historically.

In line with this general approach to the use of native names, in this work I have used the Czech/Slovak/German abbreviations of party names (set out below) that were common during the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–38).

Agr. –	Czechoslovak Agrarian Party	DCV –	German Christian-Socialist Party
BL –	German Agrarian Party	DSA –	German Social Democratic Party
ČND –	Czechoslovak National Democrats	HSL'S –	Hlinka's Slovak People's Party
ČS –	Czechoslovak (National) Socialists	KSČ –	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
ČSD –	Czechoslovak Social Democrats	Nsj. –	National Unity (from 1934)
ČSL –	Czechoslovak People's Party	Pokrok. –	Czech Progressive Party (1905–20)
ČSŽ –	Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party	SNS –	Slovak National Party

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<sup>1</sup> The Czech/Slovak names are respectively Čechy, Morava, Slezsko/Sliezsko, Lužice, Slovensko, Sedmíhradsko/ Sedmohradsko, Praha, Kostnice (German: Konstanz), Dunaj, Podkarparská Rus.

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# Introduction

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*There has been a significant amount of new literature on nations and nationalism in recent years. (...) Polemically, one might say that at the moment we have an over-production of theories and a stagnation of comparative research on the topic.*

Miroslav Hroch<sup>1</sup>

The empirical focus of this thesis is the national relations between Czechs and Slovaks during the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–38). Czechoslovakia was founded in the heyday of the principle of national self-determination. Although one of the nationally most heterogeneous successor-states of the Habsburg empire,<sup>2</sup> it was from the outset presented as the nation-state of the "Czechoslovak nation with two tribes." This notion, for which I have adopted the term *Czechoslovakism*,<sup>3</sup> remained the official doctrine throughout the First Republic, and was abandoned only reluctantly after the Munich settlement of 1938.

The Czechs and the Slovaks had lived in separate parts of Austria-Hungary before 1918 – the Czechs in Austria, the Slovaks in Hungary. While the Czechs had lost their independence gradually from 1526, the Slovaks had never had a state of their own. Both national revivals started in the late 18th century, but neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks filed demands that went beyond autonomy in a federalized Austria-Hungary until 1915. During the First World War, an exile movement with Tomáš G. Masaryk, Edvard Beneš and Milan R. Štefánik at the helm advocated the establishment of a joint Czecho-Slovak state, and managed to convince the Allies that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation and deserved their own state. This was accepted by Czech and Slovak elites once they realized that Austria-Hungary was doomed.

At the inception of the First Republic, elite relations between the Czechs and Slovaks were fairly cordial. Differences soon arose, however, and for most of the 20 years the First Republic lasted, Slovak autonomists were pitted against Czechoslovak centralists. As these labels suggest, the identity struggle between proponents and opponents of Czechoslovakism was closely linked to a dispute over the political-administrative organization and distribution of power. The federalization of Czechoslovakia following the Munich settlement thus represented a double victory for Slovak autonomists, marking the end of Czechoslovakism.

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<sup>1</sup> Miroslav Hroch: From national movement to the fully-formed nation, in: *New Left review* 198/April 1993:3-4.

<sup>2</sup> This was also an effect of the fact that historical and strategic considerations were as important as national principles in determining the state borders. According to the Czechoslovak census of 1921, there were 13.4 million Czechoslovak citizens. Of these, Czechs and Slovaks together comprised 65.5 percent, Germans 23.4 percent, Magyars 5.6 percent, Ruthenians 3.5 percent, Jews 1.4 percent, Poles 0.6 percent and "others" 0.2 percent. The largest among "others" were Rumanians (13,974 persons), Gypsies (8,446) and Yugoslavs (2,108). See *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I, (1924:60, 66).

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. Josef Tomeš: *Slovník k politickým dějinám Československa 1918–1992* (1994:17).

Linguistically and culturally, the Czechs and Slovaks were close enough that the Czechoslovak nation project conceivably might work. The primary objective of this thesis has been to explain why it did *not*, and why the level of conflict rose instead. The problem formulation is thus dual: (1) *What was the basis for the increased national conflict between Czechs and Slovaks during the First Republic?* (2) *Why did the Czechoslovak nation project fail?* These questions are partly overlapping. On the one hand, the chances that an overarching nation project will succeed may be expected to be inversely related to the conflict level. On the other hand, an attempt to advance an overarching nation project like this in the face of strong opposition from one of the target groups may be expected to exacerbate national conflict.

In order to answer the first question, I have analyzed the national complaints and demands that were voiced in debates and interpellations in the Parliament. This approach was based on the assumption that in a democracy, the most important national conflicts will be articulated politically. An interesting question is whether government policies contributed directly or indirectly to the increased national conflict between Czechs and Slovaks. If it did, we need to ask what the government could have done differently, and under what restraints it operated.

In order to answer the second question, I have in addition analyzed Czechoslovakism qua ideology – with special focus on its actual dispersal and the content of the ideology. First, if Czechoslovakism was not advocated consistently, this could be part of the reason why it failed. I have thus tried to establish to what extent it *was* advocated. Second, there may be elements in the ideology that worked against it. In order to identify such controversial points, it has been necessary to go into the *scholarly* debate about Czechoslovakism in some detail.

A secondary objective has been to shed light on what motivated the leading politicians on either side, with special focus on why consecutive Czechoslovak governments kept insisting on a unitary Czechoslovak nation and state, long after it was clear that this had failed. Here it has been necessary to go into the *political* debate about Czechoslovakism.

In terms of theory, this thesis draws on two partly overlapping theory traditions: Theories of nations and nationalism, and typologies of national conflict regulation. Theories of nations and nationalism tend to be oriented towards explaining causally why and how nations and nationalism originated in the past, while scholars who focus on national conflict regulation tend to be oriented more towards policy implications in contemporary multi-national states. My ambition has not been to add another theory, but rather to combine existing theories in order to shed light on an empirical material. The main theoretical contribution is the development of a framework to aid the analysis of national conflict in multi-national states, through an elaboration of the nationality policy concept. A nationality policy is defined as a *multi-dimensional concept, involving consciously designed policies at a symbolic level and a practical level within the political, the cultural and the economic domains*. By relating common government policies to common demands made on behalf of national groups, this nationality policy framework yields a theoretical grid within which national demands and policies can be said to vary. At the same time, it provides a point of departure for developing explanations to why a certain nationality policy succeeded or failed.

The result of the analysis is admittedly a rather bulky narrative – some might say too bulky. First, the topic is in itself extensive, and I could easily have doubled the length of this presentation. Second, it has been my aim to give as complete and cohesive a picture as possible, both of the dispute about national identity between Czechoslovakists and Slovak autonomists and of the struggle about cultural rights, political power and economic redistribution. I have sought to document what the national conflicts were all about, how they were related and what the government did in order to alleviate them. Third, I have wanted to give a "thick" description, in terms of providing the necessary historical context, and in terms of conveying some of the flavor and texture of the actual disputes.

Although the main objective of this thesis is empirical, there are also some interesting theoretical implications. First, the thesis goes right into one of the most crucial disputes in the theoretical debate about nations and nationalism: Whether nations can be purposefully constructed. Official Czechoslovakism is a clear example of an attempt at forging a new overarching national identity. An analysis of why it failed may yield new insight into the conditions for success and failure in the attempted "construction" of national identity.

Second, this thesis seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge about what causes national conflict, through the analysis of the national demands made on behalf of the Slovak nation. An interesting point is to what extent such demands or complaints were directly associated with what Hroch calls *nationally relevant conflicts*, which occur when national divides coincide with some other conflict of interest.<sup>4</sup> This is also a question of to what extent national sentiment is susceptible to manipulation.

### ***Delimitation***

It goes without saying that all aspects of the national relations between Czechs and Slovaks during the First Republic could not be included, even in this bulky narrative. I have chosen to exclude from the analysis national minorities as well as foreign policy considerations and international events. My focus will be on elite relations between Czechs and Slovaks. There are partly practical, partly theoretical reasons for this. The focus on national relations between Czechs and Slovaks and the problem formulation on the previous page confines the study theoretically. A practical consideration was that the available time and financial resources were limited. In addition, I encountered problems with the sources.

My main reason for excluding the national minorities is that they were never meant to be a part of the Czechoslovak nation project; indeed, in the case of the Germans and Magyars, they were even presented as the enemies of the "Czechoslovak" state-nation. German and Magyar national demands and complaints will thus be mentioned only to the extent that they are relevant to Czecho-Slovak relations. Likewise, foreign policy considerations and international events are generally left out, unless they have a direct bearing on these relations.

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<sup>4</sup> Miroslav Hroch: *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe* (1985:185).

This also means that although the Munich settlement of September 30th 1938 was obviously an important precondition for the federalization of Czechoslovakia, the event in itself and the background for it are of minor interest in our context.<sup>5</sup>

More importantly, the study is confined to national relations at the *elite* level. The elite in question was mainly a *political* elite (Cabinet members and members of Parliament), but also to some degree an intellectual elite. With respect to the Parliament, I have put main emphasis on the Chamber of Deputies, since this is where the real power lay. In the 20 years of the First Republic, there is not one example of ministers being recruited among the senators, according to Dušan Uhlíř.<sup>6</sup> The difference in power and importance is also reflected in the sheer volume of the stenographic notes of the two chambers.

My original plan was to find out to what extent the Czechoslovak nation project was a success also at the *mass* level, and conversely, whether the level of conflict increased among ordinary people. Jiří Musil suggests that the degree of integration at mass level can be investigated by looking at the number of intermarriages, migration of Czechs to Slovakia and vice versa, the number of Czech and Slovak students studying outside their home region, tourism, the volume of cultural contacts and the mutual knowledge of language, culture and history.<sup>7</sup>

Of Musil's suggestions, the number of intermarriages would probably be the most reliable measure. Several scholars have argued that intermarriage is a sign of social nearness – cf. Mitchell's scale of social nearness or social distance, where willingness to allow someone into the family through marriage signals maximum social nearness. Large-scale intermarriage across the former ethnic boundaries is also the ultimate proof of successful assimilation in McGarry/O'Leary's scheme.<sup>8</sup> If the number of intermarriages between Czechs and Slovaks were higher than e.g. between Czechs and Germans or Slovaks and Magyars, and increasing, this would at least suggest that integration was taking place.

Here a problem arises. Most statistical data from the inter-war period, including statistics of Czecho-Slovak intermarriages, are obscured by the fact that due to Official Czechoslovakism, Czechs and Slovaks were habitually presented as one nation in statistics pertaining to nationality. This also means that the progress of Czechoslovakism in terms of how many declared "Czechoslovak" nationality in the population censuses cannot be measured.

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<sup>5</sup> Through the Munich settlement Czechoslovakia lost the German inhabited border areas to Nazi Germany, and parts of Těšín to Poland. In the Vienna award of November 1938, Czechoslovakia lost the Magyar-inhabited southern rim of Slovakia to Hungary. See e.g. map (and text) in Paul Robert Magocsi: *Historical atlas of East Central Europe* (1993:132). On Czechoslovak foreign policies, see e.g. Antonín Klimek and Eduard Kubů: *Československá zahraniční politika 1918–1938* (1995); Igor Lukes: *Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler. The diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s* (1996).

<sup>6</sup> Dušan Uhlíř: *Republikánská strana venkovského a maloroľnického lidu 1918–1938* (1988:142–43). See also Oskar Krejčí: *Kniha o volbách* (1994:134); Joseph Rothschild: *East Central Europe between the two world wars* (1992:93).

<sup>7</sup> See Jiří Musil: *The end of Czechoslovakia* (1995:89).

<sup>8</sup> Mitchell referred in Thomas Hylland Eriksen: *Ethnicity and nationalism*, (1993:25); John McGarry/Brendan O'Leary: *The politics of ethnic conflict regulation*, (1993:17).

As for Musil's other suggestions, an increasing exchange of students, tourists and workers would not necessarily mean that a Czechoslovak nation was coming into being. Given unequal work and study opportunities between regions, it could rather be expected that people would have to move outside their own region to work or study. Internal migration data are available only for the population census years 1921 and 1930, and employment data for Czechs working in Slovakia and Slovaks in the Czech lands were hard to come by. The only such data I have found are from two articles in the statistical journal *Československý Statistický Obzor* in the 1930s.<sup>9</sup> As for cultural contacts and knowledge of language, culture and history, statistics are entirely lacking. Here the situation can be assessed only indirectly. Insufficient data are thus the most important reason for my decision not to focus on mass relations.

### ***Outline of the theoretical approach***

According to Craig Calhoun, the term "theory" is used in three different ways by social scientists; theory as an orderly system of tested propositions; theory as logically integrated causal explanation; and theory as theoretical perspective – approaches to solving problems and developing explanations rather than the solutions and explanations themselves.<sup>10</sup> My theoretical approach is theory in the third sense of the word, meaning that it is as much a way "of thinking about the empirical world" as a way of explaining what is going on. In this perspective, theories are seen as instruments of understanding rather than reproductions or recreations of reality. Theories are not "true" or "false", but more useful or less useful; good theories help us to structure our knowledge about the world in meaningful ways.

The national conflict level in multi-national states is in my view the outcome of four factors: The existence of national "we-groups"; the actual differences between them in political power, social position and cultural opportunities; how these differences are perceived and presented in terms of national demands on behalf of the various national groups; and how these demands are met by the government in terms of a nationality policy. The former two are seen as preconditions of national conflict, while the dynamics between the two latter are seen as crucial for the outcome. This is also where the main emphasis of this study lies.

National demands are based on the *perception* of a problem and the call for *solutions* to the problem. Demands are made on behalf of the nation by a group of people claiming to represent it, and are directed against the government. An asymmetric power relation is thus acknowledged. National demands vary in terms of scope and content. They are principally of two different kinds: *symbolic* demands (mostly) related to recognition of national existence, and *practical* demands related to the actual situation of the members of the nation. The difference is not always clear-cut. Within the group of practical demands, there are cultural, political and economical demands.

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<sup>9</sup> Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:183–90), Pavol Horváth: Slováci v Českých zemiach, in the same journal (1938:223–26). I will return to these figures in a later chapter.

<sup>10</sup> Craig Calhoun: *Critical social theory*, (1996:5–6).



Governments relate to these demands through a *nationality policy*, by accommodating or rejecting them. In addition, governments often have an agenda of their own, aims meant to be fulfilled by the nationality policy – as in this case, arguably, the creation of a new national identity. Nationality policies are then more or less efficient means to an end, whether the aim is to pacify a national movement or to form a new nation.

This approach to the study of national conflict rests on certain basic assumptions. First, there is an assumption about the nature of national identity. Identity requires (1) that the members of the group have something in common, that there are *important others* who do not share this feature, who can provide a contrast to the we-group, and (2) that the members of the group recognize each other as belonging to the group, and feel themselves to be a group. This also means that national identity has more to do with feelings, a sense of community with those who are in a deep sense "like us", than with any rational selection of means to an end. National identity thus has a clearly expressive side, and this is also reflected in the national demands.

Second, it is assumed that different national identity is not in itself enough to cause conflict. If a state contains more than one national group, this will not automatically lead to national conflict. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient, precondition for conflict. Assuming the opposite would mean that all multi-national states are doomed to disintegrate sooner or later, and that only nation-states are stable. A third, related, assumption is that actual differences in power and access to goods and values are in fact important in order to understand why national conflict occur, which implies a certain materialist bias. However, it is *not* assumed that ideas or identities are unimportant, or that national conflict can be reduced to differences in material interests, the way some Marxists seem to think. What *is* assumed is that differences in national identity must to a certain extent correspond to differences in power or access to goods and values in order to cause conflict.

A fourth assumption is that inequality between national groups is deemed illegitimate by the members of the less-favored national group, which means that inequalities become objects of complaints directed against the government of the multi-national state. This also implies that the *perception* of inequality is just as important as the realities. A corollary is that inequalities deemed legitimate by those concerned do not generate conflicts. In feudal society, inequality was seen as instituted by God, and thus tolerable. In a society of (presumably) equal citizens, this is no longer the case. The notion of equality has become an inherent part of the nation idea – in terms of a world of equal nations as well as a community of equal co-nationals.

A fifth assumption is that people who get what they want (national demands are accommodated), become satisfied, which means that national demands that are met disappear from the agenda. Conversely, it is assumed that the failure to meet demands will cause dissatisfaction, which tend to raise the conflict level. This is not entirely unproblematic – national demands tend to escalate, from modest, cultural claims to far-reaching political claims, and if a government gives in to some national demands, new ones may follow. Conversely, a repressive strategy may yield lesser demands, to the extent that some options will be deemed unrealistic or impossible. I will return to some of these problems in Chapter Four.

### ***Structure of the thesis***

The theoretical framework of the study (briefly outlined above) is presented in Part One. First some problems associated with the use of method and sources are addressed. Second, some of the central concepts, chiefly *nation* and *nationalism* are clarified. This is followed by an overview of the theoretical debate on these matters. Finally, I propose a framework for the study of national conflict in multi-national states by relating common national demands to common nationality policies. Here I distinguish between a symbolic and a practical level, and I range nationality policies from accommodating via neutral to repressive strategies within a cultural, an economic and a political dimension.

Part Two concentrates on the historical context. First an outline of Czech and Slovak history is given, with special emphasis on the foundation for national identity. Then follows an overview of the Czech and Slovak nation-forming process, and finally the changes in Czech and Slovak identity in the course of the national "awakening" are discussed. This historical part provides the necessary historical setting for the analysis of Czecho-Slovak relations in general during the First Republic. In addition, an outline of Czech and Slovak history, and especially the national revival, is necessary as a backdrop to the analysis of the struggle for national identity, since the interpretation of history was such a central part of it.

Part Three is the main part of this thesis. It is subdivided in six chapters. Chapter Eight is a presentation of the political and/or intellectual elite that formulated the national demands and the nationality policies. Chapter Nine and Ten focus on the struggle over national identity. Chapter Nine concentrates on documenting Official Czechoslovakism, with special emphasis on the contents and dispersal, while Chapter Ten is about the scholarly and political debate. Part of the answer to why Czechoslovakism failed will be suggested already here.

The three next chapters are centered on the dynamics between national demands (mostly on behalf of the Slovaks) and the nationality policies of the Czechoslovak government on a more practical level – concerning cultural rights, economic redistribution and political power. Chapters Eleven and Twelve address nationally relevant conflicts within the cultural and economic dimensions that may have acted to exacerbate national conflict between Czechs and Slovaks, and what the government did to alleviate them. One point of departure for these chapters is the demands and complaints filed on behalf of the Slovak nation (and to a much lesser extent the Czech) in the Parliament. Chapter Thirteen concerns the political dimension, focusing on the admittedly very unequal tug-of-war between Czechoslovak centralists and Slovak autonomists over the political-administrative organization and political-territorial power distribution of the state. The main emphasis is on the autonomy proposals and the arguments in favor of and against Slovak autonomy. Combined with Chapter Ten, this Chapter also sheds light on the motives of central politicians.

Finally, in the Conclusion, I will summarize the results, return to the overarching questions that were presented on page 2, and discuss some theoretical implications of the findings of this thesis.

PART ONE  

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THEORETICAL APPROACH



## *Introduction*

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*In this Alice-in-Wonderland world in which nation usually means state, in which nation-state usually means multinational state, in which nationalism usually means loyalty to the state (...) it should come as no surprise that the nature of nationalism remains essentially unprobed.*

**Walker Connor**<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of Part One is to serve as a theoretical backdrop for analyzing why the Czechoslovak nation project failed and why the level of national conflict increased during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The primary objective is to place the thesis into a theoretical context and to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis. In addition, I will address some problems related to the research process, especially the choice of sources and use of method. This is done in Chapter One.

A major obstacle to understanding problems related to nations and nationalism is the conceptual chaos surrounding these phenomena, amply illustrated by the quotation above. In order to avoid misunderstandings, any scholar should make clear what he or she means by "nation" or "nationalism." The former is by and large the easier task, because some consensus has been reached on what it means to be a nation. The conception of "nationalism", on the other hand, tends to be intertwined with theories of how and why nations and nationalism formed. For this reason, I have decided to treat the nation concept separately in Chapter Two, while "nationalism" is covered in Chapter Three, along with a presentation of the scholarly debate about how and why nations and nationalism formed. As a part of this, I will also spell out my own position in relation to the main cleavages in the debate.

While Chapter Two and Three concentrate on what and why, Chapter Four addresses the consequences: If there is more than one national group within a single state, national conflicts are likely to arise, because national and other divides tend to coincide. Such (perceived) inequalities become the object of national demands directed against the government. On the other hand, governments have policies that are more or less explicitly designed to influence the national question, what I have termed a *nationality policy*. With a few notable exceptions, recent scholarship in this field has been dominated by historians, anthropologists and sociologists. While the political aspect is generally included, a more systematic treatment of the relationship between government policies and national sentiment/national movements is still wanting. The object of Chapter Four is to provide a theoretical framework for the study of this relationship, including an elaboration of possible nationality policy strategies and a discussion of possible restraints on the choice of strategy and of the conditions for success.

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<sup>1</sup> Connor: *Ethnonationalism*, (1994:111-12).

# *One*

## *On sources and method*

*It does not follow that, because interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no interpretation is wholly objective, one interpretation is as good as another, and the facts of history are in principle not amenable to objective interpretation.*

**E.H. Carr<sup>1</sup>**

The object of this chapter is to discuss some problems related to the research process, especially the choice of sources and use of method. Inevitably, some questions involving philosophy of science will be touched on, but I will try to keep this at a minimum. I will first briefly discuss the distinction between history and social sciences, and between qualitative and quantitative methods. Since my sources are mostly of a historical, qualitative kind, much of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the collection and interpretation of sources.

Historians often distinguish between history as an *ideographical* discipline, as opposed to the *generalizing* social sciences. This refers to the notion that history is occupied with explaining singular cases or processes in the past, "das einmalige", while social sciences aim at establishing general theories or even "laws." This dichotomy is, however, a false one. First, the degree of theoretical orientation varies between the social sciences and between individual scholars within each of the social sciences, and the notion of "laws" is rather controversial e.g. in sociology and political science. Second, history is far from theory-free: there is much implicit theory in most historical accounts. As soon as history moves beyond mere description to narratives or explanations, general theories are invoked. The trend in history is for accounts to become more problem-oriented. Such accounts are often quite analytical, yet even source-oriented accounts contain some general theoretical assumptions.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, history is not alone in concentrating on the singular, but, while the range of methods available to the historian is logically restricted by the fact that past events already happened, social scientists studying the present can also collect their own data. According to Robert K. Yin, case studies add two sources of evidence to the historian's repertoire: direct observation and systematic interviewing.<sup>3</sup> When we are studying the past, case studies have much in common with the problem-oriented historical account. The most striking difference left is perhaps the literary style: the narrative form of history.

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<sup>1</sup> E.H. Carr: *What is history?* (1990:27).

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Ottar Dahl: *Problemer i historiens teori* (1986), Chapter 1; John Tosh: *The pursuit of history* (1996), Chapters 7 and 8. The distinction between source-oriented and problem-oriented approaches is made by Tosh (page 54).

<sup>3</sup> Yin: *Case study research. Design and methods* (1991:19). Yet, historians also increasingly use interviews as a supplementary source of evidence when they study our near past. See Tosh (1996), Chapter 10.

This thesis is written in a *social science* tradition, in the sense that the theoretical assumptions are made explicit. In addition to the analysis of a specific historical process, a secondary aim is to contribute to the body of general knowledge about national identity and national conflict. At the same time, however, many of the *methods* normally used by the social sciences to gather information (such as interview techniques, surveys, observation) are out of the question, simply because the historical period under scrutiny is long gone, as are most of the people that lived through it as adults. The available sources are thus of a historical nature, and this in turn affects the choice of methods in the processing of data.

The advantage of using material that already exists is that the data are "natural" in that they are not artifacts of the research process, although their selection and interpretation will to a certain extent be affected by the focus and research questions. A disadvantage is that some of the data that we would like to have simply do not exist.

### ***Qualitative and quantitative method***

Broadly speaking, quantitative method is oriented towards frequencies and correlation, while qualitative method is oriented towards meaning and interpretation. In the social sciences, the choice of method has at times been a matter of principle: It used to be considered more "scientific" to count than to analyze meaning, and qualitative methods were seen as less objective than quantitative ones. In practice, there will always be a qualitative element in research: before you can count something, you have to decide what to count and how to categorize what you are counting. On the other hand, also qualitative techniques involve implicit counting: when we record the tendency of a text, we do so by paying attention to meaningful elements that keep recurring.

The struggle between these two camps now seems to be more or less over, and it is becoming increasingly common to combine methods. Today, qualitative and quantitative methods are acknowledged as the extremes of a scale, rather than dichotomies. The choice of method then becomes a strategic matter rather than a matter of principle. Combination of methods is often called "triangulation", and is also used as a method of validation.<sup>4</sup>

Historians have traditionally been more oriented towards qualitative than quantitative techniques. This follows partly from the nature of the historical sources: the most important sources of historical knowledge are symbolic sources (mostly texts) produced in order to convey meaning. Systematic statistics are in fact a relatively modern phenomenon,<sup>5</sup> and even for modern periods the statistics needed are not always available. The narrative form traditionally employed by historians also predisposes for qualitative approaches.

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<sup>4</sup> See Sigmund Grønmo: Forholdet mellom kvantitativ og kvalitativ metode, in: Holter, Harriet/Kalleberg, Ragnvald: *Kvalitative metoder i samfunnsforskningen* (1982: 94–95); David Silverman: *Interpreting qualitative method*, (1995: pp. 156 ff.).

<sup>5</sup> The modern census was invented in Scandinavia in the mid-18th century. See Tosh (1996:188).

### ***On the sources and their collection***

Tosh makes a useful distinction between history as what actually happened in the past, and history as the representation of that past in the work of historians.<sup>6</sup> Such historical knowledge is principally restricted in two ways. On the one hand, the character of the sources will be influenced by contemporary ideas as to what is important, and it is the views of the literate strata and upper classes that are recorded. On the other hand, there is a limited number of preserved sources, and what actually gets preserved, is accidental. A lot of material once produced has been lost for various reasons, and many things were simply never recorded.

The main problem of historical research is thus first, to find the available relevant material, the sources that can be used to answer our research questions. Sometimes such sources do not exist, and we have to rephrase our questions. More often the range of potential sources exhausts our human and material means. In this case it becomes difficult to meet the requirement of *completeness*: i.e. to use all available data that may help to answer the questions that have been raised. A selection of sources is nearly always necessary, and the requirement then becomes *adequate representation* of the types of sources and tendencies.<sup>7</sup>

The lack of relevant data concerning the national relations between Czechs and Slovaks at mass level has already been mentioned. On the whole, however, the problem was the opposite, and a selection had to be made. One option was to narrow down the focus, either by concentrating on the struggle over national identity, or by confining the study to practical nationality policies and national demands. Either choice would have allowed me to go deeper into that particular problem. A third possibility was to sample the relevant sources rather than seeking full coverage, while keeping the broader focus. This is what I decided on in the end.

Material was collected during several concentrated stays in Prague in the period 1994–97, combined with brief visits to Bratislava. I had feared that much of the printed material from the period had been destroyed during communism, but this turned out to be unfounded. I collected a broad range of material, from memoirs via newspaper articles, political programs, various school textbooks, and secondary literature to statistics. I went systematically through the population censuses and the statistical reports at the Bureau of Statistics, and I studied interpellations and stenographic records in the Parliament Library. I also visited several antiquarian bookstores and other bookstores several times.

Written historical sources may be categorized in various ways. One common divide is between primary sources (original, contemporary sources) and secondary literature (accounts based on original sources or other secondary literature). The distinction may not be as clear-cut as it appears. First, terms like *original* and *contemporary* are open to interpretation: How near in time and place must a source be in order to be considered original? Historians in any case tend to prefer the sources that are closest in time and place to the events in question.

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<sup>6</sup> Tosh (1996:vi).

<sup>7</sup> See Ottar Dahl: *Grunntrekk i historieforskningens metode* (1991), Chapter 4.



Second, and more important in this case, is that a text may be defined as a primary or secondary source depending on the use. A textbook in history would be a secondary source if I were interested in the historical events, but a primary source if I wanted to study how Czech and Slovak history was presented to the school children in terms of what identity was conveyed. For my purposes, a majority of the sources used in Part Three are primary sources, while the historical background part (Part Two) is based almost entirely on secondary literature.

Another common divide is between published and unpublished sources (Tosh) or, in Dahl's terminology, public and confidential sources. Finally, sources can be categorized according to author, with a distinction often being drawn between sources produced by governments and sources produced by corporations, associations or private individuals. Dahl here distinguishes between personal and institutional sources, the latter category covering governmental as well as non-governmental institutional sources.<sup>8</sup> Within institutional sources, documentary sources represent a special category; sources that originated under controlled circumstances.

Some of my sources are documentary, like the Constitution of 1920 and various laws. Nearly all my sources are published. Many are institutional, or in other words "official", meaning that they were meant for the public and that they originated within an institutional framework. Examples here are political programs, declarations, decisions, school textbooks and stenographic reports of the sessions of the Parliament. Some are personal, written by some person on behalf of himself and meant for the public – mainly memoirs, articles and the like. My material contains little of what Dahl refers to as confidential sources (diaries, personal letters, internal documents and secret reports). These are especially well suited to provide insight into personal motives, hidden plans, spontaneous attitudes, while public sources provide better information on common attitudes and perceptions – which is mostly what I am after.<sup>9</sup> A final distinction (between narrative sources and remnants) will be treated shortly.

At the top of the source hierarchy we find "sources which arise directly from everyday business or social intercourse, leaving open the task of interpretation", according to Tosh.<sup>10</sup> Contemporary sources trying to interpret events (newspapers, books, etc.) may on the other hand offer valuable insight into mentalities, attitudes and political and historical assumptions.

One possible problem related to completeness and adequate representation is *national bias*. It might be argued that since most of the material was collected in Prague, a Czech bias is a potential risk. While aware of this danger (which is why I went to Bratislava in order to supplement my data), I feel that it should not be overestimated. Prague was the capital of Czechoslovakia, so all official publications from the First Republic were collected in Prague and are still available there. The National Library, the Parliamentary Library and the Bureau of Statistics were state-wide, Czechoslovak institutions, not just Czech ones.

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<sup>8</sup> Tosh (1996:34); Dahl (1991:44).

<sup>9</sup> See Dahl (1991:67).

<sup>10</sup> Tosh (1996:34). In a sense any text contains interpretation – the author's interpretation of himself and his social world.

There is, however, a second, more serious, problem: although the National Library was supposed to receive a copy of everything that was published, it is not very likely that they did receive everything, or indeed that they still have it. Volumes simply disappeared during communism – not so much because they were intentionally destroyed, but because librarians and others removed volumes or cards from the catalogues when books became illegal. Several times I ordered books that proved to be missing. Moreover, the process of feeding catalogue information into computers has only begun, which means that searching through the library is a tedious job of leafing through individual catalogue cards by hand. I may have missed a few.

A third problem that affects the requirement of completeness as well as adequate representation is related to the decision to leave out the major Czech and Slovak newspapers. Originally I had thought to investigate how the national question was treated in the major Czech and Slovak newspapers during the period. I soon realized that this would require more time and funding than I had. An exception has been made in the case of *Slovák*, the newspaper of the major Slovak nationalist opposition party of the First Republic, Hlinka's Slovak People's Party. Judging from the treatment of the national question in this paper, including the references to other (Czech) newspapers, my guess would be that the tone was somewhat sharper in the press than in the Parliament. On the other hand, my impression is clearly that the main complaints and demands *were* voiced in the Parliament, and that the difference is mainly one of style and rhetoric. Besides, my main focus is on the dynamics between national demands and nationality policies at the elite level, and for this purpose, the stenographic reports of the meetings are obviously a better source. They are closer to the events in time and place; moreover, they are sources that originated – to repeat the words of Tosh – "directly from everyday business or social intercourse, leaving open the task of interpretation", which also places them higher in the source hierarchy than newspapers.

Furthermore, I decided to go beyond the political elite and the political organs in the analysis of official Czechoslovakism and the struggle over national identity, in order to get a better grip of the arguments used. In addition to the political elite, a university-educated elite (an intelligentsia) helped formulate the arguments in favor of a Czechoslovak, respectively Slovak nation. This is justifiable also for the reason that it is not always easy to distinguish between this intelligentsia and the political elite, since people tended to change hats, and the intelligentsia was heavily represented among the political elite throughout the entire period.

The potential problems related to the selection of parliamentary documentation are mostly a matter of adequate representation. The stenographic reports of the meetings to be found in the Parliamentary Library are complete, with one small exception: The Law of the protection of the republic of 1923 with amendments of 1933 and 1934 made the stenographic reports subject to censorship. Since brackets [,] are added where text has been stricken, it is possible to see where something has been removed. Before 1933, this affected only the speeches of members of the Communist Party. After this, I have registered one or two occasions where it was also applied to speakers of the Slovak People's Party. This does not seem to have been very common, and I thus judge the effect to have been minor.

The sheer amount of documentation made it quite impossible to go through everything. The question then becomes to what extent the registers are accurate, and whether the criteria of categorization changed from one period to the next in a way that may have affected the sample. I have no reason to believe the latter to be the case. I feel reasonably safe that I have found most of the parliamentary interpellations involving national demands or complaints on behalf of the Slovaks (and Czechs: they were not many), as well as most of the replies. A possible exception is interpellations pertaining to economic demands. I have not checked all entries on "economy", and to the extent that the national dimension of economy was not reflected in the register, I may not have found them. On the other hand, since I have also read a number of parliamentary debates on the state budgets, it seems likely that any missing topics have been covered this way. I thus do not consider the risk of inadequate representation of economic demands to be great.

There were 17 governments during the period, with new state budgets every year. I have read all the 13 debates following the inauguration of a new government.<sup>11</sup> The budget debates take up hundreds of pages, and it has not been possible to go through every word. I have therefore aimed for a representative sample, in terms of time periods as well as the political and national colors of the governments, mainly in order to get an impression of how the central Czech and Slovak politicians argued around autonomy, national identity, and economy.

Part of my analysis of official Czechoslovakism is based on school textbooks in history. Such books are institutional products and can be expected to reflect the officially sanctioned view rather than the personal views of the authors. This is supported by the fact that they had to be authorized by the Ministry of Education and Public Enlightenment. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find an overview of the books actually used during the period. In order to be on the safe side, I have tried to sample books written by Czech and Slovak authors at various points of time, books meant for the primary school as well as for the secondary school, and authorized as well as non-authorized books.

### ***Critical approach to sources***

A second main problem of historical research, besides finding relevant material, is mastery of the sources. This ideal is sought through a critical approach to the sources. Tosh distinguishes between external and internal source criticism. External criticism refers to the evaluation of a document in order to test its *authenticity*: Is the information concerning the author, the place and the time it was written correct? Internal criticism concerns the contents of the document; it involves both an *interpretation* of the source, linguistically and in terms of historical context, and also an evaluation in terms of how *reliable* or *credible* the source is.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> There were not always debates following the inauguration of a new government, especially when the change of government only was a reshuffle of ministers. This applies to all three Hodža governments (two in 1935 and in 1937). Nor was there any debate following the inauguration of the second caretaker government of Jan Černý in 1926.

<sup>12</sup> See Tosh (1996: pp. 57 ff.), Dahl (1991:52).

Dahl distinguishes between four steps in this process: source observation, determination of origin, interpretation of content and determination of usefulness (evaluation of credibility, truth content and relevance). The former two correspond to Tosh's external criticism, the latter two to his internal criticism. Source criticism may thus be seen as a way to determine whether we can rely on the available sources, and whether they can be used to answer our research questions. The distinction between narrative sources and remnants is important. All written sources can be used as *remnants* of the past, to say something about the author or the conditions under which they originated – which means utilizing the *performative* aspect. Written sources can be divided into *normative* sources (expressing feelings, attitudes, wishes and the will of the author) and *cognitive* sources (saying something about factual events). Cognitive sources oriented towards the past are the only sources that can be used as *narratives*, as accounts of factual events.<sup>13</sup> This distinction is not always clear-cut: I have, for example, used stenographic reports from the Parliamentary proceedings to document what national demands were raised and how the government responded, which involved both uses.

Credibility is especially important in the case of narrative sources. Elements in the evaluation of credibility of written, narrative sources are proximity in time and space; the author's ability, willingness and motivation to give a correct representation of what happened; the degree of control by contemporary witnesses; and consistency with other independent sources<sup>14</sup> – none of which is of course any guarantee. Sources tend to be inaccurate, incomplete and/or biased because of prejudices or personal interest. The historian's answer is to collect as many independent, well-placed, contemporary sources as possible.

In our case, it is generally no problem to determine origin or authenticity. External source criticism is thus not a major concern. As for internal criticism, I will address the question of reliability first. With the sources I have used to document national demands and nationality policies, reliability is generally high. Most of them are public and institutional sources. Some of them (such as the stenographic records of parliamentary sessions) were produced under controlled circumstances, and thus have a strong claim to accuracy. It is more than likely that the stenographic reports closely resemble what was actually said in the Parliament (apart from the exception mentioned above), and that the interpellations have been correctly reprinted.

Official statistics is an important category of *narrative* sources.<sup>15</sup> The quality of statistics will, of course, depend on the way the data have been collected, but I have no reason to believe that official statistics during the First Czechoslovak Republic were any less accurate than other such statistics. One exception is the habit of presenting Czechs and Slovaks as a Czechoslovak nation, irrespective of what people actually answered. Also other institutional sources that are used as narrative sources seem to have satisfactory credibility, unless otherwise noted.

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<sup>13</sup> Dahl (1991: pp. 39 ff.).

<sup>14</sup> See Dahl (1991: pp. 74 ff.); Tosh (1996: pp. 60 ff.).

<sup>15</sup> There is little quantification involved on my part, since I mostly refer to already existing statistics. This is also the reason why I have not discussed quantitative techniques in this chapter.

Especially when the struggle over national identity is concerned, the sources are used mostly as *remnants*. These sources were often produced for other purposes: for instance, I have used official statistics on nationality to document Czechoslovakism. This is also an example of indirect use of sources. When we use written texts to infer something about values, attitudes, perceptions, intentions – or as in this case – identities, the problem is less a matter of reliability in terms of factual events, and more a matter of establishing whether the text is a reliable account of the actual values, attitudes, perceptions, or intentions of its author(s).

There are two potential problems. One is the lack of correspondence between the text (in terms of views, intentions, feelings, perceptions, arguments), and what the author "really" meant or thought. Was he being honest, or did he have other motives? Can we take the text at face value, or should we look for the hidden meaning? The question is not an easy one. We must take as our main point of departure that people normally mean what they say: to assume that people are always deceptive would make normal social intercourse *and* research quite impossible. On the other hand, it is obvious that people sometimes are less than honest, especially about their reasons for doing things.

Another potential problem is that the message may be ambiguous and/or inconsistent, and then it becomes hard to conclude anything at all about its "real" contents. Yet, apart from reflecting a confused mind, such inconsistencies and self-contradictions can also be seen as clues that can be used to resolve the first problem, as signs of "dishonesty." The point of the text may for instance be to make something come true by stating that it already is. Governments or national movements, for instance, sought to convince the people that they were one nation. When the agitation started, the claim was not true, but then it became true as people gradually accepted the message.

### ***More on interpretation***

Another aspect of internal source criticism besides evaluation of reliability concerns the interpretation of contents. Interpretation (of text, talk and behavior) is *the* qualitative method for processing of data, included in the tool kit of history, the social sciences and the arts.<sup>16</sup> Approaches to interpretation vary considerably, however, from linguistics to history and the social sciences. In this thesis, texts are used to document a process, which means that I am concerned with the communicative and contextual functions of the text rather than the formal linguistic sides. My approach is probably closest to the historians' approach to text analysis, although I have used some elements from argument analysis,<sup>17</sup> especially in my treatment of the struggle over national identity. And, despite all variations, there is a lot of common ground between the many approaches to text interpretation or analysis.

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<sup>16</sup> See e.g. Silverman (1995); Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen: *Samfunnsvitenskapens forutsetninger* (1995), Chapter 7; Dahl (1991), Chapter 4; Tosh (1996), Chapter 6; Svennevig, Sandvik, Vagle: *Tilnærminger til tekst. Modeller for språklig tekstanalyse* (1995); Fairclough: *Critical discourse analysis* (1995).

<sup>17</sup> Those elements are taken from Svennevig et al. (1995), Chapter 4.

*Hermeneutics* has its origins in the interpretation of biblical texts. Today it refers both to a method for interpretation of meaningful phenomena and to the conditions for understanding meaning. Hermeneutics as a method of interpretation is associated with the *hermeneutic circle*, where correct interpretation is based on interpreting the part in relation to the whole, the whole in relation to the part. This means that words and sentences must be analyzed in relation to the whole text, and that the text must be analyzed in relation to the context – time, place, institutional context and the intention of the author. The point of departure is that the meaning of texts (and other communicative actions) is not intrinsic, but must be interpreted in order to be understood; moreover, on average, more than one interpretation is possible. This then raises the question of choosing the "correct" interpretation among several, and the problem becomes greater, the more ambiguous the text is.

Gilje and Grimen mention two approaches to correct interpretation.<sup>18</sup> One is text-oriented and holistic, based on consistency between the text and its constituent parts. However, there may be more than one interpretation that fits the requirement and more importantly, this approach assumes that texts are consistent, harmonious entities, which is in most cases far too strong an assumption. In fact, the inconsistencies are often interesting in themselves, as already mentioned. The other approach is actor-oriented, where correct interpretation is seen as an interpretation that corresponds to the intention of the author. Problems related to this approach are that the author's intentions can often only be ascertained through (language) acts that are in themselves in need of interpretation and that in many kinds of texts the intention of the author is not a major concern. A general problem, posed by relativism and more recently by post-modernism, is whether it is at all meaningful to speak of "correct" interpretation.

Historical method, with its emphasis on source criticism and the ambition to avoid bias, is based on the assumption that this is both meaningful *and* possible. The self-proclaimed post-modernist Keith Jenkins argues that history should not aim at "real knowledge of the past", but should be seen as "a discursive practice that enables present-minded people(s) to delve around and reorganise it appropriately to their needs." He bases his conclusion on the view that "there is no method of establishing incorrigible meanings: all facts to be meaningful need embedding in interpretive readings."<sup>19</sup> First, he argues that there is no unpositioned criterion by which the degree of bias can be judged. This is based on the premise that objective re-creation of history is not possible and that history is a series of readings, all of which are positions. In other words: The scholar is embedded in the social structure of his own society.

Second, Jenkins argues that empathy is not possible, because there is no presuppositionless interpretation of the past, and interpretations of the past are constructed in the present. This is based on the premise that the differences between past and present assumptions and ways of thinking and acting are too great to be overcome, and that the scholar is embedded in the "idea world" of his own society and time. Finally, Jenkins argues that certainty is impossible,

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<sup>18</sup> Gilje & Grimen (1995), chapter 7.

<sup>19</sup> Quotations in Jenkins: *Re-thinking history* (1994:68, 33). The following is based on Jenkins (1994: pp. 33 ff.).

because there are no "deeper" sources to draw on to get things right. Sources are mute, they speak only when called upon by the historian, and what kind of explanations the traces can be found to support will depend on how the historian organizes these traces of the past.

The last argument is valid enough, but the former two are based on a different kind of absolutism than the objectivism they challenge: that humans in general and scholars in particular are unable to understand people who are substantially different from themselves. This means that "the human will to bridge the gap between people, traditions, cultures"<sup>20</sup> is neglected. According to post-modernism, nothing is certain – except that people are unable to transcend their social positions and the horizons of their time and society. The relativist "anything goes" is ill-suited as a point of departure for research, but this does not mean that criteria for correct understanding are easy to come by. In practical research, knowledge of the context, experience and power of judgment play an important role. Interpretations can never be certain – only more or less credible or convincing, based on the evidence that is presented.

It is common to distinguish between a *linguistic interpretation*, which means translating the meaning of a text from the original language of the source (whether this is foreign, archaic or plain everyday language) into a scholarly language, and a *contextual* or *real interpretation*; which seeks to answer the question: what does it mean? Meaning can be understood in three ways: as the intention of the author, as relevance for the reader and as a message to several readers. Finally, linguistic and contextual interpretation is combined in a *reconstruction* of the meaning of the text which includes a description of content, perceptions and tendencies, and which tends to emphasize structure and continuity.<sup>21</sup>

There are challenges related to each step in this process. Linguistic interpretation is not always easy, even in the cases where the author(s) of the text and the interpreter (scholar) belong to the same time and society. Words or terms may have different meanings in various social (sub)contexts, the text may contain self-contradictory or ambiguous elements, metaphors or irony may make the meaning of the text less obvious, etc. I do not have the benefit of sharing time or society with my sources, and some additional problems follow from this.

First, there is the problem of translating from Czech to English, neither of which is my native language. I clearly stand the risk of losing some nuances, since words tend to have slightly different connotations in different languages, even when a dictionary may list them as equivalent. Furthermore, not all the concepts that are lexicalized in Czech are lexicalized in English, and vice versa. Idiomatic expressions are a particular problem.<sup>22</sup> Turning to the contextual or real interpretation, we encounter the problem of historical context. I am an outsider: do I know enough about Czechoslovak society in the inter-war era and the period

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<sup>20</sup> Calhoun (1996:91).

<sup>21</sup> See Dahl (1991: pp. 64 ff.); Tosh (1996: pp. 59 ff.); Svennevig et al. (1995), Chapter 3.

<sup>22</sup> I have tried to solve these problems by consulting various dictionaries, and when I have still had doubts, I have consulted Karen Gammelgaard, senior lecturer at the Department of East European and Oriental Studies of the University of Oslo.

preceding it to be able to get the "right" associations? This is a problem I realized at a very early stage, and it led me to take an overly long detour into Czech and Slovak history before I could make sense of the texts from the inter-war period that I was trying to interpret. I have tested my interpretations on Czech and Slovak historians, without whose kind help, my job would have been much more difficult.<sup>23</sup>

Second, the things that we take for granted may be a problem in research directed at foreign and/or past societies, because it can lead to false analogies and ethnocentrism. The question is then how "alien" this other society appears to us. There are of course various differences between Czechoslovakia in the inter-war years and Norway today – yet culturally, these differences are smaller than one might expect. Apart from the traditions that unite most Europeans,<sup>24</sup> there are clear parallels in the development of national identity and their contents in the Norwegian and Czech/Slovak cases. These parallels may enable me to understand Czech and Slovak national identity from within, although there remains of course also a risk of making false analogies.

Being an outsider can, however, also be turned into an advantage. People tend to take things in their own society for granted, and because outsiders do not take the same things for granted, they may see things that insiders are blind to – which also means that case studies of foreign societies are implicitly comparative. In addition, outsiders may have an advantage in cases where strong internal conflicts or feelings are involved. National identities *are* often taken for granted, and being a foreigner allows me to see the Czecho-Slovak conflict from outside. Put differently, there is less risk of my being embedded in the society under study. The challenge may not be so much to bracket our own ideas and thoughts, as to find the resources in our own language and experience to enable us to understand what confronts us as alien, without imposing distorting prejudices on it. Gadamer argues that we should rather "recognize the distance in time as a positive and productive possibility of understanding."<sup>25</sup>

The most obvious danger in relation to the *reconstruction* of meaning is the danger of subconscious distortion of findings. This affects the inter-subjectivity of the results and thus the validity. Such distortion may take various forms. First, theories or preconceived ideas may make us overlook elements of the text that do not fit the picture, or we may "over-interpret" elements to make them fit. When texts are used indirectly, this danger is very real. It may involve reading into the text motives, meanings, or intentions that the author(s) never meant to convey or never even had. This type of bias tends to occur when models or theories are applied too rigidly (the "tyranny" of models).

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<sup>23</sup> Thanks again to Alena Bartlová, Miroslav Hroch, Dušan Kováč, Eva Kowalská, Robert Kvaček, and Jan Rychlík.

<sup>24</sup> These are "the inheritance of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, artistic classicism and romanticism, and above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy", according to Anthony D. Smith: *National identity* (1991:174).

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Bernstein: *Beyond objectivism and relativism* (1991:140).



Another danger is that, when looking for tendencies in a sample of texts, we may be led to exaggerate the consistency of our findings. The deviations from the "typical" pattern are then overlooked, and the pattern is made to appear clearer than it actually is. How we interpret the texts we are reading at present may e.g. be affected by the texts we have already read.

A third problem, and one that according to Silverman is rather common in qualitative research, is the tendency to select field data (quotations) that are conspicuous because they are exotic, at the expense of the less dramatic, but more typical.<sup>26</sup> This is sometimes tempting. There are no simple solutions to any of these problems, other than to make sure that our conclusions can be corroborated by the text, and that our use of the text is systematic rather than anecdotal. One possible way of dealing with this in practical research is to look actively for the deviant cases, those at odds with the general tendency, and take a closer look at these in order to find out what makes them different and why. This is a suggestion Silverman makes in the case of interpretation of interview data, but it can be used also on historical sources.<sup>27</sup>

A second strategy is to use simple quantification to validate impressions formed in the course of the interpretation process.<sup>28</sup> In my case, this involved counting pages (in textbooks) and the number of times various topics with a bearing on the national question came up in interpellations and debates. Finally, in order to avoid "over-interpretation", we should also keep in mind that when people write, their message may be less than clear, their arguments inconsistent, and their choice of words impulsive. A little caution is thus warranted.

### ***Concluding remarks***

In this chapter, I have discussed some problems related to the collection and processing of data. Although this thesis has been written in the social science tradition, the methods for collection and use of sources are those of the historian, as, of course, are the problems. I have therefore addressed the kind of questions that apply to historical research, and my point of departure has been a critical approach to sources.

While the reliability of historical material concerns whether the text faithfully reports (1) what actually went on, how, where, when and by whom, (narrative sources) or (2) what the author actually meant or felt (remnants), the question of validity remains a question of correct ("fair" or "unbiased") interpretation. In this chapter I have sought to address some of the more general methodological problems. Throughout the remainder of this narrative, methodological problems will be discussed in the context in which they occur.

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<sup>26</sup> See Silverman (1995:153).

<sup>27</sup> See Silverman (1995), Chapter 7.

<sup>28</sup> See Silverman (1995:162).

# Two

## *To be reckoned among nations*

*A nation is a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors.*<sup>1</sup>

Analytically, we may distinguish between three concepts of the nation: The nation as a *political community*, more or less coterminous with a sovereign state; the nation as a *subjective community*; and the nation as a *cultural community*, with emphasis on language or other "objective" factors. Varieties of all three are in contemporary use. This ambiguity is deeply rooted in history, and indicates how the path to nationhood has been far from uniform.

Today's nation concept is far removed from the original Latin *natio* (from *nasci*, to be born), which designated groups of people that were foreign, i.e. different from the Romans by birth, race, or origin. The elusiveness of our contemporary nation concept is the result of a series of semantic changes over the centuries in different parts of Europe, from a community of origin (geographically and/or linguistically) among university students, via a community of opinion, a political, cultural and social elite, to a sovereign people, and finally a unique people.<sup>2</sup>

Historically, the criteria that must be filled in order for an entity to be reckoned among nations have varied, as have indeed the criteria for inclusion in one particular nation. Varying features of nationhood have been emphasized; among the most prominent of these have been national character (expressed through shared values, customs and traditions); a connection to a territory; a common government and common laws; shared history, religion, language and origins. The idea that people belonging to certain nations share a national character, certain features and ways of behaving that are more or less objectively given, can be dated back to the Middle Ages, and had become widely accepted in Europe by the mid 18th century.<sup>3</sup> For obvious reasons, the habit of equating nation with race largely went out of fashion after the Second World War, as did the notion of national character. It gave way to the notion of "national identity", which is perceived as subjectively *defined* rather than objectively given, *flexible* rather than unchangeable, *varying* according to context rather than permanent.

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<sup>1</sup> European saying, quoted in Robert King: *Minorities under communism* (1973:5).

<sup>2</sup> Leah Greenfeld: *Nationalism* (1992:4–9). See also Louis L. Snyder: *Encyclopedia of nationalism* (1990), Aira Kemiläinen: *Nationalism* (1964); John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith: *Nationalism* (1994); Walker Connor: *Ethnonationalism* (1994).

<sup>3</sup> Anthony D. Smith: *National identity* (1991:85–86).

Roughly speaking, there were two main paths to nationhood in Europe. One path was the familiar nationalist, where a national movement helped form, or in their own eyes, reawakened the nation. The other path was the path of the "first-born"<sup>4</sup> West European nations, where a nation was formed within the borders of an existing state. In the nationalist version, the nation was a *cultural* community, while the "first-born" nations were first and foremost *civic* nations. This distinction should, however, not be exaggerated.

Before the French Revolution, the features of *nation* in France had been a connection to a *territory* (or a land), including common laws and government, and a *national character*. In the course of the Revolution, "nation" got the additional meaning of a *whole* people and a *sovereign* people, thereby strengthening the political conception of nationhood. This also implied that nation was a community of will, not just any people living within the territory of a state.

Among the Germans, *nation* acquired ethno-cultural rather than political connotations. The attributes of the nation were *common (racial) origins* and *country*, often associated with common language, laws and customs. This idea of nationhood was much more closed and differential than the French. Aira Kemaläinen argues that the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation (as a loose confederation rather than a state), was essential in shaping the original German conception of nation as a community of descent and language. Another important factor was the zone of ethno-culturally mixed populations in Eastern Europe, where German identity was defined ethno-culturally in relation to the Slavs.<sup>5</sup> The philosophers of German Romanticism elaborated on this ethno-cultural conception of nationhood, perceiving nations as historically rooted, organic entities, regulated by natural laws rather than human will, and imbued with a specific, unique spirit, a *Volksgeist*. The role of the state was to provide shelter for this cultural organism, whose true spirit found expression through the native language.<sup>6</sup>

### ***A nation is a state ...***

None of the conventional meanings of *nation* are "wrong." On the other hand, one of them should be avoided for the sake of clarity: namely, the all-too-common equation of the word "nation" with *state* (or also nation-state) – cf. the United Nations. In this meaning "nationality" equals "citizenship", with no questions asked about the subjective identity or cultural attributes of the population. For our purposes, a definition along these lines would be unsatisfactory and confusing, chiefly because the lack of congruence between nation and state is often a major point of contention for national movements: The classic nationalist goal is to secure "a state of its own" for the nation. Hence, for the study of nationalism, the nation cannot be *any* group of people living within an existing state framework.

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<sup>4</sup> The term was coined by Leah Greenfeld (1992).

<sup>5</sup> See Kemiläinen (1964:39) and Rogers Brubaker: *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany* (1992:5–7).

<sup>6</sup> A different German tradition evolved in Prussia, where the meaning of *nation* came to be understood more along (French) political lines. See Brubaker (1992: pp. 9 ff.) for more on this.

The rest of this discussion will focus on two other rivaling nation concepts. These may conveniently be labeled *voluntarist* and *cultural* nation concepts, since they focus, respectively, on voluntary adherence and on certain shared objective features, such as language, religion, ethnicity and shared history. These are of course not mutually exclusive notions.

### ***... is a "daily plebiscite" ...***

In a lecture held at the Sorbonne in 1882, which appeared in print the same year under the title *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, the French historian Ernest Renan spoke of the nation as "a daily plebiscite" (*un plébiscite de tous les jours*) – perhaps one of the most quoted phrases in the literature on nationalism even today. Renan regarded a nation as a spiritual human community, endowed with a past, but also with a desire to uphold it through a day-to-day vote of confidence. According to Renan, not only does the nation share common memories, it also shares an amnesia, a collective forgetfulness that enables the members to forget past differences, while concentrating on the things that link them together.

Renan's concept of the nation owes much to Rousseau, and conveys a close relationship between the nation idea and the idea of rule by the sovereign people. The nation, according to Rousseau, *was* the sovereign people. Yet, Rousseau thought of a *society whose members shared common customs* as the best foundation for a political society: The people that are fit for legislation – the people that should be sovereign – should already be "united by some common bond of origin, interest or convention."<sup>7</sup> Here the voluntary aspect becomes blurred.

The nation in Renan's scheme was an entity united by the same political institutions, the same rules and regulations, the same rights and obligations, which made membership in the nation more a matter of voluntary choice than a matter of birth or blood. His insistence that it would be wrong to attribute to nations racial, religious, linguistic, or physiographical connotations must be seen in light of the French experience, what the French were and what they were not at that time. They were certainly not a homogeneous cultural community. The transition from peasants to Frenchmen was not completed until the early 20th century, according to a much-quoted study by Eugen Weber.<sup>8</sup> Later on "French-ness" acquired an additional cultural meaning, including food, beverage, language, customs and traditions. This culturally French identity permeated the masses only after compulsory education was introduced during the 1880s.<sup>9</sup> The notion of an ancestry of blood never entered the French national idea; the French nation was thus *inclusive* where the German was *exclusive*.

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<sup>7</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *The social contract* (1762), quoted in Anthony H. Birch: *Nationalism and national integration* (1989:15).

<sup>8</sup> Eugen Weber: *Peasants into Frenchmen* (1976), referred in Connor (1994); Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.): *Becoming national* (1996:7).

<sup>9</sup> Douglas Johnson: The making of the French nation, in: Mikuláš Teich/Roy Porter (eds): *The national question in Europe in historical context* (1993:52).

The merit of a voluntarist nation concept is the idea of an *identity* inherent in it – and, even more important, an identity that may to a certain extent be *chosen*. A nation is not a fixed entity that we are born into, but a community of people with a mutual feeling of belonging together. The existence of a nation presupposes a subjective identity, which is *acquired*; hence, nations are capable of change, incorporating new members, expanding and declining. A nation concept like this allows for the fact that at times there may be groups of people with dual or no distinct feeling of national identity at all. It also allows for the fact that people occasionally change national denomination, if not in the course of one generation, at least in two or three. This is especially important for understanding the *processes* that led to the formation of nations, and in accounting for the fact that nations have a beginning, and possibly also an end.

Second, a voluntarist nation concept includes only those who are aware of belonging to the nation. This enables us to distinguish between a situation where nobody feels that they belong together in a national community, a situation where some feel that they belong together and a situation where all have this feeling. This allows us to distinguish between *stages* in the evolution of national awareness, and to describe nation forming as a gradual process. Nations exist not by virtue of some common objective feature, like skin color, language, or religion, but by virtue of our identification with people that are *like us*: they are in the famous phrase of Benedict Anderson "imagined communities."<sup>10</sup>

Hence, where no documentation can be found proving that such sentiments were very common, no nation can be said to have existed. And nothing of the kind can be proven for the Middle Ages or the ancient world.<sup>11</sup> Most pre-modern communities are then ruled out, as well quite a few of the present-day entities that claim to be nations.

On the other hand, an *exclusively* voluntarist nation concept makes it impossible to distinguish between a situation where only some feel that they belong together and a situation where *all* have this feeling, because separating "some" from "all" implies using a criterion other than voluntary adherence. This would mean that even the smallest elite starting to define itself as a nation must be considered a nation. We need to be able to distinguish between state populations and nations, between ethnic groups and nations, and between national movements and nations. A strictly voluntarist nation concept does not permit any of this. Finally, to perceive the nation as something *entirely* voluntary would be to understate both the stability of national identities *and* the amount of coercion involved. For one thing, national identities have been known to persist for years under foreign oppression. This suggests a stability outside the domain of will alone. Second, even the French model nation is not quite as voluntary as it may seem. France was made into a unit by conquest, and the incorporation processes that led to a common identity were certainly not without coercive elements.

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<sup>10</sup> Benedict Anderson: *Imagined communities* (1991:6-7).

<sup>11</sup> Even if it did exist, we would not be able to prove the existence of an all-encompassing national sentiment in the Middle Ages, since the available sources are at the most reliable for the literate strata. (See Chapter One, page 14).

### ***... is a community of culture***

In his 1913 manifesto on *Marxism and the national question*, Josef Stalin defined the nation as a *historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up, manifested in a common culture*.<sup>12</sup> This is entirely in line with Otto Bauer's nation concept. It is often quoted in the literature on nationalism as an example of a purely cultural definition, since it leaves out the notion of an subjective awareness altogether.

Where the voluntarist nation concept is rooted in the experience of the French and the British, the cultural nation concept has deep roots in German and East European soil. The nation in the German meaning is not some accidental group of people, but a people bound together by culture, by language, by birth, by history. This is a culturally distinct entity, an organic whole, something to be born into, rather than a matter of choice by a sovereign people. German romantic philosophers like Herder and Fichte added the conception of language as the soul of the nation and the main differentiating principle. Their influence has been profound and lasting. Even today some scholars, not to mention nationalists, see language as the main constituting feature of nations. Other candidates are ethnicity, religion and a shared history.

A cultural nation concept has some obvious merits. By emphasizing culture and language, we exclude heterogeneous state populations from the concept, and the entities we normally think of as nations *do* have certain cultural features in common. Moreover, an identity, separating *us* from *the others*, presupposes that *we* have something in common that *they* do not have, a certain "sameness" in cultural values and attributes that can be recognized. It does *not* imply that this sameness has existed from time immemorial. On the contrary, common features may be more or less recently "construed" or "invented",<sup>13</sup> and they may have spread from an original elite to the masses. That does not make them any less real.

Today most scholars of nationalism reject an exclusively cultural or objective nation concept, and rightly so in my opinion, mainly because objective criteria claiming general validity are hard to come by. A closer look at the main candidate – language – may serve to illustrate the problem. First, although the differences between literary languages may be easily observable, dialect boundaries tend to be fuzzy rather than sharp. In Europe, the Magyars and the Basques are probably the only people who beyond doubt are linguistically different from *all* their neighbors. Second, nation is not always coterminous with language. There are people who speak different languages and see themselves as one nation – notably the Swiss. There are numerous other people who speak the same language, but regard themselves as different nations, like the Germans and the Austrians, or the British, the Australians and the Americans. Likewise, the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims of former Yugoslavia speak basically the same language, albeit with some nuances in dialect that criss-cross the national divide.

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<sup>12</sup> Quotation in Teich & Porter (1993: xvii).

<sup>13</sup> I will return to this debate in the next chapter.

The same exercise could be applied to other criteria. Upon reviewing the main alleged criteria (language, religion, ethnicity, holy icons), Eric Hobsbawm concludes that no single criterion is applicable to all cases, and consequently, that no feature is indispensable for the formation of national identities.<sup>14</sup> He does, however, concede that when such common features exist, they make the job of national movements easier, as they serve as a foundation for mobilizing the masses. This indicates that it is not the differentiating feature per se that is important, but the fact that it sets "us" apart from "the others."

Another problem is of course that, regardless of what kind of features we see as constituting nationhood, a cultural concept of nation means that we would not be able to distinguish between what Anthony D. Smith calls *ethnic categories* (people who have certain cultural attributes in common but do not define themselves as a group), *ethnie*, (where some people are aware of their common attributes), and *nations*, (where most people are aware that they "belong together").<sup>15</sup> Again, we are deprived of the possibility of describing the forming of nations as a process. Cultural sameness is obviously not enough either.

### ***National identity – a combined notion***

Our conception of "nation" should include both a certain cultural sameness (it *may* include language, and in most cases it will) and a feeling of belonging to a community. A nation may then be defined as a *historically constituted community of people who share a common culture, including one or more differentiating cultural features, created and recreated by people with a mutual feeling of belonging together.*

National identities thus exist in our minds as ideas of who we are and with whom we belong. This subjective identification thrives on a certain sameness, some cultural features that are seen as constituting the national community. It is this sameness that enables the members of a community to recognize each other as belonging to the same community, and by the same token recognize non-members as outsiders or foreigners.

The ability of a nation to incorporate new members depends both on the willingness of newcomers to change their identity, and on the willingness of the host nation to accept them as co-nationals. A corollary is that nations are more or less open to newcomers, depending on what the constituting features are believed to be. A national identity that is tied to residence and adherence to certain political institutions is open to newcomers, an identity tied to ancestry is typically closed, while a national identity that is first and foremost based on language is neither completely open nor completely closed. Finally, while any cultural feature may be acquired in the course of a few generations, assimilation may still be barred if one's physical features remain outside the bounds of "normal appearance" in the national community.

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<sup>14</sup> See Eric Hobsbawm: *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (1992), Chapter 2.

<sup>15</sup> Anthony D. Smith: *National identity* (1991).

# Three

## *Ancient bond or invented tradition?*

*Neither the national self-conception nor the critical demythologization of it is quite to the point. The national is seldom unbroken continuity or totally artificial.*

Øyvind Østerud<sup>1</sup>

According to the culture-romantic nationalist portrait, nations are natural, ancient and eternal, existing from time immemorial to the end of time – though at times slumbering and in need of reawakening. Nations are depicted as extended families against a background of glorious pasts and golden ages, hard-fought battles and great victories, only interrupted by the occasional five-hundred-year-night of foreign oppression. In this picture, national movements are guardians of the nation and champions of liberation – and progressive forces in history.

Against this stands a would-be scholarly picture of nations as artificial, modern and temporary, recently invented by someone for their own purposes. In this picture, national movements are not the champions of an already existing nation, but the creators of nations. Nations are not reawakened and liberated, they are constructed. This picture has often been combined with a rejection of nationalism as a morally evil doctrine which "spells disaster" <sup>2</sup> when taken to its logical consequence. Neither picture is, in my view, very accurate.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to provide a theoretical backdrop to the thesis through a brief outline of the scholarly debate(s) on nations and nationalism, and to clarify my own position. The theoretical literature is huge, so it goes without saying that it is not possible to give a comprehensive picture even of the contemporary debate in a few pages.<sup>3</sup> I will concentrate on presenting the main lines of disagreement and the scholars that have inspired my own work. The scholarly debate consists of several intertwined debates. One concerns what nationalism "really" *is*. Another concerns the *causes* of nationalism, as understood by that particular scholar. A third debate concerns whether nationalism and nations are *good* or *bad*, which also depends on how nationalism is defined. I find the first two debates more interesting than the latter. In this chapter I begin by discussing the concept of nationalism; then I turn to theories of "nationalism", and finally I present my own approach.

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<sup>1</sup> ('Verken den nasjonale selvoppfatning eller den kritiske avmytologisering av den er helt treffende. Det nasjonale er sjelden ubrutt kontinuitet eller rent kunstprodukt'). Østerud: *Hva er nasjonalisme?* (1994:61).

<sup>2</sup> Anthony D. Smith: *Nationalism and the historians* (1992:59).

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. the following readers from the past five years: G. Eley & R. G. Suny (eds.): *Becoming national* (1996); J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds.): *Nationalism* (1994) and *Ethnicity* (1996); S. Periwal (ed.): *Notions of nationalism* (1995); M. Ringrose & A. Lerner (eds.): *Reimagining the nation* (1993); S. J. Woolf (ed.): *Nationalism in Europe: a reader* (1995).



### ***What is nationalism?***

Much of the confusion, and even some of the disagreement, between scholars about what causes nationalism is due to the notorious ambiguity of the term "nationalism." According to Peter Alter, it first appeared in a work by the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder in 1774.<sup>4</sup> In Germany at the end of the 18th century it meant national aspiration, even national fervor; it then was adopted into French meaning exaggerated devotion to one's own nation. Later it was also used in the meaning of a national movement. In English, it became associated with national individuality, national character and love of the fatherland, but the association with chauvinism was not originally a part of it. According to Aira Kemiläinen, it was not very frequently used before the end of the 19th century.<sup>5</sup> In Continental Europe, the negative connotations were sharpened by the association with Nazism during the Second World War.

Today, the most common scholarly use is nationalism as *ideology* and/or as *social* or *political movement*, but it can also be encountered in the sense of national consciousness or national sentiment; growth and maintenance of nations; state-led assimilation policies; and patriotism on behalf of one's country. It is also sometimes associated with xenophobia, racism, nazism and fascism. Liah Greenfeld presents the widest contemporary concept of nationalism I have encountered. At the same time, curiously enough, she excludes some of the "normal" contents. She uses nationalism as an umbrella term denoting "the related phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and consciousness, and collectives based on them – nations; occasionally (...) the articulate ideology on which national identity and consciousness rest, though not (...) the politically activist, xenophobic variety of national patriotism, which it frequently designates."<sup>6</sup>

It may be argued that labels are matters of convenience and that any definition will do, as long as it is explicit. However, I find it analytically unfruitful to mix causes and effects the way Greenfeld does. At the very least, we should keep national awareness, national identity, national sentiment and nations apart from national movements, nationalism qua ideology, nation-building and nation-forming. First, in most places nationalism (whether defined as an ideology, a national movement, or nation-building) existed prior to any national awareness or sentiment at mass level. Second, the diffusion of national consciousness is one of the primary aims of national movements and nation-building elites alike. Third, national identity (and the nation) was the outcome of the nation-forming process.

One option is to include national movements, nationalism as ideology and nation-building in the concept of nationalism. This is quite common, yet in my opinion not preferable. National movements are movements from below and have to win people for the national cause. They cannot rely on the coercive power of a state apparatus, and should thus be distinguished from state-led policies of "nation-building" or national integration.

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<sup>4</sup> Peter Alter: *Nationalism* (1992:7).

<sup>5</sup> Aira Kemiläinen: *Nationalism. Problems concerning the word, the concept and classification* (1964:48–52).

<sup>6</sup> Liah Greenfeld: *Nationalism. Five roads to modernity* (1992:3).

Once national movements achieve power through the establishment of a "nation-state", they will have at their disposal entirely other means, and can embark on the task of completing (or consolidating) the nation-forming process. If there are national minorities in the new state, the political elite must decide whether to attempt to assimilate them, or accommodate them. Sometimes an assimilation or integration policy is termed "official nationalism."<sup>7</sup> This is not entirely unwarranted, but should be avoided for the sake of clarity.

The suffix *-ism* normally brings to mind a system of thought, and it may thus be argued that the term nationalism should be reserved for the ideological contents. Yet, nationalism is not a consistent, well-elaborated system of ideas, an ideology in the strict sense, and in practice it is difficult to keep national movements and their programs apart. On the other hand, it is possible to find a core that is common to most movements that have been called national(ist): namely, the idea that the world is divided into individual and equal nations that should be free to develop and decide their own fate – ultimately, in their own state.

One set of phenomena should be treated as separate from "nationalism": racism, xenophobia, fascism and nazism. This is not because Nazi or fascist ideas *cannot* be combined with nationalism. On the contrary, such ideologies are not intelligible without it, although Nazism transcends nationalism by its emphasis on the Aryan race and *Lebensraum*. The difference is that national movements seek to regenerate the nation, they struggle for the political independence of this nation, and the relevant unit is the culturally defined nation, not a race.<sup>8</sup>

The point is that the ideological flavor of nationalist movements varies. Nationalism defies categorization: Some forms are democratic in outlook, some are authoritarian. Some are traditionalist and strongly religious, some are modernist and skeptical to religion. Some are conservative or reactionary, some are radical and Marxist. This also illustrates the Janus-faced and multi-faceted character of "nationalism."<sup>9</sup> On balance, however, nationalism has been liberating more often than repressing, and has been a radical force more often than a reactionary one.

The evaluation of nationalism as an evil doctrine often seems based on an implicit assumption that love for one's own nation, or a desire for national self-determination, inevitably must lead to the worst atrocities that have been committed in the name of the nation.<sup>10</sup> Yet, there is no automatic link between loyalty to the nation and the idea that those who are not "one of us" should be chased out of "our country", subjugated, or killed. It is quite *possible* to be attached to one's own and still respect others. As moral individuals, we must condemn the atrocities, not the identity. As scholars, our primary task is to explain, not to condemn.

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<sup>7</sup> See Benedict Anderson: *Imagined Communities* (1991) Chapter 6.

<sup>8</sup> The relation between nationalism, racism, and fascism is discussed in Chapter 4 of Montserrat Guibernau: *Nationalisms* (1996). See also George L. Mosse: 'Racism and nationalism', in: *Nations and Nationalism* 2, 1995.

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter 3 ("Janusansiktene") in Østerud (1994).

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. the introduction of Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.): *Becoming national* (1996:12).

Personally, I have chosen to avoid the word "nationalism" as far as possible, partly for the sake of clarity, partly because of its negative connotations in Czech and Slovak (see Chapter Seven). This is also the reason why I prefer the contemporary term "Slovak *autonomists*" to "Slovak *nationalists*." I prefer to use the term *nation-forming process* for the process during which national identities were formed and spread from an elite to the masses. I will use the term *national movement* for social and political movements that strive to spread the awareness of being a nation to the masses and to enhance the position of that nation culturally, economically and politically. *National consciousness* will be understood as an awareness of belonging to a nation, *national sentiment* as loyalty to or love for that nation. State-led assimilation policies are termed *nation-building* or *national integration* and treated as a nationality policy strategy. Finally, *nationalism* and *nationalist* will signify the ideology, when I am not referring directly to the theories of other scholars or quoting someone.

### ***Primordialist, modernist, post-modernist, or ethnicist?***

Depending on where the scholars stand on the question of the relative antiquity or modernity of nations, it is common to distinguish between three main positions: the *primordialist*, the *modernist* and the *ethnicist* position.<sup>11</sup> Another important line of disagreement concerns whether nations are social constructions or are historically constituted. On the basis of this, Anthony D. Smith divides the second category in two: the modernist and the *post-modernist* position, where the latter is distinguished by its emphasis on cultural construction (or invention) as opposed to political and social determination. Smith at the same time accuses the post-modernists of having "abandoned the attempt to understand [nationalism] causally and substituted a series of descriptive metaphors."<sup>12</sup>

The picture of nations as ancient, eternal and natural is referred to as *primordialist* in the literature. History was interpreted as the story of nations engaged in self-realization, and nations were objectively identifiable primordial entities. What needed to be explained was the rise and decline of nations, not the fact that they existed. In line with the general ideological view of the past, decline was often explained by moral decay or by weak national character. Because of the close link between the rise of modern historiography and the emergence of national movements, this position was quite common in the historiography of the 19th century and well into this century. National historians were not only scholars, they themselves were often involved in the task of "reawakening" the nation. The primordial position has now long since been abandoned by most scholars of nationalism.<sup>13</sup> I have included it in this chapter mainly to provide a contrast to the modernist position, and will thus leave it here.

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<sup>11</sup> The term *ethnicist* is borrowed from John Hutchinson: *Modern nationalism* (1994:3), while the other two terms are quite common. Anthony D. Smith prefers the label "Ethno-symbolic theory" or "Ethno-symbolism." See A. D. Smith: 'Nations and their pasts', in *Nations and Nationalism* 3, (1996a:362), and the introduction to Hutchinson & Smith (eds.) (1996:10).

<sup>12</sup> See A. D. Smith: 'Gastronomy or geology?' in *Nations and Nationalism* 1 (1995b:9), and Smith (1996a:360–361).

<sup>13</sup> One post-war "primordialist" is Clifford Geertz. Excerpts from his work may be found in Hutchinson & Smith (eds.) (1994; 1996). See Miroslav Hroch: *Europeisk nasjonalhistorie* (1998) on the link between history and national movements.

The early *modernist* theories (often called diffusion theories) centered on nationalism as an *ideology*. Later theories were oriented towards *nation-building* as a way of integrating a state population across divides, of which Stein Rokkan's theory is a good example,<sup>14</sup> while recent theories are more concerned with nationalism as a *social and political movement* and with national identity. What more recent modernist and post-modernist theories have in common is the idea that nations and nationalism are novel, distinctly modern phenomena. Compared to the primordialist position, they reverse the time-sequence between nations and nationalism, since all sides agree that nationalism appeared around the French Revolution. In Ernest Gellner's words: "It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around."<sup>15</sup>

The focus on nations as artificial or invented is more typical of "post-modernist" than of modernist theories, but also the latter often see nations as constructed by nationalism (cf. Gellner's statement above). This is sometimes, but not always, combined with the idea that nations are temporary phenomena. What needs explanation in this scheme is the relationship between modernization and the rise of nations and nationalism. Labels can be misleading. There are, for example, clear differences between the theories of Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson (which Anthony D. Smith labels post-modernist),<sup>16</sup> and the more extreme constructivist view of nations as discursive practices or texts.<sup>17</sup> Although Anderson conceive nations as "imagined communities", and Hobsbawm as based on "invented traditions", neither denies that nations are real, substantial entities.

The *ethnicist* or *ethno-symbolic* approach transcends the dichotomies above. In this picture, nations are neither ancient, primordial entities nor novelties that suddenly appeared at the threshold of modernity. They are modern, but they have roots in pre-modern ethnic communities. To paraphrase a discussion between Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith, nations have navels and these navels matter.<sup>18</sup> The nation represents neither a clean break with the past, nor unbroken continuity; pre-modern identities are often radically transformed when ethnic groups become nations. This approach emphasizes that nation-forming is a process, where success is by no means guaranteed. The ethnicist position thus confronts both the modernist and the post-modernist position, but the front against the latter is clearer,<sup>19</sup> perhaps because the two leading figures on the modernist and ethnicist side (Gellner and Smith) were once teacher and student.

In the following I will first turn briefly to early diffusionist and modernization theories. Then I will present some of the contemporary theories – modernist, "post-modernist" and ethnicist.

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<sup>14</sup> See Stein Rokkan: *Stat, nasjon, klasse* (1987).

<sup>15</sup> Ernest Gellner: *Nations and nationalism* (1983:55).

<sup>16</sup> See e.g. Anthony D. Smith (1995b; 1996a).

<sup>17</sup> See e.g. Rogers Brubaker: *Nationalism reframed* (1996:13-22); James Der Derian: 'S/N: International Theory, Balkanization and the New World Order', in Ringrose & Lerner (eds.) (1993).

<sup>18</sup> See A. D. Smith: 'Nations and their pasts', Ernest Gellner's reply: 'Do nations have navels?' and A. D. Smith's 'Memory and modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism', in *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, 1996.

<sup>19</sup> This has not changed after Gellner died on November 5th, 1995.

### *A plague goes over the world*

Early historically oriented studies tended to concentrate on nationalism as an *ideology* of European origin, which gradually spread to the rest of the world, more or less like waves (or a disease!). These scholars, who may be labeled diffusionist, tended to see nations as belonging to a modern age, and as created by nationalists.<sup>20</sup> Classic works here are Carlton Hayes' *The historical evolution of modern nationalism* (1931), Hans Kohn's *The idea of nationalism* (1944), and Elie Kedourie's *Nationalism* (1960).

Kedourie explained the origins of nationalism in terms of certain ideas that prevailed in Europe towards the end of the 18th century, and later spread to the rest of the world, as native elites "imported" them. This was also the first attempt at critical de-masking of nationalism.<sup>21</sup> Kedourie emphasized the philosophy of Kant, Herder and Fichte, while Rousseau was strangely absent. He linked the revolt in European philosophy to the changing social conditions, and especially to a break in the transmission of social and political customs between generations. The old ways seemed outdated in light of the technical revolution and the reduced impact of religion, which left the young generations estranged. The young were receptive to the nationalist ideas because of their situation; the movements simply met a deep-felt urgency to belong. Once the ideas existed, they started living their own life, spreading almost like magic.

Needless to say, the mere existence of certain ideas among European intellectuals cannot explain why they were taken up by other elites, or why Czech or German or French peasants started to adhere to them. Ideas may nevertheless shape the *appearance* of national movements and help define their goals. For example, the idea of language as the "soul of the nation" obviously did have a strong and lasting impact, even to the extent that zealots revived almost dead languages. Cleansing the language, ridding it of foreign words and influences, creating new words (or even languages) based on the vernacular and past literary sources are familiar aspects of national ventures everywhere. The diffusion of nationalist ideas is thus a fact that should not be overlooked; the crucial question Kedourie failed to answer is *why*.

Let us take a closer look at these ideas. According to the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, diversity (and struggle) were fundamental characteristics of the universe, and such diversity was the design of God. Diversity meant that every culture possessed a unique incomparable value and that every people had a duty to *cultivate* their own peculiar qualities: only then could the world progress. The perfect world is one in which harmony between varieties prevails. The idea of God-given diversity was certainly no invention of German Romanticism, but the idea of a duty to cultivate one's own qualities was. In the German tradition a nation became a natural division of the human race, each nation possessing its own character, which its members must keep pure and inviolable. The best political arrangement was a state of its own, or else the nation would risk losing its identity.

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<sup>20</sup> Nigel Harris: *National liberation* (1992) is an example of a modern variety of diffusionist theories that explain the diffusion of the nation-state model by its economic and military efficiency.

<sup>21</sup> See the introduction to Eley & Suny (1996:6).

Of special importance is Herder's view of the pre-eminence of language. For him, language was the main criterion of nationhood, and thus, for a man to speak a foreign language was to live an artificial life, to be estranged from the spontaneous, instinctive sources of his personality. Fichte went even further, arguing that the mere presence of foreign vocables within a language can contaminate the very springs of political morality (!).<sup>22</sup> The purer the language, the more natural it is, and the easier it becomes for the nation to realize itself, and to increase its freedom. In order to preserve the language and thereby the nation, the nation must get a state of its own, or else it is bound to give up its language and coalesce with its conquerors.

The impact of these ideas was revolutionary when combined with the legacy of the French Revolution: To the principle of the sovereign people, German Romanticism added the idea that (legitimate) boundaries of states are natural, and should correspond to linguistic divides.

### *A side effect of modernization*

*Modernization* theories focus on the links between the existence of nations, national movements and nation-building and different aspects of modernization, like uneven development, industrialization, the role of the modern state, print capitalism and the like. Nations and nationalism appear in different parts of the world because of certain *structural similarities* (various aspects of modernization) – not primarily because some ideas have spread. Nations and nationalism are European in origin only in the sense that Europe was the region where these phenomena first appeared. These scholars also see nations and nationalism as distinctly modern phenomena, while they vary in their emphasis on the "invented-ness" of nations.

The older theories of modernization did not really offer much of an explanation. Functionalist theories tended to postulate a link between modernization and the rise of nations and nationalism, invoking "needs" on part of societies, rather than explaining why and how. Anti-colonialist and Marxist theories reduced nationalism to economic oppression or economic deprivation of some kind.<sup>23</sup> Communication theories presented certain means of communication as crucial to the emergence of nations and nationalism.<sup>24</sup> Yet, the main problem was that they fit reality badly, as "nationalism" in most meanings of the word preceded "modernization" many places.<sup>25</sup> As for the *communication* theories, it is obvious that certain means of mass communication are necessary for nation-forming to succeed, but they are hardly sufficient.

As examples of contemporary theories I have chosen the theories of Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Michael Mann, partly because these scholars are so central to the debate, partly because they focus on different aspects of modernization.

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<sup>22</sup> Kedourie: *Nationalism* (1993: pp. 57 ff.).

<sup>23</sup> As Coakley points out, these were not really theories of nationalism but more general theories of society or social change. See John Coakley (ed.): *The social origins of nationalist movements* (1992:2).

<sup>24</sup> See e.g. Karl W. Deutsch: *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1966), and *Tides among nations* (1979).

<sup>25</sup> See A. D. Smith: *Theories of nationalism* (1983) for a critical presentation of these theories.

### ERIC HOBSBAWM: THE INVENTION OF TRADITION

Of the contemporary (post-)modernist theories presented here,<sup>26</sup> the theory of Eric Hobsbawm is closest to the conception of nations as modern, invented and temporary. His emphasis is on how national movements create or invent nations by inventing the traditions that are allegedly shared by the nation, and how national movements make use of existing social conflicts in order to further their aims. His emphasis on the "invented-ness" of nations is stronger in his earlier writings than in his latest works.<sup>27</sup> Yet he maintains that although "proto-nationalism, where it existed, made the task of nationalism easier, insofar as existing symbols and sentiments of proto-national community could be mobilized behind a modern cause or a modern state", it was in no way "enough to form nationalities, nations, let alone states."<sup>28</sup>

Hobsbawm and his school are of course right in noting that many of the rituals and symbols that we today treasure as national traditions *are* actually of recent date, deliberately created during the "national awakening." There are numerous examples, from flags and national anthems to celebrations, festivals and folk costumes. On the other hand, some of these "invented traditions" are in fact more genuine. Folk costumes were based on old models found tucked away in attics and closets, folk songs were collected and written down in their existing oral form, some old festivals were revived along with the new ones that were created, etc.<sup>29</sup> Besides, how "genuine" a tradition is, is probably irrelevant: what really matters is how it makes people feel in terms of identity.

The social and political conditions that in Hobsbawm's scheme allow national elites to invent nations are tied to economic and political modernization. The significant social conditions are twofold. On the one hand *traditional* groups resisted the pressure of modernization, on the other hand *new groups* without local ties arose as a consequence of migration processes, causing new mixtures of people with different culture within the same area. This created tensions that could be used by the nationalists to mobilize people behind their cause.

The political conditions are also twofold. First, the growth of the *modern state* led to a larger administration and an expansion of education, which required the choice of a language of administration and education other than Latin. When the vernacular of one group became the official language, others became disadvantaged. This was mainly a problem for the middle class, since the great masses of people were illiterate and the nobility was cosmopolitan and bi- or trilingual. Linguistic nationalism was the arena of people with low, but sufficient education to have white-collar jobs. In Hobsbawm's words: "The battle-lines of linguistic nationalism were manned by provincial journalists, schoolteachers and aspiring subaltern officials."<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> A. D. Smith repeatedly refers to Hobsbawm's theory as post-modernist, but Hobsbawm may not approve of this label himself. An alternative label would be Marxist.

<sup>27</sup> See e.g. Chapters 1 and 7 in Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (eds.) *The invention of traditions* [written 1983] (1992).

<sup>28</sup> Hobsbawm: *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (1992:77).

<sup>29</sup> On folk costumes in Norway, see e.g. Astrid Oxaal: *Bunaden – stagnasjon eller nyskapning ?* (1998:141-57).

<sup>30</sup> Hobsbawm (1992:117).

Second, there is the democratization of politics. Participation in politics was extended to an increasing number of new groups in the period following the French Revolution. Hobsbawm's main point is that social and national demands went hand in hand. The struggle for national emancipation became a struggle for better social conditions as the national movement reached the mass phase. This combination of social and national demands, says Hobsbawm, was necessary for the national movements to succeed, because the national cause itself (language etc.) had limited appeal outside the middle class.

#### **ERNEST GELLNER: A NEW HORIZON**

With Ernest Gellner, the main focus is on culture, yet industrialism is the driving force behind the rise of nations and nationalism in his theory.<sup>31</sup> His main argument concerns the formation of nations. Nations are products of industrial society; they appear in the transition from agrarian to industrial society. In agrarian society, people have the same jobs all their lives, vocational skills are mostly transmitted from father to son, the literate strata are small and clearly separated from the peasant masses, and education outside the household is for the few. Consequently, loyalties, conflicts and horizons are local; a shared, codified culture is not necessary.

In an industrial society all this changes. This is a mobile society, where people change jobs during their lifetime as well as from one generation to next, where the divide between elite and ordinary people is obscure, where most people are specialists and work operations require cooperation. Here, the ability to context free communication is a must, as are a standardized written code, literacy and compulsory education outside the household for all. Mobile society in other words requires a shared, codified culture.

In this society, your worth is not tied to what you are, but to what you know and what you do (merit). Since competence and participation is limited by the "high culture", your skills are valid only in the area where the codified culture is valid. This is the new, expanded horizon of industrial man. It replaces the local loyalties that are dissolved by an increasingly mobile society. Culture replaces structure as the foundation for identity, and a new, *national* identity is born. Because the modern state is the only entity large enough to sustain the necessary system for transmitting this high culture, a state is not an option, but a necessity.

Nationalism is a reaction to the cultural-standardization efforts of industrial society by groups who are either not able to assimilate because of entropy resistant features,<sup>32</sup> or who are politically and/or economically deprived, while still sufficiently culturally different from their oppressors to be able to identify them as alien. In industrial society, inequality becomes intolerable. The modernization process is uneven, leading to increasing levels of inequality and conflict, as some groups benefit from industrialization while others do not. If those who benefit are culturally different from the others, national movements emerge.

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<sup>31</sup> See Ernest Gellner: *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), and 'Do nations have navels?' in *Nations and Nationalism* 3, 1996.

<sup>32</sup> These are features that cannot be erased, like blue skin color (Gellner's own example). See Gellner (1983: pp. 61 ff.)



This theory is compelling, but not very specific. The major drawback of Gellner's theory is its high level of abstraction, which means that it cannot easily be applied to specific cases.<sup>33</sup> The many ambiguities are caused partly by his failure to distinguish between different phases of the nation-forming process, partly by his conspicuous lack of agents, and partly by his failure to make explicit what he means by words like "nations" and "nationalism." It is for instance hard to know whether he means that national movements *start* because of the uneven industrialization, or whether they *succeed* because of it. The former is contrary to evidence; several national movements started way before industrialization and some of these even succeeded.

Another weakness in Gellner's theory is that nationalism in many cases preceded compulsory education and a codified high culture; both were often the result of national ventures rather than the other way around, especially in Eastern Europe. Again, it is possible that compulsory education and mass literacy are necessary conditions for an awareness of belonging to a nation to pervade all social classes, but such awareness existed in smaller or larger groups before this happened.<sup>34</sup> The description of agrarian society as a society where all loyalties and identities were local or also religious is simply false. "Traditional society" was never entirely void of social and geographic mobility, there have always been groups on the move. Conversely, local identities and loyalties are still salient in industrial society – they have not been wholly replaced. Third, Gellner's strong emphasis on language is, if not totally unwarranted, at least not always to the point. Language is not the only feature that nations can have in common. In many cases, a shared history probably plays a more important role.

Gellner's theory may not be a good explanation of why national movements first started, but it still may provide insight into why national movements succeed in mobilizing people behind their cause. What may be drawn from it, is that people were receptive to nationalist ideas because they lived in a society where political and economic oppression corresponded to ethnic or cultural divisions. National movements succeeded in mobilizing people because they were able to identify their oppressors as culturally different, and hence not "one of us."

#### **BENEDICT ANDERSON: AN IMAGINED COMMUNITY**

In the theory of Benedict Anderson, "print capitalism" is the central aspect of modernization that explains the rise of nations and nationalism. Anderson defines the nation as an *imagined political community* – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. He argues that all communities larger than villages of face-to-face contact are imagined – not that this implies they are imaginary, fabricated, or false. In Anderson's own words, "what, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> See A. D. Smith (1996a:361) for more criticism of modernist theories in general.

<sup>34</sup> Confirmation of this may be found in documents that date back to the Middle Ages and even further. See also Part Two.

<sup>35</sup> Benedict Anderson: *Imagined Communities* (1991:42–43).

From the outset, the market of print capitalism was a broad, but thin layer of those who could read Latin. Gradually, it turned to the great potential markets that could only be reached through vernacular languages. Three parallel developments facilitated the expansion of print capitalism: (1) Vernacular languages were slowly and geographically unevenly turned into languages of administration in the new centralized, bureaucratic states. (2) Latin developed in an aesthetic direction, making access harder. (3) The Reformation reduced the position of Latin as a holy language, because Luther's bible was translated into a vernacular tongue.

Print capitalism shaped a common sphere of communication exchange under Latin and over the local dialects, leading to imagined communities of readers of the same newspapers, books and journals. Print capitalism froze the vernacular languages, codified them, and made them look continuous and stable. At the same time it created power languages, as some dialects were closer to the literary languages than others. These dialects became the languages of the elites: high status languages. A shared language was important for the creation of the first nations, but once the model existed, it could be copied, and imagined communities became possible without a common language. In Latin America, the Atlantic marked the borders of the imagined communities; in Europe, language borders had the same effect.

The time sequence between the alleged driving force and the rise of nations and nationalism is more fitting here, since print capitalism dates back to the 16th century. Yet, while print capitalism and the development of vernacular languages are important, especially in order to explain how national identities could spread, they do not explain why these imagined communities should be sovereign, or why people would want to risk their lives to achieve this.

Anderson stresses the New World origins of nationalism, specifically the Creole origins.<sup>36</sup> While Creole movements may have been the first to seek political liberation, the "nations" they were acting on behalf of were nations in the pre-Revolutionary sense of the word, i.e. political elites. The culturally heterogeneous population was hardly counted at all, or independence was sought in order to preserve the society the way it was. Moreover, Anderson ignores the fact that the nation concept and the notion of national character are European in origin. The models of the "Creole pioneers" were clearly their European mother countries.

#### **MICHAEL MANN: THE PRIMACY OF THE MODERN STATE**

Michael Mann's main argument is that nations and nationalism developed primarily in response to the development of the modern state.<sup>37</sup> However, prior to this, Mann asserts, there was a *religious* phase, where Protestantism and the Counter-Reformation expanded literacy in vernacular languages, and a *commercial/statist* phase, where commercial capitalism and military state modernization took over much of the expansion of literacy.

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<sup>36</sup> Anderson accuses European scholars of being "accustomed to the conceit that everything important in the modern world originated in Europe." (1991:xiii.)

<sup>37</sup> Michael Mann: *A theory of nationalism and its excesses*, in Periwal (1995:44–64).

Against Anderson's emphasis on print capitalism, Mann argues that, although the ascent of print capitalism made it technically possible to do so, "the nation still did not mobilize society." Likewise, he argues that in the initial period there was little in capitalism that could encourage a distinctively *national* civil society; markets remained fairly transnational in the 18th and 19th centuries and industrialization spread faster in the peripheral and frontier regions than in state cores. Instead the key lies in the state, Mann claims.

His main line of argument is that, prior to the 18th century, states did not penetrate society to any great extent; their involvement in warfare did not require it. However, because of the military revolution and the many wars in the 18th century, the state began to absorb a much larger share of GNP; in addition, the armies called in a larger share of the population.<sup>38</sup> In a situation where the state intruded in people's lives to a much larger extent, taxing and conscripting them, it also became necessary to mobilize their enthusiasm for its goals. At the same time, increased state extraction increased the pressure against the subjects, especially those that could least afford it, resulting in demands for political citizenship for the "people" and the "nation." Self-conscious nations, Mann argues, emerged from the struggle for representative government, and were initially born of the pressures of state militarism.

Mann also emphasizes that this struggle had different consequences in different settings. In the case of *state-reinforcing nations* like Britain and France, where the linguistic community was securely located in the state's territorial and class core, the endeavors to make the state more representative only served to strengthen the salience and the centralization of that state. In multi-cultural empires like the Austrian, the Ottoman and Russian, fiscal and conscription pressures produced other outcomes. Here reformers mobilized in favor of their province rather than the whole empire, and these nations thus became *state-subverting*. National revolts were associated with "powerful provincial political organization", not with the industrial level, Mann argues. He does, however, admit that the cores of these "province-nations" were usually reinforced by language, religion, a distinct economic market or all of the above. (A third category is the (temporary) *state-creating nations* – the Germans and Italians.)

### ***The ethnic origins of nations***

While conceding that the nation is a modern phenomenon and nationalism even more so, (dating from the late 18th century), Anthony D. Smith emphasizes the pre-national roots of nations. In this scheme, nationalism succeeded because it was sociologically fertile, and the role of modernization was more that of a catalyst than of an initiating or driving force behind the rise of nations and nationalism. This also implies that it is not possible to invent just any identity, or weld together any heterogeneous population. Nations are not invented, but historically constituted and are as such no more artificial than any other cultural phenomena.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> By 1810, 5 % of the population manned the army. See Mann (1995:47).

<sup>39</sup> A. D. Smith: *National identity* (1991), *The ethnic origins of nations* (1986), *Nations and nationalism in a global era* (1995a). See also A. D. Smith (1996b).

Smith distinguishes between two types of pre-modern entities; *ethnic categories*, where the awareness of being a separate collectivity was lacking, and *ethnic communities* or *ethnie*, where at least an elite possessed such awareness. It is *ethnie* that were most easily turned into nations. The main attributes of *ethnie* are as follows, according to Smith: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.<sup>40</sup> According to this terminology, the Slovaks were an ethnic category prior to the 18th century, while the Czechs were an *ethnie* by the Middle Ages.

The ethnic configuration formed through *amalgamation* of separate units and *splitting up* of units, because of schisms or migration. State formation, military mobilization (war) and organized religion were crucial, according to Smith. The most important contribution of war was to mobilize ethnic sentiment, to serve as a centralizing force and to provide myths and memories for future generations. *Religion* often contributed to the creation of myths of ethnic origins and to the preservation of memories of saints and heroes, customs and rituals, myths and legends. The myth-symbol complex (or also *mythomoteur*) was important for the diffusion and preservation of ethnic (and later national) identity.

The ethnic identities that crystallized through such processes were sustained through mechanisms like religious reform, selective cultural borrowing, popular participation and myths of ethnic election (the chosen people). Location, autonomy, trading (and other) skills, and organized religion also played a role. The bearers were the priests, the scribes and bards. Such *ethnie* formed cores on which modern nations were built, but not all *ethnie* were turned into nations. Since *ethnie* were associated with a certain territory, the presumed boundaries of the nation were largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant *ethnie*, which included a founding charter, a myth of the golden age and associated territorial claims.

Smith's analysis of the processes that led to the formation of nations is based on a distinction between two (ideal) types of *ethnie* – lateral *ethnie* and vertical *ethnie*. Lateral *ethnie* were composed of aristocrats and higher clergy, and sometimes bureaucrats, high military officers and wealthy merchants. Smith terms them "lateral" because they were socially confined to the upper strata while being geographically extended, and they often had close links to neighboring lateral *ethnie*. Lateral *ethnie* typically had "ragged" borders and lacked social depth.

Vertical *ethnie* were more compact and popular. Their culture tended to be diffused to other social strata and classes. Social divisions were not underpinned by cultural differences; instead, a distinctive historical culture helped to unite different classes around a common heritage and common traditions, especially in times of war. Many of the vertical *ethnie* were based on religion, which in turn became a problem in the transformation to nations. Combinations are possible, and *ethnie* may change, from vertical to lateral, and back again.

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<sup>40</sup> Smith 1991, Chapter 2 (Definitions, page 21). His *ethnie* corresponds roughly to Hobsbawm's proto-nationalism.

According to Smith, there were two alternative routes to nationhood, each based on a distinct type of ethnic cores. The *lateral* route to nationhood was the route of England, France, Spain, Sweden, and to some extent Poland and Russia. The dominant lateral *ethnie*, which formed the ethnic core of the states, were gradually able to incorporate middle strata and outlying regions into the dominant ethnic culture. The primary force in this incorporation was the new, bureaucratic state. Through military, administrative, fiscal and judicial means it transmitted the values, myths, traditions and memories of the dominant aristocratic ethnic core to new groups. The result was a new and broader cultural identity for the population. In most cases, however, this process also involved some reciprocity.

Insofar as the state "created" nations, according to Smith, it did so in conjunction with (and in the context of) other processes, chiefly the development of a market economy, and the cultural and educational developments following the decline of ecclesiastical authority after the Reformation. Ultimately, nations were the outcome of a vigorous program of political socialization through the public mass education system.

The other route to nationhood is based on *vertical* *ethnie*. Vertical *ethnie* were usually subject communities, and the bureaucratic state only had indirect influence on the nation-forming process. This is the "nationalist" route to nationhood, where the main role was played by intellectual elites, who formed the nation by way of vernacular mobilization. National movements were movements from below, but they were often led by an intellectual elite. Smith interprets the national quest of the ethnic intelligentsia as a response to modernization. Modernization meant a larger state bureaucracy, as well as putting aside Latin in favor of languages based on the vernacular of the dominant elite, which put the elites of the subject peoples at disadvantage. At the same time, a larger bureaucracy implied broader strata of educated people. Secular education and new ways of organizing economic life meant that traditional values and ways came under attack. And the French Revolution and German Romanticism opened up new opportunities through the spread of revolutionary ideas.

National mobilization proceeded by way of several interrelated processes, which often had the character of protest against the ancient regime. National mobilization tended to be a quest for political and economic rights as well as for cultural rights – it was a quest for a homeland; for economic, civic and social rights; for education and administration in the vernacular language. The start has always been the revival of the past, as expressed through the search for poetic spaces and the cult of the golden age. In order to succeed, the national awakeners must return to a living past, one people can identify with. If the reconstructed past becomes too obscure, the national project may fail and the nation might never come into being.

This makes sense as a description of the role of pre-modern ethnic identities in the growth of nations. Yet, Smith's theory is not specific enough when it comes to answering why *ethnie* became nations at that particular point of time. The missing link is the mechanism by which the masses become convinced that "we" are a nation that should stick together against "the others."

### *Phases of the nation-forming process*

The approach of Miroslav Hroch forms a bridge between a modernist and an ethnicist position.<sup>41</sup> He sees nations as historically constituted: the outcomes of long-term integration- and disintegration processes, during which members of certain groups and inhabitants of certain territories gradually formed a unit, and also came to see themselves as a unit. The first part of the nation-forming process was often completed in pre-modern time (e.g. the Middle Ages), but nations reached the mass phase only in conjunction with the transition from a feudal to a capitalist society. Hroch is closer to A. D. Smith than to Hobsbawm or Gellner in his view of the starting point of the nation-forming process, but he is more oriented towards the material foundations for the success of national movements than Smith, which is also a reflection of his Marxist heritage. Timing and relevance are seen as important factors determining whether national agitation will succeed or not. Emphasizing the importance of the density of communication networks, Hroch explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Deutsch.

Hroch distinguishes between two historical situations at the threshold of nationhood in Europe: (1) The situation of the "ruling" ("great") nation, where a new class, the "third estate", set itself up against the old feudal ruling class and proclaimed itself the representative of the whole nation, and (2) The situation of the small "oppressed" nation, where the transition to nationhood was made more complex by the fact that the national movement had to fight both the ancient regime (and its feudal features) *and* the new ruling nation. Hroch confines his theory to the small nation.

Characteristic of the situation of the oppressed "small" nation was that it had no native ruling class; it admittedly formed an ethnic (sometimes also a historical) unit, but not an independent political unit; and it lacked a continuous tradition of cultural production in a literary language of its own. Some were "nations without history": they had never had a state of their own. Some had constituted political entities in the Middle Ages, but were later subjugated under the dominating empires of Europe. Intermediate cases between the "small" and the "large" nation, in Hroch's scheme, are Italy, Germany (which had other attributes of a great nation, but lacked a state) and Poland (which lost statehood in the late 18th century).

Hroch distinguishes between three phases in the nation-forming process: phase A (scholarly interest), phase B (patriotic agitation,) and phase C (the rise of a mass national movement). Initially, a small group of intellectuals would show a passionate concern for the study of the language, the culture, the history of the nation-to-be. These activities were scholarly rather than national ventures. The intellectual forefathers of the national movement remained without any widespread social influence, and often did not even make an attempt at national agitation.

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<sup>41</sup> See Hroch: *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe* (1985), Chapters 1 through 7, and Conclusion: 'Specific features of the nation-forming process in the circumstances of the "small nation"', in Øystein Sørensen (ed.): *Nationalism in Small European Nations* (1996a); *The social interpretation of linguistic demands in European National movements*, EUI working papers No 94/1 (1994); National self-determination from a historical perspective, in Sukumar Periwal (ed.): *Notions of nationalism*, (1995); *V národním zájmu* (1996b).

The second phase was marked by a shift from scholarly interest to active agitation for the national cause. A group of "patriots" took upon them the task of "reawakening" the nation, their aim being the diffusion of national awareness to the masses or the lower classes. This was the time of the national literary societies (the *Matica Srpska*, established in Budapest in 1826 was the model of such societies), of the journals and newspapers in vernacular languages. In this phase, demands for political as well as cultural autonomy came to the front, and nationalist political parties were often formed. The second phase was crucial to the formation of the small nations. Without the peasants and the workers, the nation could simply not come into being.

The third phase was the mass phase, when the nation-forming process was successfully completed. All social classes now reacted to national impulses – national consciousness had become the concern of the broad masses, and the national movement had a firm organizational structure extending over the whole territory. Small nations were fully formed when they displayed a class structure typical of the stage of development (industrial society), and their national movement had taken on a mass character, according to Hroch. Independence sometimes came before the nation was fully formed, sometimes after, sometimes not at all.

Hroch stresses that national agitation was never guaranteed success. The nation-to-be might never pass into phase C, thus leaving the national development incomplete. Agitation is not enough to explain the successful formation of nations. According to Hroch's study, "identical forms of agitation, identical patriotic manifestations, led to very different results, and nowhere were they sufficient by themselves to bring the national movement successfully into its mass phase."<sup>42</sup> Implicit in his reasoning is a polemic against the idea that nations were invented by frustrated intellectuals, but also against the idea that material conflicts are irrelevant.

A crucial point is that nations are not homogeneous classes or social groups, with the same fundamental interests. What emerges as the "national interest" is in Hroch's words "the transformed and sublimated image of the material interests of concrete classes and groups, whose members took an active part in the national movement (or had to be won over to participate in it)." This is also the key to success: The national movement failed where it in Phase B was not able to take the interests of the specific classes and groups that constituted the small nation, introduce these interests into national agitation, and articulate them in national terms.<sup>43</sup>

In Hroch's terms, this was a matter of articulating the existing *nationally relevant conflicts*, such as those between the old guild handicraftsmen (and the small traders), and the large-scale industrial producers (and big merchants). Where the former belonged to the "oppressed" nation and the latter to the "ruling" nation, this conflict of interest could be transformed into a national conflict. The extent to which this happened and how strong it was, would depend on whether the coming of the industrial revolution coincided with phase B.

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<sup>42</sup> Hroch (1985:178).

<sup>43</sup> Hroch (1985:185–86).

A second nationally relevant conflict may be found within the intelligentsia. When the division of society into estates was dissolved as a part of the industrialization process, members of the non-noble strata gained access to secondary and higher education. While their numbers were increasing, they found their upward mobility into the higher and better paid professions blocked, as these were still monopolized by the old elite, who were traditionally self-recruiting. Where this elite belonged predominantly to the ruling nation, and the newly educated strata to the oppressed nation, membership in the small nation began to be interpreted as a group handicap, and thus social antagonism became converted into a national question.

A third nationally relevant conflict concerns the transition from feudal to industrial society. This is a conflict between the principle of civic equality and a society divided into estates. The growing hostility of the popular strata to feudal privileges and to the barriers between estates took on a national character in the case of oppressed nations, since the privileged strata generally belonged to the ruling nation. Equality for all citizens came to mean equality irrespective of nationality: thus equality between nations and equality between the members of each nation amounted to the same, and national and democratic demands went hand in hand.

Hobsbawm, Gellner, Hroch and partly Mann point out that, at the threshold of modernity, certain groups felt politically and/or economically oppressed or disadvantaged, as well as being culturally different from their oppressors – and they see a link between this and the rise of national movements. In my view, Hroch provides a better explanation of the mechanisms that give rise to national movements in these situations than the others, Gellner in particular. An important difference is that where Gellner is macro-oriented and abstract, Hroch's approach is much more agency-oriented and more open.

Hroch's emphasis on the dynamics between nationally relevant conflicts and national agitation seems especially fruitful, for at least two reasons. First, because it accentuates that agitation on behalf of the nation was not in itself enough to complete the nation-forming process successfully. Hroch's three-phase scheme is of course most useful in situations where a national cultural revival preceded a political movement – as in the Czech and Slovak cases. Second, his term "nationally relevant conflict" is well suited for studying national conflict also between fully formed nations in multi-national states – as I intend to do. The main advantage of Hroch's theory is thus that it provides a good point of departure for empirical research.

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So far, I have focused on the differences between the various approaches, but the discussion has also revealed several similarities. First, most scholars distinguish between two main routes to nationhood in Europe, with the Germans, the Italians and partly the Poles (Mann, Hroch) sometimes presented as a third category. Along the "civic path", originally culturally heterogeneous populations were welded into nations; along the "nationalist path", culturally more homogeneous populations were mobilized against a foreign ruling elite. The labels differ – *small* nations versus *ruling* nations, nations based on *vertical* versus *lateral* ethnies, *state-subverting* versus *state-reinforcing* nations, etc., but the same cases are included.



Second, most scholars today agree that nations are modern, and virtually all agree that nationalism (qua ideology and movement) is a modern phenomenon. In the words of A. D. Smith, "nations are modern, as is nationalism, even when their members think they are very old and even when they are in part created out of pre-modern cultures and memories."<sup>44</sup> The *disagreement* on the modernity–antiquity axis thus concerns *causes*: What were the primary factors behind the advent of nations and nationalism? Within the (post-)modernist camp, there is disagreement concerning what aspect of modernization was most important; and between the modernists and the ethnicists, there is disagreement about how important modernization was compared to pre-modern cultural elements. Even on this point, the differences between scholars are a matter of emphasis; most scholars accord a role to modernization, whether as a primary force or a catalyst. Likewise, most scholars attribute some role to pre-modern cultural factors, whether as differentiating features, building blocks, or *ethnie*.

The sharpest scholarly dispute seems to concern whether nations are the result of concerted and conscious efforts by certain individuals to "invent" traditions, or the results of historical processes. This is partly a matter of continuity or change, partly a matter of agency. According to Eley and Suny, "the fundamental insight of the 'constructionists' is that nationality is not a natural consequence or outgrowth of common culture or long antiquity; nations are not so much discovered or awakened, as they are created or invented by the labors of intellectuals."<sup>45</sup>

Against this, A. D. Smith argues first, that it is almost impossible to disentangle the elements of pure invention from the rediscovery, revival, or reconstruction of pre-existing elements. He polemizes against the view that the pre-national past can be used freely as raw materials or building blocks; he points out that it is always the past of that particular nation that is reformulated, and argues that this acts as a restraint on invention. Yet, he admits that nation-forming processes do involve some degree of "invention", in the sense that existing elements are often recombined in new ways. Second, Smith argues that it is one thing to establish traditions, while it is quite another to ensure their lasting success and popular acceptance.<sup>46</sup> Hroch makes some of the same points, arguing that also scholarly principles worked against invention.<sup>47</sup>

Whether they regard nations as entirely modern or based on pre-national ties, as invented or historically constituted, most scholars agree that nations *are* real, substantial entities. Recently, however, constructivist oriented scholars like Rogers Brubaker have argued that this means taking "a conception inherent in the practice of nationalism [...] – namely the realist, reifying conception of nations as real communities – and [making] this conception central to the theory of nationalism." Brubaker proposes the concept "nationness" instead of "nation."<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> A. D. Smith (1996b:385).

<sup>45</sup> See the introduction to Eley & Suny (1996:23).

<sup>46</sup> A. D. Smith: "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?" in Ringrose & Lerner (1993:15–16).

<sup>47</sup> Miroslav Hroch: Europeisk nasjonalhistorie, in: Øystein Sørensen: *Jakten på det norske* (1998:225).

<sup>48</sup> Brubaker (1996:15).

### ***Where do I stand?***

My point of departure is that theories are not representations of the world, but tools of understanding, and as such they can be more useful, or less so. I tend to prefer specific theories that are conducive to empirical research, rather than general and more abstract theories. Likewise, I prefer approaches that combine agency with structure. While agreeing that nations were, to a greater or lesser degree, the results of "hard, continuous, repeated, creative labor" on the part of intellectuals and nationalist leaderships,<sup>49</sup> I do not think that the advent of nations can be explained by the conscious actions of individuals alone. We also need to explain the effects of those actions causally: What were the conditions that made them fail or succeed?<sup>50</sup>

The failure to answer *why* and *how* nations and nationalism came about is the reason why I find unsatisfactory the recent constructivist tendency to focus exclusively on nationalism as "discourse" or "practice." To state that nations are constituted by a nationalist discourse where the conception of nations as real, substantial entities is central, is just a more complicated way of saying that nations exist by virtue of a collective awareness of belonging together. I do not believe that nations will go away if we as scholars stop using the concept "nation", nor can I see what difference it would make if we use a different term like Brubaker's "nationness."

There are actually two analytically different, yet historically intertwined processes that need to be explained. On the one hand, we need to explain how the awareness of being a collectivity united by certain shared cultural features *formed*, how this awareness *spread* from an elite to the masses, and how it is *perpetuated*. This is a matter of what makes national identity form and of what factors facilitate its diffusion and continued existence – in other words, of explaining the nation-forming process and the salience of national identity.

On the other hand, we need to explain how national identities became politically relevant. This is, first, a matter of explaining the rise of certain *ideas*; chiefly the notion that a community of people believing themselves to be a nation, united by certain shared elements of culture and a feeling of belonging together, should have the right to rule itself. Second, it is a matter of explaining why this program was taken up by an elite, and why it was subsequently accepted (or not accepted) by a majority of those deemed to belong to the nation(-to-be).

### ***From ethnies to national identity***

Collective identities form through contacts within a group, but also in contrast to the others: This means that membership in the group is defined by the things that unite the group and at the same time distinguish it from the (important) others. In practice not all features will be equally relevant, of course; some cultural features are used as emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some cases radical differences are played down and denied.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Eley & Suny (1996:23).

<sup>50</sup> Ottar Dahl: *Problemer i historiens teori* (1986:49).

<sup>51</sup> Fredrik Barth: *Ethnic groups and boundaries* (1969:14).

The awareness of belonging to a cultural community (or an *ethnie* in A. D. Smith's term) thus probably formed through various contacts with the culturally different others. On the one hand, conquest and wars between ethnically different groups served to unite people across families, clans and tribes against the (more) alien others. On the other hand, trade put at least the people of market towns and the surrounding areas in touch with traveling foreigners. In Europe, Christianity brought with it missionaries, pilgrimages and crusades; in the Middle Ages universities (and educational "pilgrimages") were added.<sup>52</sup>

Political-geographical borders may have played a role in two ways: By delimiting the possible common denominators that could function as criteria of inclusion and exclusion for the "we-group", and by serving as frameworks for and stops in communication and contact. Diets were assembled of members of the political class (nobility, gentry, higher clergy and burghers of free and royal towns) in the unit (kingdom, principality, duchy, etc.). Trade across borders was impeded by levied tax; and certain goods could not be exported at all (e.g. gold and other precious metals). This contact pattern would also explain why an awareness of being a culturally unique group formed first among the political elite and urban populations.

By the end of the Middle Ages, some awareness of belonging to over-local communities based on some cultural sameness was common among elites and urban populations many places in Europe, including the Czech lands. Starting in the latter half of the 18th century, such diffuse and socially limited *ethnic* identities were turned into more explicit and widespread *national* identities. The transition was not completed until around the middle of the 19th century at the earliest. What happened during this transition was twofold:

First, a nation-forming elite more or less consciously formulated what it meant to be a nation, by defining the features that the nation-to-be shared, which in turn functioned as criteria of inclusion and exclusion. These features varied from case to case, depending on the historical circumstances. Yet, the choice of features that were deemed constituting depended not only on what the nation(-to-be) had in common as opposed to the important others. "Imported" ideas of what it meant to be a nation also played a role in many cases. The Herderian idea of language as the soul of the nation was especially influential, also where language was not originally an important part of the pre-modern identity – as in the Serbian case.<sup>53</sup>

Second, nation-forming was about spreading the new national identity (certain features, the awareness of sharing these features, and the solidarity this implied) from an elite to all strata of the nation-to-be. These were frequently interconnected processes: The defined contents of national identity changed simultaneously with the inclusion of more and more groups in the nation. The contents of national identity are not fixed, but often change also after the nation is fully formed. There may be competing opinions of what it means to be a nation – or different *national ideologies*, whose advocates are trying to win "more souls" for their concept.

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<sup>52</sup> "Nation" was used about students from roughly the same geographical or linguistic region. See Greenfeld (1992:4).

<sup>53</sup> See e.g. Ivo Banac: *The national question in Yugoslavia* (1988).

The contents of national identity seem to vary according to the route to nationhood. Generally, the contents of national identity seem culturally "thicker" in the cases that followed the nationalist route to nationhood, while the original contents of national identity in the "first-born" nations were more voluntary and political in character. However, these differences should not be over-emphasized. Also the "civic" nations were clearly based on a certain cultural heritage, namely the heritage of the dominating elite; or, in A. D. Smith's term, the ethnic core. Conversely, the contents of identity in the "cultural" nations were not linked exclusively to cultural features, but also to some extent associated with a territory, a homeland.

While *ethnie* crystallized over a long period of time through interaction within culture groups and between culture groups, without anyone's active planning or promotion, there was at least some element of conscious planning or "invention" in the case of the *nation*. However, the nation-building metaphor that has been used to describe nation-forming in Western Europe<sup>54</sup> implies a larger degree of construction by the elite than what was generally the case – at least initially. The incorporation of new groups and outlying regions in the dominant *ethnie* was at first largely an unplanned side effect of other processes. Yet, even in France national consciousness permeated the masses only after the idea of belonging to the French nation could be advanced through a compulsory education system, and that was not until the late 19th century. In the "nationalist" case, the planned element is even clearer; the national "awakeners" actively promoted the formation as well as the diffusion of the new national identity.

The two routes to nationhood also differed greatly in terms of the power of the agents of nation-forming. *Ruling elites* had superior coercive power through the control of the secret police, the judiciary and the military, as well as having superior control of incentives and means of promoting their national project, through the education system, the administration, the political system and the mass media. By contrast, *national movements* had to mobilize support for their cause mainly through agitation, rallies, newspapers (if allowed), clubs and meetings. People might or might not listen to them, and there was often a risk associated with joining the national movement.

The elements in this description should be familiar. Regardless of all other variations, some elite played an important role in all nation-forming processes, performing the dual task of formulating the contents of nationhood and of diffusing national consciousness to the masses. In order to do so, it had to have certain means at its disposal: a way of transmitting the message (the awareness of being a nation, predicated upon certain shared features) to the masses. In most places in Europe, mass literacy, mass media and compulsory education seem to have been preconditions for the mass diffusion of national identity. Many scholars, also some not been presented here, have emphasized these modern conditions. On the other hand, Hroch suggests that mass diffusion was possible before this in cases where a national church was the bearer of identity, chiefly in the Balkans. Here the church could provide the institutional means of diffusing a national awareness orally, through the retelling of national legends.

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<sup>54</sup> See e.g. Stein Rokkan: *Stat, nasjon, klasse* (1987); Øyvind Østerud: *Hva er nasjonalisme?* (1994:24).

Finally, and perhaps less obvious, the completion of the nation-forming process rested on certain ideas that matured during the French Revolution and in its aftermath, ideas through which national identity became politically relevant.

How did those ideas emerge? Why did those particular elites take upon themselves the task of formulating the contents of nationhood, of diffusing national consciousness to the masses, and/or defending the rights of the nation(-to-be) against the ruling elite? And why were this national identity, and the national program that often accompanied it, accepted and even enthusiastically supported by the masses? If a message, an elite and the means to diffuse it were all that was needed, then all nation-forming processes would succeed, sooner or later. Since this is not the case, we need to explain what it takes.

### ***Changing ideas of nation and legitimacy***

Ethnic communities have existed for a long time, yet before the French Revolution it did not occur to anyone that this should have political consequences. The relevant divides were between members of the Estates and the *plebs* and between people of different religious denominations. The *nation* was conceived in terms of a political elite (those enjoying political rights) up to the French Revolution. Principles of legitimacy were linked to divine sanction and heritage, although the Estates often had the formal right to elect the king. Free election of kings normally only occurred when the male line of the former ruling house became extinct. Lands were added (and lost) to kingdoms and empires through marriage and wars.

What happened in the course of the French Revolution and its aftermath, was a fusion between a community of culture and a political principle of legitimacy. First, the nation came to be conceived as the whole people, and not only a political elite. This is important in explaining why someone should try to convince the masses that they were a nation, and how groups without any ruling class could begin to see themselves as nations, as was the case with the Slovaks. Second, the nation (the whole people) became the new basis for legitimate rule. The principle of national self-determination, first expressed through the French Revolution, rested on new ideas of the natural rights of man, originating in the Enlightenment. Through the ideas of Rousseau, self-determination was accorded not only to individuals, but also to groups – namely nations. In Rousseau's scheme, the nation was more of a political than a cultural unit, although he did imply certain common rules and institutions.

Combined with the ideas of Herder, who saw the nation as an organic whole and the native language as the soul of the nation, this new principle of legitimacy was revolutionary in impact. In the West, national self-determination was primarily a democratic program, stating that legitimate rule is rule by the people for the people. In Eastern Europe, it became a program for national political liberation on cultural ground. In some cases, national self-determination of the cultural brand meant national *and* democratic rule. Where the nation was politically underprivileged, democratic and national demands amounted to the same. In other cases, *national* was divorced from *democratic*, and national self-determination was compatible with limited or non-existent democracy. The Hungarian case after 1867 is an example of this.

***Why did elites (and later masses) take up the national program?***

Why then did certain elites<sup>55</sup> embark on the task of forming a nation on the basis of a diffuse feeling of belonging together in a community of culture? This is a difficult question indeed. A first problem is whether we can really assume that a nation was an intended outcome, and not just an accidental side effect of actions that had other motives. *If* we assume intention, we need to explain what motivated the action on part of the elite.

Let us first turn to the question of intention. Intention is loud and clear in the latter part of nation-forming processes, whether the elite in question worked through a national movement from below (the agitators of Hroch's phase B) or used the means of a ruling elite in power ("nation-building" elites in Western Europe). On the other hand, it is not necessarily obvious that the intention of the scholars of phase A in Hroch's scheme was to provide the foundations for national identity, even though that was clearly the result. Initially, the various national cultural revivals were spurred by Enlightenment ideals of scholarship and education. The idea that scholarship should serve the nation made a breakthrough only after the turn of the 19th century, under the influence of German Romanticism and the ideas of the French Revolution. As for the "first-born" nations of the West, the initial incorporation of new classes and groups in the culture of the dominating elite was even less planned, let alone intended.

One possible explanation is the self-interest or manipulation theory, which is based on the assumption that an elite wanted the masses to believe that they were a part of the nation, in order to serve their own (material) interests. Gains that might be achieved through the manipulation of the masses could include peace and order (for the ruling class), access to power (for an elite in opposition), or also job opportunities (for an intellectual elite).

This seems to fit the Western cases best. It would clearly be in the interest of a ruling elite to keep the masses quiet, and if the elite believed that this could be done by propagandizing that "we all belong together", it would seem reasonable to try to do so. Likewise, if access to power could be achieved by claiming to represent the people (the nation) against the feudal ruling class, it would be stupid not to try this. On the other hand, if the nation-forming elite did not believe in its own message, why then should the elite believe in the ability of the symbolism linked to "nation" to keep people quiet, or to mobilize them?

One argument against manipulation as a motive in the case of national movements is that it is hard to see what the scholars of phase A would stand to gain from studying the language and history of their nation-to-be, apart from the derision of the ruling nation. The individual agitators in phase B in many cases risked their careers, years in prison, perhaps even their lives – and for what? – an insecure gain in the distant future, and not necessarily even in their own lifetime. This does not seem a rational thing to do if narrow self-interest was the motivation.

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<sup>55</sup> I here use the term elite in a loose sense. There is of course a big difference in terms of power between a ruling elite in a more or less multi-ethnic state, and the leaders of national movements, who were sometimes an intellectual and educational elite, but generally not a political elite. The gap between the "elite" and the masses becomes more blurred in this case.

Alternatively, we may assume that these people actually believed in their message – which means that they believed in the existence of their nation, and that this nation should have the same rights and possibilities as every other nation. What then, was their motivation, if not the prospect of personal material gain? The strength of the ideas of nationalism? Hardly. For one thing, people do not normally adhere to ideas because of the pure strength of the ideas themselves; and if so, the broader success of national movements would be very puzzling indeed.

What we often fail to recognize is that national movements are not the mere sum of individual actions: they are collective in nature, and so is their motivation. It is the well being and the interests of the nation (conceived as those that are like "us" in essential ways) that informs action. The nation as a source of self-respect and pride in what is "ours" is in my view more important to understand the emotional power of "nationalism" than individual prospects of material gain. When people are willing to die for their nation, they do so for people like themselves, people they identify with, people who are bound together in an "extended family", a community of shared ancestry<sup>56</sup> – not for some vague idea or career opportunity.

Thus, the decay of the nation has to be stopped, its cultural heritage must be preserved and cultivated, and the people must again be proud of being a part of the nation. Once a certain measure of cultural consolidation is achieved, the national awakeners start their campaign on behalf of the nation, claiming equal cultural, political and socio-economic rights. This is a continuation of the quest for identity: We, the nation, are being treated unfairly. Wrongs committed to the nation are also seen as an attack on the worth and the pride of the individual members. Part of what informed the actions of the national awakeners was a genuine feeling of belonging together in a community of fate, a community that was not being respected the way it should by the others, the members of the ruling nation. Emotion played a part that is not recognized by the "invention" school. On the other hand, we should not fall in the opposite trap of claiming that material interests or conflicts had nothing whatsoever to do with this.

The question is what made the nation-forming elite feel so strongly for the nation, what made national identities salient. This is where material interests come in. I think what Hroch calls *nationally relevant conflicts* are important: first, for explaining what motivated an elite to take up a national program and try to convince the rest of the people that they were a nation that should decide its own fate. Second, such conflicts are important for explaining why the masses rallied behind the national cause. One nationally relevant conflict that concerned the intellectuals was the introduction of a vernacular language other than their own in the administration, which left them disadvantaged and strengthened the feeling of belonging together with other members of the disadvantaged culture. The choice of another language was also a devaluation of the native language and thus of those who used it. This is a nationally relevant conflict linked to the rise of the modern state.

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<sup>56</sup> This is of course a myth, insofar as most nations are not genetically related in any real sense, and genetically, there are no sharp dividing lines between nations, because of migration and assimilation processes.

In the case of the masses, various political and economic conflicts occurring during the transition from feudalism to a capitalist, industrialized society concurred with cultural divides, converting social antagonisms into national ones. National movements succeeded because they were able to unite national, social and sometimes also democratic demands. Once national identity encompassed everyone, it could be perpetuated through institutional means, with the mass media, national organizations of different kinds (from publishing houses via theaters to political parties) and the educational system as the most important.

This can be used as a point of departure also for addressing national conflicts in multi-national states. If the concurrence of cultural, political and economic divides could help form national identities in conjunction with nationalist agitation during the transition from feudal to modern society, it is likely that this will have similar effects in multi-national states today. In other words, if there are great and systematic differences in political power, cultural opportunities and economic means between the national communities of a multi-national state, the national conflict level between the groups is likely to be high. Here it will probably be difficult to build a new, overarching identity, because nationally relevant conflicts will perpetuate the existing identification processes and sharpen the boundaries between the communities.

### ***How "voluntary" is national identity?***

A paradox is that while it was to a certain degree possible to weld together culturally heterogeneous populations into nations in France and Britain, the very same project failed in the Habsburg empire and in Russia. Why? Part of the answer is of course that the image of the successful welding together of culturally heterogeneous groups in West European nation-states is inaccurate, if not entirely false. The result turned out not to be nation-states after all; national revivals in Catalonia, among the Basques, the Scots, the Welsh, the Flemish attest to that – although they are of course referred to as regions rather than nations.

Yet, there are also plenty of examples that people *have* changed their identity – historically during the amalgamation of various peoples into nations in Western Europe, and more recently involving immigrants to settler societies. This suggests that identities can to a certain extent be chosen, and that it is in principle possible to make groups that were (at least originally) culturally heterogeneous into nations. On the other hand, the fact that national opposition movements were able to advance their national projects against the larger projects of the ruling elites in Russia and the Habsburg empire indicates that nations are not *easily* invented or constructed. If that were the case, the ruling elites, with all their resources, would surely have an advantage over the, relatively speaking, powerless and disorganized national movements?

First, it is probably easier to identify with someone if you have something tangible in common with him or her. This may be part of the reason why it was easier for a Czech "awakener" to convince a fellow Czech-speaking peasant that they were both Czech, than for a French civil servant to convince an Alsatian German-speaking peasant that they were both French.



Second, national identity is probably more "voluntary" during a nation-forming process, than after national consciousness has become common. Once there, national identity becomes more or less inescapable, because it is reproduced through the institutions of society, including the family, the school system, the mass media, even sports. This does not mean that all individuals, even in modern nations, necessarily have a professed subjective national identity.

Third, national identity (or any collective identity) is never exclusively a matter of choice on the part of the individual. In order to become a member of a nation (or any other group) you must also be accepted by the rest of the group. Change of identity thus not only requires re-identification on part of the individual, but also recognition from the others. If someone's individual features are not compatible with the core constituting features of a collective identity, he or she will not be accepted. National identity may be *exclusive*, based on inheritance and blood, *limiting*, based on a language (which may be learned) or *inclusive*, based on self-definition and adherence to certain political institutions. The latter is more open to outsiders, but it is also less tangible, and thus probably less competitive in terms of being a source of identification.

It may thus seem that the chances of welding a culturally heterogeneous population together will be best in cases where (1) there are no, or weak, alternative (cultural) foundations for identification, i.e. where the groups in question are ethnic categories rather than ethnies; (2) where there are no, or few, nationally relevant conflicts, i.e. conflicts that coincide with recognizable cultural divides; and (3) where there is no "nationally" aware elite.

It may be argued that to the extent it was possible to weld culturally heterogeneous populations together in the West European cases, timing was crucial: The slow process of bureaucratic incorporation of the original ethnic groups in France started at a time when the rapid changes and new conflicts accompanying the transition to a mobile, modern society were not yet under way.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, this happened before the emergence of the idea that culture should be politically relevant. By the time Germanization was attempted in the Habsburg empire, the national revivals were already in progress, and the national movements had the conflict structure of early modern society and a more tangible "sameness" on their side.

### ***Concluding remarks***

Let me summarize the argument. Nations are historically constituted, dynamic and in constant change, which also helps explain the great variations in the contents of identity, how and when they were formed. The formation of ethnies or ethnic categories, the cores on which many modern nations were built, was not possible without contact and conceivably also conflict with culturally different others. Conflicts between groups that are culturally different from each other serve to reinforce identity and strengthen internal solidarity. National conflicts occur when conflicts of interest or value coincide with national cultural divides.

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<sup>57</sup> French was declared the official language as early as in 1539, according to Douglas Johnson: 'The making of the French nation', in Mikuláš Teich & Roy Porter (eds.): *The national question in Europe in historical context* (1993:41).

A transition from pre-national to national entities required, first, the existence of an elite who took upon itself the dual task of *defining* the contents of national identity, if necessary through the revival of a literary language and by spelling out and rewriting history; and of *diffusing* that national identity to the masses. Second, the elite had to have the necessary *means* to achieve this, in terms of mass literacy, mass media, compulsory education, etc. There were enormous differences in resources between the ruling elite of the "first-born" nations and the national movements from below of the "nationalist" route, yet neither route to nationhood was guaranteed success – "nation-building" least of all. Third, people were receptive to nationalist ideas because they lived in a society where political and economic disadvantages corresponded to ethnic or cultural divisions. National movements succeeded in mobilizing people because they were able to identify their oppressors as culturally different. The problem was not only that national identity coincided with social class (in terms of social and/or political positions) and that class divisions thus reinforced national divisions, but also that the culture and language of the subordinate group(s) tended to be undervalued, considered as folksy and the like.

The assertion that nationalism creates nations "where they do not exist" is thus at best inaccurate. At the very least the awareness among the elite of being a culturally unique group must precede political demands on behalf of the nation-to-be. On the other hand, the idea that the nation should rule itself does not follow automatically from the fact that people feel themselves to be a culturally unique group. People have lived in multi-ethnic empires for centuries without ever doubting the right of a culturally foreign ruler or even ruling class to decide over them. This core idea of nationalism qua ideology is a truly modern phenomenon, caused by the merging of Enlightenment ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy with a new conception of nation on the one hand, and certain ideas of German Romanticism on the other.

A national movement fills two tasks: On the one hand its activities are directed inwards, striving to consolidate the objective foundations of nationhood and at the same time diffusing the awareness of being a nation to the masses. Then, if the nation does not possess a state of its own, these inwardly oriented activities are paralleled by an external struggle for national cultural and political autonomy (or ultimately: secession) directed against the rulers. National movements arise in opposition to the modern centralizing state, specifically to the political elite of the modern state, and they define the identity of their nation in opposition to the ruling nation that they feel oppressed by.

The two nations that are the focus of this study, the *Czechs* and the *Slovaks*, both followed the "nationalist" route to nationhood. National movements formulated the contents of national identity, spread this identity to the masses and finally achieved independence from the former ruling nations, the Germans and the Magyars. Czechoslovakia was anything but the nation-state the new ruling elite proclaimed it to be, and the elite had to decide how to cope with this circumstance. The Czechoslovak nation project was an attempt at forming a nation from above, but, unlike the "state-nations" of Western Europe, this nation project comprised only some two-thirds of the citizens, the Czechs and Slovaks, while excluding the rest. In summation, then, it should be fairly clear that the approach applied in this thesis owes most to the theories of Anthony D. Smith and Miroslav Hroch.

# *Four*

## *A nationality policy framework*

*There are recurrent tendencies to ethnic cleavage and identifiable patterns of conflict, but (...) even in the most severely divided society, ties of blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood.*

**Donald L. Horowitz<sup>1</sup>**

The main object of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing national conflict in multi-national states, by combining elements from theories of nations and nationalism with typologies of national conflict regulation. These traditions are only partly overlapping. Theories of nations and nationalism tend to focus on why and how nations and nationalism originated (basically in the 18th and 19th centuries), while studies of national conflict regulation tend to focus on how contemporary states handle their multi-nationality.

The national conflict level in multi-national states is the outcome of four factors: The existence of national "we-groups"; the actual differences between them in political power, social position and cultural opportunities; how these differences are perceived and presented in terms of national demands on behalf of the various national groups; and how the demands are met by the government. I will use the term *nationality policy* about government strategies<sup>2</sup> directed at all types of national groups, which implies that national problems in multi-national states can be analyzed within the same theoretical framework. That does not mean it is unimportant whether the national groups in question are large or small, indigenous or immigrant: On the contrary, these are factors that may have a bearing both on to what extent national demands are advanced and especially on the specific contents of those demands.

My ambition has not primarily been to provide a theory of what makes a particular nationality policy succeed, or to make a contribution to the development of real-world nationality policies (the latter is the domain of politicians, not scholars), but to provide a theoretical framework for empirical research. This framework is thus meant as a heuristic device that may help us to ask the "right" questions, more than an attempt to provide the "right" answers. I will start by elaborating on the nationality policy concept, through a survey of common demands voiced by national movements, and possible nationality policy strategies on part of the government. This comprises the larger part of the chapter. Then I will discuss some factors that may affect the choice of government strategies. Finally, I will discuss the conditions for success: Under what circumstances is a certain nationality policy most likely to succeed? Especially in the latter part of the chapter I draw on the existing body of theories of nations and nationalism.

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<sup>1</sup> Donald L. Horowitz: *Ethnic groups in conflict* (1985:684).

<sup>2</sup> The term "government" is here used in a loose sense, in the meaning of political authority.

Theoretical approaches to the study of government strategies towards the national question in multi-national states vary considerably, even in the use of terms. We may distinguish between three broad research traditions: One is focused on national integration or nation-building, and is generally premised on the idea of making ethnic or national differences go away. A second is focused on ethnic or national conflict resolution or regulation, and often, but not always, takes the multi-national composition of the state for granted.<sup>3</sup> A third research tradition is associated with the concept of a nationality policy, and generally concerns Eastern Europe.<sup>4</sup>

The advantages of the third approach are, first, that no assumption is made about the objective of the policy. Whether the aim of a nationality policy is to make national differences go away, to solve national conflicts, or merely to contain or repress them, is an empirical question that has to be resolved in each case. I think that the various strategies aimed at dealing with ethnic or national diversity should be treated as a multi-dimensional variable rather than as separate phenomena or parts of a typology. Second, the notion of a governmental nationality policy forces us to distinguish between various agents in terms of power: The nationality policy is formulated and executed by an elite in power, and can be contrasted with national demands raised on behalf of national groups. These are formulated by somebody (with less power) claiming to speak on behalf of the national group in question. Third, this approach allows us to distinguish rather sharply between aims and outcomes, and thus raises the question of why a policy failed or succeeded.

Pedro Ramet defines nationality policy as "a unified, purposeful and coherent program, which is potentially consistent, and which infuses specific decisions and actions of state",<sup>5</sup> which implies both an ideological program and concrete actions by the government. In Walker Connor's usage, a Leninist nationality policy denotes Lenin's view of the national question, including a theory of nations and nationalism as well as a strategy. He distinguishes analytically between three dimensions of the Leninist policy of national equality: one cultural, one economic and one political dimension. Combined, these provide an image of a nationality policy as a multi-dimensional concept, involving consciously designed policies within the political, the cultural and the economic domains. In addition, however, the policies of the government should be related to potential demands made on behalf of national groups.

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<sup>3</sup> The distinction between these two research traditions is pointed out by Horowitz (1985: pp. 566 ff.). Examples of the former are Karl W. Deutsch: *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1966), Charles Tilly (ed.): *The formation of National States in Western Europe* (1975), Anthony H. Birch: *Nationalism & national integration* (1989). Examples of the latter is Arend Lijphart: *Democracy in plural societies* (1977) and Eric A. Nordlinger: *Conflict regulation in divided societies* (1972). Examples of a wider use of ethnic conflict regulation, which also includes integration/assimilation, are the typologies of John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary: *The politics of ethnic conflict regulation* (1993), and John Coakley: *The resolution of ethnic conflict. Towards a typology* (1992a).

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. R. A. Kann: *Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches* (1993); L. Szarka: *The Slovak national question and Hungarian nationality policy before 1918* (1994); A. Kommisrud: *Statsbygging og sosio-økonomisk endring i multinasjonale samfunn* (1993); J. Bugajski: *Ethnic politics in Eastern Europe. A guide to nationality policies, organizations and parties* (1995); P. Ramet: *Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia 1963–1983* (1984); W. Connor: *The national question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (1984).

<sup>5</sup> Ramet (1984:43).

### ***National demands and nationally relevant conflicts***

As pointed out in Chapter Three, national movements from below combined two tasks: On the one hand, they formulated what it meant to be a nation and tried to diffuse the awareness of being a nation to the masses. This is the nation-forming aspect of their activities. On the other hand, they claimed to speak on behalf of this nation, and defended what they perceived as the national interest against the ruling nation. This articulation of national demands belongs to the outward-directed activities of national movements.

One kind of national demand directly related to the quest for national identity is the demand for *recognition* as a nation. Such demands may be termed *symbolic*, as opposed to more *practical* demands within the political, socio-economic, or cultural domain. Symbolic demands are tied to the status of the national group in question within the multi-national state. This is first and foremost a claim to uniqueness (*we* are a nation too), but it is also a claim to equality (as a nation, we are entitled to the status and the rights that belong to a nation). This is more than a matter of mere words: Recognition or the lack of such may be of consequence for how the government meets other national demands as well. Without nationhood to bolster the claim, it is much more difficult to get, say, separate schools or political autonomy. The claim for national recognition is especially important where the government has a nation project of its own that it wants to promote – as was the case in the First Czechoslovak Republic.

*Practical* demands may principally be subdivided in two: demands for national equality and demands for autonomy. Demands for *autonomy* go to the very core of the nationalist doctrine, claiming for each nation the right to decide its own fate and manage its own affairs. These demands are directed at structures, rules and decision-making power. Demands for national *equality* are relational in character, concern the outcome of policies and may be expected to be more directly associated with the existence of nationally relevant conflicts.

A nationally relevant conflict of interest may be said to exist *objectively* when national divisions coincide with patterns of cultural, economic or political inequality. It becomes important for the national conflict level only if the members of a national group are made aware that they are being deprived or disadvantaged, whether compared to other national groups or compared to the former status of their own group. If that happens, nationally relevant conflicts become expressed through national demands aimed at correcting the alleged wrong. This also means that we can expect a national demand to disappear from the national agenda once the problem has been solved.

However, the link between national demands and nationally relevant conflicts is not quite that simple. First, we cannot assume that all national demands correspond to the "objective" interests of all parts of the nation. As Miroslav Hroch has pointed out, there will be some interests that are shared by practically all members of the national group, regardless of their standing. In addition, however, some group interests become transformed into national interests through their association with members of the personified nation, which is conceived as a unity. The interests of a part of the nation are thus seen as the interests of the whole nation.

Second, the articulation of national demands requires a national movement or a group of individuals who take it upon themselves to speak on behalf of the nation(-to-be). Historically, such national spokesmen began to appear only after national awareness had started to become widespread, in Europe in the course of the 19th century. Third, national demands were not uniform, even within one and the same national movement. Hroch has shown that national demands were cumulative and expanding during the nation-forming process. He distinguishes between various levels of social, cultural-linguistic and political demands and shows that, contrary to a common assumption, full national self-determination became a demand very late.<sup>6</sup>

Before we take a look at the most common practical demands within the political, cultural and economic domains, it should be noted that there is no fixed time sequence between them. In some cases, political demands came early in the nation forming process (sometimes even before the nation was fully formed), but cultural demands preceded political demands in the case of most non-dominant nations in Europe (including the Czechs and Slovaks).<sup>7</sup>

*Political* demands for autonomy may be more or less far-reaching. The ultimate demand is an independent state, although historically, national movements have often stopped short of this. Secession does not always seem feasible, and demands for independence may lead to accusations of treason, possibly also reprisals. Among many of the nationalities of the Habsburg empire, independence was not presented as a national goal until the First World War. More common than secession are demands for autonomy at a local, (municipal), or national level (e.g. federation) or within certain policy areas (e.g. cultural autonomy) – or for the establishment of an administrative unit (the national homeland) for which autonomy is claimed.

The political demand for equality concerns "fair" representation for the nation in the political system. This is a matter of participation in the existing organs, at state level or also at province level. Historically, national and democratic demands often went hand in hand: National groups were under-represented in the political system because they were under-represented in the social groups that had access to political power. A national struggle for participation thus became a struggle for democratization of the political system in order to allow a larger part of the underprivileged national group to participate. Such claims for equal representation became meaningful only under constitutional conditions, of course.

Participation is, at least initially, often seen as a means to achieve other national goals, be they linguistic, cultural, socio-economic or whatever – a means to support the perceived national interest. If this is difficult at state level (the leaders of the national group being in permanent minority), the struggle for autonomy (more influence for the nation in its own affairs) follows naturally, and is often parallel to the struggle for participation, as it was in the Czech case.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Hroch: *V národním zájmu* (1996b:203–204, 212); National self-determination from a historical perspective in S. Periwal: *Notions of nationalism* (1995); *The social interpretation of linguistic demands in European national movements* (1994).

<sup>7</sup> Hroch (1996b:200).

<sup>8</sup> Hroch (1996b:100–104).

In theory, the claim for equality may take on two forms: "our" nation should have an influence that corresponds to our size; or, alternatively, we should have the same influence as the other nations, irrespective of size. In the latter case, the personified nation is taken as a point of departure, and the principle "one nation, one vote", replaces "one man, one vote."

*Economic* demands for autonomy cannot be separated from political autonomy, since they generally require such autonomy, whether they concern national control of natural resources (such as minerals), of the economic surplus that is created on the national territory, or of the recruitment policy. A second type of economic demands concerns justice or equality for the members of the nation and the national territory. Demands may concern investments in infrastructure or industry in the national territory, greater income equality, redistribution of wealth between regions and financial help to ensure economic development for their territory.

Logically, we would expect control over natural resources or economic surplus to become an issue only if the national territory is economically more developed than the rest of the state, and redistribution to become an issue when it is less developed, but again, perceptions play a role. This also means that demands for economic autonomy and demands for economic equality may be partly contradictory, and national movements may have to make a trade-off between the two. Historically, however, another type of (socio-) economic demands was important: demands for the abolition of feudal conditions. These included freedom for serfs and peasants, equal taxation and customs, improvement of the conditions of townspeople, equal access to the school system and equal pay regardless of nationality. The latter working-class oriented demand was naturally a latecomer.

*Cultural* demands are first and foremost aimed at preserving national identity and developing the national culture (especially the language). This is a question of the right to express oneself: Internally, it concerns the right to develop one's own culture and national identity without government interference. Externally, it concerns the right to practice and display this culture in public arenas, like the school system, the administration, the courts and the Parliament. The latter is also a question of cultural equality compared to other national groups within the state, including the ruling nation. Cultural demands may be expected to vary according to which attributes are seen as constituting for the nation, but the major arenas to which they apply tend to be the same: the school system, "public life" and "cultural life."

Demands for the introduction of the national language in the school system may be presented in two forms – as a demand for the national language as a *subject*, and as a *medium of instruction*. The latter demand is stronger and often comes later. Historically, these demands especially concerned secondary schools, as the national language had often already been introduced into elementary school as a matter of necessity (e.g. in the Habsburg empire). Other examples are demands that certain confessions be taught (if religion is important for national identity), or that appropriate attention be paid to (the correct interpretation of) the history of the nation (if a shared history is important for national identity – as is normally the case). Often these demands will be combined with demands for separate schools and universities.

Public life is another important arena. The most far-reaching demands of the linguistic program concern the use of the national language in the courts, in the local and central administration, in post offices, in the railway system and in politics. Apart from demands for national linguistic equality, also proportional representation in the public sector may become an issue. The latter demand is of a socio-economic character. According to Hroch, these demands have been linked; the call for linguistic equality sooner or later turned into a struggle for positions.<sup>9</sup>

The third arena concerns the preservation of national culture. Demands could include permission to publish books etc. in the national language and about the nation, erection of national memorials and preservation of historical ruins and churches, financial and institutional means to study the history and language of the nation, etc. The latter may involve a demand for separate universities and research facilities, and/or employment quotas.

Thus far, I have concentrated on situations where national movements exist and national demands are filed. Both the scope and the contents of national demands vary. We may expect to find the greatest variation between, on the one hand, large, clustered, self-aware national groups, living in their own homeland, and, on the other hand, small, dispersed, non-indigenous groups. Immigrant groups are often more willing to shed their original identity than indigenous populations in the first place – if they are not too different from their host population. Second, their cultural and economic demands seem more limited. Both may have something to do with the fact that immigrants have generally come voluntarily. Finally, I do not know of a single example of a recent immigrant group claiming autonomy or secession. Part of the reason for this is probably that, throughout history, demands for political autonomy have been linked to a strong homeland rhetoric, and that alternative arguments are not easily available.

National demands become directed against the government of the multi-national state, either because the situation that is sought remedied (such as the lack of schools) is the result of a government policy, or also because the national leaders believe that the government can do something about it. This means that they require a government response.

### ***Nationality policy strategies***

A nationality policy may be seen as a policy at two levels, both linked to national demands: A government policy on a *symbolic* level, dealing with demands for recognition, and a policy on a more *practical* level, dealing with demands for equality and autonomy. In this perspective, the available selection of nationality policy strategies can be described in terms of government responses to common national demands. In addition, there are some strategies that do not have counterparts in national demands. Two of these are clearly repressive and morally appalling: Forced population transfer and genocide. A third strategy is the indigenization (*korenizaciya*) policy of the Soviet regime in the 1920s, which encouraged signs of "national uniqueness" among ethnic groups who never even asked for it.

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<sup>9</sup> Hroch (1994:20).



Government responses may be ranged from giving far-reaching concessions to the national groups (an *accommodating* strategy), via a more *neutral* stance, to total *repression* (national discrimination). The two former strategies correspond to Nathan Glazer and Michael Walzer's distinction between measures aimed at *protecting or promoting* an ethnocultural identity and *non-discrimination*.<sup>10</sup> Non-discrimination or a neutral stance basically means that the state will leave the various national groups alone, allowing individual, but not group rights. Only the accommodating strategies allow for nationality as a legitimate interest, and these are thus the only strategies that permit any kind of national autonomy. Accommodating strategies may involve a centralized or a decentralized decision-making system. The table below provides a theoretical grid within which the nationality policy may be said to vary.

**Table 1. Nationality policy strategies**

Stance:		Accommodating		Neutral	Repressive
<i>Level</i>	Dimension	Centralized power	Decentralized power	Either*	Either**
<i>Practical</i>	Political	consociation	federation	individual rights	discrimination
	Economic	equality	economic autonomy	economic criteria	discrimination
	Cultural	equal rights	cultural autonomy	individual rights	discrimination
<i>Symbolic</i>		recognition of individual nationhood		indifference	rejection

\* A neutral stance towards the national question may well be combined with a federal political structure, but the state will not be federated according to *national distribution*, as nationality is not a legitimate interest in the system.

\*\* A repressive stance means that national groups are being discriminated against. The decision to do so may be taken at the central or local level. In the latter case, the group may appeal to the central level over the heads of the local elite, as in the case of the Slovaks before 1867.

Obviously, not all of the conceivable strategies may be combined. (I will return to this later). It should also be kept in mind that the distinction between the levels, dimensions and strategies has been made chiefly for analytical purposes; it may not be that clear-cut in the real world. Some demands within each level and dimension may be accommodated, others not, while both national demands and nationality policies may have practical as well as symbolic aspects. Cultural rights may be institutionalized to a greater or lesser degree, valid for all or just some of the national groups in the state; the political system may be more or less centralized; decision-making may be decentralized in all or just some policy areas.

On the *symbolic* level, demands for national recognition will either be rejected (the regime will not accept the existence of the national group in question) or met (the multi-national structure of the state is admitted). Logically, we would not expect regimes that recognize national plurality to make any attempt at creating an overarching civic identity. The exception is the *korenizaciya* policy, which was seen as a first step on the "dialectical" road to merging.

<sup>10</sup> See Will Kymlicka (ed.): *The rights of minority cultures* (1996:9), and Glazer's and Walzer's contributions in this book.

Conversely, we would expect regimes that refuse to recognize certain national groups to advance an alternative, competing nation project. In this case, a struggle over identity, over "who we really are", may ensue. Subgroups (seeing themselves as separate nations) are then often referred to as regions, tribes or at best ethnic groups. The regime may use pan-national ideologies to cultivate a new overarching identity, or may try to merge the existing national groups into a new identity using the attributes of the dominant group as the point of departure. The borderline between civic and overarching identities may not always be very sharp.

We may expect some sort of cohesion between the nationality policy at a symbolic and practical level: If the nation does not exist, it does not deserve special treatment. If this were always the case, however, the distinction between a symbolic and a practical level would not be very interesting. However, there are even in West European "nation-states" examples of cultural and even political concessions being given also when the group in question is *not* recognized as a separate nation (Basques in Spain, Scots in Britain).

On a more *practical* level, national demands for autonomy and equality within the political, economic and cultural domains can be met by various government strategies. Within the *political* dimension, the demand for autonomy or self-determination is more far-reaching than the demand for the right to participation or representation in the decision-making system, because its fulfillment limits the power and thus the control of the central government over the affairs of the national group in question. Moreover, once such arrangements have been established, they tend to narrow down future options.

Principally, the demand for national self-determination may be *accommodated* in two ways: Through decentralization of decision-making power to the national group in question, or through "national co-rule" at the central level. The former often implies federation, the latter some form of consociationalism. Combinations are of course also possible. If devolution of power from the central to the local level is to serve the purpose of national self-determination, the political-administrative units to which power is devolved must be nationally homogeneous, which in turn requires a certain geographical clustering of the relevant national groups. It is possible to formulate schemes that permit decision-making power – for instance, in cultural matters – for a national group dispersed unevenly over a territory, but this is not usual.<sup>11</sup>

To some extent, political autonomy also requires individual political rights for the national group in question, because participation in political decision-making requires national representation, while the converse is not true. The right to participate in elections and run for office for instance, form part of any democratic system, whereas the safeguarding of the influence of named national groups will require some sort of extra institutional arrangement. In severely divided societies national minorities tend to become permanent political minorities.

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<sup>11</sup> This is what Otto Bauer contemplated in order to save the Habsburg empire, although he wanted economic decisions to be centralized. For details on Otto Bauer's scheme, see A. Kommisrud: "Historiske og historieløse folk. En historisk-sosiologisk teori om nasjonalitetskonflikter i Sentral-Europa", *Sosiologi* 3/1992. The establishment of *Sametinget*, a political organ for members of the Sami minority in Norway, might be one practical example, although it is admittedly not very powerful.

A *neutral* strategy means the absence of national political discrimination. All citizens have the same political rights regardless of nationality – but nationality is not a legitimate interest in the political system, and national groups thus have no collective rights. The state may be unitary or federal, but, in the latter case, the system is not federated according to national divisions (one example here is the United States). While an accommodating stance means giving people rights both as individuals and collectives, a neutral stance thus only allows for the former.

Finally, a *repressive* strategy allows for neither. This means that members of other nations than the ruling nation(s) are oppressed, deprived of local autonomy, as well as individual political rights. Members of non-ruling nations are poorly represented in political positions, or not represented at all. This does not necessarily mean that the state is centralized – only that the national group is deprived of political rights, the origin of which may be at the central or the local level.

Within the *economic* dimension, national demands concern economic autonomy (the freedom to utilize own resources), and economic equality. Economic autonomy is hardly possible without a measure of political autonomy, which may make it impractical to divorce from the political dimension. Economic equality is a question of whether the national group is discriminated against economically, in terms of job opportunities, state investments or economic development. The matter of job opportunities is more directly related to national groups than policies of economic development and state investments, which are spatially oriented in most states – directed at certain territories rather than at specific social groups.

It may be argued that any government will try to keep the regions happy, irrespective of the national composition. Even repressive and centralized regimes sometimes see economic equality as a goal. *If* the main rationale is not the national question, but a wider objective of stability and harmonious economic development, it may be argued that economic policies should be kept apart from the nationality policy. On the other hand, national movements do file certain economic demands. If we retain the notion of a "policy" as something intentional, we may include among nationality policy strategies those economic policies that explicitly refer to national demands and/or are designed to achieve economic equality among national groups. The fact that economic policies aimed at equality seem to cut across political strategies is the main argument in favor of *keeping* a separate economic dimension.

Demands for national economic equality may be *accommodated* through measures like state investments in the territory of the national group, investments in infrastructure, supporting the establishment of new economic activity, employment quotas in the public sector, etc. A *neutral* stance again means that nationality is considered irrelevant: Investments are placed where the need is greatest or where the economic returns are expected to be superior, and the employment criterion is merit. Again, people have rights as citizens and individuals, not as members of national groups. (This may have an integrating effect, even though this is not necessarily the aim.) A *repressive* strategy means that national groups are economically oppressed, excluded from certain jobs, by-passed in terms of investments and infrastructure, taken advantage of, deprived of resources and land, of property rights and the like.

National demands within the *cultural dimension* concern preservation and development of the national "self", as articulated through language, religion, traditions, etc. In practice, *accommodation* of cultural demands is often a question of institutionalization of cultural rights.

Language rights are of course important; especially the right to use the national language as the medium of instruction at all levels of education, and as the language of administration, locally and centrally. In the latter case, bilingualism is in practice required. In order to achieve a national education system where children are taught in their own culture and religion, traditions and history, schools (or at least classes) must be segregated. The ultimate accommodating policy thus becomes separate universities for the national groups. Even cultural rights presuppose a certain geographic clustering of the national group in order to be workable, especially if there are many minorities. It would not be very practical to require civil servants or judges to be fluent in three or four or sixteen languages. For that reason, we can expect institutionalized rights to apply only to the core territory of the national minorities, while the cultural rights of the ruling nation or the majority will be ensured everywhere.

A *neutral* stance means giving national groups language education in their mother tongue (as a *subject*), but not necessarily the right to instruction in it. Schools will usually not be segregated; there will be segregated classes only during language education in the mother tongue. The curricula will be the same for all, and the history of the state will be taught. The religion of the state (or no religion at all) will be taught, but the national groups will be free to practice their religion. All citizens will be obliged to learn the official language of the state, whether this is the mother tongue of the ruling nation or a non-indigenous language.

A repressive strategy means having a uniform school system with the same curriculum for all, or even that national minorities are excluded. National groups may be deprived of the right to practice their religion, be excluded from the administration, the universities, and generally discriminated against culturally. Many cultural expressions will be forbidden. The administration will be monopolized by the ruling nation(s).

Obviously, some combinations of these strategies are more conceivable than others. The *accommodation* strategies on all three dimensions may be combined, in a federalized or consociational political system, with institutionalized cultural rights, employment and representation quotas for the various national groups, etc. Belgium may serve as an example of this.

The *neutral strategies* put together is the classical response of Western liberal societies to immigrants. This nationality policy is based on the non-discrimination principle, where the state protects the minorities against prejudice and discrimination and allows them to maintain whatever part of their ethnic heritage they wish, but does not support them actively, apart from occasional language instruction in the mother tongue. People have rights as individuals or citizens, and these rights are the same for all. The aim of this policy is normally integration. In reality, of course, this "neutral" policy supports the majority's language, history and culture.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See Kymlicka (1996:10) for a discussion of this.

A highly authoritarian regime that relies on coercion may combine the *repressive* strategies on all three dimensions. In this case, the political system will be centralized, national groups will not have any political rights nor any right to assert their culture, and they will be economically oppressed. The initial policy towards the indigenous Americans may be a case in point here.

As for the other combinations, cultural concessions are possible without political concessions. Granting cultural rights (such as the right to use the mother tongue in contact with the authorities) may be an impediment to efficient communication and may increase administration costs, but it will not be a threat to the viability of the multi-national state, unless it should lead to escalating political demands. The reverse option – granting political autonomy without allowing cultural expression – is logically impossible, since autonomy tends to mean decision-making power for national bodies in issues of special importance to that nation. To a certain extent, economic strategies cut across the other two, in as much as policies aimed at economic equality may be combined with all strategies within the political and the cultural dimension.

Since the political dimension seems to be the most confining, we can take this as our point of departure when addressing the possible combinations of strategies:

1. An *accommodating* stance on the political dimension can be combined only with accommodating strategies within the cultural dimension, and logically goes together with recognition of the national group(s) in question. Economic autonomy requires political autonomy, and probably vice versa. Political autonomy could in principle be restricted to legislation, but even that would require a minimum of funding. In the real world, a certain degree of economic autonomy for regional bodies is more common than is legislative power. Finally, political autonomy and cultural rights may be combined both with employment quotas and with merit as an employment criterion, but hardly with discrimination.
2. A *neutral* stance within the political dimension (people have rights as individuals, not as national groups) may be combined with a neutral stance within each of the other two dimensions or also with an accommodating stance in economic matters (integration policies in Western democracies). It can be combined with an accommodating stance within the cultural dimension (limited cultural rights for minority groups in democratic societies, which may or may not mean that national groups are recognized). Finally, it can be combined with a repressive position on the cultural dimension and a neutral or accommodating stance on the economic dimension (assimilation policies in democracies).
3. A *repressive* stance on the political dimension may again be combined with a repressive position on both other dimensions (hegemonic control or assimilation strategies in authoritarian societies, depending on the aim. In the former case, the national or ethnic pluralism is not denied; in the latter case, it is). Total political repression can hardly be combined with extensive cultural autonomy or with the right for national groups to control their own national resources. Yet, limited cultural rights are possible along with political repression in authoritarian and centralized systems. A repressive position on the political dimension may thus be combined with cultural rights, but not with cultural autonomy.

### *The choice of strategy*

It is not easy to provide any general answers to why governments choose one particular combination of strategies and not another. Obviously, governments in different states, and even consecutive governments in the same state, have made different choices over the course of the years. Ultimately, a specific answer must be given for each empirical case. However, we can point out some factors that may serve to confine the policy options that are available.

### *Strategies and aims*

A rather banal point is that the choice of strategy depends on the aim that one seeks to achieve. A nationality policy may be aimed at eliminating national differences and thereby national conflict, at merely keeping the national groups down (hegemonic control) or at moderating conflict. Aims may also be used as alternative criteria of classification. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, for instance, classify conflict regulation in terms of methods for eliminating differences and methods for managing differences. Among the former are genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition and/or secession (self-determination) and integration and/or assimilation. Methods of managing differences are hegemonic control, arbitration (third-party intervention), cantonization and/or federalization and consociationalism or power-sharing. Aims are also indirectly a criterion of classification in John Coakley's typology.<sup>13</sup>

Apart from secession, strategies aimed at eliminating national conflict will be located at the repressive end of the scale, at least in terms of culture. In the most extreme case, elimination means genocide; but also assimilation and integration involve a certain amount of coercion, mainly in terms of cultural standardization. If nothing else, they condition the scope of choice: If your chances of getting work depend on certain language abilities, you have little choice.

Strategies aimed at keeping national groups down (hegemonic control) are generally also located at the repressive end of the scale. This is historically the most common way of handling a multi-ethnic composition. Imperial or authoritarian regimes control multiple cultures within their territories through coercive domination and elite co-option. Throughout history, hegemonic control has often rested on the support of the largest or most powerful national group, but this is not a prerequisite. For the target groups, the practical difference between hegemonic control and assimilation may be obscure in terms of cultural rights.

Strategies aimed at moderating national conflict generally tend more towards the accommodating end of the scale – if not necessarily in terms of political power, at least in terms of cultural rights and economic policy. The government's point of departure will often be that the multi-national composition of the state is there to stay, and that national conflicts will be less of a problem if concessions are given to the national groups. Since cultural and economic demands are less threatening, we can expect these to be met before political demands. On the whole, however, national movements generally get less than they ask for.

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<sup>13</sup> See McGarry & O'Leary (1993:4); Coakley (1992). McGarry & O'Leary lack limited cultural rights as separate category.

Among the moderating strategies, the least accommodating mode is limited cultural rights, while federalization and consociationalism are the most accommodating: Once national groups have been given decision-making power, institutionalization of cultural rights cannot be prevented. Consociational arrangements are sometimes combined with some measure of decentralization or federalization.

The question is then: Why do governments seek to achieve that particular goal through the nationality policy? and, given the goal, why was this and not another strategy chosen? First, factors like the international situation, the available economic resources, and not least the type of regime (democratic/authoritarian) put constraints on the range of choice. Second, how the government evaluates the various strategies as means to an end will depend on the prevailing *beliefs* (underlying conceptions of nationhood and perceived causes of national conflict), and the national composition of the state. The latter includes the character of the national demands, the number and size of the national groups and their internal relations.

### ***Constraints on the choice of strategy***

First a few words about *economy*: While measures like employment quotas are in principle independent of the economic situation, it is obvious that extensive state investments in infrastructure or other development schemes in national "homelands" require a certain economic basis. Even employment quotas may be problematic in an economic recession, because better opportunities for a disadvantaged group mean fewer jobs for the ruling nation.

The nature of the *regime* restricts the aim as well as the means of a nationality policy. Among the aims, hegemonic control is a more suitable aim for the authoritarian than democratic regimes, because the repressive means that it implies run contrary to democratic principles. Hegemonic control in democracies seems to imply that the democratic structure is formal rather than real, or that the dominating nation is ensured the upper hand through the election system. The best example of the former is probably South Africa under apartheid. Elimination and moderation of national conflict are, on the other hand, aims that may be sought by authoritarian regimes and democracies alike.

It may be argued that authoritarian regimes will have a broader range of choice if the goal is elimination of national differences (including genocide and mass population transfers). Likewise, it may be argued that democracies will have a wider range of choice if the goal is moderation of conflict, because genuine federalism and consociation probably require a minimum of democratic institutions in order to work.<sup>14</sup> To accommodate national demands for individual political rights and/or autonomy, an authoritarian regime will thus have to accept some degree of democratization. This may also be a reason why political concessions are less frequent than cultural concessions.

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<sup>14</sup> Some Communist states have applied a sort of pseudo-federalism, notably Yugoslavia, yet it remained rather centralized until Tito's death. See Bakke: *På slakk line. Jugoslavisk nasjonalitetspolitikk 1945–1980* (1989: pp. 171 ff.).

Strategies involving (limited) cultural rights seem to be least sensitive to regime, as they have been employed by both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Finally, democracies do not always choose moderating strategies: assimilation policies directed at indigenous ethnic groups (groups with low self-awareness) have been quite common in West European democracies, including Norway (cf. the earlier treatment of the Sami ("Lapp") people).

It may be argued that an authoritarian regime will be less vulnerable to national conflict than a democracy, since it can always resort to coercion. Yet a minimum of support is probably required for any regime to survive over a length of time, and a regime that can ally itself with a ruling nation (preferably a majority) is likely to be stronger. This limits the choice: even the strongest government can hardly afford to alienate both the ruling nation and the others. However, also democracies must take into consideration the reactions of the ruling nation.

*International* considerations are especially important where one or more of the subject nations or national minorities have "a state of their own" outside the framework of a multi-national state – an irredenta situation. This becomes particularly acute where the national group in question lives in the border area of the multi-national state *and* the borders are disputed. There are many examples of this, and the solutions have varied, from trying to convince the people in question that they are their own nation, via concessions, to total suppression. We cannot generalize about the implications of an irredenta situation, only note that it will affect the choice of strategy to a greater or a lesser extent. This will depend on how articulate the national group is, how strong the alternative state is, and the perception of external threat. However, (the prospect of) external intervention may also influence policies.

### ***Prevailing beliefs and strategy***

The clearest link to theories of nationalism is that any nationality policy rests on some theory or conception of nationhood, however loose and ill-defined. First, the predominant nation concept may in itself affect the range of choice. Providing that the aim of an *integration* policy is to make the national target group(s) a part of the state-nation without necessarily having to shed their culture, it presupposes a voluntarist nation concept. In this scheme national identity is acquired, and it is assumed that any individual can become a member of any nation if he or she chooses to. *Assimilation* policies are also based on the assumption that people can change their identity, but this is not enough: People must in addition shed their culture (assimilate) in order to change national identity. Here national identity becomes ascribed as much as acquired. The underlying nation concept here sees the nation as a cultural community.

Finally, if you believe that national identity cannot be changed at all, assimilation ceases to be an option. Then the nation is conceived as a community of ancestry, accessible only by birth. In this case, the only resort is genocide or forced mass population transfers; or simply living with the differences. Strategies aimed at repressing/controlling or moderating conflict are in principle less influenced by the concept of nationhood, but often rest on the implicit assumption that national identities cannot easily be erased or changed at will.



The choice of strategy will also to a certain extent be affected by underlying beliefs as to what *causes* national conflict, provided that the aim is harmony/moderation of national conflict. This aim can be derived from the higher aim of ensuring the survival of the state, which seems a fairly dominant objective of democratic and authoritarian regimes alike. Again, the resolve to control or repress national conflict is generally independent of underlying beliefs; what causes national conflict remains irrelevant if you do not intend to do anything about it.

Strategies of assimilation (and partly also integration) seem based on the assumption that it is not only possible, but indeed necessary to eliminate national differences in order to make national conflict disappear. A quite common underlying belief, found also in the literature on national conflict resolution, is that national conflict is primarily a reflection of economic inequality. A natural response would be to try to buy off the national group in question, by offering economic support and employment opportunities. The Marxist variant was to see national sentiment as a transitional phenomenon produced by the kind of inequality that appeared during the early stages of industrialization. The Leninist version was slightly different: national sentiment was seen as being caused by earlier oppression. Thus, if only the various national groups are not oppressed, they will come to their senses and join the ruling nation voluntarily.<sup>15</sup> Needless to say, things did not turn out quite that way.

Accommodating strategies are implicitly based on the assumption that if the national groups get what they want, national conflict will disappear. Often the assumption will be that national equality will reduce tensions, and that national groups that get a certain amount of autonomy will abstain from issuing the ultimate demand: Secession and a separate state. When governments choose accommodating strategies, they thus either believe that it will work, or else concessions are forced upon them by external forces. Yet, the fact that a nationality policy failed does not necessarily mean that the government made a wrong assessment. Timing is in itself extremely important, and some conditions are more favorable than others.

### ***Nature of the national demands and group relations***

On the one hand, the specific national demands that are advanced provide inputs for the nationality policy. The government may decide to accede to national demands wholly or in part, or reject them altogether. Conversely, if national demands are lacking or limited in scope, this will also affect the nationality policy, in the sense that the government is given more leeway, and in the sense that certain aims become easier to attain, chiefly assimilation/integration. A rather banal point is that governments seldom give national groups more than they ask for. A possible exception is again the Soviet *korenizaciya* policy, where cultural concessions were given to groups that never asked for anything of the kind. As Hroch points out, national demands tend to be cumulative, meaning that they become more extensive over time.<sup>16</sup> Concessions that may be acceptable at T<sup>1</sup> may thus not necessarily be acceptable at T<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> See e.g. Connor (1984:34), Horowitz (1985:14) on this.

<sup>16</sup> See Hroch (1994: pp. 13 ff.); Hroch (1995); Hroch (1996b).

There will often be more than one subject nation in a multi-national state, and occasionally also more than one ruling nation (as was the case with the Habsburg monarchy after 1867). The number of national groups and relations among them will also affect the choice of strategy. With more than one national opposition movement, the demands of these may be compatible or incompatible with each other as well as with the interests of the ruling nation(s) – depending, among other things, on national distribution and disputed homelands.

The size of the ruling nation compared to the others taken together is probably especially important for the willingness of the government to give *political* concessions, because such concessions will often be at the expense of the ruling nation: If some gain power, others necessarily lose power. If national opposition movements have mutually incompatible demands, that increases the leeway of the government. Conversely, the leeway of national movements increases if central and local government can be played out against each other.

To the extent that the present-day situation of the national group is affected by the nationality policy (and it invariably is), a specific nationality policy will also indirectly affect national demands, since demands are inversely related to the situation of the national group. A group that already has individual rights to political participation will not make that a major demand unless those rights are violated through censorship, election fraud, etc.; a group that already has been granted the right to language instruction in the school system will not make that a major demand, unless the right is violated, and so on. A corollary is that for a national movement that appears only under democratic, constitutional conditions – where political participation is already instituted – individual political rights will not be an issue.

A nationality policy may be directed at all national groups in a state, or at one specific group. In either case, neither the aim nor the strategies are given once and for all – and the outcome in terms of national conflict least of all. Ultimately, the success of a nationality policy will depend on the reactions of the national target groups to that specific nationality policy. National demands and nationality policy can thus be seen as action–reaction sequences.

### ***Nationality policy strategies and conditions for success***

Success can never be guaranteed – not for national movements, and not for governments. A nationality policy aimed at *controlling* national conflict is a success as long as the government remains in control and does not have to grant concessions. When the strategy breaks down, that usually means either that the regime is (at the verge of) being overthrown or that the multi-national state is falling apart. The main condition for success is thus repressive capacity.

The conditions for successful *integration* or *assimilation* are different from the conditions for successful *accommodation* of conflict. These will therefore be discussed separately. First a few words on the two most extreme elimination strategies, genocide and mass population transfers. Insofar as *all* individual members of the national group are killed or moved, these strategies can be termed successful; otherwise both methods (apart from being morally appalling) tend to aggravate conflict.

### ***Conditions for successful assimilation/integration***

Assimilation and integration strategies both aim at creating some sort of common identity for the multi-cultural population of a state, whether this is merely a common civic identity or a common cultural identity. Any successful assimilation policy requires large-scale individual changes of identity. It is beyond doubt that change of national identity *is* possible, even within a single generation and certainly in the course of two or three. On the other hand, for a whole national group to be swallowed up, a vast majority of the group in question must be willing to redirect loyalty to the new group. At the individual level, people must have a reason to change their allegiance – and this may still not be enough if their former identity is very strong.

The threshold for change of identity may be expected to be lower the more inclusive the conception of nationhood is: If you can be accepted as a member of the nation simply by swearing allegiance to the flag, to certain institutions, rules and regulations, then the threshold is lower than if you have to speak the language like a native, believe in the same God, wear the same kind of clothes, eat the same food, and have the same skin color as the natives. National identities containing a strong civic element may thus be easier to acquire than more culturally confined identities. They also represent a less drastic change, since they permit cultural features to be retained, at least to a certain extent.

The most favorable conditions for large-scale assimilation seem to be situations where national consciousness is weak and not very widespread (an early stage of the nation forming process), where the target group(s) have few members, where the group is dispersed or not indigenous to the area, and where the members of the target group(s) are not too different in attributes from the group they are about to enter. Conversely, achieving assimilation and integration can be expected to be far more difficult when the national consciousness is strong, the group in question is large and lives on its ancestral lands,<sup>17</sup> and nationally relevant conflicts between groups keep reinforcing national identity. In such cases, assimilation/integration strategies would seem to aggravate conflicts rather than eliminating them.

### ***Conditions for successful accommodation***

Accommodating strategies usually presuppose that the nation-forming process of the national groups in question has reached the stage where a national movement starts issuing demands on behalf of the nation-to-be.<sup>18</sup> Also here, the pattern of national distribution and the level of national conflict will circumscribe the choice of strategy. The settlement pattern is most critical in relation to federalism, yet also cultural autonomy presupposes a certain clustering of the national communities. Cultural rights may be the least sensitive to national distribution.

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<sup>17</sup> See also McGarry & O'Leary (1993:19).

<sup>18</sup> Again the nationality policy of the Soviet union in the 1920s is an exception. Here the government helped nation-forming processes, by codifying languages that had not previously been codified and telling people that they were unique. Likewise, the Yugoslav government actively sought to convince the Macedonians that they were a separate nation and not Bulgarians. In the Soviet case, this policy was based on the theory that national flourishing was a necessary intermediate stage of national merging, while the Yugoslav policy was more based on practical, foreign policy considerations. See e.g. Svein Mønnesland: *Før Jugoslavia og etter* (1992) and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse: *The national question in the Soviet Union and Russia* (1995).

Basically, for a federal solution to ensure the longed-for political autonomy or rule by co-nationals, the national groups must be concentrated on certain territories, and the national territories must be continuous. Two important reasons why units are less than homogeneous are (1) insufficient clustering of the national communities caused by enclaves and nationally mixed areas (as in former Yugoslavia), and (2) lack of congruence between the borders of the units and the national dividing lines, for historical reasons. In this case, a federalization of the state (or secession) may lead to new national conflicts, as new minorities are created.

Cantonization may be conceived of as a form of "internal secession" that is possible even in areas with national enclaves, since it means de-composing the arena of national conflict and competition into smaller and more manageable units. However, this may not be an acceptable solution for the national movements in question; achieving *one* national political unit under a single government is often seen as a goal in its own right. The question also arises who should decide the borders of the micro-units. Historically, there are no examples where cantonization has been used as a conscious device in order to solve national conflict. The Swiss example developed organically; it was not a result of any deliberate policy.

The existence of nationally relevant conflicts and the intensity of national conflict may also affect the chances of success, because conflict helps to reinforce national identity, national solidarity and the tendency to divide the world into of "us" and "them", friends and foes. The higher the conflict level, the lower is trust between the national groups likely to be, and likewise also the willingness to accept compromises. The level of national conflict is most critical in relation to consociationalism, yet even federation may prove an unworkable solution if the conflict level is too high. For a consociational system to function, no national group must be committed to strategies of assimilating others or creating their own nation-state; successive generations of political leaders must be committed to the survival of the system; and compromise must be possible without giving rise to accusations of treason.<sup>19</sup> If the conflict level is very high and national movements demand independence, it may be argued that no strategy (short of secession) will succeed in moderating national conflict. However, secession often leads to war, especially when the national groups are insufficiently clustered.<sup>20</sup>

As noted by Horowitz, the relationship between national groups may be ranked or unranked.<sup>21</sup> In the former case, national identity coincides with social class (in terms of social and/or political positions), and class divisions thus reinforce national divisions. This is a variety of what Hroch calls nationally relevant conflicts. In the latter case, national identity is independent of class divisions, and social cleavages are cross-national. Other things being equal, a situation where national groups are ranked will probably be more prone to national conflict.

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<sup>19</sup> See Arend Lijphart: *Democracy in plural societies* (1977).

<sup>20</sup> The only examples of entirely peaceful divorces in Europe in this century would seem to be the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905, and the Czecho-Slovak divorce in 1993.

<sup>21</sup> Horowitz (1985:22).

Another matter is whether a nationality policy always *can* moderate national conflict. An important point here is to what extent the national demands of one group are incompatible with the interests of other national groups in the multi-national state: Will concessions to one national group affect other national groups adversely, comparatively or in actual terms? This is also a matter of to what extent national demands are relational or even zero-sum.<sup>22</sup>

The three types of national demands – symbolic demands, demands for national equality and demands for national autonomy – are not equally relational in character, and do not involve the same kind of interests. A demand on the part of group A for recognition as a separate nation is not per se contrary to the interests of any other national group in the state, unless an overarching nation project is at stake. Symbolic demands are thus not particularly relational, but demands for recognition are often linked to demands for national equality and autonomy.

Demands for national equality are, by contrast, typically relational: They always affect the situation of other national groups in the state, at least in relative terms. In a situation where group A is dominant (and wants to keep things that way) and groups B and C demand national equality, the government will often be in a no-win situation, because giving concessions to B and C will mean alienating A. The problem is greatest when the conflict is perceived by both parties as zero-sum: The gain of one then becomes the loss of the other. The larger A is, the easier it is for the government to let A keep its privileged position. One solution to this is to try to keep all national groups unhappy by steering a middle course.

On the other hand, national demands for equality seldom form strictly zero-sum conflicts. A conflict over economic redistribution is zero-sum only when there is no growth in the economy; a conflict over redistribution of political positions in the Parliament or the central administration is zero-sum only when there is no growth in the number of parliamentary seats or civil servants. Cultural demands for equality are even less likely to be zero-sum: A demand for separate schools for the children of group A in their own language becomes a problem for group B only if B-schools are turned into A-schools and children from group B have to attend these. On the other hand, any demand for linguistic equality in the civil service will affect other national groups, since this will often in practice be a demand for bilingualism. The trouble is that sometimes a change in the relative distribution will be resented by the dominating group. Even extended individual political rights may cause conflict if this tips the balance of power between different national groups. In ranked systems, this will typically be the case.

Demands for autonomy may or may not affect other national groups. Cultural demands for autonomy are usually not very relational in character. The freedom to develop one's own national identity through national organizations, journals, newspapers etc., the right to study one's own history and cultivate one's own language and the right to cultivate one's own religion hardly affect other national groups directly, unless this is seen as subversion of a common or overarching nation project.

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<sup>22</sup> See Horowitz (1985:566).

Whether or not political demands for autonomy affect other national groups will depend in part on distribution. If the national groups live neatly separated in compact territories, a federal solution may be acceptable to all groups. If not, a federal solution may be resented by those who find themselves separated from co-nationals by the new borders, and especially if a former ruling nation is turned into a minority. On the other hand, federalization also means redistribution of power from the central level to more local levels – from a central elite (often dominated by the ruling nation), to more local elites. Political demands for autonomy are thus partly relational, while Economic autonomy may increase national conflict if there is a redistribution effect.

### ***Concluding remarks***

We have seen that, depending on the aim of the nationality policy, success is likely to be more easily achieved under certain conditions. While low conflict level and non-relational demands are always an advantage, conditions that are favorable to accommodation are not necessarily favorable to integration/assimilation. Crucial factors in the latter case seem to be the level of national consciousness, the willingness to assimilate, the dispersion of the group and the (non-)existence of nationally relevant conflicts.

Since national demands are expressions of dissatisfaction, we can expect the national conflict level to increase when a national groups feels its identity threatened, and when it feels discriminated against linguistically-culturally, economically or in terms of political representation/influence. The conflict level is more likely to be high in ranked systems.

For the government, the dilemma is that concessions may lead to new, more extreme demands, as demands tend to be cumulative. Concessions to one national group may also lead to reactions from other national groups in the multinational state, and the government must decide what group(s) it can least afford to antagonize. This will depend among other things on the size and relations between the groups and the degree of zero-sum conflicts.

Timing is crucial for the outcome in the case of accommodating strategies: A policy that might have moderated national conflict at  $T^1$  may prove unworkable at  $T^2$  because the scope of the national demands has changed or the national conflict level has increased. Cultural concessions may work in the early stages of the nation-forming process, but not after a political program has been developed. A government that wants to keep a certain freedom of choice will often hesitate to concede to political demands for autonomy, because federalization/consociationalism means changing the rules, and is much more difficult to reverse than cultural concessions. The choice of strategy at  $T^1$  will thus circumscribe the range of choice at  $T^2$ . Governments hesitate, and when concessions do come, it is often too late.

# PART TWO

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## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND





## *Introduction*

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*Oh believe, (that) a better time will come for the Czechoslav brothers,  
when everything again roars as one voice from Šumava to the Tatras.*

**Svatopluk Čech, 1888<sup>1</sup>**

**P**art Two is meant as a historical backdrop for the analysis of why the Czechoslovak nation project failed and why the national conflict level increased during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The historical context was important for the outcome, in the sense that the historical heritage provided the foundation for nationally relevant conflicts in the inter-war period. Furthermore, the historical context can help us understand why the Czechs and Slovaks became nations. Finally, an outline of Czech and Slovak history is necessary as a backdrop to the analysis of the struggle for national identity, since the dispute about the Czechoslovak reinterpretation of history was so central to that struggle.

In Chapter Five I give a basic outline of events and periods that shaped Czech and Slovak (pre-)national identity, and that are important for Czech and Slovak self-understanding, with special focus on the period from the mid-18th century to the First World War.

As noted in Part One, national movements strive to fulfill the dual task of defining the contents of nationhood (including consolidating its outwards expressions), and of convincing the members of the nation-to-be that they are a nation that should stick together. They also present demands on behalf of the nation-to-be towards the rulers, aimed at recognition, national equality and eventually autonomy. The nation-forming aspect will be dealt with separately in Chapters Six and Seven for the sake of clarity, while I have chosen to treat the national demands and the response of the rulers (nationality policy) as an integral part of Chapter Five. National demands and nationality policy are hard to separate from the general political development of the Habsburg Empire in this period, since the national question was a (if not *the*) major conflict dimension.

Chapter Six deals with the three phases in the nation-forming process, following Miroslav Hroch's scheme. The main emphasis will be on the period that the Czechs call *obrození* (revival), from the 1770s to the mid-19th century, i.e. the first two of these phases. In Chapter Seven the focus is on the changing conceptions of the contents of nationhood in the course of these revivals, with special emphasis on the central "awakeners" (*buditelé*) – the men who formed the Czech and Slovak self-understanding at the threshold of nationhood.

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<sup>1</sup> (Ó věřte, lepší vzejde čas pro českoslávské bratry, až zahřmí zas vše v jeden hlas od Šumavy až v Tatry!). Quoted in Josef Pešek: *Matka vlast. Obrázkové dějiny československé* (1923:368).

# *Five*

## *Czech and Slovak history in outline*

*Historical error is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.*

**Ernest Renan, 1882<sup>1</sup>**

Rewriting history is a favorite activity in most nation-forming processes, whether they are nations from above or nations from below. In the Czech and to a lesser extent in the Slovak case, the interpretation of history has played a major role in defining the contents of national identity. A brief outline of the history of the two nations may thus be useful for readers not familiar with central facts. The purpose of this chapter is mainly to provide an overview of the periods and events of Czech and Slovak history that are important for understanding the rest of the narrative. Thus, this account will be highly selective in emphasis.<sup>2</sup>

It is not always easy to distinguish between history the way it "really" was, and history the way it is presented. There are two traps that should be avoided. One is to present the history of nations as if they were nations from the very dawn of time, the other is to presume that national identity suddenly appeared out of nowhere at the threshold of the modern era. National historians of the 19th century have often been accused of the former; many contemporary scholars are guilty of the latter. We need to distinguish between an early awareness of being a culturally separate group, confined to a (small) elite, and the subsequent development of a national identity and its diffusion to the masses.

National identities are historically constituted, which means they are contingent on the specific historical circumstances that brought them about. Under other circumstances Czechs and Slovaks might have been one nation, or they might not have been nations at all. Let us turn to the history that shaped these two nations.

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<sup>1</sup> Ernest Renan: What is a nation? (Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?), in: G. Eley & R.G. Suny: *Becoming national* (1996:45).

<sup>2</sup> For more details, see in Czech and Slovak e.g. *Československá vlastivěda*, Díl II Dějiny (1969), O. Urban: *České a slovenské dějiny do roku 1918* (1991), *Dějiny zemí koruny české I-II* (1993), *Slovník českých dějin* (1994), *Starý národ – mladý stát* (1994), R. Marsina, V. Čičaj, D. Kováč, L. Lipták: *Slovenské dejiny* (1992), J. Lettrich: *Dejiny novodobého Slovenska* (1993), A. Špiesz: *Dejiny Slovenska na ceste k sebauvedomeniu* (1992). Much of the older literature in English is from a Czech or Czechoslovak point of view, like R.W. Seton-Watson's *History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (1965), or the Czech historian J.V. Polišenský's *History of Czechoslovakia in outline* (1991), a reprint of a book that was published in 1947. A modern exception is (the rather nationalist) S.J. Kirschbaum: *A history of Slovakia* (1995). See also: V. Mamatey and R. Luza: *A history of the Czechoslovak republic* (1973). From the inter-war era: K. Krofta: *A short history of Czechoslovakia* (1934). Anthologies: M. Rechcigl's *Studies in Czechoslovak history vol. I, II* (1976), J. Morison: *The Czech and Slovak experience* (1992). On the Habsburg Empire: R.A. Kann: *Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches 1526 bis 1918* (1993), J. Béranger: *A history of the Habsburg Empire 1273–1700* (1994), R.A. Kann & Z.V. David: *The peoples of the East Habsburg lands 1526–1918* (1984), Jiří Kořalka: *Češi v Habsburské říši a v Evropě 1815–1914* (1996).

### *The coming of the Slavs and their first states*

Because of the lack of indigenous sources, it is not clear exactly when the first Slavs arrived in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, nor where they came from. On the basis of archeological data and Roman sources, the forefathers of the Czechs and Slovaks have been located in the area around the Great Migrations of 500–600 AD. Smaller groups may have been there already in the first or second century AD. It is believed that they came from the area between the Carpathian mountains and the Baltic, or further east. Archeological data show that the area had been inhabited by a multitude of groups long before the arrival of the first Slavs.

The Western Slavs, often referred to as Wends (Venedae) or Slavs (Sclavi) by Roman sources, were already at this point a separate group, different from the Southern and the Eastern Slavs.<sup>3</sup> They were not united politically, but divided into several clans or tribes. It was the tribe that occupied the central area around present-day Prague that eventually gave its name to all Czechs. As for the divide between Czechs and Slovaks, there is no evidence that they were at that time separate peoples, although it is likely that they were organized in separate tribes.

The first Slav state<sup>4</sup> was the state of *Samo*, a Frankish merchant who united Slav tribes in the face of an Avar attack around 623 AD. The core area is believed to have been southern Moravia, but the exact extent is not known. It fell apart after Samo's death in 658.

The next Slav state is more important, especially because of the emphasis it has been given in Czechoslovak and Slovak historiography. This is the so-called Great Moravia of the 9th century, alternately presented as the first Czechoslovak state and as the first Slovak state.<sup>5</sup> In geographical extension it obviously *was* the first state that, at least for a while, roughly covered the area that was to become Czechoslovakia more than 1000 years later. It appeared on the scene around 830 under the ruler Mojmir, who was followed by Rastislav (846–70), and Svätopluk (870–94). The core area of the state was Southern Moravia, but it later expanded to include parts of present-day Slovakia, Bohemia, Silesia as well as a part of the Hungarian plain. Great Moravia reached its maximum extension under Svätopluk.

During the 830s Mojmir conquered the lands of Pribina, a local ruler in the Nitra area. Whether he was a Moravian nobleman or the ruler of a separate tribe is still a matter of dispute. Pribina is known for introducing Christianity to the area. The Archbishop of Salzburg consecrated the first church in Nitra between 821 and 836, supposedly in 833. Christianity was first brought to present-day Czech and Slovak areas by Frankish (Germanic) missionaries, using Latin. Rastislav requested missionaries who could preach the Gospel in a Slavic tongue.

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<sup>3</sup> See Jan Filip: *Počátky slovanského osídlení v Československu* (1946), *Dějiny země koruny české I* (1993).

<sup>4</sup> States in the modern sense of the word developed only towards the end of the Middle Ages – some would say as late as 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia). See Anthony Black: *Political thought in Europe 1250–1450* (1992:186–91).

<sup>5</sup> According to Richard Marsina et al. it was not the first Czechoslovak state because the Bohemian Czechs were part of it only for a short time, and besides they considered it as forcefully imposed. On the other hand it was not a purely Slovak state either, but more a Slovak-Moravian state. See R. Marsina, V. Čičaj, D. Kováč, L. Lipták: *Slovenské dejiny* (1992:33). Labels like Slovak, Moravian or Czechoslovak are of course imposed afterwards; Great Moravia was a Slav state.

Upon receiving no answer from Rome, he turned to the Byzantine emperor Michael III, who sent the bilingual (Greek and a Macedonian or Bulgarian dialect) brothers Constantin (Cyril) and Methodius. They devised the Glagolitic alphabet and the first Slav literary language (Old Church Slavonic), sometimes referred to as Old Bulgarian.<sup>6</sup> The cultural legacy bequeathed by Constantin and Methodius was a lasting one: Old Church Slavonic provided the foundation for literacy and education among the Slavs of Eastern Europe, including the Czechs and Slovaks. It was, for instance, the language of the first legends of the Czech St. Václav.

Constantin and Methodius spent the years between 863 and 867 in Great Moravia. The object of their mission was not to convert the masses, but to educate the local clergy. Through their educational activities, the translation of parts of the Bible, and the founding of a Slav liturgy they established the basis for a church organization in Great Moravia. A few months before he died in 869, Constantin entered a monastery in Rome, where he took the name Cyril, while Methodius returned to Pannonia. The struggle over the church language between the Slav and the Latin camp was temporarily won by the former when Great Moravia got its own archdiocese in 880 and Methodius became the first archbishop. After the death of Methodius in 885, the papal decision was reversed, and Frankish missionaries regained the upper hand. Yet, despite their combined efforts, paganism was still dominant when Great Moravia was conquered.<sup>7</sup>

After the death of Svätopluk in 894, Great Moravia and its new ruler Mojmir II ran into trouble from two sides. Mojmir II lost control over Bohemia to a local prince of Přemyslid stock (Spytihněv); and, after he lost several decisive battles against the Magyars around 904–05, Great Moravia was doomed. Mojmir II died in battle against the Magyars in 907, which spelled the death of that state as well. The southern parts of present-day Slovakia came under direct Magyar rule, while Moravia lost its ruling dynasty and much of its church organization. This also meant that what was to become the Czech core area gravitated westwards.

### ***Czechs under Přemyslid rule***

The first Přemyslid to rule the Bohemian Czechs was prince Bořivoj I, who made Prague the center of the embryonic Bohemian state. He and his wife Ludmila were baptized around 870–80, probably by Methodius, and he accepted the suzerainty of Svätopluk in 889. After Bořivoj's death in 890, Svätopluk ruled Bohemia directly. It is not clear exactly when the next ruler of Přemyslid stock, Spytihněv, took office (in 894 or later), but historians agree that he was succeeded by Vratislav (915–21) and his wife Drahomíra (921–24), who ruled in the name of her under-age son, prince Václav I. The latter was canonized after his death and is normally referred to as Václav the Saint in Czech history.

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<sup>6</sup> Scholars disagree on whether Old Church Slavonic was oriented towards Moravian, since this is the area where it was first used, or based on a Macedonian/Bulgarian dialect of the missionaries' native area. The latter seems most likely. See Henrik Birnbaum: *Aspects of the Slavic Middle Ages and Slavic Renaissance culture* (1991:532 pp.)

<sup>7</sup> Archeological evidence indicates that the Slav forefathers of the Czechs and Slovaks remained out of touch with Christianity for the entire eighth century. See Urban (1991:15).

The historical Václav ruled for eleven years at the most. He was born around 907, and ascended the throne at the age of seventeen. Whether he died in 929 or 935 is a matter of dispute, but he was murdered in Stará Boleslav by his own brother Boleslav I, apparently for reasons of power. Václav is credited with consolidating Přemyslid power in the face of Magyar and Saxon threats, even though he did swear allegiance to the Saxon king after a decisive battle in 929. He is also known as an ardent Christian, bent on converting his people, and in honor of the Saxon patron St. Vitus he had a church built at the royal castle Hradčany, in Prague. After his death, he became the patron saint of Bohemia and a symbol of Czech statehood.

Legends about him are many, and it seems that the cult of Václav started already under Boleslav, after Václav was laid to rest in his own church of St. Vitus. The first Old Church Slavonic legend about Václav the Saint appeared as early as in the first half of the 10th century, i.e. shortly after his death, followed by a host of Latin legends. Václav seems to have been an extraordinary ruler for his time, in that he knew how to read and write. According to legend, he learned both from his grandmother Ludmila. Legend also has it that Václav's mother Drahomíra had Ludmila killed because she had too great influence on him. In the legends Václav is presented as the pious Christian, a martyr who went to his brother knowing he would be killed. Drahomíra represents paganism against the proto-martyr Ludmila. To the English-speaking world, he is known as "Good King Wenceslaus" of the Christmas carol.

Boleslav I (935–c. 972), known in chronicles as the Cruel, is generally forgiven for killing Václav because of his abilities as a warrior. He engaged in a long-lasting conflict with Otto I (936–73), yet sided with him against the pagan Magyars in a decisive battle near Augsburg in 955. As a result of that battle, the Přemyslids acquired control of Moravia, Silesia and parts of present-day Slovakia (in the west) and Poland (the area around Kraków). This expansion was linked to the diffusion of Christianity. During the reign of his son Boleslav II (the Pious, 972–99) the first monastery was established in 973, again at Hradčany, which became the center of the cult of Ludmila. At the same time the Pope agreed to establish a bishopric in Prague. Boleslav II also finished the act of uniting of the Czechs under direct Přemyslid rule.

Towards the turn of the century, the Přemyslids got competition from Poland under the Piast dynasty and Hungary under Arpad rule. Boleslav III (999–1002, 1003) lost most of what his grandfather had gained. It was his brother Oldřich who reconquered Moravia from Poland around 1019, and thus established the borders that were to last until modern times. In order to prevent the state from falling apart and to resolve the power struggle between the members of the dynasty, Oldřich's son Břetislav I (1035–55) in 1054 enforced the principle of seniority, according to which the oldest Přemyslid would inherit the throne. This law was abolished in 1216, after which the primogeniture principle (from father to eldest son) was valid.

The first Czech prince to become crowned king was Vratislav II (1061–92), in 1085. The next was Vladislav II (1140–72), who received his title in 1158. The Royal title was, however, bestowed on them personally. It became hereditary only when Přemysl Otakar I (1197–1230) was made king in 1198. This also signaled a more independent position for the Czech ruler, confirmed by the Papacy in 1204, and then by the Sicilian Golden Bull of Friedrich II in 1212.

The last century of Přemyslid rule was in many ways a Golden Age, not least in terms of territorial expansion. Austria first came under Czech rule in 1246. Under the reign of Přemysl II Otakar (1253–78) the Czech kingdom expanded in several directions. In 1260 he won Styria in a battle with the Hungarian king, in 1266 he received Cheb as dowry for his mother, in 1269 Carinthia and Carniola was added. His war against Rudolf I of Habsburg in 1276 was less of a success, and he had to give up the Alpine regions, Cheb and Austria. He died in battle in Marchfeld (in Austria) in 1278, leaving the throne to his under-age son Václav II (1278–1305). During this period, the power of the nobility increased. Václav II got back Cheb, acquired Silesia, the area around Kraków, and was proclaimed king of Poland in 1300. In 1301 he was offered the Hungarian crown, but let it pass to his son Václav III (1305–06). The male line of the Přemyslids died out when Václav III was murdered in 1306.

During the 400 years of (male) Přemyslid rule, the Czech lands underwent great changes. Christianity was firmly established by the turn of the 12th century. The interior was gradually colonized, feudal relations were established and market places developed into agglomerations of people. The first towns were founded under the kings Přemysl Otakar I (1197–1230) and Václav I (1230–53). The establishment of town privileges was closely linked to two other developments: the mining and processing of precious metals, mainly silver and gold, and the German colonization that accompanied it. Mining was also an important foundation for Czech Royal power. As early as in the first half of the 13th century rich silver mines were opened in the areas of Jihlava and Havlíčkův Brod, while mining in Kutná Hora started after the middle of the century. Also German merchants, craftsmen and artisans came in large numbers.

The German migration to the Czech lands during the 13th century was concentrated in time and mainly confined to town communities, which meant that the newcomers were not readily assimilated into the Czech population. Major long-term effects were stabilization and legal delimitation of feudal relations through the (German) town privileges, urbanization of the Czech lands, and cultural and linguistic division. The Germans formed a patrician class in the towns, thus comprising culturally separate islands in an otherwise Slav population.

What about Czech consciousness of being a culturally separate group? The chronicle of Kosmas (c. 1045–1125), a Canon and later Dean at the St. Vitus chapter of Prague, indicates that such an awareness did exist, at least among the nobility. Kosmas' *Chronica Boemorum* was written towards the end of his life, between approximately 1119 and his death in 1125. Here the legends about forefather Czech (Praotec Čech) and Libuše and Přemysl are presented for the first time (see Appendix A); Kosmas also put the finishing touches on the cult of Holy Václav. He sided with the Czech rulers against all foreign enemies, including the Holy Roman Empire and the Poles. But in the conflict between the bishop of Prague and the ruler, Kosmas sided with the bishop. Thus, the fact that a certain Czech awareness existed by no means implies that it was the dominant identity, or that it was very widespread. It is quite obvious that Kosmas' primary loyalty was to the Church and not to any Czech "nation."

The so-called Dalimil chronicle<sup>8</sup> is the oldest chronicle written in the Czech language, probably by a man of noble origin, yet the author remains unknown. It was finished between 1310 and 1314. The chronicle was occasioned by the ascension of a ruler of a foreign dynasty to the Czech throne (Jan of Luxembourg, 1310), and reflected the hostility of the Czech nobility to the German patrician class. The author obviously also resented the rulers' habit of taking German princesses as wives: "I would rather marry a Czech peasant girl, than to take a German woman of imperial stock. Everyone's heart follows their language, and therefore my people will not accept a German woman."<sup>9</sup> That is a rather strong statement, considering the gulf in social standing between peasantry and nobility at the time.

### *Slovaks under Arpad rule*

The Magyars were originally organized in tribes, but after 950 AD a state gradually formed around two of the strongest tribes. Gejza, a prince of the Arpad dynasty, is known to have ruled from around 972 to 997. Arpad, the founder of the dynasty, had led the Magyars in the battle against Great Moravia. He was known as a fierce warrior, whose descendants were to rule Hungary (including what is today Slovak territory) for three centuries.

The first Arpad to be crowned king (in 1000), after accepting Christianity, was Gejza's son István I (997–1038), known in Slovak history as Štefan. Although he was not a martyr he was canonized after his death, and is also known as István the Saint. The crown of St. István became a symbol of Hungarian statehood, much as the crown of St. Václav was a symbol of Czech statehood. István/Štefan allowed Christianity to spread throughout his kingdom; he had churches built, and under his reign an archdiocese was erected in Ostrihom (Esztergom). Later, around 1085 a bishopric was re-established in Nitra, almost 200 years after the Great Moravian bishopric (founded in 879) had been discarded. This was to remain the only bishopric exclusively on Slovak soil until 1776, when Maria Theresia founded two more – in Banská Bystrica and in Spiš.

After the arrival of the Magyars towards the end of the 9th century, the original Slav population on the Hungarian plain was gradually assimilated or driven into the mountains. From the many Slavic loan words in Hungarian, especially concerning crafts and agriculture, it has been suggested that the forefathers of the Slovaks and the Magyars had developed a symbiotic relationship.<sup>10</sup> It has also been suggested that the Slovaks Christianized the Magyars. But while some of the missionaries may have come from Nitra, they were not necessarily of Slavic origin. It more likely that a majority were Franks, preaching in Latin. On the other hand, the Czech missionary Vojtěch (St. Adalbert) baptized István I, and is ascribed a role in converting the Magyars. Politically there was no symbiosis: the Magyars were in control.

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<sup>8</sup> It was wrongly attributed to a *Dalimil Meziříčský*, a canon of Boleslav, who is mentioned as a source for the chronicle.

<sup>9</sup> (Raději se chci s českú selkú snieti, než ciesařovnu německú ženú miet. Všet' každému srdce po jazykú svému, a proto Němkyně nebude přieti lidu mému). Quoted in *Slovník českých dějin* (1994:149).

<sup>10</sup> See Kirschbaum (1995:49).

Present-day Slovak territory came under Arpad rule already under István I, after being partly under Czech (Boleslav I, II), and partly under Polish rule. The county (*župa*) system gradually developed from the 10th century on. By the 14th century, it was fully in place, not to be altered until the 20th century. In retrospect and from a national point of view, the most important effect of this county system was to split the Slavic (Slovak) population of what came to be known as "Upper Hungary" (Hungarian: *Felvidék*) into eleven administrative units. Until the 12th century, Slovak territory (or the part of it that had been under Great Moravian rule) had been regarded as an indivisible principality and had its own coat-of-arms. On the other hand, unlike Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia was not an administrative unit until well after Czechoslovakia was established, and the name *Slovensko* (Slovakia) was first used by Slovak intellectuals in the course of the national revival in the 19th century.

The Arpads consolidated their power under László I (Ladislav, 1077–95) and Kálmán (Kolo-man, 1095–1114), as well as extending their territory southwards to Croatia, which became part of the Hungarian state through a personal union in 1102. Royal power was at its height under Béla III (1173–96), during whose time Hungary was among the most powerful states in Europe. Later, the balance of power shifted in favor of the nobility, partly because of the unclear succession rules in the Arpad dynasty. After a long struggle, András II (Andrew, Ondrej, 1205–35) was forced to issue the Golden Bull of 1222, which among other things gave the nobility *ius resistendi* – the right to resist Royal power, as well as inalienability and exemption from taxes on property. Through a separate deal in 1234, the Church achieved various economic and judiciary privileges, strengthening its independent position.

The Tartar onslaught of 1240–42 did not affect Slovak territory as much as the central parts of Hungary. Yet, the Tartars did trash the wooden defenses where they came, and as a result the first stone fortresses on Slovak territory were built after they left. Rebuilding the centralized royal power and economic reconstruction of devastated land was a time- and resource-consuming process. King Béla IV (1235–70) thus had to give the nobility free hands in their areas, which strengthened the power of the nobility even more. Moreover, when Béla IV lost Styria to the Czech king Přemysl Otakar II in 1260, a quarrel between Béla and his son István V ensued, resulting in the sharing of power between them in 1264. At this time powerful members of the nobility were able to form states within the state. One of them was Matthias Csák (Matúš Čák, c. 1260–1321), a Hungarian nobleman who ruled the western part of present-day Slovakia, centered on Trenčín. In Slovak legends he is portrayed as a national hero.

As early as in the 12th century, the Arpad rulers of Hungary were among the richest in Europe. The fertility of the Hungarian plain contributed to this in part, but more important was the mining and processing of precious metals that started in the 12th century. In the 11th century the southwestern part of present-day Slovakia had been among the most developed in Hungary. After a temporary eclipse following the Croatian acquisition, Slovak territory again increased in economic importance of in the 13th century as a result of mining activities in places like Banská Štiavnica (silver) and Banská Bystrica (copper). In junction with the gold mine in Kremnica the first mint on Slovak territory was established.



During this period the first Slovak towns were founded (around 30 by the turn of the century), making Slovak territory the most urbanized in Hungary. German colonization played an important part in the development of towns, as privileges were granted to German mining communities. The Arpads also encouraged German settlement in order to defend the frontier against invasions from nomadic tribes. One of the privileges of the German towns was that only Germans could own property, restricting the number of Magyars and Slavs.

The Vlach colonization that took place in several waves between the 14th and the 17th centuries also left an imprint. The Vlachs were a pastoral people who originally came from the eastern parts of the Carpathians. Culturally and linguistically they gradually merged with the Slavic population, but they left a legacy in names of villages and parishes and certain expressions.

When did the Slovaks start to think of themselves as a separate group? According to a strongly nationalist contemporary short history of Slovakia, such awareness formed already under Great Moravia: We are Slovaks, they are Moravians.<sup>11</sup> Stanislav Kirschbaum also suggests that Great Moravia was important: "Great Moravia was, for a millennium, the only state to which the Slovaks could point. Its legacy [...] could not therefore be anything but fundamental for the Slovak nation."<sup>12</sup> This is of course true, but only in the sense that the national awakeners of the 18th and 19th centuries, presenting it as the first Slovak state, could use it to argue the Slovak case against the Magyars. There is no evidence whatsoever to corroborate that the Slovaks had an awareness of being a separate group as early as in the 9th century.

It is even doubtful that such awareness existed in the Middle Ages. Kirschbaum argues that "the Magyar system, because it was more open and more adaptable to local needs than in many areas of Europe, had allowed for the growth of a Slovak national consciousness, in particular in towns and cities. It was the presence of German colonists, their economic activities and the rights that they were granted by the king, [...] that reinforced and helped it to develop."<sup>13</sup>

It is of course conceivable that a Slovak consciousness was beginning to form among certain elites, but it is not likely that it was very strong or widespread. For one thing, even though Slovak territory was the most urbanized part of Hungary, the town population was more often than not non-Slavic, and, perhaps more important, the nobility was for the most part Magyar. The dependent, illiterate and non-mobile peasant population was hardly in a position to develop such an identity. Second, although the name *Slovák* appeared for the first time in 1485, its precise meaning remained vague until the 18th century.<sup>14</sup> This suggests that whatever identity may have existed, was rather diffuse and ill defined. Texts in the vernacular prior to the 14th and 15th centuries are lacking; the lingua franca was Latin.

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<sup>11</sup> (sa utváralo vedomie odlišnosti [...]. My sme Slováci – oni Moravani). *Starý národ – mladý štát* (1994:14)

<sup>12</sup> Kirschbaum (1995:37).

<sup>13</sup> Kirschbaum (1995:59).

<sup>14</sup> Lubomír Ďurovič: *Slovak*, in Schenker and Stankiewicz (eds): *The Slavic literary languages* (1980:211).

### *Czechs under Luxembourg rule*

After the last male Přemysl was murdered, several contenders appeared on the scene. In the end Jan (John) of Luxembourg became Czech king in 1310, after marrying Eliška of Přemysl, daughter of Václav II. This "foreign king" never played any important role in Czech internal affairs. He spent most of his time at the French court, where he had been raised. Meanwhile, the nobility increased their power in collusion with his wife Eliška and with Alžběta, the Polish widow of Václav II. Under Jan's reign, Cheb was definitely added to Czech territory, along with new territories in Silesia. His son Václav (who ruled under the name of Karel) became Margrave of Moravia already in 1334 and co-regent of the Czech lands in 1337.

Karel (Karl IV, 1346–78) has been regarded as one of the greatest Czech kings. He enlarged the territory, chiefly to the north (Lower Lusatia 1368, Brandenburg 1373) and west (Upper Palatinate, 1353). He was elected king of the Holy Roman Empire in July 1346 and became Czech king after his father's death in August that year. In 1355 he was crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Through the Golden Bull of 1356, he turned the Czech king into the first among the lay electors of the Holy Roman Empire, while ensuring for Bohemia a status completely independent from the Empire.<sup>15</sup> He was married four times, first to a French princess of Valois stock, whom his father chose, then to the daughter of Rudolf II of Palatinate, one of his major opponents, then to the heiress of the last Silesian principality not under Czech rule, and finally to the granddaughter of the Polish king. All were politically advantageous matches.

The reign of Karel was a Golden Age for the Czech lands, economically, culturally and politically. Prague became the center, not only of the Czech kingdom, but also of the Holy Roman Empire. Karel was raised partly at the French court (1323–33) and was fluent in five languages (Czech, French, Italian, German and Latin). Yet, he was well aware of his Přemyslid inheritance, and in his biography *Vita Caroli*, he wrote about the legend of St. Václav. He launched the building of the monumental St. Vitus Cathedral already in 1344, including a chapel around the tomb of St. Václav, and initiated several other impressive projects, including a stone bridge over the Vltava (Moldau) River and the rebuilding of the castle. His former friend and teacher, Pope Clement VI, turned the Prague bishopric into an archdiocese, also in 1344.

Karel was a patron of the arts, literature, the Church, and architecture. Under his reign, Czech developed into a literary language with fixed rules for spelling and grammar, and the first complete Old Czech translation of the Bible was finished with Royal support. In 1348 he founded Prague's New Town and established the first university of Central Europe in Prague (which still carries his name, Charles University). It became the center for higher learning in Central Europe, renown for its high academic level. The students and teachers at the university were originally divided into four "nations" – the Bavarian, the Saxon, the Polish

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<sup>15</sup> The Holy Roman Empire (*of the German nation* was added under Friedrich III, 1440–93) was a loose confederation of German principalities. The king was elected by a fixed number of electors, among whom was the Bohemian king, but crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire by the Pope. This gave the Papacy a power it did not hesitate to use.

and the Czech. The "foreign nations" thus had predominance over the Czech in controversies. Václav IV (1378–1419) was crowned Czech king already as a two-year-old in 1363 and king of the Holy Roman Empire in 1376, two years before his father's death. He has (perhaps somewhat unfairly) been described as a weak, disinterested or outright lazy king, addicted to alcohol, hunting and magic, and disposed to choleric fits. (According to legend, he died of rage upon receiving the news of the defenestration of the city councilors on July 30th, 1419). He also allegedly kept bad company – mingling with members of the lower nobility.

Circumstances were not exactly favorable for him either. Already in 1380 the nineteen-year-old Václav was faced with the schism between the Pope of Rome and the Pope of Avignon. Unable to take a decisive stand, he lost prestige abroad. The Archbishop of Prague came out strongly in favor of Rome, causing a rift between the Church and Václav that was exploited by the Czech nobility in collusion with Sigismund, his half brother, to take back some of the power that had been lost under Karel. Because of his trouble at home and abroad, Václav IV was deprived of his title as Holy Roman Emperor in 1400. Sigismund, by then king of Hungary, became king of the Holy Roman Empire in 1411, and was crowned emperor in 1433.

On top of all Václav's other troubles, the plague known as the Black Death hit the Czech lands with full impact in 1380, causing the economic conditions to worsen drastically. Having been left almost untouched by the particularly fierce epidemic that had killed half of Europe's population in the years between 1348 and 1352, the Czech lands now had their turn, and between 10 and 15 percent of the population was wiped out. Many of the larger German-speaking towns were especially hard hit, and when dead Germans were replaced by Czechs from smaller towns and villages, these towns became more Czech in composition, especially in Bohemia. This migration also meant that a Czech patrician class developed. It was during this period that Prague's Old Town finally became a Czech town.

### *Czechs under Hussism*

The interpretation of "Hussism" was a central point of disagreement in the debate over the meaning of Czech history before and after the First World War. Probably no other period in Czech history has been more important for Czech self-understanding. And yet, the Hussites did not even call themselves by that name – they referred to themselves as believers, Czechs, brothers and sisters or God's crusaders. It was their opponents, seeing heretics in them, who labeled them Hussites (Husité) after Jan Hus, the martyr who died at the stake in 1415.<sup>16</sup>

Little is known about Hus's background, except that he was born in Husinec around 1371. He came to Prague as a student at the University in the 1390s, where he finished his Master of Arts degree in 1396. Hus was ordained priest a few years later, and began studying theology. In 1402 he started preaching in the vernacular in the Bethlehem Chapel, where he soon got a large following because of his criticisms of the wrongdoings and abuses of the Church.

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<sup>16</sup> *Dějiny země koruny české I* (1993:158).

His teachings were highly influenced by John Wyclif (1320–84), an English thinker, priest and translator of the Bible into the vernacular, whose writings had reached Bohemia by the early 1390s. Wyclif defended the doctrine of predestination, stating that only the "community of the just" – those believers predestined to salvation – were the sole true Church with any legitimate claim to spiritual authority. Since nobody except God could know who these people were, they could not be recognized. The clergy, bishops and papacy were thus man-made institutions with no divine sanction. Salvation was available to all true believers quite independently of the clergy, through faith, reading of the Scripture and personal sanctity.<sup>17</sup>

Wyclif, Hus and their followers saw all believers as equal before God and the Bible as God's law and the highest authority – in contrast to the contemporary conception of the Pope as God's representative on earth and master of the means of salvation. They held that the clergy should live modestly, like the apostles, concentrating on spiritual matters and leaving worldly affairs to the state. The Church hierarchy could not fail to see the ramifications.

When the Archbishop of Prague in 1408 ordered the followers of Wyclif to disassociate themselves from his writings, they refused. Václav IV, who had not forgotten his earlier conflicts with the prelates, at first sympathized with Hus and his followers. He thus changed the distribution of votes between the four "nations" at the University through the *Kutná Hora decree* of 1409, giving the Czechs three votes and the foreigners only one, a reversal of the original ratio. In 1410 the Archbishop of Prague had Wyclif's writings burned and Hus excommunicated. Then Hus was excommunicated by the Papal Curia. Finally, when he in 1412 spoke up against the sale of indulgences, he lost the support of Václav IV, who had considerable revenues from this activity. Hus fled Prague and sought refuge in the castles of two sympathetic noblemen in southern Bohemia, where he wrote his most important texts, some in Latin, some in Czech. The reform of Czech spelling at this time has been attributed to Hus.

Under a pledge of safe-conduct from the Holy Roman king, Sigismund of Hungary, Hus went to the Church Council of Constance (convened to solve the three-papal situation) in 1414 to defend himself against the heresy charges. Despite of the safe-conduct he was jailed and commanded to forswear his teachings, which he refused. He was then sentenced to death and burned at the stake in Constance on July 6th, 1415. His close friend Jeroným (Jerome) of Prague followed him in 1416. Their deaths only served to ignite the fervor of their followers.

After 1416, the Hussites were able to continue their activities only in areas controlled by the Hussite nobility. In 1419, a crowd led by Jan of Želivský, a former monk, marched into the New Town of Prague, demanding the release of Hussite captives. When the town councilors refused, they were thrown out of the window of the town hall by the enraged mob. This was the first famous defenestration in Czech history, which also marked the start of the Hussite revolution. Václav IV died childless only a few days later, and the Hussite nobility refused to acknowledge his brother Sigismund as legitimate heir to the Bohemian crown.

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<sup>17</sup> Anthony Black: *Political thought in Europe 1250–1450* (1992:79–80).

With the help of the Catholic nobility of Bohemia and Moravia, Sigismund was crowned king in St. Vitus Cathedral in the summer of 1420, but this coronation was proclaimed invalid at the Diet of Čáslav one year later. The Diet elected a twenty-member collective organ, composed of burghers, lower nobility and upper nobility, to rule the country. The Diet also turned the Four Articles of Prague into law. These articles called for communion under both kinds for the laity, the banning and punishment of all mortal sins (also among the clergy), freedom to preach the gospel, and required the clergy to abandon all worldly goods and power.

Already around 1414 communion under both kinds for the laity (both bread and wine; Latin: *sub utraque specie*), had become a central issue for the Hussites and the chalice their symbol. Because of this they have often been referred to as Utraquists or Calixitins. After the death of Hus, the movement soon split into several factions. The most radical faction was the Tábórites (after Tábor in south Bohemia); ascetic iconoclasts who were opposed to sacraments that were not in the original Church. They established their own community (Tábor), where God's law only was to be valid. The university intelligentsia and part of the nobility were more moderate, advocating the Four Articles, while not wanting to change the basic structure of society.

Sometime before 1460, the Unitas Fratrum (Unity of Brethren) appeared – a sect based on the ideas of Petr Chelčický. He had much in common with the Tábórites in his radicalism, but differed from them on one central point: He believed that the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" should be taken literally. Apart from his pacifism, he taught that all are equal before God; he saw the Church as one body with many equal parts and Christ as the head.

The Hussites were convinced that they were chosen by God to rid the Church of all evil, and wanted to spread the Four Articles of Prague to all Christendom. Christian Europe, however, saw them as heretics. In the years 1420 to 1431 five crusades were organized against Hussite Bohemia. The Czechs, under the leadership of the legendary one-eyed hero Jan Žižka (c. 1360–1424), and later Prokop the Bald (dead 1434), fought well, extending far into present-day Slovakia, but the costs were enormous in material damage and loss of human life. It has been estimated that the population was reduced by forty percent during the Hussite wars.

Negotiations between the Hussite moderates and the Church started at the Council of Basel in 1433. The moderate Hussites and the Catholic nobility joined forces and defeated the radicals in the Battle of Lipany in 1434. The Compacts of 1436 settled the issue, allowing people in Bohemia to choose between the Utraquist and the Roman Catholic confession. Little more than communion under both kinds was achieved, and Pope Eugenius IV never even sanctioned the Compacts. After the Hussite wars, around 70 percent of the population were Hussites.

Accepting the Compacts, the aging Sigismund of Hungary finally acquired the Czech throne. He died only a year after, in 1437, without a male heir, and Albrecht (Albert) V of Habsburg, married to Sigismund's daughter Alžběta (Elizabeth), became Czech king. He died after only two years. Ladislav Posthumous (born five months after his father's death), was acknowledged as legitimate heir in 1444 and crowned in 1453, but only ruled for four years. The real power was in the hands of the nobility at this time.

Jiří of Poděbrady, a Hussite nobleman, gradually rose to power in the Czech lands, serving as administrator of the Bohemian kingdom from around 1448. His power did not change appreciably when Ladislav Posthumous was crowned king. After the young king died, Jiří was elected king in 1458; the first Czech king to be elected. He was also to be the last Czech to ascend the Bohemian throne. Unfortunately, he was regarded as a heretic by practically all of Europe.

Jiří of Poděbrady soon reinstated royal authority. As a Hussite, however, he ran into trouble with the Papacy. Pope Pius II denied the validity of the Basel Compacts already in 1462. Refusing to give in, Jiří was excommunicated by Pope Paul II in 1466. In 1468 his own son-in-law, the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus (Matyás Korvín) declared war and prepared for a crusade. When Jiří of Poděbrady died in 1471, the eldest son of the Polish ruler Kazimír IV, Vladislav (Władysław) II of Jagellon (1471–1516) was elected king, as Jiří wanted. In Bohemia, the real power remained in the hands of the nobility, while Matthias Corvinus kept control of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia until his death in 1490, when the lands of the Czech crown were again united. Religious peace was finally achieved between the Hussites and the Catholics at the Diet of Kutná Hora (1485) where the Compacts were recognized as crown law (valid until 1567), and religious tolerance was thereby established.

Vladislav was followed by his under-age son Louis (Ludvík, 1516–26), who died without an heir in the fateful battle against the Turks at Mohács, leaving the Czech as well as the Hungarian throne vacant. Through a pact of 1515 between Vladislav and Maximilian I of Habsburg, establishing mutual inheritance in case of extinction of the male line, Ferdinand I of Habsburg (married to Princess Anna of Jagellon) was able to make legitimate claim to the Czech crown. He was elected king by the Bohemian estates in 1526 and crowned in 1527.

### ***A national or a religious movement?***

A major point of dispute well into this century was whether Hussism was a religious or a national movement. It was certainly not "national" in any modern sense of the word. The religious contents are fairly obvious – even the names the believer went by, like Utraquists or Calixitins (not to mention "God's warriors"! ) testify to that, as do their demands expressed by the Four Articles of Prague. The only demand that can be seen as remotely "national" is the one concerning the right to preach the Gospel freely, i.e. also in the Czech language.

On the other hand, the struggle did take on a certain ethnic or "national" dimension. First, the Hussite emphasis on the Bible as the law of God and on preaching in the vernacular naturally gave priority to the Czech language. (A major effect of Hussism was indeed to bolster Czech linguistic development.) This is probably also part of the reason why Hussism spread unevenly in the Czech- and German-speaking communities. Second, the fact that the Germans only to a very limited extent embraced Hussism, and on the contrary appeared among its foremost opponents (for instance at Charles University of Prague), created a front between a German-Catholic party and a Czech-Hussite party. This was strengthened during the Hussite wars, when the Hussite Czechs had to fight the Catholic foreigners.

The ethnic dimension should, however, not be overemphasized. A major part of the Czech population never converted to Hussism, even in Bohemia, where the movement was strongest. There were quite a few Czechs also on the Catholic side, especially in Moravia and among the nobility. Also, even though the movement *was* almost exclusively Czech, some notable exceptions are known, like the Englishman Peter Payne, and the German Nikolas of Dresden.<sup>18</sup>

Various factors contributed to the strength of the Hussite movement. Charles University strengthened the contact with the rest of Europe, made possible free exchange of opinions on church-related problems and produced a native educated elite, part of which was not able to get employment. This disaffected elite worked together with rich, influential, self-aware burghers, who also played an important role in the Hussite movement, claiming rights against the upper nobility. Second, the plague and the deep social and economic crisis that ensued provided fertile ground for Hussite ideas among the people. The plague was interpreted as a punishment from God, and associated with the morally decaying state of the Church.

The Church of the Middle Ages was very rich and powerful, and the clergy did not always lead a life proper for men of God. The moral state of the Church was no better in Bohemia than elsewhere. Apart from owning estates (30 percent of all land was in Church hands), the Church also sold indulgences, literally making money on people's sins. Moreover, at the time of Hus, there were three competing Popes – the Pope of Avignon, the Pope of Rome and the Pope of Pisa – a circumstance which did not exactly enhance the prestige of the Church.

Finally, the nobility had strengthened its position during the reign of Václav IV, and it was at first sympathetic to the Hussite cause, as was indeed Václav himself until 1412. As the Hussites advocated that the Church should not own property, this is not surprising: after all, who would be the obvious candidate to take over Church land, if not the nobility? Yet, material interests alone cannot explain the Hussite sympathies of all individual noblemen, although the Hussite proportion was largest in the bishoprics where the Church controlled most of the parishes (Litomyšl).<sup>19</sup>

### ***Slovaks between Arpad and Habsburg rule***

Already in 1300, almost a year before the death of the last male Arpad, the twelve-year-old Charles Robert of Anjou appeared in Hungary. He was the grandson of King Charles II of Naples and Maria, the daughter of the Hungarian king István V. His candidature was supported by the Papal Curia, and he was soon after crowned by the archbishop of Ostrihom. But when András (Andrew) III of Arpad died, the Hungarian nobility refused to acknowledge the coronation. Instead, the nobility offered the Hungarian throne to the Czech king Václav II, who declined in favor of his twelve-year-old son Václav.

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<sup>18</sup> Urban (1991:70).

<sup>19</sup> This is discussed by John Martin Klassen in *The nobility and the making of the Hussite revolution* (1978:40 pp.).

This Václav, ruling under the name Ladislav V (1301–05) soon lost the support of the nobility, and abdicated in 1305. At the same time he became Czech king under the name of Václav III. Charles Robert of Anjou was finally acknowledged king of Hungary in 1307, after Matúš Čák (Matthias Csák) threw in his lot with him. Čák continued to rule his territory right up to his death in 1321, yet he was hardly the national hero that Slovak mythology would have it, but a nobleman acting in his own interest. After Čák's death, Charles Robert was able to consolidate power and confiscate the territory. He was succeeded by his son Louis I (the Great, 1342–82), who also became king of Poland in 1370. During their reigns, French cultural influence became stronger at the Hungarian court, and economically it was a Golden Age. At the same time, the German privileges were dwindling. The *Privilegium pro Slavis*, granted to the town of Žilina by Louis I in 1381, gave the Slavic population equal rights with the Germans.

A new succession struggle erupted when Louis I died without a male heir. His daughter Maria was engaged to Sigismund, who was able to take office in 1387. He had to give up Brandenburg for the Hungarian throne, and he gave the Polish king 12 towns in the Spiš area around 1412–16 in return for a loan. As we have already noted, Sigismund did not have much military luck against the Czech Hussites, against whom he led several crusades against as king of the Holy Roman Empire. The Hussites advanced into Hungarian (mainly Slovak) territory on several occasions in the years 1428–33, and Hussite groups remained there off and on for almost four decades. The last remnants were driven out by Matthias Corvinus in 1467.

A Czech Catholic nobleman by the name of Jan Jiskra of Brandýs played an important role in the succession struggle after the death of Albrecht of Habsburg (1437–39), who succeeded Sigismund in Hungary as well as the Czech lands. The nobility elected Władysław III of Poland as their new king, bypassing the legitimate heir Ladislav Posthumous. His mother Alžběta (Elizabeth) of Luxembourg contested this, and Jiskra sided with her. Leading an army of around 5000 former Hussites, he was able to control the Zvolen-Spiš area until around 1453. After the Polish king died in the Battle of Varna (1444), Jiskra held his position in opposition to Jan Hunyady, the most powerful Hungarian nobleman, who acquired a position in Hungary after 1444 similar to that which Jiří of Poděbrady had in the Czech lands.

The extent of Hussite influence among the Slovaks has been a matter of dispute. A common view has been that it paved the way for Protestantism among the Slovaks and the Czechs. In Czechoslovak works of history in the inter-war period, Hussite influence was evaluated positively, and the fellowship between Czechs and Slovaks was emphasized. Yet, according to some contemporary Slovak historians, Hussism was "limited to a few individuals in church chapters."<sup>20</sup> The Hussites found support mainly among the lesser nobility, especially in areas where they established garrisons. In the nationalist version, Hussite advances were "nothing but plundering raids, hurting a majority of the inhabitants of the territory under attack."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Matúš Kučera and Bohumír Kostický: *Historia. Slovensko v obrazoch* (1990). Referred by Kirschbaum (1995:48).

<sup>21</sup> (jednoznačné korisťnými výpravami, škodiacimi všetkým obyvateľom napádaných území). *Starý národ – mladý štát* (1994:56).



While it is probably true that Hussism never was a strong force among ordinary people, a legacy of the Czech presence in Slovakia during the Hussite wars was a gradual diffusion (starting in 1422) of literary Czech as the current language of administration and private correspondence in Slovakia. With the Reformation, it also became the language of religion.

After the premature death of Ladislav Posthumous, Matthias Corvinus (Matyás Korvín, 1458–90), the son of Hunyady, was elected king. The fact that noblemen were elected kings in Hungary and in the Czech lands is evidence of the strong position of the nobility in both countries at the time. During his reign, Renaissance influences began to penetrate Hungary. The first university on Slovak territory, *Academia Istropolitana*, was established in Bratislava in 1465. It was only to last until 1490. Students of Slovak origin thus continued to study at universities abroad, in Prague, in Vienna, and Kraków. After the death of Corvinus, the Czech and the Hungarian crown were again united, this time under Vladislav of Jagellon.

From the south a new threat was appearing. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire had begun gradually to push north. In the Battle of Mohács in 1526, Louis II was killed, setting the stage for the Ottoman occupation and partition of Hungary. A majority of the nobility elected János Zápolyai (Jan Zápolský, 1526–40), the vojvoda of Transylvania and the biggest landowner in Hungary, as new king of Hungary. Another group of Hungarian nobles, including the nobility of Croatia-Slavonia, soon after elected Ferdinand I of Habsburg (1526–64). According to the Jagellon-Habsburg arrangement of 1515, Ferdinand was the legitimate heir. In the civil war that ensued, Zápolyai obtained the support of the Ottomans. As a result, Hungary was divided into three spheres, controlled by the Habsburgs (the northwestern rim – or Royal Hungary), the Ottomans (the central part) and Zápolyai (Transylvania).

In the truce of 1547 Ferdinand I was acknowledged as *de facto* king of Hungary, including Slovak territory. Yet, the heir of János Zápolyai, János Zsigmond Zápolyai (protégé of the Sultan) did not give up the title of king of Hungary until 1570, when he settled for the title prince of Transylvania and ruler of a part of Hungary. He was followed by other Transylvanian magnates – first, members of the Báthory family (1571–1613), then Gábor Bethlen (1613–29) and finally György Rákóczi I (Juraj Rákoci, 1630–48) and György Rákóczi II (1648–60).

In the meantime, Protestantism had begun to spread in Hungary. It first made inroads in the German-speaking mining towns, and from there spread to the landed gentry and eventually to the population at large.

### ***Slovaks during the Ottoman wars***

The succession struggle facilitated the Ottoman advance. Buda fell in 1529, and later the same year the Turks besieged Vienna for the first time. By the time of the five-year truce that started in 1547, the Turks controlled the area between the Tisza and the Danube well beyond Buda to the north, as well as a strip of land to the west of Danube. A new war in 1551–68 extended Ottoman control further into Slovak territory, where the river Ipel' meets the Danube. The peace of Adrianople in 1568, twice renewed, lasted until new hostilities broke out in 1593.

During the war of 1593–1606, the Ottoman Empire conquered areas west and east of this strip, leaving roughly present-day Slovak territory and a small strip of east Hungary and Croatia. Following the last Ottoman offensive in 1682, a strip of land in the southern part of present-day Slovakia was under Ottoman rule for a year. The unsuccessful second siege of Vienna in 1683 signaled the end of Ottoman influence on the Hungarian plain. Already in 1686 the Habsburgs took Buda back, and by 1688 they had reached Belgrade. In 1689 they pushed deep into Serbia, but were driven back. The peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci (Karlowitz) in 1699 left the Banat under Ottoman control, otherwise it followed the Sava-Danube line.<sup>22</sup> For the Slovaks this meant that the Ottoman wars were over.

Slovak territory was affected in several ways by the wars. First, as the frontier between the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires, the southern part of Slovak territory was a major war zone. The territory was devastated, people fled into the mountains and the social structure was left in general disarray. Several towns were turned into ashes, and the areas that came under direct Ottoman rule were taxed heavily. In addition, Slovak territory was affected by the general economic decline in East Central Europe that followed the "discovery" of the New World. The Slovak mining towns began to feel the competition from overseas gold and silver.

More important, though, was the fact that Slovak territory for more than 150 years became the center of Royal Hungary. Ecclesiastical organs were moved during the 1540s (the Archbishop of Ostrihom moved to Trnava), and Bratislava became de facto the Hungarian capital, where coronations and Diets were held until 1848, even though the administration was moved to Buda and Pest during the reign of Josef II (1780–90). An estimated two-thirds of the Hungarian nobility<sup>23</sup> sought refuge on Slovak territory, especially in the towns. In addition, Magyar townspeople came. After the liberation, the movement went the other way.

Another side effect of the wars was that an increasing number of Slovaks were co-opted into the lower nobility because of their contribution to the defense against the Turks. Slovak and Magyar settlements thus became more interwoven, and the numerical balance between them changed: It has been estimated that Hungary lost between 500,000 and one million inhabitants in the course of the 16th century,<sup>24</sup> and the Magyars bore the blunt of this.

The Ottoman wars also gave the Reformation more leeway. By 1550, the Roman Catholic Church had practically ceased to exist as an institution in Hungary. It is estimated that, by around 1580, 80–85 percent of the population (apart from Croatia, which remained a Catholic stronghold) were Protestant.<sup>25</sup> Lutheranism started to spread already before 1521, but was after 1540 challenged by Calvinism. Twenty years later Calvinism was the religion of most of the Magyars, while a majority of the Germans and Slovaks remained Lutheran.

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<sup>22</sup> See Paul Robert Magocsi: *Historical atlas of East Central Europe*, Map 14, 18, 19b and 20a (also the text) for details.

<sup>23</sup> Kirschbaum (1995:64).

<sup>24</sup> Jean Bérenger: *A history of the Habsburg Empire 1273–1700* (1994:197).

<sup>25</sup> Bérenger (1994:180).

One of the reasons why the Counter-Reformation was so slow in asserting itself in Hungary, was that Protestant magnates used the commotion caused by the Ottoman wars (and the Thirty Years' War) to advance their own interests and ensure religious freedom for the population. Magnates of semi-independent Transylvania (largely Protestant by the end of the 16th century) played an important part in the rebellions against the Habsburgs in 1604, in 1619 and in 1644.

The first rebellion in 1604 was led by the Transylvanian magnate István (Stephen) Bocskay, and was initiated by the Catholic take-over of the Lutheran church of Košice. Rudolf II of Habsburg refused to listen to the complaints of the Protestant nobility, and by 1605 an open rebellion developed. The Habsburgs were still at war with the Ottoman Turks, and Rudolf realized he could not fight both. In the ensuing peace of Vienna in 1606, the Hungarian nobility retained all their privileges, and their religious freedom was granted. This was also the result of the second rebellion in 1619, when Gábor Bethlen, the prince of Transylvania, used the opportunity presented by the start of the Thirty Years' War to seize Slovak territory. Religious freedom was affirmed in 1645, after the third rebellion led by the Transylvanian prince György Rákóczi in 1644. This time the Košice area was retained by Rákóczi.

On Slovak territory, the first modest beginnings of the Counter-Reformation came around 1560, when some Jesuits were sent to Trnava to establish a seminary. They left in 1567, after the buildings were burnt down, but returned in 1586, this time to stay. A turning point for the Counter-Reformation in Hungary was the appointment of Peter Pázmány as Archbishop of Ostrihom in 1616. In 1635 he established the first Jesuit university in Trnava (to be moved to Buda in 1777), where teachers as well as students were predominantly of Slovak origin. The second Jesuit university was established in Košice in 1660. The really severe Counter-Reformation did not set in until the 1670s, when Protestant clergy were threatened with the gallows.

The new harsh policy of re-catholization triggered a fourth rebellion, led by a nobleman from the Slovak part of Royal Hungary, Imre Thököli (Imrich Tököli), who controlled Slovak territory by the end of 1680. Leopold I realized that he risked losing most of Royal Hungary if he did not compromise with the rebels. Religious freedom was reinstated by the Diet of Sopron in 1681, but the Protestant churches confiscated after 1671 were not returned. The rebels were not satisfied, and in 1682 the Ottoman Turks came to their aid. After the Ottomans were driven out of the Hungarian plain, the Habsburgs won Slovak territory back in 1685.

In the Diet of Bratislava in 1687, the power of the nobility was limited by the abolition of the *ius resistendi* (instituted by the Golden Bull of 1222), and by the provision that gave the male line of the Habsburgs hereditary rights to the Hungarian crown. Yet, while confirming the dominant position of the Catholic Church, this Diet also reaffirmed the rights of the Protestants laid down by the Diet of 1681. Leopold I's attempts at uniting the Habsburg lands through a common religion had failed. A majority of the noble families of Hungary had converted to Catholicism by 1660, and the Counter-Reformation made great progress among the common people by the end of the century, but conversion was not complete and was never to be. Protestant minorities survived among the Slovaks and Germans as well as the Magyars.

The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation also affected future Slovak identity. Among Slovak Protestants, Czech became the liturgical language. The *Kralice* bible of the Unitas Fratrum (the Brethren) from the latter half of the 16th century was used by Slovak Protestants until the 19th century. The use of vernaculars in services reinforced the division of the Protestants into Calvinists (Magyars) and Lutherans (Slovaks, Germans). The Lutherans in Slovakia formed de facto bishoprics, whose representatives were elected. As the Slovaks formed a majority in most of the Lutheran Church bodies, most of the leaders were of Slovak origin.

The Catholic Church, still using Latin, remained one church organization – and was closely linked to the house of Habsburg. Yet, in the course of the Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits developed what has later been termed "Jesuit Slovak." This language closely resembled Cultured West Slovak, a regional administrative code spontaneously developed in the 16th and 17th centuries through the use of Czech with local Slovak features in the administration of West Slovak towns.<sup>26</sup> The Counter-Reformation thus laid the foundations for a Slovak literary language. Equally important, institutions of learning (Protestant and Catholic) were subsequently established all over Slovak territory, which meant that the Slovak literate elite grew. The Jesuits were especially active in establishing institutions of learning, including two universities. Many Slovak Protestants attended German universities, Wittenberg in particular.

This is also the period when the first works with specific reference to the Slovaks (or "Slavs of Hungary") started to appear. At the University of Strasbourg, Peter Révay published *De monarchia et sacra corona regni Hungariae centeniae septem* ("Seven centuries of the Hungarian kingdom and holy crown") in 1656. Jakob Jakobeus, a Czech exile arriving after the Battle of the White Mountain (see below), published in Slovakized Czech *Viva gentis Slavonicae delineatio* ("An outline of the Slav nation") and *Gentis Slavonicae lacrumae, suspiria et vota* ("The tears, sighs and demands of the Slav nation"). A defense of the Slovaks (Slavs) was given by Daniel Sinapius Horčička in *Neo-forum Latino-Slavonicum* ("A new Latin-Slav market") from 1678.<sup>27</sup>

Although no distinction was made between "Slav" and "Slovak", it seems that a certain Slovak identity had developed by the middle of the 17th century. The higher level of education among the Slovaks was probably important here, but the Ottoman wars can also be assumed to have had an effect.<sup>28</sup> On the one hand, with the Hungarian plain gone, Slovakia was finally a unit. It seems likely that Slovak groups who defended their land against the enemy developed a sense of mutual solidarity. Moreover, the population movements associated with the wars had brought the Slovaks into contact with people that were culturally very different, whether they were fleeing Magyars or Turkish janissaries. To the extent that identities develop in opposition to the "others", this may have enhanced a Slovak feeling of belonging together.

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<sup>26</sup> Ďurovič (1980:212).

<sup>27</sup> All titles quoted by Kirschbaum (1995:71). He translates "Slavonicae" and "Slavonicum" with *Slovak*, which may be admissible considering the referred contents of the works, but literally the meaning is *Slav*.

<sup>28</sup> Wars have been instrumental in forging identities. See e.g. Anthony D. Smith: *The ethnic origins of nations* (1986).

On the other hand, this unit was not "Slovakia", but Royal Hungary, and people of Slovak, German and Magyar origin had fought the Ottomans together. The wars may thus also have contributed to a Hungarian *Landes patriotism*. That such a Hungarian patriotism existed is beyond doubt. In fact, the early Slovak awakeners worked within the framework of Hungarian patriotism, as we shall see in Chapter Six.<sup>29</sup> Finally, it has been suggested that the Ottoman wars helped unite the Habsburg subjects. Robert A. Kann argues that the wars "undoubtedly at least led to a limited feeling of solidarity between the Habsburg domains."<sup>30</sup> The recurring conflicts between the Catholic Habsburgs and the Protestant nobility (who did not hesitate to seek the support of the Porte) suggest, however, that this is a rather dubious conclusion.

The Ottoman wars and the religious struggle thus conceivably contributed to the development of a Slovak (pre-national) identity in two ways: First, the wars united the Slovaks against a common enemy that was different from them in culture and in religion, while at the same time elevating some Slovaks to the ranks of the lower nobility (the gentry). Second, the increased level of education was important for the formation of a Slovak identity; the Slovak literate elite was enlarged, two vernacular-based literary languages (Czech and Jesuit Slovak) were established, and the Slovaks were brought into contact with European currents.

### ***Czechs under Habsburg rule to the Battle of the White Mountain***

When the Bohemian Diet in 1526 elected Ferdinand I of Habsburg as king, it was on the explicit condition that he would acknowledge the liberties of the Estates – which is a reflection of the strong position of the Estates at the time. The Estates of Moravia (still a margravate), Silesia and Lusatia followed suit. Ferdinand's wife Anna, daughter of Vladislav II of Jagellon, represented the link to the Czech ruling house. This was the start of 400 years of Habsburg rule in the Czech lands.

Ferdinand soon set out to curb the power of the Estates. The power struggle came to a head during the war between the Holy Roman Emperor Karl V and the league of Protestant princes in 1546–47. In the fall of 1546 and again in 1547, Ferdinand placed the military forces of the Czech lands on alert without conferring with the Estates, to whom this right belonged.

The Bohemian Diet accused the king of infringing on their rights and sent forces against him. The Estates of the other Czech lands kept aloof. After the Catholic victory in the Battle of Mühlsberg, the Bohemian Estates got cold feet. Ferdinand did not fail to punish his disobedient subjects, by limiting the autonomy of Prague and other Royal towns. In addition, he confiscated the property of quite a few nobles, many of them members of the Brethren. Finally, two burghers and two nobles were executed in the Old Town square in Prague.

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<sup>29</sup> See also Eva Kowalská: Historische Tradition, Sprache und Ausbildung: Zu einige Faktoren des Werdegangs der Slowaken zur Nation, in: Timmermann: *Die Entstehung der Nationalbewegung in Europa 1750–1849* (1993: pp. 241 ff.).

<sup>30</sup> (zumindest ein begrenztes Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit der habsburgischen Länder herbeiführten). Kann (1993:70).

The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 settled the score between Protestants and Catholics according to the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, which divided the Holy Roman Empire into Catholic and Protestant territories. It gave the ruler of a territory the right to require that all his subjects, including the nobility, adhere to his religion. This signaled the end of religious freedom, although it was not at first enforced in the Czech lands.

Lutheranism had started to spread in Bohemia after 1519. Utraquism was by then dwindling, and while some of the Utraquists (so-called Old Utraquists) held on to the old faith, after 1540 a majority (the Neo-Utraquists) gravitated towards Lutheranism. Calvinism made limited inroads in the Czech lands; more important were the *Unitas Fratrum* (the Brethren), even though they were still persecuted, especially by Ferdinand I. The religious situation remained complicated throughout the 16th century. It has been estimated that those faithful to Rome still did not exceed 10 percent of the population in 1600.<sup>31</sup>

Ferdinand was more of a pragmatic than an ardent Catholic, but he did invite the Jesuit order to the Czech lands in 1556. Under the reign of Maximilian II (I on the Czech throne, 1564–76), re-catholization was not actively promoted. In 1567 he invalidated the Basel Compacts after Protestant pressure, but declined to establish a new religious order. The Czech Confession (*Confessio bohémica*), a compromise elaborated by the non-Catholic majority (Utraquists, Lutherans and Brethren) of the Diet of 1575 was accepted by the king only orally.

Rudolf II (1576–1611), the last Habsburg to reside in Prague, was unlike his father Maximilian undoubtedly a Catholic, but not a religious zealot. In 1583 he moved the Court from Vienna to Prague, turning it into the cultural center of Europe and adding renaissance-style buildings to its rich mosaic. His court became the center of a re-catholization drive, hosting representatives of the Papacy and the Spanish envoy. With the active support of the royal court and the Papal nuncio, the Catholics were able to acquire the highest offices in the Czech lands in 1598–99, despite being a small minority. This alienated the Estates.

When Rudolf's brother Matthias turned against him in 1607, Matthias got the support of the Moravian nobility, while the Bohemian Diet declined after receiving promises from Rudolf that he would meet their demands. Rudolf had to cede the control of Moravia, Hungary and the Austrian lands to his brother, but was allowed to keep Bohemia, Silesia and Upper and Lower Lusatia. He paid for the support of the Bohemian Estates by issuing an imperial charter in 1609, the so-called *Letter of Majesty*, which gave his subjects freedom of religion, essentially putting the Czech Confession of 1575 into effect. After an unsuccessful attempt at getting the Estates to yield through military force in 1611, Rudolf had to abdicate in favor of Matthias. Matthias moved the court back to Vienna already the year after, leaving the rule of the Czech lands to his representatives, among whom the Spanish and Catholic party dominated. This the Czechs resented.

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<sup>31</sup> Bérenger (1994:228). In *Dějiny zemí koruny české I* (1993:285), an estimate of between 10 and 15 percent is given.

None of the four sons of the late Maximilian II had legitimate heirs, and it was thus decided in 1617 that their cousin Ferdinand of Styria would inherit the Eastern Habsburg lands. He was by then already known for his uncompromising stand towards the "heretics" of his own lands. When his candidature was presented to the Czech Diet of 1617, the non-Catholic opposition demanded that he acknowledge the Letter of Majesty of 1609, which he reluctantly did. The few who still resisted his candidature were jailed or deprived of their positions.

In the spring of 1618, the non-Catholic burghers and nobility convened a meeting to discuss the violation of their rights. Matthias' ban of the meeting ignited the opposition, and on May 23rd a delegation arrived at Prague Castle. In an improvised court meeting the king's officials were found guilty of violating the rights of the Estates, and defenestrated. (All three survived.) One day later, the king was dethroned, and a government of the Estates was elected. Upper and Lower Lusatia and Silesia expressed support, while Moravia remained neutral until the death of Matthias in 1619. A general Diet of all the Czech lands in the summer of 1619 elected the Calvinist Friedrich of Palatine king. The turning point of the inevitable war came when Maximilian of Bavaria, the leader of the Catholic league of the Holy Roman Empire, sided with Ferdinand in 1620. The legendary Battle of the White Mountain<sup>32</sup> in November 1620 only lasted for a few hours, yet the outcome proved disastrous for Czech Protestant opposition.

Culturally, the period up to the Battle of the White Mountain has been portrayed as a Golden Age. Humanist influences started to make themselves felt after the turn of the 16th century. The Catholics wrote in Latin and Czech, while the Utraquists ventured to spread humanist ideas outside narrow, educated circles by writing their texts exclusively in Czech. *Kronika česká* ("The Czech Chronicle"), written by Václav Hájek of Libočan (c. 1500–53) is probably the most read work of the Czech renaissance. Hájek was originally an Utraquist, but converted to Catholicism in the early 1520s, and his chronicle was thus found acceptable also after the Battle of the White Mountain. However, the most famous renaissance text is the *Kralice Bible* (named after the Moravian town where the Brethren had their press), a translation renown for its beautiful and elevated language. The New Testament was translated by Jan Blahoslav (1523–71), bishop of the Brethren, who perfected the Czech grammar and spelling. His students and followers completed the work, and the Bible was published in six volumes in the years 1579–94. It had great influence on the development of Czech as a literary language.

Parallel to this linguistic elevation, however, Czech gradually lost ground politically. The prestige of the German language grew in the Czech lands after the ascension of the Habsburgs to the throne, also because of the diffusion of Protestantism. At the same time, Czech and German Protestants united against the Catholics, and this helped to soften the conflict between the two peoples. Also in the Czech lands the religious struggle contributed to the establishment of new institutions of learning. The Clementinum in Prague, formerly a Dominican monastery, was turned into a Jesuit College in 1562. Charles University was controlled by the Utraquists, while the college of Olomouc became a Jesuit university in 1567.

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<sup>32</sup> *Bílá hora* (the White Mountain) is not actually a mountain, but an elevation a little outside the center of Prague.

### *The Czech age of darkness (temno)*

The period following the Battle of the White Mountain has been presented by Czech national historiography as *temno* (darkness). The penalty for the disloyalty of the Protestant nobility was indeed harsh. Those leaders of the rebellion who had not managed to escape were jailed, and 27 of them (three lords, seven knights and seventeen burghers) were executed in the Old Town square of Prague. Many also had their property completely or partially confiscated.

A far more ardent Catholic than any of his Habsburg predecessors, Ferdinand II started a strong Counter-Reformation drive after the Battle of the White Mountain. Charles University was entrusted to the Jesuits in 1622, who merged it with the Clementinum (permanently after 1654). Protestant preachers were banished and non-Catholics ousted from their positions. In 1627 Protestant nobles and burghers who had not yet fled or converted were presented with the choice between submission and exile, which involved selling their property to Catholics. The peasants were forbidden to leave (some of them did anyway, especially in the border areas), and were brought back to Catholicism the hard way in the 17th century.

Ferdinand II used the opportunity to reward loyal Catholic nobility, many of them non-Czech. By the end of the Thirty Years' War, almost half of the free estates of Bohemia were in foreign hands. Many thousands of Czech Protestant families left the country. It has been estimated that the Czech lands lost around a third of their population as a result of war, emigration, famine and epidemics.<sup>33</sup> Neither the transfer of land nor the population losses were quite as marked in Moravia and Silesia as in Bohemia.

The renewed constitution of 1627 (1628 in Moravia) made the Czech crown hereditary according to the male *and* the female line of the Habsburgs. (By contrast, in 1687 the Hungarian crown was made hereditary according to the male line only.) The Estates thus lost the right to elect their king, and the power it implied. The renewed constitution also made Catholicism the only permitted confession, put the German language on equal terms with Czech in state affairs and transferred legislative authority to the ruler. In essence, the Diet retained only the right to vote over taxes, which was by no means unimportant. The king also got the right to appoint all major officers of the crown. In practice these dignitaries were always chosen among the nobility of the Czech lands, but the renewed constitution nevertheless curbed the power of the (Czech) Estates in favor of the ruling house – and worked in favor of the German-speakers.

The other side of the age of darkness (*temno*) is the linguistic and cultural decline that allegedly set in after the Battle of the White Mountain. To what extent decline is an accurate description of what happened, it still a matter of dispute. On the one hand, the rigid Jesuit censorship that was maintained until 1760 must have impeded intellectual life, and certainly closed off the Habsburg domains to Western influences. It is also a fact that the Jesuits in their eagerness to root out heresy burnt literally thousands of Czech books.

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<sup>33</sup> *Dějiny země koruny české I* (1993:276). According to Bérenger (1994:296), however, the war related "losses in the whole of the country [were] less than one-fifth."



Moreover, many Czech men of letters chose exile rather than giving up their faith. Two of the most renowned are Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius, 1592–1670), the last bishop of the Brethren, and Pavel Stránský of Zapy (1583–1657). Komenský's most elevated work in Czech was *Labyrint světa a lusthauz (ráj) srdce* ("Labyrinth of the world and paradise of the heart", 1631). More important from a national point of view, however, was his *Kšaft umírající matky Jednoty bratrské* ("Testament of the dying mother Unitas Fratrum", 1650). This is where the words that Masaryk loved to quote appear: "I too believe in God, that after the passing of the storm's anger, brought down on us by our sins, the government of your affairs will again be returned to you, oh Czech people."<sup>34</sup> Stránský is known for his Latin history of the Czech lands *Respublica Bojema* ("The Czech state" – 1634), but perhaps more for his defense of the Czech language in *Okřik na nedbalého Čecha* ("Outcry for the hapless Czech"), published anonymously during the rebellion of the Estates before the Battle of the White Mountain.

Some present-day Czech scholars argue against the decline thesis of the awakeners, stating that "it would be wrong to say that the exodus of non-Catholic scholars after the Battle of the White Mountain and the dissolution of the Utraquist network of schools led to a marked decline of the level of education in the Czech lands."<sup>35</sup> On the contrary, they argue; the Jesuit school system was one of the best of its time, completely on level with Humanist and Protestant education. And it is true that not all men of letters left the Czech lands after 1620.

One of those who stayed was the Jesuit historian Bohuslav Balbín (1621–1688). He wrote *Epitome historica Rerum Bohemicarum seu Historia Boleslaviensis* (Excerpt of Bohemian history, or the History of Boleslav), an outline of Czech history from the beginning of Christianity to 1526, where he especially glorified the reign of Karel IV. Balbín's most famous work, *Dissertatio apologetica pro lingua Slavonica, praecipue Bohemica* (dissertation to the defense of the Slav language, especially the Czech) finished in 1672, was even more strongly patriotic in tone than the *Epitome* and never passed any censorship. It thus remained in manuscript until František Martin Pelcl (one of the early national awakeners) had it published in 1775. In 1869 it came out in Czech under the title *Obrana jazyka slovanského, zvláště českého*.

Neither, according to the same authors, is it entirely true that the Czech language went into decline. Latin remained the most important language of scholarship, but there were poets and others writing in an elevated Czech, like Bedřich Bridel (1619–1680). Also, even though Latin again became the liturgical language, preaching in Czech was common even among the Jesuits, simply because the common people did not understand Latin. Finally, art, sculpture, music, theater and architecture undoubtedly developed to a very high level in the Czech lands during the Baroque era following the Battle of the White Mountain. The Baroque era also represented an all time high in the building of churches, cathedrals and monasteries.

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<sup>34</sup> (Věřímť i já Bohu, že po přejití vichřic hněvu, hříchy našimi na hlavy naše uvedeného, vláda věcí tvých k tobě se zase navrátí, ó lide český). Quotation from the introductory page of Jaroslav Pánek: *Jan Amos Komenský* (1990).

<sup>35</sup> (Bylo by mylnou domněnkou soudit, že odchodem nekatolických učenců po Bíle hoře a zániku utrakvistické sítě škol výrazně upadla v českých zemích vzdělanost). *Dějiny země koruny české I* (1993:292).

### ***Czechs and Slovaks under Enlightened absolutism***

When the Austrian Habsburgs became involved in the war of the Spanish succession (1700–14) following the death of the last male Habsburg of the western branch, the Hungarian magnates staged a last rebellion, led by Ferenc Rákóczi II, župan of Saris. A Diet in 1707 deposed Josef I, but when he confirmed the nobility's tax exemptions and other privileges, the opposition fell apart and peace was signed in 1711. The rebel stronghold was Slovak territory, and one of the rebels was Juraj Jánošík, an outlaw who was hanged in 1713. Jánošík has been pictured in Slovak legends and folk art as a Robin Hood figure and national hero.

In an effort to keep the remaining eastern Habsburg domains together, Karl VI formulated the *Pragmatic Sanction* in 1713. According to this document, all Habsburg domains were to be ruled as a unified, indivisible and hereditary totality. The order of succession was also regulated: Male descendants of Karl VI were to inherit first, followed by female descendants of Karl VI and finally the (female) descendants of Josef I. As it turned out, the succession rules came into effect sooner than he had probably hoped for; Karl VI had only one son (in 1716) who died as an infant. The eldest of his three daughters, Maria Theresia, was born in 1717.

The Diets of the Czech lands and Austria accepted the Pragmatic Sanction in 1720 and the Hungarian Diet in 1723. The main problem was to get the assent of the rest of Europe. During the Thirty Years' War Lusatia had been lost to Saxony (1635), although the Habsburgs as kings of Bohemia technically remained feudal masters. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) after Karl's death, most of Silesia and Kladsko (Kłodzko) went to Prussia (1742). The loss became final in 1763 after Maria Theresia failed to recover these lands.

The era of enlightened absolutism is normally confined to the reign of Maria Theresia (1740–80) and the briefer reigns of her sons Josef II (1780–90) and Leopold II (1790–92). It marked the beginning of a new era, in which feudalism was to yield to a modern society. A crucial aim was to turn the various Habsburg domains into a modern, centralized Empire and to educate and enlighten the people. The most important reforms were unification and bureaucratization of the administration, changes in the relation between lords and serfs, and religious and educational reforms, including religious tolerance. It is on the latter point that Josef II differed most from his mother. Through a series of reforms starting in 1748 the government of the Czech and Austrian lands became centralized, depriving the Estates of power and privileges. In 1748 a deputation system parallel to the Diets of the Czech and Austrian lands was established, and the Diets gave up their right to approve the number of men at arms and the monetary contributions for 10 years. In 1749 the Czech and Austrian Court Chancelleries were abolished, to be gradually replaced by a unitary administration for the Czech and Austrian lands.

The Czechs were punished for electing Karl Albert of Bavaria as king in 1741, while in Hungary, where the nobility had been loyal, the administration system remained unaltered under Maria Theresia. After the Diet refused to raise the war taxes, however, she dissolved that assembly in 1765, never to convoke it again. Josef II abolished the old *župa* and divided the country into ten units under royal commissaries, restricting the power of the nobility.

In 1750 a common monetary system was established, and the Austrian system of weights and measures was introduced in Moravia (1758) and in Bohemia (1765). Customs barriers were removed between the Czech lands in 1752 and between the Czech and Austrian lands in 1775, whereas the customs wall against Hungary remained. This was partly motivated by the Austrian need for a secure supply of raw materials, partly by the Hungarian Diet's refusal to renounce the tax exemptions, a privilege that was retained until the revolution of 1848.

Leopold I had limited the extent of the *robot* (serfdom work) of estate peasants to three days a week in 1680. Josef II abolished serfdom (*Leibeigenschaft*) in the Czech and Austrian lands in 1781 and in Hungary in 1785. In 1789 he tried to change the tax system from *robot* to payment in money and kind. This was met with opposition from nobility and peasants alike, especially in Hungary; the nobility did not want to lose their tax exemptions, and the peasants – living in a subsistence economy – did not have the money to pay.

In 1773 the Papal Bull dissolving the Jesuit order signaled the end of the Counter-Reformation. Already in 1781 Josef issued the Patent of Tolerance, granting to Lutherans, Calvinists and Greek Orthodox (Uniate) believers the right to voice their allegiance publicly. In a separate decree the Jews received limited rights. At the same time, censorship was abolished. The Patent of Tolerance was only one of many reforms that infringed on the prerogatives of the Catholic Church: general seminaries were established, monasteries were not allowed to send gold abroad the way they used to, etc.

Until their order was dissolved in 1773, the Jesuits ran a large part of the school system. The *Allgemeine Schulordnung* (universal school decree) of 1774 established compulsory education in *Trivialschulen* (elementary schools) where the children were to learn the basic skills of reading, writing, counting and religion. In Hungary, a similar reform of the school system (*Ratio Educationis*) was introduced in 1777, but was made valid only for the Catholic schools. The Protestants had their own schools, authorized by the Diet of 1687.

In all schools above *Trivialschulen*, middle schools and teachers' academies included, German was made the medium of education (in Hungary only after 1786). By Royal decree of 1784, the official language of education was changed from Latin to German in the universities of all the Habsburg domains apart from Hungary. Already under Maria Theresia German had been made the language of administration in the Austrian and Czech lands, while Latin was used in Hungary until Josef II replaced it with German through the language decree of 1784.

In 1787 Josef II started a new war with the Ottoman Empire that was intensely unpopular, and towards the end of his life he revoked all his reforms, except the Patent of Tolerance and the abolition of serfdom. His brother Leopold II (1790–92) got the job of restoring order in Hungary. In the compromise of 1791, Hungary was again acknowledged as a separate country, although the Pragmatic Sanction was affirmed. Laws were to be approved by the Diet as well as the king – thus putting an end to rule by royal decree. Taxes were to be levied by the Diet, which was to meet at least every three years. The rights of the Protestants were again affirmed, Latin was reinstated, and Magyar was allowed in the middle schools.

It has been suggested that the reforms of the school system and the administration were a part of a deliberate Germanization policy on the part of Josef II. Robert A. Kann argues that Josef II was "at least a moderate nationalist"<sup>36</sup> who believed in the superiority of German culture. Yet, as Josef Kočí remarks, "the choice of German [as the language of administration and education] was probably not motivated by nationalistic or chauvinistic concerns."<sup>37</sup> When a vernacular language was needed to replace Latin as the language of administration and education in a modernized and centralized Habsburg Empire, German was the natural choice. It had long since been codified, it was the language of a large part of the political elite as well as of the capital Vienna – and there were no viable alternatives.

I doubt that Josef was a German chauvinist, and his aim was certainly not assimilation. He continued to have proclamations and rulings printed in Czech, and no attempt was made to force the lower classes to learn German. His Germanization policy was thus scarcely directed at eliminating the multi-national composition of the state. It is in fact dubious whether we can speak of a deliberate nationality policy in the Habsburg Empire before the turn of the 19th century at all. Prior to the French Revolution it never occurred to anyone to question the legitimacy of multi-national states as such, and deliberate nation-building was not yet on the agenda. National demands were likewise modest, cultural and oriented towards scholarship.

Regardless of the aim, however, it may be argued that the Germanization policy of Josef II served to ignite the incipient national revivals of the Czechs and Slovaks (and Magyars). On the one hand, the centralization efforts fueled the *Landespatriotismus* associated with the Czech lands and with Hungary. On the other hand, movements for national linguistic preservation emerged among most of the subject nations during the final three decades of the 18th century. The start of the Czech and Slovak national revivals was marked by a new interest in the study of their history, followed by a (re-)codification of the language. I return to the national revivals in more detail in the following two chapters. Finally, for the ruling nation of the Habsburg Empire, the "German question" had begun to present itself with increasing urgency, especially after the German Confederation was established in 1815.

### ***From absolutism to revolution***

The enlightened absolutism of Maria Theresia, Josef II and Leopold II was followed by the reactionary absolutism of Franz II (1792–1835) and his powerful *Kanzler* Clemens Wenzel Lothar Metternich (1821–48). After the death of Franz II, a triumvirate consisting of Metternich, Franz's brother Ludwig and the Bohemian nobleman František Antonín Kolovrat (Franz Anton Kolowrat) ruled in the name of the feeble-minded Ferdinand V. The power of Metternich increased gradually, first in external affairs, after 1815 in internal affairs as well.

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<sup>36</sup> (... zumindest ein gemäßigter Nationalist...). R.A. Kann: *Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches* (1993:176).

<sup>37</sup> (Volba němčiny nebyla snad výsledkem nějaké nacionalisticky nebo šovinisticky laděné motivace). J. Kočí: *České národní obrození* (1978:142).

The first part of the reign of Franz II was dominated by the Napoleonic Wars, starting in 1792 and ending at Waterloo in 1815. Frightened by the general anarchy that ensued after the French Revolution and the Jacobin conspiracy in Hungary in 1794–95, Franz was convinced that strict measures were necessary in internal matters. Rigid censorship was reintroduced, and from the very beginning he aimed at strong centralization. The police played an increasingly greater role, earning the Habsburg monarchy the label of police state. The main task of the secret police and the censors was to prevent the diffusion of liberal ideas. The influence of the Church in lower and medium level education increased.

The expenses of the Napoleonic Wars had impeded economic development in the Habsburg domains. After 1815 this situation gradually improved, and industrialization, which had started in the Czech lands around the turn of the century, picked up speed.

In Hungary the Diet was assembled regularly to vote over taxes and troops. As a result of the refusal to pay the Hungarian share of the state bankruptcy caused by the Napoleonic Wars, the Diet was not summoned between 1812 and 1825, when Franz reconvened it order to ensure the succession of his son Ferdinand V. After this it met regularly. The Hungarian nobility managed to uphold a more independent position than, for instance, the nobility of the Czech lands also during absolutism. This made it possible for a liberal circle to form among them, which was to play an important part in the events of 1848–49.

The strong position of the Hungarian (mostly Magyar) nobility also explains the relative success of the Magyar national movement. After the nobility fought back the attempt at introducing German in Hungary under Josef II, the Magyar language gradually acquired a preferred status. Already in 1805 the emperor granted a request that correspondence between the chancellery and the Hungarian Consilium be written in Magyar, and in 1830 the Hungarian Diet made knowledge of Magyar a requirement for employment in the administration and for admission to the judiciary. A law of 1840 expanded the use of Magyar in the state administration and in the Church. It was now required that all clergy know Magyar. In 1844 Magyar was made the official language of all governmental institutions and the medium of instruction of all middle schools. This lenience of the court towards the Magyars of course worked to the direct disadvantage of the non-Magyar national groups in Hungary, and especially the Slovaks.

Yet, the regime was on the whole far more repressive politically than culturally. The Czech and Slovak awakeners were allowed to express Slav reciprocity as long as they stayed within the cultural orbit. During this period the long struggle to introduce Czech (and Slovak) into the schools started. The language decree of 1816 represented a temporary gain (until 1821) for the Czechs, requiring that teachers of *gymnasias* located in bilingual towns (with mixed Czech-German population) must know Czech in addition to German. At the same time, Czech pupils were allowed to practice their language in school.<sup>38</sup> The Slovaks were worse off, yet the local *Trivialschulen* were taught in Slovak out of necessity.

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<sup>38</sup> See *Československá vlastivěda*, Díl II Svazek 2 (1969:79–80).

It has been argued that the Czech and Slovak national movements were mainly cultural movements before the 1840s because they were circumscribed by reactionary absolutism. There may be some truth in this, but only as far as the last two decades before 1848 are concerned; before that time, the contents of national identity were not sufficiently developed.

### ***The spring of the peoples, 1848***

After the 1848 February Revolution in France, Metternich's days were numbered. As news of the revolution spread, unrest started in several parts of the Habsburg Empire. In Prague a congregation of people assembled on March 11th by the secret political society *Repeal* resolved to send a petition to the emperor, and elected a national committee (the St. Václav committee) to carry this out. In Vienna an upheaval forced Metternich to retire. His fall only served to ignite the revolution. In the following days censorship was abolished, and the new Kolowrat government promised a more liberal constitution. In April a temporary constitution was decreed. It was, however, by no means liberal; the income requirements excluded most people from the ballot, and the liberal response was to form their own assembly.

The Prague Petition of 1848 was in effect the first modern Czech political program, yet a few German liberals also supported it. The major demands concerned language (equality between Czech and German), state rights (recognition and promotion of the unity of the Czech lands), and liberal reforms (civil rights, participation of towns and villages in the Diets of the historical lands, local autonomy, public court meetings, improved situation for the serfs etc.). A second petition demanded that the lands of the Czech crown be united, that a modern, freely elected representative organ be established and a minister responsible for the Czech lands be appointed. A cabinet letter of April 8th promised equality of the Czech language with German in public life, and the creation of a Diet and executive organ for Bohemia, but it left the matter of uniting the Czech lands to the imperial *Reichstag*.

Until 1848, a Bohemian *Landespatriotismus* based on historical rights united the (Czech and German) nobility and burghers against Vienna. By 1848 the Czechs were monopolizing Bohemian identity, while the Germans (*Deutsch-Böhme*) were becoming increasingly Great German in orientation. A turning point was František Palacký's open letter to the German Parliament in Frankfurt in April 1848, where he argued that only a strong Austria, organized as a constitutional federation equally fair to all nations, could save the Czechs and other small nations from annihilation. What these federal units should be, was not clear: The first Czech proposal to the preparatory Constitutional assembly envisaged broad autonomy for all of the Czech lands without joining them; a second proposal in January 1849 foresaw federalization after ethnic lines, excluding the German parts of the Czech lands, but adding Slovak territory.

A Slav congress of all the Slav nations of the Habsburg Empire (and beyond) was convened in Prague in June 1848 in order to support the Austro-Slav program, but was dissolved before it came to any conclusion because of clashes between Czech radicals and the military. A state of emergency was declared and the National Committee was dissolved. After this, the promises of a Diet and executive organ for Bohemia were withdrawn.

The preparatory Constitutional assembly started its work in Vienna in July 1848. In September, serfdom and the robot system were abolished, and after the October rebellion, the Parliament was moved to Kroměříž (Kremsier) in Moravia. Felix Schwarzenberg took over as Prime Minister in November, and Ferdinand V was induced to abdicate in favor of his young nephew Franz (ruled 1848–1916), who added Josef to his name to honor the heritage of Josef II. The army forcibly dissolved the Parliament in March 1849, not allowing it to finish its work.

In Hungary the liberal nobility seized the opportunity to establish an independent government under Lajos Batthyány in March 1848. It was responsible to a Parliament elected on the basis of suffrage for all citizens, but in practice citizenship was restricted. The tax exemptions of the nobility were terminated, freedom of the press introduced and serfdom abolished. In July, the Parliament voted for the establishment of a Hungarian army under government control, a separate national budget, and separate currency. Vienna reacted by sending royal troops led by Josip Jelačić, the ban of Croatia, later joined by voluntaries of the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary, including the Slovaks. The civil war ended in the Battle of Világos in August 1849.

In May 1848, the Slovaks voiced their first political demands in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and the first Slovak political organ, the Slovak national council, was established in September. Slovak demands included separate national parliaments for each nation *and* a common parliament for all the nations of Hungary, introduction of Slovak as the national language in Slovakia, an adequate number of Slovak-medium schools, and the classical liberal rights of freedom of the press, organization and congregation. The Hungarian Parliament refused, introduced marital law, and issued an arrest warrant for the organizers of the meeting, Ľudovít Štúr, Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodža. Hungary's liberal revolution thus went hand in hand with suppression of the non-Magyars.

### ***Neo-absolutism and political thaw***

Neo-absolutism was introduced in Austria after the dissolution of the Kremsier Parliament, and in Hungary after the Battle of Világos. It is often termed "Bach absolutism", after Alexander Bach, the new strong man after the death of Schwarzenberg in 1852. Censorship and police control were again tightened, national newspapers were closed down, and the regime interfered increasingly with culture and science. Pressure for Germanization was felt all over the monarchy. German was introduced as the language of administration everywhere, also in Slovakia. The medium of instruction in most middle schools was German or Magyar; for the Slovaks, however, the situation actually improved, since a Slovakized Czech, so-called Old Slovak, was introduced wholly or in part in 11 of the 27 *gymnasia* in Slovakia in 1851–52. By contrast, the first Czech gymnasium was erected in 1862, in Tábor. Before 1848, only elementary schools in the countryside had Czech as the medium of instruction; the first town school was established in Prague in 1848. In 1854 the instruction in Czech was reduced.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> See Kann & David (1984:377). Urban (1991:237); Kořalka (1996:104); *Dějiny země koruny české II* (1993:96); *Československá vlastivěda, Díl II, Dějiny Svazek 2* (1969:206).

The increased influence of the Catholic Church, expressed by the concordat of 1855 between the Papacy and the Austrian government, proved a disadvantage for the Church in the Czech lands in the long run, because of the anti-clericalism it aroused.

Yet, Bach absolutism was not a complete return to the old state of affairs. The peasant reforms and equality before the law remained. In the years 1852–55 the administration was reformed; the historical lands were formally preserved, but now they functioned merely as provinces. In Hungary the *župa* system was abolished, Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina and Transylvania were detached, and the rest of the land was divided into five units, two covering Slovak territory. The Slovaks thus got nothing in return for supporting the court against the Magyar rebels. A new common tax system was established, and the tariff wall between Austria and Hungary was removed in 1850–51. For the first time, the Empire was a single economic entity.

In the western part, neo-absolutism was an economic success. Being more developed, the Austrian part was better able to compete in a common market. Also, the abolishment of serfdom stimulated market-oriented agriculture as well as industry. During this period the Czech lands became one of the most industrialized regions in Central Europe. Combined with rapid population growth, this led to the rise of an urban and rural proletariat, emigration overseas, and urbanization. At the same time, Slovakia experienced economic stagnation. Although serfdom had in principle been abolished in 1848, the Slovaks had to wait five years for practical solutions and another few years for the implementation. This impeded the participation of the Slovaks in market-oriented agriculture. The common market slowed down the industrialization of Slovak territory, also because of the lack of railways to connect it to the rest of Hungary and Austria.

The defeat in the war against the Italian movement in Sardinia in 1859 triggered the fall of absolutism and the gradual transition to constitutional government. Through the October Diploma of 1860, the unique character of the historical lands was confirmed, raising the hopes of the leaders of the subject nations for a federal solution, and the old *župa* system was reintroduced. In the more liberal atmosphere after 1860, national cultural life again flourished, and national petitions and memoranda were again formulated. As in 1848, national and democratic demands went hand in hand in the Czech and Slovak cases.

A Czech political program published in *Národní listy* on January 1st 1861 demanded national equality, civil rights and extensive autonomy. This also marked the start of the first Czech political party, the National Party (*Národní strana*), later known as the Old Czechs. František Palacký and his son-in-law, František Ladislav Rieger, were its front figures. After 1860 the party advocated federalization of the Habsburg monarchy along historical-political lines (not ethnic ones, as Palacký advocated in 1849), a program for which it gained the support of the landed nobility. A part of this scheme was to unite Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Within the Czech lands, the party demanded national equality between Czechs and Germans, which of course implied various cultural rights, especially concerning the position of Czech in the school system and as a language of administration. By then the Moravians had abandoned the idea of separatism, and endorsed association with Bohemia.



The Constitution established by February Patent of 1861 reinstated the Diets of the historical lands, while dividing the *Reichsrat* into two houses – an upper house of nobles and higher dignitaries appointed by the emperor, and a lower house elected by the Diets of the historical lands and approved by the emperor. Suffrage remained strongly restricted by income requirements, and weighted in favor of great landowners through the curia system. Although it was a reversal of the Habsburg policy of centralization, the new constitution was disappointing from a national point of view. In April 1861, the Hungarian Diet demanded recognition of the Hungarian constitution of 1848, but Franz Josef merely dissolved the Diet. The new *Reichsrat* was assembled in Vienna for the first time in May 1861, but without the Magyars, Croats and Italians, who boycotted it from the start. In 1863 the Czechs followed suit.

The Slovaks were not represented in the Hungarian Diet, but in July 1861 a meeting was called in Turčianský Svätý Martin in order to present Slovak national demands. The memorandum of 1861 demanded recognition of the Slovaks as a separate nation; a separate Slovak administrative unit; and the introduction of the Slovak language as the only official language in public life, in the administration, the Church and the schools of Slovakia. The Slovaks also demanded the repeal of laws that were contrary to the equality of all nations of Hungary, Slovak access to schools of all levels, and permission to form educational associations. At the same time a national committee was established. The two first demands were presented to the emperor in December the same year, after getting no response in the Hungarian Parliament. The Slovaks succeeded in getting Slovak introduced as the official language instead of "Old Slovak." Three Slovak *gymnasias* were established in the 1860s, one in Martin, where also the *Matica slovenská* was erected in 1863. Vienna acceded to the use of Slovak in lower administration and the schools, but this was implemented only to a limited degree.

### ***The Ausgleich of 1867***

After the Prussian victory in the war of 1866, the imperial government was forced to accept the demands of the Magyar nobility. The *Ausgleich* (compromise) of 1867 divided the Habsburg Empire into two parts, the Hungarian crown lands and the rest, and established a form of dual centralism. According to the agreement, Austria and Hungary would have a joint monarch, joint ministries of foreign affairs, war and finance, and delegations from the two parliaments would discuss matters of common interest at annual meetings. The tariff union would continue, and common expenses would be divided according to the ratio 70/30 for Austria/Hungary, respectively. This was a good deal for Hungary, considering its economic potential. All other issues would be handled separately, including the national question.

The Ausgleich solved the Magyar question, but became an obstacle to finding a solution to the other national questions in the Empire. In Hungary, the Magyar-dominated nobility was firmly in charge of a political system that remained repressive throughout the entire period, especially towards the subject nations. In the Austrian part, the political situation was far more fluid, and the evolution of constitutionalism gave the national movements much greater leeway, culturally as well as politically, especially after the turn of the century.

The Habsburg rulers never made any serious attempt at turning the population of their various domains into an "Austrian nation" – before or after 1867. The non-Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy was an agglomeration of historical entities that had been ruled as a unit for barely one hundred years, and it did not even have a name prior to 1867.<sup>40</sup> Besides, the Germans saw themselves as a part of a German nation, and could not be used as a point of departure.

Conversely, Hungary *was* in fact a political unit of some stature. It had been a kingdom since the Middle Ages, interrupted only by the Ottoman yoke, and a certain Hungarian *Landespatritismus* did exist. The original idea of a single Hungarian *political* nation increasingly came to imply a *cultural* nation – and that required an assimilation of the non-Magyars. This process was initiated before 1867; the difference was that the court was now unable to curtail it.

### ***Czechs in Austria***

In order to get the Austrian-Hungarian compromise through Parliament, the government had to assent to the demands of the German liberals for constitutional changes. A series of laws were passed in the *Reichsrat*, ensuring rights of organization and congregation; abolishing censorship; guaranteeing civil rights like freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of worship, freedom of scholarly endeavor and education; and proclaiming national equality. The latter included the right to foster and defend the national language, as well as linguistic equality in the schools, administration and public life. Still, the provision that no one should be forced to learn a second language worked in favor of the Germans.

The Czechs were critical to the February Patent of 1861, and the Ausgleich alienated them even further, by giving the Magyars what the Czechs wanted – recognition of historical rights and political autonomy. They thus extended their boycott of the *Reichsrat* (initiated in 1863) to the Bohemian and Moravian Diets. The contents of the Czech national program actually changed very little from 1867 to the outbreak of the war. They wanted extensive political autonomy for the Czech lands and national equality – expressed through demands for Czech schools, Czech institutions of higher learning (including universities), and the use of Czech in the administration and courts of the Czech lands, in contacts with the public and internally.

However, varying strategies were adopted by the Czech political leaders – from passive resistance, via trading parliamentary support for national concessions, to obstruction. The gradual change of leadership that took place was partly linked to the extension of individual political rights, favoring parties based on the middle and lower classes. This also made the Austrian political system more competitive, and contributed to a sharpening of the national conflicts between the Czech majority and the German (privileged) minority, especially in Bohemia. Although the Germans never had so dominant a position in Austria as the Magyars had in Hungary, they were still an impediment to concessions to the Czechs.

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<sup>40</sup> "Austria" traditionally referred to an even smaller area than the present-day Austrian republic. The wider meaning, covering the entire non-Hungarian part of the dual monarchy, developed during the last fifty years of Habsburg rule. Informally, it was known as Cis-Leithania (i.e. "this side" of Leitha, a small tributary to Danube).

During the initial period of the Dual Monarchy, the Czech focus was on political autonomy for the Czech lands. The national leaders based their claims for autonomy on the historical rights of the Czech crown (*státní právo*), and enlisted the support of the Bohemian nobility. In the Declaration of 1868, Czech deputies of the Bohemian and Moravian Diets demanded negotiations with the emperor to restore traditional rights, and used outdoor mass rallies, so-called *tábory*, to get public support. An attempt to reconcile the Czechs was made in 1871, through the eighteen Fundamental Articles (*fundamentálky*), where the Czech lands were envisaged as a third party in the Austrian-Hungarian partnership. Having achieved a majority in the Bohemian and Moravian Diets in the elections of 1871, the federalists were able to pass the *fundamentálky*. The opposition was formidable among the German nationalist camp in Vienna, the Magyar nobility and a united Germany, and the Articles were in fact never implemented.

The policy of passive resistance continued, which brought the Czechs nowhere. Disagreement (mainly over strategy) led to a formal split of the original Czech national party in two factions, the conservative Old Czechs and the more liberal Young Czechs, who rejoined the *Reichsrat* in 1874, shortly after going independent under the official name of the National Liberal Party (*Národní strana svobodomyšlná*). In 1878 the Old Czechs rejoined the Diets and in 1879 also the *Reichsrat*, where they and the Young Czechs established a common Parliamentary Club. While not giving up their Austro-Slav vision, the Czech political leaders now concentrated on linguistic, cultural and educational demands. Their new approach was to trade parliamentary support for national concessions. This was made possible by the new government of Count Eduard Taaffe (1879–97), who wanted to rule independent of German liberalism.

In four memoranda in November 1879 the Czechs demanded linguistic equality in administration and judiciary, at the university in Prague, in middle schools and in vocational schools. The language decree of 1880 put Czech on level with German as far as public communications were concerned, yet the internal administration language remained German. Charles University was divided in two: one German and one Czech part (effective from 1882), which was to become a major impetus to Czech national life. A host of new Czech *gymnasia* and vocational schools were also founded in the early 1880s. By 1912 there were 63 Czech *gymnasia*.

The extension of suffrage benefited the Czechs, since they were underprivileged economically. After the reform of 1885, the Czechs and the federalists achieved a permanent majority in the Bohemian Diet, which led to German boycott in 1887.

Czech opinion was becoming increasingly critical of the Old Czech cooperation with the conservative government, and the so-called *punktace* (a Czech–German agreement conceived in order to reconcile the Bohemian Germans) of 1890 dealt the final blow to the old national party. The *punktace* implied a division of the Czech lands along national lines. The school system, agricultural offices and judiciary would be divided into Czech and German sections, and national curia introduced in the Diets. In reality the Czech lands would have been divided into German and bi-lingual areas, blocking federalization. The *punktace* came to be seen as a victory for the German nationalists in the Czech lands, and aroused bitter opposition from the Czech public with the Young Czechs at the helm. The *punktace* was never enforced.

In the election in 1891, the Old Czechs lost all seats but two, and the Young Czechs became the leading national party. Three of the Young Czech deputies belonged to the Realist circle: Tomáš G. *Masaryk*, Josef *Kaizl* and Karel *Kramář*. The Young Czechs stayed in opposition for only six years, and then returned to the old strategy of trading support for concessions.

Through the Badeni Ordinances of 1897 the Czechs would have achieved one of their major aims, had they been fully implemented: They stipulated that cases initiated in Czech should be dealt with in Czech in government organs under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, Commerce and Agriculture. This meant that civil servants would have to be proficient in both Czech and German. Needless to say, the Germans were not happy about this, and after riots in Vienna the demand for bilingualism was abandoned in 1898. The Ordinances were followed in Moravia and the linguistically mixed areas of Bohemia, while the language was, respectively, Czech and German in the Czech and German zones.

Towards the turn of the century the Czech party system gradually became more differentiated, also because of the extension of suffrage to new groups (from 1896 a fifth curia was included, making "ordinary" men eligible to vote). The Czech Social Democrats had organized as a party already in 1878, but joined the Austrian Social Democrats in 1889. Bohemia was the stronghold of socialist currents in the Empire because of its advanced economic position: Two-thirds of the industrial production in Austria was located in the Czech lands, and the growth rate of the last thirty years before the First World War was incredible. By 1910, the percentage of the population living in communities with less than 2000 inhabitants had decreased to 57.5; less than half of the population (42.5 percent in 1910) was employed in agriculture, while industrial employment had risen to 38.4 percent.

In the 1890s two Catholic parties were formed in Moravia, but only the party led by Jan Šrámek survived. An Agrarian Party was formed in 1899, breaking loose from its association with the Young Czechs. As a reaction to the anti-state rights declaration of the Social Democrats upon entering the *Reichsrat* in 1897, a nationally oriented social reform party was established in 1898, the National Social Party. Three small radical parties established in the 1890s united in the Progressive State Rights Party in 1908.

The representation of the new parties was, however, limited before universal male suffrage and secret ballot were introduced in 1907; besides, the national program still had the support of the entire Czech camp. At the openings of the *Reichsrat*, the Czech deputies of all parties (save the Social Democrats), repeated their protest against centralism and asserted the historical rights of the Czech crown. Yet, even the Social Democrats supported the cultural and linguistic demands, and during the last years before the war, an autonomist current developed within in this party as well. The most important cultural demands – a second Czech university (in Moravia) and Czechization of the administration in Czech areas – were, however, never fulfilled.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> See Kann & David (1984: pp. 292 ff.) for more details.

When universal male suffrage was introduced in 1907, the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party emerged as the largest Czech parties, the former in terms of votes (38.1 percent to 19.6), the latter in terms of mandates (28 to 24). The Catholic parties got 17.3 percent of the vote and 17 mandates, while the Young Czechs polled 11.1 percent and got 18 mandates. This reflects that the election system was still biased in favor of the Germans and the upper classes.<sup>42</sup>

### *Slovaks in Hungary*

While the Austrian part was developing in a more constitutional and democratic direction, the Magyar nobility remained firmly in control of Hungary, and political participation remained socially and nationally restricted. In principle all citizens above the age of 24 were eligible to vote, it was just that "citizenship" was limited by property and income qualifications, or higher education.<sup>43</sup> This effectively excluded the lower and middle classes from any influence. Combined with election terror, especially after 1895, this ensured that the representation of the non-Magyar groups was kept at a minimum. As late as 1914, the Magyars controlled 405 out of a total of 453 seats in the Lower House of the Hungarian Parliament, the Croats 40 and the other nationalities 8 seats. Of these, *one* representative was Slovak – Ferdinand Juriga.

As in 1848, the particular Magyar brand of liberalism was anything but liberal in the national question. The Hungarian nationality law of 1868 was hardly liberal even in letter, declaring the equality of all citizens to be based on the existence of a single Hungarian political nation. Magyar became the only official language of the state, in the state administration, the courts, the Parliament and higher education. Only in church, local administration and primary and secondary education were other groups allowed to use their language – for the time being.

The first years after 1867, there were two currents in the Slovak national movement: the Old School, organized in the Slovak National Party (officially founded in 1871), and the New School, linked to the Budapest journal *Slovenské Noviny* ("Slovak news", founded in 1868). The former (originally pro-Vienna) faction remained faithful to the political demands of autonomy as set out in the memorandum of 1861, and increasingly placed its hope in Russia, since Vienna seemed unable or unwilling to help. The latter believed in concessions from the Magyar liberals, if they only would give up the political demands and concentrate on the cultural ones instead. An initial aim of both currents was to make the nationality law as liberal as possible, and, after it was adopted, to have it replaced with more favorable legislation. Their power to work for these aims was, however, very limited, and nothing was achieved. From 1861 to 1884, the Slovaks were represented in the Hungarian Parliament only once, from 1869–72, when the New School got two deputies, and the National Party one. In addition to tactics of intimidation and election terror, the socio-economic position of the Slovaks worked against them; the majority were not able to meet the income and education qualifications.

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<sup>42</sup> For election results (1907), see Kořalka (1996:120); Urban (1991:220).

<sup>43</sup> Income and education requirements were lowered in 1874 and 1913, but elections remained public. Under this system, only 6 percent of the population was entitled to vote. For details, see Oskar Krejčí: *Kniha o volbách* (1994:86–87).

Magyarization pressure only increased, especially after Kálmán Tisza (1875–90) took over as Prime Minister for the Liberal Party. He firmly believed that a numerical reduction in the non-Magyars was the key to independence from Vienna. Already in 1874 the three Slovak *gymnasias* were abolished, and in 1875 the *Matica slovenská* was closed down on the charge of being an "unpatriotic and anti-state institution." Its property and funds were confiscated. On this occasion Tisza stated that no such thing as a Slovak nation existed. The strategy of the New School had failed grossly, and it folded, together with its newspaper, that same year.

By government decrees of 1879 and 1883 Magyar was introduced in all schools (including elementary schools in non-Magyar areas), fluency in Magyar became a requirement for being allowed to teach at all, and Slovak associations were forbidden. In 1891 Magyar was even introduced in kindergartens. During the latter part of the 1870s and the first half of the 1880s state agencies and courts on Slovak territory introduced Magyar as the official language, externally as well as internally. Finally, the Education Act of 1907 made Magyar the medium of instruction in national minority schools. The situation was at its worst under Tisza and Dezső Bánffy (1895–99). The latter even Magyarized Slovak geographical names.

During the late 1870s, contacts with the Czechs were renewed. Funds were raised to send Slovaks to Czech *gymnasias* and to Charles University in Prague, where a Slovak student society (*Detvan*) was established in 1882. The journal *Hlas* ("Voice"), preaching Czechoslovak national unity, was established in 1898 by a circle of young Slovak intellectuals who had studied abroad, chiefly under professor Tomáš G. Masaryk in Prague. At the political level, however, the (Old) Czech leaders were reluctant to be associated with the Slovaks, fearing reprisals. In 1884 the Slovak National Party had decided not to take part in the elections, and abstained also from the two following ones, in 1887 and 1892. Meanwhile, unsuccessful attempts were made at petitioning Vienna to restore the *Matica slovenská* and prevent the use of its funds for Magyarization purposes.

The church policy of the Hungarian Liberal Party, still in power, led to the establishment of a Hungarian Catholic People's Party in 1895 (*Néppárt*), which paid lip service to the interests of the subject nations. Prior to the elections of 1896, the Slovak National Party thus urged people to vote for the candidates of *Néppárt*. A Slovak clerical current developed, which was the predecessor of the People's Party (*Ludová strana*) under the leadership of Father Andrej Hlinka. In the following election, the National Party had its own candidates, running on a modest program demanding that the nationality law of 1868 be observed. The Slovaks got four mandates in 1901, two in 1905, seven in 1906, and three in 1910.

Around the turn of the century, three additional currents began emerging among the Slovaks, none of which was formally organized into separate parties before 1914. A Czechoslovak-oriented group developed around the journal *Hlas*, published in Skalica from 1898. The leading figures were Vavro Šrobár and Pavel Blaho. Around the journal *Slovenský týždeň* ("Slovak weekly") from 1903 an agrarian current was forming under the leadership of Milan Hodža. Finally, a Slovak Social Democratic current developed within the Hungarian Social Democratic Party during the 1890s.

Only under István Tisza (1913–17) was conciliation with the Slovak national movement attempted. The Slovaks were offered certain language rights in return for abstaining from political demands. Extended rights to instruction in Slovak were ordered in 1914. When the Magyars finally abandoned their assimilation policy and offered autonomy towards the end of the war, it was too late. A Czecho-Slovak solution was by then a more tempting alternative.

It should be noted that Magyarization did *not* mean oppression on racial grounds. Practically any career was open to a Slovak who was willing to shed his language and culture and become Magyar. Many aspiring Slovaks opted for a career, and thus gradually formed a bilingual elite with Magyar subjective identity – at least outwardly. It was bitterly complained that many of the Slovak *Magyarones* (assimilated Slovaks) were even more bent on Magyarization than the Magyars by birth, and they were of course seen as traitors. According to presumably official figures, there were 121 Slovak civil servants in Hungary as a whole at the end of the First World War, of these 74 in the Slovak župy. The figures include notaries and court officials.<sup>44</sup>

The major industrial centers of Hungary were concentrated on the Hungarian plain, especially around Budapest (Buda and Pest had been joined into one city after 1873). Slovakia had only two industrial centers, Bratislava and Košice, both of which had a non-Slovak majority,<sup>45</sup> otherwise small scale crafts production dominated. In 1869, 80.9 percent of the working force in Slovakia were employed in agriculture, in 1900 the percentage was still 68.3, and probably even higher among the Slovaks, considering their distribution. Some 80 percent of the population still lived in communities with less than 2,000 people at the start of the war. Apart from the intelligentsia, Slovak workers outside Slovakia and Slovaks living in multi-national towns on Slovak territory were especially affected by Magyarization.

Because of migration and assimilation processes, the ratio between Magyars and Slovaks in Slovak territory was changing to the benefit of the Magyars. In the census of 1880, 63 percent indicated Slovak as their mother tongue and 23.2 percent Magyar; by 1910 the figure had fallen to 57.7 percent for Slovak and increased to 30.5 for Magyar.<sup>46</sup> Considering the general Magyarization pressure, however, the census hardly gave an accurate picture. Between 1900 and 1914 alone, 430,000 people moved from Slovakia, to industrial centers or overseas. From 1871 to 1914 half a million Slovaks settled permanently in the United States. Compared to the size of the population, only the Irish had a higher emigration rate.<sup>47</sup> In the Slovak colony that was forming there, the diffusion of national consciousness was not impeded, and this articulate community was to play an important part in the time to come.

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<sup>44</sup> Figures reported in Konštantín Čulen: *Česi a Slováci v štátnych službách ČSR* (1994:21). According to Urban (1991:225) there were 24 Slovak of 1,664 civil servants in Slovakia in 1910, while Kann & David (1984:384) report 154, but also a much higher total (6,185 civil servants). There were in any case few.

<sup>45</sup> In the census of 1900, only 16.3 percent of the population of Bratislava and 23 percent of the population of Košice declared Slovak to be their mother tongue. See *Štatistický lexikon obcí v republike Československej III* (1936:164).

<sup>46</sup> *Štatistický lexikon obcí III* (1936:166–67).

<sup>47</sup> See Kann & David (1984:384).

### *Towards independence*

Before the outbreak of the war on June 28th, 1914, neither Czechs nor Slovaks had seriously advocated independence. The *Reichsrat* had been closed down already in the spring of 1914, to be reconvened only after the death of Franz Josef in 1916, and civil rights were suspended. In Hungary, the government tightened its control of the press and other forms of public expression. The first initiative to form a Czechoslovak state came from the Czech political leaders, while the Slovaks went into passivity after the war started – save a group headed by Milan Hodža, who worked for a federal solution within Hungary. Masaryk left Prague already in December 1914 to work for independence, and set out on a grand diplomatic tour to London, Paris, Moscow and Washington. At home a secret group (known as the *Mafie*) formed under Edvard Beneš, coordinating the contact with the independence movement abroad.

In May 1915, the Habsburg government interned leading Czech politicians who were in favor of independence (among them Václav Klobáček, Karel Kramář and Alois Rašín). After these arrests an activist, pro-Austrian circle formed under the leadership of Antonín Švehla (Agrarians), Bohumír Šmeral (Social Democrats) and Zdenek Tobolka (Young Czechs), in the conviction that the Habsburg Empire would survive the war. Most Czech parties participated in the Czech Union (*Český svaz*), formed by the Czech members of the *Reichsrat* in 1916, and the National Committee (*Národní výbor*) in Prague. On several occasions the Czech leaders declared their loyalty to the ruling house, even as late as in May 1917, when they presented as their goal a free democratic Czech state (including the Slovaks) under the Habsburg scepter. A decisive change occurred only in January 1918, after the Russian Revolution and the subsequent proclamation of national self-determination. In the meantime the National Committee had been reorganized under the leadership of Kramář, who was set free in July 1917.

Abroad, independence was an explicit aim as early as in 1915. In October that year, Czech and Slovak émigré associations at a meeting in Cleveland, Ohio, advocated a Czecho-Slovak federation. In November Czech exiles in Paris declared an independent Czechoslovak state as their goal. Later a *Czechoslovak National Council* was founded there, which coordinated the efforts in Europe. Masaryk, Milan R. Štefánik and Beneš, now in exile, were the leading figures.

That Slovak émigré associations backed a Czecho-Slovak solution became known in Slovakia, and helped convince the national leaders at home. However, the Slovak National Party had not yet given up hopes of gaining concessions from the Magyars. By May 1918, it was becoming clear that the Slovak leaders opted for a union with the Czechs, which was confirmed at two meetings, one socialist and one national. In September, all Slovak political parties and groups joined to form a Slovak National Council. Ferdinand Juriga, the only serving Slovak deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, declared on behalf of the Council and the Slovaks on October 19th that they no longer recognized the authority of the Hungarian government.

Meanwhile, Masaryk had co-signed an agreement in Pittsburgh, USA, between Czech and Slovak émigré organizations on the future organization of a Czecho-Slovak state, the notorious Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918, which promised the Slovaks autonomy, albeit with some reservations.



On October 18th, 1918, the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, by then recognized as the legitimate government of the Czechs and Slovaks, declared independence (the Washington declaration). The Czechoslovak National Committee in Prague founded the Czechoslovak republic on October 28th, 1918. Two days later in Turčianský Svätý Martin a meeting of the Slovak political parties gave Slovak support to the establishment of a Czechoslovak state.

Apart from the incident in 1848–49, the Czech leaders had consistently demanded federalization along historical-political lines, while the Slovaks had always argued their case on the basis of natural rights. The "Slovakia" they wanted autonomy for, had clear borders only to the north and west, fading into Magyar territory to the south. At the Paris Peace Conference, the borders of the new state were drawn according to historical lines in the Czech lands and national lines in Slovakia, adding some Magyar territory "for the sake of internal communication." One third of the Czechoslovak "nation-state" state was non-Czechoslovak in population.

### *Concluding remarks*

Due to differences in the economic, political and cultural development of Austria and Hungary, the situation of the Czechs and of the Slovaks was very different at the inception of the First Republic. Economically, the Czech lands were the most industrialized part of Austria, whereas 62 percent of the population in Slovakia was still employed in agriculture in 1910. And although the growth rate of Hungary exceeded Austria's after 1867, economic differences between the two parts of the Empire remained considerable.<sup>48</sup> A part of the picture was also the weak infrastructure and the low urbanization in Slovakia compared to the Czech lands.

Politically, the Austrian part of the Empire gradually developed into a constitutional democracy, with the introduction of general male suffrage in 1907. This period witnessed the development of a Czech party system differentiated according to socio-economic and religious cleavages, while the original National Party (the Old Czechs) was reduced to almost nothing. In contrast, the liberalism of the Hungarian regime never applied to non-Magyar groups, and the Slovaks thus remained essentially without representation in the Hungarian political system. In practice, only one Slovak party (with various currents) existed: the Slovak National Party.

Most fateful was perhaps the difference in the level of cultural development. Over the years, the nationality policy of the Austrian regime became more accommodating culturally, allowing Czech cultural and national development. By 1912, there were both a university and 63 *gymnasias* where Czech was the language of instruction, and Czech had been partially introduced in the administration, while the Slovaks barely had Slovak-medium elementary schools. Instead, the Slovaks were subjected to a harsh Magyarization policy, and the national and cultural progress that was achieved in the 1860s was reversed. In the next chapter, we will look into the consequences which this had for Czech and Slovak national development.

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<sup>48</sup> According to Urban (1991:223) the national income of the Austrian part increased a little more than 6,5 times, while the national income of the Hungarian part increased more than 8,5 times from 1850 to 1913.

# Six

## *Czech and Slovak national revival*

*What can be more glorious, Than to revere one's ancestors, To honor them,  
and the fatherland, and the language, To strive for their improvement?*

**Jan Nejedly, 1801<sup>1</sup>**

The terms that were originally used to describe the transition to nationhood (resurrection, awakening) portrayed the process as something of a miracle: The nation had been dead and was brought back to life, or it had been asleep and was reawakened. A legacy of this is the continued use of the term "awakeners" (*buditelé*) about the men who initiated the process, albeit hardly in a literal sense. The concept of a national revival (*národní obrození*) that became common in the second half of the 19th century suggests a less dramatic change.

It seems that a pre-national Czech identity existed among the nobility already in the Middle Ages; cf. the chronicles of Kosmas and "Dalimil." The Slovak case is more dubious. An idea of "other-ness" is conveyed in certain texts from the 17th century, but this identity was still diffuse and ill-defined. These pre-national identities provided a point of departure for the transition to nationhood, starting in the second half of the 18th century. The ambiguity of those identities and the close cultural and linguistic affinity between Czechs and Slovaks affected the course of the revivals, and explain how Czechoslovakism was possible.

The aim of this chapter is to give an outline of the national revivals of the Czechs and Slovaks,<sup>2</sup> following Hroch's three-phase scheme. The changing contents of Czech and Slovak identity will be addressed in Chapter Seven. As noted Chapter Three, the diffusion of national identity from an elite to the masses is a gradual process, and its successful completion depends on the ability of a nationally aware elite to propagate the national message and the willingness of the masses to endorse it. Provided that such an elite exists, the former is a question of having the necessary means available; the latter is a matter of nationally relevant conflicts.

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<sup>1</sup> (Slavnější což může byti, Nežlí čest svým předkům vzdát, Je i vlast, i jazyk ctíti, O jich zvelebení dbát?). Quoted in Hugh LeCaine Agnew: *Origins of the Czech national renaissance* (1993:163).

<sup>2</sup> For details, see: J. Kočí: *České národní obrození* (1978), *Počátky českého národního obrození* (1990), Z. Šolle & A. Gajanová: *Po stopě dějin. Češi a Slováci v letech 1848–1938* (1969), J. Novotný: *Češi a Slováci za národního obrození a do vzniku českosloveského státu* (1968), *Slovanství v národním životě Čechů a Slováků* (1968). In English: M. Hroch: *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe* (1985), P. Brock & H. G. Skilling (ed.): *The Czech renaissance of the nineteenth century* (1970); H. L. Agnew: *Origins of the Czech national revival* (1993), A. Klima: *The Czechs in*; M. Teich & R. Porter (eds.): *The National question in Europe* (1993), P. Brock: *The Slovak national awakening* (1976), Jiří Kořalka: *Participation of lower middle and working classes in the Czech national movement during the 19th century* (1993), S.J. Kirschbaum: *A history of Slovakia* (1994), and J. F. Zacek: *Nationalism in Czechoslovakia* in Sugar & Lederer (eds): *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (1994).

The means available to a national movement are clearly different from the means of a government, especially in terms of coercive power. A government can resort to censorship, police surveillance, harassment, imprisonment, violence, even death in order to silence unwanted messages. A national movement must convince the people that they are a nation through agitation, which in practice requires a certain minimum of freedom of congregation and access to printed mass media. National institutions also require financing, whether they are theaters, journals, museum societies or publishing companies. It is perhaps in terms of means the Slovak case differs most from the Czech, and an important reason for this is the difference in nationality policy after 1867.

As for nationally relevant conflicts, such conflicts definitely existed in both cases. Both the Habsburg empire as a whole and the Czech lands, respectively Hungary, approximated what Horowitz calls ranked systems, with concurrence between cultural features and social and/or political domination/subordination. This concurrence was not perfect, but clear enough to provide a foundation for the idea that "we", the Czechs or Slovaks, are underprivileged compared to the others – the Germans and (increasingly) the Magyars.

### ***The role of enlightened absolutism***

Traditionally, German Romanticism in general and Herder's ideas in particular have been blamed for the evolution of nationalist ideas and their subsequent diffusion. More recently, the role of Enlightenment ideas and enlightened absolutism has been emphasized. It is hardly accidental that all the national revivals of the subject peoples of the Habsburg Empire started during the era of enlightened absolutism. Moreover, Herderian Romantic influences *are* quite apparent, especially in the 19th century. However, none of these influences were engraved on a *tabula rasa*: They entered into a complicated interaction with existing ideas and, not least, existing realities, yielding similar and yet unique results in each nation.

There are at least two possible interpretations of the link between the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas through enlightened absolutism and the start of the national revivals. On the one hand, the early national revivals can be seen as a natural *part* of the greater Enlightenment project, with its emphasis on progress and scholarship. On the other hand, they can be interpreted as a *reaction* to the policies of enlightened absolutism. Especially important were the school reforms, the relaxation of censorship and the Patent of Tolerance. The liquidation of the last of the state-rights institution of Bohemia (the Court Chancellery) and the abolition of serfdom were especially offensive to the Bohemian nobility.

The school reforms were consequential in two ways: they raised the question of providing ordinary people with education, and they were accompanied by a Germanization policy that put non-Germans at a disadvantage. From the very beginning, the revivals took the shape of national and linguistic defense. The relaxation of censorship facilitated the defense reaction, by allowing patriotic literature to be printed, including texts that had been forbidden during the Counter-Reformation, such as Balbín's famous defense of the Czech language (1775).

The Patent of Tolerance brought the Czechs and Slovaks closer together, mainly through its restrictions: Czech Protestants were not allowed to take priests from outside the empire. Since the Slovak Protestant clergy was familiar with the use of Czech in sermons, Slovaks were naturally preferred. According to Jan Novotný, these Slovaks not only contributed to the religious life of the Czechs, they also took part in the Czech revival. Upon their return to Slovakia, they became the foremost spokesmen for Czecho-Slovak reciprocity.<sup>3</sup>

The Enlightenment imprint on the first scholarly phase of the national revival is unmistakable. Yet, the concern of the early awakeners was clearly national, and their attitudes were unequivocally patriotic on behalf of the nation-to-be. Keeping this in mind, we can say that the transition from a scholarly oriented phase A to a more agitation oriented phase B coincided with a shift in influence, from the Enlightenment to German Romanticism. However, cultural matters continued to dominate, and activities were still directed inwards. During the 1840s, the political emphasis increased, and after the events of 1848–49, the national movements definitely engaged in a political struggle with the government(s). In the Czech case, this coincided with a transition from phase B (agitation) to phase C (the mass phase), to use Hroch's terminology.

### ***The Czech national revival***

Many scholars (among them Masaryk), distinguish between two generations of Czech awakeners: An older generation, represented by Josef Dobrovský, who was more influenced by the Enlightenment, and a younger generation, represented by Josef Jungmann, who was more influenced by Romantic currents. This distinction coincides roughly with the distinction between phase A and phase B in Hroch's scheme, but not entirely. Later, after the transition to the mass phase (C), a more critical approach gradually formed.

### ***The scholarly phase***

The start of the Czech national revival is usually dated to the period between 1770 and 1790. The efforts of the early awakeners were mostly of a scholarly kind, and they usually wrote in Latin or German. During this early period, the Bohemian nobility played an important part in the Czech revival, especially by financing the scholarly activities of the awakeners. Initial efforts focused on studying history and defending the Czech language as a mark of Czech statehood. It was during this period that efforts to recodify the language also started, and the first national institutions were established. The two most important of these were a chair for the study of Czech language and literature at Charles University of Prague in 1793 (first occupied by František Martin Pelcl), and the Bohemian Society of Sciences in 1784 (the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences from 1790). The first Czech publishing house, *Česká expedice* (Czech Expedition) was established by Václav Matěj Kramerius in 1790.

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<sup>3</sup> Novotný (1968:40).

The older works of Czech history were marred with myths, and those that were allowed after 1620 had been written from a Catholic point of view, which rendered suspect the Czech cultural achievements (including the language) of the heretic 15th and 16th centuries. The use of new critical methods in history (basically the same as those employed to today) affected old (pre-Hussite) patriotic works as well as the dogmatic Catholic texts of the Counter-Reformation, by bringing their scientific quality and truthfulness under attack. This paved the way for a new critical attitude to undocumented legends, and a re-evaluation of the Hussite heritage, only to be completed by Palacký more than half a century later.

An early example (first volume appeared in 1761) of the use of critical method is Gelasius Dobner's commentary to Hájek's Czech chronicle (*Kronyka česká*), where he raised doubts about the authenticity of central Czech founding myths, like the legend of forefather Czech (Praotec Čech). For this he was charged with being unpatriotic. Dobner's reply illustrates the Enlightenment spirit of the first generation: "It is the foremost duty of the historian that out of love for his fatherland and for knowledge he should wipe away everything that was invented by later ages, and thus rescue his nation from the ridicule of foreigners."<sup>4</sup> Two early attempts at rewriting Czech history are Pelcl's *Kurzgefasste Geschichte der Böhmen* (first ed. 1774) and *Nová kronyka česká* (3 vols., 1791–96).

Josef Dobrovský (1753–1829) is generally regarded as the major figure in the first generation of Czech awakeners, mainly because of his central role in the recodification of the Czech language. In 1792 Dobrovský published *Geschichte der Böhmischen Sprache und Litteratur*. A more detailed version, only leading up to 1526 because of censorship, came in 1818. He compiled a dictionary, formulated a grammar (published 1809) and set out the guidelines for the creation of new words. Part One of his Czech–German dictionary came in 1802; Part Two was finished by Puchmajer and Hanka in 1821. Dobrovský is also counted among the founders of Czech Slavonic studies. Despite his efforts, he had little faith in the future of the Czech language. He wrote most of his texts in German; like many of his contemporaries, he did not believe that Czech could be used in the fine arts and in science. It is rather ironic that he laid the foundations for the development that was eventually to prove him wrong.

Works of agitation were not entirely lacking during the first phase, but much of this was written in German or Latin, which excluded a majority of the people; besides, the patriotic message was generally directed at the nobility rather than the average commoner. However, some attempts were made at diffusing a sense of national pride and awareness to the broader masses through publication of newspapers and journals and patriotic theatrical performances in Czech. The Royal Theater of the Estates, a German-language theater in Prague founded in 1781, allowed Czech performances in 1785–86. Then a Czech theater, *Bouda* (The Lodge), was temporarily set up in the Horse Market (today's *Václavské náměstí*), while the *Vlastenské Divadlo* (Patriotic Theater, founded 1789) lasted for about ten years.

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<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Agnew (1993:29).

The first newspaper in Czech, *Pražské poštovské noviny* (Prague Post News) appeared as early as in 1719. *Krameriусovy císařské královské pražské poštovské noviny* (Kramérius' Royal Prague Post News, founded 1789), was the first truly patriotic newspaper in the Czech language, while Jan Nejedlý's *Hlasatel český* (Czech Herald) was the first successful Czech literary journal, appearing from 1806.<sup>5</sup> Others were to follow, but around the turn of the century they were still few in number, as were their subscribers.

### ***The phase of agitation***

The start of phase B of the Czech revival may be dated to around 1810–20. According to Hroch, the Czech national movement was well on its way to becoming a mass movement by the mid-1840s, and was helped by the revolution of 1848–49.<sup>6</sup> The phase of agitation in the Czech case thus covered a time-span of around forty years.

This was in many ways a transitional phase, when a national ideology was formed, while the scope of activities expanded and changed direction. Two trends are discernible: On the one hand, the line between scholarship and agitation became more blurred. It was no longer scholarship for its own sake, but scholarship aimed at improving the situation of the nation. At the same time, important national institutions were founded. On the other hand, the activities of the awakeners expanded gradually, from scholarship to poetry, journalism and the collection of national songs, fairytales and legends. Scholars were often also translators of plays and poetry, or they wrote poetry themselves. To write in Czech became a patriotic act in itself.

Josef Jungmann (1773–1847) is generally regarded as the second great Czech awakener. He was a transitional figure – on the one hand he was influenced by Enlightenment rationalism, and was a great admirer of Voltaire,<sup>7</sup> but at the same time he was influenced by Romantic currents. Among his major academic contributions are *Slovesnost* (1820), which was the first Czech reader and textbook in literary theory, a history of Czech literature (1825), and a five-volume Czech–German dictionary (1834–39). He was also among the founders of the first scientific journal in Czech, *Krok* ("Step", 1821).

In his *Dvojitý rozhovor o jazyku českém* (Two Conversations on the Czech Language – 1806), Jungmann formulated the first Czech national cultural program. To him, the hallmark of nationhood was language. He accordingly set out to shape a sophisticated scientific literature as well as belles-lettres in Czech. He wrote poems himself and translated a number of European authors into Czech. (Milton's *Paradise Lost* is counted as the most important work). Jungmann discovered that Czech lacked a broad range of words for more sophisticated purposes, and set out to remedy this, often using Polish or Russian models. Some of the resulting (odd) new words soon went out of use, but the legacy of his efforts is visible even today.

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<sup>5</sup> See Agnew (1993: pp. 129 ff. and 148) for details on theater and journals.

<sup>6</sup> Hroch (1985:44.)

<sup>7</sup> Šolle & Gajanová (1969:16).

Apart from Jungmann, three other names stand out in the second phase of the Czech revival; a Moravian – František Palacký (1798–1876), and two men born in "Upper Hungary" – Jan Kollár (1793–1852) and Pavel Josef Šafařík (1795–1861).<sup>8</sup> They belonged roughly to the same generation and were well acquainted. As Protestants they attended the Lyceum in Bratislava, and Kollár and Šafařík had both attended the German University of Jena, a hotbed of German nationalism at the time. Unlike the others, Palacký went beyond the cultural orbit, advocating political autonomy for the Czechs in a federalized Austria after 1848.

As a scholar Palacký was able to combine national enthusiasm with a high academic level. He is seen as the founder of modern Czech historiography, and is still counted among the greatest Czech historians of all times. His monumental work on Czech history started to appear in German in 1836 under the title *Geschichte von Böhmen* (two volumes). After 1848 he began writing in Czech. Expanded versions of these and three more volumes later were published under the title *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě* (History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia). Here Czech history is followed up to 1526.

Many of the best scholars of this time were also translators, poets, journalists and writers. Mention has already been made of the translation activities of Jungmann. One of Jungmann's disciples, František Ladislav Čelakovský (1799–1852), was a poet, a translator and a philologist. In his two *Ohlasy* (Echoes – 1829 and 1839), he mixed folk songs with his own poetry. Božena Němcová (1820–1862) collected folk tales and wrote her own tales (best known is "Grandmother"), where she used elements from popular tradition to develop a new genre.

The Romantic currents of the time inspired the panegyric praise of national character and the exclamations of love for anything that could be defined as "national" so characteristic of the first half of the 19th century, in art, in literature, in journalism and poetry. "Kde domov můj", the present Czech national anthem, is a good illustration of the kind of poetry written at the time. The original text by Josef Kajetán Tyl (1808–56), written to the musical *Fidlovačka* (1834), runs like this: "Where is my home? Water murmurs in the meadows, pine trees whisper in the mountains, spring flowers sway in the orchard, the land of Paradise is in sight! And that is the beautiful land, the Czech land – my home!"<sup>9</sup>

It is in light of this Romanticism we must see the infamous pseudo-medieval manuscripts (a cycle of false Old Czech poems) which "proved" that the Czechs were at a culturally advanced stage at a time when the German archenemies were still barbarians. These writings were "discovered" in 1817 and 1818, and exerted great influence on nationally minded Czechs because of their elegant style and the myths they created about the Czech past. Dobrovský doubted their authenticity, but they were generally believed to be genuine until the 1880s. Today, it is generally believed that students of Jungmann's (Hanka was one) manufactured them.

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<sup>8</sup> Kollár and Šafařík also played a central role in the Slovak national revival. I will return to them in greater detail in that context.

<sup>9</sup> (Kde domov můj? Hučí voda po lučinách, bory šumí po skalínách, v sadě skví se jara květ, zemský ráj to na pohled! A to je ta krásná země, země česká – domov můj!). The text is e.g. quoted by Milada Součková in Brock & Skilling (1970:26).

The bulk of Czech national institutions were established during the 19th century. A Czech National Museum was founded in 1820, after two years of bureaucratic wrangling. The Museum was established by members of the Bohemian nobility, who were influenced more by *Landespatriotismus* than by Czech national ideas. Beginning in 1827, they published two journals, one in German (which expired in 1832 for lack of subscribers) and one in Czech. Palacký became the first editor of both. In 1831 Palacký, Jungmann and Jan Svatopluk Presl founded the *Matice česká*, modeled on the five years older Serbian *Matica*.

The *Matice česká* was, in the words of Stanley B. Kimball, "the first institution to promote successfully the revival of Czech. It was also the first independent Czech cultural institution to advance nationalism, the first modern institution of a purely Czech character, one of the first and strongest supporters of the modern Czech nation, and the most important legal centre of the Czech national movement to 1848."<sup>10</sup> The goal of the *Matice* was to support Czech language and literature. Under Bach absolutism, however, it reverted to publishing neutral and practical books, and was after 1861 superseded by other institutions.

Karel Havlíček (1821–56) was the forerunner of a new, critical brand of Czech patriots. He is regarded as the founder of Czech political journalism, but he was also a poet and politician. When Czech was first starting to gain foothold in the scientific and literary community, the status of the language was still precarious, and, in the eyes of the patriots, everything written in Czech was by definition good – no matter what the literary quality.

Havlíček rebelled against this notion. He found much of the Romantic super-patriotic Czech literature of his time shallow and theatrical. As a first object of his criticism he chose Josef Kajetán Tyl's novel *Poslední Čech* (The Last Czech). In his review, he remarked rather caustically that it was easier to die for one's country than to torture oneself by reading some of the patriotic literature being produced (!).<sup>11</sup> This brought him to Palacký's attention, on whose recommendation he in 1846 became the editor of *Pražské noviny* (*Národní noviny* from 1848) and its literary magazine *Česká včela*. Despite his critical attitude, Havlíček managed to become a national symbol, due to his brave opposition to Vienna after 1849.

Unlike most of his contemporaries, Havlíček laid the blame for the nation's weak position on the Czechs themselves. "Who is the greatest enemy of our nationality?" he asked. "We are ourselves! The government cannot wipe us out, it cannot stamp out our language if we use it. In time, it will even have to protect it. Who can keep us from learning Czech? And yet only a few hundred know it well enough so that they can use it in discussion and professional writing!"<sup>12</sup> His critical attitude also extended to the Pan-Slav ideas that had dominated the Czech national movement after the Napoleonic Wars. In his eyes, the different Slav peoples were separate nations – not one nation with several tribes.

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<sup>10</sup> Stanley B. Kimball: *The Matice česká, 1831–1861*, in Brock & Skilling (1970:54).

<sup>11</sup> Referred by Barbara Kohák Himmel: *Karel Havlíček and the Czech press*, in Brock & Skilling (1970:116).

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Himmel in Brock & Skilling (1970:120).



### *The mass phase*

The transition from the phase of agitation to the mass phase can be dated to the period between 1848 and 1861. Before 1848, the nation did not yet include all strata of the population. After 1861, national awareness had reached the masses and a fully-fledged mass national movement existed, politically institutionalized in the National Party (Old Czechs). This transition coincided with the rapid industrialization of the Czech lands, creating new nationally relevant conflicts, and it was completed after serfdom was abolished in 1848.

The latter half of the 19th century was also a period during which the Czechs got many of their important national institutions. Apart from the many newspapers, journals and reading societies that were established, a nationally oriented gymnastics society, *Sokol* (Falcon) was founded in 1862, followed in 1881 by a national theater (which burned down right after the opening and was reopened two years later). The theater was built entirely on voluntary contributions from Czech patriots, and is in itself evidence of the strength of the national movement. The many rallies during the period of passive resistance (1863–79) testify to its mass character.

The Czech part of Charles University became after 1882 the center of a new generation of patriots, who took up the critical heritage of Havlíček. These are called the Realist school for their critical attitude to the old ways of presenting Czech history and the Romanticism of the preceding period. Leading figures in the Realist school were Jan Gebauer in linguistics, Tomáš G. Masaryk in philosophy, and Jaroslav Goll in history. In the struggle over the authenticity of the "old medieval" writings in 1886–87, they all stood together, arguing that the nation could not live on a lie. For this, they were charged with being anti-national.

Now scholarship and agitation again parted company: The aim became to tell history the way it actually was (cf. Ranke). At the same time, the leadership of the national movement passed to writers, journalists and politicians, who generally subscribed to a romantic national interpretation of history. The break between the scholars and the national movement was, however, not complete. Scholars remained important in defining the contents of national identity: what it really meant to be Czech. An illustration of this is the debate on the meaning of Czech history, which started after the turn of the century and is still not quite over.<sup>13</sup>

In this debate the former Realist alliance broke up, with Goll and especially his disciples (who remained faithful to the positivist ideal) on one side, and Masaryk and his supporters on the other. It was Masaryk who triggered the debate through a series of books he wrote on the national question in the years 1895–98, where he set out to present a new philosophy of Czech history. I will return to this debate in the next chapter.

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<sup>13</sup> A collection of contributions until 1945 may be found in Miloš Havelka (ed.): *Spor o smysl českých dějin* (1995). On the contemporary debate, see e.g. Jan Patočka: *Náš národní program* (1990), Jan Křen: *Historické proměny češství* (1992), Jaroslav Krejčí: *O češství a evropanství* (1983, 1995), Petr Pithart: *Dějiny a politika* (1990), František Kautman: *Naděje a úskalí českého nacionalismu. Viktor Dyk v českém politickém životě* (1992).

### ***The Slovak national revival***

The Slovak revival deviates from the Czech in at least three respects. First, the pre-national foundations were much weaker. Using two terms coined by Anthony D. Smith we might say that while the Czechs could *rediscover* their history, the Slovaks had to *reconstruct* theirs.<sup>14</sup> A literary language had to be codified for the first time; Slovaks lacked state traditions, and national awareness was not very widespread. Second, two competing currents coexisted during the national revival: One Slovak-Catholic, the other Czechoslovak-Protestant, and this additionally impeded the revival – especially after the linguistically-based concept of the nation gained ground. Third, the Slovak awakeners lacked a native nobility who could help finance their activities.

### ***The scholarly phase***

The Slovak national revival started in roughly the same period as the Czech, the final two decades of the 18th century. Activities were also roughly of the same kind and the awakeners wrote in a foreign language, mostly Latin or Czech. Incidentally, two of the Slovak "firsts" were initiated by Slovak Catholics. In 1780 the first Slovak history, *Historia gentis Slavae. De regno regisbuque Slavorum*, was published in Latin. The author was Juraj Papánek, a Catholic priest. By name this was a Slavic history, but it was meant for a Slovak audience, and the focus was on the Slovak tribe of the Slav nation. Papánek invented a line of Slovak kings that never existed,<sup>15</sup> and presented Great Moravia as the first Slovak state.

The idea of codifying the Slovak language was conceived in the Society for the Fostering of the Slovak Language under the General Seminary in Bratislava during the 1780s. The driving force was another Catholic clergyman, Anton Bernolák (1762–1813). In *Dissertatio philologico-critica de litteris Slavorum* (1787), he criticized the idea of a national unity between Czechs and Slovaks on the basis of a common literary language. He saw a literary language as a means of expressing national character and distinguishing the Slovaks from the neighboring Slav nations. The resemblance to Jungmann's ideas twenty years later is obvious.

Bernolák was well acquainted with Czech literature and cultural traditions, and partly used them as a point of departure for his own work. He was thus not anti-Czech in a cultural or historical sense. In the introduction to his dictionary he emphasized that he did not hate the Czech language, which he besides Polish and Russian considered as the most educated of the Slav tongues. He published a grammar in 1790 and a handbook on etymology in 1791 (both in Latin) while his dictionary *Slowár Slowenský*, completed in 1796, was published post mortem in the years 1825 to 1827. Bernolák based his codification of Slovak on a Western Slovak dialect; he discarded Czech letters that represented sounds not found in Slovak (ř, ž, ů) and created new ones for sounds not common in Czech (ľ). The literary language he created is known as *Bernoláčtina*.

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<sup>14</sup> On the concepts, see A.D. Smith: *The ethnic origin of nations* (1986:178).

<sup>15</sup> See *Slovanství v národním životě Čechů a Slováků* (1968:102).

During the 1790s, a few books were published in this language, mainly religious literature, some works of Enlightenment and some patriotic books, but also some translations and poems. In order to facilitate the diffusion of the language, Bernolák and Juraj Fandlý, another renown Slovak patriot and writer, founded *Slovenské učené tovarištvo* (The Slovak Learned Society) in 1792. This was one of the very first Slovak national institutions, was important also because its 581 members formed a tight network all over Slovakia.

While Bernoláčtina spread among the Catholic majority population, the nationally minded Slovak Protestant intelligentsia remained faithful to the Kralice Bible and the Czech *Bibličtina* (Bible language). This intelligentsia played a role far out of proportion to the number of Protestants in the population. They sought out their Czech counterparts for support, and through these contacts, the concept of a Czecho-Slovak tribe of the Slav nation gradually arose. The language-religious split thus played a major part in the crystallization of the two currents in the Slovak national revival.

An early example of a contribution from the Protestant current is Ján Hrdlička's *Vznešenost řeči české neb vůbec slovenské* (The Sublimity of the Czech tongue or actually the Slovak, 1786). This was a defense of the Czech Bible language, and it echoed Karel Hynek Thám's *Obranu jazyka českého proti zlobivým jeho utrhačům* (Defense of the Czech language against the mischief of its offenders, 1783). The Protestant Lyceum in Bratislava was the center of this current. Important figures outside the Lyceum were initially Juraj Ribay and Štefan Leška. Ribay had close links with Dobrovský from 1785 to his death in 1812, and for Dobrovský's dictionary he collected 14,700 Slovak words and 3,850 expressions that differed from Czech.

In the beginning of the 19th century the Protestant awakeners, led by Bohuslav Tablic and Juraj Palkovič, increased the efforts to strengthen the Czecho-Slovak linguistic and cultural community. They established bookstores, tried to spread Czech literature, worked to found a Czecho-Slovak society (accomplished only in the 1830s for lack of funding), and the establishment of a Czechoslovak chair at the Protestant Lyceum in Bratislava. The latter was achieved in 1803 with support from Czech patriots, and Palkovič filled the professor post until 1848. Between 1812 and 1818 he also published a patriotic weekly, *Týdeník aneb Císařské královské Národní noviny* (Weekly or Royal National News).

### ***The phase of agitation***

According to Hroch, the Slovak phase of agitation started in the 1820s, only slightly later than the Czech. But material conditions were more difficult, and Slovak agitation did not begin to bear fruit until the 1830s. A certain degree of success can be noted around the mid-1840s, and some notable results were achieved in the cultural and educational fields during the 1860s, but because of increased Magyarization after the *Ausgleich* of 1867, the transition to the mass phase was postponed to the 20th century.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See Hroch (1985:98–99).

While the phase of agitation was a time of national flowering among the Czechs in terms of national institutions, journals and newspapers, the Slovak situation was far more precarious. First, Magyarization pressures were much stronger. Assimilation into the ruling Magyar nation was openly advocated already in 1817, and anti-Slovak attacks were accompanied by arguments to the effect that the Slovaks did not comprise their own nation within the Hungarian framework, and thus had no right to a national life. The Magyar language was made compulsory in the higher school system and the administration system; eventually also the primary schools were increasingly Magyarized, culminating after 1867.

Second, the Slovak awakeners were few, their composition was socially narrow, and they were usually not well off. The nobility was Magyarized and has been accused of being more bent on Magyarization than were the native Magyars, while the bourgeoisie was largely German. According to Novotný, this is one of the reasons why the available funding for Slovak journals with educational and patriotic contents was inadequate in the 1820s and 1830s. Not until the 1840s were the Slovaks able to finance regular newspapers and journals. In the meantime, they relied on Czech patriotic journals to some extent, like *Květy* (Flowers) under the editorship of Josef Kajetán Tyl from 1834. Czech journals played a role in the Slovak revival chiefly by bringing articles addressing Slovak problems, and by publishing pieces written by Slovak patriots, Protestants and Catholics. Czech books were also widely sold.<sup>17</sup>

The transition from phase A to phase B coincided with an greater emphasis on Pan-Slavic ideas. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) Russia stood out as the great emancipator in the eyes of the Slavic subject peoples of Eastern Europe, and a general pro-Russian and Pan-Slavic wave ensued. The Slovaks were no exception; the Pan-Slavic tone of the Slovak national revival was, if anything, stronger than elsewhere. The Polish uprising (1830) changed the direction of Slovak Pan-Slavism from pro-Russian to pro-Polish, with a few exceptions.

The Romantic currents that influenced the generations of Jungmann and Palacký in the Czech national revival are no less visible in the Slovak case. Panegyric praise of everything national can be found among representatives of both currents. The literary form of Bernoláčtina peaked during the 1820s and 1830s through the poetry of Ján Hollý, who surprised even the Czech awakeners by his well-turned verse. (Not that it made them any better disposed towards Bernoláčtina, however.) His poems were even published in Czech translation in the Czech scientific journal *Krok* in 1823. He also translated classical poetry into Bernoláčtina, such as Virgil's *Aeneid*, and thereby helped prove its utility.<sup>18</sup>

*Slávy dcera* (the daughter of Slava) written by Jan Kollár (1793–1852) is probably the best example of Romantic influences among the other current of Slovak awakeners, those adhering to the Czech literary language. This monumental collection of poetic songs, first published in 1824 and expanded in later editions, praised the Slavs and predicated their great future.

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<sup>17</sup> See Novotný (1968: pp. 77 ff.).

<sup>18</sup> Novotný (1968:73–74).

*Slávy dcera* is also a clear expression of Kollár's ideas of Slav reciprocity, which he spelled out in his theoretical works *Rozprava o jméněch* (Discussion of Names, 1830) and *O literárnej vzájemnosti mezi kmeny a nářečmi slavskými* (Concerning the Literary Reciprocity between Slav Tribes and Tongues, 1836). His means of ensuring Slav reciprocity were of a cultural nature: bookstores, libraries, comparative grammars and dictionaries, publication of folksongs and proverbs, translation of books, chairs of Slav dialects at the universities, literary periodicals and intensive travel among scholars.

Kollár wrote his own texts mainly in archaic Czech, and he also tried to expand the use of Czech in Slovakia. He was opposed not only to Bernoláčtina, but also to the new Slovak literary language formed by Štúr in the 1840s, and to Jungmann's modern Czech.

While Kollár channeled his enthusiasm for the Slav cause into poetry and romancing about the noble Slavs, Pavel Josef Šafařík focused on scholarship. Among Šafařík's greatest contributions are *Geschichte der slawischen Sprache und Literatur nach alle Mundarten* (1826), which was the first attempt at a comprehensive history of the Slav languages and alphabets, and *Slovanské starožitnosti* (Slav Antiques, 1836–37), devoted to the oldest Slav history. *Slovanský národopis* (Slav Ethnography, 1842) gave a contemporary picture of the Slavic nations, their settlements and numbers, their languages and literature, and is seen as one of the first expressions of Czech political Austro-Slavism.

The 1830s saw the beginning of a rapprochement between the Catholic and the Protestant current in the Slovak revival under the umbrella of Slav reciprocity. The defenders of Bernoláčtina, with Martin Hajmuljak at the helm, emphasized the cultural kinship with the Czechs, and the followers of Kollár started to see the need for linguistic reform. In 1834, a joint body, *Spolek milovníkov řeči a literatury Slovenskej* (The Association of Lovers of the Slovak Tongue and Literature) was founded, with Kollár as the first chairman. The increased Magyarization drive of the 1840s only strengthened this rapprochement, and also served as a pretext for the first Slovak petition to the emperor against Magyarization (1842).

A decisive event in the rapprochement process was the second (and ultimately successful) attempt at codifying a Slovak literary language, by the third great Slovak awakener of this phase, the Lutheran clergyman Ľudovít Štúr. The decision to form a new Slovak literary language based on a central Slovak dialect was made in February 1843. The foundations for his codification of a new Slovak literary language were set out in two books, *Nárečja slovenskuo* (The Slovak Tongue) and *Náuka řeči slovenskej* (Theory of the Slovak Language), a Slovak grammar. The first book written in this new "code" was the yearbook *Nitra* (1844), published by Jozef Miloslav Hurban (1817–88), one of Štúr's close compatriots. Like Štúr and the third co-worker, Michal Miloslav Hodža, Hurban was a clergyman of Protestant stock educated at the Lyceum in Bratislava and active in the Czecho-Slovak society. He was the first of the "Štúr circle" who abandoned Kollár's concept of a Czecho-Slovak nation and adopted the notion of Slovak individuality, around 1837.

In 1845, the Štúr circle published the first issue of *Slovenské Narodní Noviny* (Slovak National News) with the literary magazine *Orol tatranský* (The Tatra Eagle), which was forbidden after Bach absolutism set in. After a period when three Slovak literary languages (*Bernoláčtina*, *Štúrština* and *Czech Bibličtina*) coexisted, a final compromise was reached in 1852, incorporating some elements of *Bernoláčtina*. The result was published in Martin Hattala's *Kratká mluvnica slovenská* (A Concise Slovak Grammar). This also marked the end of the Czechoslovak current in the Slovak revival, at least for the time being.

The 1840s also saw the first successful attempts at forming patriotic associations for the general public, like the cooperative movement, the Sunday school movement (under the slogan education of the nation) and amateur theaters. In the brief period between the end of Bach absolutism (1859) and the *Ausgleich* of 1867, Slovak agitation made clear progress, not least institutionally. *Matica slovenská* (The Slovak Matica) was founded in Turčianský Svätý Martin in 1863. The aim was moral and scholarly education of the Slovaks, cultivating Slovak literature and art, and increased material welfare of the Slovak nation. The three Slovak *gymnasia* that were founded strengthened the Slovak intelligentsia, at least for a while. The *Ausgleich* meant a setback for the Slovak national movement. Magyarization impeded the diffusion of Slovak identity as well as the development of Slovak political parties.

### ***Towards a mass phase***

Prior to the revolution of 1848, the Slovak national movement had been confined to a small intelligentsia, largely made up of the clergy. Towards the end of the century, it was gaining a foothold also among the middle classes in the cities, well-off peasants and professionals. It has been suggested that the "opposition and radical press had a special capacity to replace the banned or unauthorized Slovak secondary schools, associations and political forums."<sup>19</sup> Slovak journals and newspapers thus represented an institutional base through which the Slovak national movement could grow in spite of the harsh conditions. In addition, Slovak students who did not want to assimilate often left Slovak territory for places where the atmosphere was freer and more encouraging. Slovak national circles were developing outside Slovak territory, as was the case among students in Prague, Vienna and Budapest, and close political cooperation developed with the other subject nations of Hungary as well as with the Czechs. The Czechophile current again grew stronger as the First World War approached.

The Slovak problem was also brought to the attention of the world through the writings of R.W. Seton-Watson (*Racial Problems in Hungary*, 1906) and the Norwegian author Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, especially after the Černová incident in 1907. The pretext was that Andrej Hlinka, a Ružomberok priest, was deprived of his office and jailed on charges of Pan-Slav agitation. When a new church in Černová was to be consecrated by a Magyar priest, a large crowd protested. The Hungarian Gendarmerie fired into the crowd, killing 16 people.

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<sup>19</sup> László Szarka: *The Slovak national question and Hungarian nationality policy before 1918*, in: *The Hungarian Quarterly*, vol. 35 (1994:106).

To what extent a Slovak national identity was a mass phenomenon at the beginning of the First World War is hard to say, since the census was based on language, not on subjective identity. Considering the number of Slovaks that were still peasants and the totally dominant Magyar propaganda, it is likely that the Slovaks had not yet completed the mass phase by 1918. Moreover, a comparison of census figures from the last Hungarian and the first Czechoslovak census suggests that there existed a large bilingual group with dual or situational national identity (I will return to this question in Chapter Ten).

### ***Concluding remarks***

There were some major differences between the Czech and Slovak national revivals. The pre-national foundations for nationhood were clearer, the period of agitation started earlier, and the transition to a fully fledged mass national movement was made much earlier in the Czech case than the Slovak. Hroch terms the Czech development "integration heightened by revolution" and the Slovak "belated under the influence of external oppression."<sup>20</sup>

The Czechs were able to make the transition to the mass phase right after the middle of the 19th century, and had plenty of time before the First World War to develop their political and cultural life. In 1918, the Czechs were thus a fully formed nation with well-developed national institutions, a national identity that encompassed the entire population and a sophisticated political system, where all major social classes were represented.

Slovak patriotic agitation started in the 1840s, but it did not take off during the revolution of 1848–49, and was thwarted, first by Bach absolutism (1852–59), later by the Magyarization drive after 1867. The Slovaks did not manage the transition to the mass phase until the days of the First Republic. An important legacy of the Slovak national revival was the division of the national movement into two currents, one Slovak oriented and one Czechoslovak oriented, roughly corresponding to the division between Catholics and Protestants. No such division occurred in the Czech movement.

In addition to the differing economic, political and cultural conditions, there were thus differences between the Czechs and Slovaks in terms of national awareness as well. There were still regions in Slovakia where people did not relate to the national message; moreover, a great many people were on the verge of being assimilated into the Magyar nation. The stage was now set for a struggle over the Slovak "soul."

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<sup>20</sup> Hroch (1985: pp. 98 ff.).

## Seven

### *Czech and Slovak identity redefined*

*What should man love the most – the fatherland or the nation? (...) The fatherland is dead land (...); the nation and language is our blood, life, spirit, ourselves.*

**Eudovít Šuhajda, 1834<sup>1</sup>**

**D**uring a nation-forming process, the nation-forming elite more or less consciously formulates what it means to be a nation, by defining those features that the nation-to-be shares. In the preceding chapter, the focus was on the phases of the national revival, the process through which modern Czech and Slovak national identities were formed. Now I will turn to their contents. What did it mean to be Czech or Slovak? What were the features that united people into one nation, setting "us" apart from "the others"?

Pre-national identities will often undergo a major transformation in the course of a national revival, as the image of what it means to be a nation gradually crystallizes. But the contents of national identities may also change considerably after the nation is fully formed, depending on the circumstances. The original image may thus be modified several times over. In this chapter I will concentrate on the changes in how nationhood was conceived during the Czech and Slovak revivals, from the late 18th through the 19th centuries.

The discussion will be organized around some features commonly held to unite nations: language, history (including religion and territory) and national character. The latter is a notion that largely went out of fashion after the Second World War, yet it was still common in the inter-war period. Finally, the Slav connection in the revivals (including Czecho-Slovak ideas) will be given separate treatment, because this is so important for understanding the inter-war debate on these questions.

The changing conceptions of "Czech-ness" and "Slovak-ness" were closely intertwined with a change in how "nation" was conceived. The Herderian idea that nations are bound together by language was especially influential in Eastern Europe. In the Czech and Slovak case, this worked in conjunction with a new conception of the relation between nation and class inherited from post-Revolutionary France: The nation was no longer the "noble nation", but also included the common people – the whole people. In a situation where the nobility was linguistically foreign, these new ideas necessarily affected national self-understanding deeply.

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<sup>1</sup> (Co má člověk více milovat – vlast nebo národ? [...] Vlast je mrtvá země, [...]; národ a řeč je naše krev, život, duch, my sami). Quoted in *Československá vlastivěda*, Díl II, Dějiny, Svazek 2 (1969:119).



### *Czech and Slovak conceptions of nation*

Unlike most Western languages, Czech and Slovak lack a word for "nation" directly derived from the Latin *nasci-* (to be born). The Latin root is found in words like *nacionalista* (a nationalist), *nacionalistický* (nationalist), *nacionalizmus* (nationalism), *nacionální/nacionální* (national), but they are today used sparingly and mostly in a negative sense, although this was not the case in the inter-war period. The word for nation is *národ* (from *narodit se* = to be born – in other words, a translation loan, parallel to the Latin word), while words like *národní/národní* (national), *vlastenec* (patriot – of vlast; homeland), *vlastenectví/vlastenectvo* (patriotism) are used to describe positive love of the nation. Yet, even if the word is native, the ambiguity of the modern nation concept is almost the same in Czech as in English.<sup>2</sup>

The meaning of "Czech" (*český*) is historically more ambiguous than the meaning of "Slovak" (*slovenský*). English and German use *Bohemian* (*böhmisch*) when referring to territorial identity, and *Czech* (*tschechisch*) when referring to cultural and linguistic identity. The Czechs have one word for both. Originally, *český* had at least three meanings: *Geographically* it referred to Bohemia (*Čechy*) as opposed to Moravia, *politically* to the lands of the Czech crown (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia – sometimes also Lusatia), and *culturally* to the Czech nation. After the Second World War the two latter meanings have become less contradictory, as the Czech lands are now probably more culturally homogeneous than ever. Note that Bohemia and Moravia are still referred to as *the Czech lands* or the lands of the Czech crown. Even today, a term covering both regions is wanting, which is reflected in the name of the new state – *Česká republika* (the Czech Republic).<sup>3</sup>

Slovak (*slovenský*) historically referred to culture or origin ("race"), rather than to territory. Slovaks were never thought of as the people living on the territory of Slovakia. Quite the reverse – Slovakia was defined as the territory inhabited by Slovaks. According to Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, Slovakia (*Slovensko*) was used publicly for the first time in 1849 in a petition to the Habsburg emperor,<sup>4</sup> at a point when the linguistic nation-concept was well established.

Slovak identity did not have a particularly precise content: Before the revival, the Slovaks often referred to themselves as *Slovaks*, *Slavs* or *Slavs of Hungary*. *Slovak* was sometimes even used about Slavs in general. Linguistically, the difference is not very great between *Slovák* and *Slovan* (Slav), *slovenský* (Slovak) and *slovanský* (Slavonic). The fact that "Slovak" was not a territorial term is also reflected in the term "Slavs of Hungary", making Hungary the relevant territory. The ambiguity of the term "Czech" thus had no historical parallel in "Slovak." Today that is a different story: "Slovak" can now refer to both territory and nation.

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<sup>2</sup> *Slovník spisovné češtiny* (Czech Dictionary, 1994) gives three definitions of *národ*: 1) a community of people united by common speech, laws, territory, economy, psychological features and culture, 2) a [primitive] tribe, 3) the broad layers of the population, the people.

<sup>3</sup> The logical name would be *Česko*, a parallel to *Slovensko* (Slovakia), *Norsko* (Norway) or *Dánsko* (Denmark). As of yet, *Česko* is only a slang form.

<sup>4</sup> Stanislav J. Kirschbaum: *A history of Slovakia* (1994:9).

### *Czech pre-national identity*

Scholars seem to agree that an awareness of being Czech existed early in the Middle Ages – albeit undoubtedly confined to the upper strata of society. The influx of German miners and craftsmen to Bohemian towns probably contributed to this, because of the privileges and power they attained. Since language was the chief marker distinguishing the two groups, Czech sentiment tended to show itself in defense of the Czech language, for instance through demands that all dignitaries should know Czech. Language was thus early perceived as an important part of being Czech, and Czech identity was from the outset conceived in opposition to German. At the same time, however, a process of mutual assimilation was at work.

A second important period in the crystallization of Czech identity is the Hussite era. According to František Šmahel, language (*lingua*), kinship (*sanguis*) and faith (*fides*) were the main features of Czech identity at the time.<sup>5</sup> Certain Czech strata already saw themselves as different from the Germans in language, now religion was added, and with it, the idea of being a chosen people. In Zacek's words: "Catholic Europe's characterization of the Czechs as 'a nation of heretics' provoked a feeling of defensive solidarity permeated with a national religious messianism, a mystical conviction that the Czech nation was the most Christian of all and had been elected by God to revive the fallen church."<sup>6</sup> At the same time, Czech sentiment spread to new classes, including townspeople as well as clergy and nobility.

The territorial conception of Czech identity that was expressed through a Bohemian *Landespatriotismus* at the start of the national revival probably preceded the cultural conception. Bohemia had been ruled by Czech princes for centuries at the time of Kosmas' death (1125), and it is likely that the existence of a Czech state, covering roughly the same core area for several hundred years, helped create a sense of (territorial) identity. Jan Křen argues that for long periods of time, "the ethnic and territorial, respectively, political conceptions of nation blended into each other, and are in the course of history only rarely possible to distinguish from each other."<sup>7</sup>

The foundations of a more popular conception of Czech identity were laid after the Battle of the White Mountain. The foreign nobility that replaced the fleeing Czech nobility after 1627 was predominantly German, and with the ruling house tipping the balance in favor of German as the political language of the Czech lands, the remaining Czech noble families were also gradually Germanized. The cultural and linguistic division between Czechs and Germans thus also increasingly became a class division, while Czech was reduced to a language of heretics and plebs. This was resented even by Catholic patriots like Balbín.

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<sup>5</sup> František Šmahel: *Idea národa v husitských Čechách* (1971:41).

<sup>6</sup> J. Zacek: Nationalism in Czechoslovakia, in Sugar & Lederer: *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (1994:173). The role of war in the crystallizing of pre-national and national identity is well documented. See e.g. A.D. Smith: *The ethnic origins of nations* (1986).

<sup>7</sup> (Byla celá dlouhá období, kdy se etnické a teritoriální, resp. politické pojetí národa prolínalo a v dějinách se jen zřídka dá úplně oddělit). Jan Křen: *Historické proměny češství* (1992:19).

### *Slovak pre-national identity*

It is not altogether clear when a Slovak consciousness first formed. A quite common view has been that a Slovak identity is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back a few hundred years at the most. The fact that the Slovaks themselves did not seem to have any clear idea of being Slovaks prior to the 19th century (cf. the confusion between "Slav" and "Slovak"), points in this direction. Thus Anthony D. Smith uses the Slovaks as an example of an *ethnic category* rather than an *ethnie*, stating that "to an observer, they possessed many of the [objective] ethnic elements we have outlined, but little or no sense of community and solidarity."<sup>8</sup>

Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, on the other hand, argues that a Slovak consciousness existed in towns and cities already in the Middle Ages, along with an awareness of belonging to the Hungarian state.<sup>9</sup> While it is possible that a sense of other-ness had developed in the towns in the Middle Ages, this Slovak awareness cannot have been very strong or widespread, since the group did not even have a proper name.

Yet, the fact that they distinguished between themselves and other groups within the territory of Hungary shows that they thought of themselves as culturally different. A middle position more along these lines is taken by Peter Brock in his essay on the Slovak national awakening, where he states that "the Slovaks had [in the 1780s] long possessed at least a vague feeling that they were different from their neighbors. [But] at the same time close ties existed, tending to unite the Slovaks with these neighbouring peoples and to obscure that sense of other-ness."<sup>10</sup> These ties were political in the case of the Magyars (a common state from the 11th century) and linguistic and cultural in case of the Czechs (a common, Czech literary language). As we will recall, the latter is valid only for the Slovak Protestants. In practical terms, this "obscured other-ness" implied that, at the inception of the national revival, what it meant to be Slovak was yet to be defined. Two contrasting questions could be asked: Why was Slovak identity so weak? And why did a separate Slovak identity developed at all?

The first question has already been partly answered. One crucial identity-forming factor was missing in the Slovak case: a territorial focus. Although the part of Slovak territory that had been under Great Moravian rule was seen as an indivisible principality until the 12th century, Slovakia was never a united administrative or political whole before 1928,<sup>11</sup> and there were no state traditions whatsoever. Prior to the revival (and some time afterwards), the relevant political unit was Hungary. This meant that Slovak political history was not Slovak, but Hungarian, as was the territory. It also meant that the small Slovak elite that existed had a Hungarian identity – linked to the idea of a *Natio Hungarica*, formed in the late Middle Ages.

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<sup>8</sup> A. D. Smith (1986:30).

<sup>9</sup> See Kirschbaum (1994:59).

<sup>10</sup> Peter Brock: *The Slovak national awakening* (1976:3).

<sup>11</sup> It was admittedly in practice treated as one unit with the establishment of the Ministry of Slovakia in 1918.

Second, while the Reformation did not contribute to the formation of a Slovak literary language, because Czech was available, the Counter-Reformation did, through the evolution of "Jesuit Slovak." The role of Protestantism and Catholicism in terms of vernacularization was thus the opposite of other cases, although Jesuit Slovak lacked a firm grammatical and orthographic structure. Ironically, by allowing the Slovaks to remain split in terms of religion, the comparative freedom of religion in Hungary was a disadvantage from a national point of view. Church organization also weakened Slovak unity: The organization of the Slovak Protestants followed ethnic lines, but Czech was used for preaching the gospel; the Slovak Catholics developed a language of their own, but were organizationally united with the Magyars.

How then, did a sense of other-ness develop at all? It seems reasonable that a sense of Slovak identity first developed in the towns, possibly in opposition to German privileges and later also as a result of the Magyar influx to Slovak-inhabited areas after the Battle of Mohács. The continuous wars with the Ottoman Turks<sup>12</sup> and the educational efforts linked to the religious struggle (including the evolution of Jesuit Slovak), undoubtedly contributed to the crystallization of identity. The lack of historical and territorial ties (apart from the notorious Great Moravia) served to set the Slovaks apart from the Czechs, despite the cultural affinities.

### *Changing ideas of "nation" in the Czech and Slovak revivals*

At the threshold of the national revivals, the conception of nationhood in East Central Europe was that of the *noble* nation, meaning that the politically privileged strata alone made up the nation. To qualify for nationhood, state traditions and a historical nobility were needed. In the Czech case, both requirements were met, except that the nobility (also the few families of Czech origin that were left) was becoming increasingly Germanized. The Bohemian noble nation was thus becoming more German than Czech. Within this framework there was no such thing as a Slovak nation: The Slovaks who enjoyed noble rank belonged by definition to the Hungarian (political) nation, the *Natio Hungarica*, and the rest were *plebs*.<sup>13</sup>

At that time, the conception of Czech identity was still open to interpretation.<sup>14</sup> On the one hand, the Bohemian nobility (Czech and German) who opposed the centralizing efforts of Vienna articulated a *political* idea of nation that restricted the nation to groups with political rights (the Estates). This *Landespatriotismus* of the nobility was based on historical and territorial rights linked to the lands of the Czech crown. According to this nation concept, it was possible to be German-speaking and Czech (or rather Bohemian) at the same time. A scholar could thus be regarded as a good patriot and still write in German or Latin. Some the early Czech awakeners actually had German origins – among them Dobner and Pelcl.

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<sup>12</sup> The Ottoman Wars probably also had another effect, that of shaping the Slovak self-image as the defenders of civilization, later echoed in Štúr's writings.

<sup>13</sup> See Brock (1976:7).

<sup>14</sup> See Anna Drabek: *The concept of 'nation' in Bohemia and Moravia at the turn of the 19th century* (1992:305–11).

On the other hand, the early Czech awakeners articulated a nation concept that was *culturally* and linguistically based. According to Anna Drabek, František Martin Pelcl nearly always meant the Czech-speaking inhabitants of the country when he wrote of the "Bohemian nation" in his 1774 "Short History of Bohemia." Josef Dobrovský used the term exclusively to refer to the Czechs, yet he probably did not include the dependent illiterate masses, the *plebs*. This would make his pessimism on behalf of the Czech language more understandable. At that time, Czech was losing its foothold not only among the nobility, but also in the towns.<sup>15</sup>

The distinction between these nation concepts was not always clear. In a handbook for the education of sons of the aristocracy (published in German in 1773) the nobleman Franz Josef Kinský described *Czech* as the national language of the Bohemians, yet also regarded *German* as a second native language in the Kingdom of Bohemia.<sup>16</sup> The idea of the noble nation also explains the efforts of the early awakeners to win over the nobility to the national cause.

After 1815, the linguistically-based nation concept gained the upper hand under the influence of Romanticism. Mastery of the Czech language became essential in order to be considered a part of the Czech nation, which left out the German-speakers in general and the upper classes in particular. "The people are Czech; let the masters speak French among themselves [...] that way they expose themselves – as foreigners", wrote Jungmann in *O jazyku českém* (On the Czech language, 1806).<sup>17</sup> However, the final break between Czechs and Germans did not occur until in 1848. This is also reflected in the change of language and focus of the third and following volumes of Palacký's monumental work about Czech history, published after 1848. Palacký wrote the first two volumes in German, under the title "History of Bohemia." This work now became "The History of the *Czech Nation* in Bohemia and Moravia."

At the same time, with the foreign ruling class "expelled", the Czechs emerged as even more politically oppressed. Political demands on behalf of the nation-to-be were presented simultaneously with the final victory of a popular, culturally-based nation concept. Consequently, in the Czech (and Slovak) case, national and democratic demands went hand in hand, while in the Magyar case, the national project was divorced from democratic ideas.

The cultural nation concept actually gained ground earlier among the Slovaks than among the Czechs. Otherwise, there was a clear parallelism in the identity changes in the Czech lands and Hungary. In the former case Czech identity was monopolized by the Czechs after the break-through of the linguistic nation concept, in the latter case Hungarian identity was monopolized by the Magyars. The chief difference was that while the Bohemian and Moravian Germans already had an alternative in the Great German identity, the Slovaks had to create an identity of their own.

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<sup>15</sup> Josef Kočí: *České národní obrození* (1978:91).

<sup>16</sup> See Drabek (1992:307).

<sup>17</sup> (Lid český jest; panstvo, nechť sobě hovoří francouzsky [...] zač sebe vydávají za cizozemce). Jungmann, quoted in: *Československá vlastivěda*, Díl II, svazek 2 (1969:77).

The concept of a *Natio Hungarica* was originally linked to the nobility, but under the influence of the Enlightenment, it became transformed into a citizen-oriented, political nation concept. As long as the Hungarian nation was conceived in political terms, it was possible to be linguistically Slovak and a member of the *Natio Hungarica* at the same time. As it came to be understood more and more in cultural terms, the Slovaks found themselves faced with a choice between assimilation into the Magyar nation and national opposition.

As a new conception of nationhood was gradually evolving after the French Revolution, emphasizing popular and linguistic elements, the small Slovak elite split into three factions: A noble faction adhering to the old idea of a Hungarian political (and eventually cultural) nation; a Protestant faction who believed in Czecho-Slovak unity based on a common literary language and common cultural traditions; and a Catholic faction who believed in a separate Slovak nation (or actually a Slovak tribe within a Slav nation). Initially, however, both Protestants and Catholics thought of Slovaks as being culturally distinct, according to Eva Kowalská.<sup>18</sup>

The linguistic conception of nationhood is important in order to understand why the language split became a problem. If the language is the soul of the nation, it follows logically that there must be one nation for each language, and one language for each nation. And "language" in this context was not the vernacular dialects of the masses, but the elevated, literary style of the educated classes. Thus, adherence to a Slovak literary language implied that a Slovak nation existed in its own right, while adherence to a Czech literary language implied that the Slovaks were a part of a larger Czechoslovak nation. What the two currents had in common was the idea that the Slovak, respectively Czechoslovak, "tribe" belonged to a larger Slav nation.

### ***Language and identity***

Language and identity questions became closely intertwined in both national revivals. This is also a point where the Czech and the Slovak revivals spill over into each other, because of the use of Czech as a literary language in Slovakia before, and in the Protestant case, also after the revival started. The Slovak Protestants regarded the Czech language of the Kralice Bible as their literary language, and thus wanted a part in its further development. Likewise, since Czech (and some Slovak) awakeners considered Slovak dialects to be a part of the Czech language, they resented any attempt at codifying Slovak, which they perceived as a split.

Czech had been a literary language since the 14th century, but had fallen into oblivion following the Battle of the White Mountain, after losing its position as the language of power. By the 18th century it was used mainly to publish official declarations, religious pamphlets and literature aimed at popular enlightenment. The former was grammatically conservative, but full of Germanisms and neologisms; the latter was heavily influenced by dialect forms.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> See Eva Kowalská: Historische Tradition, Sprache und Ausbildung: Zu einigen Faktoren des Werdegangs der Slowaken zur Nation, in Heiner Timmermann (ed): *Die Entstehung der Nationalbewegung in Europa 1750–1849* (1993).

<sup>19</sup> Hugh LeCaine Agnew: *Origins of the Czech national revival* (1993:70).

Two basic strategies were open to the Czech awakeners. One obvious option was to use the contemporary vernacular language as a point of departure. The other option was to base modern Czech on the literary language that already existed, and then preferably in an archaic form, since the sorry state of contemporary literary Czech was widely acknowledged.

The choice of 16th century Czech and especially the Kralice Bible as a point of departure made literary Czech harder to master for the common people, since the language of the Kralice Bible had been conservative even compared to the spoken language of its own time.<sup>20</sup> This clearly shows that utility was not the primary concern. Instead the re-codification of Czech started as a desire to save the Czech historical heritage from total annihilation. The function of the language as a source of identity, of pride in what is "unique and ours", was seen as more important than the communicative function. It was no accident that Humanist Czech was chosen; the period from 1520 to the Battle of the White Mountain was described as "the beautiful or Golden Age" in Josef Dobrovský's classification of the development of Czech.<sup>21</sup>

The choice of strategy was probably also related to the status of the Czech (spoken) language at the end of the 18th century: It was regarded as a language of peasants and plebs and was held in low esteem. At this point, the old noble nation concept had not yet been replaced, the Czech awakeners had not given up trying to win the nobility over to their cause, and many of them needed (and received) the support of nobles for their scholarly activities. The elevated literary language of the 16th century was simply better suited for their purpose than the (in the awakeners' own eyes) degenerate peasant jargon of the 18th century. Once the old literary language was chosen as a point of departure, Czech grammar was more or less established. The old spelling and the vocabulary were of course modernized, especially after the turn of the century. The latter was a virtue of necessity, as Czech lacked the terms for a wide range of modern and scientific phenomena. During the Romantic period in the 19th century, more popular forms entered the literary language, through collection of folk songs and fairytales, and through the translation work of Jungmann and others.

The Slovaks did not have any literary heritage in their own language to preserve, or a codified literary language for that matter. The motivation for codifying the language could thus not be a desire to preserve a historical heritage. Instead the Slav connection was used as legitimization. In an unpublished part of the introduction to *Slowár slowenský* (Slovak Dictionary, written in 1796) Anton Bernolák, after praising the Slav language for its age-old existence, its wide extension, its sublimity and beauty, concluded thus: "Yet, most praise belongs to that tongue, which in relation to the others is their mother, or is decisively closest to their mother. This original tongue is simply the Slovak [Hungaro-Slav] tongue."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> According to *Vývoj českého jazyka a dialektologie* (1971:114) it was archaic grammatically as well as in vocabulary.

<sup>21</sup> See Agnew (1993:112) for the complete classification.

<sup>22</sup> (ale tu najviac chvály patrí tomu nárečiu, ktoré vzhľadom na ostatné je priamo ich matkou alebo ke matke sa rozhodne najviac približuje. Takýmto írečitým nárečím je jedine slovenské [uhorsko-slovanské] nárečie). Quoted in *Slovanství v národním životě Čechů a Slováků* (1968:104).

Bernolák argued that Slovak was easier to understand for other Slav peoples than any other Slavic tongue, and that it was purer because it was less influenced by foreign words. And yet, the motive behind the effort to codify Slovak as a separate literary language was the conviction that the Slovaks were a separate tribe of the Slav nation and needed their own literary language.

The Slovak dilemma was of a different kind than the Czech: They had to choose which spoken form to use as a foundation. Bernolák opted for Cultured West Slovak, although he mixed in some Central Slovak, which was a natural choice under the circumstances. First, Bernolák was familiar with West Slovak through his studies in Trnava and Bratislava. More important, Trnava had had a strong position as a Slovak cultural center since the 16th century, with its own university until 1777. It should be noted that what Bernolák chose as his point of departure was a West Slovak *elite* idiom, not the language of illiterate peasants – which is understandable, since the noble nation was still dominant. Instead of using the spelling rules of other Slav languages as a foundation, Bernolák based his codification on phonetic principles.

By choosing West Slovak Bernolák based his codification on the Slovak idioms that most closely resembled Czech. This, and the fact that Bernolák used Czech as a pattern, suggests that the object of codifying Slovak was not primarily to differentiate the Slovaks from the Czechs. In the eyes of Catholic Slovaks, the Czech *Bibličtina* was tainted by its association with Hussism and the Reformation. It was thus unacceptable from a religious, rather than from a national point of view. After the Patent of Tolerance was introduced in 1781, the front between Catholics and Protestants gradually softened. And while Bernoláčtina was not able to unite the two camps, Czech was increasingly stigmatized by the Magyar propaganda.

The second attempt at codifying a Slovak literary language was accomplished by a group of Protestant awakeners with Ľudovít Štúr at the helm. The phonetic orthography was kept, but Štúr switched to the idiom of the intelligentsia and townspeople of Central Slovakia, linking it to former "Cultured Central Slovak." The reason why this was chosen was, according to Kirschbaum, that it "already enjoyed a great deal of prestige as the main vehicle of popular oral culture, something that Kollár's and Šafařík's folk song collections confirmed. It was also understandable to those speaking Eastern as well as Western Slovak dialects."<sup>23</sup>

In addition to these practical arguments, however, the choice of Central Slovak also seems to have been motivated by its purity: These were the dialects that were least affected by foreign influences. According to Thomas Čapek, already Matej Bel (1684-1749) stated that the richest and purest Slovak dialect was the one spoken about an equal distance from the seats of the Bohemians, Moravians, Poles and Magyars, and according to location called Central Slovak.<sup>24</sup> In a way, Štúr took the consequence of the ideas of Bernolák and Bel. In vocabulary, however, he was conservative, preferring to keep the continuity with Czech.

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<sup>23</sup> Kirschbaum (1995:101).

<sup>24</sup> Referred in Thomas Čapek: *The Slovaks of Hungary* (1906:117).



Given the linguistic conception of nationhood, Štúr's codification implied that the Protestants now definitely saw the Slovaks as a separate "tribe." Štúr had from the outset been a proponent of Kollár's concept of one Czecho-Slovak "tribe" and used the Czech *Bibličtina* as late as in 1841. Gradually, however, he came to the conclusion that the Slovaks should be conceived as a separate tribe with their own language. This was interconnected in Štúr's way of thinking. In 1843 he wrote "language is, then, the surest sign of the essence and individuality of every nation. Just like an individual human being, the nation reveals its deeper inner self through language [...] the spirit of the nation develops in and with the language in the form most appropriate to it: they are interdependent, and so one cannot exist without the other."<sup>25</sup>

The Czech awakeners tended to see the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation and were thus opposed to a separate Slovak literary language. Already in a letter to Juraj Ribay in 1794 Dobrovský had expressed his opposition to Bernoláčtina. He went against it publicly in 1809, and in a letter to Kopitar in 1810 he argued that "Slovaks (as well as Moravians) are not called Czechs, but according to language they belong to the Czech tribe all the same." According to Novotný, it was Ribay who inspired Dobrovský to think that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation.<sup>26</sup> Likewise, the Czech awakeners opposed Štúr's codification of Slovak. On Kollár's initiative, a pamphlet entitled *Hlasové o potřebě jednoty spisovného jazyka pro Čechy, Moravany a Slováky* (Voices about the Need for a United Literary Language of the Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks) was published with the support of the *Matica česká* in 1846. Here the Štúr circle was accused of betraying Czecho-Slovak unity and reciprocity.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, Slovak Protestant awakeners tried to interfere with Czech linguistic development. A disagreement arose between Juraj Palkovič and Josef Jungmann over the direction of the Czech language. Palkovič was the more conservative of the two and wanted to keep the old forms of the *Bibličtina*, while Jungmann regarded the language as an organism in constant development. Both believed that language was the most important marker of nationhood. Palkovič saw Czech as a more developed and cultivated form of Slovak, and he thus believed in the existence of a Czecho-Slovak nation.<sup>28</sup>

Realizing that modern Czech was more difficult to understand for the Slovaks than the old *Bibličtina*, Jan Kollár wanted to introduce more Slovak features in order to make literary Czech easier to understand. His poems as well as other writings are characterized by Slovakisms in grammar and in vocabulary. Appointed special councilor for Slovak questions by the Austrian government after the defeat of the Magyar liberals in 1849, Kollár was able to introduce "Old Slovak", a Slovakized Czech, in the school system of Slovakia.

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<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Robert Pynsent: *Questions of identity. Czech and Slovak ideas of nationality and personality* (1994:186).

<sup>26</sup> (Slováci (ba i Moravané) se nenazývají Čechy, ale podle řeči patří přece k českému kmeni). *Slovanství...* (1968:105). See also Jan Novotný: *Češi a Slováci za národního obrození a do vzniku československého státu* (1968:42, 43, 45).

<sup>27</sup> See David Short: The use and abuse of the language argument in mid-nineteenth-century 'Czechoslovakism': An appraisal of a propaganda milestone, in: Robert B. Pynsent: *The literature of nationalism* (1996:44–54).

<sup>28</sup> See Novotný (1968:55).

Yet, the development of a truly Czechoslovak literary language was opposed by leading Czech patriots, like Jungmann and Palacký. They warned Kollár against linguistic experiments, which they regarded as harmful to Czech literature.<sup>29</sup>

### ***History and identity***

The interpretation of history is often an important part of the nation-forming process. Again, the starting point was very different in the Czech and the Slovak cases. The Czechs had a long tradition of "national" history writing, in the form of chronicles like Kosmas', the so-called Dalimil chronicle, the chronicle of Václav Hájek of Libočany and others. In the Slovak case, the first truly national history was written in the beginning of the revival by Juraj Papánek, although works where the Slovaks were treated as a separate group started to appear in the 17th (Révay, Jakobeus) and 18th centuries (e.g. Matej Bel).

During the Counter-Reformation, Czech history was naturally interpreted from a strictly Catholic point of view. At most, the reign of Karel IV was acknowledged, while Hussism was associated with heresy and condemned. It was thus perceived as a period of disgrace, an ebb in Czech history. The Battle at the White Mountain was brought upon the Czechs by themselves, as a punishment for their heresy, and the Counter-Reformation saved them from their heretic predilections. Czech, being the language of the Hussite heretics, was also more than slightly suspect. Old legends that suited the historiography of the *temno* were adopted – like those associated with the cult of St. Václav. In addition, new legends were built around the new Catholic saint Jan Nepomucký, who was intended to replace Jan Hus.<sup>30</sup>

It was the new critical methods in Czech historiography, starting with Dobner's comments to Hájek's *Kronyka česká*, that paved the way for a gradual re-evaluation of the historical heritage. Through a critical scrutiny of the sources, the more fantastic and mythical parts of the heritage were repudiated. This also affected the newly inaugurated cult of Jan Nepomucký. Simultaneously, a re-evaluation of crucial events in Czech history (chiefly Hussism and the Battle of the White Mountain) started. The Patent of Tolerance (1781) indirectly helped in rehabilitating Hussism by allowing other religions than Catholicism. In the beginning of the revival, the Hussites and the Brethren were still seen as heretics, but they began to get credit for their linguistic efforts. Hussism thus became a literary Golden Age before it became a Golden Age in general. In František M. Pelcl's *Kurzgefasste Geschichte der Böhmen* (A Brief History of Bohemia – 1774), the Hussites were still evaluated more negatively than positively, although Pelcl praised Žižka and Prokop the Bald for their heroism.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> According to a quotation in Novotný (1968:64), they described that kind of experiments as inconsistent with and a disaster for our literature ("nešťestí a neshody naší literatury").

<sup>30</sup> The historical figure Jan z Pomuku and the Jan Nepomucký of legend show little resemblance. See for instance Robert B. Pynsent: *Questions of identity* (1994:201).

<sup>31</sup> Kočí (1978:98).

It was the Protestant František Palacký who took the final steps in the reinterpretation of the Hussite period. Palacký reversed the old picture totally, making the Hussite period a time of glory and the Counter-Reformation a disgrace, while the Battle at the White Mountain became an externally imposed cause of the national decline. His point of departure was a philosophy of history where Czech history was seen as one of ceaseless contact and struggle between the Slav and the German element, and as a struggle between the ideas of authoritarian power (the church of the Middle Ages) and freedom of the spirit (Czech Hussism).

For Palacký, the great periods of Czech history were the reign of Karel IV, the Hussite period, and the reign of the "Hussite king," Jiří of Poděbrady. It is probably no coincidence that these were the periods of Czech independence. Parallel to this, Hussism also started to become the object of literary works, as in *Jan Hus* (1848) by Josef Kajetán Tyl, and later in works by Alois Jirásek and others.

Hussism was now interpreted as a national and popular movement, fighting for freedom against the German-Catholic principles of authority and feudalism. Anti-German attitudes and anti-clericalism thus went hand in hand in the Czech national movement – which is rather paradoxical, considering that an overwhelming majority of the people remained Catholic even after the Patent of Tolerance was instituted. According to Kočí, a total of only some 50,000 people in Bohemia and Moravia converted to the tolerated churches.<sup>32</sup>

A fairly continuous feature of Czech historiography from Kosmas via Dalimil, Balbín and Stránský to Palacký was its anti-German bias. If anything, the anti-German tinge of the Czech national movement became stronger in the course of the national revival. Palacký was the first to define the struggle against the Germans as the meaning of Czech history, yet he was much more nuanced than many of the patriots of his day. He reproved the Czechs for their love of things foreign and their religious quarrelsomeness, and he blamed the Czech estates for the Germanization of the Czech lands prior to the Austrian accession to the Bohemian throne. In the course of the Czech revival, the Germans were increasingly portrayed as the arch-enemy, responsible for every evil that had ever befallen the Czechs. In the popular conception of history even Czech kings who invited German colonists to the land were condemned.

A corollary of the anti-German attitude was an anti-noble attitude, especially after 1848. The Czech (Catholic) nobility was blamed for the outcome at the White Mountain, seen as traitors to the national cause at Lipany, and charged with sacrificing the interests of the nation for the sake of their own material gain. Old legends were put to new use. The story about the judgment of Libuše (originally written down by Kosmas)<sup>33</sup> elaborated on in the false medieval manuscripts fitted the image of the popular and democratic character of the Czechs and underlined the humble origin of the former Czech ruling house, the Přemyslids (see Appendix A). The false medieval manuscripts were also used as proof of the early Czech civilization.

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<sup>32</sup> Kočí (1978:131).

<sup>33</sup> See Vladimír Karbusický: *Báje, mýty, dějiny* (1995) for an analysis of the old Czech legends of Kosmas.

Tomáš G. Masaryk's series of books on the national question, written in the 1890s,<sup>34</sup> brought a new reinterpretation of Czech history that was based on Palacký's, but differed on central points. Masaryk agreed with Palacký's positive evaluation of Hussism and went even further in presenting it as *the most* glorious period in Czech history. On the other hand, he disagreed with Palacký's interpretation of Czech history as a history of struggle against the Germans, and his positive evaluation of the reign of Jiří of Poděbrady.

Masaryk re-emphasized the religious contents of the Hussite struggles, and argued that the Hussite struggles had been directed only against those Germans that supported Rome; if the struggle had been a nationalistic one, it would have taken on a political rather than religious guise. At the same time he turned the Hussite struggles into a struggle for the ideal of humanity, which in his view was the *leitmotif* of Czech history. A central point, for which Masaryk was severely criticized, was the idea of continuity between the Czech reformation (Hussism) and the national revival. His philosophy of Czech history may be summarized thus:

1. The meaning of Czech history was religious, not national. The meaning of Czech history was not to fight the Germans, but the *ideal of humanity* as revealed through the Czech reformation and the national revival, achieving its finest expression in the Bohemian Brethren.
2. The decline associated with the Battle of the White Mountain was first and foremost a moral decline: the Czechs lost their independence and were unable to regain it because they had betrayed the ideals of the Czech reformation. In this scheme, the Battle of the White Mountain only completed the Czech fall that had begun with the Battle of Lipany in 1434. In turn, the national revival was caused by a new sense of faith in the Hussite ideals.
3. The only cure was to return to the ideal of humanity. Masaryk's answer was that the Czechs must learn from history, and determine how they best could bring about spiritual rebirth – by overcoming "the Rome within ourselves."<sup>35</sup>
4. The means must be in line with the goal – humanistic. Masaryk thus advocated hard work and criticism, as opposed to the Romanticism of violent revolution on the one hand and the passive cult of martyrs on the other. To work for the nation rather than just talk, to live for the nation instead of fantasizing about dying for it – that was the credo of Masaryk.

Masaryk's major opponents in the debate on the meaning of Czech history were Josef Pekař and Kamil Krofta – who had been on the same side as Masaryk in the struggle over the false manuscripts. While giving him credit for this, they argued that he fell prey to a new error, by establishing a new, equally false and equally romantic ideology instead.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> T.G. Masaryk, Tomáš G. *Česká otázka. O naší nynější krizi. Jan Hus – Naše obrození a naše reformace* (1924a). See also George J. Kovtun (ed.): *The spirit of Thomas G. Masaryk* (1990:90), a collection of Masaryk texts translated into English.

<sup>35</sup> (Emphasis in original.) See Kovtun (1990:95).

<sup>36</sup> See Jiří Jareš: *Jest otázka česká otázkou náboženskou?* (1922:14). Josef Pekař: *O smysl českých dějin* (1990), Miloš Havelka (ed.): *Spor o smysl českých dějin* (1995). Martin Kučera: *Pekař proti Masarykovi* (1995).

For the Slovaks, the national revival was not so much a question of reinterpreting a history that was already written: Slovak history needed to be written anew in a way that could support the equality of the Slovaks in the *Natio Hungarica* and later the existence of a Slovak or Czecho-Slovak tribe of the Slav nation. It is interesting how the Slovak awakeners tried to compensate for the lack of Slovak statehood, partly by inventing a line of kings that did not exist, partly by interpreting Great Moravia as a Slovak state, and partly by portraying the Slovaks as the most original of the Slav tribes. The latter is maybe the most striking feature.

Great Moravia and the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition, which were regarded as closely related, were emphasized as expressions of an independent, pre-Magyar Slovak existence. A special position was awarded Rastislav, who had invited Cyril and Methodius to bring the gospel to his people, and Svätopluk, under whose reign the empire reached its widest extension. In addition, the importance of Hussism and Jan Jiskra was underlined (by the Protestants) and certain Hungarian noblemen, like Matúš Čák, were presented as champions of Slovak interests. His position is illustrated by Čapek's comparison of Štúr with him: "Štúr was [...] the most remarkable champion of Slovak rights since Matúš Čák's days."<sup>37</sup>

The views of the continuity/break between Great Moravia and the tradition of St. István changed during the revival. Initially, Papánek emphasized the successful integration of Slovak nobility into the ruling elite of the new Hungarian state, i.e. the continuity with Great Moravia. The aim was apparently to substantiate that a culturally Slovak gentry (to which he belonged) had equal rights in the *Natio Hungarica*. In this scheme, the Hungarian state became the heir to the civilization of Great Moravia, originating through a contract between Magyar tribes and the Slovaks.<sup>38</sup> The implication was also that the nomadic Magyars had inherited basic agricultural skills, Christianity and the Moravian state tradition from the Slovaks, who had acted as the civilizers of the "barbarians." The Slovaks should thus be regarded as equal partners in the Hungarian state. Also Papánek's invention of a line of false kings can be interpreted as an attempt at establishing Slovak historical rights.

According to Papánek, the cradle of the Slav nation was the area around the Danube. The Slovaks were the most direct descendants of the original Slavs, geographically and culturally, and because of the close ancestry, Slovak was closer to the original Slav mother tongue than any other Slav language. The close ancestry was also reflected by the fact that the Slovaks were the only tribe to keep the old name. These were views Bernolák shared. However, he disagreed with Papánek in one main respect: He viewed the demise of Great Moravia and emergence of the Hungarian state as a national disaster.<sup>39</sup> The Protestant priest Ján Hrdlička voiced similar thoughts in *Slovenský národ* (The Slovak Nation, 1785). He placed the "cradle" of the Slav nation in the Nitra, Bystrica and Košice areas.

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<sup>37</sup> Čapek (1906:134).

<sup>38</sup> See Kowalská (1993:244).

<sup>39</sup> See R.A. Kann & Z.V. David: *The peoples of the Eastern Habsburg lands 1526–1918* (1984:246).

Even the clearly Czechoslovak oriented Pavel Josef Šafařík endorsed the idea of the Slovaks as the most genuine or original of Slavs. In *Slovanské starožitnosti*, devoted to the oldest Slav history, he established the age-old presence of the Slavs and their correspondingly large role in European history and culture. He argued that Proto-Slavonic survived longer in Slovakia than elsewhere for geographical reasons: The Slavs who settled there remained isolated from other peoples longer than other Slavs. In his view, the Czech language was the daughter of Slovak, and to recreate a Slovak language would thus be like going from the *Iliad* to the ABC (!).<sup>40</sup>

As Magyarization pressure increased, the idea of a contract faded away: The blame for the historical subjugation of the Slovaks was now increasingly placed on the Magyars and the Germans. Yet the idea of the Slovaks as civilizers lingered on, in the idea of the Slovaks as defenders of civilization in the Ottoman wars. This focus is also visible in the literature of the national revival; the Ottoman wars were a favorite topic, along with real and more mythical heroes. A favorite in Slovak romantic poetry was Juraj Jánošík, the Slovak Robin Hood.

Compared to the rather marked anti-German bias of the Czech movement, the Slovak analog is less obvious. Slovak identity was partly defined in contrast to the barbarians or the infidels (the Turks and the Magyars), but the Germans were also regarded as an enemy. This may be a reaction to Habsburg rule, or also an effect of the traditionally privileged position of the Germans in the towns of Slovakia – or even a spill-over from the Czech revival. An illustrative example is how Štúr wrote of Cyril and Methodius in 1841: "And going about, they taught and the people listened to their words about great matters and God's miracles, and the people tore down all idols and bowed down before the Lord. And the Lord took great pleasure in this people, for He multiplied them and extended the frontiers of their country. But the Satan of the Germans drove the God-loving king [Rastislav] to destruction and ensured that he was dogged by treachery and that he fell into the hands of his enemies."<sup>41</sup>

### ***Conceptions of national character***

At least seen from the outside, Czech character had, prior to the revival, been associated with heresy.<sup>42</sup> An image of the Czechs as great warriors was probably also fairly common. In Balbín's narrative, the Lion in the Czech coat of arms symbolized courage. He portrayed the Slavs (Czechs) as the "most aggressive" of all nations in war.<sup>43</sup> To fight wars was not originally the task of commoners, but of the nobility. This image of national character thus concerned the upper class, whereas the conception of the Czechs as heretics also included the masses – but was evaluated negatively.

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<sup>40</sup> Referred in Pynsent (1994:63).

<sup>41</sup> Quoted in Pynsent (1994:161).

<sup>42</sup> According to Václav Chaloupecký: *Československé dějiny* (1922:22), Hungarian sources spoke of the Czech Hussites as heretics (Bohemi-haeretici). See also John Hale: The Renaissance idea of Europe, in: Soledad García (ed.): *European identity and the search for legitimacy* (1993:54).

<sup>43</sup> ("nejválečnější národ"). Referred in Kočí (1978:14).

In contrast, the rather diffuse Slovak identity meant that, prior to the revival, specific notions of the Slovak character were not very widespread. However, Ján Hrdlička (1785) gave a picture of Slovak character that was clearly popular: Slovaks were described as *hard working, modest, hospitable* and *merry*. This conception was strengthened in the course of the revival.

When nationhood was extended to the masses and the linguistic nation concept replaced the "noble nation" the commoners (or the peasants) became the core of the nation. At the same time, national character became associated with allegedly popular features. Despite their different historical points of departure, the Czech and Slovak self-understanding was strikingly similar: Both emphasized the democratic character of their nation, their popular foundation, and their mild and peaceable character. First, this may be linked to their position as non-dominant nations: After the "foreign nobility" was excluded, the Czech nation was confined to a Czech-speaking intelligentsia, townspeople and peasants, while the popular character of the Slovak nation-to-be was even more marked because of the tiny intelligentsia.

Second, Jan Kollár represented a shared influence. In *Dobré vlastnosti národu slovanského* (The Good Qualities of the Slav Nation – Pest 1822), he distilled Herder's picture of the Slavs as quiet, mild, peaceful, hard-working farming people who loved their land, were hospitable to strangers and led a merry musical life. This characteristic mildness helped explain how the Czechs and Slovaks could be subjugated. According to Kollár, the Slav virtues were five: *piety, diligence, innocent joy, love of their language and tolerance towards other nations*. He portrayed the Slavs as a gentle, innocent, "dove-like nation", arguing that the Slavs never went to war other than to defend themselves, but they fought bravely. They never subjugated others, settled only in lands that were empty or already abandoned by others, and everywhere they "tamed other, savage nations with their quiet, peaceable presence."<sup>44</sup> Kollár also added the myth of the democratic, freedom-loving Slavs: The reason why they did not subjugate other nations was that they loved the freedom of their enemies as much as their own.

All this boils down to the Herderian myth of the Slavs as farmers. The reason why most Slavs were peasants was that it was their natural vocation, the very foundation of life. In Šafařík's words: "The Slavs' invincible predilection for farming is the work of Nature herself, [...] the natural pleasantness of their character and manners and their predilection for a free life could find satisfaction only in farming."<sup>45</sup> Kollár's picture of the Germans stands in stark contrast to the picture of the mild Slavs. He portrayed them as the opposite of the Slav in almost every respect, and everything bad was their fault. So feudalism was German, of course, since the Slavs were natural-born democrats. Both Kollár and Šafařík regarded the Germans or Germanic tribes as enemies of the Slavs from time immemorial (in Kollár's version 23 German emperors from Charlemagne to Henry IV had worked to de-naturalize the Slavs!). And they disliked the Magyars, whom they described as "Asiatic hordes."<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Pynsent (1994:75, 80–86).

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in Pynsent (1994:83).

<sup>46</sup> Pynsent (1994:93).

Palacký shared the view of the Slavs as peace-loving creatures, and praised them for their simplicity, piety and sensitivity. He also saw the Czechs as inherently democratic in their ways and Bohemia as a bridge between east and west, between the Slavs and the Germanic people. The belief in Slav mildness dwindled after 1830, but the notion of the Czechs (and Slovaks) as democratic and peace-loving was retained.

Štúr's point of departure in his description of Slovak character was also that of the Slav. The Slavs were regarded as peaceable farmers, and as the guardians of Christian western civilization against "Eastern barbarism." The Slovaks were seen as civilizers – in Štúr's scheme of things they saved the Magyars from their "barbarian self" – by converting them to Christianity and by teaching them how to plow and build houses. The Slovaks, in other words, turned the Magyars away from their nomadic life style of plundering and pillage. He emphasized the Slav democracy, wisdom, courage and piety. But piety was in his eyes not a feature that had come with Christianity: it had always been a part of the Slav, and hence the Slovak, character.

Masaryk's national philosophy was a break also with the die-hard conception of the Germans as the arch-enemy of the Czechs. In Masaryk's view, the Germans were closest to the Slavs in character; hence, the German influences did not stir the Czech character to the extent that was often thought. He also constantly portrayed the Germans as educators of the Czechs. In this he differed from Kollár and Palacký. His main criticism of Kollár was indeed the latter's negative evaluation of the Germans, more this than the exaggeration of the fine Slav qualities. On the other hand, Masaryk's feelings towards the Germans were ambivalent. The positive task of the national awakers was in his view to form and to spread an independent Czech culture and to improve the language through a variety of literary activities; the negative task was to withstand the domination of German language and culture, and German influences generally.<sup>47</sup>

Masaryk argued both against the revivalist myth of the mild and passive Slav and the earlier accounts of Slavs as brutal and ruthless. He declared that the picture of the mild and passive Slav was arrived at in Slavonic studies by an a priori construction, not on the basis of critical research, and that the old Slavs had indeed been aggressive, adventurous and brutal. The refinement of Slav manners and morals, Masaryk argued, started with the arrival of Christianity. Still, he maintained that the Slavs were by nature less aggressive than the Germans: "Our predecessors were rough, brutal, cruel and so on, but they were not as aggressive, in their whole nature as aggressive and eager to rule as the Germanic. [...] Herder in most respects correctly passed on what older and newer sources before him had shown."<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> (Úkol, jež si postavili naši buditelé před sto lety, máme my, jejich potomkové, po stu letech a budou ho mít i potomkové naši – je to starý náš úkol národní a kulturní). T.G. Masaryk *Česká otázka* (1990a:14).

<sup>48</sup> (Naši předkové byli hrubí, suroví, ukrutní a tak dále, ale nebyli tak bojovní, celou svou náturou bojovní a pánovití jako Germáni. [...] Herder v hlavní věci správně podával o Slovanéch, co staří a novější prameny před ním dávaly). Masaryk (1990a:69).



### ***The Slav idea in the Czech and Slovak national revival***

The idea of a Slav nation (Slavism, Slav reciprocity) and a Czechoslovak tribe of that nation played different roles in the Czech and Slovak national revivals. From the beginning of the *Czech* revival, Slavism served the interests of the Czech nation-to-be, and was conditional on a Czech national consciousness, rather than serving as the foundation for it.<sup>49</sup> It was from the outset neither very explicit nor very elaborated. In both currents of the *Slovak* national revival, the idea of a Slav nation was a premise, a starting point for revival efforts. Until the turn of the century, the Slovaks were referred to as "Slavs of Hungary" just as often as "Slovaks."

We may note an increasing awareness of the difference between Slav and Slovak (respectively Czech) going from the first to the second generation of awakeners. At the same time, Slavism was to a much larger extent an integrated (and conscious) part of the ideological profile of the Czech and Slovak national movement after the turn of the century. The younger generation saw Russia as a champion of freedom against the aggression of Napoleonic France. Then, after autocratic Russia crushed the Polish rebellion in 1830, the sentiment became more pro-Polish.

The Slav idea had strongest effect on the Czech and Slovak national revivals through the work of Jan Kollár and Pavel Josef Šafařík. As early as in 1821 Kollár had formulated the idea of one Slav nation with four branches or tribes: Russian, Czechoslovak, Polish and "Illyrian" (South Slav), corresponding to four Slavic tongues.<sup>50</sup> He wanted a gradual rapprochement and in the end a merger between the four branches of the Slav nation. In a hostile world, belonging to large nation would protect the tribes better than being a self-contained entity, Kollár felt.

His idea of a Czechoslovak tribe within a larger Slav nation was reciprocity in miniature: Czechoslovak unity also had the advantage of making the Slovaks a part of a nation that did have a history of its own, and a tradition of a literary language. In view of the equation of language with nation inherent in the Herderian cultural nation concept, Kollár's life-long opposition to a separate Slovak literary language makes eminent sense. He saw a single Czechoslovak language as a means of protecting the Slovaks against the Magyars, and Slav unity as protecting the Czechs and Slovaks against German domination. However, Kollár's scheme never went beyond cultural reciprocity.

Šafařík was, despite his Slav visions, more of a realist than Kollár. He did not believe it was possible to create a common Slav literary language, and he rejected the non-organic mixture of all Slav tongues as artificial.<sup>51</sup> As a scholar, he acknowledged the existence of all Slav tongues. In *Geschichte der slawischen Sprache und Literatur nach alle Mundarten* (1826), he even acknowledged Slovak as a separate tongue, but in *Slovanské starožitnosti* (1836-37) it was counted as Czechoslovak.

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<sup>49</sup> *Slovanství...* (1968:95).

<sup>50</sup> See Thomas G. Pešek: The "Czechoslovak" question on the eve of the 1848 revolution, in Brock & Skilling: *The Czech renaissance of the nineteenth century* (1970:132), and Pynsent (1994:52 pp.)

<sup>51</sup> *Slovanství...* (1968:117, 148).

Among the Czech nationally minded elite, the broad ideas of Slav reciprocity gradually started to change towards a narrower concept of Austro-Slav reciprocity towards the middle of the 19th century. At the same time, the emphasis changed from cultural reciprocity to political cooperation. In addition to the reactionary absolutism of Czar Russia, clashes between Slav peoples (the Russians and the Poles, the Poles and the Ukrainians) weakened the picture of the dove-like Slav character and led to a new awareness of contradictions between Slav nations.

Karel Havlíček was the first to enter openly into conflict with Kollár's all-Slav orientation. His stay in Russia (1842–44) had cured him of his originally pro-Russian feelings. Where Šafařík was critical to the Russian autocratic government, Havlíček extended his skepticism to the *people* as well. For him the Russian nation was absolutist, and he saw Russian Pan-Slavism in this light: "Russian Pan-Slavists assume that we would like to be under their government, and they are strongly convinced that one time all Slav lands will be in their power. They are starting to say and write Slav instead of Russian, so they also can say Russian instead of Slav."<sup>52</sup>

Havlíček regarded Kollár's ideas as harmful, and in *Slovan a Čech* (Slav and Czech, 1846), he rejected them altogether: The Slavs were not one nation with four tribes, but four nations, as different from each other as any other group of European nations. They did not answer for each other's virtues or vices. Because of the circumstances, however, a greater sympathy was possible between the Czechs and the South Slavs, who could be of mutual benefit to each other politically, according to Havlíček. There is no Romantic Slav reciprocity in this – rather a calculation of what best served the interests of the Czech nation. The punch line of the article has become famous: "with national pride I say 'I am Czech', but never 'I am a Slav'." <sup>53</sup>

The early Czech Austro-Slavism, represented by Lev Thun (1811–88) was of a cultural nature. In 1842 Thun tried to convince the Habsburgs that the Czech national movement was there to stay, that Germanization was futile, and that the Slavs of the empire would not be a threat to Austria, if she treated them well. Yet, the Austro-Slav position is better known as the political doctrine of Czech liberalism after 1848; equal rights for all nations within the empire and political autonomy in a federalized Austria. Arguments varied from the natural rights of the 1848–49 revolution, to the historical rights Czech politicians reverted to afterwards.

Czech Austro-Slavism was closely related to the Czech self-image as a small nation in a hostile world. This is abundantly clear in the letter Palacký sent to the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848, where he argued that when the Czech lands were a part of the Holy Roman Empire, this was a union between rulers only. Stating that "we are Czechs, not Germans", and refusing to take part in the forming of a German nation-state, he argued that the Czechs needed protection against a united Germany *and* Russia, something only (a federalized) Austria could provide.

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<sup>52</sup> (Ruští pan-slavisté [...] se domnívají, že bychom rádi pod jejich vládou stáli ... a pevně jsou přesvědčení, že jednou všechny slovanské země v moci své míti budou ... Tito pánové počínají všude místo ruský říkati a psáti slovanský, aby pak místo slovanský zas také ruský říci mohli). Quoted in *Slovanství...* (1968:151).

<sup>53</sup> (s hrdostí národní řeknu: 'Já jsem Čech', ale nikdy 'já jsem Slovan'). Quoted in *Slovanství...* (1968:152).

In his famous phrase: "Surely, if the Austrian state did not already long exist, we would have to see to it at once that it was created in the interest of Europe, yes of humanity." <sup>54</sup> After the Ausgleich of 1867, Palacký's Austro-Slavism turned sour, and his new slogan was: "We were here before Austria, and we will be here after." <sup>55</sup> In the wake of the Ausgleich a Russophile current temporarily dominated the Czech national movement, and this had a renaissance after 1905. A parallel development took place among the Slovaks around 1838, when the emphasis shifted from cultural to political reciprocity between the Slavs. Like Havlíček, Ľudovít Štúr rejected Kollár's idea of a Slav nation with four tribes. Yet, he did not reject the notion of a Slav nation, only the division into only four tribes – and in particular the notion of a Czechoslovak and an Illyrian (Yugoslav) tribe, which he regarded as constructed. In Štúr's conception, Slavdom was a bond of affinity between ten individual and equal Slav tribes, of which the Czechs and the Slovaks were separate and equal partners.

Slav unity was no longer seen as a matter of cultural rapprochement, including elements like a common language, but as a matter of spiritual unity going beyond differences of language and literature. <sup>56</sup> At the same time, national identity and national concerns became the primary, Slav reciprocity secondary. In line with this new spiritual conception of Slav reciprocity, increased contact and cooperation with other Slav tribes was envisaged, especially within the Habsburg empire. In the event, political cooperation after 1895 also involved non-Slav peoples of Hungary (the Rumanians). Like in the Czech case, a Russophile current followed in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich; and a part of the Slovak national movement remained strongly pro-Russian right up to the First World War. However, political Pan-Slavism, foreseeing a political union of all Slavs in one state, was never seriously advocated.

As for Czechoslovak reciprocity, this assumed varying forms among the Czech and Slovak awakeners from the beginning. The Czechs tended to see the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation and the Slovak tongue as a group of Czech dialects. They generally viewed the Slovaks as poor relatives, and this attitude did not change much during the national revival. After the political Austro-Slav position was adopted, the Czech state rights program became an obstacle to Czecho-Slovak political cooperation, since the Slovaks were not a historical nation. The Slovaks regarded themselves as a part of the *Czechoslovak* tribe of the Slav nation, not as Czechs, and most of them had some notion of Slovak individuality. Juraj Ribay, for example, stated that "our Church and literary language is Czech", <sup>57</sup> yet saw Slovak as a separate Slav tongue. Kollár considered Czech and Slovak to be one tongue, but wanted to introduce some Slovak elements into Czech to make it easier for the Slovaks to understand.

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<sup>54</sup> (Zajisté, kdyby státu rakouského nebylo již od dávna, musili bychom v interesu Evropy, ba humanity samé přičiniti se co nejdříve, aby se utvořil). Jiří Morava: *Palacký* (1994:141), or *Kdo byl kdo v našich dějinách do roku 1918* (1993:228).

<sup>55</sup> (Byli jsme před Rakouskem, budeme i po něm). This sentence is quoted almost everywhere Palacký is mentioned. See e.g. J. Bartoš, S. Kovářová, M. Trapl: *Osobnosti českých dějin*, (1995:267), *Kdo byl kdo...* (1993:228)

<sup>56</sup> *Slovanství...* (1968:162–3).

<sup>57</sup> (náš jazyk církevní a literární je čeština). Ribay in a letter to Durych in 1789, quoted in *Slovanství...* (1968:105).

After the second codification of Slovak, the Czechoslovak idea became secondary and no longer implied linguistic unity, yet the idea of cultural kinship was not abandoned. Czechoslovakism in this diluted form had a renaissance in the Czech and Slovak elite in the years prior to the First World War. The focus was on aiding the Slovaks in cultural and economic matters, not on political cooperation. This found expression among the Czechs through the Czechoslav Unity (*Československá jednota*, 1895).<sup>58</sup> Among the Slovaks, the student association *Detvan* and the circle around the journal *Hlas* (Voice, 1898), the so-called Hlasists, and *Prúdy* (streams, 1909) were the chief advocates of Czecho-Slovak reciprocity.

Masaryk played an important part in this renaissance through his close contacts with the Hlasists, who saw him as their teacher and leader. In *Česká otázka* (1895) he expressed the idea that the Slovaks were Czechs, when he marveled that "the first among Czech awakeners [Kollár] is a Czech, but born in Hungary." He praised the Slovaks for welcoming Czech exiles in times of trouble, and for contributing to the Czech revival.<sup>59</sup>

In *Problém malého národa* (Problem of a Small Nation, 1905) Masaryk explicitly defined the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation: "Just consider, how Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and lastly Slovakia are separated in our minds. There are two million Czechs in the Hungarian kingdom! [...] We cannot just give up a third of our nation. Even losing one soul is not in order. And here we are speaking of two million souls that have become foreign to us. Our national sentiment has not yet been *brought to completion*. We must even more than before *join the individual tribes and forces*."<sup>60</sup> The program of Masaryk's Progressive Party of 1912 stated, "We consider the Hungarian Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation."<sup>61</sup>

### ***Summary and conclusion***

To simplify, we may say that at the inception of the national revival, Czech identity was defined more by a common history than by language – and by virtue of this history, a common territory. This territory was the historical lands of the Czech crown, not the territory that was inhabited by Czech-speaking people. The nation was confined to the political classes (the Estates) or at the most included free men. From the outset, the emphasis of the "awakeners" was on the history of the Czech crown. Their interest in the Czech language was mainly of an antiquarian character; the desire to save a historical heritage from annihilation. Here it was not always easy to distinguish between national awareness and *Landespatritismus*.

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<sup>58</sup> Expressions of this Czechoslovakism may be found in Karel Kálal: *Slovensko a Slováci* (1905), and *Vývoj federalismu v Rakousku od r. 1848*, published by Revue Naše Slovensko, the organ of Československá jednota between 1907 and 1910.

<sup>59</sup> (Prvním naším buditelem je Čech, ale narozený v Uhrách). Masaryk (1990a:55, 56).

<sup>60</sup> (Jen považme, jak v našem vědomí jsou rozdělení Čechy, Morava, i Slezsko a dokonce i Slovensko. Dva miliony Čechů je v uherském království! [...] nevzdáme se přece jedné třetiny svého národa. Pokud se nám může ztratit jedna duše, není to v pořádku. A tu běží o dva miliony duší, které jsou nám cizí. Naše cítění národnostní není ještě *dovršeno*. Musíme ještě více *sloučit jednotlivé kmeny a síly* než doposud.) T.G. Masaryk: *Ideály humanitní. Problém malého národa. Demokratism v politice* (1990b:87). (Emphasis in original.)

<sup>61</sup> Quoted in H. Gordon Skilling: *T.G. Masaryk: Against the current, 1882–1914* (1994:70).

Slovak identity was far more diffuse, but also more popularly oriented from the start because of the lack of a separate political or "noble" nation. The feeling of "other-ness" was linked to culture and origin rather than to history, which the Slovaks shared with the other peoples of Hungary. The cultivation of the St. István tradition and the invention of Slovak kings in the early days of the revival may be interpreted as an attempt at establishing Slovak historical rights. The Slav idea was far more central than in the Czech case, as it was used to legitimize the codification of Slovak and served as a bridge between the two currents.

The picture of Czech and Slovak national character painted during the first part of both national awakenings was generally a positive one, based on the stereotype of the mild Slavs: They were merry, mild and agreeable, pious, industrious, peaceful and dove-like, born democrats. All this had been perverted by the Germans, who were aggressive and undemocratic – every bit what the Slavs were not. In the Czech case, the Germans commanded the stage alone in the role as enemy of the nation or "the important other"; in the Slovak case, they shared it with the Magyars and the Ottoman Turks. In the latter half of the 19th century, the old virtues of the Czech character were questioned, with an emphasis on negative features. Havlíček started this trend, and Masaryk and other "realists" at the Czech university followed suit.

When nationhood was extended to the masses and the language-based concept of nation replaced the former "noble nation", the understanding of Czech identity changed, through a shift in emphasis from history and territory to culture and language. At the same time, the Czech nation moved from being a noble to a plebeian nation, excluding in phase B most of those who populated the political nation at the inception of phase A. The German-speaking nobility became demonized and excluded, the Czech-speaking masses were praised and included in the new picture. History and national character were reinterpreted to fit this revised conception of nationhood.

The idea of the peasant as the core of the nation partly followed from the existing social structure. The great majority of the people were peasants at the time when the linguistic and popular conception of nationhood was gaining ground, and their subjugated position was parallel to the political subjugation of the subject nations in the Austro-Hungarian empire. During this period, the idea of the Czech peasant as the bearer of national identity through the period of darkness (*temno*) became common. In the words of J.V. Polišenský: "While the renegades within the class of the nobility were rapidly losing contact with the nation [...], *the people remained unbroken* by misery and terror. At that time [during the *temno*] the character of the Czech nation as it is today was being formed. A united whole, popular and democratic in expression, anti-dynastic and rebellious in spirit" (my emphasis).<sup>62</sup> However, the Czech and Slovak need to present themselves as "civilized" compared to the most important "others" suggests that the image of the popular, small nation was not unambiguous. Moreover, when the Czechs monopolized Bohemian/Czech identity after 1848, they also monopolized the historical right to the territory of the Czech crown, regardless of its national composition.

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<sup>62</sup> J.V. Polišenský: *History of Czechoslovakia in outline* (1991:68). The book was originally published in 1947.

In the Slovak case, the effect of the linguistic nation concept was, at least initially, to deepen the split within Slovak patriotic intelligentsia. A Slovak-Catholic current adhering to a Slovak literary language opposed a Czechoslovak-Protestant current adhering to a Czech literary language – and, by implication, a Czechoslovak tribe of the Slav nation. A side effect was to associate Slovak with Catholic, at a time when anti-clericalism (in the sense of anti-Catholicism) was beginning to become a part of Czech self-understanding.

A Slovak national identity associated with language and people became firmly established only after the second codification of Slovak in the 1840s. This is also when the idea of a Slav nation was relegated as secondary to national interests. The religious connection survived, in the notion of the pious character of the Slovak, and Kollár's image of the mild, kind, peaceful, pure Slav character of the Slovaks was retained. In the Slovak case, the phase of agitation started before national identity had been clearly defined, in a situation where two national ideologies coexisted, and it succeeded only after the two currents merged. Had it been successful before 1840, the Slovak Protestants might have come to define themselves as Czechs.

Our discussion has also shown that the idea of the Czechs and Slovaks as one nation had historical roots in the national revivals of the Czechs and Slovaks. Until the second codification of Slovak, Czechoslovak reciprocity had implied cultural as well as linguistic unity. After the turn of the century, it survived only in a diluted form (divorced from the notion of one literary language), but it could nevertheless be used as a point of departure for the formulation of a Czechoslovakist national ideology during and after the First World War. The Czechoslovak strand in the Czech and Slovak revivals was thus, on the one hand, a resource, because it provided Official Czechoslovakism with a historical basis.

On the other hand, it also posed a few problems. For one thing, there was an inherent duplicity in this historical heritage, in the sense that Czech and Slovak conceptions of Czechoslovak reciprocity differed from the very beginning. The Czech awakeners tended to regard the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation, and Slovak as a Czech dialect. The Slovak conception was more that of a Czechoslovak tribe of a larger Slav nation, where the Czechs and Slovaks were more equal. Second, although the notion of Czechoslovak reciprocity no longer implied a shared literary language, it was still based on a cultural nation concept. This at least potentially restricted the range of features that could be employed to define Czechoslovak nationhood.

Finally, when efforts to advance a Czechoslovak nation project started, the contents of Czech and Slovak identity had already been formulated. An important question is to what extent this proposed Czechoslovak identity ran counter to the existing Czech and Slovak identities. I will return to this in Chapter Ten.

PART THREE  

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THE ANALYSIS

## *Introduction*

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*Czechoslovakia is a renewal of the former Czech (and Great Moravian)  
state (...) Czechs and Slovaks are one nation and have one language.*

**Tomáš G. Masaryk, 1923<sup>1</sup>**

Now that I have provided the theoretical framework and the historical context for the analysis, it is time to turn to the primary objective of the study, which is to explain why the Czechoslovak nation project failed, and why the national conflict level between the Czechs and Slovaks increased during the First Republic. A secondary objective is to shed light on what motivated the leading politicians on either side, with special focus on why consecutive Czechoslovak governments kept insisting on a unitary Czechoslovak nation and state.

The nationality policy framework that was developed in Chapter Four is used as a structuring device for the remainder of the narrative. I first introduced a divide between a *symbolic* and a *practical* level. At both levels, national demands are met with certain nationality policies, which may be accommodating, repressive or neutral (non-discrimination, equality on an individual basis regardless of nationality). The practical level was then subdivided into a *political*, a *cultural* and an *economic* dimension.

In the First Republic, there was a struggle at a *symbolic* level about national identity between Czech and Slovak proponents of Czechoslovakism and *Slovak* autonomists, whereas among *Czechs* there was hardly any opposition to Czechoslovakism.<sup>2</sup> It has been argued that in the inter-war era the term *Čechoslovakismus* was used mainly by those who were opposed to it, and then in a pejorative sense.<sup>3</sup> As we shall see, this is not entirely true, and no such thing is implied on my part.

The analysis has been divided in two: Chapter Nine seeks to establish to what extent Czechoslovakism was advocated in various official documents, statistics, school textbooks, etc., including wartime documents. Inevitably, the chapter also addresses the contents of the proposed Czechoslovak national identity. Since Masaryk's most important contribution was to lay the foundation for the Czechoslovakist ideology during the First World War, I have chosen to confine the presentation of his views mostly to this chapter.

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<sup>1</sup> (Československo je obnovením bývalého českého (a velkomoravského) státu; [...] Češi a Slováci jsou jeden národ a mají jeden jazyk.) From *Slované po válce* (1923), excerpt in T.G. Masaryk: *Slovanské problémy* (1928:13).

<sup>2</sup> Instead there was an internal debate about the contents of Czech identity and the meaning of Czech history. I have decided to leave this out, because it had very little bearing on Czecho-Slovak relations. A collection of contributions to the debate up to 1939 may be found in Miloš Havelka (ed.): *Spor o smysl českých dějin* (1995).

<sup>3</sup> See Jan Rychlík: Slovensko-české vztahy z české perspektivy, in *Idea Československa a střední Evropa* (1994:112).



I have tried to distinguish between this officially endorsed Czechoslovakism and the identity struggle that was played out in public. This is the topic of Chapter Ten, where the primary objective is to establish to what extent the Czechoslovakist ideology included elements that may have worked against its acceptance. The focus is on how the two sides argued in order to substantiate their respective nation projects, with special emphasis on how they interpreted history. This chapter also includes a presentation of Slovak symbolic demands in the Parliament, and the main lines of argument in the Parliament. Part of the reason why the Czechoslovak nation project failed is indicated already in Chapter Ten.

Before turning to Official Czechoslovakism, however, I need to address the question of *agency*. This is done in Chapter Eight. Who were the men (and they were only men) who voiced national demands on behalf of the Slovaks, and who were the members of the government coalition that formulated the nationality policies of the First Republic? In this context, I have found it necessary to give an overview of the political system of the first republic, including major Czechoslovak parties and government coalitions.

At a *practical* level, the political lines of cleavage were less clear-cut. National demands were filed on behalf of the Slovaks (and to a much lesser extent the Czechs), not only by Slovak autonomists, but occasionally also by Slovak members of the government parties. The analysis of the dynamics between national demands and nationality policy is divided into three, according to dimension. Chapter Eleven covers the *cultural* dimension, with special emphasis on how the most salient demands were related to the contents of Slovak nationhood; Chapter Twelve covers the *economic* dimension and Chapter Thirteen covers the *political* dimension.

There is one exception: Slovak representation in the Parliament and government coalitions will be treated in Chapter Eight, since this issue was intimately related to the character of the political system. Grievances concerning representation and civic and individual political rights are presented in Chapter Thirteen, but the main focus of this chapter is on the admittedly highly unequal "tug-of-war" between Czechoslovak centralists and Slovak autonomists over the distribution of power and the political-administrative organization of the state.

Central questions that are asked are whether the *composition* of the national demands changed over time, to what extent the various demands were *accommodated*, why/why not, and to what extent there was a *reality* behind the demands in the sense that they corresponded to nationally relevant conflicts. In Chapter Twelve an additional question is posed: to what extent did economic complaints concern issues outside government control? The primary objective of Chapters Eleven through Thirteen is to identify the foundations of the heightened level of national conflict between Czechs and Slovaks during the first republic.

The matter of what motivated the politicians on either side is addressed – partly in Chapter Nine, partly in Chapter Ten, and partly through an analysis of the main arguments in favor of and against autonomy in Chapter Thirteen.

# *Eight*

## *Czech and Slovak political elite*

*Those who formulated national demands, expressed what they regarded as (...) the interests of all the members of the "nation".*

**Miroslav Hroch**<sup>1</sup>

**B**efore we start on the analysis, the question of *agency* must be addressed. The objective of this chapter is to present the men who formulated national demands on behalf of the Slovak (or to a far lesser extent the Czech) nation, and those who formulated the government nationality policy. Nearly all the individuals in question were men, and they belonged to a political and/or intellectual elite. I begin with an overview of the political system of the First Republic, including an outline of the Constitution and the election system. Then I will present the major Czechoslovak parties, the government coalitions, and two extra-Parliamentary groups (the Pětka and the Hrad circle). Finally, the political elite of the First Republic will be described in terms of socio-economic status, age cohort and gender.

Practical *nationality policy* was the domain of the various ministers and the Cabinet as a whole. This means that the parties of the government coalitions had a more direct influence on its formulation than the opposition. A limited number of people (92 to be exact) were involved in the governments of the First Republic. An even more limited number held ministerial posts that were of any importance for the formulation and execution of the nationality policy, and the lives of these are generally well documented. For the most part, Slovak *national demands* were articulated in the Parliament by opposition parties. In addition, national demands were of course voiced through various other channels, notably the press and public rallies.

If we turn to the symbolic aspect of the struggle, we may note that *Official Czechoslovakism* was articulated not only by members of the government, but also by members of the coalition partners in the Parliament, by governmental agencies like the Bureau of Statistics, and in the education system. Masaryk and the independence movement abroad played an important part in its initial formulation. Likewise, arguments for a separate Slovak nation were presented by politicians as well as intellectuals, journalists and writers. Those who participated in the identity struggle or contributed to Czechoslovakism were a more amorphous group, consisting of scholars and textbook authors in addition to politicians, which means that a systematic presentation is difficult. The main emphasis of this chapter will be on the political elite: the Parliamentarians and Cabinet members.

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<sup>1</sup> (... ti, kdo formulovali národní požadavky, vyjadřovali v nich to, co považovali [...] za zájem všech příslušníků skupiny "národ".) M. Hroch: *V národním zájmu* (1996b:3).

### *A constitutional democracy*

Czechoslovakia was from the beginning a democracy, although the national minorities were not represented in the Parliament until after the first election in 1920. The provisional constitution of November 13th, 1918, promulgated by the Czechoslovak National Committee, established a 256-member national assembly as the supreme political organ.<sup>2</sup> Of the 254 seats that were filled, 213 represented Czech parties – of these 54 were former *Reichsrat* deputies. The remainder were appointed according to a key based on the showing in the last election to the *Reichsrat*. Since Juriga was the only Slovak in the Hungarian Parliament, the rest of the Slovak Club had to be co-opted – or rather hand-picked by Vavro Šrobár. Five of the 41 were former Hungarian deputies: Juriga, Metód Bella, Pavel Blaho, Milan Hodža, and Milan Ivanka. The Slovaks were numerically under-represented from the outset, but this was in part rectified by the appointment of 14 more Slovaks according to a law of March 11th, 1919.

This Revolutionary Parliament consisting only of Czechs and Slovaks provided the future framework for the Czechoslovak state though the constitution of February 29th, 1920. The Constitution stated that the Czechoslovak state was to be a democratic republic, the head of which should be an elected president (§ 2), elected for a seven-year term. The territory of the republic should form a united and indivisible unit, and the borders might be altered only by constitutional law (§3). Legislative power was placed in the hands of a Parliament consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, located in Prague (§6). At the same time, the former Moravian and Bohemian Diets were abolished (§ 7). This also meant that the political system that was established was centralized to Prague.

The Senate had 150 members and the Chamber of Deputies 300, elected for eight- and six-year terms, respectively. Since the president made use of the right given to him (§31) to dissolve the Parliament, the election periods were actually shorter. All citizens, male and female, were eligible to vote, above the age of 21 for the Chamber of Deputies (*sněmovna*) and above the age of 26 for the Senate. Deputies and senators were to be elected according to a general, equal, direct, and secret ballot, on the basis of proportional representation.

Section V in the Constitution established full civil rights, including personal freedom and freedom of property, freedom of the press and the right of free assembly and association, right of petition, postal inviolability, liberty of instruction and conscience and liberty of expression for all residents of the republic (§ 106–125). The Constitution also had a special section VI devoted to the protection of national, religious and racial minorities, according to which all citizens of the Czechoslovak republic were equal before the law and enjoyed equal civic and political rights regardless of race, language or religion (§ 128).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Zákon ze dne 13. listopadu 1918 o prozatímní ústavě in *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1918).

<sup>3</sup> The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic exists in an English version published by the Czechoslovak Government Information Service (1944). Another English version may be found in Joseph A. Mikuš: *Slovakia. A political and constitutional history (with documents)* (1995:170-198). Otherwise, see Zákon číslo 121. ze dne 29. února 1920, kterým se uvozuje ústavní listina československé republiky, in *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920).

A separate language act in pursuance of § 129 was included in the Constitutional charter, stating in the first article that "the Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the Republic." Finally, a separate act establishing 22 counties (župy) was debated and adopted on the same day as the Constitution. These counties were to replace the old historical lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) and the existing counties in Slovakia. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to the east became a separate county. The Constitution thus not only provided the democratic framework within which national demands could be raised, it also had a direct bearing on Czecho-Slovak relations within the political and cultural dimensions. Combined with the county act, the Constitution regulated the distribution of decision-making power between central and regional levels, and combined with the special Language Act it regulated the language rights of the various national groups in the state. I will return to the parliamentary debate over these aspects of the Constitution in Chapters Eleven and Thirteen.

Before we turn to the Czechoslovak party system, which was a central part of the above mentioned framework, a few words about the proportional election system are in order. For the elections, the country was divided into 23 election districts (Chamber of Deputies) and 13 election districts (the Senate). Voters could not influence the ranking of the candidates set up by the parties (the system of "obligatory candidate lists"). Mandates were distributed in three rounds according to a proportional formula (the Hare method), which ensured a certain over-representation of the large parties. Since Czechoslovak parties dominated among the larger parties, they were slightly over-represented. In 1920, for example, Czechoslovak parties got 68.6 percent of the vote and 70.8 percent of the mandates in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>4</sup>

### ***Eight major Czechoslovak political parties***

Due to the diverging political conditions in the two parts of Austria-Hungary, the party systems of the Czechs and Slovaks differed considerably. Under Austrian Constitutionalism, a differentiated political system had developed in the Czech lands, whereas Slovak political development had been held back by the Magyarization policy of the Hungarian government, including their policy of election fraud and intimidation (see Chapter Five). The Slovak National Party was thus the only Slovak party.

After 1918, Czech parties extended their party organizations and changed their names to "Czechoslovak" in order to incorporate the Slovak electorate. In terms of support and membership, however, the parties became Czecho-Slovak to varying degrees. The parties that could appeal to hitherto non-organized Slovak political currents (the Agrarians and the Social Democrats) received the strongest Slovak support. Otherwise, the party system of the first Czechoslovak republic was organized along national lines, meaning that the national minorities had their own parties. The one major exception to this was the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which organized Communists of all national backgrounds.

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<sup>4</sup> See *Volby do národního shromáždění v dubnu roku 1920* (1922:19).

In the first election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1920, 22 parties presented candidates, and half were Czechoslovak. In the second election in 1925, the number had increased to 29 (12 Czechoslovak). Then the number was reduced to 19 parties in 1929, (10 Czechoslovak), and finally to 16 (11 Czechoslovak) in 1935. The number of parties running for the Senate was lower, especially in the first two elections – 17 in 1920, 23 in 1925, 18 in 1929, and 15 in 1935. Because of this fragmented party system, no single party dominated Czechoslovak politics during the First Republic. The normal was one of broad coalition governments, first of Czechoslovak parties only, later also including the so-called activist German parties. Magyar parties were never represented in the government, neither were the Communists.

Of the Czechoslovak parties, there were eight (including the Communist Party) parties of any stature, i.e. parties that polled well enough to be represented in both chambers and/or were part of the coalition governments that were so typical of the inter-war period.

The largest party in terms of mandates in the *Reichsrat* and thus in the Revolutionary Parliament from 1918 was the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, reorganized as the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside in 1919. After the fusion with the Slovak Agrarian Party in 1922, the party took the official name the Republican Agrarian and Smallholders' Party, but it was generally referred to as the Agrarian Party (Agr.). It was the strongest party in all elections but the first; it took part in all governments, and held the post of Prime Minister in all governments but one from 1922–38. Relatively speaking, it actually polled better in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. (See table 2.) The chairmen of the party were Antonín Švehla (1919–33) and Rudolf Beran (1933–38). The first and only Slovak prime minister, Milan Hodža (1935–38) came from this party. He was one of the most influential Slovak politicians, and the longest-serving Slovak minister.

The largest party in terms of votes in the last *Reichsrat* election was the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and this party also won the election of 1920 as the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party (ČSD). The left wing, led by Bohumír Šmeral, formed the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1921, thereby weakening the party permanently, especially in Slovakia. The Social Democrats participated in most governments during the First Republic, apart from the period 1926–29. Chairmen were Antonín Němec (to 1924), and Antonín Hampl (1924–38). Two of the most profiled Slovak politicians of the Czechoslovakist brand, Ivan Dérer and Ivan Markovič, were elected on this party's ballot.

The Communist Party (KSČ) became the second largest party in the elections of 1925, outdone only by the Agrarians. After the Moscow faction gained the upper hand in 1929, it lost quite a few members and supporters, but remained among the three or four strongest parties in the following elections. After the party had been founded, a number of persons served as chairman and/or general secretary, including Bohumil Jílek (general secretary 1921–22, 1925–29), Antonín Zápotocký (general secretary 1923–25), Alois Muna (chairman 1923–24), Josef Haken (chairman 1925–27). After 1929 the party was firmly in the hands of Klement Gottwald and the pro-Bolshevik faction. The party was in permanent opposition, and had no political power. The policy towards the national question varied over time.

**Table 2. Election results for Czechoslovak parties, 1920–35 <sup>5</sup>**

Year	Agr.		ČSD		ČSL		ČS		ČND <sup>6</sup>		ČSŽ		HSL'S <sup>7</sup>		KSČ
Bohemia															
1920	424,236	19.0	762,092	34.2	191,844	8.6	381,367	17.1	298,054	13.4	80,757	3.6	–	–	–
1925	488,267	23.4	386,440	18.6	296,756	14.2	435,761	20.9	213,843	10.3	194,162	9.3	–	–	468,593
1929	524,578	22.9	535,358	23.4	255,877	11.2	535,740	23.4	200,995	8.8	176,188	7.7	962	0.0	398,260
1935	541,578	–	549,578	–	255,395	–	494,478	–	325,916	–	274,673	–	–	–	384,756
Moravia															
1920	179,382	17.8	318,087	31.6	272,495	27.1	89,890	8.9	89,498	8.9	42,056	4.2	–	–	–
1925	199,721	19.2	166,145	16.0	368,905	35.4	120,909	11.6	42,730	4.1	80,320	7.7	–	–	191,851
1929	224,522	19.4	269,674	23.3	321,936	27.8	177,595	15.4	56,198	4.9	77,539	6.7	20,406	1.8	162,136
1935	287,567	–	269,089	–	315,567	–	198,197	–	77,995	–	122,703	–	28,588	–	174,574
Slovakia															
1920	242,045	23.8	510,341	50.2	–	–	29,564	2.9	–	–	–	–	235,389	23.1	–
1925	248,034	26.4	60,636	6.5	18,036	1.9	36,909	3.9	24,954	2.7	11,576	1.2	489,111	52.1	198,111
1929	278,979	28.2	135,506	13.7	36,548	3.7	43,968	4.4	53,745	5.4	30,134	3.0	403,683	40.8	152,242
1935	286,739	–	184,389	–	37,515	–	51,924	–	25,490	–	41,996	–	489,641	–	210,765
Total <sup>8</sup>															
1920	845,663 (40)	19.9	1,590,520 (74)	37.4	699,728 (33)	16.4	500,821 (24)	11.8	387,552 (19)	9.1	122,813 (6)	2.9	–	–	–
1925	970,940 (45)	23.4	631,403 (29)	15.2	691,095 (31)	16.7	609,153 (28)	14.7	284,601 (13)	6.9	286,058 (13)	6.9	489,111 (23)	11.8	934,223 (41)
1929	1,105,498 (46)	24.0	963,462 (39)	20.9	623,340 (25)	13.5	767,328 (32)	16.7	359,547 (15)	7.8	291,209 (12)	6.3	425,051 (19)	9.2	753,444 (30)
1935	1,176,628 (45)	–	1,032,773 (38)	–	615,804 (22)	–	755,872 (28)	–	458,351 (17)	–	448,049 (17)	–	564,273 (22)	–	849,495 (30)

Sources: *Statistická příručka republiky Československa* (1925: pp. 344 ff., 1928: pp. 254 ff., 1932: pp. 401 ff.), *Volby do národního shromáždění v dubnu roku 1920* (1922:70), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v listopadu 1925* (1926:19), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930:9, 21), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935* (1936:9, 20).

<sup>5</sup> Results for the Chamber of Deputies, in absolute numbers, percentage of Czechoslovak votes, and total number of mandates (in parenthesis). The Communist Party is not included in the percentage of Czechoslovak votes. Such figures are entirely lacking for 1935. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia is included in the total.

<sup>6</sup> The election results for 1935 are those of the National Unity (*Národní sjednocení*).

<sup>7</sup> The 1935 results are those of the Autonomist bloc (*Autonomistický blok*).

<sup>8</sup> The Czechoslovak and Slovak Agrarian parties, then not yet united, are counted together in the 1920 total. The Czechoslovak People's Party and the Slovak People's Party ran together in 1920. The total includes both parties. In addition, *Socialistická strana čsl. lidu pracujících* (a socialist party) got 58,580 votes and three mandates in 1920, *Liga proti vázaným kandidátním listinám* (a non-socialist party) got 70,857 votes and three mandates in 1929, and *Národní obec fašistická* (a fascist party) got 167,433 votes and six mandates in 1935.

The Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL), founded in 1919, took up the heritage of the pre-war Catholic parties. In the first election, it collaborated with the Slovak People's Party; later it ran independently in Slovakia, but never gained any real foothold there. It was consistently strongest in Moravia, where it was the largest party in three of four elections. Jan Šrámek, a Moravian, was chairman of the party (1919–38), and also represented the party in all governments from 1922 to 1938. The only Slovak of any prominence was Martin Mičura, who was the sole Slovak deputy (1925–38), and chairman of the Slovak branch from 1925.

The Czech National Social Party was renamed the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (ČS) at the end of the war, and became the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party in 1926 (not to be confused with German National Socialism, or Nazism). In addition to the former Czech National Social Party, the larger part of the Progressive Party (Masaryk's old party) joined, as did a group of Czech anarchists led by Bohumil Vrbenský. The party participated in most governments during the First Republic. Václav Jaroslav Klobáček was the chairman throughout this period (1918–38). Edvard Beneš was a member from 1923 to 1935, although he gave up his mandate on Masaryk's advice in order to be able to continue as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the non-socialist coalition in 1926–29.<sup>9</sup> The party never gained any large following in Slovakia, but was represented in the Chamber of Deputies by the Slovaks Igor Hrušovský (1919–36) and Emil Boleslav Lukáč (1936–39), and the Czech Vladimír Polívka (1929–38). In the Senate the Czech Albert Milota (1929–38) represented Slovakia.

The Czechoslovak National Democratic Party (ČND), founded in 1919, was formed from the remnants of the Old Czech and Young Czech Party, the Constitutional Progressive Party, the Moravian Populist Party and the smaller part of the Progressive Party. It had the first prime minister, Karel Kramář, who also served as chairman of the party (1918–35). The party enjoyed an influence that by far exceeded its size, and was represented in all governments from 1922–1934. Milan Ivanka (1925–34) was the Slovak deputy of the party, but he left when the National Democrats, the National League and the National Front united in the National Unity in 1934. Kramář continued as chairman until his death in 1937. In 1937 the National League went independent again, and the rest of the National Unity reorganized as the Czechoslovak National Democrats and joined the government in March 1938.

The Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party (ČSŽ), founded in 1919, had a rather weak start, but had by the election of 1925 reached the size of the National Democrats, although it never equaled that party in influence. It was represented in the government coalition in the periods 1925–32 and again in 1935–38, always in positions related to economic affairs (public works, railways, industry and trade). Chairmen were František Horák (to 1930) and Josef Václav Najman (from 1930). From Slovakia the party was represented in the Chamber of Deputies by Ján Líška (1929–38) and in the Senate by Bohuš Kianička (1925–38).

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<sup>9</sup> See Masaryk's letter to Beneš in Jaroslav Pecháček: *Masaryk – Beneš – Hrad* (1996:39).

The Slovak National Party (SNS) was the only properly organized Slovak party before the war, but within this party several currents had developed in opposition to the conservative leadership in Martin. The two most important were the Hlasist faction and a Catholic wing. Some of the former helped establish the National Republican Peasant's Party in 1919 (Milan Hodža, Pavel Blaho, Vavro Šrobár). Before the election of 1920 it was re-united with the Slovak National Party in the Slovak National and Peasant's Party. After a split in 1921, the agrarian wing joined the Czech agrarians in the Republican Agrarian and Smallholders' Party.

The Slovak National Party was reduced almost to oblivion in the First Republic, and managed to get into the Parliament only in collaboration with other parties. In the 1929 election the party collaborated with the Czechoslovak National Democrats, and, as a result, its chairman Martin Rázus was elected deputy. In 1935 the party joined the Autonomist bloc, and Rázus was re-elected. The Slovak National Party organized the small autonomist wing among the Protestants. Chairmen were Matúš Dula (1914–21), Emil Stodola (1921–22), G.A. Bežo (1922–25), Jur Janoška (1925–29), Martin Rázus (1929–37) and Ján Pauliny-Tóth (1937–38).

The Catholic wing of the national movement (Andrej Hlinka, Ferdinand Juriga) formed the Slovak People's Party in 1913, but the party did not have its own program until after the war. Technically, it broke off from the Hungarian Catholic People's Party (*Néppárt*). The Slovak People's Party (of Hlinka from 1925, HSL'S) was the largest party in Slovakia in three of four elections. Only in the first election (1920) when it ran together with the Czechoslovak People's Party, was it outdone by two other parties, the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party. A member of the party was called a "ľudák" (after *ľudová strana*) and the plural "ľudáci" referred to the party as a whole. I have Anglicized it to *ľudáks*.

The party was an exclusively Slovak phenomenon; in Bohemia it ran only once, in 1929, with disastrous results (962 votes!), in Moravia it ran in the last two elections. In 1929, it cooperated with Antonín Čuřík, a sworn enemy of Šrámek, who gained a mandate in Moravia with ľudák help. In the 1935 election, the ľudáks collaborated with the Slovak National Party and the Polish and Ruthenian nationalists in the Autonomist bloc. The party was constantly in opposition, apart from a brief period (1927–29). Andrej Hlinka was party chairman from its founding in 1913 until his death in 1938, when he was succeeded by Jozef Tiso.

Andrej Hlinka, Jozef Buday, Štefan Onderčo and Jozef Sivák were members of the Slovak Club in the Revolutionary Parliament and remained influential. Ferdinand Juriga and Florián Tománek played important roles until their exclusion in 1929 because of disloyalty in the aftermath of the Tuka trial.<sup>10</sup> Among the older generation of ľudáks were also Jozef Tiso, Marek Gažík, Ignác Grebáč-Orlov, Anton Hancko, Ľudovít Labaj, Štefan Polyak – and Pavol Macháček, who belonged to the Juriga wing. Many of the older generation were clergymen: Hlinka, Juriga, Tománek, Macháček, Buday, Tiso, Onderčo, Šalát and Grebáč-Orlov.

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<sup>10</sup> Vojtech Tuka was a Magyarone who represented the Slovak People's Party in the Parliament (1925-29). He was prosecuted for espionage for Hungary, and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. See also Chapter Thirteen.



The young Slovak intelligentsia who joined the party in the 1930s was more secular and nationalist oriented. A radical group formed around the journal *Nástup*, including Alexandr (Šaňo) Mach, and the Ďurčanský brothers (Ján and Ferdinand), who flirted with fascism and were not averse to anti-democratic measures in the struggle for Slovak national rights. Two moderate men of the young generation were, however, more prominent: Karol Sidor, Hlinka's protégé and editor-in-chief of *Slovák* from 1931, and the secretary-general Martin Sokol (1927–38).

Although the young made inroads in the Ľudák press (including *Slovák*) and the party organization, the older, more moderate generation remained firmly in control of the parliamentary club, and thus stayed in power. And despite various faction struggles, the Slovak People's Party stands out as the main carrier of Slovak national demands throughout the entire First Republic. The Ľudáks claimed to speak not only on behalf of their voters, but on behalf of the entire Slovak nation, as the only "all-national party, embracing all strands of the nation".<sup>11</sup> This claim was of course disputed by the other parties. Being in permanent opposition to the government coalition (apart from the brief period from 1927 to 1929), the Ľudáks had very little leverage on their own. This did not stop them from complaining of the wrongs being done to the Slovaks in a long series of interpellations in the Parliament.

In terms of political ideology, the Czechoslovak Social Democrats<sup>12</sup> and the Czechoslovak National Socialists were on the socialist side of the spectrum. The latter was more nationally oriented (Czech), and organized the lower middle class. The Agrarian Party was a classical peasants' party with a pragmatic outlook, concerned with the interests of the farmers and the countryside. Two parties may be termed bourgeois or liberal – the Czechoslovak National Democrats and the Czechoslovak Small Trader's Party, the former representing tradesmen, merchants and a considerable number of public officials and employees, the latter representing the middle classes. Apart from the National Socialists, the National Democrats were the most Czech oriented – many would say Czech nationalist – of the parties. Finally, the Czechoslovak and the Slovak People's Parties may be termed Catholic Conservative parties, while the Slovak National Party was a bourgeois-conservative party.

The main divide between the Slovak National Party and the Slovak People's Party was, as mentioned, confession. In national terms, the difference between their programs was not very large. The parties often took joint action when Slovak interests were at stake, and sometimes even with members of the government parties.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> (Ľudová strana čo všenárodná strana zahrňuje v sebe všetky vrstvy národa). Tiso in *Slovák týždenník* no. 3a, 20.1.1924:1.

<sup>12</sup> The Slovak Social Democratic current was organized as a part of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party before the war, and did not organize independently during the First Republic.

<sup>13</sup> On Czech and Slovak parties, see e.g. J. Chmelař: *Political parties in Czechoslovakia* (1926), C. Hoch: *Political parties in Czechoslovakia* (1936), E. Lipták (ed): *Politické strany na Slovensku 1860-1989* (1992), J. Felak: "At the price of the republic". *Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1929-38* (1994), F. Klátil: *Republika nad stranami. O vzniku a vývoji Československé strany národně socialistické (1897-1948)* (1992:pp. 125 ff.). Short entries on parties and persons may be found in J. Tomeš: *Slovník k politickým dějinám Československa* (1994), *Kto bol kto za I. ČSR* (1993), *Slovakia and the Slovaks. A concise encyclopedia* (1994), *Kdo byl kdo v našich dějinách ve 20. století* (1994), O. Krejčí: *Knihy o volbách* (1994).

### *Slovak political representation*

Before turning to the Czechoslovak governments, let us look at what consequences the shared party system had for Slovak representation in the Parliament. Official figures distinguishing between Czechs and Slovak deputies only existed for the period 1925–29,<sup>14</sup> and the other sources I found were contradictory. I thus ended up going through the index of the stenographic notes of the Parliament proceedings, meticulously counting those who spoke Slovak. The result of this time-consuming operation (given below) was a lower number of Slovaks than given in any of the sources, including the official parliamentary source.<sup>15</sup>

**Table 3: National distribution of mandates, Chamber of Deputies**

Nationality	census data		1920		1925		1929		1935	
	1921	1930	deputies	percent	Deputies	percent	deputies	percent	deputies	percent
"Czechoslovak"	65.5	66.9	202	68.7	207	69.0	208	69.3	210	70.0
– Czech	50.8	51.1	160	54.4	161	53.7	165	55.0	167	55.7
– Slovak	14.7	15.8	42	14.3	46	15.3	43	14.3	43	14.3
German	23.3	22.3	73	24.8	75	25.0	73	24.3	71	23.6
Magyar	5.6	4.8	9	3.1	10	3.3	8	2.6	11	3.7
Other	5.6	6.0	10	3.4	8	2.6	11	3.7	8	2.6
Total	100	100	294	100	300	100	300	100	300	100

Sources: Oskar Krejčf: *Kniha o volbách* (1994:137), except the division between Czech and Slovak deputies, which is my own compilations, based on *Index k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích Poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé*, I–IV volební období (1927, 1929, 1935, 1950). Census data are from *Scítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I (1924:60), and *Scítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934:46, 47).

While the Slovaks were generally under-represented, the Czechs were over-represented during the entire First Republic. There are two main reasons for the low number of Slovak deputies. First, while the mandates were geographically distributed in round one, the whole country was one election district in round two and three. It was thus possible to transfer votes from one election district or region in order to get a mandate in another election district or region, which worked against Slovakia. The second and most important reason was that several of the deputies of Czechoslovak parties representing Slovakia proved to be Czechs or even Magyars, while no Slovak represented Bohemia or Moravia.

<sup>14</sup> See *Národní shromáždění republiky československé v prvním desetiletí* (1928:1104).

<sup>15</sup> The discrepancy between my figure and the official figure for 1925 (46 compared to 47) may be due to the fact that I have counted the Communist István (Štefan) Major as a Magyar, because he spoke Magyar in the Parliament. He spoke Slovak in the next period and may thus be an example of a Slovak Magyarone with changing allegiance. The over-representation of the Germans and the under-representation of the rest of the minorities in the Parliament can mostly be attributed to the fact that the election system favored large parties.

The table below shows the number of Slovak deputies representing Czechoslovak parties, their share of the deputies, and the share of the votes obtained by those parties in Slovakia. If the major Czechoslovak parties deprived the Slovaks of mandates in round two and three, the percentage in column 3 should be higher than the percentage in column 2. The discrepancy between column 2 and 3 is largest for socialist parties.

**Table 4: Slovak deputies in relation to votes cast in Slovakia**

(See legend below)	1920 <sup>16</sup>			1925			1929 <sup>17</sup>			1936 <sup>18</sup>		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Slovak People's Party	12	100	100	23	100	100	18	94.7	95.0	20	90.9	86.8
Agrarian Party	12	30.0	28.6	12	26.7	25.5	12	26.1	25.2	10	22.2	24.4
Czechosl. Social Democrats	17	23.0	32.0	2	6.9	9.6	4	10.3	14.1	5	13.6	17.8
Czechosl. People's Party	–	–	–	1	3.2	2.6	1	4.0	5.9	1	4.5	6.1
Czechosl. national Socialists	1	4.2	5.9	1	3.6	6.1	1	3.1	5.7	1	3.6	6.9
Czechosl. national Democrats	–	–	–	1	7.7	8.8	2	13.3	14.9	0	0	5.6
Czechosl. Small Traders	–	–	–	0	0	4.0	1	8.3	10.3	1	5.9	9.3
Communist Party	–	–	–	6	14.6	21.2	4	13.3	20.2	5	16.6	24.8
Slovak total	42	21.1	24.2	46	20.6	22.2	43	19.7	21.2	43	19.6	22.5

Legend: 1. Number of Slovak deputies. 2. Slovak deputies in percentage of the total number of deputies for the party. 3. Slovakia's percentage of the total number of votes cast for the party.

Sources: My own compilations based on the total number of mandates and votes cast in Table 2, *Volby do národního shromáždění v dubnu roku 1920* (1922:70), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v listopadu 1925* (1926:19), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930:21), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935* (1936:20), and the same sources as mentioned in Table 3.

The problem with using votes cast for the parties in Slovakia as a basis of comparison is that these figures may include voters of other nationalities. This is especially a problem in the case of the Communist Party, which was an explicitly multi-national party. In 1925, 22 of the 41 Communist deputies in Czechoslovakia as a whole were Czechs, six were Slovaks, three were Magyars (including Major), seven were Germans, two were Ruthenians and there was one Pole. In 1929, there were seventeen Czechs, four Slovaks (including Major), two Magyars, six Germans and one Pole. In 1935, there were sixteen Czechs, five Slovaks, one Magyar, five Germans, two Ruthenians and one Pole.<sup>19</sup> Considering the multinational character of the party, it is not surprising that Slovak representation does not equal Slovakia's share of the votes cast.

<sup>16</sup> There were a total of 48 deputies elected from Slovakia on the ballot of Czechoslovak parties. 23 represented the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, but among these only 17 were Slovaks, while there were one Magyar (Géza Borovszky) and five Czechs (Václav Barták, Jiří Krejčí, Josef Kříž, Anna Sychravová and Heřman Tausík).

<sup>17</sup> The National Democrats and the Slovak National party got a mandate each by collaborating in 1929. In addition to one Slovak deputy, the Czechoslovak National Socialists were represented from Slovakia by the Czech Vladimír Polívka.

<sup>18</sup> The Ľudák figure includes Martin Rázus (SNS). The Czechoslovak Social democrats had 6 deputies – one was Magyar (Ignác Schulcz). The Agrarian Party had 12 deputies; one was Czech (Petr Židovský) and one Magyar (Štefan Csomor).

<sup>19</sup> The figures are my own compilation based on language as recorded in the Parliamentary proceedings.

The same applies to the Social Democrats in 1920, where 6 of the 23 deputies elected from Slovakia were either Czech (5) or Magyar (1), leaving only 17 Slovaks. In 1925 and 1929 only Slovak Social Democrats were elected from Slovakia, and the deprivation is thus real, especially in 1929. In 1935, one Magyar was elected in addition to the five Slovaks.

Another problem case is the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. Its Slovak division was founded by Czechs, its membership basis was Czech,<sup>20</sup> and it is likely that many of its voters in Slovakia were Czech, as well, considering that the party was always represented from the westernmost election districts, Trnava and Nové Zámky.<sup>21</sup> Also in this case, the table shows that the Slovaks were under-represented compared to Slovakia's share of the votes cast. The reason why is that a Czech (Vladimír Polívka) is not included among the Slovak deputies in the table. If he had been, the Slovaks would have been over-represented. Finally, the reason for the under-representation of Slovak Agrarians in 1935 is that two of the twelve deputies from Slovakia were Czech or Magyar. Otherwise, the Agrarians gave the Slovaks more deputies than they were entitled to in three of four periods, and in the case of some of the other parties, one deputy more would often mean over-representation of the Slovaks.

There is no doubt that there were fewer Slovak deputies than there could have been because of the shared party system. Another matter is to what extent they were free to promote Slovak interests. While ensuring a more proportional representation, the second and third rounds also implied an element of indirect election, because the ranking of the candidates during these rounds was determined by the party leadership.<sup>22</sup> This enhanced the power of that leadership and strengthened party discipline. More than a third of the mandates were in fact distributed in the second and third rounds. Once in office, deputies and senators were kept under tight rein by a system that allowed parties to deprive non-conforming party members of their mandates. This may have restricted the ability of Slovak members of the Czechoslovak parties to further Slovak interests in disagreement with their own parties.

### ***Czechoslovak governments***

In the twenty-year period the First Republic existed, there were seventeen governments, which means that on average the governments lasted a little over one year. Of these, all but two were composed of politicians, the remaining two being caretaker governments led by Jan Černý, in 1920 and 1926. The first of these caretaker governments lasted for a year, the second only seven months. These frequent changes of government during the first Czechoslovak republic leave an initial impression of low political stability.

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<sup>20</sup> See Ľubomír Lipták (ed.): *Politické strany na Slovensku 1860-1989* (1992:147), Ľubica Kázmerová: Československá strana národnosocialistická na Slovensku v rokoch 1919-1929, in: *Historický časopis* 1 (1993:50-59).

<sup>21</sup> According to Carol Skalnik Leff, the National Socialists never gained a foothold outside the resident Czech communities. See Leff: *National conflict in Czechoslovakia* (1988:57).

<sup>22</sup> For details of the election system of the First Republic, see Oskar Krejčí: *Kniha o volbách* (1994: pp. 134 ff., 319).

Two facts speak against this impression, however. First, the turnover of people did not correspond to the turnover of governments. A total of 92 persons (all men) participated in governments in the period, which means that each was on average a member of a little over three governments, lasting a little under four years. The impression of stability is strengthened if we take into consideration that 20 of the 92 were ministers for five years or more and seven were ministers for ten years or more. Moreover, 63 of the 92 were also members of Parliament, and the parliamentarians were over-represented among the longest-serving ministers.

Edvard Beneš had the record: he held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in all fifteen governments from 1918 to 1935, when he was elected president. Jan Šrámek, came out second, serving as minister in twelve governments for a total term of sixteen years and five months. Milan Hodža, the longest-serving Slovak, was a minister in eleven governments, for a total term of twelve years and ten months, the last three years as prime minister. The longest serving German was Franz Spina, member of nine governments, totaling eleven years and nine months. Of the 29 who were not members of Parliament, only seven served for two years or more, while sixteen were members of the caretaker governments of Jan Černý only, and held office for one year or less. The longest serving non-parliamentarians were Jan Černý and Jozef Kállay, with respectively seven years and five years. In view of this overall continuity of persons, the picture is rather one of stability than of flux. (See also Appendix B<sub>I</sub> and B<sub>II</sub>.)

Second, the various coalition governments were composed of very much the same Czechoslovak parties. Broad coalitions of bourgeois and socialist parties (and after 1926 the activist German parties) were the rule. The two Tusar cabinets (the red-green coalition, 1919–20) and the third Švehla cabinet and the first Udržal cabinet (the green-black or bourgeois coalition, 1926–29) provide the exceptions. Otherwise, the five major parties that gave name to the *Pětka* (group of five) were part of most governments. The original *Pětka* was composed of Antonín Švehla (Agrarians), leader of the group, Alois Rašín (National Democrats), Rudolf Bechyně (Social Democrats), Jiří Stříbrný (National Socialists) and Jan Šrámek (Czechoslovak People's Party). This extra-parliamentary group was formed during the first caretaker cabinet of Jan Černý in 1920, and was formally dissolved in 1926. It functioned as a coordinating organ between the caretaker government and the Parliament. According to Ferdinand Peroutka, the *Pětka* was the real government at the time.

After the demise of the Černý government, the *Pětka* continued to form broad compromises between the coalition partners on important issues. The *Pětka* was severely criticized because of its unconstitutional status and its secretive working style. According to Peroutka, the political leadership it provided was sorely needed; helping the Czechoslovak parties overcome their tradition of opposition against the government. Also attributed to the *Pětka* are the solid restraint displayed by the parties, the durability of the regime and the cultivating of the art of coalition compromise which characterized the first Czechoslovak republic.<sup>23</sup> All the members of the original *Pětka* became ministers in the first Švehla government.

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<sup>23</sup> (*Pětka* vládla, úřednický kabinet administroval). Ferdinand Peroutka: *Budování státu IV* (1991:1386, 1391, 1393).

Of the largest parties, the Agrarian party were represented in all political governments, and the Social Democrats and the National Socialists in all but the third Švehla cabinet and the first Udržal cabinet. The Czechoslovak People's Party was represented in all governments but the two Tusar cabinets, as were the National Democrats, but they went into opposition in 1934, after forming the *National Unity*. The Small Traders' Party was represented more unevenly. German activist parties after 1926 included a Social Democratic party, a Christian-Democratic and an Agrarian party, which was represented in all governments from 1926-1938.

There were clear fiefdoms in the government, including the staff of the bureaucracy. The office of Prime Minister, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior were Agrarian fiefs, the National Democrats often had the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Industry and Commerce, while the Socialist parties shared among themselves the posts of Minister of Social Affairs, Post and Telegraph, and most of the time Education, Supply, and Railways.

### ***Slovaks in government***

Throughout the period, a clear majority of the ministers were Czech. There were never more than three Slovaks at a time, and never more than three Germans (see table 5). Before the Germans started to participate in coalitions in 1926, the Slovaks were over-represented in four governments compared to their share of the total population, but not compared to their share of the Czech and Slovak population. The only time the Slovaks were represented according to their share of the Czech and Slovak population was during the two cabinets where Hlinka's Slovak People's Party took part (Švehla III and Udržal I – two years, nine months). The Slovaks were under-represented compared to their share of the population in all governments after 1929, and even more so than in the Chamber of Deputies. This probably simply reflects the fact that the Czechoslovak, centralist coalition parties had their strongholds in the Czech lands, while the opposition parties were stronger in Slovakia.

Apart from Milan R. Štefánik, who never took up any cabinet position, 13 Slovaks served as ministers. Five were Agrarians (Hodža, Slávik, Šrobár, Houdek, Štefánek), two were Social democrats (Dérér, Markovič), three represented the Slovak People's Party (Tiso, Gažík, Labaj), and the remaining three served as "non-political" ministers (Kállay, Mičura, Fajnor). Mičura later became a deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party (1925–38), Fajnor became chairman of the Czechoslovak National Democrats in Slovakia in 1922, while Kállay was chairman of the Slovak branch of the Agrarian Party in 1937–38.<sup>24</sup> The Slovak ministers were thus mainly Agrarians or Social Democrats. Two names stand out in terms of the total length of service: The Agrarian Milan Hodža (thirteen years, two months) and the Social Democrat Ivan Dérér (nine years, eleven months). Among the "non-political", Jozef Kállay served longest (four years and three months).

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<sup>24</sup> See Lipták (1992:189, 195), *Slovenský biografický slovník* (1986).

**Table 5: Slovaks in Czechoslovak governments 1918–38**

Government	Slovak ministers	Duration		Czechs		Slovaks		Germans	
		Y.	M.	absolute	percent	absolute	percent	absolute	percent
1. Kramář	Šrobár, Štefánik		8	15	88.2	2	11.8	–	
2. Tusar I	Šrobár, Hodža, Houdek <sup>25</sup>		10	14	87.5	2 (3)	12.5	–	
3. Tusar II	Šrobár, Dérer, Markovič		4	14	82.4	3	17.6	–	
4. Černý I	Mičura, Fajnor	1	0	14	87.5	2	12.5	–	
5. Beneš	Mičura, Šrobár, Dérer	1	0	12	80.0	3	20.0	–	
6. Švehla I	Markovič, Kállay, Hodža	3	2	14	82.4	3	17.6	–	
7. Švehla II	Kállay, Hodža, Dérer		3	14	82.4	3	17.6	–	
8. Černý II	Kállay, Slávik		7	11	84.6	2	15.4	–	
9. Švehla III	Hodža, Kállay, Gažík, Tiso <sup>26</sup>	2	3	11	68.7	3 (2)	18.8	2	12.5
10. Udržal I	Gažík, Labaj, Tiso, Hodža, Štefánek <sup>27</sup>		10	10	66.7	3	20.0	2	13.3
11. Udržal II	Dérer, Slávik	2	10	12	75.0	2	12.5	2	12.5
12. Malypetr	Dérer, Hodža	1	3	11	73.3	2	13.3	2	13.3
13. Malypetr	Dérer, Hodža	1	4	11	73.3	2	13.3	2	13.3
14. Malypetr	Dérer, Hodža		5	12	75.0	2	12.5	2	12.5
15. Hodža	Dérer, Hodža		1	12	75.0	2	12.5	2	12.5
16. Hodža <sup>28</sup>	Dérer, Hodža	1	7	13	76.4	2	11.8	2	11.8
17. Hodža <sup>29</sup>	Dérer, Hodža	1	2	13	76.4	2	11.8	2 (0)	11.8

Sources: *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928; 1938).

What these had in common (except for the Ľudáks), was that they subscribed to some sort of Czechoslovakism. Almost all had some link either to *Hlas* (Voice) or *Prúdy* (Streams), the pre-war Slovak journals advocating Czechoslovak unity. Six of the ministers were former Hlasists: Šrobár (one of the first editors), M.R. Štefánik, Houdek, Hodža, Fajnor and Štefánek. Three were former contributors to *Prúdy*: Markovič (one of the first editors), Dérer and Slávik.<sup>30</sup> Both journals were under the ideological influence of Masaryk. Houdek was also a friend of Masaryk's son Herbert. A majority of the Slovak ministers had received some or all of their education outside Hungary: Štefánik, Houdek and Šrobár in Prague, Mičura in Berlin and Cluj, Štefánek in Vienna, Hodža in Budapest and Vienna, Slávik in Budapest, Berlin and Paris, and Fajnor in Berlin and Budapest. A majority of the Slovak ministers were Protestants; apart from the Ľudáks, Mičura and Šrobár (!) were the only known Catholics.

<sup>25</sup> Hodža from Dec. 6th, 1919, Houdek to April 1st, 1920. They were thus three for four months.

<sup>26</sup> Kállay was Minister for Slovakia until Gažík and Tiso entered the government January 1st, 1927.

<sup>27</sup> The Ľudáks left the government on October 8th, 1929. Labaj took over for Gažík on February 2nd, 1929. Štefánek took over for Hodža on February 20th, 1929.

<sup>28</sup> The Czechs became 13 after Kamil Krofta replaced Hodža as minister of foreign affairs on February 29th, 1936.

<sup>29</sup> The two German members of the last Hodža government quit during the spring of 1938. Franz Spina was not replaced, while Ludwig Czech was replaced, first by Dérer, who doubled, then by František Ježek, a prior minister without portfolio.

<sup>30</sup> Štefánek lists the main contributors to *Hlas* and *Prúdy* in his book *Masaryk a Slovensko* (1931:31). He also mentions the Slovak National socialist deputy Igor Hrušovský as one of the Hlasists, and the Slovak Agrarian deputy Ján Halla as a member of the *Prúdy* circle. See also *Slovakia and the Slovaks* (1994).

The single most important ministry from a national point of view was the Ministry of Education, but also the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Unification of Legislation, and until 1928, the Plenipotentiary Ministry for Slovakia were important from a national point of view. Five of eleven Ministers of Education were Slovaks, seven of eight Ministers of Unification of Legislation were Slovaks, as were all Ministers of Slovakia. Slovaks were also well represented among the Ministers of Justice, Health and Agriculture.

On the other hand, not a single Slovak was Minister of Industry and Commerce, Public Works, Post and Telegraph, Railways, Social Affairs, or Finance. This means that the economic interests of Slovakia were not taken care of in terms of representation, while the Slovaks were fairly well represented in the ministries that may be deemed important from a national, cultural point of view. Taken together, the Slovaks serving as Ministers of Education served nearly half the period, but it is worth noting that they were all Czechoslovakists, as were indeed all the Czechs who held that position. The Ľudáks served (in the nationally less important positions) as Minister of Health (Tiso) and Minister of Unification of Legislation (Gažík, Labaj).

### ***Masaryk and the "Hrad" faction***

Finally, special mention should be made of the so-called *Hrad* faction, named after the castle where the Czechoslovak president resided. The term referred to an influential circle around Masaryk and Beneš, which included leading politicians from the National Socialist and Social Democratic parties, persons associated with the national gymnastics organization (*Sokol*), the organization of former legionaries (*Československá obec legionářská*), as well as some writers and intellectuals. Among the latter was Kamil Krofta, a professor of history who succeeded Beneš as Minister of Foreign Affairs. But there were also some politicians representing other parties, especially Agrarians (including former Hlasists like Vavro Šrobár and Anton Štefánek, and František Udržal) and some National Democrats. Masaryk denied that any such Hrad group existed,<sup>31</sup> although he admitted having close contacts with the Prime Minister (Švehla), the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Beneš) and Defense (Udržal).

It has been suggested that Beneš was the driving force in the Hrad circle; but, from Masaryk's letters to Beneš, Jaroslav Pecháček judges that Masaryk was the real leader.<sup>32</sup> Ideologically the *Hrad* faction adhered to Masaryk's humanism and democratic ideals; its foreign-policy orientation was towards the Allies, especially France; and it emphasized the role of the independence movement abroad in the establishment of a Czechoslovak republic.<sup>33</sup> Among the strongest opponents of the Hrad faction were some of the central figures in the home front, such as Karel Kramář and Jiří Stříbrný.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> (neexistuje žádný "Hrad"). See T.G. Masaryk: *Cesta demokracie III* (1994:268) – a collection of Masaryk's texts.

<sup>32</sup> See Pecháček: *Masaryk – Beneš – Hrad* (1996:16).

<sup>33</sup> Olivová: *Československé dějiny 1914–39*, Díl I (1993:91-92), Tomeš (1994), *Dějiny zemí koruny české*, Díl II (1993).

<sup>34</sup> See e.g. Jiří Stříbrný: *T.G.M. a 28. říjen* (1938).



### *A political and educational elite*

Initially, I mentioned that the individuals who formulated the national demands on behalf of the Slovak and a nationality policy on behalf of the government belonged to a political and/or intellectual elite. The members of government stand out in both respects. Of the 92 individuals who were ministers at some point, 58 had the title "Doctor". A further eight were "engineers", two were generals. The remaining 24 are listed without any title.<sup>35</sup> Even though the title "Doctor" may cover a variety of specialties (Ph.D., Doctor of Law, Medicine etc), we may safely assume that it indicates a fairly high level of education.

Of the 24 without any title, nine belonged to the Agrarians, six to the Social Democrats and three to the National Socialists. Ten were journalists or editors, four were peasants, one was a landowner, two were workers, three were civil servants, one was an economist, one was a party secretary and one was a high school teacher. I have not been able to identify the occupational status of Leopold Průša, Minister of Supply under Černý in 1920–21. We can at least include the journalists and the high school teacher among the intelligentsia, and probably also the civil servants. In any case members of academia predominated among the ministers, while the two major classes of the population, workers and peasants, were hardly represented at all. The most relevant post from a national point of view is the Ministry of Education and Enlightenment. All the ministers either held an academic degree or were editors.

If we turn to the social composition of the Czechoslovak parties represented in the Parliament, the picture becomes a little more nuanced, but workers and peasants were still under-represented compared to their share of the population. (See Table 6.)

The largest group was civil servants and clerical workers, numbering almost a third of the Chamber of Deputies in all election periods, and a little less in the Senate. What we may loosely term the "intelligentsia" came out second, numbering roughly between 20 and 25 percent. This category includes teachers at all levels, also professors at institutions of higher learning and universities, in addition to editors and writers. The latter were the most numerous in this group. If we include lawyers and doctors (the majority here were lawyers), among the intelligentsia, this group also comprises around a third altogether.

The peasants only followed in third place, and never exceeded 20.5 percent in either chamber. Around half of the peasants represented the Agrarian Party. Likewise the workers never exceeded 10 percent, and a great majority of them were Communists. The business community (including large landowners) was substantially better represented in the Senate than in the Chamber of Deputies. The Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party had the narrowest profile in terms of social composition, mostly sending merchants to the Parliament, yet it never made up as much as half of the businessman category. Finally, clergymen were mainly represented in the parliamentary clubs of the Catholic parties (the Czechoslovak People's Party and Hlinka's Slovak People's Party) and to a lesser extent in the Agrarian Party.

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<sup>35</sup> V. K. Barvínek: *Dvacet let Československa. Politický a hospodářský přehled 1. republiky* (1938). See also Appendix B1.

**Table 6: Social composition of Czech and Slovak parties, 1920-35**

Party:	Legend: 1. 1920 2. 1925 3. 1929 4. 1935	Workers				Peasants				Intelligentsia (teachers, professors, editors, writers)				Lawyers & doctors				Clergy				Civil servants & clerical workers (private and public)				Businessmen (trade, industry, construction, estate owners)			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Czechoslovak Agrarian Party	Deputies Senators	- -	- -	- -	- -	21 7	21 12	19 9	20 10	7 2	5 1	5 2	5 3	7 1	4 2	2 2	2 1	- 2	1 2	1 1	- 2	3 3	11 2	14 5	13 4	4 4	4 4	5 5	5 3
Czechoslovak Social Democrats	Deputies Senators	7 2	1 1	2 -	3 -	1 3	1 -	1 -	1 -	20 7	13 3	13 6	14 7	4 2	3 2	8 3	5 1	- -	- -	- -	- -	23 16	10 7	19 9	15 10	- 6	1 1	- 2	- 2
Czechoslovak National Socialists	Deputies Senators	- -	1 -	1 -	1 -	- -	- -	1 -	1 -	9 4	8 5	8 7	7 8	1 3	1 3	- 2	- 1	- -	- -	- -	15 3	15 5	19 6	17 4	2 -	2 1	3 1	2 1	
Czechoslovak People's Party	Deputies Senators	- 1	- 1	- 1	2 -	8 3	11 4	6 4	7 4	3 -	5 -	6 1	5 -	2 1	2 3	2 1	1 1	2 3	3 3	- 4	4 3	7 4	6 3	3 2	2 1	3 1	2 -	4 -	
Czechoslovak National Democrats	Deputies Senators	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 -	- 1	- -	- -	8 4	1 3	6 2	5 2	- 2	1 1	1 1	3 1	- -	- -	1 -	- -	9 3	9 1	4 4	7 4	3 2	2 1	2 1	2 2
Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party	Deputies Senators	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 -	1 -	2 -	2 -	- -	- -	- -	- 1	- -	- -	- -	1 -	2 -	1 -	1 -	4 3	10 6	9 6	14 7	
Hlinka's Slovak People's Party	Deputies Senators	- -	1 1	- -	- -	1 1	3 4	2 1	4 -	1 2	5 2	3 3	4 3	3 1	4 -	3 -	2 2	5 -	8 -	5 1	4 1	1 1	2 3	5 1	7 2	- 1	- 2	2 3	1 2
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	Deputies Senators	3 -	14 4	18 8	12 6	1 2	2 2	3 2	1 2	7 1	12 1	4 2	8 3	1 -	1 1	- -	1 -	- -	- -	- -	13 4	10 10	5 2	8 5	2 -	- 2	- 1	- -	
Total: <sup>1</sup>	Deputies Senators	10 3	17 7	21 9	18 6	34 16	38 23	32 16	34 16	56 20	50 15	47 23	50 26	18 10	16 12	16 9	14 8	7 5	12 5	10 5	4 7	69 33	66 32	73 26	71 31	17 17	22 18	23 19	28 17

Sources: V. Zaděra: *Politické strany v národním shromáždění* (1930: 65–70); *Volby do národní shromáždění. Historický přehled výsledků voleb za období 1920–1935* (1990).

<sup>1</sup> In addition, there were 5 deputies who did not belong to any parliamentary club in 1920 (2 peasants, 2 businessmen, 1 lawyer), 1 in 1925 (peasant) and 3 in 1929 (1 peasant, two intelligentsia). Two senators were without club in 1920 (1 peasant, 1 businessman) and 1 in 1929 (businessman). There were also 3 housewives in the Chamber of deputies in 1925, (2 Communists and 1 National Socialist). Both sources give information for the years 1920, 1925, and 1929. They are mostly in agreement, the main exception being variations regarding the Communist Party in the Chamber of Deputies in all three years. I have chosen to trust the figures given by the older of the two sources in these cases (Zaděra). The 1935 figures are all from *Volby do národní shromáždění*.

Perhaps most surprising is the social profile of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats. The number of workers was low, while a great majority of its deputies and senators were members of the intelligentsia, or they were lawyers or civil servants/clerical workers. Apart from the few workers which the party admittedly had among its ranks, its social profile was strikingly similar to that of the National Socialists and the National Democrats, who also recruited mainly among civil servants, clerical workers and the intelligentsia.

The Slovak People's Party would appear to be the party with the most even social composition, apart from the many clergymen who represented it in the Chamber of Deputies, especially in the period 1925–29. In view of the social composition of the Slovak population, however (around 60 percent were employed in agriculture in 1921), the peasants were greatly under-represented, not to mention the workers. A closer look reveals that a great majority also of the *ľudáks* had higher education.

If we compare the social composition of the elected Parliaments with the Revolutionary Parliament, we find that the latter has an even clearer elite character. Only 14.4 percent of the deputies were workers or peasants, while 12.5 percent were lawyers, 26.8 percent belonged to the intelligentsia (writers, teachers, professors), another 26.8 percent were civil servants and clerical workers, 5.8 percent were clergymen, while the business community accounted for 9.3 percent. 28 percent of the deputies had a Doctor's degree. The heavy representation of lawyers in the Revolutionary Parliament was in line with traditional Czech representation patterns.<sup>36</sup>

**Table 7: Age cohorts in the Parliament, 1925–38**

Legend: 1=1925, 2=1929 3=1935	1900– 05	1890–99			1880–89			1870–79			1860–69			1850–59			Total
	1935	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	
Deputies	44	29	54	101	149	144	114	97	84	35	23	18	6	1	0	0	300
Senators	–	–	–	–	1	30	74	96	83	64	43	32	10	10	5	2	150
Total	44	29	54	101	150	174	188	193	167	99	66	50	16	11	5	2	450

Source: My compilations based on V. Záděra: *Politické strany v národním shromáždění* (1930:114–125), and *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928: pp. 1299 ff.; 1938: pp. 983 ff.).

Finally, a few words on the composition of the Parliament in terms of age and gender are in order. I have unfortunately not been able to compile information for the first election period. The minimum age requirement for election to the Chamber of Deputies was 30; to the Senate, 45 years of age. Table 7 shows that the age cohorts born between 1870 and 1889 (who were thus between 30 and 50 years of age in 1918) dominated Czechoslovak politics throughout the period. This can easily be seen by comparing column 1 (the 1925 election) with column 3 (the 1935 election) for consecutive cohorts.

<sup>36</sup> See e.g. tables in Jiří Kořálka: *Češi v habsburské říši a v Evropě 1815-1914* (1996:107–108). See also Appendix F.

Ten female deputies were elected in the 1925 and 1929 elections; seven were Czech and three German. In 1935, nine women were elected – eight Czech and one German. There were four female senators in 1925, three in 1929, and five in 1935 – all Czech. The total number of women thus never exceeded fourteen (3.1 percent). Most of the women represented Socialist or Communist Parties: all but two in 1925 and 1929, and all but three in 1935. The exceptions belonged to the German National Party, the Agrarians and the National Democrats/National Unity. Not a single Slovak woman was elected. Apart from the National socialist Františka Zemínová, the women did not play any important part in the debates over national questions in the Parliament.

Strictly speaking, none of the parties can be said to have been representative of the population in terms of social composition.

### ***Concluding remarks***

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, nationality policy, whether a response to national demands or government-initiated, was in practice the domain of the various ministers and the Cabinet as a whole. The parties represented in the government coalition of course had influence on the formulation of this policy, as did the *Pětka* and the *Hrad* faction. The nationality policy as a whole was probably in most cases the outcome of compromises within the government coalition, although there were times when individual members of the government had considerable personal influence (e.g. Dérer and Hodža). One party or movement stands out as the main carrier of Slovak national demands during the entire First Republic: The (Hlinka's) Slovak People's Party, although the Slovak National Party did play a part when Rázus was represented in the Parliament.

No explicit presentation has been given of that wider, more amorphous group who contributed to the formulation of Official Czechoslovakism as a national ideology, and who defended Slovak national individuality. I have found it more practical to present individuals in the context their contributions occur; biographic data may also be found in Appendix C<sub>I</sub> and C<sub>II</sub>. As a whole, this group was perhaps less of a political elite, and more of an intellectual elite. The majority of those who were not politicians were scholars (or writers), and many were politicians *and* scholars. Among the scholar-politicians, in addition to Tomáš G. Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, we find Kamil Krofta, professor of history, Anton Štefánek, professor of sociology, and Josef Šusta, professor of history and author of history textbooks for secondary school. We will become more acquainted with these people in the next two chapters.

# *Nine*

## *Official Czechoslovakism*

*The Czechs and Slovaks want to develop into a unified, politically indivisible, Czechoslovak nation ...*

**Milan Rastislav Štefánik, 1916<sup>1</sup>**

Czechoslovakism, the state ideology of the First Republic, had at least two meanings: It meant that Czechs and Slovaks together comprised a Czechoslovak nation with two "tribes", Czechs and Slovaks – or also that the Slovaks were actually Czechs, only less developed. This ambiguity was present throughout the period, yet a shift in emphasis from the second to the first meaning is discernible. Overall, Czech and Slovak conceptions of Czechoslovakism differed; the second, somewhat prejudiced conception of the Slovaks as less worthy Czechs was – naturally enough – less prevalent among Slovaks than Czechs. It was also less common in official statements *after* the First World War than during the war.

In Czech literature on the subject, it is sometimes argued that the Czechoslovak state ideology aimed at creating a Czechoslovak *political* nation along the lines of the French or British.<sup>2</sup> However, to approximate the Western model, the Czechoslovak nation project would have to include all citizens. The national minorities were never meant to be a part of the Czechoslovak nation; on the contrary, they were explicitly excluded and (in the German and Magyar case) even presented as enemies of the "state nation." Besides, as we shall see, the idea of a Czechoslovak nation was based primarily on the cultural and ethnic affinity of the Czechs and Slovaks, although the underlying rationale may have been political. Czechoslovakism can be seen as an alternative to the existing Czech and Slovak national ideologies on cultural ground, and as such it triggered a struggle over national identity, which I will return to in Chapter Ten.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how and to what extent Official Czechoslovakism was expressed in various official documents. As pointed out in the introduction, one possible reason why it failed could be that it was not consistently advocated. The main emphasis here is thus on the *contents* of the ideology and its *dispersal*. As far as the First Republic is concerned, I have chosen documents according to a rather narrow definition of "official", closer to "authorized" than in the sense of "not private." Obviously, since Czechoslovakism originated in the independence movement abroad (whose members lacked a formal mandate), this would not have worked in the case of wartime documents; here a wider definition has been applied.

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<sup>1</sup> (Češi a Slováci si přejí vyvinout se v jednotný, politicky nedílný národ československý). Quoted in Jan Měchýř: *Slovensko v Československu 1918–1991* (1991:17).

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Jan Rychlík: Slovensko-české vztahy z české perspektivy, in *Idea Československa a střední Evropa* (1994:112).

It goes without saying that it has not been possible to review every remotely relevant document from the entire period. The main emphasis is on wartime documents, official statistics and school textbooks, primarily in history. In addition, I have included the Constitution of 1920, which established the legal foundation for the Czechoslovak Republic and remained in place throughout the period. In this context I will also take a look at Czechoslovak state symbols like the flag and coat of arms to see what conception of Czechoslovak nationhood and statehood they convey. Finally, I have included the first official speeches of the Czechoslovak prime minister (Karel Kramář) and president (Tomáš G. Masaryk), mainly to provide a contrast to the propaganda of the war years.

The reason why I have decided to deal with wartime propaganda in some detail is that it was during the war that the foundations for a Czechoslovak state ideology as well as for the Czechoslovak state were laid. Wartime arguments also had a bearing on the public debate after the war. Thanks to Beneš, who collected "the most important documents of our revolution" and had them published in a third volume of his war memoirs, it proved not to be such an onerous task to go through the relevant documents.<sup>3</sup> The following presentation covers official declarations of the Czech deputies in the *Reichsrat*, organized in the Czech Union (*Český svaz*) and National Committee (*Národní výbor*), as well as the pamphlets of the independence movement abroad with Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik at the helm.

A critical question is whether the contents of textbooks or the way statistics are compiled can be controlled by the authorities. It may be argued that they reflect academic traditions and objective "disinterestedness" rather than state ideology. On the other hand it is a fact that a national or even nationalist historiography has been a quite common phenomenon in modern "nation-states", and especially in school textbooks. The school system is generally one of the most important arenas for diffusion and perpetuation of national identity.<sup>4</sup> In the First Czechoslovak Republic, as everywhere else, textbooks had to be approved by the Ministry of Education, which gave the authorities at least some leverage. Likewise, population censuses and statistics have historically been initiated by governments, and in the First Republic census forms were determined by a committee appointed by the government.

### ***Czechoslovakism in war-time documents***

Before the outbreak of the First World War, calls for the political unification of Czechs and Slovaks were rare. Palacký had advocated such unification briefly in 1849, as a part of his scheme for federation along national lines; otherwise leading Czech politicians were rather indifferent to the Slovak question. They concentrated on the Czech question, and their arguments in favor of Czech autonomy were based on Czech historical state rights. Since the Slovaks were not a "historical nation", these arguments could not be employed by the Slovaks.

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<sup>3</sup> See Beneš: *Světová válka a naše revoluce*, vol. III (1929a:VII).

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Eric Hobsbawm: *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (1992).

In addition to the Czech state rights program, Magyar political and cultural persecution of the Slovaks effectively blocked any proposals for political unification. Vavro Šrobár, one of the leading Hlasists, argued in 1902 that "there cannot be any question of a fusion in the political sense; we [i.e. the Slovaks] are citizens of the crown of St. Stephen and have recognized this publicly; we are obliged to defend the integrity of our homeland (*krajina*) against anyone."<sup>5</sup> His actions in the fateful October days of 1918 (see page 189) were to provide a vivid contrast.

Masaryk's conception of the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation, voiced as early as in 1905, is very clear in the first war-time documents propagandizing Czechoslovak statehood. Masaryk contemplated an independent Czechoslovak state already in the fall of 1914, although he admitted to R.W. Seton-Watson that this was a maximum program. Masaryk envisaged a renewal of the historical Czech kingdom (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia), adding the Slovak part of Hungary. Although Masaryk had been rather ambivalent to the Czech state right argument before the war, he was now using it himself, and in line with this he suggested that the new state be a (renewed) monarchy. His arguments for including the German-speaking areas to the north were reported to be of an economic character. Without the industrial centers these areas contained, Bohemia could not be self-sufficient (*soběstačné*), and besides, they would be needed if the new state was to take over its share of the Austrian state debt.<sup>6</sup>

In *Independent Bohemia*, a confidential memo of April 1915 to the British Foreign Minister, Masaryk presented his full view of the "re-establishment of Bohemia as an independent state", which he contrasted with the artificial Austrian monarchy. He argued that the "Bohemian state would be composed of the so-called Bohemian countries, namely of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; to these would be added the Slovak districts of North Hungary. [...] The Slovaks are Bohemians, in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language. The Slovaks strive also for independence and accept the programme of union with Bohemia."<sup>7</sup> Here Masaryk obviously used "Bohemian" in the meaning of "Czech."

Masaryk argued that the new state would not be too small, the economy would be sound (the Czech lands being the "pearl of Austria"), and, because of the population mix in the Czech lands, the minority problem could in any case not be avoided. This state would be constitutional and democratic – in line with the heritage of Hus, Chelčický and Komenský. The Czechs had done Europe and humanity a great favor by being the first nation to break the theocracy of the Middle Ages, thus paving the way for modern European development through the Reformation and struggle for spiritual freedom. Surely this gave them the right to strive for independence, and for a place and a voice among free nations today, Masaryk argued. His focus was clearly on the Czechs and on Czech history; the Slovaks were treated merely as an appendix.

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<sup>5</sup> Quoted in H. Gordon Skilling: *T.G. Masaryk. Against the current 1882–1914* (1994:77). See Chapter 5 on the Slovaks.

<sup>6</sup> Masaryk's views were reported in a memorandum written by R.W. Seton-Watson in November 1914. It is reprinted in Jan Rychlík et al.: *R.W. Seton-Watson and his relations with the Czechs and Slovaks* (1995:209–15). A Czech translation may be found in Edvard Beneš: *Světová válka a naše revoluce*, vol. III (1929a:227–37).

<sup>7</sup> T.G. Masaryk: *Independent Bohemia*, in Rychlík et al. (1995:229). For a Czech version, see Beneš (1929a: 246–47).

The same goes for *Bohemia's claim for freedom*, published on behalf of the London Czech Committee in 1915. Strongly anti-German in tone, it professed the hope that "our national aspirations will be crowned with the full independence of our beloved country; we desire to shake off the German yoke that weighed us down for so many unhappy centuries. [...] The utter impossibility of suppressing the Czech genius with bayonets [...] is best shown by the tenacity with which the Czech people through centuries of German influence have preserved their artistic tastes. The peasants' huts, [...] furniture, [...] dress, all bear the mark of national genius." Also here Slovak was presented as a Czech dialect: "The Bohemian language [...] must be divided into three groups: first that used throughout the kingdom of Bohemia; second that of Moravia; and third, the dialect spoken by the Slovaks of North Eastern Hungary."<sup>8</sup> These statements all reflect the circumstance that the "resistance movement abroad started as a Czech movement, setting as its goal to establish a Czechoslovak state."<sup>9</sup>

The lack of reference to a Czechoslovak nation is conspicuous in the first major document signed by people of Slovak origin, the Cleveland Agreement of October 22nd, 1915, between the Czech National Alliance (formed 1914) and the Slovak League (formed 1907). It called for "1. Independence of the Czech lands and Slovakia. 2. A union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative alliance of states with a complete national autonomy of Slovakia, with its own parliament, its own state government, its own complete cultural freedom, and therefore, its own complete use of the Slovak language, its own financial and political government and with a Slovak state language. 3. Voting power: General, secret and direct. 4. Form of government: A personal union with a democratic form of state, the same as in England."<sup>10</sup> A fifth point stated that the agreement could be amended only with the approval of both parts.

The declaration of the *Czech Foreign Committee* of November 14th, 1915, which was the first public demand for Czechoslovak statehood by the independence movement abroad, kept referring exclusively to the Czech nation – despite the co-signature of the secretary and chairman of the Slovak League. The Committee stated that the Czech nation would no longer be silenced, that having lost faith in the viability of Austria-Hungary it no longer recognized it, and that the Czech nation would strive for an independent Czechoslovak state.

After the Slovak astronomer Milan Rastislav Štefánik joined the Committee in December 1915, the Czech outlook became less pronounced. The Czech Foreign Committee was turned into the National Committee of the Czech lands in February 1916, and shortly after renamed to the Czechoslovak National Council (*Československá národní rada*). Štefánik had been part of the Czecho-Slovak oriented circle around *Detvan* and *Hlas* during his studies in Prague, where he became acquainted with Masaryk. During the war, he was engaged in the organization of

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<sup>8</sup> *Bohemia's claim for freedom* (edited by J. Prochazka) (1915:4, 33, 35).

<sup>9</sup> (zahraniční odboj začínal jako hnutí české, které se vytyčilo za svůj cíl dosažení československého státu). Karel Pichlík: *Bez legend* (1990:39).

<sup>10</sup> The English text is from *The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact* (1934:16). A Slovak version may be found in *Starý národ, mladý štát* (1994:90). The meaning is identical. On the activities of the émigré groups, see Pichlík (1990).



Czecho-Slovak volunteers on allied side. His version of Czechoslovakism differed from Masaryk's: "We are not allowed to divide into Czechs and Slovaks – let us behave as if Czechs were Slovaks living in Moravia and Bohemia, and Slovaks Czechs living in Slovakia."<sup>11</sup>

In an article in the journal of the Czechoslovak National Council in 1916, Masaryk argued that it was the political and administrative separation of the Czechs lands and Slovakia following the fall of Great Moravia that had "weaned" the Czechs and Slovaks from each other and mutually estranged them, not the language question. And neither would language be any problem in the new state: "It is self evident that the Slovaks, joined with the Czech lands in one state, will use Slovak in the public administration", he argued.<sup>12</sup> Unification was favorable to both: the Czechs would be strengthened nationally, the Slovaks economically, and generally they would be stronger together than either of them would be alone. "Together the Slav majority of the population of all the lands [i.e. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia] will rise to almost nine million and will thus be stronger against the minorities."<sup>13</sup>

In *The future Bohemia* (1917), published in the London journal *The New Europe*, Masaryk again presented the Slovaks as "a part of the Czech nation", but added that because of the separation from the Czechs, they "formed a national unity *against the Magyars*." The fact that they used "their dialect as literary language" was in his view not important, since all Czechs understood Slovak very well, and the other way around.<sup>14</sup> According to Masaryk, the unity of the two national branches was increasing, and their political leaders (those who were free to speak) agreed on the demands for a common, unified state. He also underlined that the rights of the national minorities must be respected; this would also be in the interest of the Czechs.

The fullest elaboration of Masaryk's views may be found in *The New Europe* (*Nová Evropa*, 1918), written during his stay in Russia and his journey to the United States in 1917. It was presented as an elaboration of "our national program." Here Masaryk spoke alternately of Czechoslovaks, Czechs and Slovaks, and the Czech nation. In his eyes, nationality expressed itself in practice through language. He thus presented Slovak as an archaic dialect, the main differences between it and the Moravian and central Czech (Prague) dialects being some archaic forms and a few words. Slovak had "the same accent as Czech", and this was "precisely what distinguished the Slav tongues from each other."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> (Nesmieme sa deliť ani na Čechov, ani na Slovákov, ale máme pred očami jedine to, ako by Česi boli Slováci na Morave a v Čechách bývajúci a Slováci na Slovensku bývajúci Česi). Quoted in V. Zuberec: *Krásny život M.R. Štefánika* (1990:46).

<sup>12</sup> (Rozumí se samo sebou, že Slováci, spojení s českými zeměmi v jeden stát, budou užívat slovenštiny ve veřejné správě). The article is reprinted in T.G. Masaryk: *V boji za samostatnost* (1927:43–45).

<sup>13</sup> (Spojením vzroste slovanská majorita obyvateľstva všetkých zemí na temer 9 miliónů a bude tudíž silnější vůči minoritám). Masaryk (1927:45).

<sup>14</sup> (utvořili národní jednotu *proti Madarům*. V osmnáctém století přijali vlastní nářečí jako literární jazyk). The quotation is from the Czech version published under the title *Budoucí Čechy* (1919:7).

<sup>15</sup> (náš národní program) (slovenština má též akcent jako čeština a právě akcentem se rozlišuje jazykové slovanství). T.G. Masaryk: *Nová Evropa* (1994b:56, 102, 150). On Czechs, Slovaks, Czechoslovaks, see pp. 96, 100–02, 117–19, 144–50.

At this point Masaryk was openly anti-German (against Pan-Germanism), as well as anti-Austrian. After presenting the familiar Czech state rights arguments, he argued that dualism was "disloyalty and a direct conspiracy of the dynasty with the Germans and Magyars against the Czechs; Austria originated through a union not only of Austria and Hungary, but [also] of the Czech state." Actually, according to Masaryk, the Czechs had more right to independence than the Magyars, since Hungary (minus Slovakia) had been under the Turks at the time of the union in 1526. He claimed that the Czechs would be satisfied neither with autonomy nor an Austrian federation. The Czechs had a historical right to independence, to a state comprising the Czech lands. In addition, they had the natural and historical right to include Slovakia, brutally oppressed by the Magyars. "Slovakia, forming the core of the Great Moravian empire, was torn away by the Magyars in the 10th century, later it was for a short time joined with its kinsmen, at times it was independent. Culturally the Slovaks remained in close union with the Czechs. [...] Unification of the Czechs and Slovaks is thus a legitimate demand", he argued.<sup>16</sup>

As Masaryk saw it, large, nationally mixed empires were synonymous with autocracy. "Austria-Hungary is the organized violence of a minority over the majority, [it] is the continuation of the dynastic absolutism of the Middle Ages." The choice was in his eyes one between a "degenerated dynasty" and the freedom of nine nations; even Germans and Magyars would benefit in terms of higher political morality if they desisted from oppressing other nations. He repeated that the Czech level of culture was no lower than the German, adding that the cultural level of the Slovaks was no lower than that of the Magyars. Moreover, since the Czechs had always been in favor of equality, the rights of the minorities would be guaranteed. He asked rhetorically: "What is most fair – that more than nine million Czechs and Slovaks will be ruled by Germans – or that three million Germans will be ruled by Czechoslovaks?"<sup>17</sup> Besides, liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks would be favorable to the Allies, since a Czechoslovak state, due to its central geographic position, would be a barrier against Pan-Germanism.

Edvard Beneš, the general secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council, argued in a similar vein. In a memorandum to the British foreign minister Arthur J. Balfour, dated May 10th, 1918, Beneš claimed that the Czechoslovaks had put up resistance against Austria-Hungary and Germany from the very beginning of the war. "The whole nation soon understood that [the Central powers'] victory would mean that the Pan-German dreams would come true and that the Czechoslovaks would be totally subjugated by the Germans and Magyars."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> (neloajálnost a přímo komplot dynastie s Němci a Maďary proti Čechům; Rakousko vzniklo unií nejen Rakouska a Uher, nýbrž [také] se státem českým). (Slovensko, tvořící jádro velko-moravské říše, bylo maďary odtrženo v 10. stol., později bylo nakrátko se svými soukmenovci politicky spojeno, čas bylo samostatné. Kulturně Slováci zůstali stále v těsném svazku s Čechy. [...] Spojení Čechů a Slováků je tudíž požadavek legitimní). Masaryk (1994b:146, 150).

<sup>17</sup> (Rakousko-Uhersko je organizovaným násilím menšiny nad většinou, [...] je pokračováním středověkého dynastického absolutismu). (Co jest správnější – aby více než devět miliónů Čechů a Slováků bylo pod vládou Němců, či aby tři miliónů Němců byly pod vládou Čechoslováků?). Masaryk (1994b:101–02, 153). See also pp. 91 and 123.

<sup>18</sup> (Celý národ pojednou pochopil, že [...] vítězství by znamenalo uskutečnění pangermanských snů a úplné podrobení Čechoslováků Němcům a Maďarům). Beneš (1929a:342).

In a new memorandum the next day he argued that the Czechoslovaks were "the most mature" of all the nations in Austria-Hungary politically, intellectually and economically, and that they were "nationally the richest and most conscious." In July 1918 he drafted a declaration that he wanted the British government to adopt, stating that "the Czechoslovak nation existed as an independent state from the 6th century. It was deprived of its independence only during the last centuries through violence and unlawful revolt, yet its previous right to independence was always admitted."<sup>19</sup> Here "Czechoslovak nation" is obviously used synonymously with "Czech nation", and Slovakia is by implication included among the historical lands. Beneš generally treated the Czechs and Slovaks as one nation, without bothering to justify this view.

As for the "home front", strict censorship and the arrest of leading politicians and intellectuals made it difficult for Czech and Slovak leaders to voice anything at all publicly. Moreover, when they did, they concentrated on safeguarding what they perceived as national interests against the Magyars and Germans, acting on the assumption that the empire would survive the war. Until the war luck turned in 1917, they had all reason to do so; the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire seems much more inevitable with hindsight than it did before it actually happened. It is in this light the Czech activist policy must be understood.

As late as January 1917, the presidium of the Czech Union (*Český Svaz*) twice declared Czech loyalty to the throne. On January 24th, this was combined with a reminder of Czech national demands: "Our belief is unshaken, that after the victorious end of the world war all rights belonging to the Czech nation will be achieved within the framework of the empire and under the Habsburg dynasty." On January 31st, the presidium, referring to the declared goal of the Allies to liberate the Czechs from foreign rule, repudiated the "insinuation" that this was what the Czechs wanted, and declared that the "Czech nation, as always in the past, now and in the time to come sees no future or conditions for development but under the Habsburg scepter."<sup>20</sup>

Only in the declaration of the Czech deputies at the first meeting of the *Reichsrat* on May 30th, 1917, did the first reference to the "Czechoslav" question appear. They demanded that the empire be "transformed into a federative state of free and equal national states" in the interest of the nations as well as the empire and the dynasty. Referring to the "natural right of nations to self-determination and free development, strengthened by our inalienable historical rights", they called for the merging of all branches of the Czechoslav nation, including the Slovaks, in a democratic Czech state within the framework of the empire.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> (nevyspělejší ... nejbohatší a nejuvědomělejší s hlediska národního). (Čechoslovenský národ existoval jakožto nezávislý stát od. VI. století. Byl zbaven své nezávislosti teprve během posledních století násilím a nezákonným převratem, ale jeho bývalá historická práva na nezávislost byla mu vždy přiznávána). Beneš (1929a:354, 407–08).

<sup>20</sup> ([N]ikdy neotřáslí naší vírou, že po vítězném pro nás skončení světového zápasu dosáhneme v rámci říše a pod žezlem habsburské dynastie splnění všech práv českého národa). ([N]árod český jako vždycky v minulosti, tak také v přítomnosti a ve době příští jen pod žezlem habsburským vidí svou budoucnost a podmínky svého vývoje). Beneš (1929a:286, 287).

<sup>21</sup> The protocolled German text read: "wobei nicht ausser macht gelassen werden kann jener tschechoslawische Stamm, welcher zusammenhängend an der historischen Grenzen unseres böhmischen Vaterlandes lebt." (in which no Czechoslav tribe living adjoining to the historical borders of our fatherland can be left out). Referred by Beneš (1929a: 292). The Slovaks were directly mentioned in the Czech text, but not in the German.

The political situation of the Slovaks was even more difficult from the beginning of the war. After assuring loyalty to the empire and the Habsburg ruling house, the Slovak National Party went into passivity for the duration of the war, while the sole Slovak deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, Ferdinand (Ferdiš) Juriga, repeatedly voiced his loyalty and even voted for the war budget. By remaining loyal, he hoped to achieve cultural concessions for the Slovaks after the war. He demanded realization of the nationality law of 1868, and that Slovak should become a compulsory subject in all Slovak primary and secondary schools.<sup>22</sup>

Only in the last year of the war did the Czechs and Slovaks at home start to voice demands for independent statehood. The Czechs did so first, in the Declaration of January 6th, 1918, adopted by a general Diet of the Czech lands. Claiming to speak "in the name of the Czech nation and of its oppressed and forcibly-silenced Slovak branch of Hungary", the Czech deputies protested against "the rejection of the right of self-determination at the peace negotiations" (at Brest Litovsk) and demanded that "all nations, including [...] ours be guaranteed participation and full freedom of defending their rights." The Czech deputies complained that their "Slovak branch" had become "the victims of Magyar brutality and of unspeakable violence in a state which [...] remains the darkest corner of Europe, [...] denationalized from childhood, not represented in Parliament and Civil Service, deprived of public schools." In conclusion they demanded Czech independence on the grounds of historic rights – "a sovereign, equal, democratic and socially just state, built upon the equality of all citizens within the historic boundaries of the Czech lands and of Slovakia."<sup>23</sup> The Slovaks were here consistently described as a branch of the *Czech* nation, rather than of a "Czechoslovak nation."

The first Slovak declaration in favor of independence was adopted on May 1st, 1918, by an assembly of workers in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš. The assembly demanded that the right of all nations in Europe to self-determination be recognized, "including also the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak tribe."<sup>24</sup> In addition, they demanded social and civil rights, but not Czechoslovak statehood. In a meeting at Turčiansky Svätý Martin on May 24th, Slovak political leaders openly discussed the alternatives. In the choice between remaining under Magyar rule and a Czechoslovak solution, they opted for the latter: "The Slovak National Party unconditionally stands on the right of the Slovak nation to self-determination, and on the basis of this vindicates Slovak participation in the formation of an independent state consisting of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia." This did not imply that a Czechoslovak nation existed. On the contrary, Czechoslovak statehood was conditional on the recognition of the Slovaks as a nation on equal terms with the Czechs.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> See *Československá vlastivěda, Díl II, Svazek 2* (1969:362–64).

<sup>23</sup> The quotations are from an English translation published by the Czechoslovak Arts Club in New York under the title *The Czech declaration of January 6, 1918* (1918). Where the English version reads "Czechoslovaks" in the first quotation, the Czech version, printed in Beneš (1929a:318–21), reads "tedy i našemu" (i.e. also our [nation]). In the second quotation the English version reads "our brothers, the Slovaks" where the Czech reads "slovenská větev naše" (our Slovak branch).

<sup>24</sup> (teda i uhorskej vetvi československého kmeňa). Beneš (1929a:341).

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Bartlová: Vzťahy Čechov a Slovákov v medzivojnom období in: *Češi a Slováci ve střední Evropě* (1993b:17).

Like the Cleveland Agreement of 1915, the Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918, was signed by representatives of the Slovak League and the Czech national alliance in the USA. In addition, it bore the signatures of representatives of the Alliance of Czech Catholics and, not least, of the chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, Tomáš G. Masaryk. It read: "We approve the political program, which endeavors to unite the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state of the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own parliament and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in the school, in office and in public life in general. The Czecho-Slovak state shall be a republic, its constitution shall be democratic. [...] The detailed regulations for the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak state are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives."<sup>26</sup> Again, no mention was made of any Czechoslovak nation.

In Prague the establishment of the Czechoslovak National Committee (*Československý národní výbor*) on July 13th, 1918, signaled a shift in terminology. The Committee consisted of Czechs only and was led by Karel Kramář (chairman), Václav Klobáček, Antonín Švehla and František Soukup. Addressing the entire "Czechoslovak nation", it stated the intention to "assemble, organize and lead the great spiritual, moral and material powers of the nation in the effort to achieve [...] the right to self-determination in an independent, democratic Czechoslovak state."<sup>27</sup> In a resolution of September 29th, 1918, the National Committee and the Czech Union rejected all attempts at changing the Austrian Constitution, stating that they no longer believed any promises from those who to the last minute did not "shrink from any means to humiliate, starve and wipe out our nation and [...] hurt our most sacred feelings."<sup>28</sup> The resolution referred to "our nation" or the "Czech nation", but did not mention the Slovaks.

Already on September 3rd the government of the United States recognized the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris as a de facto Czechoslovak government. Others followed suit. On October 14th, Beneš informed the Allied governments of the establishment of a provisional Czechoslovak government, composed by Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik, and of the appointment of ambassadors to London, Paris, Rome, Washington and Omsk (Russia). This government declared independence on October 18th, following the federalization manifesto of the Austrian Emperor Karl I on October 16th.

The "Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation", often referred to as the Washington declaration, stated: "Our nation cannot freely develop in a Habsburg mock-federation, which is only a new form of the denationalizing oppression under which we have suffered for the past three hundred years. [...] We make this declaration on the basis of our

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<sup>26</sup> I have quoted the English version which is printed in *The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh pact* (1934:27). The original Slovak version is photographed on the next page. It may also be found in Beneš (1929a:365), and Měchýř (1991:6).

<sup>27</sup> (shromažďovati, pořádati a vésti všechny veliké duševní, morální a hmotné síly v národě k dosažení [...] právo sebeurčení a samostatném, demokratickém státě československém). Beneš (1929a:396).

<sup>28</sup> The quotation is from the appendix of Vladimír Nosek: *Independent Bohemia. An account of the Czecho-Slovak struggle for liberty* (1918:171–72). The Czech version may be found in Beneš (1929a:465).

historic and natural right. We have been an independent state since the seventh century; and in 1526 as an independent state, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, we joined with Austria and Hungary in a defensive union against the Turkish danger. We have never voluntarily surrendered our rights as an independent state in this confederation. The Habsburgs broke their compact with our nation by illegally transgressing our rights [...] and we therefore refuse longer to remain a part of Austria-Hungary in any form.

We claim the right of Bohemia to be reunited with her Slovak brethren of Slovakia, once a part of our national State, later torn from our national body, and fifty years ago incorporated in the Hungarian State of the Magyars, who, by their unspeakable violence and ruthless oppression of their subject races have lost all moral and human right to rule anybody but themselves.

We will not remain a part of a State which has no justification for existence, and which, refusing to accept the fundamental principles of world-organization, remains only an artificial and immoral political structure, hindering every movement toward democratic and social progress. The Habsburg dynasty, weighed down by a huge inheritance of error and crime, is a perpetual menace to the peace of the world, and we deem it our duty toward humanity and civilization to aid in bringing about its downfall and destruction. [...] We hereby declare the Habsburg dynasty unworthy of leading out nation, and deny all of their claims to rule in the Czechoslovak lands."<sup>29</sup>

The declaration also stated that the "nation of Comenius" adhered to democratic principles, for which "our nation shed its blood in the memorable Hussite wars five hundred years ago." Some main principles for the forthcoming "Constitution of the Czechoslovak nation" were also outlined. These included a republican state form; complete freedom of conscience, religion and scholarly endeavor, literature and art, speech, the press, assembly and petition; separation of church and state; universal suffrage (including women), parliamentarism, equal rights for national minorities, and social and economic reform, including land reform.

On October 19th, the National Committee in Prague protested against the latest attempts of the Vienna government "to tear apart the unity of the Czechoslovak nation and endanger the unity and indivisibility of the Czech lands." Asserting that it would accept only "absolute sovereignty and independence of the Czechoslovak homelands", the Committee protested against the Magyar allegations that their "Slovak brothers" did not want to form a state and national whole with the nation of which it was an inseparable branch. The Slovaks knew better than anyone what the Magyar promises were worth, and they also knew that the Czech nation loved the Slovak language like their own mother tongue, and what a joy it would be for the Czechs to see Slovak individuality preserved, the Committee argued.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> The quotations are from the English version published by the Czechoslovak Arts Club of New York City in October 1918. The declaration is also printed as an appendix of Thomas Čapek's *The origins of the Czechoslovak state* (1926) and of Nosek's *Independent Bohemia* (1918: pp. 178 ff.). A Czech version may be found in Beneš (1929a: pp. 472 ff.).

<sup>30</sup> (pokusy roztrhnouti jednotu národa československého a ohroziti jednotu a nedílnost zemí českých) (státní samostatnost a neodvislost vlastí československých) (slovenští naši bratři) (s národem jehož jsou nerozlučnou větví) Beneš (1929a:477).

When the note of Foreign Minister Andrassy confirming Habsburg capitulation became public knowledge on October 28th, 1918, the National Committee proclaimed the establishment of a Czechoslovak republic. In the proclamation to the "Czechoslovak people", the Czechoslovak National Committee stated that "your ancient dream has come true. The Czechoslovak state today entered the ranks of the independent, free, cultural states of the world. As the only authorized and responsible body, entrusted by the entire Czechoslovak people, the National Committee has taken charge of the administration of the state."<sup>31</sup> It was signed by four Czechs – Soukup, Švehla, Stříbrný and Rašín, and one Slovak – Vavro Šrobár.

On October 30th, an assembly in Turčiansky Svätý Martin of all the Slovak political currents formally established a Slovak National Council, presented as the "National Council of the Slovak branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation." It claimed the exclusive right to speak and act "in the name of the Czechoslovak nation living within the borders of Hungary", declaring: "1. The Slovak nation forms linguistically and [culturally-]historically a part of the Czechoslovak nation. The [Slovak branch] have taken part in all the intellectual struggles of the Czech nation, which made it renown throughout the world. 2. For this Czechoslovak nation also we demand the right to self-determination and full independence. [...] 3. We demand the immediate conclusion of peace [...] We are convinced that our [hardworking and talented Slovak nation], which despite unheard of oppression, has long been able to attain such degree of national culture, will not be excluded from the blessings of peace."<sup>32</sup> The declaration was signed Matúš Dula, president of the Slovak National Council, and Karol A. Medvecký, secretary.

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Until 1917, the Czechoslovakist rhetoric was confined to the independence movement abroad, and chiefly to Masaryk. He presented the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation, and generally advocated Bohemia (*Čechy*) as a suitable name for the common state. During activism, Czech leaders at home maintained an exclusively Czech focus. When references to the Slovaks started to appear, they were presented as a Slovak branch of the Czech or "Czechoslav" nation, while a "Czechoslovak nation" only entered the vocabulary in the course of 1918. The Slovaks at home were to a large degree silenced during the war, yet in two official declarations from 1918, the Slovak leaders referred to their nation as the Hungarian, respectively the Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak tribe or nation. Finally, the lack of reference to a "Czechoslovak nation" is conspicuous in the two Czechoslovak agreements signed by émigré organizations in the USA – the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918.

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<sup>31</sup> (Lide československý! Tvůj odvčký sen stal se skutkem. Stát československý vstoupil dnešního dne v řadu samostatných, svobodných, kulturních států světa. Národní výbor, nadaný důvěrou veškerého lidu československého, přejal jako jediný a oprávněný a odpovědný činitel do svých rukou správu svého státu). The whole proclamation is printed as an appendix in Jan Galandauer: *Vznik Československé republiky 1918* (1988:315–16).

<sup>32</sup> The quotations are mostly from the English translation in the appendix of Čapek (1926:99–101). The exceptions read in the Slovak original [slovenská vetev] and [snaživý a nadaný slovenský národ]. The original Slovak text may be found in Galandauer (1988:317–18), Měchýř (1991:8) and on the back cover of Dušan Kováč (ed.): *Muži deklarácie* (1991).

What can we read out of this? First of all, it seems clear that the shift in rhetoric from Czech to Czechoslovak during the final year of the war signaled neither a shift in national identity on part of the Czech leaders, nor a sudden conviction that a Czechoslovak nation existed. It is of course possible that the Slovaks were implicitly included in the Czech nation before the shift in terminology occurred. In that case, the inclusion of the sentence referring to "all branches of the Czechoslav nation" in the declaration of May 30th, 1917, merely signified a change of labels to something less Czech-biased. That change was, however, made reluctantly and only after Slovak lobbying on part of Vavro Šrobár and others.

On the Czech side, it was objected first, that the request of Šrobár was not legitimate enough for such a large step. Second, it was argued that apart from Great Moravia in the 9th century, there was no historical justification for the unification of the Czechs and Slovaks (Slovakia never having been a part of the Czech state). Finally, it was pointed out that to include the Slovaks would mean giving up the Czech historical state right, which could jeopardize the unity of the Czech historical lands, especially the German-speaking border areas.<sup>33</sup> The latter seems to have been the most important concern. At this point, the Czech leaders still took the Habsburg framework for granted, and their major concern was Czech interests.

Once they realized that the Habsburg Empire would not survive the war, it became important to ensure that an independent Czech state would be as strong as possible (cf. the Czech self-conception as a small and vulnerable nation). Galandauer argues that the inclusion of the Slovaks was the only possible way to enlarge the Czech state – and besides, Slovakia was a bridge to Russia. The demand for Czecho-Slovak unification was thus strategically motivated.

Likewise, it is not likely that the former Russophile and conservative leaders of the Slovak National Party (who made up the majority at Martin) became convinced over night that the Slovaks belonged to a Czechoslovak nation, especially since they had argued against it before the war. I think Dušan Kováč is right when he argues that the statement in the Martin declaration that the Slovaks were linguistically and culturally-historically a part of the Czechoslovak nation was "at the given time perceived as necessary for tactical reasons."<sup>34</sup> The aim was to express support for the idea of founding a Czechoslovak state, which was seen as preferable to remaining inside a Hungarian state. (At the time the declaration was adopted, the congregation in Martin was unaware that a Czechoslovak state had already been proclaimed.) The reasons why they did not demand Slovak autonomy were partly tactical – cf. Magyar claims that the Slovaks did not want a joint state with the Czechs. Besides, in a meeting with Czech leaders in Prague a few days prior to the assembly, Matúš Dula had been assured that the Slovaks would be able to decide over their administration, courts and schools themselves.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> See Jan Galandauer: 30. května 1917: Slovensko poprvé v programu legitimní české politické reprezentace, in *Češi a Slováci ve střední Evropě ve 20. století* (1993b:138–39), or also: Galandauer: Die Slowaken in den tschechischen politischen Programmen, in: *Österreichische Osthefte*, 4/1994.

<sup>34</sup> (táto formulácia bola chápaná ako v danej chvíli z taktických dôvodov potrebná). Kováč (1991:19).

<sup>35</sup> See Bartlová (1993b:17). I will return to this in greater detail in Chapter Thirteen.



Finally, I am not even convinced that the leaders of the independence movement abroad genuinely believed in the existence of a Czechoslovak nation or felt "Czechoslovak." Beneš explicitly defined himself as Czech – even as a "nationally conscious Czech" – in his war memoirs, although he as Minister of Foreign Affairs and later as President always remained faithful to the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation.<sup>36</sup>

In his writings up to the war, Masaryk always referred to the Czechs as "we" and the Slovaks as "they"; only after becoming president he did begin to refer to himself as half Slovak. Born in Hodonín, a Moravian village bordering on Slovakia, of a bilingual mother and a Slovak father, he started to define himself as Czech while attending the *gymnasium* in Brno.<sup>37</sup> Considering his family background and the fact that he grew up in the border area, it is possible that he believed that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It is also possible that strategic considerations governed his views already in 1905 (see page 154); the Czechs were seen as a small nation in a hostile world, and the Slovaks would be a welcome addition numerically.

During the First Republic, Štefánik was consistently portrayed as a model Czechoslovak. In a foreword to a biography published in 1938, Beneš describes him as an "archetype of and a symbol of the Czechoslovak", a man characterized by his "Czechoslovak-ness." He writes that "in the beginning of the war, [Štefánik] himself did not speak of the Czechoslovak question, he always only spoke of the Czechs and understood by that also the Slovaks."<sup>38</sup> The latter point is a valid one; he *did* speak of the Czechs and the Czech lands – but the interpretation of this among Slovak scholars today diverges from Beneš' views.

The way Štefánik's biographer Štefan Štvrtecký presents it, his use of terminology was of a tactical nature: "Štefánik, even though he himself used the term 'the Czecho-Slovak lands', insisted that it officially in the name of the [Czechoslovak] national council be spoken only of the Czech lands, because he believed that dualism in the Czecho-Slovak question might threaten the liberation of the Slovaks."<sup>39</sup> Also Vladimír Zuberec argues that Štefánik's Czechoslovakism was of a tactical nature (his main objective being to free the Slovaks from the Magyars), and that Štefánik's close relationship with the Czechs in no way "affected his Slovak patriotism and his intense feelings towards Slovakia and the Slovak nation."<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> (A na mne, Čecha ... národně cítící Čech). Beneš: *Světová válka a naše revoluce*, vol. I (1927), page 3 and 5. On the latter, see also Edvard Beneš: *Masarykovo pojetí ideje národní a problém jednoty československé* (1935:17); *Reč k slovákom o našej národnej prítomnosti a budúcnosti* (1934), *Smysl československé revoluce* (1923).

<sup>37</sup> Karel Čapek: *Hovory s T.G. Masarykem* (1990: pp. 44 ff.). The allegations that his mother only knew German, and his real father was a Jew or a German aristocrat, have been repudiated. See Polák: *Masarykovi rodiče a antisemitský mýtus* (1995).

<sup>38</sup> (rys jeho [...]: jeho československost'). (Štefánik bol priamo typom a symbolom Čechoslováka. Na počiatku vojny on sám nikdy nehovoril o otázke československej, hovoril vždy len o Čechoch a rozumel tým tiež Slovákov). See the handwritten foreword in *Štefánik I* (1938), edited by Štefan Osuský and Bohdan Pavlů.

<sup>39</sup> (Štefánik, hoci sám používal termín "zemí česko-slovenských", trval na tom, aby sa v oficiálnom názve národnej rady hovorilo len o českých zemiach, lebo podľa jeho mienky dualizmus v česko-slovenskej otázke by mohol ohroziť oslobodenie Slovákov). Štefan Štvrtecký: *Náš Milan Rastislav Štefánik* (1990:121).

<sup>40</sup> (nenarušoval jeho slovenské vlastenectvo, intenzívny citový vzťah k Slovensku a slovenskému národu). Zuberec (1990:47).

The strategic aspects of Štefánik's thinking around the Czechoslovak question are also apparent from some quotations from 1916: "Slovakia alone is not capable of an independent state life [...] It will never be recognized as an independent political unit. [...] Slovakia become important precisely by strengthening the Czech lands [...] It is not possible to imagine another solution on the fate of the Slovaks and Slovakia, than unification with the Czechs and the Czech lands."<sup>41</sup> A strength-through-unity message is here clearly conveyed.

If the demand for a joint state was strategically motivated, the Czechoslovak rhetoric may be interpreted partly as a reflection of the need to justify unification of the Czechs and Slovaks (national self-determination being the password of the day), partly as a reflection of a need to strengthen the Czechs' position towards the Germans in a future Czech state. Masaryk indirectly admitted this in his 1916 article in *Czechoslovak Independence*, where he argued that together, the Czechs and Slovaks would be stronger against the minorities. Masaryk's and Beneš' alternation between a Czech and a Czechoslovak nation points in the same direction.

### ***From Czechoslovak to Czech and back***

The opening speech at the first meeting of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Parliament on November 14th, 1918, was held by the chairman of the Czechoslovak National Committee, Karel Kramář, who became Prime Minister later the same day. He stated that "our chests swell with joy and pride over everything our nation achieved in the awful war. From the first moment [...] we believed and hoped that we now finally must get our freedom and independence. The hero of the war was our Czechoslovak people." Then, after thanking everyone who had heroically contributed to independence, at home and abroad, he concluded that "we deserved our freedom, we were [...] faithful to our past, our great forefathers, who so gladly sacrificed their lives for their beliefs, their conviction and their language."

Throughout this speech, he consistently referred to "our nation" or the "Czech nation", and only once to the Czechoslovak *people* (see above), while the state was referred to as Czech, Czechoslovak or Czechoslav. Emphasizing the historical unity of the "Czechoslav lands", he stated that the Czechs would not abandon the connection with their "Slovak brothers, who know best that our nation loves them with a direct, brotherly love, with all their idiosyncrasies, their beautiful individuality, and that we do not want anything but their separate, independent and free development in our common fatherland!"<sup>42</sup> The tone was rather patronizing.

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<sup>41</sup> (Slovensko samo osebe nie je schopné na samostatný štátny život [...] Ako samostatná politická jednotka nebude nikdy uznané [...] Slovensko dostáva význam práve tým, že posilňuje Česko [...] Nemožno si predstaviť iné riešenie osudu Slovákov a Slovenska, ako v zjednotení s Čechmi a s českými krajinami). Quoted in Štvrtecký (1990:146–47).

<sup>42</sup> (Nám všem dmou se prsa radostí, hrdoší a pýchou nade vším, co v hrozné válce dokázal náš národ. Od první chvíle [...] věřil a doufal, že nyní konečně dojdí musí své svobody a samostatnosti. Hrdinou války byl náš československý lid). (jsme si svou svobodu zasloužili, že jsme byli [...] hodni své minulosti, svých velkých předků, kteří tak radostně obětovali život za svou víru, za své přesvědčení a za svůj jazyk). (bratry Slováky, kteří nejlépe vědí, že národ náš miluje je upřímnou, bratrskou láskou se všemi jejich zvláštnostmi, s jejich krásným svérázem, a že nechceme nic jiného, než aby po svém, volně a svobodně se rozvíjeli ve společné naší vlasti!) *Řeči a projevy předsedy první vlády československé Dr. Karla Kramáře* (1935: 2, 6, 10).

After assuring the "German nation living in the border area of our state" that they had nothing to fear in terms of national development, Kramář went on to say: "Our state will of course be a Czech state, since we have won it through blood and suffering. But it will be our pride and ambition to assure that in our state nobody who is not Czech will feel oppressed and not free. We have too long felt the barbarism of cultural repression, the humiliation of our nation, whom they gave neither linguistic rights nor the schools necessary for education in the mother tongue, to wish to allow the same sin against freedom and culture!" It now remained for the Czech nation to show that it was able not only to win its freedom, but also to keep it, he argued: "We are independent and free! The severe bonds of Austrian and Hungarian violence have fallen! It is up to us to show that the Czech nation can manage to be free."<sup>43</sup>

One month later Kramář said: "I am repeating one thing again and again to every German [...]: this state will be Czech and Czech only. [...] We want integrity and indivisibility for our country, and that is our credo."<sup>44</sup> Karol Sidor wrote two decades later: "Kramář thought that it was a question of renewal of the Czech state, not of forming a new state [...] it was clear that the Czech nation was to play the role of a ruling nation in the new state."<sup>45</sup>

The Slovak Vice President of the Revolutionary Parliament, Metod Bella, delivered a speech on behalf of the Slovak nation on November 14th that year: "The Slovak nation today enters history [through] the unification of us Slovaks with the Czechs, after a thousand years of hard suffering. The process of unification [...] is completed, the proof of which is the fact that also the Slovak branch of our Czechoslovak nation is represented in this distinguished assembly for the first time. On behalf of the Slovak nation we express our deepest gratitude to the Czech nation and [...] convey our brotherly love for the Czech nation, the love of a pure heart." Against the conception of Slovak autonomy within a Hungarian framework Bella argued that it was not possible to have two kinds of freedom in one nation, and therefore there could only be Czechoslovak freedom for the Czechoslovak nation: "We want, believe in, hope for and will hold on to Czechoslovak freedom in a Czechoslovak republic only!" he concluded.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> (Náš stát ovšem bude českým státem, tak, jak jsme si ho vydobyli krví a utrpením. Ale naší hrdostí a touhou by bylo, aby nikdo zde u nás, kdo není Čechem, necítil se utiskovaným a nesvobodným. My příliš dlouho cítili všechno barbarství kulturních útisků, všechno ponižování svého národa, kterému nedávali ani prav jazykových, ani škol nutných pro vzdělání v jazyku mateřském, abychom se chtěli dopouštět stejných hříchů proti svobodě a kultuře!). (Jsme volni a svobodni! Padla těžka pouta rakouského a maďarského násilnictví! Na nás jest, aby český národ dokázal, že dovede býti svobodným). Kramář (1935:11, 14–15).

<sup>44</sup> (stále a stále opakují jedno každému Němci [...]: tento stát bude český a jen český. [...] chceme celistvost a nedělitelnost našich zemí a to jest naše kredo). Kramář (1935:63–64).

<sup>45</sup> (Kramář to tak myslel, že ide tu o obnovenie českého štátu, nie o vytvorenie nového štátneho útvaru [...] bolo zjavné, že český národ v novom útvere má hrať úlohu panujúceho národa). Karol Sidor: *Slovenská politika v pražskom sneme 1918–38* (1975:27).

<sup>46</sup> (Národ slovenský v dnešných dňoch vstupuje po tisícročnom ťažkom utrpení do historie, do spojenia nás Slovákov s Čechmi. Proces tohoto spojenia [...] je dokonáný, čehož dôkazom je, že v tomto vysokom shromaždení je po prvýkrát zastúpená aj slovenská vetev nášeho národa československého. Národ slovenský vyslovuje ústy našmi našu vďaku najhlubšiu národu českému a [...] tlumočí našu lásku bratrskému národu českému, lásku zo srdca čistého). (My chceme, veríme, dúfame a pridržať sa budeme len slobody československej v slobodnej československej republike!) Kramář (1935:150–51).

Masaryk spoke in the Revolutionary Parliament on December 22nd, the day after his return – for Prague "the most glorious day in all its twelve hundred years of history", according to one Western admirer.<sup>47</sup> He started by quoting Komenský's prophecy: "I too believe in God, that after the passing of the storm's anger, brought down on us by our sins, the government of your affairs will again be returned to you, oh Czech people." This prophecy had come true, Masaryk asserted – the nation was free and independent. Otherwise his speech resembled *The New Europe*: he described the war as a struggle between two camps, where the ideals of justice prevailed: "Mind prevailed over matter, right over violence, truth over deceit."<sup>48</sup>

References to a Czechoslovak nation were curiously absent; instead Masaryk spoke of "we Czechs and Slovaks", "our nation", the "whole nation, the Czechs and Slovaks", and "our Slovaks" – which nevertheless conveyed the idea of one nation. This was characteristic of Masaryk's speeches, articles and letters after the war. When addressing Czechs and Slovaks face to face, he would usually speak of "we Czechs and Slovaks" or "our nation." When addressing only Czechs, he would speak of "we Czechs" and the "Czech nation." When addressing only Slovaks, he emphasized his Slovak blood, and at least on one occasion used the term "Slovak nation." In interviews with the foreign press he emphasized that the Czechs and Slovaks were "the sons of one nation, divided only by differences of dialect" or that "the Slovaks are the same nationality as us." "The Czechoslovak nation" occurs most often in such contexts. Masaryk's identity seems to have been situational, but predominantly Czech.<sup>49</sup>

In his first speech to the Parliament, Masaryk left no doubt whose state it was: "The territory settled by Germans is our territory and will remain ours. We built our state, we upheld it, we will build it again; I would like the Germans to work with us in this – that would be a better policy than their dubious present efforts [at secession.] We formed our state; this determines the state rights position of our Germans, who originally came to the country as immigrants and colonists. We have full right to the riches of our country, indispensable to our industry and to the Germans. We do not want to and cannot sacrifice our considerable Czech minorities in the so-called German areas." Masaryk then switched to Slovak, arguing that it was "absurd that a nation like the Magyars had been allowed to exploit four other nations for that long", including "our Slovaks." He assured the Magyars that "we will not repay evil with evil."<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Donald A. Lowrie: *Masaryk nation builder* (1930:3).

<sup>48</sup> (zvítězil duch nad hmotou, právo nad násilím, pravda nad chytráctvím). Masaryk: *Poselství presidentova* (1924b:3–5), *Cesta demokracie, Soubor projevů za republiky, sv. I 1918–1920* (1933:10–16).

<sup>49</sup> (synové jednoho národa; dělí je jen rozdíl dialektické). (Slováci jsou též národnosti jako my). The quotations are from interviews with *Dělní hřbitov*, a Magyar paper, and *Het Allgemeen Handelsblad* (Amsterdam). See Masaryk (1933: 4, 8, 32, 36, 57, 60, 63, 69, 78, 85, 87, 93, 103, 121, 124, 125, 143, 148, 178, 191, 224, 241, 311, 323, 330, 345, 376).

<sup>50</sup> (území obývané Němci je území naše a zůstane naším. My jsme vybudovali svůj stát, my jsme jej drželi, my jej budujeme znovu; přál bych si, aby naši Němci při tom pracovali s námi – to by byla lepší politika, než jejich pochybné úsilí nyní. [...] My jsme vytvořili náš stát; tím se určuje státoprávní postavení našich Němců, kteří původně do země přišli jako emigranti a kolonisté. Máme plné právo na bohatství našeho území, nezbytného pro průmysl náš i Němců mezi námi. My nechceme, ani můžeme obětovati naše značné menšiny české v t.zv. německém území). (Bolo priamo nesmyselne, že taký národ, akým sú Maďari, smel tak dlúho vykorisťovať štyri iné národy, našich Slovákov) (nebudeme im odplácať zlym). Masaryk (1924b:13–14).

Masaryk's reference to the Germans as colonists predictably led to strong reactions in the German camp. This must be seen in the context of the peace negotiations where establishment of the Czechoslovak borders was on the agenda. In several interviews in February 1919 Masaryk emphasized that the "so-called German area" had been a part of the historical Czech state for ages, basically since the 7th century, and that there had never been any doubt about these borders. The Germans thus knew that they came to the Czech lands, he argued. Moreover, the area in question was not exclusively German; there were also half a million Czechs living there and these could not be abandoned. In Masaryk's view a nation of ten million people (this figure included the Slovaks) could less afford to lose half a million people than a nation of 70 million could afford to lose three million. Besides the "ten million Czechs [!]" were not stupid enough to oppress three million Germans.<sup>51</sup>

Masaryk also argued that ethnically pure states were impossible, and that most of the Magyars in Slovakia were "Magyarized Slovaks" anyway (!).<sup>52</sup> Yet, he emphasized at the Czechoslovak state-nation would be just to the minorities, speaking on October 28th, 1919: "We are now an independent nation, we have our state, [and] we will not be threatened by our former national adversaries, the Germans and the Magyars, the way we were. [...] We formed the state, and it is thus entirely natural that it will have our special character, that lies in [...] the very notion of an independent state. But there will be no brutal denationalization in our republic."<sup>53</sup>

In the first official statements in November and December 1918, the Czechoslovak rhetoric was thus far less pronounced than in the war-time documents. Kramář' speech was very Czech oriented, and he explicitly presented the state as "Czech", while Masaryk did not use the term "Czechoslovak nation", but still conveyed the idea of one nation and presented the state as "ours." It did not take long for the Czechoslovak rhetoric to return; early in 1919 it was back in the speeches in the Parliament, and by 1920 also Kramář spoke of the state as Czechoslovak and of the Czechoslovak nation as its master.<sup>54</sup> However, it never became totally dominant, as we shall see in the next chapter. Part of the reason for the new emphasis on the Czechoslovak nation was probably the German claims that the Czechoslovak state was not a nation-state, but a nationality state where the Czechs did not even comprise a majority.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Interviews in *De Telegraaf* (Amsterdam) 4.2.1919, *Het Algemeen Handelsblad* (Amsterdam) 15.2.1919, *The New York World*, 21.2.1919, *The Sunday Times* (London) 12.3.1920, reprinted (in Czech) in: Masaryk (1933:77, 85, 91, 277).

<sup>52</sup> (Maďari na Slovensku ani nejsou Maďari, největší jejich část jsou pomáďarštělí Slováci). The quotation is from an interview in *Dělní hřbitov* 9.1.1919. See Masaryk (1933:69).

<sup>53</sup> (Jsme nyní národ samostatný, máme stát svůj, nebudeme našimi dřívější národními odpůrci, Němci a Maďari, tak ohroženi, jako jsme byli.[...] Stát vytvořili jsme a proto je docela přirozené, že bude mít svůj zvláštní ráz, to tkví [...] v samém pojmu samostatného státu. Ale v naší republice nebude žádného násilného odnárodnování). Masaryk (1924b:34–35). See also an interview with *A hřek* (a Magyar paper) in: Masaryk (1933:311–12).

<sup>54</sup> See e.g. Vlastimil Tusar (ČSD), 62. schůze N. S. R. Č. dne 10. června 1919 (p. 1913), Václav Bouček (Pokrok). and Alois Tučný (ČS), 63. schůze N. S. R. Č. 11. června 1919 (pp. 1955, 1979), Karel Kramář (ČND), 5. schůze N. S. R. Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 165–66), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Národního shromáždění československého*.

<sup>55</sup> This argument was based on the census of 1910, which gave the Czechs only 46 percent. See *Die Staatsrechtlichen Erklärungen der Abgeordneten und Senatoren der Deutschen, Magyaren und Slowaken* (1920:5).

### *Czechoslovakism in the Constitution of 1920*

In the Constitution of February 29th, 1920, the notion of a Czechoslovak nation was directly mentioned only twice, both times in the Preamble. This Preamble reads, in extenso: "We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect unity of our nation, to establish the reign of justice in the Republic, to assure the peaceful development of our Czechoslovak homeland, to contribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this state and to secure the blessings of freedom to coming generations, have in our National assembly on February 29th 1920 adopted the following Constitution for the Czechoslovak republic. In doing so, we, the Czechoslovak nation, declare that we will endeavor to carry out this constitution as well as all the laws of our country in the spirit of our history as well as in the spirit of the modern principles embodied in the slogan of self-determination; for we want to take our place in the community of nations as a cultivated, peace-loving, democratic and progressive member."<sup>56</sup>

What did a "Czechoslovak nation" mean in this context? Eva Broklová argues that since the formulation "we, the Czechoslovak nation" is an obvious parallel to the same formulation in the preamble of the French and American Constitution, it can only be interpreted in terms of a political nation.<sup>57</sup> I disagree. First, the nation concept was at the time used about a linguistically and culturally defined community, not about nation in a political sense. In the words of Antonín Boháč: "In our lands nationality is not used in the political sense."<sup>58</sup> Besides, when the entire population of the state was implied, the Constitution referred to citizens (*státní občané*) or also to inhabitants (*obyvatelé*) of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Second, a political interpretation of "nation" is unreasonable, especially the second time "we, the Czechoslovak nation" occurs. The "spirit of our history" and "the modern principles embodied in the slogan of self-determination" in the following sentence hardly refer to the citizens of the newly formed Czechoslovak state. On the contrary, this is consistent with the war-time propaganda aiming at Czech and Slovak independence – which is perhaps not surprising, since the author of the Preamble was Jan Herben, a long-term friend of Masaryk. In the debate Herben, after reminding the Parliament that it had been 420 years since the last time the Czech nation freely made its constitution, concluded: "I think that when we after 420 years appear before Europe and the entire world with a constitution, it would be appropriate that we at the head of the constitution place these words: 'We, the Czechoslovak nation...'. "<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The quotation is in the main from the English translation of the preamble in *The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic* (1944), except in the cases where the translation was inaccurate or linguistically awkward. The second reference to the Czechoslovak nation (*národ Československý*) was for instance missing. See also *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920:255). The quotations are also in the following from the English version.

<sup>57</sup> ("My, národ Československý...", což je zřejmou obdobou stejné formulace v ústavě francouzské a americké a jen v takovém smyslu – jako politický národ – interpretovatelnou). Broklová: *Československá demokracie* (1992a:148).

<sup>58</sup> (V našich zemích slova národnosti ve smyslu [...] politickém se neužívá). Antonín Boháč: *Národnost či jazyk*, in: *Československý statistický věstník*, r. II (1921:53).

<sup>59</sup> (Myslil jsem, že by bylo vhodné, když my po 420 letech předstupujeme před Evropu a před celý svět s ústavou, že bychom měli v čelo té ústavy dátí toho heslo: "My, národ československý"). Herben, 126. schůze N. S. R. Č. dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3824) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Národního shromáždění československého*, Svazek IV.

The Constitution as such made no mention of a Czechoslovak nation (or a Czech and Slovak nation for that matter) although it is fairly clear from the debate that this was implied by the references to a "Czechoslovak language" in § 131 and in the Special Language Act in pursuance of § 129. (I will return to this debate in Chapter Eleven.) The Language Act stated in § 1 that "the Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the republic." Since the peace treaty referred to a *Czech* official language, the introduction of a "Czechoslovak" state language represented a shift away from the conception of the state as exclusively Czech.

The Constitution thus marked a watershed in the official rhetoric, if not a complete divide. For example, the Bank Law of 1920, adopted immediately after the Constitution (in April), stated that "the text of bank notes is Czech", adding that the value should also be given in Slovak, Ruthenian, German, Polish and Magyar. Here Slovak was placed on the same level as the minority languages. When the law was amended in 1925, the new formulation was that "the text of the bank notes is in the state, official language", i.e. Czechoslovak.<sup>60</sup>

### *The continuity of Czechoslovak state symbols*

The temporary coat of arms adopted in 1919 consisted of the Czech lion in silver on a red background, thus providing a link to former Czech statehood. The double-tailed lion had been introduced as the coat of arms of the Czech kingdom in the 13th century, replacing Saint



Václav's golden eagle as the heraldic motive. From the second half of the 13th century, the double-tailed lion represented the Bohemian kingdom, while a silver-and-red-checkered eagle on a blue background became the coat of arms of the Moravian margravate.<sup>61</sup>

The final coat of arms that was adopted in 1920 included also the Slovak coat of arms, but always in a secondary position. It came in three sizes. The most common was the small (to the left), where the Slovak coat of arms (the patriarchal cross over three hills, symbolizing Tatra, Fatra and Matra) was placed on the chest of the Czech lion. The oldest evidence of the patriarchal cross dates back to 1190 (a denar of the Hungarian king

Béla III), and it became a symbol of the territory of Slovakia from the 13th century. Three green hills were added in the 14th century. In 1848, Štúr and his followers adopted the silver patriarchal cross on a red background as their symbol, only that they made the hills blue.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup> (§ 18. Text bankovek jest český). (čl. VI. (1) Text bankovek jest v jazyku státním, oficiálním). Zákon ze dne 14. dubna 1920 o akciové bance cedulové (no. 347), and Zákon ze dne 23. dubna 1925, kterým se mění a doplňuje zákon ze dne 14. dubna 1920 č. 347 Sb. z. a n., o akciové bance cedulové (no 102), in: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920:860; 1925:507).

<sup>61</sup> *Dějiny zemí koruny české*, Díl I (1993:72–73).

<sup>62</sup> *Slovakia and the Slovaks. A concise encyclopedia* (1994:618).

The middle size had the Czech double-tailed lion on the front. The reverse side was divided in four, featuring the Slovak coat of arms, the Moravian coat of arms, the Silesian coat of arms, and a newly designed Ruthenian coat of arms. The large version had the Czech coat of arms on the front, while the reverse consisted of two Czech double-tailed lions facing each other, with a shield between them that was divided in seven, one for each of the historical coats of arms plus the Slovakian and Ruthenian. Under the shield was a banner with the motto: *Pravda vítězí* ("the truth prevails"), the old motto of Jan Hus. Apart from in the small coat of arms, Slovakia's coat of arms was thus represented on equal terms with other *regions* in the Czechoslovak state (e.g. Moravia, Silesia), not with the Czech nation.

The old colors of the Czech kingdom were red and white, while Štúr and his followers introduced the Slav tricolor (red–blue–white) as the Slovak flag in 1848. In the flag of Czechoslovakia, the old colors of the Czech kingdom were kept as the main colors. A blue wedge was added, the wedge symbolizing the three hills in the Slovak coat of arms, and the color blue symbolizing Moravia or also the Slav tricolor.<sup>63</sup> The state symbols thus primarily represented continuity with historical Czech statehood. The exception was the national anthem, which was composed of the first verse of *Kde domov můj?* (Where is my home) by Josef Kajetán Tyl and *Nad Tatrou sa blýska* (It is lightening over the Tatras) by Janko Matúška. The former was written in Prague in 1834; the latter in Bratislava in 1844. Both were already in use as national anthems; *Nad Tatrou sa blýska* admittedly along with *Hej Slováci* (wake up, Slovaks – 1834).

### ***Official Czechoslovakism in statistics***

The Czechs and Slovaks were habitually presented as one nation in statistics pertaining to nationality during the entire First Republic. This applies to statistical handbooks, yearbooks, and even the population censuses. The only exceptions are cases where the figures were based on foreign or pre-war statistics (Austrian or Hungarian).

The first statistical handbook, published in 1920, consisted mostly of data from 1910 and thus followed the categorization of the original statistics. However, Slovak school statistics from 1919/20 listed the number of pupils according to language of instruction and nationality – where the categories were "Slovaks and Czechs", "Germans" and "Magyars." At this early stage, the Czechs and Slovaks were counted together, but were not termed Czechoslovaks. In the next volume (1925), schools and the language of education are still alternately "Czech", "Slovak", "Czech and Slovak", "Czech or Slovak", but in the case of the nationality of the students/pupils, Czechs and Slovaks are consistently listed together as "Czechoslovaks." The same goes for the census data from 1921. The statistics distinguish between Czech and Slovak migrants to and from the United States (the source being the US immigration authorities), yet even here the table headings refer to "persons of Czechoslovak nationality."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> See Karel Malý (ed.): *Dějiny českého a československého práva do roku 1945* (1997:289–91). The large coat of arms is pictured in *Album reprezentantů všech oborů veřejného života československého* (1927:7).

<sup>64</sup> *Statistická příručka republiky Československé* (1920:101) (1925:6, 360, 446).



In the third volume, published in 1928, schools, institutions of higher education and language of education were referred to as "Czechoslovak" rather than Czech or Slovak, and even in a table listing books published in 1923 and 1924 according to language, "Czechoslovak" was one category. In fact, "Czechoslovak" was a single category in all tables where nationality was involved. All this also applies to the fourth volume published in 1932.<sup>65</sup>

The handbook was replaced by a statistical yearbook, first issued in 1934. The "Czechoslovak" vocabulary was now firmly established in official statistics, and did not change from one volume to the next. The same vocabulary kept recurring in more specialized statistics, like *Statistický lexikon obcí* (which gave data on the municipal level) or statistical surveys like *Statistický přehled republiky československé* (1930, 1936).

In these handbooks and yearbooks, the Czechoslovak category was used without any specification of what a "Czechoslovak nationality" (*národnost československá*) really meant in practical terms. Yet, in order to compile those statistics, such a specification had to be made. Here the guidelines for the gathering of population census data are of particular interest.

An international debate had been going on among statisticians since the mid-19th century concerning if and how nationality should be included in censuses. In Austria-Hungary, language was included for the first time in the census of 1880; the government reluctantly followed the recommendation of the international statistical congress of 1873.<sup>66</sup> In the Austrian part, language was listed according to "*Umgangssprache*", the language normally used in public – which tended to inflate the number of the economically and politically stronger Germans in mixed areas in the Czech lands. In Hungary "mother tongue" was chosen, but here harassment kept the number of non-Magyars, including Slovaks, artificially low.

A limited census was conducted in Slovakia in 1919, on the order of the Plenipotentiary Minister for Slovakia, Vavro Šrobár. In § 31 in the instruction to the census officials, nationality (*národnost*) was defined thus: "With nationality is meant [...] the national-political conviction of each individual in accordance with the tribal affiliation to a certain national whole or nation." The former suggests a subjective definition of nationhood, the latter was meant as a correction if someone subscribed to a nationality "whose language he does not know at all." Children should be given the same nationality as their parents, the mentally disabled should be listed according to the language spoken. In the form (filled in by an official), Slovak and Czech should be listed together. This was also indicated in the instruction: "In column 15 Slovaks as well as Czechs shall be registered."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> See *Statistická příručka republiky Československé III* (1928:5) for school statistics, p. 19 for published books, *Statistická příručka republiky Československé IV* (1932: 350) for school statistics, p. 369 for published books.

<sup>66</sup> It was discussed at several international statistical congresses, starting in 1853. See Eric Hobsbawm: *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (1992:97), and Boháč (1921:40–58).

<sup>67</sup> (Národnosťou rozumie sa [...] národno-politické presvedčenie jednotlivcovo podľa kmenovej príslušnosti k určitému národnému celku alebo národu). (ktorej reč vôbec nezná). (Do stĺpca 15. zapisujú sa jak Slováci, tak Češi). The instruction is published in *Československý statistický věstník*, r. II (1921: pp. 26 ff.). The quotations are from page 32.

Two full censuses were carried out during the First Republic, the first in February 1921, the second in December 1930. The need for a census was seen as pressing from the very beginning, because "nationality data from the former censuses were unreliable"<sup>68</sup> and besides, the war had affected the population deeply. Yet, a preparatory committee for the first census, consisting mainly of professionals and politicians, was not established until in March 1920. After long discussions the committee rejected mother tongue as well as "*Umgangssprache*" (Czech: *obcovací jazyk*), and opted for a subjective or voluntary definition of nationality.<sup>69</sup>

In the instructions to the census officials, it was emphasized in § 20: "data on nationality must be determined especially conscientiously and in perfect accord with the truth. [...] The census official may only register the nationality that the head of the household declares for himself and minor members of his family and insane persons. Adults shall indicate their nationality to the census official themselves. If a person indicates two nationalities or no nationality at all, he should first be informed properly; if the answer is still not satisfactory, the census official shall determine the nationality of that person on the basis of his mother tongue. [...] The official may change the data on nationality in the census form only in cases where an obvious error has been made. In that case he shall carry out the change with the consent of the person in question, who is to confirm his consent by his signature."<sup>70</sup>

The form should, if possible, be filled in by the head of the family. The instructions attached to the form (for the "head of the household" to read), had a § 8 which concerned the column for nationality. Here it was emphasized that only one nationality could be entered for each person, "for instance Czechoslovak (Czech or Slovak), German, French, Italian etc. By nationality should be understood tribal affiliation, the main external mark of which is usually mother tongue."<sup>71</sup> The first and the second sentence might seem contradictory: Czechoslovak was defined as a nationality, even though Czech and Slovak were separate languages. The answer is of course that Czech and Slovak were regarded as two literary forms of the same language. Nevertheless, no matter what people of Czech or Slovak origin answered – Czech, Slovak or Czechoslovak (the latter was presumably not very common),<sup>72</sup> virtually all statistics pertaining to nationality registered them as "Czechoslovaks."

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<sup>68</sup> (data národnostní z minulých sčítání lidu byla nespolehlivá). *Sčítání lidu v republice Československé ze dne 15. února 1921, Díl I* (1924:7).

<sup>69</sup> See *Sčítání lidu...1921, Díl I* (1924:7–8) for the members. On the debate in the committee, see also Antonín Boháč: *Rádliův sociologický rozbor naší národnostní statistiky*, in *Československý statistický věstník*, r. XI (1930:3).

<sup>70</sup> (Údaje o národnosti musí býti zjištěny se zvláštní svědomitostí a přesně podle pravdy. [...] Do popisných archů smí sčítací komisař zapsati jen tu národnost, kterou mu přednosta domácnosti udá za sebe a nedospělé členy své rodiny a osoby nepřičetné. Osoby dospělé mají sčítánímu komisaři udati samy svoji národnost. Udává-li sčítaná osoba národnosti dvě nebo nepřiznává-li se k národnosti žádné, dlužno ji nejprve řádně poučiti; není-li odpověď ani po tomto poučení uspokojivá, určí sčítání komisař takovýchto osob podle jejich mateřského jazyka. [...] Ve sčítacích arších smí komisař měniti údaj o národnosti jen tehdy, když jde o zřejmou nesprávnost. V tomto případě provede změnu se souhlasem osoby, o níž jde; ta pak potvrdí souhlas svým podpisem). *Sčítání lidu ...1921, Díl I* (1924:9).

<sup>71</sup> (na př. československá (česká neb slovenská), německá, francouzská atd. Národností jest rozuměti kmenovou příslušnost, jejímž hlavním vnějším znakem jest zpravidla mateřský jazyk). *Sčítání lidu ...1921, Díl I* (1924:13).

<sup>72</sup> *Slovák* no. 294, 31.12.1930:6 e.g. reports 11.965 Slovaks, 1.736 Czechs, and 139 Czechoslovaks in Ružomberok in 1930.

The treatment of the Czechs and Slovaks as one Czechoslovak nation is quite consistent throughout the many volumes of statistics based on the census of 1921, in the text parts as well as in the tables. The text part on nationality, for instance, reveals that "The Czechoslovak nation form a majority of almost two-thirds (65.5 %) in the Czechoslovak republic as a whole." Two pages later it is acknowledged that "through the creation of a Slovak literary language in the 19th century, the Czechoslovak nation was divided in two branches: a Czech and a Slovak."<sup>73</sup> The number of Czechs and Slovaks in the various lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia) is then listed. This is in fact one of the very few places in all the census statistics where separate data are given for Czechs and Slovaks.

Following the census of 1921, a new debate on the definition of nationality broke out, which ended with a change of the definition in the second census on December 1st, 1930.<sup>74</sup> According to the instructions (§ 5) "as a rule nationality is registered for each counted person according to mother tongue. A nationality other than the one indicated by mother tongue can only be entered in cases where the person in question speaks the mother tongue neither in his family nor in his household and is able to speak the language of that other nationality perfectly. Jews may nevertheless always declare Jewish nationality. [...] If someone declares two nationalities or none, his nationality is to be registered according to mother tongue."<sup>75</sup> The exemption of the Jews was the same as in 1921; otherwise this was a retreat to a more objective definition of nationhood less susceptible to manipulation. Incidentally, it also made it harder for people who had assimilated to be registered as members of their new national group, which especially affected Magyarized Slovaks. No reference whatsoever was made to a "Czechoslovak" category, or any other national category for that matter.

Again, Czechs and Slovaks are listed together as "Czechoslovaks" in almost all statistics pertaining to nationality. It is stated that, in Czechoslovakia apart from Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the "Czechoslovak nationality is a 70 percent majority and the present core of the population." Also here an overview is given of "the division of the Czechoslovak nation into a Czech and a Slovak branch." Interestingly enough, the title of this table is "the *Czech and Slovak nationality* in 1920 and 1930 according to land" (my emphasis).<sup>76</sup> Yet, this is again an exception; otherwise the "Czechoslovak nationality" keeps recurring.

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<sup>73</sup> (V celé Československé republice tvoří československý národ většinu téměř dvoutřetinovou (65.51 %)). (Vytvořením spisovného jazyka slovenského v 19. století byl rozdělen československý národ ve dvě větve: českou a slovenskou). *Sčítání lidu ...1921, Díl I* (1924:59, 61).

<sup>74</sup> The debate is presented in great detail in Antonín Boháč: *Národnost při druhém Sčítání lidu*, in *Československý statistický věstník*, r. XII (1931:14–30).

<sup>75</sup> (Národnost se zapisuje u každé sčítané osoby [...] zpravidla podle mateřského jazyka. Jinou národnost, než pro kterou svědčí mateřský jazyk, lze zapsati jen tehdy, jestliže sčítaná osoba nemluví mateřským jazykem ani ve své rodině ani v domácnosti a úplně ovládá řeč oné národnosti. Židé mohou však vždy přiznati národnost židovskou. [...] Přízná-li někdo národnosti dvě nebo žádnou, zapíše se jeho národnost podle mateřského jazyka). *Sčítání lidu v republice Československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930, Díl I* (1934:17).

<sup>76</sup> (70tiprocentní většina a současné jádro obyvatelstva [...] jest národnosti československé) (Rozdělení československého národa na větev českou a slovenskou) (Národnost česká a slovenská r. 1920 a 1930 podle zemí). *Sčítání lidu... 1930, Díl I* (1934:47).

### *Czechoslovakism in school textbooks*

Obviously, I have not been able to read every textbook that was used in the First Republic. I have concentrated on sampling Czech and Slovak textbooks, since Czecho-Slovak relations are the focus of this study. I have however included one German-language textbook in history (Lorenz Puffer: *Heimatsgeschichte der Čechoslovakischen republik*, 1924) for the sake of contrast. A major difference between this and the Czech and Slovak textbooks is indeed the approach to the Czechoslovak question, as we shall see.

Textbooks in history have been chosen instead of texts in, say, geography or civics, because this is where I would expect to find attempts at creating a historical foundation for a Czechoslovak identity – something more than the now familiar use of the words "Czechoslovak nation" or "Czechoslovak nationality." However, since such books are "authorized texts" only in the sense that they were approved by the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment, some variation in emphasis is to be expected.

The predilections and idiosyncrasies of the various authors are hard to avoid, but in sampling books I have tried to control variations in emphasis due to level (primary school vs. secondary school), time of publication (early/late in the period) and language (Czech, Slovak). The latter turned out to be one of the most important dividing lines, for reasons I will return to. Not all the books in my sample had been officially approved by the Ministry, or bore the following inscription on the front page: "Approved by decree of the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment of (date), number ..." <sup>77</sup> The number of unauthorized books is greatest in the case of Czech primary-school textbooks. There is only a slight difference in terms of nationalist tendency between these and the books that were approved by the Ministry.

**Table 8: Sample of history textbooks**

Language	For primary schools		For middle schools/gymnasias	
	Approved	Non-approved	Approved	Non-a.
Czech	Soukup I, II 1919, 1921 Gebauerová 1920, Dejmek 1930, Kejř 1935 (4)	Moravec 1921, Pešek 1923, Svačina 1927, Caha 1922, 1930 (almost identical), Jíl 1928 (5)	Bidlo & Šusta 1921, Pešek 1922, Traub 1923, Nikolau, Baxa & Stocký 1924, Lameš & Zpěvák 1935, Bidlo & Šusta 1935 (6)	Pekař 1921 (1)
Slovak	Koreň 1922, 1932 (almost identical), Merhout/Ježo* 1928, Merhout+ 1924, Dejmek, Kratochvíl & Šimko 1927 (4)	Kadlečík (1)	Pešek+ 1924, Vlach/Krecar & Vančík* 1925, Pešek/Šikura* 1926, Nikolau, Baxa & Stocký/ Ondruš* 1926, Hlavinka 1926, Pešek/Žibrita* 1933, Bidlo & Šusta/Chorvát* 1936 (7)	
German			Puffer 1924 (1)	

+ translated from Czech

\* "Slovakized" or adapted for Slovak schools by the person(s) after /. The front pages read "poslovenčil" or "upravil pre...."

<sup>77</sup> (Schváleno výnosem ministerstva školství a národní osvěty ze dne ..., číslo .../Odobreno výnosom ministersva školstva a národnej osvety zo dňa ..., č. ...).

### *History textbooks for primary schools*

All the Czech textbooks in my sample are characterized by a *Czech* rather than a Czechoslovak focus, in the selection of material as well as in vocabulary. The history that is told is the history of the Czech nation, seen through the eyes of a Czech "we." Essentially this is a history of Czech persons and events, Czech triumphs and suffering. Slovak history is marginal in most of the books, often treated in an appendix or mentioned only briefly as a part of Hungarian (i.e. foreign) history. The message that is conveyed in terms of identity is that of a Czech national identity. This is also reflected in the vocabulary; most of the time the books refer to the *Czech* nation, although the Slovaks are sometimes implicitly included in this. Any mention of a "Czechoslovak nation" is rare indeed.

All the Czech textbooks are nationally oriented, in the sense of focusing on the history of the Czech nation rather than on the history of the territory of the Czechoslovak republic. The main difference between the textbooks used in primary school and the those used in secondary school is that the former are more "nationalist", with events and historical persons evaluated in terms of the good or the harm done to the Czech nation. The Germans in particular are negatively evaluated, as is also the Habsburg family. This tendency is even more pronounced in the unauthorized books, but here it is mostly a question of wording.

Let us first take a look at how the "Czechoslovak question" was treated. Several of the books sampled have "Czechoslovak" in the title, but only two feature "Czechoslovak nation." Both these are unauthorized books, and the titles are almost identical: *Stručné dějiny národa československého* (1921) by Eduard Moravec and *Stručné dějiny československého národa* (1927) by Bohumil Svačina. Oddly enough, in the latter the "Czechoslovak nation" does not occur even once in the text, in the former only twice – and then in the context of the Slav forefathers and the founding of the Czechoslovak republic.

Even if a Czechoslovak *nation* is often missing in these books, the notion of Czechoslovak *unity* is not uncommon. This is, however, a unity on Czech premises, which also affects the vocabulary: the Slovaks are often referred to as "our brothers the Slovaks" or "the brotherly branch." Czechoslovak unity is emphasized especially in parts about the Slav forefathers and the Czechoslovak republic and its establishment, occasionally also in the context of Hussism in Slovakia/Jan Jiskra and the national revival. Lack of Czechoslovak unity is most often attributed to the "wild" Magyars, to disunity within the ranks – to which the demise of Great Moravia is attributed – and to the linguistic split during the national revival. Disunity is seen as a Czech shortcoming in general and the cause of the subjugation under the Germans.

As for the Slav forefathers, the main emphasis is on the Czech tribes. The books of Dejmek and Kejř refer briefly to the legend about how forefather Czech brought the Slavs forefathers to *Bohemia* (see Appendix A) – without any mention of the Slovak or Moravian tribes.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Petr Dejmek: *Stopami lidstva. Dějepis pro 6.–8. školní rok obecných škol* (1930:37), Václav Kejř: *Dějepis pro 6. až 8. postupní ročník obecných škol* (1935:22).

The earliest of the Czech textbooks by František Alois Soukup (1919) refers only to Czech tribes in Bohemia and Moravia. Especially interesting is the following statement: "The Czech language was at the time much closer to the languages of other Slav nations than it is today, it was especially close to Polish and the language of the Lusatian Sorbs. [...] The individual tribes of course had their own dialects, just like we also today can observe that people speak differently in various regions. Yet, already in the oldest relics of speech we can observe differences in accent between the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia on the one hand, and the Slovaks on the other hand."<sup>79</sup> This shows that Soukup considered Slovak to be a Czech dialect. If he had regarded Slovak as a separate language, it would be unnatural to mention Polish and the language of the Lusatian Sorbs as the Slav languages that were "especially close" to Czech. Moreover, the differences between Czech and Slovak dialects were presented as regional differences within the same language.

Likewise, Arnošt Caha argued that the "present-day Slovaks (in Slovakia) are the ancestors of the same Slavs as the other Czechs."<sup>80</sup> In his account of the Slav forefathers, Svačina wrote that "also in Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia [there] lived tribes [that were] closely associated with the Czechs and formed one nation with them. The various tribes were later separated from each other only by dialect, dress, habits and customs."<sup>81</sup> Moravec listed the names of the various Slav tribes in Bohemia, adding: "other Slav tribes later settled in Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia. From all these tribes the Czechoslovak nation originated."<sup>82</sup> Finally, Josef Pešek presented the Czechs and Slovaks as one nation in *Matka vlast* (1923): "The Czech, Moravian and Slovak Slavs originally spoke the same language and thus formed one nation, divided only according to tongue or dialect."<sup>83</sup>

Pešek also made a major point of the fact that the Slovaks adopted Czech as a literary language in services and the administration following Jan Jiskra's stay in Slovakia: "And thus the words of the Holy Scripture again after such a long time united the brothers, the Czechs and Slovaks, who in the past had been separated by the 'Magyar sword'."<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> (Jazyk český byl tehdy mnohem příbuznější jazykům ostatních národů slovanských, než je tomu nyní; zejména blízkým byl polštině a jazyku Srbů lužických [...]) Jednotlivé kmeny měly ovšem svá nářečí, tak jako i dnes pozorujeme, že v různých krajinách se různě mluví. Již v nejstarších památkách řeči pozorujeme však rozdíl mezi řečí Čechů v Čechách a na Moravě a mezi řečí Slováků). František Alois Soukup: *Dějepis pro školy měšťanské*. Díl I (1919:68).

<sup>80</sup> (Nynější Slováci (na Slovensku) jsou potomky týchž Slovanů jako ostatní Čechů). Arnošt Caha: *Malé dějiny Československé* (1922: 4). An identical sentence appears in the 1930 edition of the same book, page 7. The title is also the same, only that the hyphen has been removed (*československé* rather than *česko-slovenské*).

<sup>81</sup> (Také na Moravě, a ve Slezsku a na Slovensku bydlili Čechům příbuzní kmenové a tvořili s nimi jeden národ. Jednotlivé kmeny lišily se později od sebe pouze nářečím, krojem, zvyky a obyčejí). Svačina (1927:5).

<sup>82</sup> (Na Moravě, ve Slezsku i na Slovensku usadili se později jiní kmenové slovanští. Z těchto všech kmenů povstal národ československý). Eduard Moravec: *Stručné dějiny národa československého* (1921:4).

<sup>83</sup> (Slované čeští, moravští i slovenští mluvili původně tímž jazykem a tvořili tak národ jediný, rozdělený jen podle nářečí neboli dialektů). Josef Pešek: *Matka vlast* (1923:20). This book was almost certainly used in Czech primary schools, even though it was not approved. My copy is stamped "Šestá obecná škola pro chlapce na Kr. Vinohradech."

<sup>84</sup> (A tak slova Písma na kolik věků spojoval opět bratry, Čechy a Slováky, které byl kdysi rozloučil "meč maďarský"). Pešek (1923:176).

Several authors mentioned the campaigns of the Hussite warriors in Slovakia in a positive vein, although the emphasis varies somewhat. In Soukup's version Hussism "again awakened "Czech-ness" among the Slovaks",<sup>85</sup> while Caha and Moravec wrote that the Czech Hussites became awakeners and founders of national enlightenment in Slovakia.<sup>86</sup> Svačina actually attributed to the Hussites a role in strengthening Slovak national consciousness: "The Hussites [...] spread enlightenment in Slovakia and strengthened Slovak national consciousness."<sup>87</sup> Kejř emphasized the positive effects of the sojourn of Jan Jiskra and the Hussites in Slovakia, without making any inference to identity or Czechoslovak unity, and pointed out that "the Czech language gained great esteem and was also the language of administration some places." Dejmek merely stated that Czech hymns and the Czech language spread in Slovakia at the time.<sup>88</sup> What they all had in common (apart from Dejmek) was that the effects of Hussism in Slovakia were eyed favorably.

It is obvious from the description of the national revival that several textbook authors regarded the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation, although this was not always made explicit. The Slovaks Ján Kollár and Pavel Josef Šafařík were mentioned among the Czech awakeners, often without pointing out their Slovak origin. More importantly, four of the authors reproached the Slovaks for breaking away from literary Czech, and the argument was that by doing so they broke the unity with the Czechs. Yet, the author of the most recent of the approved books, Kejř (1935), merely reported that the Slovaks (the "Slovak brothers") had chosen their own literary language.<sup>89</sup>

Dejmek found it "unfortunate" that "some Slovaks left the common Czech literary language and started writing in Slovak, through which the separation and estrangement between the brotherly branches was fatally deepened."<sup>90</sup> Caha wrote of the revival of our "brothers the Slovaks" that they through their codification of Slovak as a literary language "separated from the Czech literary language, causing great harm to us and themselves."<sup>91</sup> Svačina argued in the same vein: "By the separation of the Slovaks from literary Czech great harm was done to the Slovaks as well as to us. Czechoslovak unity was broken by it and the struggle for freedom against the Magyars became harder."<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> (zájezdy husitských vojsk na Slovensko budily znovu češství mezi Slováky). Soukup (1919:25).

<sup>86</sup> Moravec (1921:47), Caha (1922:37–38), Caha (1930:51). (The text is identical in both editions).

<sup>87</sup> (husité [...] šířili na Slovensku vzdělanost a upevnil národní vědomí slovenské). Svačina (1927:38).

<sup>88</sup> (Český jazyk nabyl veliké vážnosti a někde byl i úředním jazykem). Kejř (1935:57); Dejmek (1930:74).

<sup>89</sup> Kejř (1935:88, 110).

<sup>90</sup> (Neblahým činem však bylo, že nekteří Slováci později opustili společný spisovný jazyk český a počali psáti slovensky, čímž odtržení i odcizení bratrských větví bylo osudně prohloubeno). Dejmek (1930:114–15).

<sup>91</sup> (Tak se Slováci odtrhli od písemnictví českého na velikou škodu naši a svou). Caha (1922:54), Caha (1930:69).

<sup>92</sup> (Odtržením Slováků od spisovné češtiny byla však způsobena velká škoda jak Slovákům tak i nám. Jednota československá byla tím porušena a boj za svobodu s Maďary byl těžší). Svačina (1927:71).

A more elaborated version may be found in *Dějepis pro školy měšťanské* (1920) by Marie Gebauerová, A. Jirák and A. Reitler: "the Czech patriots (among them also the Slovaks Kollár and Šafařík) warned the Slovaks and asked them not to separate from the Czechs linguistically, but in vain. [...] The literary independence of the Slovaks was detrimental to both nations, but especially to the Slovaks themselves. Literary Slovak attracted neither the disloyal nobility nor brought the two religious camps closer together; the Magyars suppressed the Slovaks even more after that. The greatest disadvantage for the Slovaks was that they separated from the sources of Czech culture and education, which developed so beautifully in the second half of the 19th century."<sup>93</sup> This stereotype of the Czechs as more "cultured" than the Slovaks was quite common, as we shall see in the next chapter. It went together with a notion that the Czechs contributed, while the Slovaks benefited.

Yet, according to Gebauerová et al. there was hope for the Slovaks: "In the last decades conscious Slovaks have made up for the error themselves by sending their sons to study in Czech middle schools and in some cases in Czech higher schools. Out of these the best heralds of Czecho-Slovak unity developed. The awareness that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation, even with two literary languages, did not die out, the proof of which is the combined efforts of the sons of both the tribes of the nation during the world war at home as well as abroad." When referring to the resistance during the war, however, Gebauerová consistently used terms like the "Czech nation", "Czechs at home", "Czechs abroad."<sup>94</sup>

The idea that the linguistic separation was harmful was nothing new, as we have seen in Chapter Seven. In the 1910 version of the same textbook, Gebauerová stated that "the separation of the Slovaks from the Czech literary language was detrimental to the Czech nation."<sup>95</sup> In this edition, however, no explicit mention is made of the Czechs and Slovaks as being one nation, although it is implied that the Slovaks were Czechs, too; otherwise their linguistic separation could hardly be considered a loss. On this point the text from 1920 is self-contradictory: The Czechs and Slovaks were presented as *two* nations when referring to the linguistic split, and *one* nation later on – "even with two literary languages." This in itself is an indication that Czechoslovak unity was more a program than a living reality.

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<sup>93</sup> (Čeští vlastenci (mezi nimi i Slováci Kollár a Šafařík) varovali Slováky a žádali jich, aby se od Čechů literárně neoddělovali, ale marně. [...] Literární osamostatnění Slováků bylo na škodu pro oba národy, zvláště pak pro Slováky samé. Spisovná slovenština nepřivábila ani odpadlé šlechty, ani nesblížila obou táborů náboženských; Maďaři pak Slováky utlačovali stále více. Největší škodou pro Slováky bylo, že se odloučili od zdrojů vzdělanosti české, která v druhé polovici XIX. století tak krásně se vyvinula). M. Gebauerová, A. Jirák, A. Reitler: *Dějepis pro školy měšťanské* (1920:21). "Vzdělanost" in Czech means education as well as sophisticated manners, cultured. (Norwegian: "dannelse").

<sup>94</sup> (V posledních desetiletích uvědomělí Slováci napravovali chybu sami tím, že své syny posílali na studia do českých středních škol, po případě na české školy vysoké. Z nich vyvinuli se nejlepší hlasatelé česko-slovenské jednoty. Vědomí, že Čechové a Slováci jsou jeden národ, byť i s dvojím spisovným jazykem neuhasl, čehož důkazem je společná práce synův obou kmenů národa za světové války a to doma i za hranicemi). ("český národ", "Čechové doma", Čechové za hranicemi."). Gebauerová (1920:21, 104–05).

<sup>95</sup> (Škodou pro národ český bylo odtržení Slováků od spisovného jazyk českého). Marie Gebauerová: *Dějepis pro školy měšťanské*, Díl III (1910:24).



Pešek emphasized the role of the revival in revitalizing Czechoslovak unity. Under the title "For that our Slovak language" he wrote that, before the revival, "people regarded themselves solely as Hanák, Slovak etc. and felt themselves to be inhabitants of Moravia and Slovakia, set apart from the Czechs. They forgot that, being in reality one national stem, they are all Czechoslovaks. [...] The Slovak national revival is a part of the Czech revival, and is directly linked to the Czech Reformation. The Slovak awakeners understood that we are one body, one blood, and one spirit. They spoke of Czechoslovanes and Czechoslavs." Masaryk's influence is clear in the reference to the Czech Reformation. Yet, Pešek also claimed that "in Bohemia and Moravia and some places in Slovakia [...] the linguistic split was regarded as a fatal disaster in terms of education as well as nationally for the Czechs and the Slovaks."<sup>96</sup>

Czechoslovak unity was most strongly and most often advocated in the context of the establishment of the Czechoslovak state. After referring to the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918, where "the Slovaks declared that they were a part of the unitary Czechoslovak nation [and] joined the Czechoslovak state", A. Jíl stated that the "unity of the nation was renewed after 900 years."<sup>97</sup> At the same time, however, "Czech" and "Czechoslovak" were to a large degree used as synonyms. Of special interest is the tendency to replace "Czechoslovak" with "Czech" in contexts where the former would be more appropriate.

Moravec stated that "after 300 years of oppression, the *Czechs* declared their country a republic, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia",<sup>98</sup> while Jíl claimed that "Karel Kramář declared the Habsburg family as dethroned and the *Czech* country as a republic." This cannot be attributed to the original; Kramář stated that "our Czechoslovak state is a free Czechoslovak republic."<sup>99</sup> Writing as late as 1930, Dejmek claimed that "a Czech state was solemnly pronounced by Masaryk already on October 18th in Washington", and that "a revolutionary parliament of all Czech and Slovak political parties [...] declared the Habsburg family as dethroned, the *Czech* state a republic and Masaryk its first president. We also occupied the German border areas and brotherly Slovakia by military means."<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> (Jednotlivci se pokládali pouze za Hanáky, Slováky atd. a cítili se jako obyvatelé Moravy a Slovenska, odlišní od Čechů. Zapomínali, že jsou vlastně jeden národní kmen, že jsou všichni Čechoslováci. [...] Slovenské obrození je částí obrození českého, souvisí tam přímo s českou reformací. Slovenští buditelé pochopili, že jsme jedno tělo, jedna krev, jeden duch. Mluvili o Čechoslovánech a Čechoslavii). (V Čechách a na Moravě a leckde i na Slovensku [...] jazykovou odluku [...] pokládali za osudnou pohromu osvětovou i národní pro Čechy i pro Slováky). Pešek (1923:304–05, 308). Hanák is a Moravian dialect spoken in the Olomouc area. See Lamprecht: *Historická mluvnice češtiny* (1986:422–23).

<sup>97</sup> (prohlašují Slováci, že jsou částí jednotného národa československého, přihlašují se k státu československému [...] Jednota národa je po 900 letech obnovena!) (Jíl 1928:66).

<sup>98</sup> (My emphasis). (Čechové prohlásili po 300letém útisku svou vlast republikou, zahrnující Čechy, Moravu, Slezsko a Slovensko). Moravec (1921:41).

<sup>99</sup> (Karel Kramář prohlásil rod habsburský za sesazený s trůnu, země české za republiku). (Jíl 1928:66). (náš stát československý je svobodnou československou republikou). Karel Kramář: *Řečí a projevy předsedy první vlády československé Dr. Karla Kramáře* (1935:15).

<sup>100</sup> (My emphasis). (Český stát byl Masarykem slavnostně prohlášen již 18. října 1918 ve Washingtoně). (revoluční Národní shromáždění ze všech politických stran českých a slovenských [...] prohlásilo rod Habsburský za sesazený, český stát republikou a Masaryka jejím prvním prezidentem. Odsadili jsme vojensky i německé kraje pohraniční a bratrské Slovensko). Dejmek (1930:154, 155).

Likewise, Svačina claimed that on October 28th the "National Committee [...] issued a solemn declaration that the ancient dream of the *Czech* nation had come true: An independent, Czechoslovak state. It was the most memorable day in Czech history."<sup>101</sup> In Caha's version, the National Committee declared that "the ancient dream of our nation had come true: independence of the Czechoslovak state." *Our nation* must, however, be interpreted as the *Czech* nation in light of the next sentence: "The Czech nation rejoiced, all Czechs were overcome by sweet sensations; it was a day as if taken out of the most beautiful fairytale in the world."<sup>102</sup>

In Dejmek's version: "the Czech nation again breathed freely, after almost 300 years, enjoying that in line with the prophecy of Komenský, 'the government of its affairs was again returned in its hand'. [...] On October 30th also the Slovaks declared state unity with us; the world war rectified a thousand years of injustice and freed them from the clutches of the Magyars – as [it freed] us from the oppression of the Germans and Habsburgs." The Czech focus is even clearer in his final appeal, where he asked "you, the Czech youth" to keep building the state.<sup>103</sup>

Although Svačina's focus was clearly Czech (he also wrote of "the struggle of the Czech nation for freedom", "the fate of the Czech nation", "the right of the Czech nation to independence" Masaryk as "the greatest son of the Czech nation" etc.<sup>104</sup>), he mostly referred to the state as "Czechoslovak." His treatment of Milan Rastislav Štefánik co-founder of the state, however, indicates that the liberation was seen as a Czech project: "The talented Slovak Milan Štefánik was of great service to the Czech endeavors for liberation."<sup>105</sup>

The contrasts are striking between Kejř's appeal to Czechoslovak unity in the parts about the Czechoslovak republic and the Czech focus of the rest of his book: "We love our nation, we are proud of our past and therefore we esteem the present so much. Our history has taught us too well that we will preserve the state only through unity and love to our own state. The best guarantee of the safety and duration of the Czechoslovak republic is national unity with the Slovaks. Czechs and Slovaks must be one body and one blood, devoted to their state in life and death."<sup>106</sup> Even here the point of departure is obviously a Czech "we."

<sup>101</sup> (Národní výbor [...] vydal slavnostní prohlášení, že splnil se odvěky sen českého národa: samostatnost státu československého. Byl to nej památ nější den v dějinách českých). Svačina (1927:75).

<sup>102</sup> (se splnil odvěky sen národa našeho: samostatnost státu československého. Národ český jásal, sladké opojení zmocnilo se všech Čechů; byl to den jako vyňatý z nejkrásnější pohádky na světě). Caha (1930:76), Caha (1922:60).

<sup>103</sup> (Národ český téměř po 300 letech opět svobodně vydechl, raduje se, že dle věštby Komenského "vláda věcí jeho vrátila se opět do jeho rukou" [...] Dne 30. října prohlásili i Slováci státní jednotu s námi, světová válka napravila tisíciletou křivdu a osvobodila je ze spárů Maďarů – jako nás z útlatu Němců a Habsburků). (ty pak, mládeži česká). Dejmek (1930:154, 158).

<sup>104</sup> (Boj českého národa za svobodu, osud českého národa, práva národa českého na samostatnost, největšího syna českého národa). Svačina (1927:72–76).

<sup>105</sup> (Velké služby prokázal českým snahám za osvobození nadaný Slovák Milan Štefánik). Svačina (1927:73).

<sup>106</sup> (Svůj národ milujeme, jsme hrdi na jeho minulost, a proto si tolik vážíme přítomnosti. Dějiny nás dostatečně poučily, že stát udržíme pouze svorností a láskou k vlastnímu státu. Nejlepší zárukou bezpečnosti a trvání Československé republiky je národní jednotu se Slováky. Čech a Slovák musí býti jedno tělo a jedna krev, oddaní na život a na smrt svému státu). Kejř (1935:105–06).

As for the factors that allegedly harmed Czechoslovak unity – or the unity of the Czech nation, depending on the viewpoint, I have already mentioned the statements about the linguistic split. Other factors were the coming of the Magyars, and internal disunity. Dejmek emphasized the negative effects of Magyar rule on Czecho-Slovak reciprocity: "Slovakia languished under their rule for almost 1000 years and during that time, the chasm between the two branches of the brotherly nation deepened even more, and the awareness of shared affiliation disappeared among the Slovaks."<sup>107</sup> The Magyars were in general described as wild or even as barbarians. According to Caha "The German king Arnulf asked the wild Magyars for help against them [i.e. the Moravians]", and "From the time [of Břetislav, 1035-1055] until 1918 Slovakia languished under the yoke of the Magyar barbarians."<sup>108</sup>

The charge of "disunity" is a recurrent theme in these books. While there was broad agreement that the positive features of the Slav forefathers were their hospitality, good-heartedness, diligence, peace-lovingness and courage, their bad feature was in Caha's words "disunity and quarrelsomeness, which more than once brought them to the brink of ruin."<sup>109</sup> The disunity theme reoccurs twice in Svačina's text, in the context of the demise of Great Moravia: "But the sons of Svatopluk soon forgot the advice of their father to stand together, they quarreled among themselves about the inheritance, and thus the Czechs separated from the Great Moravian empire. [...] The disunity of the sons of Svatopluk was responsible for the demise of the Great Moravian empire."<sup>110</sup> A similar motive may be found in Pešek's *Matka vlast*: "The Czechs took advantage of the disunity between the [brothers] and separated from the Great Moravian empire."<sup>111</sup>

Soukup combined the Magyar and the disunity motives: King Arnulf tried to force Svatopluk to submission. When he was not able to do it himself, he called on the wild Magyars for help. Just at this dangerous time Svatopluk died, dividing the empire between his three sons; the others were to abide the oldest, Mojmir II. This they did not, and when the Magyars attacked the Great Moravian empire, the disunited brothers were not able to defend themselves."<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> (Slovensko však úpelo pod jejich vládou téměř 1000 let a během té doby prohlubovala se čím dal více propast mezi oběma větvemi bratrského národa a mezi Slováky mizelo vědomí společné příslušnosti). Dejmek (1930:40).

<sup>108</sup> (Německý král Arnulf pozval si na pomoc proti nim divoké Maďary). (Od té doby až do r. 1918 úpelo Slovensko v područí maďarských barbarů). Caha (1930:14, 18).

<sup>109</sup> (Předkové naši byli pohostinní, dobrosrdeční, střídmí, pracovití, mírumilovní, ale stateční. Jejich nepěknou vlastností byla nesvornost a hašteřivost, jež je nejednou přivedla na okraj záhuby). Caha (1930:8), Caha (1922:4–5). See also Moravec (1921:5), Jíl (1928:12), Svačina (1927:5).

<sup>110</sup> (Ale synové Svatoplukovi brzy zapomněli na radu otce, aby byli svorní, mezi sebou se svěřili o dědictví a proto se Čechové od říše velkomoravské odtrhli). (Nesvornost synů Svatoplukových zaviněna byl pád říše velkomoravské). Svačina (1927:10, 24).

<sup>111</sup> (Nesvárů těch užili Čechové a od říše velkomoravské se odtrhli). Pešek (1923:41).

<sup>112</sup> (král Arnulf. Snažil se přinutit Svatopluka k poslušnosti. Když sám nemohl toho dokázat, povoloval si na pomoc divoké Maďary. Právě v této nebezpečné době zemřel Svatopluk, rozděliv říši třem synům; nejstaršího z nich, Mojmir II měli ostatní být poslušni. Toho však neučinili, a když Maďaři přepadli říši velkomoravskou, nemohli se nesvorní bratři ubránit). Soukup (1919:66).

Kejř was less specific about the Slav features than many of the others and he did not mention disunity as a bad habit. Yet, he at least implicitly presented it as a reason for the Czech separation from Great Moravia and its demise: "When Svatopluk died (in 894), Bohemia separated from the Great Moravian empire during the reign of his three disunited sons, and around 906 the great Slav state succumbed to the incursion of the wild Mongolian Magyars. [...] After the devastation of the Great Moravian empire they occupied Slovakia, which until recently remained in their power. Czech rulers later several times made attempts at liberating their unfortunate brothers, but always succeeded only for short periods. Czechoslovak unification could be realized only after the world war in a Czechoslovak republic."<sup>113</sup>

Czech primary-school textbooks in history thus convey a Czech rather than a Czechoslovak identity. Let us now turn briefly to the question of historical contents: What events, periods and persons were emphasized, and how were they evaluated?

The emphasis was placed more on the Přemyslid kings than on the Great Moravian empire; the Czech founding myths were at least mentioned, and in one case (Pešek's *Matka vlast*) even retold. The legends of forefather Czech (Čech) and of Krok, Libuše and Přemysl were most often mentioned. Dejmek even referred to Krok as being "possibly Samo's grandson."<sup>114</sup> The evaluation of the last Přemyslids and Karel IV varied somewhat because of the German question, while Jan Hus, Hussism and the Hussite king, Jiří of Poděbrady, were positively evaluated (or even panegyrically praised). The Battle of the White Mountain was seen as a national disaster, and the *temno* (darkness) was regarded a national disgrace. Otherwise, due emphasis was given to the national revival (*obrození*) and the national struggle for national rights, autonomy and finally independence. The Germans and partly the Magyars were presented as enemies of the Czech nation, as was the Habsburg ruling house. The Slovaks were, as already suggested, most often mentioned in the context of the Slav immigration, the national revival, and the establishment of Czechoslovakia.

Anti-German sentiment runs like a scarlet thread through these books, the approved ones being no exception. Dejmek even reproduced the old myth of the aggressive German and the mild Slav: "The Western Slavs have ever since struggled with Germanic [tribes] (the Germans). Their conflicting basic features collide: The outstanding feature of the Germans is domination, the Slavs love freedom. The Germans strove to rule the Slavs, the Slavs defended their freedom. From this stems the never-ending chain of disputes between them."<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> (Když (r. 894) Svatopluk zemřel, odtrhly se za vlády jeho tří nesvorných synů od velkomoravské říše Čechy a kolem r. 906 podlehl veliký slovanský stát nájezdu divokých mongolských Maďarů. [...] Po zničení velkomoravské říše zabrali Slovensko, které zůstalo až donedávna v jejich moci. Čeští panovníci se pokoušeli později několikrát, aby osvobodili nešťastné bratry, ale podařilo se to vždy jen nakrátko. Československé sjednocení mohlo být uskutečněno až po světové válce v republice československé). Kejř (1935:23–26).

<sup>114</sup> (Krok, snad Samův vnuk). Dejmek (1930:37).

<sup>115</sup> (Západní Slované od té doby do dneška zápolí s Germány (Němci). Srážejí se jejich protichůdné rysy základní: Germáni vyznačují se panovačností, Slované milují svobodu. Germáni usilovali ovládnouti Slované, Slované bránili své svobody. Odtud nekonečný řetěz sporů mezi nimi). Dejmek (1930:36).

Anti-German sentiment was also expressed in disapproval of the kings who had been responsible for bringing Germans to the Czech lands or for increasing German influence. This even goes for kings who were otherwise hailed. According to Soukup, "the rule of Saint Václav was opposed by Czech nobility and Václav's brother Boleslav. They reproached him for too much compliance to the German king and generosity to the priests, who were mostly of German origin."<sup>116</sup> Soukup did not defend the Czech patron saint against these allegations.

Most severely attacked were the last Přemyslids. Of Přemysl Otakar II (1253-78) Soukup wrote: "Přemysl II favored the Germans even more than his father. [...] In Prague German was spoken at his court [...] He founded many German towns, more than 50 monasteries, manned almost exclusively by German monks [...] like his forefather, he signed with the Old German name Ottaker, instead of the beautiful Old Czech name Přemysl."<sup>117</sup>

Caha reproached Přemysl I Otakar (1197-1230) and his son Václav I for inviting the Germans to the Czech lands, for encouraging German ways at the court and for founding German towns. And although "they were the only ruling family of Czech blood", "the last Přemyslids had very little Czech blood (their mothers, grandmothers etc. were German). [...] They became estranged from our nation also [by the fact] that they so eagerly settled Germans here." And three pages later: "The Germanization of the Royal court, several powerful noble families, a large part of the higher and lower clergy and later the growth of numerous German towns and villages was a *very grave danger for the future of our nation*."<sup>118</sup> Here the Czechness (or rather the lack of such) of the ruling house was actually linked in with blood kinship.

Likewise, Dejmek reproached the Přemyslids for seeking German support when they felt weak, and for marrying German princesses. The result of this was that the family "was Germanized to an extent that the last Přemyslids were Germans not only in mentality, but some of them were not even able to speak Czech." Under Přemysl I, "Germanization was unfortunately not limited to the ruling family and the court, but affected also the entire Bohemia and Moravia. Under the last Přemyslids, the foundation was laid for the first national division of these lands, which is to this day their ill fate."<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> (Proti vládě sv. Václava vystoupil čeští pánové s bratrem Václavovým Boleslavem. Vytýkali mu přílišnou povolnost k německému králi a štědrost ke kněžím, kteří bylo většinou německého původu). Soukup (1919:71).

<sup>117</sup> (Přemysl II. přál Němcům ještě více, než sám jeho otec. [...] V Praze při jeho dvoře mluvilo se německý [...] Mnoho německých měst založil, na 50 klášterů, osazených téměř výhradně německými mnichy [...] místo pěkného staročeského jména Přemysl podepisoval se, jako děd jeho, staroněmeckým jménem *Ottaker*). Soukup (1919:117).

<sup>118</sup> (byli jedinou panovnickou rodinou české krve. Ale poslední Přemyslovci měli české krve pramálo (jejich matky, babičky atd. byly Němky). [...] Národu našemu se odcizili a tím, že tak horlivě usazovali u nás Němce). Caha (1922:18), Caha (1930:26). (Poněmčení královského dvora, několika mocných rodů šlechtických a veliké části vyššího duchovenstva i řeholnictva, pak vznik četných měst a vesnic německých byly *velmi vážným nebezpečím pro budoucnost našeho národa*). (Original emphasis). Caha (1922:15, 19–20), Caha (1930:24, 29).

<sup>119</sup> (poněmčil se rod tak, že poslední Přemyslovci nejen smýšlením byli Němci, ale někteří již ani česky mluví neuměli). (Žel, že poněmčování neomezilo se na panovnický rod a dvořanstvo, ale zasáhlo i celé Čechy a Moravu. Za posledních Přemyslovců byl založen základ k prvnímu národnímu rozdělení těchto zemí, které jim je podnes zlou sudbou). Dejmek (1930:51).

In the conception of these history texts, the legacy of the Přemyslids was thus dual: on the one hand, they united the Czech lands; on the other hand, they "put the nation at risk by Germanization."<sup>120</sup> The German colonization of the Czech lands was on the whole often presented as disadvantageous for the Czechs, although Kejř gave "German immigrants, colonists" credit for influencing the situation of the serfs to the better.<sup>121</sup>

Caha even charged the otherwise celebrated Karel (Karl IV) with favoring everything German. Karel was thus "not the best and greatest Czech ruler. His generosity towards the clergy (which corrupted the priests and through them also the common people) and his benevolence towards the Germans, *did so much harm to the Czech nation that only the Hussite movement saved our nation from disaster.*" In the 1930 edition, the reference to the Hussite movement was omitted, but even here Karel "did very much harm to the Czech nation."<sup>122</sup>

Kejř agreed that "the shadowy side of the rule of Karel for the Czech state was the increasing German influence. German predominated at the Royal court and all higher public and religious organs were filled by members of the German nation. The clergy consolidated their power the most [...] The affluence loosened the morale, especially among the nobility and in the church. A correction movement, Hussism, therefore later arose, saving our nation, at least for some time, not only from moral corruption but also nationally." Likewise Svačina presented Karel as "a patron of the Germans. His court was German and the towns were administered in German. Foreigners, mainly Germans, poured in to Bohemia, harming the Czech nation." Karel was also blamed for the moral decline of the church.<sup>123</sup>

This stands in stark contrast to other, positive images of Karel. Soukup portrayed Karel as a defender of the Czech case, arguing that he, "with the consent of Pope Clement VI, his former teacher, raised the Prague bishopric to an Archbishopric in order to prevent every German influence on Czech affairs [...] Because of his love for the nation, the country and the language, his care for the serfs, his peaceful disposition, which saved the country from the destruction of war, and his fine personal qualities, Karel IV was called the 'father of the country'." Also Dejmek spoke well of Karel: "Karel I contributed so much to the Czech lands that he is still being called the 'father of the country' ".<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> (ohrozili národ poněmcením). Jíl (1928:26, 28). See also Svačina (1927:23), Soukup (1919:122) and Kejř (1935:33).

<sup>121</sup> (vlivem přistěhovalých Němců, kolonistů). Kejř (1935:35).

<sup>122</sup> (Avšak nejlepším a největším panovníkem český nebyl. Jeho štědrost k duchovenstvu (jež znemravňovala kněze a jimi i lid obecný) a jeho blahovůle k Němcům *tak poškodila národ český, že jen hnutí husitské zachránilo národ náš od záhuby*). (Original emphasis). Caha 1922:22. (blahovůle k Němcům velmi poškodila národ český). Caha (1930:31).

<sup>123</sup> (Stínem Karlovy doby pro český stát je silně se rozmahající němectví. Němčina vládla i u dvora a všechny vyšší úřady veřejné a duchovní byly obsazeny příslušníky německého národa. Nejvíce upevnilo své panství duchovenstvo. [...] Blahobyt uvolnil mravy, zvláště mezi šlechtou a v církvi. Proto vzniklo pozdější opravné hnutí, husitství, jež zachránilo alespoň na čas národ nejen od zkázy mravní, ale i národnostní). Kejř (1935:40). See also Svačina (1927:28).

<sup>124</sup> (Aby zabránil každému vlivu Německa na české záležitosti, povýšil se svolením papeže Klimenta VI., svého bývalého učitele, pražské biskupství na arcibiskupství). (Pro lásku k národu, zemi a jazyku, pro vzornou péči o poddané, pro mírumilovnost, jíž uchránil zemi válečné zhouby a pro milé osobní vlastnosti nazván byl Karel IV. "otcem vlasti"). Soukup (1921:7,10). (Karel I. zvelebil zemi české tak, že bývá nazýván "otcem vlasti"). Dejmek (1930:61).

Hussism was generally praised as the most glorious period in Czech history. Hus was presented as the "the greatest man ever born in the Czech land" (Soukup); "the thirteenth apostle of Christ, the first apostle of freedom and a martyr for the truth"; "an ideal man, a champion of the freedom of conscience and an excellent patriot" (Moravec); and a "good, [nationally] conscious Czech" (Caha).<sup>125</sup> Of Hus as a patriot (*vlastenec*), Soukup wrote: "Hus voiced that the Czechs should respect their mother tongue and not ruin it with German words. He maintained that the Czechs should decide in Bohemia, not foreigners. Not only in words, but also in all his life he upheld the honor of his nation and encouraged every Czech to do the same, to be proud of being Czech [...] He gave us an example of true patriotism."<sup>126</sup>

Dejmek's conception of Hussism was clearly inspired by Palacký and Masaryk: "Our small nation at that time drew upon itself the attention of the entire world. [...] What makes a small nation strong enough to withstand a whole world of enemies by its own modest strength? [...] It is that great and beautiful idea of liberating the human spirit from the bonds of church enslavement, it is the great idea of democracy, which gives all social strata of the nation the right to decide on their common interests together." Dejmek also echoed Masaryk's view of continuity between Hussism and the national revival, although he admitted that "Hussism was suppressed in Lipany and wiped out of the memories of people after the White Mountain." However, "when it was exonerated by Palacký and the correct view of it again was spread among the Czech people through the schools, it became one of those driving forces which during the world war led to a new liberation of the nation", he claimed.<sup>127</sup>

In Kejř's view "the Hussite wars had influence not only on national awakening, but also on the growth in education among the broad masses of the people. [...] The war also of course led to great gains from a national point of view. The towns and thus also the Czech land rapidly became Czechized. Traces of the national awakening may also be observed in Moravia and Silesia. If it had not been for the national disunity, the nation could have been spared many bad moments and the oppression that awaited us in the nearest future."<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> (největší muž, jakého kdy země česká zrodila). Soukup (1921:18, 19). (Hus byl třináctým apoštolem Kristovým, prvním apoštolem svobody a mučedníkem pro pravdu. Český národ ctí jej jako vzor člověka, bojovníka pro volnost svědomí a vzorného vlastence). Moravec (1921:21, 23). (Hus byl dobrým, uvědomělým Čechem). Caha (1922:27, 35).

<sup>126</sup> (Hus hlásal, že Čechové mají si vážiti své mluvy mateřské a nemají ji kaziti německými slovy. Tvrdil, že v Čechách má rozhodovati Čech, nikoli cizozemec. Ale nejen slovy, nýbrž i celým životem činil čest svému národu a snažil se, aby každý Čech činil totéž; byl hrdým na to, že je Čech [...] Dal nám příklad pravého vlastenectví). Soukup (1921:18, 19).

<sup>127</sup> (Malý náš národ poutal tehdy k sobě pozornost celého světa. [...] Co činí malý národ tak silným, že odolává celému světu nepřátel vlastními nepatrnými silami? [...] je to veliká a krásná myšlenka *osvobození lidského ducha* z pout církevní poroby, je to veliká myšlenka *demokracie*, která všem vrstvám národa dává spolurozhodovati o společných zájmech). (Husitství bylo sice na Lipanech udušeno a v pozdějších dobách pobělohorských i z paměti lidu vyhlazeno [...] ale když Palackým bylo očištěno a školou rozšířeno v českém lidu opět správný názor na ně, stalo se jednou z oněch hybných sil, které za světové války vedly k novému osvobození národa). Dejmek (1930:73, 74). (Original emphasis).

<sup>128</sup> (Husitské války měly vliv nejen na národní probuzení, ale i na rozvoj vzdělanosti v nejširších vrstvách obyvatelstva. [...] Velký zisk přinesly války ovšem také po stránce národnostní. Města a tím i země Česká se rychle počesťovala. Stopy národního probuzení můžeme pozorovati také na Moravě a ve Slezsku. Nebýtí národní nesvornosti, mohl býtí národ ušetřen mnoha zlých okamžiků a útisku, jež naň čekaly v nejbližší budoucnosti). Kejř (1935:51, 52).

Others spelled out this disunity theme in more detail, and tied it directly to the Battle of Lipany. In Pešek's words: "What an army of hundred thousands, gathered from almost the entire Europe could not achieve, Czech disunity and lack of love did at Lipany on May 30th, 1434. At Lipany Czech killed Czech, brother killed brother. The Battle of Lipany was the tomb of Hussite strength and glory."<sup>129</sup> Likewise, Svačina saw the Battle of Lipany as one of "saddest moments of the Czech nation. [...] Lipany is the tomb of Hussite glory and power, at Lipany the rule of the Czech people, the Czech democracy was destroyed."<sup>130</sup>

Common themes in the presentation of Hussism were thus that Hussism was the foundation of Czech democracy, the national revival and the political liberation; a time when Czech national awareness was strengthened and German influence weakened. The conception of the Battle of Lipany as a disaster was also a part of it, along with the presentation of Jiří of Poděbrady as one of the greatest Czech kings, "a true Czech and Hussite, 'blood of our blood, bone of our bones'" (Caha).<sup>131</sup> Kejř presented Jiří of Poděbrady as "one of the three best Czech rulers" (beside Václav II and Karel), who loved his country so much that he promoted Vladislav of Poland as the next king, sacrificing the interests of his own sons for its sake.<sup>132</sup> According to Svačina, "the entire nation cried over him" when he died. "Being of Czech stock, he loved the Czech people tenderly and was always a wise and caring father for them."<sup>133</sup>

Another common feature is anti-Habsburg sentiment. Moravec writes of a battle in 1278 between "the greedy Habsburg" Rudolf of Habsburg, and Přemysl Otakar II, as "the first time the bloody sword of the Habsburgs stained Czech freedom."<sup>134</sup> Such sentiments are even more pronounced in his description of the Habsburg ascendancy to the Czech throne: "By the unlucky election of Ferdinand I of Habsburg, the Czech nation came under the yoke of a ruling family that never became attached to the Czech nation, but always ruled only by force, oppression and injustice. Ferdinand was also elected king of Hungary and thus became the founder of the former Austrian-Hungarian empire; the Czech nation had to wade through a sea of tears and blood in order to liberate itself from its supremacy." Likewise, Moravec claimed that at the White Mountain "the greatest enemies of the Czech nation, Habsburg and Rome, won."<sup>135</sup>

<sup>129</sup> (Co nesvedla statisícová vojska, sebraná téměř z celé Evropy, toho dokázala dne 30. května r. 1434 česká nesvornost a neláska. U Lipan zabíjel Čech Čecha, bratr bratra. Bitva lipanská byla hrobem husitské síly a slávy). Pešek (1923:169).

<sup>130</sup> (Lipany jsou hrobem husitské slávy a moci, u Lipan zničena byla vláda českého lidu, česká demokracie. [...] Bitva u Lipan náleží k nejnešťastnějším chvílím českého národa). Svačina (1927:36).

<sup>131</sup> (pravý Čech a husita, 'krev z krve naší, kost z kosti naší'). Caha (1922:27, 35). See also Svačina (1927:36, 37), Moravec (1921:21, 23, 24), Jíl (1928:34).

<sup>132</sup> (byl v trojici – Václav II. a Karel I. – z nejlepších českých panovníků). Kejř (1935:53–54).

<sup>133</sup> (opлакáván jsa celým národem. Jiří Poděbradský náleží k nejlepším českým panovníkům. [...] Jsa rodem Čech, vřele miloval lid český a byl mu vždy otcem moudrým a pečlivým). Svačina (1927:39).

<sup>134</sup> (Hrabivý Habsburk). (V bitvě této po prvé krvavý meč Habsburků potřásl českou svobodu). Moravec (1921:17).

<sup>135</sup> (Nešťastnou volbou Ferdinanda I., Habsburka dal se český národ v područí panovnického rodu, který k českému národu nikdy nepřílnul, ale vládl vždy jen násilím, útlakem a nespravedlností. Ferdinand byl zvolen též králem uherským a stal se tak zakladatelem bývalé říše rakousko-uherské, z jejíhož nadvládní probroditi se musel český národ k osvobození mořem slz a krve). (Největší nepřítel národa českého, Habsburk a Řím, zvítězili). Moravec (1921:26–27, 30).



Both Kejř and Pešek claimed that Ferdinand had bribed certain Czech noblemen in order to be elected, and concluded that "the Czechs through their election of Ferdinand of Habsburg made a fateful mistake, for which they soon had to pay dearly."<sup>136</sup> Kejř even expressed anti-Habsburg sentiment in one of the exercises meant for the pupils, where they were told to recapitulate the rule of the Habsburgs, "the family that was so hostile to our nation."<sup>137</sup> The election of Ferdinand was presented under the title "A mistake to be paid for" in Dejmek's narrative. He complained that "everything that made us famous in the eyes of the world and which we were proud of – Hus, Žižka, Komenský – was a thorn in eye for the Habsburgs and their most devoted allies, Rome."<sup>138</sup>

Svačina called Ferdinand II's (1620-1637) punishment of the Czechs after the White Mountain "cruel" (*ukrutný*), describing how he threw them out of their country, took away from them the religion of their forefathers, devastated the Czech nobility and "gave their estates to foreigners, enemies of the Czech nation. By this he inflicted on our nation a deadly wound, from which it was not able to recover for a long time. This is how the Habsburgs treated the Czech nation."<sup>139</sup> Caha wrote in a similar vein, concluding that "the bloodthirsty Habsburg expelled the flower of the Czech nation from the country."<sup>140</sup>

It is obvious, especially from the description of the *temno* (darkness) and the national revival, that a primordialist paradigm still predominated among the textbook authors. Metaphors like "temno" and "awakening" were thus used in a literal sense. Under the title "the Czech nation in spiritual darkness", Svačina claimed that "the darkness shrouded the soul of the Czech people. Sad, more than sad was the situation of the Czech nation. It already seemed that our nation would perish under the terrible pressure of the foreign nobility and the cunning Jesuits." However, "in the end of the 18th century the Czech nation started to wake up from the long sleep to new life."<sup>141</sup> In the words of Caha, the period after the Battle of the White Mountain was "the most terrible chapter of Czech history, written by the blood and tears of our unhappy forefathers", and "the Slovak people, just like their Czech brothers, fumbled in the dark."<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> (Čechové volbou Ferdinanda Habsburského se dopustili osudného omylu, který se n nich záhy strašlivě vymstil). Pešek (1923:199).

<sup>137</sup> (Sliby a úplatky dosáhli českého trůnu Habsburkové, jejichž vláda připravila našemu národu mnohé utrpení). (Opakujte o vládě Habsburků [...], [rod] který byl našemu národu tak nepřátelský). Kejř (1935:61, 67).

<sup>138</sup> (Chyba se mstí). (Vše, co nás před světem proslavilo a na co jsme byli hrdí – Hus, Žižka, Komenský – bylo trnem v oku Habsburkům a jejich nejoddanějšímu spojenci, Římu). Dejmek (1930:86, 99).

<sup>139</sup> (statky její daroval cizincům, nepřátelům českého národa. Tím zasadil našemu národu smrtelnou ránu, z které dlouho nemohl se probrati. Tak zacházeli Habsburkové s českým národem). Svačina (1927:50).

<sup>140</sup> (Tak krvavý Habsburk vypudil výkvět národa českého za hranice). Caha (1922:46), Caha (1930:60).

<sup>141</sup> (Český národ v duševní temnotě). (Temno obestřelo duši českého lidu. Smutný, přesmutný byl stav českého národa. Zdálo se již, že národ náš pod hrozným útlakem cizácké šlechty a lstivých jesuitů zanikne). (Koncem 18. století počal se národ český probouzeti k novému životu). Svačina (1927:55, 56, 62).

<sup>142</sup> (Je to nejhroznější kapitola českých dějin, psaná krví a slzami nešťastných předků našich). (Slovenský lid, právě jako čeští jeho bratři, tápal ve tmách). Caha (1922:48, 52); Caha (1930:63, 66). See also Pešek (1923:260)

The titles of the relevant parts of Dejmek's book tell their own story: "The darkness and the coming daybreak"; "The sun of freedom"; "Spiritual strength"; "The road to freedom." He even used the term *vzkříšení* (resurrection), when describing the start of the national movement. Dejmek's version of the resurrection of the Czech nation, this "almost miraculous [event]", was that some enthusiasts "decided that the Czech nation was not dead, it was only asleep. They considered it to be their national duty to awaken it; we call them awakeners. [...] After a 50 years effort at awakening the Czech nation from a 200 years comatose sleep following the Battle of the White Mountain, it became reality!"<sup>143</sup> Kejř complained of Germanization even during the Enlightenment: "The Enlightenment harmed us very much nationally and in terms of state [rights]. If the Czechs had not defended themselves, it could have led to incalculable harm. [...] Luckily, however, the nation awoke from its long sleep. The national awakeners played an important role in this."<sup>144</sup>

In Pešek's version, the awakeners "devoted themselves to the study of the past of their nation, whose sons they felt themselves to be, in the conviction that they were the last descendants of Czechia. They thus assumed that the Czech nation was already dead. They were not aware that there was a healthy, viable core in the people of the Czech countryside."<sup>145</sup> Also according to Jíl, "the nation that had already been counted among the dead, professed to life."<sup>146</sup>

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Let us now look at *Slovak* textbooks in history for primary school. Slovak versions of Czech textbooks seem to have been quite common in Slovak schools. Dejmek, Kratochvíl and Šimko's book *Po stopách ľudstva. Dejepis pre 6.-8. školský rok ľudových škôl slovenských* (1927) has a Czech counterpart in Dejmek's *Stopami lidstva* from 1930. Although the Czech version I obtained was published after the Slovak, it is more likely that the book was originally written in Czech. First, Dejmek was in fact Czech (see Appendix C<sub>II</sub>). Second, the emphasis on Hussism as "one of the most important periods in our history",<sup>147</sup> suggests a Czech original, since this would definitely not be true of Slovak history. Third, the Slovak version is listed with three authors, the Czech with only one. If a Slovak book had been adapted for Czech schools, it probably would have been the other way around.

<sup>143</sup> (Temno a vzcházející červánky; Slunce Svobody; Síly duchovní; Cestou k svobodám). (Pro nás nejvýznamnějším jest téměř zázračné). (Ti soudili, že národ český neumřel, ale jenom spí. Za svou národní povinnost považovali, probouzeti jej; říkáme jim buditelé. [...] A tak po 50letém úsilí probuzení českého národa z 200letého mráкотného spánku pobělohorského stalo se skutkem!) Dejmek (1930:104, 108, 114–15, 117). See also Caha (1930:67), Moravec (1921:36).

<sup>144</sup> (Osvícenství nás národnostně i státně velmi poškodilo. Kdyby se byli Čechové nebránili, mohlo dojít k nedozírným škodám. [...] Na štěstí se však národ probouzel z dlouhého spánku. O to se zasloužili národní buditelé). Kejř (1935:67, 78, 85).

<sup>145</sup> (se věnovali s láskou studiu minulosti svého národa, jehož syny se cítili, v přesvědčení, že jsou poslední potomci Čechie. Domnívali se totiž, že český národ jest již mrtev. Netušili, že v českém lidu venkovském je zdravé životaschopné jádro). Pešek (1923:260, 275, 276).

<sup>146</sup> (Národ, jenž už byl počítán mezi mrtvé, hlásí se ke životu). Jíl (1928:56).

<sup>147</sup> (Obdobie husitské je z najvýznamnejších dob našich dejín). Dejmek, Kratochvíl, Šimko: *Po stopách ľudstva. Dejepis pre 6.–8. školský rok ľudových škôl slovenských* (1927:78).

Otherwise, also Cyril Merhout's *Dejepis pre ľudové školy slovenské*, (1928) is based on a Czech original and "Slovakized" by Martin Ježo, while *Slovenská vlastiveda pre školy ľudové* (1924), edited by the same Merhout, is an anthology written by several authors, some Czech and some Slovak. Jozef Koreň was a Slovak middle school teacher, also mentioned in Albert Pražák's overview of Slovak gymnasium teachers.<sup>148</sup> His *Dejiny československého národa* (1922, 1932) was thus originally written in Slovak. This probably also goes for Gustav Kadlečík's unauthorized *Dejepis pre V. a VI. ročník škôl ľudových* (1924).

My sample of Slovak textbooks in history is in general more Czechoslovak in orientation than their Czech counterparts. The notion of a Czechoslovak nation is advanced more explicitly and systematically, and the balance between Czech and Slovak history is better, although Czech history gets almost more attention than Slovak history. To the familiar Czech themes like the founding myths, the Přemyslids, Karel IV, the Hussites, the Battle of the White Mountain and the *temno* are added Slovak themes like the Arpads, Matúš Čak, the struggle against the Turks, and Jánošík. Czechoslovak unity is, as in the Czech books, especially emphasized in the context of the Slav forefathers, the national revival and the struggle for independence, but more consistently so.

A comparison between the Czech and Slovak version of the text by Dejmek et al. proved quite revealing. The overall impression is that while the Czech version is very Czech centered, and so is the identity that is conveyed, the Slovak version is much more balanced in the emphasis on Czech and Slovak history, and a Czechoslovak identity is conveyed to a much larger extent. The formulation concerning the ruthless Germans and the mild Slavs is identical,<sup>149</sup> but while the Czech version only refers to the Czech tribes, the Slovak version also mentions the Moravian and the Slovak tribes. In both cases, the title is "the dawn of Czech history."<sup>150</sup>

While the Czech version focuses on the Přemyslids, Great Moravia (including Pribina) gets more space in the Slovak version. The Magyars (and the Germans) are more directly blamed for the demise of Great Moravia: "The German king had made several attempts at invading Moravia, but his expeditions always ended in failure. Realizing that he did not have enough strength on his own, he called on the wild Mongolian nomads – the Magyars – for help." The enemies of the empire thus took advantage of the disunity between the sons of Svätopluk after his death, and "so the Great Moravian empire except Bohemia became the prey of the Magyars and Slovakia was separated from the brotherly Czech lands for a thousand years."<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> See Albert Pražák: Zásluhy slovenského profesorstva o slovenskou střední školu a o československou literaturu, in *Mimoškolská práce profesorů československých středních škol* (1925:95).

<sup>149</sup> (Germáni vyznačujú sa panovačnosťou, Slovania milujú slobodu. Germáni usilovali o ovládnutie Slovanov, Slovania bránili svoju slobodu. Odtiaľ nekonečná reťaz bojov medzi nimi). Dejmek et al. (1927:36). (See also footnote 115).

<sup>150</sup> (Úsvit českých dějin/dejín). Dejmek (1930:37), Dejmek et al. (1927:38).

<sup>151</sup> (Kráľ nemecký sa pokúšal síce niekoľkokrát vtrhnúť do Moravy, ale jeho výprava skončila sa vždy s nezdarom. Vidiac, že nemá sám dost' sily, povolal si na pomoc divokých kočovníkov mongolských – Maďarov [...]) A tak ríša veľkomoravská okrem Česka stala sa korisťou Maďarov a Slovensko na tisíc rokov bolo odtrhnuté od bratských zemí českých). Dejmek et al. (1927:40–41).

Moreover, where the Czech version refers to a "deepening chasm between the brotherly branches" because of the thousand years of separation, the Slovak version acknowledges that "the disintegration of the Great Moravian empire was a great disaster for both Czechoslovak branches", but in spite of this, "the Slovaks and Czechs did not become estranged from each other. Until the most recent times a common language, a common culture and a common national character united them. [...] Although the Czechs and Slovaks were opposed to each other on the battlefield [...] during dynastic strife, in peace-time [...] they strengthened the ties of blood relations." Even Matúš Čák is credited with strengthening "perhaps unintentionally – the blood ties of the Slovaks and Czechs."<sup>152</sup>

The formulations regarding the importance of the Hussite period are almost identical. The exceptions are few, but important. In the Czech version, Hussism is one "of the most remarkable periods in *Czech* history", in the Slovak version it is one "of the most important periods in *our* history."<sup>153</sup> In the Czech version, following the Battle of the White Mountain "Hussism was distorted for the *Czech* people [and portrayed] as the most shameful of periods"; in the Slovak version, "the *Czechoslovak* nation learned to regard that glorious period as the darkest, worst period."<sup>154</sup> The identities conveyed are strikingly different. The Czech version is closer to the truth, since Hussism was in fact not particularly important in Slovak history. Likewise, where the Czech version refers to the "resurrection of the Czech nation", the Slovak version speaks of the "resurrection of the Czechoslovak nation." Yet, not even here is the Czechoslovak nation-project consistently advocated. Dejmek et al. also refer to "the Czech nation" twice in relation to the national revival, and even to "the Slovak nation" once.

The linguistic split is not explicitly seen as unfortunate, but reference is made to Kollár's arguments against it: "The Slovak nation would be weakened by it, and would not be able to fight Magyar successfully. [...] Kollár and his followers wanted as close coexistence with the Czech nation as possible, because they were convinced that the only way the Slovaks could preserve their national character, was by drawing strength from their stronger brothers the Czechs." However, it was recognized that the Slovak patriots saw the codification of Slovak and the uniting of the Catholics and Protestants as the only rescue from Magyarization.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> (Rozpadnutie ríše Veľkomoravskej bolo veľkým nešťastím pre obe vetve československé). (Slováci a Česi sa však zato neodcudzili jedon druhému. Spájali ich až do časov najnovších spoločný jazyk, spoločná kultúra a spoločný národný charakter. [...] Za dynastických sporov[...] stáli síce Česi a Slováci na bojišti proti sebe, ale v dobe mieru [...] utužovali sa sväzky pokrevnosti). (Matúš Trenčiansky [...] utužoval – trebárs neúmyselne – pokrevné sväzky Slovákov a Čechov). Dejmek et. al. (1927:59, 60). (For the Czech version, see footnote 107).

<sup>153</sup> (My emphasis). (Období husitské je z nejvýznamnějších dob českých dějin). Dejmek (1930:73), Dejmek et al. (1927:78). (See footnote 147 for the Slovak text).

<sup>154</sup> (českému lidu pokřiveno jakožto doba nejostudnější). Dejmek (1930:74). (See also footnote 127). (československý národ učil sa pozerat' na túto slávnú dobu ako na dobu nejsmutnejšiu, najhoršiu, ale keď bolo [...] očistené [...] stalo se jednou z tých hybných síl, ktoré za svetovej vojny viedli národ k novému oslobodeniu). Dejmek et. al. (1927:78).

<sup>155</sup> (národ slovenský bude tým soslabený a nebude vedieť úspešne zápasit' s maďarčinou [...] Kollár a jeho stúpenci priali si čím užšieho spolunažívania s národom českým, lebo boli presvedčení, že Slováci len tak udržia svoj národný charakter, keď budú čerpať posilu od silnejších svojich bratov Čechov). Dejmek et al. (1927:118–19, 124).

An interesting, albeit not very surprising feature of the Slovak version is that it is not the Germans who are presented as the main enemy, but the Magyars: "The enemies of the Slavs, especially the Magyars, did their best in all ways possible to annihilate even the last spark of Slovak national consciousness."<sup>156</sup> This is a general feature of the Slovak books.

In the description of the world war and the atrocities of the Habsburgs and Magyars, the wording is again strikingly different. In the Czech version "we Czechs and Yugoslavs had to drink the bitter chalice of suffering to the bottom", in the Slovak version it is "we *Slovaks*, Czechs and Yugoslavs." Likewise, where the Czech version reads: "But it all only led to more hatred towards the slavery of Austria and brought together the Czech nation, at odds with each other before the war, in a rare unity"; the Slovak version goes: "But it all only increased the hatred against Austria-Hungary and strengthened the unity of the Czechoslovak nation." About the *Maffie*, the Czech version states that it "secretly led the treacherous struggle of the Czech people", the Slovak that it "organized the struggle of the Czechoslovak people at home."<sup>157</sup>

The Czech version refers to the "Czech legion" (*české legie*), the Slovak to "our legion" (*naše legie*), etc. Both versions refer to Masaryk as the "dear father" (*tatíček*) of all, but only the Slovak version mentions Milan Rastislav Štefánik, who "worked fearlessly with him for us Slovaks",<sup>158</sup> although both books carry pictures of Štefánik and Beneš. Both versions state that "the Czech nation could again breathe freely after almost 300 years." But while the Czech wording is that "on October 30th also the Slovaks declared state unity with us", the Slovak wording is that "on October 30th also we Slovaks declared state unity with our brothers the Czechs."<sup>159</sup> In the Czech version the revolutionary parliament was composed of "all Czech and Slovak political parties" and the state was "Czech"; in the Slovak it was composed of "all political parties of our Czechoslovak nation" and the state was "Czechoslovak."<sup>160</sup>

*Dejiny československého národa* (1921, 1932) by Jozef Koreň is the sole Slovak textbook in my sample that has "Czechoslovak nation" in the title – and, unlike the Czech books, it does not stop there. The "Czechoslovak nation" occurs 24 times in the course of the book, and no less than four times in the chapter titles alone. In addition "Czechoslovaks" (*Čechoslováci*) are mentioned eight times, national unity is advanced, and the brother metaphor is also more elaborated than usual.

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<sup>156</sup> (Nepriatelia Slovanov, najmä Maďari, vynasnažovali sa všemožne, aby zničili i poslednú iskierku národného povedomia slovenského). Dejmek et al. (1927:134).

<sup>157</sup> (my Čechové a Jihoslováné vypili jsme kalich utrpení až na dno). (Ale to vše učilo jen víc nenáviděti otrokářské Rakousko a český národ před válkou rozeštváný srazilo ve vzácnou jednotu). (skrytě řídila velezradný odboj českého lidu). Dejmek (1930:147–48). (my Slováci, Česi a Juhoslovania). (Ale to len zväčšovalo nenávisť oproti Rakúsko-Uhorsku a upevňovalo jednotu národa československého). (organizovala odboj československého ľudu doma). Dejmek et al. (1927:142).

<sup>158</sup> (S ním neohrožene pracoval za nás Slovákov M.R. Štefánik). Dejmek et al. (1927:144).

<sup>159</sup> (Český národ téměř po 300 letech začal opět slobodně dýchat. [...] Dňa 30. októbra 1918 prihlásili sme sa aj my Slováci [...] do štátnej jednoty s bratmi Čechmi). Dejmek et al. (1927:148). (See footnote 103 for the Czech version).

<sup>160</sup> (zo všetkých politických strán nášho národa československého. [...] československý štát stal sa republikou). Dejmek et al. (1927:149). (See footnote 100 for the Czech version).

In his introduction, Koreň compares the Czechs and Slovaks with two adult brothers who live side by side: "The Czechoslovak nation is like that family. The Czechs are the oldest brother and the Slovaks are the youngest. [...] In what way do they resemble each other? In *language*. The languages of the Czechs and the Slovaks resemble each other like those two brothers." He repeats the two-brother metaphor twice towards the end of the narrative, combined with an emphasis on the benefits of unity: "The Czechs and Slovaks, two brothers of one family, brutally separated and oppressed, fervently yearned for liberation. [...] In unity is strength. The Czechs and Slovaks are two brothers of a single nation. But this can be demonstrated only if they get along harmoniously. [...] The entire history of the Czechoslovak nation [...] clearly testifies to the fact that work, honesty and unity above all uplifted our nation. Conversely, aversion against work, dishonesty and disunity only served our enemies."<sup>161</sup>

The disunity motive is, if anything, stronger in the Slovak books than in the Czech books. Koreň describes the arrival of the Slav forefathers to their new fatherland, and how "the Czechoslovak nation finally emerged from the unification – merger – of the [various] tribes." These forefathers were "hospitable and hard working, but their fault was that they were quarrelsome." Likewise, he emphasizes how "the great empire of Samo fell apart after his death because of the disunity of our forefathers", and although Svätopluk had warned against disunity, "the sons did not listen to their father's good advice. They started to quarrel about the heritage. [...] Thus the disunity of our forefathers prepared the grave of the beautiful and at times great empire."<sup>162</sup> Koreň used the exact same words about the demise of Great Moravia in an article in Merhout's *Slovenská vlastiveda*.<sup>163</sup>

Likewise, Kadlečík argued that because of the disunity of the old Slavs, they often came under the yoke of neighboring nations. In his version, the Slovaks and Czechs were united for the first time under Samo. Then "Svätopluk founded Great Moravia. Thus the Slovaks and Czechs were united for the second time. And whenever the Slovaks were united with the Czechs, they were able to defend their independence. Separated, both lost their independence." He also attributed the demise of Great Moravia to the disunity of the sons of Svätopluk.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> (Československý národ je podobný takejto rodine. Tým starším bratom v nej sú Česi a mladším sú Slováci. [...] V čomže sa tedy podobajú? V *reči*. Reč česká a reč slovenská sú si tak podobné, ako tí dvaja bratia). (Česi a Slováci, dvaja bratia jednej rodiny, násilne odlúčení a potlačovaní vrele túžili po oslobodení!) (V svornosti je sila. Česi a Slováci sú dvaja bratia jedného národa. Ale to len vtedy dokážu, keď budú svorne nažívať. [...] celé dejiny československého národa [...] jasne svedčia o tom, že práca, statočnosť a svornosť zavše povzniesla náš národ. Naproti tomu nechut' k práci, nečestnosť a nesvornosť zavše len našim nepriateľom poslúžili). Jozef Koreň: *Dejiny československého národa. Dejepis pre slovenské ľudové školy* (1921:3, 55, 63), (1932:3, 55, 64). The two editions are nearly identical.

<sup>162</sup> (Z tohoto spájania – splyvania – kmeňov povstal konečne československý národ). (pohostinní a pracovití. Ale ich vadou bolo, že sa často medzi sebou hašterili). (Ale veľká ríša Samova sa po smrti jeho pre nesvornosť našich otcov skoro rozpadla). (Avšak synovia dobrej otcovskej rady neposlúchli. Začali sa nad dedičstvom vadiť. [...] Tak nesvornosť našich otcov pripravila hrob peknej a niekedy veľkej ríši). Koreň (1921:5 6, 12); Koreň (1932:5, 6, 11).

<sup>163</sup> See Cyril Merhout: *Slovenská vlastiveda pre školy ľudové* (1924:60).

<sup>164</sup> (Tak založil Svätopluk Veľkú Moravu. Vtedy po druhý raz boli Slováci a Česi sjednotení. A kedykoľvek boli Slováci s Čechmi sjednotení, vždy si uhájili samostatnosť. Rozdelení, i jedni i druhí utratili samostatnosť). Gustav Kadlečík: *Dejepis pre V. a VI ročník škôl ľudových* (1924:3, 4, 5).

The "Czechoslovak nation" is less common in Merhout and Kadlečík's books than in Koreň's. Of these, Merhout's *Dejepis pre ľudové školy slovenské* (1928) is the least Czechoslovak in orientation. The "Czechoslovak nation" is not mentioned, and "Czechoslovaks" occur only in the context of the founding of the republic. Unlike most of the other authors, he places the awakening (*prebudenie*) of the Slovaks before the revival (*obrozenie*) of the Czechs. The linguistic separation is not viewed negatively: on the contrary, he emphasizes how "the divorce from literary Czech in Slovakia [...] was not directed against the Czechs", but aimed at awakening the Slovaks so they could defend themselves against Magyar oppression.<sup>165</sup> On the whole, a Slovak identity is conveyed more than a Czechoslovak.

A rather curious aspect is the use of the term "the Slovak nations" in plural, evidently referring to the Czechs and Slovaks: "The Habsburg ruling family, itself German, did not grant any of the just demands of the Czechs or the Slovaks. The Germans and Magyars were always able to convince the rulers that the Slovak nations wanted something unjust, when they wanted justice for their mother tongue."<sup>166</sup> It is most likely that this was only a printing error, considering that Slav and Slovak are only one letter apart (*slovanský* and *slovenský*) in Slovak. On the other hand, it is also possible that this reflected the old usage, where "Slav" and "Slovak" were used interchangeably. It almost certainly did not mean that the Czechs were Slovaks as well.

Kadlečík begins by asserting in the first sentence that a Czechoslovak nation existed: "We Slovaks belong to the Slav great nation and together with the Czechs form the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>167</sup> Otherwise, however, he refers to a Czechoslovak nation only in the context of the founding of Czechoslovakia. "Both branches" occur only once, and there are more references to the Czech and Slovak nations than to the Czechoslovak nation.

*Slovenská vlastiveda pre školy ľudové*, edited by Cyril Merhout, is also inconsistent. On the one hand, by referring to "nations" in the plural in the context of the founding of the Czechoslovak republic, it suggests that the Czechs and Slovaks were *two* nations: "The nations were united in a democratic state form." That "nations" refer to Czechs and Slovaks and not to the minorities is obvious from the next paragraph: "The Czechoslovak republic is formed by four regions: Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia. These regions were from time immemorial inhabited by nations belonging to the great and glorious Slav tribe, they spoke slightly divergent languages and in the past formed one state-unit."<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> (Činnosť Bernoláková a Štúrova urobila rozľuku od češtiny na Slovensku. Nebolo to však namierené proti Čechom, mužovia títo chceli, aby materinskou rečou v spisoch prebudili sa slovenský ľud a ubránil sa náporom Maďarov proti ich snahám utlačovacím). Cyril Merhout: *Dejepis pre ľudové školy slovenské* (1928:102).

<sup>166</sup> (Panovnícký rod Habsburský, sám nemecký, nevyhovoval spravodlivým požiadavkám ani Čechov ani Slovákov. Nemci a Maďari vedeli vždy panovníkov presvedčiť, že slovenské národy chcú niečo nespravodlivého, keď chcú spravodlivosť pre svoju materčinu). Merhout (1928:102–03).

<sup>167</sup> (My Slováci patríme k veľkému národu slavianskemu a spolu s Čechmi tvoríme národ československý). (oboch vetvi). Kadlečík (1924:3, 27).

<sup>168</sup> (národy sjednotily sa v štátnej forme demokratickej [...] Československá republika utvorená je zo štyroch krajín: Česka, Moravy, Sliezska a Slovenska. Krajiny tieto obývané boli od nepamäti národami, k veľkému a slávnemu kmenu slovanskému patriacimi, užívajú reč málo odchyľnu a tvorily v minulosti jeden štátny celok). Merhout (1924:29–30).

On the other hand, under the heading "population" (*obyvateľstvo*), Czechs and Slovaks are (as usual) lumped together and presented as a Czechoslovak majority of 67.7 percent – as opposed to Germans, Magyars, Ruthenians, and Jews. Also, Komenský is presented as "one of the greatest men of the Czechoslovak nation", and Palacký as "the famous historian of the Czechoslovak nation." And, of course, Masaryk, Beneš, Štefánik and the legionaries "struggled for the freedom of the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>169</sup>

The book also contains a small piece written by Masaryk, where he wrote of how he used to go to Slovakia on vacation "in order to work for Czechoslovak rapprochement and unification." He repeated his views on the language question: "Let the Slovaks write as they please. The main thing is that we are in reality one [unit], because a Slovak understands a Czech and a Czech [understands] a Slovak. The Slovaks were separated from us from the 9th century, they did not have their independent development, and they therefore preserved an older form of the language and their own dialects."<sup>170</sup> Masaryk thus retained the view that the Slovaks were actually (primitive) Czechs. It should also be noted that also here Masaryk was writing from a clearly Czech point of view – "the Slovaks separated from us."

The Slovak textbooks were found to be less anti-German than the Czech, but far from non-prejudiced. Karel IV was positively presented in both the books originally written in Slovak. Koreň did mention that "the splendid rule of Karel IV had its dark sides",<sup>171</sup> but this concerned his (too) strong support of the clergy. Yet, even books that were presumably not based on a Czech original reproached the Přemyslids for inviting Germans to the country.<sup>172</sup> Koreň also reproached the Přemyslids for allowing the forming of "a powerful nobility, who got hold of the land and was able to subjugate the majority of the nation." He blamed the nobility for the sad end of the Hussite struggles at Lipany, "because of the disunity of those who should have fought until death for these noble causes. The nobility is most at fault."<sup>173</sup> Julius Botto uses even stronger words: "The Hussites, who spread teachings of equality between people, were hated and persecuted by the wealthy landlords, [who] suppressed and devastated the Czech popular, democratic party at the terrible Battle of Lipany."<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> (Z obyvateľov je najviac Čechoslovákov, spolu 67.7%) (Komenský je jedným z najväčších mužov národa československého). (Slávny dejepisec národa československého František Palacký) (bojovali za slobodu československého národa). Merhout (1924:31, 67, 71, 77).

<sup>170</sup> (aby som pracoval pre československé sblíženie a sjednotenie). (nech si Slováci píšú, ako chcú. Hlavná vec je v tom, že v skutočnosti sme jedno, lebo Slovák rozumie Čechovi a Čech Slovákovi. Slováci od IX. storočia boli od nás odtrhnutí, nemali svojho samostatného vývoja, a preto udržali si staršiu formu jazyka a svoje nárečie). Masaryk in Merhout (1924:73).

<sup>171</sup> (Avšak táto skvelá vláda Karla IV. mala i temné stránky. Poneváž Karol IV. veľmi podporoval duchovenstvo). Koreň (1921:20); Koreň (1932:20). (The 1921 version reads "Karol I").

<sup>172</sup> See Kadlečík (1924:9), Koreň (1921:14), Koreň (1932:14).

<sup>173</sup> (I to bolo ich chybou, že sa rozdávaním statkov vyvinula mocná šľachta, ktorá si vyvlastnila zem a väčšinu národa uviedla do svojho poddanstva). (Smutne pre nesvornosť tých, ktorí za tieto vznešené veci až do smrti svorne bojovať mali. Hlavnú vinu nesie na tom šľachta). Koreň (1921: 14–15, 23); Koreň (1932:14, 23).

<sup>174</sup> (Husitov, ktorí rozširovali učenie o rovnoprávnosti ľudí, nenávideli a prenasledovali majetní zemskí páni potlačili a zničili českú ľudovú, demokratickú stranu v strašnej bitke v Lipanoch). Julius Botto in Merhout (1924:64).



This anti-nobility tendency is a specific feature of the Slovak books. Koreň also blamed the nobility for the outcome of the Battle of Mohács in 1526: "The nobility exploited their subjects and did not care about defending the country and Christianity against the Turks – and the danger was in truth already approaching!" And the nobility erred by not bringing "the common people over [to their side] to help them" in the Battle of the White Mountain.<sup>175</sup> Likewise, Kadlečík argued that the Czech magnates erred by "not bringing also the enslaved people over to their side. The whole nation would also then, as in the Hussite period, certainly have fought successfully for their independence and for religious freedom."<sup>176</sup>

Kadlečík expresses the idea of betrayal very strikingly elsewhere as well: "Originally our forefathers were all free and equal in wealth, for property was shared. The families of the rulers got hold of [...] this property when the division in [various] tribes ended. These foremost families also made use of the disputes about the throne. They always joined the side that gave them the most. [...] The rest of the people more and more lost their freedom and fell into serfdom. [...] For the Slovaks this serfdom (feudalism) was a great misfortune. The foremost Slovak families separated from the people for the sake of material gain [and] united with the foremost Magyar families [...] Abandoned by their leaders, the oppressed people slowly forgot about their glorious past, lost their national consciousness and pride. They totally forgot about belonging together with their neighboring brothers from Moravia and Bohemia."<sup>177</sup>

The anti-nobility tendency is even reflected in the way the Slovak "hero" Matúš Čák is described, albeit to a varying degree. Koreň writes that "although Matúš at least for awhile secured the independence of Slovakia from the Hungarian crown, [...] the Slovak people did not live any better or freer under his rule, for also Matúš was an absolutist ruler who oppressed the people....."<sup>178</sup> Kadlečík describes Matúš Čák as a nobleman who sided with first one ruler and then with the rival "in order gain something from both", afterwards refusing to acknowledge either of them. He concludes that "Matúš Čák was to blame for not joining Bohemia. Slovakia could already then have become independent."<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> (Šľachtici totiž zdierali poddaných a o obranu zeme a kresťanstva proti Turkom sa nestarali – a nebezpečie sa veru už blížilo!). (I to byla chyba, že si nezískali obecní ľud, aby im pomohol). Koreň (1921: 27, 33); Koreň (1932: 27, 33).

<sup>176</sup> (Veľmi zvinili českí veľmoži, že nezískali na svoju stranu aj poddaný ľud. Cely národ bol by i teraz, ako v dobe husitskej, iste s úspechom bojoval za svoju samostatnosť i za náboženskú slobodu). Kadlečík (1924:29).

<sup>177</sup> (Pôvodne boli predkovia naši všetci slobodní a majetkove rovní, lebo majetky boli spoločné. Keď kmenové rozdelenie časom prestalo, majetky [...] privlastnili si rodiny vladkov [...]. Aj spory o trón využili tieto prednejšie rodiny. Pridali sa vždy na stranu toho, kto im viac dal. [...] Ostatný ľud čo ďalej, tým viac utrácal slobodu a upádal do poddanstva. [...] Pre Slovákov bolo toto poddanstvo (feudalizmus) veľkým nešťastím. Najprednejšie rodiny slovenské pre výhody majetkové odtrhli sa od ľudu. Spojili sa s prednými rodinami maďarskými [...] Od vodcom opustený, utlačovaný ľud pomaly zabúdal na svoju slávnú minulosť, tratil národné povedomie a hrdosť. Úplne zabudol na spolupatričnosti so súdenným bratmi z Moravy a Čiech). Kadlečík (1924:7–8).

<sup>178</sup> (Ačkoľvek Matúš aspoň na krátky čas zabezpečil neodvislosť Slovenska od uhorskej koruny, [...] slovenský ľud nežil lepšie a voľnešie ani za jeho vlády, lebo i Matúš bol neobmedzený vladár, ktorý utlačoval ľud). Koreň (1921:19); Koreň (1932:19).

<sup>179</sup> (aby od oboch získal voľačo). (Veľmi zvinil Matúš, že sa nepripojil k Česku. Slovensko už vtedy mohlo sa stať samostatným). Kadlečík (1924:9–10).

Matúš Čák is also portrayed as a selfish nobleman in Merhout's book: "Matúš did not care much about the Slovak language or the Slovak people. He only thought of his own interests, wealth, and the welfare of the little man was of no interest to him."<sup>180</sup> Yet, Kamil Krofta is even harsher: "[Matúš Čák] was a selfish, ambitious magnate, who was not a Slav of birth or feeling, and is still quite wrongly glorified as a Slav hero; he was led to Václav not by his Slav feeling, but by [the prospect of] personal gain."<sup>181</sup>

The Slovak books are more anti-Magyar than the Czech, and they often supplement the picture of the Magyars as barbarians with the idea that the Slovaks were culturally superior. According to Dejmek et al., the Magyars were not able to Magyarize the Slovaks, because "they excelled over the Magyars in civilization. The Magyars learned crafts and farming from the Slovaks. They also took many Slovak words into their language."<sup>182</sup> Likewise the French (!) historian Ernest Denis, writing in *Slovenská vlastiveda*, argued that "the Slav inhabitants were on a much higher cultural level than their conquerors, and worked as valuable models for them. The new rulers of the land borrowed quite a few expressions from the old population, concerning religion, politics, farming and economy."<sup>183</sup> Kadlečík portrayed the Magyars as a "vagrant nation", who "tended cattle, but preferred to assault neighboring nations" and who "learned to cultivate the fields [and] to found villages and towns from our forefathers."<sup>184</sup>

Jan Hus and Hussism were in general positively evaluated, albeit not quite as panegyric as in the Czech books. Merhout (or perhaps Ježo) even referred to the more violent aspects of Hussism: "The Hussites seized church property, demolished monasteries [and] often also burned the monks to death, and stirred up general opposition against the pope."<sup>185</sup> In strongly Catholic Slovakia in the inter-war period, this was surely perceived as negative to Hussism. Otherwise, the positive Hussite influences were emphasized. According to Kadlečík, the Slovaks learned a lot from the Czechs, and "through Czech books also the national awareness of the Slovaks was roused, and so Slovaks and Czechs, separated from each other for a long time, started to become closer."<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> (o slovenčinu a o slovenský ľud sa Matúš mnoho nestaral. Mal na mysli iba svoj záujem, bohatstvo, a blaho malého ľudu mu bolo ľahostajné). Merhout (1928:37).

<sup>181</sup> (Bol to sebecký, ctižiadostivý veľmož, ktorý nebol ani rodom ani citením Slovan, a iste neprávom býval velený ako slovanský hrdina; k Václavovi nevedelo ho slovanské citenie, ale osobný prospech). Krofta in Merhout (1924:62).

<sup>182</sup> (Vynikali nad Maďarov svojou vzdelanosťou. Od Slovákov naučili sa Maďari remeslám a roľníctvu. Do svojej reči prijali i mnoho slovenských slov). Dejmek et al. (1927:43).

<sup>183</sup> (Slovania boli dospelí k o mnoho vyššiemu stupňu osvety, ako ich podmanitelia a slúžili im za vzácne vzory. Noví páni zeme od starých obyvateľov vypožičali si značné množstvo výrazov, týkajúcich náboženstva, politiky, roľníctva a hospodárstva). Denis in Merhout (1924:60).

<sup>184</sup> (Boli národ túlavý, pásli dobytok, ale najradšej napádali susedné národy). (Od predkov našich naučili sa obrábať pole, zakladať dediny, mestá). Kadlečík (1924:7).

<sup>185</sup> (husiti zmocnili sa majetku cirkevného, borili kláštory, často upaľovali i mnichov a spôsobili všeobecný odboj proti pápežovi). Merhout (1928:47).

<sup>186</sup> (Českými knihami budilo sa i národné povedomie Slovákov, a tak Slováci a Česi, za dlhý čas odtrhnutí od seba, počali sa sblížovať). Kadlečík (1924:13–14). See also Botto in Merhout (1924:64), Koreň (1921:25–26), Koreň (1932:26).

In return for the Czech help, the Slovaks helped the Czechs after the Battle of the White Mountain, Koreň claimed: "The [Czech] exiles also turned their eyes towards their brothers in Slovakia, and with bleeding hearts asked the Slovak people for shelter. And the Slovak people recognized in the exiles their brothers and sisters: with brotherly love they welcomed them to their country.[...] What did the Slovak people gain by taking the Czech exiles into its arms so gladly? It gained very much. Slovakia became the center of Czechoslovak education in [...] the 17th and 18th centuries." Koreň also praised the Protestants for "diligently founding schools everywhere they could, increasing the education level of the Slovak nation considerably."<sup>187</sup>

Negative evaluations of the Habsburgs were quite common. Koreň wrote that, with the ascendancy of Ferdinand I, "our nation came under the rule of the German Habsburgs, who ruled it for 400 years until the memorable year 1918. It was a long lasting, but also bad and indecent rule, and today the Czechoslovak nation remembers their cursed rule only with regret." He also complained that "Habsburg rule threatened the Czechoslovak nation with *denationalization*, that is *Germanization* of the Czechs and *Magyarization* of the Slovaks. [...] Now it was necessary to strive for the awakening of the Czechoslovak nation." Koreň was more ambivalent as to the revival. On the one hand, he argued that "because the Czechoslovak nation was cleaved in two – the national revival was carried out individually for the Czechs and for the Slovaks." On the other hand he claimed that the participation of Slovaks in the Czech national revival again proved that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation."<sup>188</sup>

### ***History texts for secondary schools***

Czech and Slovak history textbooks written for use in the secondary schools are more similar than their primary school counterparts; they are on the whole less nationalist in tone, especially in their description of the Germans. The Czechoslovak nation appears seldom, compared to Slovak primary-school textbooks; and when it appears, this is generally in the context of the founding of the Czechoslovak republic. The focus of the books (also the Slovak) is Czech history. One of the books in my sample is not actually a textbook in history, but a so-called *vlastivěda/vlastiveda*, where national history and geography are combined: Since this book diverges from the others in topic as well as tendency, I will treat it separately later.

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<sup>187</sup> (Slovenský ľud sa totiž od husitov učil nielen vrelej nábožnosti, ale učil sa i čítať a písať [...] Ba husiti položili i základy písomníctva, ktoré sa na Slovensku pozdejšie vyvinulo). (Vyhnanci uprelí svoj zrak i na bratské Slovensko a krvácajúcim srdcom prosili slovenský ľud o prístrešie. A slovenský ľud poznal vo vyhnancoch svojích bratov a svoje sestry: s bratskou láskou prijal ich tedy do svojej zeme). (Čo získal slovenský ľud tým, že tak vďačne prijal českých vyhnancoch do svojho lona? Získal veľmi mnoho. Slovensko sa v [...] XVII. a XVIII. stololetie stalo ohniskom československej vzdelanosti). (Evanjelici totiž tým, že všade, kde mohli, usilovne zakladali školy, veľmi povzniesli vzdelanosť národa slovenského). Koreň (1921:25, 26, 30, 34, 35–36); Koreň (1932:26, 30, 34, 36).

<sup>188</sup> (Ferdinandom I. tedy dostal sa náš národ pod vládu nemeckých Habsburkov, ktorí panovali potom nad ním za štyri sto rokov až do pamätného roku 1918. Bolo to dlhé, ale i zlé a nešťachtné vládarenie a dnes si československý národ len so žiaľom pripomína ich nepožehnanú vládu). (Vláda Habsburgov totiž hrozila československému národu *odnárodením*, to jest Čechom *ponemčením* a Slovákovi zase *pomaďarčením*. [...] Teraz sa bolo treba postarať o prebudenie československého národa). (Ponevác ale československý národ bol rozpoltený na dve čiastky – prevedené bolo toto národné obrodenie osobite u Čechov a Slovákov). (sú Česi a Slováci jeden národ). Koreň (1921:29, 42); Koreň (1932:29, 42, 43).

All these books but one were written by Czechs and (in the case of the Slovak books) translated or "Slovakized." Hlavinka's *Stručné dejiny československého pre nižšie triedy slovenských stredných škôl* (1926) is the only book that was not Slovakized, and it differs from the others by being more Czechoslovakist than the average.

The most factual and unbiased accounts in my sample were found in texts by the university professors Jaroslav Bidlo and Josef Šusta (1921, 1935, 1936) and Josef Pekař (1921).<sup>189</sup> The emphasis is on Czech history, while Slovak history gets scant attention. This is even the case in the final editions (1935, 1936) of Bidlo and Šusta's book. Moreover, the changes in the Slovak version of this book compared to the Czech are so minor that they hardly exceed a translation; the extra sentences that are sometimes added do not change the main impression.

In fact, the Slovak version follows the Czech even to an extent that Slovakia is implicitly referred to as a foreign country under the heading "Hussism abroad": "Hussism received a certain echo not only in brotherly Slovakia, but also elsewhere in Hungary...."<sup>190</sup> The referral to "brotherly" is about as far as these authors go. "Czechoslovak tribes" appear once in the Slovak version in the context of the struggle of the old Slavs with the Frankish empire,<sup>191</sup> while the idea of a Czechoslovak nation does not appear in any of the editions. One reason for this could be that the narratives of Bidlo and Šusta stop before the national revival – in the other books, it is mostly after this point that the Czechoslovak nation appears.

In Pekař's book, *Czechoslovak* appears in the title as well as in many of the chapter headings, and he referred to "Czechoslovak tribes", "Czechoslovak settlements" and "Czechoslovak soil", but not to a "Czechoslovak nation." Yet, Czechoslovak national unity is *implied* in his description of the result of the demise of Great Moravia: "the focus of Czechoslovak power and hope moved from Moravia to Bohemia. [...] The Czechs fairly soon succeeded in uniting the tribes of their own Czech land under one state power and finally attached a large part of old Moravia to it. But Slovakia was lost for the national unity for more than ten centuries."<sup>192</sup> Likewise, under the heading "the Czech national movement", he states that "the circumstance that the foremost awakeners of present-day Czech national awareness originated in Slovakia, shows its great importance in the development of Czechoslovak cultural life."<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Bidlo and Šusta: *Dějiny středního a nového věku do roku 1648* (1921); *Všeobecný dějepis pro vyšší třídy škol středních. Díl druhý. Dějiny středního a nového věku do osvícenství* (1935); *Všeobecný dějepis pro vyšší třídy středních škôl. Díl druhý. Dejiny stredného a nového věku do osvietenstva* (Slovak version, 1936); Pekař: *Dějiny československé* (1921). Pekař's book was a new version of a book published already during the Habsburg monarchy.

<sup>190</sup> (Husistvo v cudzine). (Husistvo nachádzalo značný ohlas nielen na bratskom Slovensku, ale aj inde v Uhrách). Bidlo and Šusta (1936:101). The Czech version is identical. See Bidlo & Šusta (1935:98).

<sup>191</sup> (V zápasoch tých vstupuje československé kmene) Bidlo & Šusta (1936:7).

<sup>192</sup> (kmenů československých) (sídla československá) (na půdě československé). (posunilo se těžiště moci a naděje československé z Moravy do Čech. [...] Čechům podařilo se poměrně brzo spojit v jednu státní moc kmene vlastní země české a konečně připojit k ní i velký díl staré Moravy. Ale Slovensko bylo ztraceno jednotě národní na víc než deset století). Pekař (1921:10, 11, 14).

<sup>193</sup> (Okolnost, že přední budovatelé novodobého českého vědomí národního vyšli ze Slovenska, ukazuje veliký význam jeho ve vývoji kulturního života československého). Pekař (1921:125).

As for the others, they refer to a Czechoslovak nation on average two or three times. Jaroslav Vlach (1925) and Jozef Pešek (1924) apply the term only in direct or indirect quotations. In addition, Pešek made one single reference to the "Slovak branch of the Czech nation."<sup>194</sup> In a later book (1933) Pešek referred to M.R. Štefánik as a "splendid Czechoslovak hero", who was "laid to rest by the Czechoslovak nation." Otherwise the Czechoslovak nation appears in direct or indirect quotations twice. In addition, "Czechoslovaks" and the "Czechoslovak people" appear now and then in the context of the founding of Czechoslovakia.<sup>195</sup>

Hugo Traub clearly also regarded the Slovaks as a branch of the Czech nation. Under the heading "Czech awakeners" he states that "slowly, an awareness was awakened that Czechs, Slovaks, Silesians and [even] Slovaks were members of the same nation."<sup>196</sup> Logically, this nation would be the Czech nation. A few pages later this is made explicit when he praises the "Czech nation" for its efforts in the national struggle, "while its Slovak branch lagged behind, being disproportional weaker numerically, much less developed educationally and almost without a nationally aware intelligentsia." One page later he refers to "the brotherly tribe in Slovakia." The sole reference to a Czechoslovak nation comes in the final two text pages; merely three times in context of the struggle for freedom of the "Czechoslovak nation."<sup>197</sup>

The most nationalist of the textbooks is Josef Pešek's *Má vlast* (My homeland, Czech version – 1922), where some of the same formulations as in *Matka vlast* from 1923 occur, regarding the revival. *Má vlast* has many of the features of the primary-school textbooks. The old Czech legends are mentioned; the Slavs are described as hospitable and brave but cunning and disunited and the Magyars as wild and murderous; Karel IV, Hussism and Jiří of Poděbrady are glorified. The Slovak version *Moja vlast* (1926) is more neutral in tone; it seems that much of the nationalist content was removed in the process of Slovakization.

What *Má vlast*/*Moja vlast* have in common is a high count of the term "Czechoslovak nation" compared to the other textbooks for secondary school. The contexts in which such references occur are, however, the same – the national revival and the founding of the republic. The one exception is found in the Czech version and then in relation to Great Moravia: "Velehrad [...] became the center of the land of the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> (Slovenská vetva českého národa). Jozef Pešek: *Z domova a cudziny. Obrazy z dejín stredovekých a novovekých* (1924:108). See also Jaroslav Vlach *Dejepis všeobecný pre nižšie triedy stredných škôl* (1925).

<sup>195</sup> (skvelý československý hrdina Milan R. Štefánik). (Československý národ pochoval svojho hrdinu). Jozef Pešek: *Učebnica dejepisu pre nižšie triedy stredných škôl* (1933:96). See also page 84, 87, 97, 138–40.

<sup>196</sup> (Čeští buditelé). (Pomalu se probouzelo vědomí, že Čech, Moravan, Slezan i Slovák jsou příslušníky téhož národa). Hugo Traub: *Dějepis československý* (1923:103).

<sup>197</sup> (národ český, kdežto jeho větev slovenská musela zůstatí daleko pozadu, jsouc početně nepoměrně slabší, ve vzdělanosti mnohem méně pokročilá a takřka bez inteligence národně uvědomělý). (s bratrským kmenem na Slovensku). Traub (1923:107, 108). See also p. 109–11.

<sup>198</sup> (stal se střediskem země československého národa Velehrad). Josef Pešek: *Má vlast. Československá dějprava pro nejnižší třídy škol středních* (1922:17).

In *Má vlast* Pešek refers to the Czechoslovak nation twice in the context of the national revival, but it is obvious that he is using "Czech" and "Czechoslovak" as synonyms. Pešek writes that Josef Jungmann and Jan Nejedlý "awakened a love of the Czech language and nation in their students. The Czechoslovak nation was led by its awakeners on the right track." In the next paragraph he adds that many patriots lost courage, "not believing that the Czechoslovak nation would achieve its rights. Among them was also Dobrovský, who was tormented by doubts whether the Czech national awareness would not in the end be extinguished."<sup>199</sup>

The national revival receives less emphasis in the Slovak version, and neither of the above can thus be found in *Moja vlast*. Yet, also here the Czechoslovak nation occurs twice. In the first paragraph, it is stated that "admirers of the Czechoslovak nation and language, so-called patriots, wrote in defense of their native language and awakened national awareness." Towards the end, the awakening of the Czechoslovak nation is presented as a joint venture: "The Czech Jungmann, the Moravian Palacký and the Slovaks Kollár and Šafárik through their life work awakened the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>200</sup> Both versions mention the speech made by the Slovak Jozef Miloslav Hurban when the foundation stone of the Czech national theater was laid in 1868, where Hurban emphasized that Czechs and Slovaks were one nation: "We are yours, you are ours, for we are all Slavs of the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>201</sup>

Further, in the Czech version, Pešek claims that "the students of Jaroslav Goll (Josef Pekař, Josef Šusta, Jaroslav Bidlo and others)" worked on the "history of the Czechoslovak nation", which again suggests that Czech and Czechoslovak are being used synonymously – unless Pešek was totally misinformed.<sup>202</sup> One page later, he even refers to the Slovaks as "the unhappy Czech branch."<sup>203</sup> After this the Czechoslovak nation is mentioned only in the part about the war and the founding of the Czechoslovak republic. For example, Pešek states that, upon his return, Masaryk was "greeted with true enthusiasm of the entire Czechoslovak nation as a victor." Likewise, the fiftieth anniversary of the laying of the foundation stone of the Czech national theater in May 1918 was presented as "magnificent manifestations in favor of the independence of the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>204</sup>

<sup>199</sup> (kteří v žácích svých probouzeli lásku k českému jazyku a národu. Národ československý byl svými buditeli uveden na správnou cestu). (nevěříce, že národ československý dojde svého práva. Mezi nimi byl i Dobrovský, který byl mučen pochybnostmi, nevyhyne-li na konec české vědomí národní). Pešek (1922:99).

<sup>200</sup> (Milovníci československého národa a jazyka, t. zv. vlastenci, písali na obranu rodného jazyka a probúdali národné povedomie). (Čech Jungmann, Moravan Palacký a Slováci Kollár a Šafárik svojou životnou prácou prebudili národ československý). Josef Pešek: *Moja vlast. Obrazy z dejin československých pre nejnižšie triedy škôl stredných* (1926:78, 80).

<sup>201</sup> ("My sme vaši, vy ste naši, lebo sme všetci Slovania československého národa!") Quoted in Pešek (1926:86). The Czech version is identical. See Pešek (1922:116).

<sup>202</sup> Czech historians did not start writing about Slovak history until after 1918 (see next chapter).

<sup>203</sup> (O jednotlivých obdobiach dejin československého národa pracujú úspešne žáci universitného profesora Jaroslava Golla (Jos. Pekař, Jos. Šusta, Jaroslav Bidlo a. j.). (Když pak útisk Slováků v Maďarsku dostoupil vrcholu, všiml si utrpení nešťastné větve české). Pešek (1922:123, 124).

<sup>204</sup> (V květnu zúčastnil se pak celý národ okázalých slavnosti [...] byly to velkolepé projevy pro samostatnost československého národa). (Nové zvolený president [...] byl] opravdovým nadšením uvítan celým československým národem jako vítěz). Pešek (1922:135, 138).

In the Slovak version, the reference to the Czechoslovak nation is dropped in the context of Masaryk's homecoming, while "the entire Czechoslovak nation" took part in the celebration of the anniversary.<sup>205</sup> The Czech wording is "the entire nation", presumably meaning the Czech nation, which was probably more correct – since both events took place in Prague. We may note some other interesting differences between the Czech and the Slovak version. Where the French historian Ernest Denis was "a friend of the Czech nation" in the Czech version, he was "a friend of the Czechoslovak nation" in the Slovak version. In the Czech version, the *Maffie* was composed of "members of all parties of the Czech nation", in the Slovak, it was composed of "members of all parties of the Czechoslovak nation."<sup>206</sup>

One of the most striking differences between primary- and secondary-school history textbooks is that the latter emerge as far less anti-German (but not necessarily less anti-Magyar or anti-Habsburg). This even goes for the otherwise rather nationalist *Má vlast*. Thus, textbooks for the secondary school do not even reproach the last Přemyslids for bringing Germans to the country, and Karel IV is not accused of favoring German ways. The Germans are often presented as colonizers, but not in a very prejudiced manner. Bidlo and Šusta for instance emphasize how the foreigners contributed to a better legal and economic position for the rural population.<sup>207</sup> And they repudiate the myth of the peace-loving Slav and the brutal German: "The old Slavs were not fundamentally different in their organization and character from other neighboring nations, e.g. the old Germans."<sup>208</sup>

Pekař dismisses these myths under the heading "the erroneous views of older historians" and even argues that "historical and archeological data on the whole testify to the fact that the German culture was more advanced" than the Slav because the Germans became "the direct neighbors of the Romans five hundred years before." Yet, a certain anti-German and anti-Magyar tinge is discernible in Pekař's presenting the settlement of the Magyars on the Hungarian plain as "a great tragedy for the future of the Slavs." He argues that the greatest Slav state in the Danube area fell because of it; the Northern and Southern Slavs were separated and the incipient cultural ties of the Western Slavs with Greek Byzantium were broken. Moreover, "the Slavs of the Czech lands [...] were forced to seek state and cultural support in the German empire...." and "Slovakia was lost for national unity for more than ten centuries."<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> (V máji roku 1918 celý národ československý sa účastnil). Pešek (1926:94). For the Czech version, see footnote 204.

<sup>206</sup> (přítel českého národa Ernest Denis). (byli příslušníci všech stran českého národa). Pešek (1922:130, 129). (Arnošt Denis, dávny priateľ československého národa). (príslušníci všetkých stran československého národa). Pešek (1926:93).

<sup>207</sup> (takže vlast naše se stala krajem dvoujazyčným. Cizinci přispěli však zároveň platně k zlepšení právního a hospodářského postavení všeho obyvatelstva venkovského). Bidlo & Šusta (1937:55). The Slovak version is identical. See Bidlo & Šusta (1936:57).

<sup>208</sup> (staří Slované nelišili se podstatně zřízením a povahou svou od jiných národů příbuzných, na. př. starých Germánů). Bidlo & Šusta (1921:13).

<sup>209</sup> (Mylné názory starších historiků). (data historická i archeologická svědčí vůbec o pokročilejší kultuře germánské. [...] Germáni byli pět set let dříve přímými sousedy Římanů) (Usídlení se Maďarů v Uhrách bylo velikým neštěstím pro budoucnost Slovanstva). (Slované zemí českých [...] byli přinuceni hledati opory státní i kulturní v říši německé. [...] Slovensko bylo ztraceno jednotě národní na víc než deset století). Pekař: *Dějiny československé* (1921:9, 10, 14). See also Pešek (1922:6).

Since the Czechs were also surrounded by Germans, Pekař argues, "the enormous German colonization of the Czech lands and Slovakia in the 13th century appears in such circumstances as an especially great danger to the Czech future."<sup>210</sup> In general, he emphasizes the German-Czech struggle, as is the case in the part of the narrative dealing with Hussism.

Hlavinka's *Stručné dejiny národa československého pre nižšie triedy slovenských stredných škôl* (1926) is the only secondary-school history text with the "Czechoslovak nation" in the title. It is also the only book written originally in Slovak, although we may assume that the author was probably not Slovak, considering where he worked as a teacher (Hodonín, Košice and Prague – see Appendix C<sub>II</sub>). In tone and Czechoslovak tendency this work resembles the Slovak textbooks for primary school more than the other textbooks for secondary school. It is strongly anti-German and anti-Magyar, and, like the Slovak primary-school textbooks, it refers to "Czechoslovaks" or the "Czechoslovak nation" not only in the context of the national revival or the founding of the Czechoslovak republic, but throughout the narrative. In addition, national unity between Czechs and Slovaks is implied on several other occasions.

Examples are: "the Czechoslovaks were divided into several tribes. The most powerful of them were the tribes of the Czechs [...] and] the Slovaks, who [...] together formed one Czechoslovak nation. [...] We Czechoslovaks were the first Slavs after the Yugoslavs to accept Christianity. [...] The Slovak Protestant churches always preserved national awareness and the memories of the glorious past. They prayed from the Kralice Bible and [...] that way always felt as sons of one Czechoslovak nation. [...] The Czech half of the nation suffered much more during the Counter-Reformation." Finally, after 1780 "the Czechoslovak nation could acknowledge its past – Hus, Žižka, Komenský; its past was not insulted as it had been before."<sup>211</sup>

The unity of the Czechoslovak nation is made quite explicit in the conclusion, as is the conception of the Czechoslovak republic as a Czechoslovak nation-state: "Our new state is called *Czechoslovak*; this means that the Czechs and Slovaks, two tribes of one nation, have again united in this state after long dissociation and will forever keep together, so that neither the Germans nor the Magyars can separate or injure them again. The Czechs and Slovaks are one, and those who want to tear them apart from each other, also want to tear apart their shared, free home land, the Czechoslovak state."<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> (Hromadná německá kolonisace českých zemí a Slovenska v 13. stol. jeví se za takových okolností zvlášť velikým nebezpečím pro českou budoucnost). Pekař (1921:45).

<sup>211</sup> (Čechoslováci delili sa v početné kmene. Najmocnejší z nich bol kmeň Čechov [...] a] Slováci, ktorí [...] tvoria s nimi jeden národ československý). (My Čechoslováci boli sme po Juhoslovánoch prví zo Slovanov, ktorí sme prijali kresťanstvo). (Evanjelické cirkve zachovali si vždy národné povedomie a vzpomienky na slávnú minulosť. Modlili sa z bible kráľickej [...] a tak sa cítili vždy synmi jedného národa československého. [...] Česká polovica národa trpela protireformáciou o veľa viac). (národ československý mohol sa hlásiť k svojej minulosti, k Husovi, Žižkovi, Komenskému, jeho minulosť nebola už hanobená jako pred tým). Karol Hlavinka: *Stručné dejiny národa československého pre nižšie triedy slovenských stredných škôl* (1926:10, 20, 82).

<sup>212</sup> (Česi a Slováci, dva kmene jedného národa, po dlhom rozlúčení sa v tomto štáte znovu spojili a chcú naveky spolu držať, aby ani Nemci ani Maďari ich znovu nerozdvojili a nezronili. Čech a Slovák jedno sú a kto ich chce od seba trhať, chce trhať aj ich spoločný slobodný domov, štát československý). Hlavinka (1926:107).



The strength-through-unity theme is on the whole quite prominent. Under the heading "the Czechoslovak tribes", Hlavinka asserts, "there is strength only in unity and agreement. Our earliest ancestors experienced the truth of this firsthand, as they had many enemies around them."<sup>213</sup> In the context of Great Moravia a few pages later he writes: "They defended themselves against new attacks of the Germans with the help of the Czech prince Borivoj. So we see how it was strength in mutual agreement."<sup>214</sup> As usual, the lack of unity between the sons of Svätopluk is presented as a major cause of the demise of the Great Moravian empire.

Hussism is presented as "the most glorious time in Czechoslovak history. At that time our nation fought of its own free will and unanimously for the truth of our religious conviction against the entire Europe, [...] and gave direction to the history of man through its independent road to a spiritual life. The Hussite period is named after Master Jan Hus, the most famous Czechoslovak. [...] Hus supported the rights of village people against the rich masters, the right of the Czech language against the Germans [...] He woke the Czech nation [...] his writings and his example poured spiritual strength into the Czech nation, placing it first among the nations of the world. They burned his body, but his spirit lives and will live between us forever."<sup>215</sup> On Hussism in Slovakia, he writes: "Hussism united the entire Czechoslovak nation through a powerful bond of shared struggle for a national church following the teachings of Christ, [...] the long Hussite wars made the Czechoslovak nation famous in the entire world..."<sup>216</sup>

As these quotations show, the terminology is not consistent; Hlavinka writes alternately of a Czech and a Czechoslovak nation. It is interesting to note that he does not write of a Slovak *nation* – only of Slovaks and Slovakia.

*Československá vlastivěda* (Czech – 1924) and *Československá vlastiveda* (Slovak – 1926) by Nikolau, Baxa and Stocký deviate from the textbooks in history. First, they are more Czechoslovak in orientation (with the possible exception of Hlavinka's), and second, the Czechoslovak rhetoric is for once most dominant in the Czech version. These are textbooks meant for teachers' academies, whose graduates would presumably serve in primary schools. This makes the strong Czechoslovak rhetoric even more interesting.

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<sup>213</sup> (Len v jednote a svornosti je sila. Naši predkovia skúsili túto pravdu na vlastnej koži už v najstarších dobách, lebo mali okolo seba mnoho nepriateľov). Hlavinka (1926:11).

<sup>214</sup> (Proti novým útokom Nemcov obrátil sa s pomocou českého kniežaťa Borivoja. Tak vidíme, ako vo vzájomnej svornosti bola sila). Hlavinka (1926:20).

<sup>215</sup> (Doba husitská je najslávnejšou dobou dejín československých. Vtedy národ náš bojoval z vlastnej vôle a jednomyseľne za pravdu svojho náboženského predvedenia proti celej Európe, [...] a šiel ďalej svojou samostatnou cestou duševného života udávajúc smer dejinám ľudstva. Doba husitská má meno po majstrovi Jánovi Husovi, najslávnejšom Čechoslovákovi). (Hus zastával sa tiež práv dedinského ľudu proti bohatým pánom, práv českého jazyka proti Nemcom [...]) On prebudil národ český [...] jeho spisy a jeho príklad vliaty českému národu duševnú silu, ktorá ho postavila na prvé miesto medzi národmi sveta. Telo jeho spálili, ale duch jeho žije a večne bude žiť medzi námi). Hlavinka (1926:49–50, 53).

<sup>216</sup> (Husitstvo spojilo celý československý národ mocnou páskou spoločného usilovania o národnú cirkev podľa učenia Kristovho) (Dlhé války husitské preslavia síce národ československý po celom svete). Hlavinka (1926:58).

Stanislav Nikolau's introduction is an indication of the Czechoslovak tendency: "Through the firm will and shared efforts of all parts of the nation the yearning of many generations of the Czechoslovak nation was realized – to be liberated from the bondage of the Habsburg dynasty and the German and Magyar yoke. On October 28th, 1918, an independent Czechoslovak state was proclaimed in Prague, and on October 30th, representatives of the Slovaks [assembled] in Turčiansky Sv. Martin declared the unity of the two branches. [...] the name of the state [...] is the Czechoslovak republic, by which it is understood that this republic was founded by the Czechoslovak nation, through the will of both its branches, the Czechs and the Slovaks."<sup>217</sup>

The versions differ most in the part about the various national groups. In the Czech version, "the Czechoslovak territory was inhabited exclusively by *Czechoslovak* tribes until the 12th century"; in the Slovak version these were "*Czech and Slovak* tribes." In the Czech version, "the entire Slovak *tribe* suffered under brutal Magyarization"; in the Slovak version, "the Slovak *nation*" suffered. In the Czech version, "the world war raised the hope of independence and members of both Czechoslovak tribes took up arms for the freedom of their country"; in the Slovak version, "Czechs as well as Slovaks took up arms."<sup>218</sup>

There is especially one paragraph where the change of "Czechoslovak nation" into "Czechs and Slovaks" has consequences for the whole meaning. According to the Czech version, "the Czechoslovak nation forms a full two thirds of the population. [...] Our republic is thus a nation-state in spite of all attempts at proving that it is a nationality state." By changing "the Czechoslovak nation" in the first sentence into "Czechs and Slovaks", while leaving the rest, the Slovak version supports the ľudák view of the state as the nation-state of two nations, the Czech and the Slovak.<sup>219</sup> This was probably intentional on the part of Michal Ondruš (he was a Slovak autonomist himself – see Appendix C<sub>II</sub>). The notion of a Czechoslovak nation-state was repeated elsewhere, as under the heading "the constitution of the Czechoslovak republic": "The Czechoslovak republic is a nation-state, that is, the state of the Czechoslovak nation. [...] The state language of our republic is the Czechoslovak language."<sup>220</sup>

<sup>217</sup> (Pevnou vůlí a společným úsilím všech vrstev národních uskutečněna byla touha mnohých pokolení československého národa – vymaniti se z poddanství rodu habsburského a z područí německého a maďarského. Dne 28. října 1918 prohlášen byl v Praze samostatný stát československý a 30. října prohlásili zástupci Slováků v Turčanském Sv. Martině jednotu obou větví). (Název státu [...] je Československá republika, čímž se vystihuje, že tato republika byla založena československým národem, vůlí obou jeho větví, Čechů a Slováků). Stanislav Nikolau, Bohumil Baxa, Jan Stocký: *Československá vlastivěda pro nejvyšší třídy škol středních. A III. Ročník učitelských ústavů* (1924:3). The quotation is in Czech, but the meaning of the Slovak version is identical. See Stanislav Nikolau, Bohumil Baxa, Jan Stocký: *Československá vlastivěda pro nejvyššie triedy stredných škôl, A III. Ročník učitelských ústavov* (1926:3).

<sup>218</sup> (Až do XII. století obývali československé území výhradně kmenové českoslovenští) (Ale celý kmen slovenský trpěl krutou maďarisací) (Světová válka probudila naděje po samostatnosti a příslušníci obou kmenů československých chopili se zbraně za svobodu své vlasti). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1924:58). (Až po XII. storočie bývali na československom území len kmene české a slovenské) (Slovenský národ však trpel krutou maďarizáciou) (Svetová vojna vzbudila tužby po samostatnosti a tak Česi ako Slováci chopili sa zbrane za slobodu svojej vlasti). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1926:54–55).

<sup>219</sup> (československý národ tu tvoří celé dvě třetiny obyvatelstva. [...] Je tedy naše republika státem národním, přes všechny snahy dokázati, že je státem národnostním). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1924:59). See also the Slovak version p. 55.

<sup>220</sup> (Republika československá jest státem národním, t.j. státem národa československého. [...] Státním jazykem republiky naší jest jazyk československý. Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1924:117). The Slovak version is identical. See page 113.

Under the heading "the Czechoslovaks", both versions state that there were around 11 million Czechoslovaks, and then turn to "the Czech nation." However, where the Czech version refers to "settlements of the Czechoslovak tribe" along the Slovak-Moravian border, the Slovak version refers to "Slovak settlements."<sup>221</sup>

Even more interesting is how the Slovaks are introduced. In the Czech version, the narrative of the Slovaks starts thus: "The second branch of the unitary Czechoslovak nation – the Slovaks – reside in former Hungarian territory, but the distinction is in part rather artificial. There is not any big difference between the Moravian Slovaks and their neighbors on the Slovak side. Continuous settlements of the Slovak tribe stretch ..." In the Slovak version, the entire "branch" rhetoric is left out, including the statement that the difference is artificial: "The Slovaks reside in former Hungarian territory. There is no big difference between them and the Moravian Slovaks. Continuous Slovak settlements stretch ..." <sup>222</sup> Likewise, in the Czech version, "the Slovak countryside was able to preserve its individuality much more than the Czech countryside." In the Slovak version, this becomes "Slovakia preserved its national individuality much better than the Czech lands."<sup>223</sup>

Finally, a few words about Lorenz Puffer's *Heimatsgeschichte der Čechoslovakischen Republik für die untersten Klassen der Mittelschule* (1924). I would first like to point out the odd spelling of the word for "Czechoslovak." It should be "Tschechoslowakischen" in German, but the spelling above was common enough for the German deputy Schollich to file an interpellation about it in January 1930.<sup>224</sup> In emphasis, Puffer's book is closer to the Czech tradition than the Slovak, with the focus mainly on Czech history and much less on Slovak. It is on the whole less "national" than any of the other books sampled. The "Czechoslovak nation" does not appear even once, neither is Czechoslovak unity implied indirectly anywhere. Considering that the book was formally approved, this suggests that the Ministry of Education did not see it as a priority to convince German pupils that a Czechoslovak nation existed.

In addition to Bohemian and Moravian history, Puffer also emphasizes the history of the Germans outside the Czech lands. Not very surprisingly, the Germans are not described as colonizers – on the contrary he states that the Germans were there first: "The Slavs moved into the territory of the republic, a good deal of which had been left by the Germans." Save the description of the national character (*Volkscharakter*) of the old Slavs (disloyal in wars, vengeful, even cruel; uncultured, did not respect their wives, and so on), the narrative is rather

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<sup>221</sup> (sídla československé kmene). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1924:61). (sídla slovenské). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1926:57).

<sup>222</sup> (Druhá větev jednotného národa československého – Slováci – obývá území kdysi uherské, ale rozdělení to je z části docela umělé. Mezi moravským Slovákem a jeho sousedy se strany slovenské není velkého rozdílu. Souvislá sídla slovenské větve vycházejí). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1924:62). (Slováci bývají na území voľakedy uhorskom. Medzi nimi a moravskými Slovákmi niet veľkého rozdielu. Súvislé sídla slovenské sa ťahajú). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1926:59).

<sup>223</sup> (Slovenský venkov uchoval si mnohem více svérazu než venkov český). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1924:63). (Slovensko si o mnoho lepšie zachovalo svoju národnú samobytnosť ako Čechy). Nikolau, Baxa, Stocký (1926:59).

<sup>224</sup> See Interpellation no. 204/XVIII in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny, Národního shromáždění republiky československé, III. volební období* (1930).

unbiased. However, a notion of German cultural superiority over the Slavs is conveyed at least twice: In the last paragraph under *Volkscharakter* Puffer writes, "only under the influence of Germanism and Christianity did the Slav peoples work their way up to fruitful cultural heights." And later, under the heading *Deutschtum* (German-ness): "Our German predecessors had a great role in the cultural development of the Bohemian lands."<sup>225</sup>

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Let us now sum up these findings. Originally, I expected to find a clear Czechoslovak rhetoric and special emphasis on the parts of history that unite the Czechs and Slovaks. I was surprised to find that many of the books did not convey a Czechoslovak identity at all, and even more surprised by the clear difference between Czech and Slovak textbooks for the primary school. The latter were the books that most closely approximated my expectations, but not even here was a Czechoslovak identity consistently advocated.

Slovak primary-school textbooks in history were more Czechoslovak in orientation than Czech textbooks, in terms of Czechoslovak rhetoric, in terms of the identity conveyed throughout the pages – including emphasis on elements that (supposedly) united Czechs and Slovaks – and in terms of balance between Czech and Slovak history. Yet, even in the most Czechoslovak-oriented of the books, the main focus was necessarily on the separate histories of the Czechs and Slovaks, since they actually were separated most of the time. And in every single book the terms "Czech" and "Slovak" was found to occur far more often than "Czechoslovak", although "Slovak" was only rarely combined with "nation."

All the Czech textbooks, even those written in the 1930s, emerged as very Czech-centered, and their interpretation of history closely resembled the Czech pre-war tradition. Slovak history was seen as little more than an appendix or a parenthesis, and was often even presented as foreign history. What was conveyed was a Czech identity: when the Czechoslovak rhetoric was used, "Czech" and "Czechoslovak" often amounted to the same. The Slovaks were, like their history, treated as a mere extension of the Czech nation. Strikingly, not a single Slovak book was particularly Slovak-centered or conveyed a strong Slovak identity.<sup>226</sup> And while the Czech and Slovak secondary-school textbooks proved more alike than their primary school counterparts, they were closer to the Czech than the Slovak tradition, in terms of emphasis and in terms of the identity they conveyed. Slovak history received almost shockingly little attention even in the Slovak textbooks for secondary school. This may be due to the fact that all the Slovak books were based on Czech originals, except one – and this was also different.

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<sup>225</sup> (wanderten Slawen in das von den Germanen zum guten Teile verlassene Staatsgebiet der Republik ein). (zwar unter der Einwirkung von Deutschtum und Christentum arbeiteten sich auch die Völker der Slawen zu fruchtbringender Kulturhöhe empor). (Einen großen Anteil an dieser Kulturentwicklung in der böhmischen Ländern hatten unsere deutschen Vorfahren). Lorenz Puffer: *Heimatsgeschichte der Čechoslovakischen Republik für die untersten Klassen der Mittelschule* (1924:15, 16, 40).

<sup>226</sup> A book with Slovak tendency is František Hrušovský's *Slovenské dejiny. Učebnica pre IV. triedu stredných škôl* (1941).

What did Czechoslovak nationhood consist in, according to these textbooks? The features that were seen as uniting were kinship or blood relation, language and culture, and spirit – or what we might term "national character", although that term is used only by Dejmek (see page 218). The Czechoslovak nation was thus conceived as a cultural-linguistic community based on the closeness of the two languages, and/or a kinship community based on blood relation. Common metaphors were "two brothers of the same family", "two branches of the same tribe", "the brotherly tribe", "our brothers, the Slovaks/Czechs." The shared Slav origin of course underlay all this, even though it was not always explicitly mentioned.

The alleged uniting elements were the shared Slav forefathers, the Great Moravian empire, Hussism and its implications (such as a shared literary language), the Reformation and especially the national revival and the founding of the Czechoslovak republic. The "strength-through-unity" theme was also quite common, especially in Slovak primary-school textbooks; the message was that the Czechs and Slovaks needed to stand together against their enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In this historical-political line of argument, Great Moravia was viewed positively, and its demise seen as a disaster. The primary-school books were generally anti-German and/or anti-Magyar, while an anti-nobility tendency was a special feature of the Slovak books. The textbooks for secondary school were, on the whole, far more balanced.

The variation in emphasis and in the identity conveyed also suggests that school textbooks in history were less standardized by the authorities than I had expected. At the very least it means that the Czechoslovak project was not vigorously implemented in history classes. If the Czech and Slovak versions of Nikolau/Baxa/Stocký's *vlastivěda/vlastiveda* (1924, 1926) are representative, however, the Czechoslovak rhetoric was more common elsewhere.

Stanislava Kučerová has given an interesting illustration of how she remembers her school days: "In the First Republic we learned in school that the Czechoslovak nation was unitary and that the Czechs and the Slovaks were two branches of that nation. [...] The members of the Czechoslovak nation were separated for long centuries, but the cultural contact between them never ceased, and in times of trouble the members of the two branches sought each other out and supported each other. The awareness of the unity and the reciprocity grew stronger during the national revival, when Czech and Slovak patriots spoke of one nation, 'spread over Bohemia, Moravia and Upper Hungary' and termed the Czechs, Moravians, Silesians and Slovaks Czechoslavs. [...] On the basis of a shared struggle for self-determination and shared leadership in the resistance movement abroad and later at home during the first world war, they [i.e. the Czechs and Slovaks] finally joined and united in one state again."<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> (Ve škole 1. republiky jsme se učili, že československý národ je jednotný, a že Češi a Slováci jsou dvě větve tohoto národa, [...] byli příslušníci československého národa na dlouhá staletí rozdělení, ale kulturní styky mezi nimi nikdy neustaly a v dobách zlých se příslušníci obou větví hledali a navzájem se podporovali. Vědomí jednoty a vzájemnosti sflilo v době národního obrození, kdy čeští i slovenští vlastenci mluvili o jednom národě, 'rozlehlém po Čechách, Moravě a Horních Uhřích', a Čechy, Moravany, Slezany a Slováky nazývali Čechoslovany. [...] Na základě společného obrozené zápasu o sebeurčení a společně vedeného zahraničního a posléze i domácího odboje za první světové války se r. 1918 konečně zase sešli a spojili v jednom státě). See Stanislava Kučerová: *Idea Československa ve škole první republiky*, in: *Idea Československa a střední Evropa* (1993:286).

A nagging question is of course: Why this systematic variation between Czech and Slovak primary-school textbooks, and between these and textbooks intended for use in the secondary school? Let us turn to the latter question first. The main difference between primary- and secondary-school textbooks is that the former were on average more nationalist, more biased, more anti-German, while the latter were closer to the ideal of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This may have something to do with who the authors were; the least biased textbooks for secondary school in my sample were written by university professors. The history department of Charles University (*Univerzita Karlova*) in Prague was dominated by the positivist ideal ever since the breakthrough of the Goll school in the 1880s. As the only Czech university until 1919, it had a profound influence on the history profession, especially in the early years of the period under study here.

It is of course also possible that the aims were different. Perhaps identity-formation was deemed more important in primary school, while secondary schools aimed at training the ability of critical thinking. A counter-argument is that at least two of the books for secondary school were found to be rather biased – Pešek's (*Má vlast*, 1922) and the Hlavinka text.

The difference between Czech and Slovak textbooks for primary school is more puzzling. Assuming that this difference was intentional, why should it be more important to convince Slovak children of the existence of a Czechoslovak nation than Czech children? For one thing, the need for identity-building was greater in the Slovak case. The process of Slovak nation-formation was not completed because of the former Magyarization policy; moreover, there was a need to "win back" some of the Slovaks who were on the verge of becoming assimilated into the Magyar nation. On the other hand, why further a Czechoslovak and not a Slovak identity, if identity-building was deemed necessary? Second, and maybe more important, nobody really argued against the idea that the Czechs were a part of the Czechoslovak nation. The Czechs merely changed labels and turned "Czech" into "Czechoslovak", whereas in Slovakia, there was a need to counter the claims of Hlinka and his autonomists that the Slovaks were a separate nation.

Finally, the difference may not have been fully intentional. It may have been a reflection of the very different situation of the Czechs and Slovaks at the threshold of independence. The Czech nation had been fully formed for over 50 years when the Czechoslovak republic was founded. Thanks to the establishment of a Czech university in 1882 and the generally high level of education in the Czech lands, Czech historiography was well established in 1918, and the Czechs also had a national intelligentsia. The fact that Czech textbooks in history were highly Czech-centered in terms of identity as well as focus, can be seen as a matter of continuity, of a tradition that had been established before the Czechoslovak state. It may also be argued that the Czechs were more "dependent on historical tradition for the awareness of their identity",<sup>228</sup> and thus more vulnerable to changes in the way history was narrated.

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<sup>228</sup> See Zdeněk Suda: Slovakia in Czech national consciousness, in: Jiří Musil: *The end of Czechoslovakia* (1995:116).

By contrast, Slovak historiography was not well established. The Slovaks had no university,<sup>229</sup> and the national intelligentsia was small. Moreover, a large part of the Slovak intelligentsia that did exist had been educated in Prague and were Czechoslovak in orientation. It is likely that this Czechoslovak-oriented group was over-represented among the authors of history schoolbooks. This effect may have been strengthened by the fact that the head of the Slovak department in the Ministry of Education was the Slovak-born Jaroslav Vlček, a strongly Czechoslovak-oriented professor of Czech literary history at Charles University. Likewise, the man in charge of Slovak textbooks was in the beginning Albert Pražák, professor of Czech and Slovak literary history at Comenius University of Bratislava from 1921 and a frontline figure on the Czechoslovakist side of the identity struggle.<sup>230</sup> Moreover, the first Slovak Plenipotentiary ministers of Slovakia (Vavro Šrobár, Ivan Déřer) as well as the official in charge of education in Bratislava, Anton Štefánik, belonged to the Czechoslovak-oriented wing.

The variation in emphasis between Czech and Slovak books may also have something to do with the fact that Slovak textbooks were generally written anew. Not even Slovak history was a subject in Hungarian schools, let alone Czech. The medium of instruction was Magyar, while Czech textbooks sometimes were merely revised versions of books that had been published before the war. Since Czech historiography was more developed and the Czechs had a "richer" history, it may also have been very difficult for textbook authors to devote the same number of pages to Slovak history even if they had tried – which they obviously did not.

All this being said, the textbooks also reflected a difference in the conception of Czechoslovakism that was even clearer in the public debate: the Czechs used "Czech" and "Czechoslovak" as synonyms, the Slovaks saw Czechs and Slovaks as two tribes of the same nation.

### ***Summary and conclusion***

The foundations for Czechoslovakism were laid by the independence movement abroad, where the president-to-be Tomáš G. Masaryk played an especially important role. He generally presented the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation and Slovak as a Czech dialect (albeit an archaic one). He repeatedly emphasized that the language issue was not going to be a problem in the future Czechoslovak state; the Slovaks would of course use their own language for purposes of administration, etc. Masaryk's conception of Czechoslovakism was mainly cultural-historical and linguistic, although he also argued on the basis of kinship. His conception of Czechoslovak unity remained basically unchanged also after the war.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> The Elizabethan university that was established in 1912 only started to function during the war, and the language of instruction was Magyar. See *Comenius University Bratislava 1919–1994* (1994:13–14). On Slovak historiography, see also Josef Šusta: Souhrnná zpráva o československých pracích dějepisných z let 1905–1924 in: *Posledních padesát let české práce dějepisné*. Soubor zpráv Jaroslava Golla o české literatuře historické, vydaných v "Revue Historique" v letech 1878–1906 a souhrnná zpráva Josefa Šusty za leta 1905–1924 (1926:160).

<sup>230</sup> See Owen V. Johnson: *Slovakia 1918–1938. Education and the making of a nation* (1985:90).

<sup>231</sup> See e.g. T.G. Masaryk: *Slované po válce* [1923], reprinted in: T.G. Masaryk: *Slovanské problémy* (1928:13–14).

The Czech deputies in the *Reichsrat* abandoned their exclusively Czech focus only reluctantly, and did not start to take up the Czechoslovak rhetoric until 1917. An independent Czechoslovak state was fully endorsed only after it became obvious that the Habsburg Empire would not survive the war. Moreover, until 1918 the Slovaks were presented as a branch of the Czech (or the Czechoslav) nation, rather than as belonging to the "Czechoslovak" nation. The Slovaks felt obliged to subscribe to the notion of a Czechoslovak nation in two declarations from 1918; otherwise they remained largely silent throughout the war.

For a short while immediately after independence, the Czechoslovak rhetoric was less pronounced. The contrast between wartime declarations from the latter part of the war and the first speeches of Kramář and Masaryk is quite illustrative here. However, already by 1920 a return of the Czechoslovakist ideology was visible, in the Constitution, in statistics, and in school textbooks. The Czechoslovakist rhetoric was most consistently applied in statistics. In school textbooks (and in speeches in the Parliament, as we shall see in the next chapter) it was not so consistently applied; the Czech textbooks (and the Czech deputies) tended to use Czech and Czechoslovak interchangeably. The Czechoslovak tendency was stronger in Slovak than in Czech textbooks, but even the Slovak books referred to the Slovaks (albeit not the "Slovak nation") much more often than to "Czechoslovaks" or a "Czechoslovak nation."

The fact that a Czechoslovak nation project was not consistently advocated reflects that the Czechoslovak reinterpretation of history had not yet permeated the academic community, as well as the difficulty involved. It was no easy task to reinterpret what were in essence separate histories in a way that could serve to unite the Czechs and Slovaks. In practice, it was chiefly Slovak history that underwent reinterpretation. Czech history was basically narrated in the same way as before; the strong anti-German, anti-clerical and anti-Habsburg tendency was nothing new. In addition, it seems that Masaryk's conception of Hussism as the most glorious period in Czech history had achieved a breakthrough in books for use in the primary schools.

During the war, Czechoslovakism was probably advanced mostly for strategic reasons, in order to legitimize Czechoslovak independence as a matter of national self-determination. Miloš Tomčík, for instance, argues that Masaryk, Štefánik, Osuský, Beneš, Kramář and others agreed on the use of concepts like "Czechoslovak nation" and "Czechoslovak language" as an instrument in the diplomatic struggle for a Czechoslovak state.<sup>232</sup> A second motive that was made quite explicit was to ensure the strength of the new state against its minorities.

Why, then, was the construct of a Czechoslovak nation retained also after the war? Again, we cannot exclude the possibility that some central governmental figures and the circle around Masaryk, the *Hrad* (castle) fraction, actually believed that a Czechoslovak nation existed, or could be brought about. Yet, the minority situation (especially regarding the Germans) was obviously a major concern in government circles. I will return to this in the Conclusion.

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<sup>232</sup> See Tomčík: Masarykov podiel na aktivizácii slovenskej literatúry 19. a 20. storočia, in: *T.G. Masaryk a Slovensko* (1991:51–52).



# *Ten*

## *Czech and Slovak or Czechoslovak?*

*They are working to create (...) a single Czecho-Slovak nation, which is an ethnographic monstrosity.(...) We are not Czechs, nor Czechoslovaks, but Slovaks, and we wish to remain Slovaks for ever.*

**Memorandum of the Slovaks, 1919<sup>1</sup>**

**T**wo national ideologies were pitted against each other in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The officially endorsed Czechoslovakist ideology was opposed by Slovak autonomists, who argued that the Slovaks were a *separate* nation, while there was little *Czech* opposition to the official ideology. Chapter Nine concentrated on the foundations of official Czechoslovakism and to what extent it was expressed in various official documents. The primary objective of this chapter is to pinpoint elements in the Czechoslovakist ideology that may have worked against its acceptance. This is done by examining the dispute between the proponents of Czechoslovakism and the proponents of Slovak individuality, with special emphasis on how they reinterpreted history in order to support their nation projects. I will also present the Slovak demands for recognition and other symbolic demands voiced in the Parliament. A final objective is to discuss to what extent Czechoslovakism succeeded.

The struggle between the proponents of Czechoslovakism and the proponents of Slovak individuality involved a large number of people and took place in several arenas. I have concentrated on the scholarly debate and the political debate in the Parliament, leaving out most of the debate in newspapers and journals due to the vast amount of the material and the lack of search-able registers. The Czechoslovakist side was well enough represented in my other material; in the case of the Slovak autonomist side I have added newspaper articles from *Slovák*, the organ of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party.

The scholarly debate is included here primarily because scholars were obviously in the front line of the struggle, especially on the Czechoslovak side. Moreover, they at least tried to substantiate their claims as to the existence of a Czechoslovak nation (respectively a Slovak nation), while the political debate in the Parliament (and in *Slovák*) was more fragmented and polemic. It is, however, not easy to distinguish sharply between a political and a scholarly debate. Several of these scholars were also politicians, and besides, they did not always conform to norms of impartiality and scientific method. The identity question as such was of course not on the official agenda of any meeting in the Parliament. I have therefore sampled the more general debates, like those on the budget and government inaugural debates.

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<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of the Slovak nation to the peace conference of 1919, published as document no. 25 in: Joseph A. Mikuš: *Slovakia. A political and constitutional history (with documents)* (1995: 164, 169).

On the Czechoslovakist side I have included scholars who were central to the debate, who represented different approaches to the Czechoslovak question, and/or were government politicians. Among the front figures in the debate were Albert Pražák and Václav Chaloupecký at Comenius University in Bratislava, the former a professor in Czech and Slovak literature, the latter a professor in history. Both were criticized for their Czechoslovakism. Kamil Krofta and Anton Štefánek represent the scholar-politicians; the former was a historian, diplomat and foreign minister, the latter was a sociologist, briefly a minister of education and an Agrarian Party deputy. Czech government politicians are represented by Edvard Beneš, co-founder of the state and foreign minister in all cabinets until he became president in 1935. Slovak government politicians are represented by Milan Hodža and Ivan Dérer, the two longest-serving Slovak ministers, and Vavro Šrobár, the first Minister of Slovakia.

Two scholars represent the Slovak autonomist side: Jozef Škultéty, professor of Slovak language and literature at Comenius University, and Daniel Rapant, later to become professor in history. The autonomist leaders were clergymen, lawyers and journalists more often than scholars, and generally did not write scholarly works. Andrej Hlinka was simply not the intellectual type – he was a great orator, but never wrote anything more extensive than newspaper articles. I have therefore relied on articles in *Slovák*, and on small pamphlets by Jozef Tiso of the Slovak People's Party and Martin Rázus of the Slovak National Party.

This chapter is divided in three. The first and largest part addresses the scholarly and semi-scholarly debate outside the Parliament. The second part focuses on the political debate, including Slovak demands for recognition and other symbolic demands. Finally, I will discuss briefly to what extent the Czechoslovak nation project succeeded.

### ***The interpretation of history: Scholars in the front line***

As Daniel Rapant pointed out in an article from 1930, the concept of a "Czechoslovak history" was unknown before 1918. Until then, Czech history had been limited to the historical lands (although Czech literary history included Slovak literature), whereas Slovak historiography was not well developed. Rapant explained the rise of a Czechoslovak historiography as an endeavor to "substantiate the unification of the Czech and Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak nation in a shared Czechoslovak state also historically."<sup>2</sup> Václav Chaloupecký indirectly admitted this when he argued that the great task of historiography was to remove all doubt about whether the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation, through a proper and truthful survey of the history. Both he and Josef Šusta regretted the prior neglect of "the history of that part of our nation that was forcibly torn away from the whole some thousand years ago."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> (sjednotenie českej a slovenskej vetvi národa československého v spoločný československý štát [...] odôvodniť i po stránke historickej). Daniel Rapant: Československé dejiny, in: *Od pravěku k dnešku* (1930a: 531–33).

<sup>3</sup> (Dějiny oné části našeho národa, jež někdy před tisíci lety násilně odtržena byla od celku, dějiny Slovenska). Chaloupecký: *Československé dějiny* (1922: 1–2). See also Šusta in: *Posledních padesát let české práce dějepisné* (1926: 160).

What is especially interesting about the scholarly debate is that it shows how different interpretations of the same historical events can be used to support two different nation projects. In order to demonstrate this, I have decided to structure the narrative around some main topics, rather than to present the views of one scholar/politician at a time. We shall have a look at the conception of nationhood on either side. Then we will see how the interpretation of history was used to support the existence of a Czechoslovak (or a Slovak) nation. Finally, we will see whether the scholars and politicians considered a Czechoslovak nation, or a Slovak nation, as a living reality – or as something that was yet to take shape, a project.

As the point of departure I have chosen two critical junctures in the Czechoslovakist interpretation of history: The demise of Great Moravia signified a political separation, while the codification of the Slovak language signified a linguistic separation of the two "branches" of the Czechoslovak nation. In traditional historiography the political split was regarded as most fateful, and the main emphasis was thus on explaining how Czechoslovak unity could survive despite this. Literary history was naturally more preoccupied with the linguistic split, and concentrated on explaining why it happened. Both acknowledged regional differences between Czechs and Slovaks, and explained these by the long separation. The Slovak autonomists presented alternative interpretations to all of this.

### *Conceptions of nationhood*

Considering the heritage of Eastern Europe, it is perhaps not surprising that a culturally-based nation concept (albeit often with voluntarist elements) dominated on both sides. Yet, there were nuances between the various scholars and politicians with respect to what they regarded as the most important feature. A purely *political* nation concept (one that included all citizens of the state) was nearly absent. Of the scholar-politicians represented here, only Milan Hodža explicitly used the term "Czechoslovak political nation", although Rádl implied it.

All Czechoslovak-oriented scholars and government politicians shared the notion of Czechoslovak unity as the original and, by implication, natural situation. In contrast, they tended to regard Slovak individuality as recent and sometimes also artificially cultivated. Czechoslovak unity was mostly projected onto a combination of an awareness of belonging together, having shared ancestors and a shared culture/language. A purely voluntarist nation concept was not common, but the voluntarist element was stronger here than on the autonomist side.

For Chaloupecký a nation was an ethnically unitary group of people who were born and raised under the same natural, cultural and linguistic conditions. The Czechs and Slovaks had the same Slav ancestors, lived under the same geomorphologic conditions, and spoke the same language, with some regional differences. Moreover, this was a national culture that was shared despite the political power constellations. On the other hand, he admitted that the *awareness* of a Czechoslovak national unity was a "child of our national revival."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> (dítěm našeho národního obrození). Chaloupecký (1922: 3–7). See also Chaloupecký: *Staré Slovensko* (1923: 10).

In Chaloupecký's scheme, this nation was Czech: "Linguistics and ethnography have shown absolutely convincingly that the Slovaks are a part of the group of West Slavs, the Czech group. The history of this group of Slavdom shows us that the tribes out of which history formed the Czechoslovak nation, spread to the west, north and south."<sup>5</sup> Also Kamil Krofta subscribed to the notion of "Czechoslovak tribes." In his view, "there is no serious doubt today, that the Czechs and Slovaks – apart from minor dialect differences – really spoke the same language, a language that was shared from the beginning of their historical life." He also claimed that the consciousness of national unity never died out completely, despite the political and linguistic separation. The same applies to the views of Vavro Šrobár and Ivan Dérer.<sup>6</sup>

As a linguist, it is perhaps natural that Albert Pražák should put special emphasis on the linguistic unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Until the codification of literary Slovak, Pražák asserted, "nobody in Slovakia had any doubt that they spoke the same tongue as the Czechs. And also written relics [...] are in Czech, sometimes mixed with dialect." He also argued that "the Slovaks felt as one nation with the Czechs, as one linguistic and cultural grouping."<sup>7</sup>

The idea of an original Czechoslovak linguistic and cultural unity also permeated the perspectives of Milan Hodža's scholarly work *Československý rozkol* (Czechoslovak schism, 1920). Like Pražák, he regarded the linguistic differences as a matter of dialect, but he did not share Pražák's Czech bias. Hodža was anything but consistent. In 1920 and again in 1922 he strongly emphasized the continuity of Czechoslovak cultural unity. In the mid-1920s and in 1932 he argued that Czechoslovak unity was not primarily a matter of linguistic unity, "but of spiritual unity." To speak the same language or obey the same laws was not enough: Collective will to be a nation was the main condition for national unity. Finally, in 1934 he called Czechoslovak unity a "thought construction", while stressing the historical foundations of Czechoslovak *political* kinship: Great Moravia, the Czech federation proposal at the Kremenšter Parliament and the joint wartime efforts for liberation. At this point he explicitly used the term "Czechoslovak political nation" about the Czechs and Slovaks.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> (Jazykověda i ethnografie ukázaly naprosto přesvědčivě, že Slováci jsou částí skupiny Slovanů západních, skupiny české. Dějiny této skupiny Slovanstva ukazují nám, že kmeny, z nichž historie vytvořila československý národ, rozšířily se na západ, sever i na jih). Chaloupecký: *Staré Slovensko* (1923: 10).

<sup>6</sup> (Že v tu dobu Čechové a Slováci – nehledě na malé rozdíly dialektické – opravdu mluvili stejnou řečí, řečí, která jim byla společná od začátku jejich dějinného života, o tom dnes již nelze vážně pochybovat). Kamil Krofta: *Čechové a Slováci před svým státním sjednocením* (1932: 18). See also Krofta: K vývoji národního vědomí u Slováků, in: *Národnostní obzor*, 1/1934–35: 1, Krofta: *A short history of Czechoslovakia* (1934: 137), Krofta: *Malé dějiny československé* (1937: 103). See also Ivan Dérer: Prečo sme proti autonómii? [1934] reprinted in: Rudolf Chmel (ed.): *Slovenská otázka* (1997: 73); Vavro Šrobár: *Osvobodené Slovensko* (1928: 8).

<sup>7</sup> (Slováci se [...] cítili s Čechy za jeden národ, za jedno jazykové i osvětové skupenství). (nikdo na Slovensku nepochyboval, že mluví touž řečí jako Češi. A také písemné památky [...] jsou psány češtinou, třebaš dialektický proměšovanou). Albert Pražák: *Dějiny spisovné slovenštiny po dobu Šúťrovu* (1922: 64, 103, 114–15).

<sup>8</sup> (nejde o formulovanie jednoty jazykovej, ale o jednotu duchovnú). Milan Hodža: *Články, reči, štúdie, sv. VII: Slovensko a republika* [1922, 1926, 1928] (1934: 61, 144, 190); Moderní nacionalizmus [1932], reprinted in Hodža: *Federácia v strednej Európe a iné štúdie* (1997a: 57); Hodža: Nie centralizmus, nie autonomizmus, ale regionalizmus v jednom politickom národe [1934], reprinted in Chmel (1997b: 183–88).

A similar change of emphasis from cultural to spiritual unity is discernible in the writings of Anton Štefánek. In 1922 he argued that "there is no doubt that the Slovaks do not differ from the Czechs ethnologically, or even in terms of language, religion, economy or social life to such an extent that we may speak of two, mutually foreign nations. The Slovaks and the Czechs belong to one Slav, and in the narrowest sense Czechoslovak race." Later he emphasized that "we have separate political, social and economic history. Thus, in the new state the voluntarist element is most decisive." Štefánek added that anyone who wanted to be a Czechoslovak could just settle for a definition of the nation following an American or Swiss pattern.<sup>9</sup> In 1935 he still emphasized Czechoslovak spiritual unity, while explicitly rejecting a political nation concept: "The Czechoslovak nation is not and cannot be the sum of all citizens of our state, only the sum of all Czechs and Slovaks."<sup>10</sup>

According to Edvard Beneš, cultural affinity, psychological awareness of the political and moral unity, state association and a conscious will to form a shared national awareness constituted the essence of national unity. He argued that "there must be as much as possible of this awareness and this will among us." Beneš insisted that "I speak as a Czechoslovak, for I do not have *only a Czech* national consciousness. I do not feel *only Czech*, and the Czech feeling is for me secondary to a Czechoslovak feeling."<sup>11</sup>

Bohuš Tomsa, professor of the Philosophy of Law at Comenius University, approximated a voluntarist nation concept in arguing that the existence of a Czechoslovak nation did not depend on whether it could be proven that the Czechs and Slovaks had common ancestors or a shared language, but on whether they morally felt themselves to be a Czechoslovak nation.<sup>12</sup>

One of the few Czech scholars who publicly questioned the axiom of Czechoslovak national unity was the highly controversial philosopher Emanuel Rádl. In *Válka Čechů s Němci* (The war of the Czechs with the Germans, 1928), he criticized the anti-German policies of the Czechoslovak state, and the conception of a Czechoslovak nation. He pointed out that there was no such thing as a Czechoslovak language, and argued that there were also other substantial differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks. If two languages in one nation were acceptable, why not three or four, Rádl asked, advocating a political concept of "nation."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> (O tom niet pochýb, že Slováci nedelia sa od Čechov ani etnologický, národopisne, ba ani jazykom, náboženstvom, hospodárstvom a sociálnym životom v takej miere, že by sme mohli hovoriť o dvoch, navzájom si cudzích národoch. Slováci a Česi patria k jednému plemenu slovanskému a v užšom zmysle československému). Anton Štefánek: *Slovenská a československá otázka* [1922] reprinted in Chmel (1997: 40). (Národnú kultúru a kultúrnu históriu máme z veľkej čiastky s Čechmi spoločnú. Ale politické, sociálne, hospodárske dejiny sme mali odlišné, preto rozhoduje v novom štátnom útvere hlavne element voluntaristický). Štefánek: *Exkurzia o nacionalizme* (undated – after 1929) pp. 4, 15.

<sup>10</sup> (Národ československý není a nemůže být sčítet všech občánů našeho státu, ale jen sčítet všech Čechů a Slováků). Anton Štefánek: *Problémy spisovnej slovenčiny a slovenský nacionalizmus* (1935: 6).

<sup>11</sup> (Hovorím ako Čechoslovák, keďže národného vedomia *len českého* nemám, *len* Čechom sa byť necítim, cítenie české je mi podriadené cíteniu československému). (Tohoto vedomie a tejto vôle musí byť u nás čo najviac). Edvard Beneš: *Reč k Slovákom* (1934: 8, 51). (Emphasis in original).

<sup>12</sup> Bohuš Tomsa: *Národ a československá otázka*, in: *Průdy* 6/1925: 319, 322.

<sup>13</sup> Emanuel Rádl: *Válka Čechů s Němci* (1928: 140–44). E. Čapek: *Kniha proti vlastenectví* (1928: 24–27) criticized his views.

Among the Slovak autonomists, the conception of nationhood was generally closer to a cultural than a voluntarist approach, and organic elements were not uncommon. The claim to Slovak individuality was based on language, the Slav ancestors, national awareness, shared history, national character or "soul", and habits.

Daniel Rapant argued that in order to become nationally uniting factors, historical events must be "experienced and endured together."<sup>14</sup> In an article from 1925, he asserted that subjective elements were not independent of objective elements. "The members of the various nations do not form individual nations because they have an awareness of belonging to them." On the contrary, he argued, "their will is determined by divergent development." He thus claimed that "the awareness of an independent Slovak national individuality has its origin in the different atmosphere that developed in Slovakia over the centuries." The awareness and feeling of belonging together was strengthened by internal contact within the group and by (un)friendly contact with foreigners. In Rapant's scheme, objective features like race, shared territory, economic elements, shared history, state and dynasty, religion and culture, national character and language worked together with subjective elements like shared beliefs, feelings, and will in forming a national awareness. Here he clearly gave primacy to the former.<sup>15</sup>

The most striking example of an organic nation concept was Martin Rázus' idea of the nation as the "voice of the blood": "The blood has its hum and its language, which unite thousands of hearts, expressed in one tongue joining them in an enormous family. That family is the nation! [...] The nation is nothing but kinship, blood kinship in the broadest meaning – a family." According to Rázus, national feeling had its origin in kindred feeling, in the awareness of belonging together based on mutual help in the struggle for existence. The external form of this kinship was "the voice of the blood, expressed in unitary character and language."<sup>16</sup>

Nowadays, he claimed, the voice of the blood sounded prosaic and the proponents of a new community were attempting to stifle that voice. Yet, "national feeling, the awareness of belonging together and its external form – the nation – has its justification." [...] Could we Slovaks exist without national awareness? [...] Could a poplar exist without roots?" he asked rhetorically, adding that "the form of the Slovak nation is confirmed by tradition, language and different character and this form is for us the most genuine and appropriate."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> (spoločne prežité a zažité). Daniel Rapant: *Národ a dejiny*, in: *Prúdy* 8, 1924: 472.

<sup>15</sup> (vedomie samostatnej národnej individuality slovenskej má svoj pôvod v odchýlnom ovzduší, ktoré sa na Slovensku behom stáročí vyvinulo). (príslušníci jednotlivých národov nie preto tvoria osobité národy, že majú vedomie príslušnosti k nim) (ich vôľa je determinovaná odchýlnym vývojom). Rapant: *Národ a československá otázka*, in: *Prúdy* 8, 1925: 456–63.

<sup>16</sup> (Krv má svoj šum a svoju reč, ktorá spája tisíce srdc, vyjadrujúcich sa jedným jazykom, spája ich v ohromnú rodinu. Tá rodina je národ! [...] národ nie je nič iné než príbuzenstvo, krvné príbuzenstvo v širšom zmysle – rodina). (hlas krvi, prejavový v jednotnom charaktere a v reči). Martin Rázus: *Argumenty. Hovory so synom i s tebou* [1932] (1993: 41–42).

<sup>17</sup> (Národný cit, povedomie spolupatričnosti i vonkajšia forma tohto – národ – majú svoju oprávnenosť. [...] Mohli by sme my, Slováci, existovať i bez národného povedomia? [...] Mohol by topoľ existovať i bez koreňov?). (Forma slovenského národa je u nás oprávnená tradíciou, rečou, odlišným charakterom a je pre nás formou tou najpravejšou i najprimeranejšou). Rázus (1993: 41, 43, 45).

Among the ľudák leaders, Jozef Tiso was the theoretician in the national question. Also he had organic elements in his conception of nationhood, but his nation concept was far more composite. In a lecture in 1930 Tiso defined a nation as a community of people who had the same origin, body type, character, history, language, habits, culture, goals and who possessed a continuous territory where they formed an organic whole. According to each of these criteria, the Slovaks formed "an organic whole of a nation in the ethnographic sense", he claimed. The Slovaks were thus an individual nation, and the terminology of the Czechoslovak nation could only be used in a political sense, about all inhabitants of the state.<sup>18</sup>

In 1934 Tiso also included the will to be a nation, but at the same time, he polemized against a purely voluntarist nation concept: "According to this also a group of thieves might form a nation. However, we correctly by nation mean a group of people who have common interests, common aspirations, habits, and a shared territory in which they have the will to live their life as an individual nation. We Slovaks are an independent nation. We have our territory. The revolution did not give it to us. There was a Slovak territory, an even more extensive one already 1100 years ago, when Prince Pribina crowned the territory [by establishing] the first Christian church." According to Tiso, the Slovak nation had everything that made a nation a nation. "This is not accidental, but is rooted in our entire psychology and even in biology."<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to these cultural or even organic conceptions of nationhood, *Slovák* conveyed a more voluntarist approach in the 1930s. It was argued that the main thing was "the will of the collective: To want to be a nation, to want to form a national culture of its own.[...] The nation is for us [...] an ethical community, striving to keep up and preserve certain moral and cultural values, cultivated by ourselves, which are the actual fruits of our spirit. Not wanting to be an individual nation, not wanting to form an individual national and cultural life would for us be the saddest moral judgment. [...] The past does not matter, whether we have culture does not matter, what counts is our will and our will only."<sup>20</sup> This was also used against Czechoslovakism: "We never felt ourselves to be Czechoslovaks, we are not, and will never be [...] simply because we do not want to be [...] The large majority of the Slovaks feel that they are an independent nation."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> (Slováci tvoria organický celok národa v zmysle etnografickom...) Jozef Tiso: Ideológia slovenskej ľudovej strany [1930], reprinted in Chmel (1997: 83).

<sup>19</sup> (že národ je skupinou tých, čo chcú jedno. Podľa toho i skupina zlodejov mohla by tvoriť národ. Avšak správne my národom menujeme skupinu ľudí, ktorí majú spoločné záujmy, spoločné túhy, zvyky, spoločné územie, na ktorom majú vôľu žiť svojím životom samobytného národa. My Slováci sme samostatný národ. Máme svoje územie. Nedala nám ho revolúcia. Slovenské územie bolo a to ešte širšie už pred 1100 rokmi, keď knieža Pribina dal tomuto územiu korunu: prvý kresťanský chrám). (Táto nie je nahodilá, ale koreň v celej našej psychológii a aj v biológii). Jozef Tiso in a speech at the celebration of Hlinka's 70th birthday, reported in *Slovák* no. 221, 30.9.1934: 4.

<sup>20</sup> (vôľa kolektíva: chcieť byť národom, chcieť si vytvoriť svoju národnú kultúru). *Slovák* no. 93, 24.4.1934: 3. (Národ je pre nás [...] etickou spoločnosťou, usilujúcou sa udržať a zachovať určité mravné a kultúrne hodnoty, ktoré sme si sami vypestovali a ktoré sú tak vlastným plodom nášho ducha. Nechciet byť samobytným národom, nechciet tvoriť samobytný národný a kultúrny život bolo by pre nás najsmutnejším mravným vysvedčením. [...] nerozhodne minulosť, nerozhodne to, či máme kultúru a pod., ale rozhodne len a len naša vôľa). *Slovák* no. 166, 16.6.1934: 1.

<sup>21</sup> (Nikdy sme sa necítili čechoslovákmi, nie sme nimi a nikdy ani nebudeme [...] sa Slováci v ohromnej väčšine cítia samostatným národom). *Slovák* no. 79, 5.4.1933: 1.

The mainstream autonomist conception of Slovak nationhood, was, however oriented towards objective features like culture, language, history and ancestors. In Pavel Macháček's words: "Do you believe in the Slovak nation? If yes, admit that the Slovak nation is an independent nation with its own history, consecrated by the blood and sweat of our noble forefathers and the tears of our dear mothers. – Admit that the Slovak culture is unique and not a bastard, as the Czechs say. – Admit that our sweet-sounding Slovak is an individual tongue."<sup>22</sup>

### ***The demise of Great Moravia and the political separation***

Great Moravia was not a powerful empire and it did not last long – less than a century. Moreover, it included the entire Czechoslovak territory only for about 20 years, under the reign of Svätopluk. It was important in Czechoslovak historiography because this was the only time the Czechs and Slovaks (or their Slav ancestors) had ever been united in one state prior to 1918, and in Slovak historiography because it was the first and (until 1939) only Slovak state.

In the Czechoslovak interpretation, Great Moravia thus became the predecessor of Czechoslovakia. In Krofta's words: "The appearance of Czechoslovakia on the world's stage in 1918 was in substance but a return to a state of affairs with which history had begun on her territories more than a thousand years before. The Slav tribes who at that time settled within these territories seemed, indeed, closely related to one another as they were, predestined to amalgamate into a single nation and state."<sup>23</sup> In Chaloupecký's view, "the Great Moravian empire has its significance for our nation-state and the Czechoslovak idea in that our nation again and again returned to the Great Moravian tradition in the following centuries. [...] The Great Moravian empire became in our national tradition a prototype of our nation-state."<sup>24</sup>

Several Slovak politicians emphasized the continuity between Great Moravia and Czechoslovakia, among them Šrobár, Hodža and Štefánek. For instance, Štefánek described Moravian Slovakia as the "cradle of the Great Moravian empire", and Masaryk as the "reviver of the old Great Moravian empire."<sup>25</sup> Masaryk himself argued in 1923 that "Czechoslovakia is the renewal of the former Czech (and Great Moravian) state."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> (Veríš v slovenskom národe? Ak áno, vtedy uznaj, že slovenský národ je národom samobytným so svojou vlastnou historiou, ktorú posvätili naši vznešení predkovia so svojou krvou a potom, ktorú posvätili naše drahé mamičky so svojimi slzami. – Uznaj, že slovenská kultúra je samobytná a nie bastardná, jako to Česi hlásajú. – Uznaj, že naša ľubozvučná slovenčina je rečou samobytnou). Pavel Macháček in *Slovák týždenník* no. 38, 20.9.1925: 1.

<sup>23</sup> Kamil Krofta: *A short history of Czechoslovakia* (1934: 1). The Czech version is nearly identical. See Krofta (1937: 5).

<sup>24</sup> (Pro náš národní stát a ideu československou má pak říše Velkomoravská ještě tu důležitost, že [...] se národ i v pozdějších staletích znovu a znovu vracel k tradici velkomoravské). (Tak se stala říše Velkomoravská a naší národní tradici jaksi prototypem našeho národního státu, kde celý národ našel sjednocení). Václav Chaloupecký: *Říše Velkomoravská*, in: *Idea československého státu* (1936: 18–19). See also Chaloupecký (1923: 10).

<sup>25</sup> (kolébka veľkomoravskej ríše stála sa územím moravského Slovenska). (obnoviteľ starej ríše veľkomoravskej). Anton Štefánek: *Masaryk a Slovensko* (1931: 5). See also Šrobár (1928: 8), and Hodža, reported in *Slovák* no. 101, 3.5.1928: 3.

<sup>26</sup> (Československo je obnovením bývalého českého (a velkomoravského) státu). T.G. Masaryk: *Slované po válce* [1923], reprinted in: T.G. Masaryk: *Slovanské problémy* (1928: 13–14).



The alternative to Great Moravia as the historical predecessor of Czechoslovakia was obviously the Czech state, and this was the predominant view on the Czech side, as the establishment of symbols like flag and coat of arms showed (see Chapter Nine). Yet, for the Czechs, there was no real contradiction between these alternatives. For instance, the preface of the encyclopedia *Československá vlastivěda* presented the Czechoslovak republic as a re-establishment of the historical Czech state with the addition of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. At the same time, Great Moravia was deemed important because it "united the whole territory of the Czechoslovak tribes in one state."<sup>27</sup> In contrast, Ján Halla emphasized that "the new state is not the continuation of the renewed historical Czech kingdom, with the annexation of Slovakia, but rather resembles Great Moravia."<sup>28</sup>

On the Slovak autonomist side, Jozef Škultéty saw in Great Moravia a Slovak state: "The Czechs and Slovaks, so close in kin and language, never belonged to the same state (before 1918). Great Moravia was a Slovak state, and there was beside Great Moravia an individual Czech state, dependent on it only in the last years of Svätopluk's reign." Škultéty claimed that "the forefathers of today's Slovaks, at the time called Slavs, [...] formed the memorable Great Moravian state in the 9th century."<sup>29</sup>

On the Czechoslovakist side, the demise of Great Moravia provided the (explicit or implicit) point of departure for two lines of argument – one focusing on the things that united the Czechs and Slovaks despite the political separation, the other focusing on the reasons for Czecho-Slovak differences. Each line of argument had an autonomist counterpart.

#### CZECHO-SLOVAK CONTACTS DESPITE THE SEPARATION

What needed explanation from the Czechoslovakist point of view was how Czechoslovak unity could survive 1000 years of political separation. The survival of a sense of Czecho-slovak unity was attributed to the use of Czech as a literary language and to the presence of Czechs in Slovakia at various points in history. The Hussite period played an especially important part in these projections. From a Slovak autonomist point of view, what needed to be explained was the extent of Czech influence in Slovakia despite the severed tribal ties – and especially the use of literary Czech. Both sides focused on Czecho-Slovak contacts, but their axiomatic point of departure and the interpretation of the contacts were opposite.

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<sup>27</sup> (Stát československý vznikl fakticky obnovou historického státu českého a připojením Slovenska a Podkarpatské Rusi). (jest tím důležitá, že spojovala celé území kmenů československých v jediný stát). *Československá vlastivěda, Díl V. Stát* (1931: 5, 18, 19).

<sup>28</sup> (Nový štát nie je pokračovaním oživotvoreného historického kráľovstva českého s anektovaným Slovenskom, skôr pripomína Veľkú Moravu). Ján Halla: Štátny prevrat na Slovensku, [1922] in: Chmel (1997: 49).

<sup>29</sup> (Kmenove a rečove takí blízki, Česi a Slováci štátne nikdy neprináležali spolu (až do 1918-ho roku). Veľka Morava bola slovenská, a vedľa Veľkej Moravy stál osobitný český štát, závislý od nej len v posledné roky Svätoplukovho mocného panovania). Jozef Škultéty: *Sto dvadsaťpäť rokov zo slovenského života 1790–1914. Odpoveď na knihu dr. Milana Hodžu, nazvanú 'Československý rozkol'* (1920: 69–70). (Predkovia dnešných Slovákov, zvaní vtedy Slovenmi, [...] v 9. storočí utvorili pamätihodný štát veľkomoravský). Jozef Škultéty: *Slovensko v minulosti* (1926: 3). The view that Great Moravia was the first Slovak state was elaborated on by František Hrušovský in *Slovenské dejiny*, first published in 1939.

On the Czechoslovakist side, all contacts between the Czechs and the Slovaks were regarded as uniting, and especially if they strengthened the use of Czech in Slovakia. If we start with the beginning, Beneš argued that Czechoslovak national unity appeared "already at the time of the Great Moravian empire and at a time when the Czechoslovak nation definitively accepted the Christian culture." Beneš, Chaloupecký and Šrobár emphasized that the first Přemyslids either ruled Slovakia, or fought the Magyars over her.<sup>30</sup> Chaloupecký, Beneš and Krofta attributed importance to Charles University in Prague, where students from Slovak areas were included in the *nacio bohémica*. Krofta also stressed the Western influences the German colonists brought with them to the Czech lands as well as Slovakia, and he argued that the Czech lands served as a bridge to Slovakia, while Chaloupecký emphasized that this colonization led to similar social and juridical conditions.<sup>31</sup>

In Krofta's view, an effect of Hussism was that the "national language of the Czechs and Slovaks attained increasing currency in public life and especially in the administration of the towns also in Slovakia." It also brought the Slovaks into direct and lively contact with the Czechs, yet it "could not change the fact that the Slovaks lived in another state." He also argued that the Czech cultural influence in Slovakia was strengthened by the use of Czech as a diplomatic language at the Hungarian royal court under Matthias Corvinus and under the Polish Jagellons, and attributed a unifying role to the wars against the Ottoman Turks.<sup>32</sup>

Krofta's interpretation of the Battle of the White Mountain is interesting because it represented a twist on the traditional Czech view. The *temno* was not only a national decline – it also served to set the Czechs and Slovak apart: "The spirit of public life was the same in the Czech lands and Slovakia before the White Mountain, or at least closely related. Through the upheaval of the White Mountain a deep gulf opened between the spirit of the public life in the Czech lands and in Slovakia."<sup>33</sup> Yet, he also argued that the Protestant Czech exiles after the Battle of the White Mountain "undoubtedly brought with them numerous elements of cultural, social and economic progress. Through their stay and work in Slovakia, they surely spread an awareness of linguistic unity and tribal closeness with the Czechs among the native population", and thus helped prepare the ground for the idea of Czechoslovak national unity.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> (v dobe veľkomoravskej ríše a v dobe, keď československý národ prijal definitívne kresťanskú kultúru). Beneš (1934: 10). See also Šrobár (1928: 8), Chaloupecký (1922: 12).

<sup>31</sup> (země české i tu byly namnoze mostem). Krofta (1932: 24, 25). See also Beneš (1934: 11), Chaloupecký (1922: 15).

<sup>32</sup> (zjednával si tak i na Slovensku národný jazyk Čechů a Slováků stále větší platnost v životě veřejném a zvláště ve správě městských obcí). (nemohla změnit skutečnost, že Slováci žili v jiném státě). Krofta (1932: 31, 32, 34, 41). See also Chaloupecký (1922: 22, 23, 24) and Beneš (1934: 11).

<sup>33</sup> (Kdežto před Bílou horou duch veřejného života byl v Čechách i na Slovensku stejný, neb aspoň sobě velmi příbuzný, rozevřela se převratem bělohorským mezi duchem veřejného života v zemích českých a na Slovensku hluboká propast). Krofta (1932: 44).

<sup>34</sup> (Jistě přinesli s sebou na Slovensko nejen jeden prvek kulturního, sociálního a hospodářského pokroku, jistě také šířili svým pobytem a působením na Slovensku v tamním domácím obyvatelstvu vědomí jazykové jednoty a kmenové příbuznosti s Čechy). Krofta (1932: 47, 48).

The Czech exiles and Protestantism were generally viewed positively, because the use of Czech religious books was seen as creating a linguistic and spiritual Czechoslovak literary unity. Both Krofta and Chaloupecký cited the use of the Kralice Bible as an example of this. Šrobár emphasized the role of the Brethren, especially Jan Amos Komenský and Juraj Tranovský, in spreading the "Czechoslovak language" and strengthening the self-awareness of the Slovak people.<sup>35</sup> Finally, Štefánek claimed that the reason why the Protestants became pioneers of Czechoslovak awareness was that the "Protestant individualism combined with Hussite traditions opposed the centralist universalism of Rome."<sup>36</sup>

In the political-historical approach to Czechoslovak unity, also the national revival was seen as uniting the Czechs and Slovaks. Chaloupecký gave credit to the Slovaks Tablic, Ribay, Šafařík, Kollár and Benedikti for being the first to realize the unity of the Czechoslovak nation, while Beneš claimed that "our great awakeners Kollár, Palacký, Šafařík and Jungmann formed the program of the modern Czechoslovak linguistic and national unity."<sup>37</sup> Likewise, Krofta pointed out that "also members of the Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak nation to a considerable degree took part in the awakening work." At the same time, he regarded the all-Slav orientation of Kollár as an obstacle to joint Czechoslovak national awareness.<sup>38</sup>

Krofta emphasized how "the consciousness of national unity with the Czechs never completely died out in Slovakia. On the contrary it grew visibly stronger right before the world war." Here Beneš and Šrobár emphasized the role of Masaryk, the Hlasists and of *Česko-slovenská jednota* in strengthening the awareness of Czechoslovak unity, while Krofta only referred to Slovaks studying in the Czech lands.<sup>39</sup> Šrobár saw "the fulfillment of a magnificent historical justice", and "the voice of brotherly blood" in the fact that Slovakia protected the Czech exiles, while Bohemia and Moravia educated the Slovak youth for better times.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, Krofta used the joint Czecho-Slovak efforts during the First World War as proof of Czechoslovak unity, pointing out the Slovak participation in the "Czech legions" and the domestic liberation movement, and the joint leadership of the exile movement. He mentioned Masaryk and Beneš along with Štefánek and (Štefan) Osuský. Beneš presented his co-workers M. R. Štefánek and T. G. Masaryk as symbols of the joint Czechoslovak liberation efforts.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Beneš (1934: 12), Chaloupecký (1922: 23, 25, 26, 29), Krofta (1932: 34), Šrobár (1928: 10).

<sup>36</sup> (Evanjelický individualizmus spojený s tradíciami husitskými oprel sa proti centralistickému univerzalizmu Ríma). Anton Štefánek: *Československo a autonómia* [1923] in: Chmel (1997: 67).

<sup>37</sup> (naši veľkí národní obroditelia, Kollár, Palacký, Šafařík, Jungmann priamo vytvárajú program modernej jazykovej i národnej jednoty československej). Beneš (1934: 13). See also Chaloupecký (1922: 29).

<sup>38</sup> (Buditelské práce v tomto duchu zúčastnili se vynikající měrou také příslušníci slovenské větve československého národa. Krofta (1937: 79, 80). Krofta (1934: 102, 103). See also Krofta (1935: 13).

<sup>39</sup> (nikdy na Slovensku docela nezaniklo vědomí národní jednoty s Čechy, ba že právě před světovou válkou zřejmě sílelo). Krofta (1937: 103). Krofta (1934: 137). Beneš (1934: 14), Šrobár (1928: 11).

<sup>40</sup> (vyplnenie veľkolepej dejinnej spravdnosti) (hlas bratskej krve). Šrobár (1928: 11).

<sup>41</sup> Krofta (1937: 103), Beneš (1934: 14).

Based on the premise that Masaryk was from Moravian Slovakia, and that his parents were "undoubtedly Slovak" (!), Štefánek claimed that "the Moravian-Czech-Slovak historical continuity shows itself in the Moravian-Slovak spirit of Masaryk." Indeed, he presented both Masaryk and Komenský as Slovaks (!): "Komenský, Masaryk and Štefánik will for ages join the Czechs and Slovaks in one national and cultural whole."<sup>42</sup>

Again Hodža deviated slightly from the rest (except Šrobár). While sharing many of their ideas about what united the Czechs and the Slovaks he also emphasized Slovakia's contribution as a shelter for the Czechs: "Czech Protestantism, conquered and repressed by the Austrian Counter-Reformation, took refuge in Slovakia, where over thirty printing presses preserved it from extinction. During the 17th and 18th centuries, and even in a certain sense during the first decades of the 19th, there was often a greater output of Czechoslovak literary products on Slovak than on Czech soil. The first Czech grammarian of note and several of the great figures in the Czech Renaissance came from Slovakia. It may indeed be said that in the 18th century Slovakia had become a real place of refuge for cultural efforts."<sup>43</sup>

Likewise, Hodža emphasized that Štefánik was no less an important liberator than the other two (Masaryk and Beneš): "No nation, neither our nation, received its freedom in the time of war without participating in the war itself [...] How great is the part of Štefánik in the liberation work, who [...] was the first organizer and leader of the Czechoslovak legions! When the Czechoslovak state was born in emigration, this process did not only take place with the participation of the Czechs, but also a Slovak and the Slovaks, who [...] fully equaled the Czechs in work and enthusiasm," Hodža argued. He polemized against the idea of certain people in Prague, that Slovakia was a piece of land that the Czechs had liberated: "in the liberation work we Czechs and Slovaks have a common and proportional part."<sup>44</sup>

On the Slovak autonomist side, Rapant provided a theoretical as well as a factual criticism of the Czechoslovak conception of history. He argued that a real Czechoslovak history was possible only from the founding of the Czechoslovak state, as the history of the state and of the people living in it. The fact that the founding of a Czechoslovak historiography coincided with the founding of the state showed that it was not an organic development, but a result of external events, he argued. If Czechoslovak history were organic, it would have been formed before the upheaval. Instead he saw Czechoslovak history as an endeavor to substantiate the unification of the branches of the Czechoslovak nation historically (see also page 240).<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> (Komenský, Masaryk, Štefánik budú na veky spojovať Čechov a Slovákov v jeden národný a kultúrny celok). (v moravskoslovenskej duši Masarykovej sa uplatnili moravsko-slovensko-česká kontinuita historická). Štefánek (1931: 5–6, 7).

<sup>43</sup> Hodža: The Political Evolution of Slovakia" in R.W. Seton-Watson's *Slovakia then and now* (1931: 66, 67).

<sup>44</sup> Žádný národ, ani národ náš, nezískal své svobody v době války bez vlastního válečného přičinění [...] Jak jest ohromný na osvobozenké práci podíl Štefánikův, jenž [...] byl prvním organisátorem a vůdcem československých legií! Když se v emigraci rodil československý stát, neděl se tedy proces ten pouze za účasti Čechů, ale také na účasti Slováků a Slováků, kteří [...] plně se vyrovnali Čechům i práci i nadáním). (na osvobozenkém díle máme Češi a Slováci společný a úměrný podíl). Hodža [1926] (1934: 149).

<sup>45</sup> Rapant (1930a: 531–32).

According to Rapant, attempts to write Czechoslovak history were characterized by a formal parallelism. Those who went beyond this formal parallelism tended for the most part to take into account only the positive moments of history (from a Czechoslovak point of view), while they neglected the negative almost completely, he argued. (This is in fact a valid criticism.) In Rapant's view, there was a need to distinguish between Czecho-Slovak contacts in general and those that may have served to unite the Czechs and the Slovaks. Finally, the things that set the Czechs and Slovak apart should not be overlooked. This must also be seen in the context of Rapant's view that history is important for nations subjectively as much as objectively because only certain parts of it are preserved in the collective memory. In Rapant's view, it was futile and might even be counter-productive to use "historical arguments that may be objectively true, but do not live in the center of national awareness any more."<sup>46</sup>

As for his factual criticism, Rapant argued first, that Christianity was supra-national and served to unite not only the Czechs and the Slovaks, but the whole Western world, including the German and Magyar neighbors. The awareness of a special individuality (or the foundation for it) thus certainly suffered more than it gained from Christianity. If the Eastern Rite had survived, that would have been another matter. Second, he argued that the German colonization only served the cultural rapprochement with the Germans – and besides, this was an expression of the rulers' craving for wealth and power, not of Czechoslovak cultural unity.

Third, Rapant argued that "Hussism itself had fewer proponents among the Slovaks and appeared later as a movement than among people of other nations in Lower Hungary." This, and the fact that "Hussism was disseminated in all regions neighboring the Czechs, is enough to prove that it was not a matter of some organic fruit of the national spirit, but [...] mainly religious contacts of an international kind. [...] Hussism had special importance for Slovakia (but also for Poland!) only through the influence of linguistic closeness", Rapant argued.<sup>47</sup> As for the Hussite soldiers, they were mercenaries, and there was nothing that suggested any national unity between them and the domestic population.

Škultéty went even further, arguing that the Hussite wars rather served to set the Czechs and Slovaks apart, while the Ľudáks saw intruders and plunderers in the Hussites. In Škultéty's view, "through the wars that were conducted with the one and the other side of the Moravian-Hungarian border (how many wars there were in the 15th century alone!) our nations were estranged from each other." Likewise, in his view, the suffering of the Ottoman Wars brought the Slovaks and Magyars closer.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> (argumentami dejinnými, ktoré môžu byť síce objektívne pravdivé, ale nežijú viac v strede národného povedomia). Daniel Rapant: *Národ a dejiny*, in *Prúdy* 8, 1924: 474–75. See also Rapant (1930a: 545, 552, 560).

<sup>47</sup> (Husitstvo samé na pr. má medzi Slovákmi stúpencov menej a vyskytuje sa ako hnutie pozdejšie, než je tomu u obyvateľstva inonárodného, v Dolných Uhrách). (husitstvo bolo rozšírené po všetkých krajinách susediacich s Čechmi, stačí na dôkaz, že nejde o dajaký organický plod národnej duše, ale [...] v celku však o náboženský styk rázu medzinárodného. Význam zvláštny má husitsvo pre Slovensko (ale aj pre Poľsko!) len vlivom rečovej príbuznosti). Rapant (1930a: 543–45).

<sup>48</sup> (vojny vedenými s jednej i druhej strany moravsko-uhorskej hranice (koľko bolo vojen len v 15. storočí!), odcudzoval sa jeden druhému náš národ). Škultéty (1920: 72, 73). See also Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 147, 3.7.1927: 1.

Rapant did admit a greater sense of fellowship between the domestic Protestant population and the Czech emigrants during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, but this he saw as mostly a matter of religious fellowship. Moreover, the feeling of belonging together was restricted to the Czech and the Slovak Protestants, while "between the Czech and Slovak Catholics there was no such unity and solidarity."<sup>49</sup>

Finally, the argument that the use of Czech as literary language in Slovakia until the codification of Slovak *proved* Czechoslovak national and linguistic unity, was met in two ways. First, the Slovak autonomists asserted that the use of Czech proved nothing about the national awareness of the Slovak population. Second, they argued that the use of Czech in Slovakia had been an obstacle to the formation of literary Slovak. This second line of argument also included an explanation of why literary Czech had been used in Slovakia.

Škultéty argued that if it had not been for Charles University in Prague from 1348, the Slovaks would have abandoned the Czech literary language already then. Through the influence of the university, Czech defeated all Western Slav literary languages, even the Polish. A great many students from Upper Hungary attended Charles University, according to Škultéty, and although the language of the learned classes was Latin, "the Slovaks also brought home from Prague knowledge of the Czech language, especially from the 15th century." At the same time, he rejected the idea that Jan Jiskra had anything to do with it; his reign was too short, and besides, "soldiers who lived from plundering the area could not be teachers."<sup>50</sup>

Towards the end of the 16th century, Škultéty wrote, Slovakized syntax was increasingly combined with the use of Slovak words and forms. This development was interrupted in the aftermath of the Battle of the White Mountain because of the Czech exiles who brought with them Czech books to Slovakia and founded printing houses, strengthening the position of Czech. Škultéty especially emphasized the role of Juraj Tranovský and his hymnal, which became the linguistic standard for all; he also claimed that the proofreaders "persecuted Slovak words, forms and syntax." Yet, "the Czecho-Slovak literature produced very little worth noting apart from Protestant hymns", and the Czechs were fully absorbed during the 17th century, he claimed.<sup>51</sup> Škultéty thus agreed with the Czechoslovakists that Charles University and the Czech exiles furthered the use of Czech in Slovakia, but this he assessed negatively.

While admitting the closeness of the Czech and Slovak written and spoken languages, Rapant still regarded them as separate languages, and he did not consider it decisive for Czechoslovak national unity. Such a unity would, in his view, depend on a clear awareness of belonging together. The use of Czech as a literary language did not prove anything; in that case the use of Old Church Slavonic would be a proof of the existence of a Russian-Rumanian-Bulgarian-

<sup>49</sup> (mezi katolíkmi slovenskými a českými takejto jednoty a súdržnosti nebolo). Rapant (1930a: 545–46).

<sup>50</sup> (ale Slováci z Prahy prinášali domov, najmä od 15. storočia, i známosť českého jazyka). (vojsko [...] z drancovania kraja žijúce nemôže byť učiteľom). Škultéty (1920: 72).

<sup>51</sup> (korektorov, ktorí prenasledovali slovenské slova, tvary a slovenskú syntax). (Literatúra česko-slovenská, okrem cirkevných spevov evanjelických, produkovala veľmi malo pozoruhodnejšieho). Škultéty (1920: 74, 112).

Serb nation and the use of Czech as a diplomatic language in Poland a proof of a Czecho-Polish nation. "On the basis of these analogies we can see that a shared Czech literary language for the Czechs and Slovaks cannot in itself be taken as a convincing and incontestable proof of Czechoslovak national unity", he concluded.<sup>52</sup>

*Slovák* used similar analogies to write off Chaloupecký's finding of an old document from Žilina (written in Old Czech) in an archive in Brno: "Nations and their language are not determined by some dusty old documents, but by their will to live an individual life of their own. That will exists in Slovakia. [...] As for the book from Žilina, [...] it is not a document through which a Czechoslovak national unity in the distant past or a national Czech language in Slovakia can be proven. It is a book written in Czech, just as there are similar books in many Slovak towns, written in Latin, German, even Polish. Just as it would be nonsense to conclude that there was once a Latin, German or Polish national language in Slovakia, it is certainly nonsense to infer a Czech national language from the book from Žilina."<sup>53</sup>

A few weeks later, *Slovák* quoted Dr. Ľudevít Novák, secretary of the *Matica slovenská*, to the effect that the book of Žilina was a Czech rather than a Slovak relic, from a linguistic point of view. "The publication thus at most is a documentation of Old Czech." It was suggested that Czech was used in Žilina in the 14th and 15th centuries because Slovak was not yet codified, and that it had the same function as Latin or German. Besides, it was argued, the Germans in Slovakia were often bilingual, having learned Czech at the university in Prague.<sup>54</sup>

Likewise, Buday argued: "The use of the literary Czech language by some Slovaks thus in no way proves a linguistic and national unity between Czechs and Slovaks. Moreover, when the time was right and more favorable circumstances allowed it, the Slovaks also formed their own literary language. The great majority of the Slovak nation, i.e. the Slovak Catholics, always demanded the use of the mother tongue also in literature. [...] The opposition against the formation of a Slovak literary language on the part of the Czechs and some Slovaks, like Ján Kollár and his circle, was to no avail. The opposition was broken and literary Slovak prevailed over all." Buday also emphasized the importance of language for national life.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> (Na základe uvedených analógií vidíme, že spoločná spisovná reč česká pre Čechov a Slovákov nemôže byť sama o sebe nijako vzatá za presvedčivý a nesporný preukaz národnej jednoty československej). Rapant (1930a: 548).

<sup>53</sup> (Veď on i tak nemá nijakého významu pre nás. Národy a ich reč neurčujú staré šalabachtre, ale ich vôľa žiť vlastným samobytným životom. Tá vôľa dnes na Slovensku je [...] Čo sa Žilinskej knihy týka, [...] je ona nie nejakým dokumentom ktorým by sa dala dokazovať národná jednota československá v ďalekej minulosti a nejaký národný jazyk český na Slovensku. Je to kniha, písana po česky, tak, ako sú podobné knihy v mnohých slovenských mestách písané po latinsky, nemecky, ba i poľsky. Ako by bolo nesmyslom uzatvárať, že na Slovensku bol kedysi národný jazyk latinský, nemecký, alebo poľský, takiste je nesmyslom uzatvárať i z Knihy Žilinskej na nejaký národný jazyk český. *Slovák* no. 255, 11.11.1934: 4.

<sup>54</sup> (Teda publikácia je zväčšia dokument o staročeštine). *Slovák* no. 272 1.12.1934: 2.

<sup>55</sup> (Užívanie spisovného českého jazyka niektorými Slovákmí teda vôbec nedokazuje rečovú a národnú jednotu Čechov a Slovákov. Tým väčšmi, že keď nadišiel toho čas, keď to prajnejšie okolnosti dovolily, Slováci si tiež vytvorili svoju spisovnú reč. Ohromná väčšina slovenského národa, slovenskí katolíci totiž, vždy požadovali užívanie materinskej reči i v literatúre. [...] Márný bol odpor Čechov a niektorých Slovákov, ako Jána Kollára a spoločníkov, proti vytvoreniu spisovnej reči slovenskej. Odpor bol zlomený a spisovná slovenčina zvíťazila na celej čiare). Buday, *Slovák* no. 111, 17.5.1934: 4.

As we have seen, Czecho–Slovak contacts were in general interpreted differently by the two sides, with a few exceptions. Both sides agreed that the erection of Charles University in 1348, where students from Slovakia came in contact with the Czech language, contributed to the use of Czech in Slovakia. Likewise, both sides agreed that the emigration of Czech Protestants to Slovakia following the Battle of the White Mountain strengthened the use of literary Czech in Slovakia, but on this point their evaluations diverged. Rapant also admitted that Hussism had a linguistic, albeit not a national importance.

Otherwise, the interpretation of Czecho–Slovak contacts differed. Rapant rejected the Czechoslovakist view that Christianity had served to unite the Slovaks with the Czechs more than with their other neighbors, since Christianity was supra-national in character. He argued the same way about Hussism and about the Czech Protestant exiles after 1620. According to Rapant, German colonization brought the Slovaks closer to the German cultural world, rather than serving Czechoslovak unity. Škultéty went further and argued that the Hussite wars served to set the Czechs and Slovaks apart rather than uniting them, while the Ottoman Wars united the Slovaks and the Magyars, not the Slovaks and the Czechs. Škultéty also rejected the Czechoslovakist idea that the reign of Jan Jiskra strengthened Czechoslovak unity.

Finally, while the Czechoslovakists regarded the use of literary Czech as a proof of Czecho-slovak national unity, the Slovak autonomists argued that the use of Czech was accidental; that it was detrimental to the codification of Slovak; and that the use of literary Czech did not prove anything with respect to the national awareness of the Slovak people, since it had the same function as Latin or German. Furthermore, only the upper classes used it.

#### **CONSEQUENCES OF GREAT MORAVIA'S DEMISE: CZECHO–SLOVAK DIFFERENCES**

Both sides agreed that the demise of Great Moravia served to set the Czechs and the Slovaks apart. They did not, however, agree on whether the differences were of a regional or national character, or as to how permanent they were. There were nuances even among the Czechoslovakists in how they explained the Czecho–Slovak differences that had developed over the 1000 years of separation, especially between the Czech scholars and Hodža.

It was only Krofta who had Great Moravia as an explicit point of departure. He described the dissolution of Great Moravia as a "fateful dislocation of Slovakia from Bohemia and Moravia to Hungary. [...] For the Slovaks this not only meant an interruption of the, until then, natural political and cultural community with the Czech tribes in Bohemia and Moravia, but also the thwarting of a very promising development towards a higher culture in that community." He claimed that because the Slovaks were subjugated by a foreign nation, they "were pulled down to a much lower cultural level than they had become accustomed to in Great Moravia."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> (osudný přesun Slovenska od Čech a Moravy k Uhrám). (pro Slováky bylo nejen přerušením dosavadního přirozeného společenství politického a kulturního s českými kmeny v Čechách a na Moravě, nýbrž i zaražením velmi nadějného vývoje k vyšší kultuře v tomto společenství). Krofta (1932: 11,19). (byly Slováci strženi do oblasti kultury daleko nižší, než jakou byly poznali v říši velkomoravské). Krofta: (1935: 2,13).



Pražák and Chaloupecký instead offered explanations of the Czecho-Slovak differences. Pražák argued that the Czechs and Slovaks differed only in terms of cultural level: "The Slovak soul is actually only a part of the Czech soul, and the *difference* is only a *matter of cultural maturity*." He claimed that "Slovak individuality, that is a specific Slovak cultural atmosphere of less cultural intensity, was caused by the long stay in the Magyar sphere." He saw features that distinguished the Slovaks from the Czechs negatively, and argued that they showed the obvious "harm done to the Slovaks by the long lasting Magyarization, the long absence of Slovak schools and Slovak education facilities." Czecho-Slovak differences were thus regional rather than national, and they were caused by the political separation.<sup>57</sup>

Chaloupecký's "bastard" theory is especially interesting, because it deeply affected a central dogma in the Slovak national ideology: The idea of Slovak as the Slav language that had remained closest to the original Slav mother tongue. Chaloupecký's point of departure was Slovakia's two historical cores – one in the west bordering on the Danube and one in the east bordering on the river Tisza. Between these was a hilly area, where Fatra, Tatra and Matra formed marked lateral mountain ranges. He divided Slovakia into three corresponding philological regions, arguing that "while Western Slovakia in terms of ethnographic character and settlement belonged to the group of western Slavs, to the group of Czech tribes, early Eastern Slovakia was [...] part of the eastern Slav branch. [...] Between them there was a forest, wide and desolate and until the beginning of the 13th century uninhabited."<sup>58</sup>

Following the Tartar invasion, new groups moved to central Slovakia, from the west, the east and the north: Germans, Magyars and Slavs, including Czech Slavs (Slovaks), Russian Slavs, Bulgarian Slavs and Poles: "This way an odd amalgam of Slav ethnic elements originated, which as time went by could not remain without influence on the language of the area. This is probably the historical foundation of literary Slovak. [...] The numerically weaker western branch, the Czech branch, here triumphed culturally over the richer in human material, but culturally weaker [...] eastern and northern branches. The Germans and Magyars, who originally came as guests and colonists to the Slovak border forest were mostly swallowed up, Slovakized, just like the swarm of eastern Slavs penetrating deeper into the west were more or less Slovakized, that is Czechized."<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> (slovenská duše jest vlastně jen částkou české duše a [...] *rozdíl* jest jen v *stupni kulturního vyspění*). (slovenská svojkost, t.j. zvláštní slovenské kulturní prostředí o menší kulturní intenzitě, způsobené dlouhým pobytem v maďarské sféře). (Na takovýto slovenských zvláštnostech je zřejmě znáti škody způsobené Slovákům dlouhotrvalou maďarisací, dlouhodobou nepřítomností slovenských škol a slovenských vzdělávacích ústavů). Pražák: *Češi a Slováci. Literární dějepisné poznámky k československému poměru* (1929a: 104, 122, 155, 156, 171).

<sup>58</sup> (Kdežto Slovensko západní svým etnografickým rázem a svým osídlením patřilo k skupině Slovanů západních, ke skupině kmenů českých, Slovensko východní už [...] bylo částí slovenské větve východní [...]. Mezi oběma byl hvozď, široký a pustý a až do poč. XIII stol. neosídlený). Chaloupecký (1923: 15, 16).

<sup>59</sup> (Tím vzniká podivný amalgam etnických prvků slovanských, jenž postupem doby nemůže zůstat bez vlivu ani na jazyk tohoto území. Toto jsou asi historické základy slovenštiny. Početně slabší větve západní, větve česká, vítězí tu kulturně nad bohatší na lidský materiál, avšak kulturně slabší [...] větví východní a severní. Němci a Maďaři, kteří vnikli jako hosté a kolonisté do slovenského pomezí hvozdu, zanikli z velké části v jeho útrobách, slovakisují se, tak jako se více méně slovakisují, t.j. čechisují roje Slovanů východních, které pronikly více k západu). Chaloupecký (1923: 18).

Chaloupecký emphasized that "old history does not know of a Slovak nation as an original ethnic unit. History knows only of Czech, Polish, Russian, Bulgarian, Croatian tribes – also in Hungary. 'Slovak' dialects started to develop out of the Slav colonial mixture in the valleys between the Tatra, Fatra and Matra mountains only from the 13th century, [and are] among the youngest in Slavdom." He concluded that "all in all it is possible to say that old, historical Slovakia was a Czech or, as it said in the newest fashion [!], a Czechoslovak land."<sup>60</sup>

Chaloupecký did not himself use the word "bastard" about the Slovak culture or language. This was a term coined by his opponents. In an editorial in *Slovák* in 1928, he was presented as the professor who had "declared the Slovak culture as a bastard culture." Likewise, in an article in 1934, he was introduced as the founder of the "grand scientific theory presenting the Slovaks as bastards." According to the author, Chaloupecký's "absurd theory of past settlements in Slovakia" had been rebutted by Dr. Rapant.<sup>61</sup> Unfortunately, he did not say where.

Hodža recognized that there were some differences between the Czechs and Slovaks, but, unlike Pražák, he did not view the Slovak peculiarities entirely negatively. He also refused to see the Czecho–Slovak relationship as a one-way street. Already in 1920 he claimed that the mission of Slovak was to cleanse Czech of German influences. "Czech culture and language will need refreshing; they will find it in the return to their own basis and that is the pure springs in Slovakia."<sup>62</sup> In 1928, he argued that "the Magyar terminology only entered the offices of lawyers, but never our cottages and villages. [...] The Slovak idiom is purer and older, and has for the Czechoslovak and Czech language the great value that it forms a store-room, a reservoir", in terms of vocabulary and syntax. He also argued: "For Czech, Slovak forms a certain linguistic and psychological bridge to the Slav east. [...] Too intertwined with the German cultural circle, the Czech element would to a certain extent have been isolated from the rest of the Slavs, had it not been for the linguistic and psychological bridge that we call Slovakia. I am personally convinced that the Czech language and the Czech culture [...] need Slovakia the same way that Slovakia needs Czech culture."<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> (Stará historie nezná slovenského národa, jako původní ethnické jednotky. Historie zná pouze kmeny české, polské, ruské, bulharské, chorvatské – a to i v Uhrách. Teprve od XIII. stol. z kolonizační směsi slovanské počínají se vyvíjeti v dolinách mezi Tatrou, Fatrou a Matrou "slovenské" dialekty, které jsou z nejmladších ve Slovanstvu). (Celkem možno říci, že staré, historické Slovensko bylo zemí českou nebo, jak se nejnověji říká, československou). Chaloupecký (1923: 284, 286–87, 294). See also Chaloupecký (1922: 28).

<sup>61</sup> (Chaloupecký, profesor univerzity v Bratislave, ktorý slovenskú kultúru deklaroval za kultúru bastardsnú). *Slovák* no. 128, 7.6.1928: 1. (zakladateľovi veľkolepej vedeckej teórie o bastardsnosti Slovákov). (Prof. V. Chaloupeckého ináč len nedávno musel zavracať dr. Rapant pre jeho absurdnú teóriu o niekdajšom obydlení Slovenska). *Slovák* no. 255, 11.11.1934: 4.

<sup>62</sup> (Česká kultúra i český jazyk budú potrebovať osvieženia: najdú ho v návrate k svojej vlastnej podstate, a tá je v rydzich studniciach na Slovensku). Hodža (1920: 14, 358).

<sup>63</sup> (maďarská terminológia sa dostávala len do advokátskych kancelárií, ale nikdy nie do našich chalúp a dedín. [...] Slovenský idiom je rýdzejší a starší a má pre českoslovenčinu a pre jazyk český tú ohromnú hodnotu, že tvorí akúsi zásobárňu, reservoár). (Slovenčina tvorí od češtiny istý jazykový i psychologický prechod k slovanskému východu. [...] český živel, príliš zachytený do kultúrneho kruhu nemeckého, bol by od ostatných Slovanov do istej miery izolovaný, keby nebolo jazykového a psychologického mostu, ktorý menujeme Slovenskom. Osobne som presvedčený, že český jazyk a česká kultúra [...] potrebuje to Slovensko zrovna tak, ako potrebuje Slovensko kultúru českú). Hodža [1928] (1934: 191–92).

On other occasions Hodža presented the Slovaks as a counterweight to Czech radicalism and rationalism. His message was thus that the Slovaks had something to offer the Czechs; they were needed for the sake of balance.<sup>64</sup> Also Beneš saw an important task for the Slovaks in modifying the Czech rationality and self-interest with their sensitivity. "All the Slovak peculiarities, all the poetry [!] of Slovak life in all areas must be a great source of enrichment of the shared culture and national unity in the future," Beneš argued.<sup>65</sup>

While the Czechoslovakists considered the differences between Czechs and Slovaks as regional differences that could and should be overcome, the Slovak autonomists saw the differentiation into two national units as a closed matter. According to Jozef Buday, there was "no doubt that the inhabitants of Great Moravia were the forefathers of the Czechs and the Slovaks. Maybe the Slovaks predominated. [...] Unfortunately, Great Moravia perished. The southeastern part was subjected to Hungary, while the northwestern part started to live its own life. Through this historical fact the differentiation of the West Slavs into Czechs and Slovaks [...] was sealed. Every sincere Slovak heart is certainly sorry about the fall of Great Moravia, that for the Slavs so fateful event. But it was not our fault that it happened." He argued that the separation of the Czechs and the Slovaks was a historical fact that could not be changed by temporarily shared rulers, Czech soldiers in Slovakia, or by the use of literary Czech.<sup>66</sup>

Škultéty argued that "after the demise of Great Moravia [...] the Slovaks were totally separated from the Czechs from almost 1000 years. And not only that, but when the Slovaks were separated from the Czech in the 9th and the beginning of the 10th century, there were still not nations among the Slavs. Before those times the Czechs and Slovaks could not yet have become one nation." He attributed the demise of Great Moravia to disunity between the sons of Svätopluk and other bad circumstances, while *Slovák* blamed the Czechs for turning away from Svätopluk's empire.<sup>67</sup> Škultéty also provided an alternative interpretation of Slovak history. He kept the traditional focus on the antiquity of the Slovaks and on Great Moravia and the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition as expressions of Slovak pre-Magyar independent existence. However, his interpretation of the demise of Great Moravia and the emergence of the Hungarian state represented a retreat from the view of the fall of Great Moravia as a national disaster and a partial return to Papánek's view (see page 147).

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<sup>64</sup> Hodža (1934: 129). See also pp. 274, 276; Hodža: *Agrarism* (1930: 8); and Hodža, reported in *Slovák* no. 101, 3.5.1928: 3.

<sup>65</sup> (Všetky slovenské zvláštnosti, všetka poezia slovenského života vo všetkých oboroch a smeroch musia byť v budúcnosti veľkou studnicou obohatenia spoločnej kultúry a jednoty národnej). Beneš (1934: 51).

<sup>66</sup> (Netrpí pochybnosti, že obyvatelia Veľkej Moravy boli predkovia Slovákov a Čechov. Možno, že Slováci prevládali. [...] Veľká Morava, žiaľ, zanikla. Juhovýchodná jej časť pripadla Uhorsku, kým severozápadná časť začala žiť životom osobitným, svojším. Týmto historickým faktom diferencovanie západných Slovanov na Čechov a Slovákov [...] bolo spečatené. Túto pre Slovanov tak osudnú udalosť, pád ríše Veľkomoravskej, zaiste každé úprimné slovenské srdce želim. Avšak nemôžeme za to, že sa tak stalo). Jozef Buday in *Slovák* no. 111, 17.5.1934: 4.

<sup>67</sup> (Po zaniknutí Veľkej Moravy [...] Slováci temer za tisíc rokov boli celkom odtrhnutí od Čechov. A nielen to. Ale v 9. storočí a na začiatku 10-ho, keď Slováci prišli do takej odlúčenosti od Čechov, v Slovanstve národov ešte nebolo. Do tých čias Česi a Slováci ešte nemohli sa stať jedným národom). Škultéty (1920: 69–70). See also Škultéty: *Slovensko v minulosti* (1926: 4), and *Slovák* no. 2, 3.1.1930: 2.

*O Slovákoch* (On the Slovaks – 1928) can be read as a defense of Slovak individuality and of Slovak centrality in the Slav world. Škultéty started by pointing out that the original name of the Slovaks was *Sloven* (Slav) and quoted Šafařík to the effect that "on that word: *slovensky*, *slovenské*, *Slovensko* [Slovak, Slovakia], on that single word hangs the entire antiquity of our tribe."<sup>68</sup> He did not dispute these ideas. He also made a big point out of the fact that the Slovaks accepted Christianity earlier than many other Slavs and that they accepted it from the Slav apostles Cyril and Method personally. "Of the Slavs, the apostles Cyril and Method only [worked] among the Slavs-Slovaks [...] Christianity in fact reached the South Slavs only by the disciples of our apostles, *with the Slav rite*."<sup>69</sup> Unfortunately, in Škultéty's view, the Slav forefathers of the Slovaks took up Latin right after the demise of the Slav church.

The Slovak settlements were connected not only to the Czechs, but also to the Poles and Russians, and would have been linked also to the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians had it not been for the Magyar settlement, Škultéty argued.<sup>70</sup> He presented various linguistic remnants of the Slav past in Slovak (e.g. references to Slav pagan gods), and shared terms, which showed the closeness of the Slovaks especially to the Slovenes. He pointed out that of the Slovak botanical names; some were shared with one of the other Slav nations, some with another, some with a third and some with a fourth. The Slovaks were of course West Slavs, he argued; this closeness only showed that "the centrality of the Slovak settlements among the Slavs in the past was total, that the Slovaks before the arrival of the Magyars were neighbors also with the South Slavs across the middle Danube."<sup>71</sup>

Škultéty also qualified the traditional picture of the 1000-year Magyar yoke. The essence of the argument was that the problems did not start with the demise of Great Moravia, but much later. "It is true that Slovak independence perished with the destruction of Mojmir II's Great Moravia, but the Magyars [...] would not be a threat to the Slovaks racially. The administrative language of Hungary remained Latin until the first third of the 19th century." On the contrary, it was "the Magyars [who] were close to being Slavicized the same way as the Bulgarians, who got mixed in with the Slavs on the Balkan peninsula." The Slav character of the Magyar Christian terminology showed that they had received Christianity from the Slavs, he argued, and pointed to the large number of words of Slav origin in the Magyar language.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> ("Na tom slovu: *slovensky*, *slovenské*, *Slovensko*, na tom jediném slovu visí celá starožitnosť nášho kmene"). Šafařík quoted in Škultéty: *O Slovákoch* (1928: 7).

<sup>69</sup> (Emphasis in original). (Zo Slovanov apoštolovia Cyril a Method boli jen u Slovenov-Slovákov [...] Kresťanstvo k južným Slovanom opravdove dostalo sa len od učedníkov našich apoštolov, *s obradom slovanským*). Škultéty (1928: 10).

<sup>70</sup> Škultéty (1928: 16–17).

<sup>71</sup> (v Slovanstve centrálnosť slovenských sídel v minulosti bola úplná, že Slováci susedili pred príchodom Maďarov ku strednému Dunaju i so Slovanmi južnými). Škultéty (1928: 22).

<sup>72</sup> (Pravda, samostatnosť slovenská zanikla so zaniknutím Veľkej Moravy Mojmíra II., ale Maďari [...] plemenne pre Slovákov neboli by bývali nejakí strašní. Úradnou rečou v Uhorsku stala sa latinská a ostala ňou až do prvej tretiny 19. Stoletia). Škultéty (1928: 10–11). (Vôbec Maďari tu už blízki boli k tomu, že sa poslovančia na spôsob Bulharov, ktorí na Balkánskom polostrove dostali sa medzi Slovenov). Škultéty (1926: 5).

Not only did the Slovaks Christianize the Magyars, Škultéty argued, they also contributed in various other ways. Because people of Slovak origin had Latinized their names, however, their contributions had been passed off as Magyar. For instance, the Hungarian juridical system was based on Slav (Slovak) custom, and when the Magyars regarded y-endings in their names as a sign of nobility, this was based on Slovak name traditions and the fact that many families of the Slovak gentry had names that ended that way. According to Škultéty, "the noble epsilon [y] in the end of names could thus come only from the Slovaks, from the Slovak gentry."<sup>73</sup>

"The racial yoke, dangerous to the Slovak nation, did not start until [the first third of the 19th century]", he argued. After the destruction of Great Moravia, the Slovaks thus decayed not so much under the Magyar yoke, as because of the bad circumstances. One such circumstance was that large parts of the Slovak territory had been without any state organization for at least 200 years. And imagine, he argued, "what decay among people, whose forefathers had organizers like Pribina, Mojmir, Rastislav and Svätopluk, and who had been taught by the holy apostles Cyril and Methodius." And the new rulers did not exactly help; even in the 12th century chronicles spoke of the Magyars as "wild barbarians in morals and language."<sup>74</sup>

However, the situation for the Slovaks did not become really bad until the 13th century, when the German colonization (and privileges) followed the Tartar invasions, Škultéty claimed. Being a neighboring territory, Slovakia also received most of the blows the Czech Hussites tried to inflict on Sigismund, and finally, during the wars against the Ottoman Turks, "Upper Hungary, or the territory inhabited by Slovaks, suffered the most." On the positive side, he argued that the Counter-Reformation helped the Slovaks in their "elementary struggle against the Germans" and their privileges in the 17th century.<sup>75</sup>

Škultéty thus presented Slovak history as a history of suffering, while rejecting the claim that the Slovak soul had become Magyarized: "Hard, very hard was the life we can imagine even from this short outline of the Slovak past. [...] But the Slovak preserved his face and his soul under all circumstances." What in his view saved the Slovaks in the face of Magyarization was the literary Slovak language. "Without literary Slovak, everything would have become blurred, there would have been a spiritual void – and Magyar from the Carpathians to the middle Danube,"<sup>76</sup> Škultéty argued.

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<sup>73</sup> (znamenitosť ypsilonu v zakončení mena môže teda pochodiť len od Slovákov, od slovenského zemanstva). Škultéty (1928: 25–26).

<sup>74</sup> (Jarmo plemenné, pre slovenskú národnosť nebezpečné, začalo sa vlastne už tu). (aký úpadok u ľudu, ktorého predkovia mali organizátorov, ako Pribinu, Mojmir, Rastislava, Svätopluka a učili ich svätí apoštolovia Cyril a Method!) (o Maďaroch ako o divých barbaroch v mravoch i reči). Škultéty (1928: 12, 13, 15).

<sup>75</sup> (ve elementárom boji proti Nemcom v 17. storočí pomohla Slovákom i antireformácia). Škultéty (1926: 6–7, 9). (najviac trpeli kraje [...] Horné Uhorsko čiže územie Slováckmi obývané). Škultéty (1928: 16).

<sup>76</sup> (Ťažký, veľmi ťažký to bol život, ktorý predstaví sa nám i z takéhoto náčrtku slovenskej minulosti). (Ale svoju tvár, svoju dušu Slováci vo všetkých okolnostiach zachovali). (bez slovenčiny u nás bolo by všetko otupelo [...] od Karpat po stredný Dunaj bola bývala duchovná púšť a – maďarčina). Škultéty (1926: 11, 12, 16).

The history of the Slovaks as a history of suffering was a quite common idea in the autonomist interpretation, often combined with a religious motive. According to Štefan Onderčo, "We are a nation of the cross. We have the double-armed cross in our coat of arms. We have walked the path of the cross in our work and struggle for a better future for the nation, for its bread and rights. We have fought under the slogan 'For that our Slovak language.'" <sup>77</sup>

Andrej Hlinka's speeches and articles often came close to being sermons. At Easter time 1927 he wrote an article entitled "Our Lady of Sorrows, the patron of the Slovak krajina", in *Slovák*, where he argued: "Jesus, the cross and Maria, that is the entire trinity which answers the nature and soul of the Slovak. [...] – The Slovak and the cross, these two notions are almost grown together and inseparable. I do not by this mean the cross at Golgotha [...] but the cross of Andrej, or the Cyrillo-Methodian, that is a specialty and feature of the Slovaks. Our nation never experienced joy; no other symbol serves us like Maria, Our Lady of Sorrows. [...] The fate of the Slovak was eternally hard, it was full of suffering and struggle. [...] That we are still here is first and foremost thanks to Our Lady of Sorrows, the patron of the Slovak krajina, [...] and secondly our fathers St. Cyril and Methodius. [...] And they will offer us the Hussite culture in vain; it will remain distant and foreign to the Slovaks forever...." <sup>78</sup>

Jozef Buday, another theologian, argued: "the entire cultural history of our nation teaches us that God our Lord was always merciful to our nation. Even when he in his eternal wisdom allowed temptation and hard times on the nation, in the womb of the nation he still always roused great and distinguished men who saved the nation. When all the nations of Europe were awakened to national life at the turn of the turn of the 19th century, God gave us Bernolák, the father of literary Slovak. [...] When danger is looming, the help of God is near. Again at the turn of the century, the 20th century, God our Lord roused in our nation a man who – it seems – is chosen by Providence to complete, to crown the work that Bernolák started a hundred years ago. And that man is our beloved chairman Hlinka [!]." <sup>79</sup> This hailing of Hlinka as the father of the nation was quite common in *Slovák*, especially around his 70th birthday.

<sup>77</sup> (Sme národ kríža. V erbe našom máme dvojité kríž. Po ceste krížovej sme kráčali v práci i v boji za lepšiu budúcnosť národa, za jeho chlieb a práva. Bojovali sme pod heslom "Za tú našu slovenčinu"). Štefan Onderčo in a speech at the celebration of Hlinka's 70th birthday, reported in *Slovák* no. 223, 3.10.1934: 3.

<sup>78</sup> Ježiš, kríž a Maria, toto je úplná trojica, ktorá zodpovie povahe a duši Slováka. [...] – Slováka a kríž, tieto dva pochopy sú skoro srastené a nerozlučiteľné. Nerozumiem tu ten kríž na Golgote [...] Ale kríž Andrejovský, alebo Cyrillo-methodejský, toto je špeciálnou a zvláštnosťou Slováka. Náš národ nezažil nikdy radosti, nám nesluší iný symbol, ako Maria Sedembolestná. [...] Osud Slováka bol večne ťažký, on bol útrapy a zápasu plný). (Že sme ešte dnes tu, to máme ďakovať našej Sedembolestnej Matke, Patrónke Slovenskej Krajiny [...] v prvom rade. V druhom rade otcom naším, sv. Cyrilovi a Metodovi [...]) A darmo nám budú ponúkať kultúru husitskú, Slovákom ona ostane večne ďalekou a cudzou). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 80, 8.4.1927: 1.

<sup>79</sup> (Celá kultúrna historia nášho národa nás učí, že P. Boh národu nášmu bol vždy milostivý. Keď aj v nevyzpytateľnej múdrosti svojej dopustil pokušenia, ťažké časy na národ, predsa vždy vzbudil v lone národa veľkých vzácných mužov, ktorí národ zachránili. Keď na prelome XVIII. a XIX. storočia k národnému životu prebúdaly sa všetky národy Európy, Boh nám dal Bernoláka, otca spisovnej slovenčiny). (Lež keď je nebezpečenstvo najväčšie, pomoc Božia býva najbližšia. Zase na prelome storočia, a síce XIX. a XX. vzbudil Pán Boh národu nášmu muža, ktorý – tak se zdá – Prozreteľnosťou je vyvolený dovršiť, korunovať dielo, ktoré pred sto rokmi začal Bernolák. A tento muž je náš milovaný predseda Hlinka). Jozef Buday in a meeting in honor of Andrej Hlinka, reported in *Slovák* 184, 17.8.1934.

Both Slovak autonomist parties shared the idea of the Slovaks as an especially pious people. The favorite ľudák slogan was "For God and the Nation", and the ľudák election program of 1929 stated that "the foundation of Slovak identity is Christian morality."<sup>80</sup> On Hlinka's 70th birthday, Martin Rázus said: "We are one! [...] The cross unites us. The aspiration to make Slovakia Slovak and Christian, to make it happy, joins us."<sup>81</sup>

In addition, the Herderian view of national diversity as something God-given (see page 35) was echoed in *Slovák*: "We will never allow the term Czechoslovak nation in an ethnographic sense. Why? [...] Indeed, it was only through the direction of the providence of God that the present-day varied mosaic of individual Slav nations developed over time out of that Old Slav unitary nation – among these also the Slovak nation and the Czech nation. [...] The gift of language was handed to us by God, our God almighty. Nobody on earth can thus take it away from us... Long live the Slovak spirit, it will live for ever!"<sup>82</sup>

\* \* \*

Let us recapitulate: The Czechoslovakists regarded Great Moravia as the first Czechoslovak state, and as such the historical predecessor of Czechoslovakia (along with the Czech state). In this picture, the demise of Great Moravia was a national disaster and the establishment of the Czechoslovak republic a reunion of both branches of the Czechoslovak nation. The Slovak autonomists regarded Great Moravia as a Slovak state, since a separate Czech state had existed most of the time. They accepted the existence of a Czechoslovak unity at the time of Great Moravia, but in their view this was a tribal rather than a national unity, and the 1000 years of separation precluded the development of any joint Czechoslovak national unity.

Both sides agreed that the long separation served to set the Czechs and Slovaks apart, but where the autonomists saw national differentiation, the Czechoslovakists saw regional differentiation. The interpretation of the causes and nature of the differences also varied. Pražák (and partly Krofta) emphasized the cultural retardation of the Slovaks as a result of the broken link to Czech culture and the negative influences of the Magyar (by implication barbarian) culture. In Chaloupecký's version, the Slovaks of Western Slovakia were racially and culturally Czech, while in the Slovak core area, Central Slovakia, the population was an odd amalgam of various Slav groups (and some Germans and Magyars) who had been assimilated into the stronger Czech culture. The original groups had, however, put their mark on the language of the area, which was the foundation of literary Slovak (the "bastard" theory).

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<sup>80</sup> (základom slovenskosti je kresťanská morálka). *Slovák* no. 240, 22.10.1929: 3. See also *Slovák* no. 75, 30.3.1928: 1.

<sup>81</sup> (Sme jedno! [...] Spája nás kríž. Viaže nás túha urobiť Slovensko slovenským a kresťanským, urobiť ho šťastným). Martin Rázus at Hlinka's 70th birthday, reported in *Slovák* no. 224, 4.10.1934: 2.

<sup>82</sup> (Nikdy nepripustíme termín národ československý v smysle etnografickom. Prečo? [...] Veď len riadením Božskej prozreteľnosti sa stalo, že z oného jednotného národa praslovanského vyvinula sa behom času pestrá mozaika dnešných samobytných národov slovanských – medzi nimi i národ slovenský a národ český [...] Jazyka dar sveril nám Boh, Boh náš hromovládny. Nesmie nám ho teda vyrvať na tom svete žiadny... Žije, žije duch slovenský, bude žiť naveky!) *Slovák* no. 265, 23.11.1934: 4.

Hodža regarded the differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks as regional differences – but, in his conception, it was not the Slovaks who had been influenced by the Magyars, but the Czechs who had been influenced by the Germans. The Slovak people and especially the Slovak language thus represented something older and more original, and had something to offer the Czechoslovak unity. The Slovaks could also balance the Czech rationality and radicalism by their sensitivity and traditionalism. The main cause of Czecho–Slovak differences was, in Hodža's eyes isolation, not Magyar influence on the Slovaks.

On the Slovak autonomist side, many of the elements of Slovak identity from the national revival were kept: The idea of the pious, Slav character of the Slovaks; Great Moravia as a Slovak state; the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition; the idea of the Slovak civilizers; and the idea of Magyars, Germans and the infidel Ottoman Turks as "the important other." On the other hand, the ideas of the arrival of the Magyars as a national disaster and the 1000-year foreign yoke were qualified: the Slovaks were not only victims, they had also contributed.

There is an interesting parallel between Hodža's emphasis on the Slovak contribution to Czechoslovak unity, and Škultéty's emphasis on the contribution of the Slovaks to the cultivation of the Magyars – which was of course entirely in line with the old "civilizing" motive in Slovak national ideology. This at the same time served as a defense against the Czech claim that the special Slovak features were caused by Magyar (= bad) influence. It was not the Slovaks who had been influenced by the Magyars, but the other way around. The strong religious accent in the Slovak autonomist conception of Slovak national identity is interesting, but perhaps not surprising, in view of the large number of clergymen among the leaders.

### ***The codification of Slovak and the linguistic separation***

In Czech literary history, there was a pre-war tradition of viewing the codification of Slovak as a separation from the Czechs. This dated all the way back to the beginning of the Czech national revival and Dobrovský's opposition to Bernolák's first codification of Slovak.<sup>83</sup> As we have seen in Chapter Nine, this view was also expressed in some of the school textbooks.

Since a cultural and linguistic nation concept was predominant, it is perhaps not surprising that the interpretation of the national revival and especially the codification of Slovak became a matter of dispute. From a Czechoslovakist point of view, the problem was the traditional linkage between language and nationhood, according to which one nation could not have more than one language. One strategy was to play down the importance of language and emphasize how the national unity had survived despite linguistic separation. Another strategy was to portray the linguistic separation as artificial, initiated by someone for some extra-linguistic reason. As a part of this, the motives of both Bernolák and Štúr were questioned. It was the latter line of argument that caused most opposition from the Slovak autonomist side.

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<sup>83</sup> Cf. also *Hlasové o potřebě jednoty spisovného jazyka pro Čechy, Moravany a Slováky* – 1846. David Short goes into this in quite some detail in: The use and abuse of the language argument in mid-nineteenth-century 'Czechoslovakism': An appraisal of a propaganda milestone, in: Robert B. Pynsent: *The literature of nationalism* (1996: 44–54) .



The first contribution to this debate was Milan Hodža's *Československý rozkol* (1920). He started by pointing out that although the differences between literary Czech and Slovak were clear enough, there were considerable variations among Slovak dialects; some being closer to Czech dialects than others. Second, he argued that the most striking differences between Czech and Slovak in terms of pronunciation had become reinforced in the 12th to 16th centuries. In this period a linguistic leveling had taken place in the Czech lands, whereas in Slovakia political separation and geographical distance had precluded a similar development.<sup>84</sup>

He attributed the codification of Czech to the political independence of the Czech lands, and claimed that literary Czech had been introduced in Slovakia through the court of Václav II, not by Czech exiles and Hussites. There was no reason to doubt that "the Slovaks regarded the domesticated form of the brotherly Czech language as the literary form of their own speech" already in the 14th century. "Czechoslovak was thus our literary language from the oldest times, throughout the Middle Ages to the most recent times." The fact that there were no protests against the Czech emigrants after the Hussite wars and the Battle of the White Mountain was in Hodža's eyes proof that the Slovaks regarded Czech as their own language.<sup>85</sup>

Then he turned to the causes of the Czechoslovak split, starting with Bernolák. While regarding the formulation of a Slovak national idea in the end of the 18th century as a historical necessity, Hodža attributed the departure from "the historically given foundation, [...] the national and cultural Czechoslovak unity" to the Counter-Reformation, which led to the beginnings of a "psychological spiritual division. Here Catholicism and Hungarian originality, there Protestantism with a Czech tinge."<sup>86</sup> Hodža explained Bernolák's codification of Slovak by pointing out that Czech was at the time in a precarious state because of the Counter-Reformation; even Dobrovský had doubted its future.

Second, he argued that Bernolák was not attracted to the tradition of the Czech reformation (Hussism). In his view, the "Counter-Reformation influenced us much more profoundly" and it was thus not possible to save "the moral value of the Czechoslovak religious tradition from the 17th century. *With that spiritual separation the Czechoslovak schism really started.* Bernolák was only the formal tool of this evolution", Hodža argued, and added that, as with all separatism, the Slovak national idea grew out of a conservative world-view. He also claimed that Bernoláčtina lacked a national ideological basis, and referred to a sentence in the preface of Bernolák's *Slowár slowenský*, presenting Slovak as "a convenient bridge to Magyar."<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Hodža (1920: 45, 49, 353–54). Dérer argued along similar lines in *The Unity of the Czechs and Slovaks* (1938: 37–38).

<sup>85</sup> (udomácné formy súrodneho jazyka českého pokladal Slovák za písmenné formy svojej vlastnej mluvy) (Českoslovenčina bola tedy jazykom našej písomnosti od dôb najstarších cez celý stredovek až do časov nových). Hodža (1920: 50, 52, 53).

<sup>86</sup> (psychologické triedenie duchov. Tu katolicizmus a uhorská írečitosť, tam protestantizmus s českou príchuťou). (na dejinne danom základe [...] národnej a osvetovej jednoty československej?). Hodža (1920: 57, 70).

<sup>87</sup> (Na nás pôsobila protireformácia omnoho hlbšie). (mravné hodnoty československej náboženskej tradície z veku sedemnásteho. *Touto duchovnou rozlukou začal sa vlastne československý rozkol.* Bernolák bol len formálnym nástrojom tejto našej evolúcie). ("pohodlný most ku jazyku maďarskému"). Hodža (1920: 70, 71, 73, 77). (Emphasis in original).

According to Hodža, "Kollár returned us to the Czechoslovak ideological unity. He, the Slovak, was the true heir of the thinking of Hus, Blahoslav and Komenský, documenting through his own culture the unity of the Czechoslovak cultural being."<sup>88</sup> Hodža here echoed Masaryk's ideas about continuity between the Czech reformation and the national revival (see page 146). As a result of Kollár's influence, Hodža argued, there was no separatism in Slovakia in the 1930s, when the Magyar chauvinism started. He pointed out that Štúr did not abandon the principle of a Czechoslovak literary language until 1842, and argued that if he only had Slovak linguistic and practical necessities in mind, what was deemed sufficient in 1841 would also be sufficient in 1843. Štúr therefore must have had other reasons for turning away from the Czechoslovak linguistic unity. In Hodža's view, "Not even our independent literary language, that outward expression of Slovak national individuality, appears to us as a logically necessary result of ethnographic or linguistic realities, but as a phenomenon accompanying a momentary political situation. [...] Yes, literary Slovak, the way it was designed by Štúr and consolidated by the turn in Hungarian matters in 1859, was politics, and let us put it bluntly, Hungarian politics", formed "because we lived in an Hungarian atmosphere."<sup>89</sup>

Hodža also argued that the linguistic split needed not be a national split. Indeed this had been the view of Michal M. Hodža and Jozef Miloslav Hurban in the 1840s, he claimed, whereas Štúr "wanted national separation." He reproached Štúr for not recognizing the "spiritual bonds, linking Slovakia and the Czech lands into one moral whole at the time of the Reformation."<sup>90</sup>

Wanting to protect the Slovak nationality, Štúr sought a way to work for this politically, Hodža claimed. The Slovak social structure was incomplete, consisting of serfs, a small intelligentsia, and lacking the support of burghers. Štúr needed reinforcement, which he could find only among the gentry, who had not yet succumbed to Slovak. Towards the end of 1842 he got the support of part of the gentry to establish a newspaper in Slovakia, but they emphasized that it would have to be in Slovak. Before this, no step had been taken to establish a new Slovak language. According to Hodža, "the events around the turn of 1842–1843 speak clearly: Literary Slovak enters our public life as a result of a deal with the gentry." This gentry was portrayed as politically conservative; so was Štúr, in addition to being a spiritual aristocrat influenced by Hegel.<sup>91</sup> Neither was a very flattering characteristic in the 1920s.

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<sup>88</sup> (Kollár nás vrátil do ideovej jednoty československej. On, Slovák, bol myšlienkovým pravým potomkom Husovým, Blahoslavovým a Komenského, dokumentujúc i svojou osobnou kultúrou jednotnosť osvetového bytu československého). Hodža (1920: 87). Jan Blahoslav (1523–71), translated the new testament in the Kralice bible.

<sup>89</sup> (ani len samostatný náš spisovný jazyk, tento zovňajší prejav slovensko-národnej individuality, nejaví sa nám tu ako logický nutný výsledok národopisných alebo jazykopytných skutočností, ale ako sprievodný úkaz chvíľkového politického polohy). (Áno, slovenčina, tak ako nám ju osnoval Štúr a stvrdil vývoj uhorských vecí roku 1859, bola 'politicum', a to, povedzme si doprostá, politicum hungaricum). (slovenčina vznikla, lebo sme žili v uhorskom ovzduší). Hodža (1920: 8, 11, 288). See also pp. 97, 108–09.

<sup>90</sup> (chcel rozľuku národnú) (Pásky duchovnej, spojivšej do jednotného mravného celku Slovensko s Čechmi v dobe reformačnej, Štúr neuznáva). Hodža (1920: 184–85, 189). Michal Miloslav Hodža was Milan Hodža's granduncle.

<sup>91</sup> (Udalosti na rozhraní roku 1842 a 1843 hovoria jasne: spisovná slovenčina vstupuje do nášho verejného života ako výsledok dohody zo zemanstvom). Hodža (1920: 122, 180, 213, 223–26).

As we have already seen, Pražák's point of departure was an original Czechoslovak unity based on a shared (Czech) language and a feeling of belonging together that existed prior to the Slovak revival. In Pražák's view, "only Bernolák and Štúr clouded and marred that feeling – with them came the turning point and the gradual split."<sup>92</sup> Pražák argued along two lines to corroborate this idea of Czechoslovak linguistic unity. On the one hand, he argued that the differences were small, merely a matter of dialect. In his view, "there was no basis for regarding Slovak dialects as something separate, different, individual, with a right to linguistic independence. Also nobody attempted it, because the tongue in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia seemed the same to them. Dialectal idiosyncrasies early occupied Czech and Slovak observers, [...] but always as dialect, always as a part of Czech", he concluded. Likewise, he argued that even the first codifications of Slovak "did not differ substantially from Czech."<sup>93</sup>

On the other hand, he referred to various national awakeners who agreed that Czech and Slovak were basically one language and the Czechs and Slovaks one nation – e.g. Jungmann, Palacký and Kollár (*argumentum ad verecundiam*). Of special interest is his treatment of Šafařík, who changed views on the unity of Czech and Slovak. The view of the young Šafařík (that Slovak was a separate language) was according to Pražák based on "an eclectic synthesis", while the view of the old Šafařík (that Czech and Slovak were two dialects of the same language) was a "more certain and truly scientific view." He added that Šafařík "was of course always convinced of Czechoslovak linguistic and literary unity."<sup>94</sup>

In order to substantiate that a Czechoslovak awareness had preceded Slovak identity, Pražák pointed out that the present usage of the terms *Slovak* and *Slovakia* was fairly recent, and that *Slovak* had long been used synonymously with *Slav*. He inferred from this that the Slovaks had had a Slav identity prior to the 18th century. At the same time, he saw the use of words like "Czechoslavs" or "Slavoczechs" as an expression of Czechoslovak unity.<sup>95</sup> He used the same technique in *Československý národ* (1925), where he on the basis of quotations tried to prove that the concept of a Czechoslovak nation was a correct designation, "used by the Czechs and Slovaks for ages, supported even by the speeches of former separatists and the statements of present-day autonomists",<sup>96</sup> – and that nobody had really opposed it before 1919.

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<sup>92</sup> (teprve Bernolák a Štúr mátlí a kalili tento pocit, – jimi nadcházal obrat a pozvolný rozkol). Pražák (1922: 20, 64).

<sup>93</sup> (Nebylo důvodů pokládati slovenská nářečí za něco jiného, odlišného, osobitého, co by mělo právo na jazykovou samostatnost. Také se o to nikdo nepokoušel, protože řeč v Čechách, na Moravě, ve Slezsku a na Slovensku mu připadala touž. Dialektické zvláštnosti zaujali české i slovenské pozorovatele záhy [...] ale vždy jako dialekt, vždy jako součást češtiny). (bajzovština neliší se valně od češtiny) (bernoláčina se od češtiny valně nelišila). Pražák (1922: 114–15, 131, 140).

<sup>94</sup> (eklektická syntéza) (stanovisko určitější a opravdu vědecké). (O československé jazykové a literární jednotnosti byl ovšem přesvědčen vždy). Pražák (1922: 197, 200, 201).

<sup>95</sup> (Čechoslované) (Slavočeši) (Tento poslední název [Slavočeši] byl i je výrazem pro československou jednotnost). Pražák (1922: 19). See also Pražák (1929a: 11). Chaloupecký argued along similar lines. See Chaloupecký (1923: 7).

<sup>96</sup> (je to pojmenování správné, Čechy a Slováci ode dávna užívané, doložene docela i v projevech někdejších separatistů i ve výrocích dnešních t.j. autonomistů). Albert Pražák: *Československý národ* (1925: 64).

Pražák regarded all attempts at codifying Slovak as separation. To him, the first schismatic was Josef Ignác Bajza (1755–1836). "He was the first to accuse Protestant Czech of causing the backwardness of the Slovak language, he was also the first who condemned the Hussite and expatriate invasions, because they allegedly harmed the religion of the Slovak Catholics. Bajza's program was Catholic and Hungarian, Hungarian more than Catholic." Pražák also insinuated that Bajza had Magyar masters: "I do not know whether and to what extent the Magyars influenced Bajza's actions. I would however be inclined to believe in such an influence, because Bajza's Hungarian and anti-Czech program was a conscious attempt at dividing the Czechs and Slovaks. I am strengthened in my belief by the fact that in 1830 the Magyars appointed J.J. Bajza as a member of the Learned Society of Pest, although his [academic] performance was in no way impressive [...] – it was probably awarded because of other merits."<sup>97</sup>

Similar charges were brought against Bernolák on the basis of the preface of his dictionary *Slowár slowenský*, published posthumously. Pražák claimed that the aim was "to teach Magyar through Slovak, so that as soon as possible only Magyar would be heard in Hungary. This aim [...] surprises and again exposes the foreign influences behind the scenes in the language of Bernolák." Pražák suggested that the reason why Bernolák wanted to lead the Slovaks away from the Czechs was that the Czech language was an obstacle to Magyarization. In his book from 1922 Pražák admitted that the offending sentence could have been inserted by someone else, but added: "It seems that the Catholics quickly reconciled themselves with the transition from Latin to Magyar." If he still harbored any doubts in 1929, he did not express them.<sup>98</sup>

In contrast, Pražák emphasized the positive role of the Slovak Protestants in preserving Czechoslovak unity, especially before Štúr, and claimed that they were against Bernolák "because of his expressed clerical and anti-Czech character."<sup>99</sup> Also Štúr was accused of separatism, but he was viewed more favorably because of his commitment to the Czech language and Czechoslovak unity before 1843. Pražák argued that "the Štúr circle consciously professed itself as an organic part of the Czech [nation]", and that Czech was their "beloved mother tongue." Further, "this was not the result of Czech reading, of the Czech present, but of something inherited, the voice of Slovak traditions, a Slovak subconsciousness of a former bond and former participation in the Czech religious movement [probably Hussism]."<sup>100</sup>

<sup>97</sup> (On první obvinil protestantskou češtinu, že způsobila zaostalost slovenčiny, on první odsoudil i husitské a exulantské vpády, protože prý Slováky katolíky poškodily nábožensky. Bajzův program byl katolický a uherský, uherský víc, než katolický). (Nevím, zda a pokud na počín Bajzův působili Maďari. Věřil bych však v toto působení, protože Bajzův uherský a proti-český program je vědomý pokus o rozštěpení Čechů a Slováků, a tuto víru mi sesiluje i to, že r. 1830 Maďari jmenovali do své peštské Učené společnosti členem i J.J. Bajzu, ač jeho činnost nebyla nijak mohutná [...] – ta byla asi udělena za zásluhy jiné). Pražák (1922: 131, 132, 133).

<sup>98</sup> (naučiti slovenčinou maďarštině, aby v Uhrách co nedříve zaznívala všude jen – maďarština. Tento účel Slowáru [...] překvapuje a zase odhaluje zákulisí cizích vlivů v bernoláčině). (zdá se, že katolíci se rychle smířovali s přechodem od latiny k maďarštině) Pražák (1922: 147, 148). See also Pražák (1929a: 76).

<sup>99</sup> (vyslovené církevní a nečeský ráz). Pražák (1922: 152, 155). See also Chaloupecký (1922: 29).

<sup>100</sup> (Toto vše nebyl důsledek české četby, české tehdejší současnosti, ale cosi zděděného, hlas slovenské tradice, slovenské podvědomí někdejší souvislosti a někdejší účastenství na českém náboženském pohybu). (jejich milovaná mateřština). (Štúrovci hlásili se tedy uvědoměle k Čechům jako jejich organická součást). Pražák (1922: 68, 237, 241, 250).

The Štúr circle did not abandon Czechoslovak unity for popular or linguistic reasons, but for political ones, Pražák claimed. "Hurban and Štúr simply found a political place for the Slovaks in Hungary and Slovak was most handy as an expression of that." This new Slovak orientation was "based on Hungarism, for which Czech was sacrificed in the belief that the Magyars would acknowledge the sacrifice and be politically and culturally just to the Slovaks."

In order to justify the codification of Slovak, he argued, the Štúr circle masked "the separation by a construct of the originality and dissimilarity of the Slovak tribe." Again Pražák alluded to foreign interests behind the scenes: "This concealment of the Czechoslovak historical bond [...] was of course a question of prestige for Štúr's and Hurban's independent Slovak nation, but it was also the result of the inconspicuous, but swift and consciously spread infection first of Hungarism and then of Magyarism. Despite their nice theories of the original and ancient status of their language and nation, the Slovaks never succumbed more to Hungarism and Magyarism than at this time."<sup>101</sup> Here Pražák virtually accused Štúr of being a Magyarone.

Pražák was quite alone in arguing that the codification of Slovak was a result of Magyar influences. Chaloupecký conceded that Štúr had tactical reasons for codifying Slovak, but, as he saw it, Štúr codified Slovak in order to protect the Slovak people against Magyarization, not believing that a Czechoslovak program could be realized. Even Dérer argued that the idea of an individual Slovak nation arose "in defense against Magyarization", while Štefánek claimed that Štúr and the others adopted a new literary language "out of love for Slavdom, assuming that they would more easily awaken Slovakia to the Slav national idea that way."<sup>102</sup>

The conception of the codification of Slovak as an act of separation seems to have been rather common. The encyclopedia *Československá vlastivěda* linked Bernolák's endeavor to the Jesuit university of Trnava and the Counter-Reformation, while Štúr was accused of incorrectly doubting the Czechoslovak cultural unity in the past. Considering how the Counter-Reformation and the Jesuits were generally evaluated in Czech historiography this was not flattering. Moreover, in an article about literary Slovak it was argued that because of the great similarities and the common base, Czech and Slovak must be defined as "two cultural literary expressions of a unitary national, linguistic and cultural Czechoslovak whole."<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> (odluku konstrukcí o původnosti a odlišnosti slovenského kmene). (Toto umlčení československé dějinné souvislosti [...] byla ovšem otázka prestiže Štúrova a Hurbanova samostatného slovenského národa, ale byl to i důsledek nenápadné, ale za to prudké a uvědoměle šířené infekce zprvu hungarismu a pak i Maďarismu. Slovinci přes své krásné teorie o původnosti a starobylosti své řeči a svého národa nepodlehli nikdy více hungarismu a maďarismu, jako v této době). (Hurban a Štúr prostě našli politické místo pro Slováky v Uhrách a slovenština se jim nelépe hodila pro to jako výraz). (nové slovenské orientace, založené na hungarismu, jemuž obětována čeština s věrou, že Maďari obět uznají a budou politicky a kulturně k Slovákům spravedliví). Pražák (1922: 296, 68–69, 391, 392).

<sup>102</sup> (v obrane proti maďarizácii). Dérer: Prečo sme proti autonómii? [1934], in: Chmel (1997: 180). (len z lásky k slovanstvu [...] predpokladajúc, že tak ľahšie prebudia Slovensko k národnej myšlienke slovanskej). Štefánek: Československo a autonómia [1923] in: Chmel (1997: 68, 78). See also Chaloupecký (1922: 29).

<sup>103</sup> (dvou kulturních spisovných projevů jednotného národního, jazykového a kulturního celku československého). *Československá vlastivěda. Řada II. Spisovný jazyk český a slovenský* (1936: 195). See also *Československá vlastivěda. Doplňek I, Dějiny I* (1933: 721 pp). Cf. also the school textbooks in history – discussed in Chapter Nine.

In *Češi a Slováci* (1929) Pražák sought to demonstrate that the linguistic split was not yet a closed matter: "The Slovak language was under debate in Slovakia as late as during the war, and the possibility of its return to literary Czech again emerged, if only the present generation would want it." On the other hand, the linguistic split was not incompatible with a Czechoslovak nation: "Ethnographically we are so similar that we can boldly speak of a Czechoslovak nation. All further ethnographic discoveries will strengthen our identity and prevent the dilettante fantasies of the Slovak romanticists of Slovak peculiarities or other-ness. [...] Objectively speaking, the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation and have 500 years of shared culture. Štúrism did not divide the nation in two, but complicated its form," Pražák argued.<sup>104</sup>

All subscribed to the view that the linguistic split did not preclude Czechoslovak national unity. Beneš regarded literary Slovak as harmful to Czechoslovak linguistic unity, but not to national unity. Krofta, on the contrary, argued: "If we consider a shared or unified national awareness, and a uniform understanding of the national past and the national goals as a more important condition and requirement for national unity than a shared language, we must admit that the defection of the Slovaks from literary Czech rather reinforced than hampered the development in the direction of a unified Czechoslovak national consciousness." Why? Because literary Slovak made it possible for the Slovaks to overcome the Hungarianism of the regime, he argued.<sup>105</sup> The contrast to Pražák's view is complete.

Conforming to the conception of a literary schism, Šrobár in 1928 recognized the worth and future of literary Slovak, and argued that "not even for a moment did the formation of a new literary language in Slovakia stir the awareness of Czechoslovak tribal unity."<sup>106</sup> *Slovák's* reply illustrates what a problem it created for the Czechoslovak nation project that the Czechs and Slovaks had separate literary languages: "He [Šrobár] thus recognizes two literary languages [...] but if there is national unity, two literary languages may not exist, and if there are two literary languages, there cannot be national unity! [...] And since there is no nation without a language, and a Czechoslovak language does not exist, neither can a Czechoslovak nation exist!"<sup>107</sup> The link between nation and language is here quite explicitly expressed.

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<sup>104</sup> (o slovenštinu byl ještě za války na Slovensku spor a ukázala se zase možnost jejího zvratu k spisovné češtině, jestliže jen bude soudobá generace chtít). (Národopisně si tak podobní, že směle lze mluvit o československém národě. Všechny další národopisné objevy zesilují naši totožnost a znemožňují dilettantské fantasie slovenských romantikův a slovenské zvláštnosti nebo jinosti. Objektivně vzato, Slováci a Češi jsou jeden národ a mají pětsetletou společnou kulturu. Štúrism národa nerozdvojil, ale zkomplikoval jeho útvar). Pražák (1929a: 129, 130, 140).

<sup>105</sup> (Jestliže však za důležitější podmínku a požadavek národní jednoty než společný jazyk máme společné neb jednotné národní vědomí, jednotné chápání národní minulosti i národních cílů, můžeme připustit, že odpadnutí Slováků od spisovné češtiny vývoj k jednotnému národnímu vědomí československému spíše podporovalo, než mu překáželo). Krofta (1932: 54, 58). See also Beneš (1934: 13).

<sup>106</sup> (Vznik nového spisovného jazyka na Slovensku ani na chvílku neprerušil vedomie kmenovej jednoty československej). Šrobár (1928: 11). See also Šrobár: *Československá otázka a "hlasisti"* (1927: 11).

<sup>107</sup> (Uznáva teda dva spisovné jazyky [...] lebo, kde je národná jednotnosť, tam nemôžu jestvovať dva literárne jazyky, a keď sú dva literárne jazyky, tam nemôže byť národná jednotnosť! [...] A keď národa bez reči niet a československý jazyk nejestvuje, nemôže jestvovať ani československý národ!!) *Slovák* no. 18, 21.1.1929: 6.

Škultéty answered Hodža already in 1920 in *Sto dvadsaťpäť rokov zo slovenského života 1790–1914* (150 years of Slovak life), which bore the subtitle *An answer to Dr. Milan Hodža's book 'Czechoslovak schism'*. He linked the revival to Enlightenment and Romanticism, starting during the reign of Josef II, and emphasized Russia's role in the struggle against Napoleonic France. He mentioned Papánek's "great book of the history of the Slovaks and Great Moravia" as an example of love to the past. Likewise, "our Bernolák circle" was the first to write consciously in Slovak, with "souls flaming with Slovak feeling." He pointed out that early awakeners like Papánek, Bajza, Fándly and Sklénar were Catholics, while the Protestants wrote of the "great Slovak nation" and "the beloved Slovak language" in Czech.<sup>108</sup>

With the first Slovak history and Bernolák's codification of Slovak already in place, the foundation of the Slovak national revival was completed by the great poet Ján Hollý, according to Škultéty: "Through his songs Hollý showed how sweet and beautiful [the language] is. And by presenting in poetic pictures the past of the forefathers, the deeds of Mojmir, Rastislav and Svätopluk, their special struggle against the German world and the great work of the apostles Cyril and Methodius, he generated the nation's respect for the forefathers and thereby national awareness." The aim of the Bernolák circle was to protect the native language and the nation; as Škultéty presented it, this was a reaction to Magyarization and Germanization. As long as Latin remained the language of Hungary, the Slovaks were still spiritually free, but after 1790 "the Magyar national spirit became intolerant", and they wanted a unitary Magyar nation-state. According to Škultéty, the Magyars regarded the Slovaks as the greatest obstacle to this goal, and therefore they behaved more fanatically towards the Slovaks than towards the rest.<sup>109</sup>

It seems that the reference to Slovak as a tool for learning Magyar in the preface of Bernolák's *Slowár slowenský* (see page 263 and 266) had been a matter of dispute also before the war. In a footnote, Škultéty referred to his own articles in *Slovenský pohľad* in 1897 and 1907. He argued that the Slav peoples in Austria-Hungary did not have the proper courage at the time, and that Bernolák did not write the preface himself. "Bernolák left his *Slowár* without Magyar translation, and he could thus not have written the two reprehensible paragraphs in the preface", Škultéty argued. Instead, he attributed them to Juraj Palkovič, who had bought the manuscript from Bernolák, and allegedly supplied the Magyar vocabulary. Since Palkovič was known as "one of the most resolute and sincere Slovaks" in the first third of the 19th century, it was obvious that he was merely hiding his true aims, his national ambitions. This was not uncommon at the time when the *Slowár* was published (1825–27), Škultéty asserted.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>108</sup> (veľkú knihu o historii Slovákov a Veľkej Moravy). (Bernolákovci mali už slovenským citom rozpalenú dušu). Jozef Škultéty: *Sto dvadsaťpäť rokov zo slovenského života 1790–1914. Odpoveď na knihu dr. Milana Hodžu, nazvanú 'Česko-slovenský rozkol'* (1920: 5–7).

<sup>109</sup> (Hollý svojimi spevmi ukazoval, aká je milá, aká krásna a, v poetických obrazoch predstavujúc minulosť predkov, deje Mojmyra, Rastislava, Svätopluka, ich zvláštne boje proti nemeckému svetu i veľké dielo apoštolov Cyrila a Metoda [...]) budil v národe úctu k predkom a tým povedomie národné. (Maďarská národný duch [...] stal sa netolerantným). Škultéty (1920: 8, 20).

<sup>110</sup> (Bernolák odomrel svoj *Slowár* bez maďarského tlmočenia, nasledovne nemohol on písať ani dvoch zazlievaných odstavcov práfacie). (jedného z najrozhodnejších, najotvorenejších Slovákov). See footnote in Škultéty (1920: 21–22).

Škultéty argued that all Štúr's activities were a matter of uniting the Slovaks, who had been separated by faith, dialects, valleys and mountains and one thousand years of unhappy past. He described how Štúr had had problems with the Magyar authorities when he wanted to erect an institution for the study of the Slovak language and when he wanted to establish a Slovak newspaper. According to Škultéty, there was not a Slovak who had expressed his national feeling that did not get a letter from either Štúr or Kollár in the 1840s. The decision to form a new Slovak literary language at once brought "another Slovak spirit" and "with the new spirit a new life started", he claimed. Škultéty's interpretation of the Slovak national revival was thus quite different from that of Hodža or Pražák: He emphasized their "fervent Slovak feelings" and presented the Slovak national revival as a *defense* against Magyarization. He also pointed out that the Slovaks fought the Magyars in 1848, and quoted Štúr to the effect that "The main thing for us is to destroy the dominance of the Magyars." He concluded that nobody, not even Štúr's great contemporaries Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodža, had devoted themselves so totally to the service of their nation as Štúr had done.<sup>111</sup>

Škultéty's main mission was to refute the idea that Štúr had political reasons for his codification of Slovak, and that he did so because of his inclination towards the Magyars. Škultéty criticized Hodža for not taking into account that the last third of the 18th century was the beginning of the spiritual awakening of nations in general. He argued that Bernolák was influenced by the spirit of his time, while Štúr's codification of Slovak in the 1840s grew out of the struggle to preserve the Slovak nation. In a situation where the Magyars wanted a linguistically unitary, Magyar nation-state, he argued, "national death threatened us. If they elsewhere regarded a language of their own as an instrument of national and spiritual progress, in our case the Štúr circle seized it in a hurry in 1843 so the very roof would not burn down over their heads." Škultéty rejected the notion of a Czecho-Slovak unity lasting "across all ages and across all successive changes until the evil Štúr, the perpetrator of the split", although he admitted that there had once been a Czecho-Slovak linguistic unity.<sup>112</sup>

He was especially upset with Hodža for claiming that the codification of Slovak was a result of a deal with the gentry, while presenting Kollár as an ideal. According to Škultéty, Štúr wrote letters asking for support from all possible sources, but did not himself meet with anyone. On the contrary, it was Kollár who initiated the action to get the gentry to sign a petition in favor of a Slovak newspaper. Here Škultéty quoted a letter from Kollár to Jozeffy where he suggested that support from the gentry would be welcome.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> (vrelým citom slovenským) (Hned iný bol slovenský duch). (S novým duchom začal sa nový život). (Hlavná naša vec je zničiť prevahu Maďarstva). Škultéty (1920: 33, 37, 38–49, 54). See also pp. 63–64.

<sup>112</sup> (Nám hrozila národná smrť. Jestli inde vlastnú reč pokladali za prostriedok národného a duchovného pokroku, u nás Štúrovci roku 1843-ho chytili sa jej chvatom, aby im nad hlavou nezhorela jediná strecha). (cez všetky veky, cez všetky časové premeny až po zlého Štúra, ustrojiteľa rozkolu). Škultéty (1920: 65–67, 68–69).

<sup>113</sup> Škultéty (1920: 84–85). Pavol Jozeffy (1775–1848), was a Lutheran bishop who supported the national and cultural efforts of the Štúr circle. He led the Slovak deputation to the Habsburg emperor in 1842, where they presented national demands and a plea for defense against the Magyars. See *Slovakia and the Slovaks. A concise encyclopedia* (1994: 299–300).



Moreover, he argued, Hodža's picture of a Czecho-Slovak schism was false. There had been no spiritual unity with the Czechs prior to the national revival. "The Bernolák and Štúr circles did not separate the Slovaks from the Czechs. The Slovaks found together with the Czechs only by the emergence of the Bernolák circle and especially the Štúr circle."<sup>114</sup> In Škultéty's scheme, it was the use of Czech in Slovakia that was accidental (see page 252). At Bernolák's time, the position of Czech was already weakening, he argued, and had it not been for Kollár's *Slávy dcera* the use of Czech would have died out already then. The codification of Slovak was thus inevitable. Bernolák and Štúr "actually just meant steps in the process of the establishment of Slovak as a literary language – the two highest, final steps."<sup>115</sup>

Rapant addressed the infamous preface in Bernolák's *Slowár slowenský* in a separate article entitled *Madarónstvo Bernolákovo* (The Magyarism of Bernolák – 1930). In the first literary histories, he wrote, no mention had been made of the reference to Magyar. Only in the third version of Jaroslav Vlček's history of Slovak literature (1898) was it presented as a shadow falling on the national honor of the Bernolák movement. The idea that Slovak was meant to serve as "a convenient bridge to Magyar" was first formulated by Vlček.<sup>116</sup> According to Rapant, the proponents of Czechoslovak unity followed in Vlček's footsteps, while the proponents of Slovak individuality tried to absolve Bernolák of the charges of Magyarism. Rapant presented Hodža, Pražák and Škultéty as the front figures on either side. Personally, he did not agree with any of them, but his sympathy was clearly on Škultéty's side.

According to Rapant, the *Slowár* was in essence finished already in 1790, but Bernolák could not get it published because of the size of the manuscript. He thus continued working on it until 1808. Also originally there had been five languages (Slovak, Czech, Magyar, German and Latin). The claim that Palkovič had later added the Magyar part and thus had also written the passage about Magyar in the preface was not true. On the contrary, the preface existed in 1808, written by Bernolák himself, Rapant argued. He quoted large parts of the preface to show that Bernolák's aim was to promote "understanding between the sons of Hungary." This reflected a Hungarian patriotism based on Latin predominance and linguistic equality, which underwent a crisis when Latin was replaced with Magyar. The Hungarian patriotism reflected in the preface was a typical fruit of the 18th century, and there was thus no way it could have been written in 1825–27, he argued.<sup>117</sup> In Rapant's view, Bernolák was guided by Enlightenment and religious motives, and his aim was language knowledge, not denationalization. Yet, Bernolák was also undoubtedly motivated by his "living Slovak feeling", Rapant claimed.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> (Bernolákovci a Štúrovci neodtrhli Slovákov od Čechov. Slováci našli sa s Čechmi len od vystúpenia Bernolákovcov a najmä Štúrovcov). Škultéty (1920: 118).

<sup>115</sup> (Bernolák a Štúr [...] znamenajú vlastne len stupne v procese uvedenia slovenčiny za spisovný jazyk. Najvyššie dva, posledné stupne). Škultéty (1920: 76, 86).

<sup>116</sup> Daniel Rapant: *Mad'arónstvo Bernolákovo* (1930b: 3–4).

<sup>117</sup> (styku medzi synmi vlasti). Bernolák's preface quoted by Rapant (1930b: 12). See also pp. 7–13.

<sup>118</sup> (živým jeho cítením slovenským). Rapant (1930b: 17–18, 22–23).

Finally, Rapant argued that it was not possible "to speak of an awareness of Czechoslovak unity until the end of the 18th century, i.e. until the start of the national revival." Because of the cultural connection of the Slovak Protestants with the Czechs, there were two currents in this national revival: One Czechoslovak, where the old religious-linguistic dependence was turned into national dependence during the revival; the other Hungaro-Slovak, which represented a more indigenous process, not determined by the Czech connection. Towards the end of the first half of the 19th century, with the ascension of Štúr, these two currents merged into a Slovak national awareness. According to Rapant, Czechoslovak unity only gained from this development. The linguistic separation did not split the developmental line of Czechoslovak national awareness – on the contrary, the existing two lines became closer. "The result of this rapprochement is precisely the Czechoslovak republic", he argued.<sup>119</sup>

The dispute about the national revival was mainly a scholarly dispute. However, on one occasion Hlinka argued that codification of Slovak was not done to spite the Czechs, but a necessity of life, without which the Slovaks would have lost their national awareness.<sup>120</sup>

Likewise, *Slovák* polemized against Czechoslovak linguistic unity and the conception of the codification of Slovak as a schism. First, it was argued that Czech and Slovak were two languages, not one. In order to corroborate this, various authorities were invoked (*argumentum ad verecundiam*), including Vlček, Škultéty, Štúr, Hurban, Michal M. Hodža and Palacký. It was also claimed that there were in Slovak 35,000 words not commonly used in Czech. Further, it was argued that the Slovaks as a whole had never shared a literary language with the Czechs. Before the revival, Latin had been the language of diplomacy, and very few people were able to write at all. Only a few Protestant priests and even fewer Catholic priests wrote in Czech, and many of the latter wrote a strongly Slovakized Czech. Since Czech had never been the literary language of the Slovak nation as a whole, Bernolák and Štúr's codification of Slovak could not be regarded as a separation, the anonymous author concluded.<sup>121</sup>

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Let us summarize: The Slovak national revival and the codification of Slovak were interpreted in very different ways on the two sides. Proponents of Czechoslovakism regarded it as an artificial linguistic separation and a disruption of the original Czechoslovak unity, but they insisted that the Slovak linguistic separation did not harm Czechoslovak national unity. Slovak autonomists argued that there had been no awareness of Czechoslovak unity prior to the revival, that the codification of Slovak only was the final step in a natural development, and that the Slovak national revival served to bring the Slovaks closer to the Czechs.

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<sup>119</sup> (hovoríť o vedomí národnej súnezítosti čl. až do konca XVIII. storočia, tedy do doby počínajúceho obrodenia národného). (Výsledkom tejto sblížovacej tendencie je práve republika československá). Rapant (1930a: 551). See also Daniel Rapant: *K počiatkom Maďarizácie*, Diel II (1931: 498–99).

<sup>120</sup> Andrej Hlinka: *Dohoda rovných* [1934] in: Chmel (1997: 167).

<sup>121</sup> See *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1930: 2, *Slovák* no. 2, 3.1.1930: 2, *Slovák* no. 3, 4.1.1930: 2, *Slovák* no. 4, 5.1.1930: 3, *Slovák* no. 69, 24.3.1930: 3, *Slovák* no. 73, 29.3.1930: 4.

The interpretation of motives was even more different. Škultéty defended the traditional interpretation of the Slovak revival as a national awakening under the influence of Enlightenment and Romanticism. He emphasized Štúr's flaming Slovak feeling, and argued that the motive for the codification of Slovak was to protect the Slovaks from national annihilation.

Hodža mainly attributed Bernolák's endeavors to the (negative influence) of the Counter-Reformation and the Jesuits. More vicious was Pražák's attack on Bajza and Bernolák: He insinuated that they served interests whose aim was Magyarization. Škultéty tried to save Bernolák's honor by arguing that he had not written the preface himself, and that the true author of the preface (Palkovič) was hiding his actual motive. Rapant showed that this was not true, but also argued that Bernolák was no Magyarone. Instead Bernolák was guided by Enlightenment and religious motives, and he combined Hungarian patriotism with a strong Slovak feeling. Rapant's view is close to the present-day version (see Chapter Six and Seven).

Hodža wrote off Štúr's codification of Slovak as "*politicum hungarum*" (Hungarian politics), a result of a deal with the politically conservative gentry. Here Štúr was the perpetrator of the Czecho-Slovak split, while Hodža was less negative to Hurban and his great-uncle M.M. Hodža. Conversely, Pražák had a less negative view of Štúr than of Bernolák, because of Štúr's former adherence to Czechoslovak unity. Also he argued that Slovak was codified for political reasons, and he alluded to Magyar influences behind the scenes in Štúr's case as well. In contrast, Krofta saw the codification of Slovak as a shift *away* from Hungarianism. Krofta's version corresponded better to the notion of a Czechoslovak nation with two branches, each with their own literary language, and it was probably also less offensive to the Slovaks. Finally, Štefánek argued that the codification of Slovak had been motivated by Pan-Slavism.

### ***National project or existing fact?***

As we have seen, each side used its interpretation to corroborate its views on the existence of a Czechoslovak, respectively a Slovak nation. It is striking how each presented its own nation project in primordialist terms, as original and natural, while maintaining that the competing project was an artificial construct. In present-day terms, the latter view approximates a post-modernist approach. Does the primordialist approach to the nation project also mean that both sides regarded it as already existing? There are some nuances between the scholars in this question. Pražák quite consistently argued that a Czechoslovak nation existed – claims to the contrary were written off as "dilettante fantasies" (see page 268). As late as in 1938 Pražák insisted that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation: "Although the Slovaks became independent by virtue of their own literary form 94 years ago, they remained a *part of our nation* and more than once declared that they insisted on *literary mutual unity*."<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> (Slováci se sice před čtyřicet lety osamostatnili svou vlastní spisovnou formou, ale přes to zůstali součástí našeho národa a sami nejdříve prohlásili, že trvají i na literární vzájemné jednotě) Albert Pražák: *Duchová podstata slovenské slovesnosti* (1938: 5, 41). (Emphasis in original).

Chaloupecký put the main emphasis on objective features, and regarded the Czechoslovak nation as a result of "the logic of the natural conditions", although he admitted that full awareness of national unity was still lacking.<sup>123</sup> Krofta wrote of the Czechoslovak nation as if it already existed, except in an article from 1935, where he wrote about it in the future tense: "In their own free state, the Czechs and Slovaks will surely develop into a true spiritual unity, while otherwise preserving their separate features, formed by nature and history. [...] A united Czechoslovak national awareness will not be formed by the absorption of one national consciousness by the other, but by a natural fusion of the two."<sup>124</sup>

The sociologists Beneš and Štefánek expressed similar views. Beneš presented the unification process both as an unavoidable destiny and as a great task, a duty or a mission the Czechs and Slovaks had to fulfill. In his speeches to the Slovaks (1934) Beneš claimed that there was no power in the world that could stop this unification, and pointed out how the various European nations had developed into higher national unity. He argued that "biological and sociological laws are working on our entire national whole, and our political task is simply to give those laws the right direction and especially the right tempo," and concluded that "the great historical mission of our whole generation is thus slowly and gradually to form a higher national unity of both branches of our nation, while respecting their individuality."<sup>125</sup>

Štefánek was perhaps the most consistent in seeing the Czechoslovak nation as a project. "According to common sense, the Czechs and Slovaks originate from one Slav tribe, just like their languages are not too different and their economic and cultural relations are close. It is thus not possible to cast away any natural and appropriate way of achieving the national rapprochement of both tribes", he argued.<sup>126</sup> In 1935, Štefánek claimed that the Czechs and Slovaks were involved in a mutual acculturation process. "The national life of the Czechs and Slovaks goes on in parallel, side by side. [...] But besides this parallelism and above it a marked Czechoslovak culture is growing, which belongs to both branches of the Czechoslovak nation and which is formed by Czechs and Slovaks." This process was in Štefánek's view unavoidable: The sociological laws of acculturation and accommodation would always make themselves felt, and to fight these natural forces "would be like blowing against the wind."<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> (logika přirozených poměrů). Chaloupecký (1922: 18–19).

<sup>124</sup> (Ve vlastním svobodném státě, [...] budou se zajisté Čechové i Slováci, zachovávající si jinak své odlišné vlastnosti, vytvořené v nich přírodou i dějinami, vyvíjeti k opravdové duchovní jednotě. [...] jednotné národní vědomí československé, které nevznikne pohlcením jednoho národního vědomí druhým, nýbrž přirozeným splynutím obou). Krofta (1935:1, 13).

<sup>125</sup> (tu pôsobia zákony biologické a sociologické na celý náš národný celok a našou politickou úlohu proste je, dať týmto zákonom správny smer a zvlášte správne časové tempo). (Veľkou dejinnou úlohu celého nášho pokolenia je teda vytvoriť z oboch vetví nášho národa vývojove, pomaly, s rešpektom pre osobitosť vyšší národný celok). Beneš (1934: 50, 60). See also Beneš: *Štefánek a jeho odkaz* (1929b: 32), *Náš největší úkol národní in: Idea československého státu*, sv. II (1936: 223), and Beneš: *Masarykovo pojetí ideje národní a problém jednoty československé* (1935: 14).

<sup>126</sup> (Zdravý rozum hovorí, že Česi a Slováci sú z jedného kmeňa slovanského, ak ich jazyky nie sú príliš rozdielne, ak hospodárske, kultúrne pomery sú blízke). Anton Štefánek: *Československo a autonómia* [1923], in Chmel (1997: 73).

<sup>127</sup> (Národný život Čechov a Slovákov ide paralelne popri sebe [...] Ale vedľa tohoto paralelizmu a nad ním vyrastá výrazná kultúra československá, ktorá patri obom vetvám národa československého a ktorú formujú Slováci i Česi). (bojovať proti týmto prírodným silám znamenalo by fúkať proti vetru). Štefánek (1935: 4).

Yet, he admitted that the process was nowhere near completion: "In 1918/19 our politicians believed that differences between Czechs and Slovaks could be worked out and overcome through a new national concept and the Czechoslovak ideal. Today, after 17 years, we see that the nationalist instincts, traditions and socio-psychological habits are stronger than the sound, constructive deliberations of experienced politicians and Czechoslovak neo-nationalists. [...] It is impossible to speak of any harmony and quick and direct reintegration to the benefit of the Czechoslovak state and national idea."<sup>128</sup>

Also Šrobár referred to sociological laws, and argued that through the "synthesis of both elements of the nation, a new, strong nation" – the Czechoslovak nation – would develop. This nation would be neither a Czech nor a Slovak nation, but a *new* nation.<sup>129</sup>

However, this focus on the part of Šrobár and the others on the need for Czecho–Slovak rapprochement did not mean that an original Czechoslovak unity did not exist – it only meant that they felt that the two branches of the nation needed to become closer in order to strengthen the nation. This strength-through-unity argument was quite common in the scholarly as well as in the political debate, as we shall see shortly.

On the Slovak autonomist side, the general view was that a Slovak nation already existed, and conversely that a Czechoslovak nation did not exist. Rapant was most open to the possibility of a Czechoslovak nation developing some time in the future, but even he argued that this "national unity is still questionable." In Rapant's view, "it is still not today possible to say whether the Czechs and the Slovak will ever become a totally unitary nation." On the other hand, he argued that the state was no doubt Czechoslovak – the "work of the common historical will of the Czechs and the Slovaks." Since the Czechoslovak nation did not exist, the state was necessarily a Czech and a Slovak rather than a *Czechoslovak* nation-state.<sup>130</sup>

Another exception is Matúš Černák, who argued that the Slovaks were in the final, decisive phase of their national development. It was no longer a matter of introducing or preserving literary Slovak, since almost all Slovaks of both currents now recognized the justification of an independent Slovak literary language. Yet, although there were still "many who despite a separate language feel themselves to be members of the Czechoslovak nation", the national development was being settled in favor of an individual Slovak nation, Černák argued.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> (roku 1918/19 verili naši [...] politikovia, že rozdiely, ktoré boli medzi Čechmi a Slovákmi [...] sa dajú rozriešiť a preklenúť novým nacionalným pojmom a ideálom československým. Dnes po 17 rokoch vidíme, že nacionalistické inštinkty, tradícia a sociopsychologická sotračnosť [...] sú silnejšie než zdravá konštruktívna úvaha skúsených politikov a československých [...] neonacionalistov [...]. O nejakej svornosti a rýchlej a priamej reintegrácii v prospech československej [...] štátnej a národnej myšlienky nemožno hovoriť). Štefánek (1935: 4–6).

<sup>129</sup> (synthesou oboch složiek národ nový, národ silný). Šrobár (1927: 5), and Šrobár: *Politický problém Slovenska* (1926: 35).

<sup>130</sup> (Naša jednota národná je sporná). (dnes nie je ešte možno predvídať, či z Čechov a Slovákov bude kedysi národ úplne jednotný). (štát tento je dielom spoločnej dejinnej vôle Čechov a Slovákov). Rapant (1930a: 555–56).

<sup>131</sup> (mnohí, ktorí napriek zvláštnej reči cítia sa byť príslušníkmi československého národa). Matúš Černák: *Postavenie Slovenska v ČSR zo stránky kultúrnej*, [1932] in: Chmel (1997: 135–36).

The rest took the existence of a Slovak nation for granted, although Rázus admitted that Slovak national awareness had been slow in developing and still was not strong.<sup>132</sup> There was thus a clear asymmetry between the two sides in terms of how they viewed the status of their respective nation projects. The Slovak autonomists were in general convinced that a Slovak nation already existed and had to be defended against artificial attempts at creating an overarching Czechoslovak identity. Černák is the exception, but he regarded a Slovak nation as the forthcoming end-stage of national development, and considered the fact that some Slovaks still felt themselves to be members of a Czechoslovak nation to be a passing circumstance.

In contrast, all the Czechoslovakists admitted that there were (regional) differences between the two branches of the Czechoslovak nation. There was a clear dualism in their argumentation. On the one hand, they explained historically how the original Czechoslovak unity had survived the political separation, or sought to prove that a Czechoslovak unity had preceded the Slovak national revival. On the other hand, they argued that Czecho–Slovak rapprochement was necessary to bridge the differences and to strengthen national unity. What seems striking is how nobody advocated that the Slovaks should turn away from literary Slovak. Beneš and Štefánek argued that sociological laws eventually and inescapably *would* lead to full Czechoslovak spiritual unity. Here scholarship and politics intersected.

Several of the Czech scholars, but in particular Chaloupecký and Pražák conveyed the idea that the Slovaks were a part of the Czech nation – cf. Chaloupecký's "Czech, or as it is said lately, Czechoslovak nation."<sup>133</sup> Likewise, in the interpretation of Czecho–Slovak contacts throughout history, these scholars tended to place the Slovaks in the receiving end. The Czech bias was thus clear. In this respect Hodža and partly also Šrobár deviated from the rest.

Of the texts I have used as a point of departure for this analysis, only one is a traditional history book: Krofta's *Malé dějiny československé* (1937) and its English counterpart (1934). The impression from the school textbooks in history is confirmed, in the sense that the narrative is thoroughly Czech in contents as well as in emphasis. Again, Slovak history is treated as an appendix or not mentioned at all. The main difference is that the term "Czechoslovak nation" is used more consistently, occurring 24 times, which is well above the average of the school textbooks. However, two-thirds are "routine" occurrences, and besides, "Czech nation" occurs twice as often (46 times), while "Slovak nation" occurs only twice (in quotations from the Slovak Memorandum of 1861). "Czech nation" occurs especially often in the passages about Hussism, the pretext for and the aftermath of the Battle of the White Mountain, the national revival and immediate pre-war period.<sup>134</sup> These are also the parts that are most Czech national in tone, in addition to the passages about the reign of Karel IV.

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<sup>132</sup> Rázus: *Argumenty* (1993: 43–44).

<sup>133</sup> (český, nebo, jak se nověji říká, československý národ). Chaloupecký (1923: 294).

<sup>134</sup> In Kamil Krofta: *Malé dějiny československé* (1937), "Czechoslovak nation" occurs on pp. 5, 79, 80, 86, 98, 103, 104, 106, 107, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 133, 137. "Czech nation" occurs on page 8, 10, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 43, 44, 45, 55, 56, 60, 68, 72, 73, 74, 78, 88, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 103, 105, 114, 133. "Slovak nation" occurs twice on page 90.

Finally, a few words about the arguments employed. Beside or as a part of the historical argumentation, a number of argumentation errors occurred. I have already mentioned *argumentum ad populum* (the majority trick) and *argumentum ad verecundiam* (the authority trick). In addition, *argumentum ad hominem* (attacking the person rather than the arguments) was fairly common, but more so in the political than in the scholarly debate. Pražák's insinuations that Bajza, Bernolák and Štúr were under Magyar influence could perhaps be placed in this category, likewise Hodža's characterizations of Štúr as a spiritual aristocrat and politically conservative under the influence of the gentry. Neither label was particularly flattering.

### ***The political debate***

The political debate differed from the scholarly debate in several respects. First, the interpretation of history was not a very important part of it; it merely echoed the scholarly debate. Second, the words *Czechoslovak nation*, *Czech nation* and *Slovak nation* were used mostly in a *routine fashion*. Slovak autonomists filed demands on behalf of the Slovak nation, but took its existence for granted. Likewise, Czechoslovakists used "the Czechoslovak nation" routinely about the Czechs and Slovaks, or synonymously with the Czech nation. Finally, the debate was far more fragmented and polemic. These differences can mostly be attributed to the fact that the Czechoslovak question was never on the main agenda in the Parliament.

We start with a quick look at the difference between the Czechoslovak parties in terms of their national focus. Second, I will present the symbolic demands of the Slovak autonomists. Finally, I will outline the main lines of argument on either side. I have decided against a chronological presentation of debates in the Parliament because of their fragmented character, and opted for a more systematic presentation of the arguments on either side. In order to show the structure of the argumentation, however, I have made an exception for the 1924 budget debate, where many participated on both sides.

### ***Party differences in national emphasis***

There were clear differences between the Czechoslovak parties in terms of national focus. Most of the parties were class based, and this was reflected in their programs. This means that the national question was largely absent from the agenda, apart from references to equal rights for all citizens regardless of nationality. A series of lectures on the ideology of the parties in 1930 and 1931 basically confirms this impression, although there were references to a Czechoslovak nation and state in the lectures of Stivín (ČSD) and Pekárek (ČSŽ).<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> See e.g. *Programové zásady republikánské strany československého venkova* (1919), *Program Československé sociálně demokratické strany dělnické* (1919), *Československá Sociální demokracie. Její cíle, program a postup* (1925), *Program Československé sociálně demokratické strany dělnické* (1927), *Program Československé sociálně demokratické strany dělnické* (1930). *Obnova lidské společnosti. Program a zásady československé strany lidové v Čechách* (1920), *Obnova ľudskej spoločnosti. Program a zásady československej strany ľudovej* (1926). See also Josef Stivín: *Sociální demokracie* (1930), Milan Hodža: *Agrarism* (1930), Václav Kopecký: *Ideologie strany komunistické* (1932), and Jan Pekárek: *Československá živnostensko-obchodnická strana středostavovská* (1931).

Only the National Democrats and the National Socialists presented themselves explicitly as national parties in their programs. The National Democrats were more Czech than Czechoslovak in orientation, which is also confirmed by Viktor Dyk's lecture in 1931,<sup>136</sup> while the National Socialist orientation seems to have changed from being strongly Czech to more Czechoslovak. A comparison of the programs of 1918 and 1933 is quite revealing. The former is concerned with Czech society, the Czech nation and the Czech people; it declares Hussism to be its moral foundation, and refers to the first Czech petition of the St. Václav Committee in 1848 (cf. page 108). The latter program is dominated by a Czechoslovak rhetoric and strongly resembles the argumentation of Beneš (who was a member of the party) in its emphasis on Czechoslovak unity as a great task and a battle about the young Slovak generation.<sup>137</sup>

These differences in terms of program between class-based and national parties were only partly reflected in the Parliament. The Communists and the Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party were the most narrowly class-based. Neither party participated very actively in the parliamentary debates between the proponents of Czechoslovakism and the Slovak autonomists. The Communists spoke of the imperialism of the Czech bourgeoisie, and (after 1925) favored the right to national self-determination, also for the Slovaks.<sup>138</sup> The Small Traders' Party mostly defended the interests of its group, and spoke of the "Czech nation" as often as the "Czechoslovak nation."<sup>139</sup> Likewise, the main agenda of the Czechoslovak People's Party's was religious and economic. The party was in favor of Czechoslovak unity, but its focus was more Czech than Czechoslovak. The party's only deputy from Slovakia, Martin Mičura, spoke of the Slovak nation and its interests, but he also emphasized his love of the Czechs.<sup>140</sup>

More than half of the routine occurrences of "Czechoslovak nation" appeared in the context of the "nation-state", its renewal or liberation. I will return to some of these occurrences in Chapter Thirteen. The two national parties and the Social Democrats accounted for most of the occurrences of "*Czech* nation." These were by far most common the first five years, and half of the occurrences appeared in the context of "our state" or in relation to the Germans.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>136</sup> See *Kdo jsou a co chtějí národní demokraté* (1925), Viktor Dyk: *Československá národní demokracie* (1931).

<sup>137</sup> See *Program československé strany národně-socialistické* [1918] (1928: 3–4), *Program a zásady československé strany národně-socialistické* (1933: 44–46, 166).

<sup>138</sup> See e.g. Šafranko, who claimed that the Slovak nation had gone from Magyar to Czech imprisonment, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (pp. 191–92), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé*. There was admittedly a nationally oriented wing among the Slovak communists (e.g. G. Husak, V. Clementis), the so-called "red Ľudáks", who published the journal DAV.

<sup>139</sup> See e.g. Rudolf Mičoch, 25. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 475), and 5. schůze ... dne 25. června 1935 (pp. 22, 25); Josef Václav Najman, 17. schůze ... 5. listopadu 1920 (pp. 142, 143, 144); František Ostrý, 117. schůze ... 30. listopadu 1937 (p. 75), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>140</sup> See e.g. Jan Šrámek, 62. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1919 (pp. 1942–43, 1948–49), and 6. schůze ... dne 11. června 1920 (p. 282); Václav Košek, 6. schůze ... dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 194); Martin Mičura, 106. schůze ... dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 62) and 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 36); Bohumil Stašek, 117. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1937 (p. 7), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>141</sup> See e.g. Alois Rašín (ČND), 62. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1919 (1936–37); Vlastimil Tusar (ČSD), 2. schůze ... dne 1. června 1920 (p. 17); Bohuslav Vrbenský (ČS), 25. schůze ... 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 454); Jan Slaviček (ČS), 160. schůze ... dne 25. října 1922 (p. 71), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*



In the debates I have studied, Czechoslovakist rhetoric was most common in the speeches of the National Socialists. However, in the clashes with the Slovak autonomists, they were accompanied by Social Democrats, Agrarians, and National Democrats. Slovak politicians in the former three parties were more active in defending the idea of a Czechoslovak nation than were their Czech colleagues. The occasional clashes in the Parliament were mostly initiated by the Slovak autonomists, either by asserting Slovak individuality or by attacking Czechoslovakism. The former was more common in the 1920s, the latter in the 1930s.

### *Slovak symbolic demands*

The classic symbolic demand is of course the demand for recognition as a nation. This demand was implicit in most of the argumentation of the Ľudáks. In the inauguration debate of the Beneš government in 1921, Hlinka quite explicitly demanded recognition as "republicans, as factors of this republic, but at the same time as an individual Slovak nation."<sup>142</sup> Likewise, after the election victory in 1925, Hlinka refused to join a government that "does not recognize the Slovak nation, its character, and its individuality."<sup>143</sup> It is an interesting fact that when the Ľudáks did join the government, the Czechoslovak rhetoric of the coalition members diminished radically, while the socialist parties (who were in opposition) carried on.

In addition to general demands of recognition like those just quoted, more specific demands were also filed. These concerned the spelling of the name of the Czechoslovak republic, the celebration of October 30th, the absence of "the Slovak nation" as a category in population censuses, a proposal to honor M.R. Štefánik, the status of *Hej Slováci* (wake up, Slovaks) and the Slovak part of the national anthem, and the return of Slovak artifacts. Outside the Parliament the celebration of 1100th anniversary of the first church in Nitra created a row.

Jozef Buday raised the matter of the spelling of the Czechoslovak republic in the budget debate of 1924. He invoked the French original of the Peace Treaty, where "Czechoslovak" was spelled "Tchèco-Slovaque" with a hyphen. According to Buday, this corresponded to the truth and to "the will of the Slovak nation" as an equal partner. Czechoslovakia should thus be spelled "Czecho-Slovakia", he argued.<sup>144</sup> In January 1925 the Ľudáks filed an interpellation where they in addition invoked the Pittsburgh Agreement, and pointed out that President Masaryk had signed it. It was argued that through this spelling, both documents recognized that the republic consisted of "two individual national wholes with their own territory."<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> (žiadame od vás, aby ste nás uznali za republikánov, za činiteľov tejto republiky ale zároveň za osobitný slovenský národ). Hlinka, 88. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1921 (pp. 144, 147), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>143</sup> (ktorá slovenský národ, jeho charakter, jeho svojráznosť neuznáva). Hlinka, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 184), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... See also Jozef Buday in *Slovák* no. 131, 11.6.1930: 3.

<sup>144</sup> (vůli slovenského národa). Buday, 230. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 23. listopadu 1923 (p. 478), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>145</sup> (uznáva, že nová republika složená je z dvoch osobitných národných celkov s vlastným územím). Tisk 5219/II in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č., I. volební období, Svazek XXIV* (1925). See also *Slovák* no. 238, 19.10.1929: 3, where it was argued that a spelling with a hyphen better reflected the reality.

The demand that October 30th (the day of the Martin Declaration) be celebrated on equal terms with October 28th was, just like the introduction of the hyphen, meant to symbolize the individuality and the equal status of the two nations. In a declaration in the Parliament on October 30th, 1924, presented by Ferdiš Juriga, the Ľudáks protested "vehemently against the disgracing of October 30th. Neither the Parliament, the state, the president nor the Czech nation pay any attention to that day, they degrade it to a working day, while October 28th, the day of the Czech nation is being forcibly thrust on all other nations, including our Slovak nation. In this disgracing of October 30th, the Slovak nation sees the disgracing of itself and [...] the denial of its individuality and its right to self-determination and a national life."<sup>146</sup>

The matter was raised again in the debate of the Law of Public Holidays in 1925, where the Ľudáks demanded that October 30th be celebrated instead of October 28th in Slovakia. The Czechoslovak majority of course refused (see Chapter Eleven for more details). The Ľudáks kept demanding that October 30th be celebrated on equal terms in Slovak schools, and that the Parliament should be given the day off. The latter demand was eventually met, which *Slovák* in 1934 presented as a de facto recognition. The autonomists (including Martin Rázus) with Martin Sokol at the helm also tried to introduce October 30th as a public holiday through a bill in 1937, but to no avail. In this bill they argued that October 30th had importance for the whole state because it was through the Martin Declaration the Slovaks had voluntarily decided to leave the Hungarian kingdom and join the future Czechoslovak state.<sup>147</sup>

A third symbolic issue was the absence of "the Slovak nation" in censuses. As we have seen, Czechs and Slovaks were counted together as Czechoslovaks in most statistics, including the censuses. This was the object of several complaints in *Slovák*, in 1924, 1930 and 1934.<sup>148</sup> Likewise, the autonomists, led by Hlinka, filed interpellations in the Parliament. In an interpellation in 1930, Hlinka argued that the first census had not reflected the reality, since no notice had been taken of the Slovak nation, and asked the government to make sure that the Czech and the Slovak nationality were separated in the next census. Prime Minister Udržal replied that it had been possible to write "Slovak" in the nationality column in the 1921 census, and that it would be no different now. He also pointed out that separate figures had been given for the Czech and Slovak branch in one volume of the 1921 census statistics. While admitting that data were usually given for the Czechoslovak nationality together, he concluded that this was entirely in line with the Constitution of the republic.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> (čo najrozhodnejšie ohradujeme sa proti zneucteniu 30. októbra tým, že ani parlament, ani štát, ani pán prezident, ani český národ toho dňa si nevšima, na všedný deň ho ponížuje, kým jedine 28. október, deň českého národa, všetkým iným národom i našmu slovenskému národu násilensvom četnickým natiska. V tomto zneuctení dňa 30. októbra vidí slovenský národ zneuctenie seba samého a [...] zapieranie svojej osobitosti, svojho sebaurčujúceho práva a svojho národného života vôbec). The declaration of the Club of the Slovak People's Party, published in *Slovák týždenník* no. 45, 9.11.1924: 3.

<sup>147</sup> See Anton Hancko in the 1928 budget debate, 109. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1925 (p. 90), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*; *Slovák* no. 246, 30.10.1934: 1; Tisk 862 (law proposal), in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1937).

<sup>148</sup> *Slovák týždenník* no. 20, 18.5.1924: 5–6, *Slovák* no. 15, 19.1.1930: 1; no. 56, 8.3.1930: 1; no. 66, 20.3.1930: 1; no. 252, 7.11.1930: 1; no. 111, 17.5.1934: 1.

<sup>149</sup> See Tisk 173 (interpellation) and Tisk 255 (answer) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek II (1930).

In May 1934, a new interpellation was filed, complaining that the Slovak nationality was not mentioned in the official statistics. Not only was this in contradiction with reality, since a Slovak nation existed, but it was also a direct violation of the census regulations, it was argued. § 20 in the instruction to the census officials was quoted, according to which "data on nationality must be determined especially conscientiously and in perfect accord with the truth, and pressure may not be applied to anyone." The autonomists also asked how many Czechs there were in Slovakia and how many Slovaks there were in the Czech lands. Prime Minister Malypetr only answered the last question, referring to the Bulletin of the Statistical Bureau.<sup>150</sup>

There were also some complaints concerning *Hej Slováci* and the Slovak part of the national anthem, *Nad Tatrou sa blýska*, in 1934. The autonomists with Štefan Onderčo at the helm filed an interpellation complaining that the Slovak part of the state hymn had not been played at a football match between Germany and Czechoslovakia in the World Championship in Rome. This complaint was also voiced in *Slovák*. Beneš explained that only the first verse of all the state hymns had been played. In the budget debate later that year, Jozef Sivák complained that the 100th anniversary of *Hej Slováci* had been totally ignored in the schools.<sup>151</sup>

An autonomist proposal to honor Milan Rastislav Štefánik was eventually adopted. This proposal was formulated in 1930, evidently in connection with a law honoring Tomáš G. Masaryk, adopted on the occasion of Masaryk's 80th birthday. The obvious aim was to show that the Slovaks were equal partners in the state, by emphasizing the role of Milan Rastislav Štefánik as co-founder of the state. Considering that Štefánik subscribed to the concept of a Czechoslovak nation, it might seem odd that the Ľudáks wanted to honor him, but they solved this dilemma by arguing that his Czechoslovakism was of a tactical nature.<sup>152</sup> In 1933, the government agreed to honor Štefánik, but the memorial was to be erected in Prague and not in the regional assembly in Bratislava, and the bill included the erection of a memorial for both Štefánik and Alois Rašín, the Finance Minister who had been assassinated in 1923.<sup>153</sup> In 1937, František Ježek of the National Unity and the Ľudáks filed an interpellation complaining that nothing had happened. Prime Minister Hodža replied that this was due to problems related to the construction of a Masaryk memorial, which had also not been implemented.<sup>154</sup> There were also two interpellations in 1937 regarding the return of books, archive material and artifacts.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>150</sup> ("Zvlášť údaje o národnosti musia byť zistené riadne a presne podľa pravdy a na nikoho nesmie byť robený nátlak.") Instruction to the census officials, quoted in Tisk 2576/XVII (interpellation). See also Tisk 2734/VII (answer) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIV (1934).

<sup>151</sup> See Tisk 2610/IV (interpellation) and Tisk 2728/XIV (answer) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIV (1934); *Slovák* no. 126, 6.6.1934: 1; Sivák, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 48), in *Tēsnopisecké zprávy...* The Ľudáks wanted to introduce *Hej Slováci* as part of the state hymn instead of *Nad Tatrou sa blýska*. They did in the Slovak republic.

<sup>152</sup> Tisk 212 in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek II (1930); Karol Sidor in *Slovák* no. 93, 23.4.1933: 8.

<sup>153</sup> Tisk 2147 (the government proposal) and Tisk 2156 (the report of the Constitutional-Juridical Committee) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XI (1933).

<sup>154</sup> Tisk 804/VII (interpellation) and Tisk 1038/VIII (answer) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VI, VIII (1937). As far as I am aware, neither memorial was ever erected.

<sup>155</sup> Tisk 853/XVI and Tisk 902/XVI in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1937).

Outside the Parliament, the most important symbolic issue was the celebration of the 1100th anniversary of the first church in Nitra on August 12th–15th, 1933. This was the first church on Slovak as well as Czechoslovak territory. In a declaration issued in June the Club of the Slovak People's Party presented the church as "a historical proof of our Christian cultural maturity" and "a reliable proof that the Slovaks already in the 9th century were associated with the cultured western nations. When the Czech nation celebrated the magnificent millennium of Saint Václav in 1929, that was the celebration of an almost 100 year younger Czech Christian culture." According to the Ľudáks, the younger Czech nation should thus "recognize the older civilization of the Slovak nation and bow to its 1100 years of cultural endeavors." They also called on the Slovak nation to assemble on that holy ground to remember how they even in ancient times had lived in the same territory as a free and sovereign nation with its own culture and its own soul.<sup>156</sup> The aim was clearly to turn the celebration into a national manifestation.

The government and the church, however, had other plans. The preparatory committee set up a program for the celebration where only government officials and high church dignitaries were listed as honored guests and speakers. The Slovak People's Party, the Slovak National Party, the *Matica slovenská* and the St. Vojtech Society were thus excluded. The proponents of Slovak individuality mobilized. According to reports, between 40,000 and 50,000 people were assembled in Nitra – *Slovák* even reported between 60,000 and 70,000.<sup>157</sup>

Under the title "Nitra is ours!" on August 13th, Hlinka argued: "The Slovaks were a unique, sovereign nation from the time of their great prince Pribina. We want to remain so also in the future. Therefore we want to celebrate Pribina, for that is our most holy right and national duty. [...] Nitra was Slovak already 1100 years ago, it was Catholic, and it was so at a time when the world knew nothing of red Sokol members and Czechoslovaks. [...] We will not let the celebration of the Slovak ruler Pribina be deprived of its Slovak and Christian contents. [...] We are at home in Nitra, we are the masters."<sup>158</sup> With this newspaper in hand, Hlinka was carried up to the front of the crowd at the official celebration – and was allowed to speak.

About a month later, Martin Sokol concluded that the Nitra celebration had turned out very different from what the government had wanted – a manifestation of Slovak individuality.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> (historickým dôkazom našej kresťanskej kultúrnej vyspelosti). (Kostol sv. Emmerána je spoľahlivým svedkom, že Slováci už v IX. storočí družili sa ku kultúrnym západným národom. Keď český národ 1929. roku oslavoval veľkolepé svätováclavské milénium, bolo to oslavovaním temer o celé storočie mladšej českej kultúry kresťanskej). (uznať staršieho dáta vzdelanosť národa slovenského a pokloniť sa jeho 1100-ročnému kultúrnemu snaženiu). The declaration of the Club of the Slovak People's Party, published in *Slovák* no. 126, 3.6.1933: 1. See also Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 88, Veľká noc 1933: 1.

<sup>157</sup> See James Ramon Felak: *At the price of the republic* (1994: 102); *Slovák* no. 175, 6.8.1934: 1; no 177, 9.8.1933: 1; no. 179, 11.8.1933: 1–2, no. 183, 17.8.1933: 1–2; no. 184, 18.8.1933: 1; Ivan Dérer: *Slovenský vývoj a ľudácka zrada* (1946: 153).

<sup>158</sup> (Slováci od dôb veľkého ich kniežaťa Pribinu boli autochtonným, suverenným národom. Tým chceme ostať aj naďalej. Preto Pribinu chceme oslavovať my, lebo je to naše najsvätejšie právo a národná povinnosť. [...] Nitra už pred 1100 rokmi bola slovenskou, bola katolíckou a bola takou vtedy, keď svet ničoho nevedel o červených sokolíkoch a českoslovákoch. [...] nedáme si slávnosti slovenského vladára Pribinu odslovenčiť a odkresťančiť. [...] My sme v Nitre doma, my sme v Nitre pánni!). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 181, 13.8.1933: 1.

<sup>159</sup> Martin Sokol in *Slovák* no. 204, 10.9.1933: 1.

The government made the Ľudáks pay for the success: *Slovák* was closed down for three months, rallies were banned, students were expelled from the university and teachers were suspended. This was Dérer's revenge: in fact, he had originally wanted it to be even harsher.<sup>160</sup>

### *The 1924 budget debate as an example*

In the budget debate of 1924, the clash started with a claim made by Andrej Hlinka: "we today see our national existence threatened. Centralism does not recognize the Slovak nation, although we did not know of the expression 'Czechoslovak nation' before 1918 at all. We knew of Czechoslovak unity, 'reciprocity' – I have nothing against that. But we will never compromise the independence, the sovereignty of the Slovak nation with all attributes, not even for the state." He accused the Slovak centralists of treason: "You gentlemen, Slovak renegades, recognize and form the Czechoslovak nation for egotistical reasons. [...] We will never be guilty of the crime of treason to our own nation. Let you take care of that."<sup>161</sup>

This made the National Democrat Karel Engliš react: "Are we one nation or are we not one nation? (*We are not!*) I answer that this is not a matter of declarations, it is not a matter of demagoguery, but a matter of historical truth, a matter of blood, a matter of culture. (*Excellent! Applause from the Czech deputies. Gažík: We were never one nation, you do not even know the history!*) We Czechs, Moravians and Silesians are of the opinion that we are one nation, because we love you and your people as brothers, because we have the same blood, and do not think that we have this opinion because we want to take advantage of you. [...] Wait until the Slovak people awakens, until it ceases being the object of demagoguery! (*Excellent! Applause.*) Wait until the lightning stops over the Tatras, and until it clears up also there!"<sup>162</sup>

The Slovak Agrarian Ľudevít Medvecký argued that "the national existence of the Slovaks is not only safeguarded through schools and all other institutions that were formed after the upheaval, but it is precisely the Czech brothers who worked the most to achieve this."<sup>163</sup>

<sup>160</sup> Felak (1994: 108). Dérer (1946: 64–65).

<sup>161</sup> (vidíme dnes našu národnú existenciu ohrozenú. Centralizmus slovenský národ neuznáva, trebárs my pred r. 1918 výraz "československý národ" sme vôbec nepoznali. Poznali sme Československú jednotu, "vzájomnosť", – proti tomu nič nemám. Ale samostatnosť, suverenitu slovenského národa so všetkými atribútmi nikdy nezaďujeme. Ani za štát). (vy pánovia, slovenskí renegáti, československý národ uznávate a tvoríte z egoistických ohľadov. [...] My sa nikdy nedopustíme zločinu zrady na svojom národe. To nech je vám dostatočné). Hlinka, 229. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 364), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>162</sup> (Jsme jeden národ nebo nejsme jeden národ? (Výkriky: Niesme!) Já vám na to odpovídám, že tato otázka není otázkou deklarací, není otázkou demagogie, nýbrž je otázkou historické pravdy, je otázkou krve, je otázkou kultury. (Výborně! Potlesk českých poslanců. – Posl. Gažík: Nikdy sme neboli jeden národ, ani históriu neznáte!) My Češi, Moravané a Slezané jsme toho názoru, že jsme jedním národem, protože vás a váš lid milujeme jako své bratry, protože máme stejnou krev, a nemyslete, že ten názor máme proto, že vás chceme využívat. [...] počkejte, až se probudí slovenský lid, až přestane být předmětem demagogie! (Výborně! Potlesk). Počkejte, až se přestane nad Tatrou blyškati, a až se tam také vyjasní!) Engliš, 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 369), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>163</sup> (národná existencia Slovákov je nielen školami, nielen všetkými inými inštitúciami, ktoré boli utvorené od prevratu, zabezpečená, ale že práve bratia Česi sú to, ktorí v tomto smere pracujú najviac). Medvecký, 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 391), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

His colleague Rudolf Malík spoke as a "Moravian Slovak", arguing that it was not necessary to call on Kollár, Šafařík, Štúr, Vlček and other important Slovaks to show that that "the teaching of the ľudáks of the distinctness of two nations, the Czech and the Slovak, is illusory." He invoked Martin Hattala (the man behind the Slovak grammar), *Detvan*, Milan R. Štefánik, and claimed that even Hlinka had been of a different opinion before. According to Malík: "We, the Czechs and Slovaks, are one nation, just as Hanáks, Valachs and Silesians are part of one and the same family, one and the same nation, and of one and the same blood. The fact is that Slovak is an inexhaustible source of the Czech literary language, the fact is that we understand each other very well, almost every word, and if there are differences, they are actually smaller than for instance between the Hanák dialect and literary Czech. [...] The fact is that there is even smaller difference between literary Czech and literary Slovak than between Slovak dialects in Slovakia." Malík saw "living proof that contradicts that false teaching of the ľudáks of two heterogeneous Slav nations, Czechs and Slovaks, and that is the existence of the Moravian Slovaks."<sup>164</sup>

He wrote off the thesis of two individual nations as "merely a slogan of agitation in order to gain votes among the Slovak people, so neglected and left backward by former Magyar governments. Strengthening the [Slovak] People's Party, strengthening the clergy of Hlinka's type, is what all that autonomy, all that animosity against Czechoslovak unity is about." Malík also alluded to foreign interests behind the scenes: "This separatism of yours, gentlemen, we in Moravia have long since put behind us. [...] The antagonism between Czechs and Moravians was artificially cultivated. Vienna took pleasure in it, because she saw that it weakened the Czech nation and strengthened Vienna centralism [...] I am sure that Vienna and especially Budapest have their fingers in that separatism of the People's Party. [...] Our defense and strength is in the indivisible union of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, because we are all the members of one family, one nation, and of one blood." In Malík's view, it was time the ľudáks understood that they served neither Slovakia nor the state, and he hoped that they also would come to this conclusion "unless of course, they are actually enemies of this state."<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Hanák is spoken in central Moravia, in the Olomouc area. (ona nauka ľudovců o různosti dvou národů, českého a slovenského, jest klamná). (my, Češi a Slováci, jsme jeden národ, právě jako Hanáci, Valaši, Slezané jsou součástíkou jedné a téže rodiny, jednoho a téhož národa, z jedné a téže krve. Fakt je, že slovenština je nevyčerpatelným zdrojem spisovného jazyka českého, fakt je, že si velmi dobře rozumíme, každé skoro slovo, a jsou-li jaké rozdíly, jsou tyto věru menší nežli na příkl. mezi nářečím hanáckým a spisovným jazykem českým [...]) Fakt je, že mezi spisovnou češtinou a mezi spisovnou slovenštinou je menší rozdíl nežli mezi dialekty slovenskými na Slovensku samém). (živý důkaz, který onu falešnou nauku ľudovců o dvou různorodých národech slovanských, Čechů a Slováků, vyvrací, a to je existence moravských Slováků). Malík, 231. schůze ... dne 26. listopadu 1923 (pp. 587–88), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>165</sup> (autonomii za pouhých agitací hesla k získání hlasů mezi slovenským lidem, dřívějšími vládami maďarskými tak zanedbaným, tak zaostalým. Posílení strany ľudové, posílení kleru rázu Hlinkova – toť celá ona autonomie, toť celé ono nepřátelství proti československé jednotě. [...] Tento váš separatismus, pánové, máme my na Moravě [...] už dávno za sebou. [...] Tento antagonismus mezi Čechy a Moravany byl uměle pěstován. Vídeň měla z toho jen radost, poněvadž v tom viděla zeslabení národa českého a zesílení vídeňského centralismu. [...] Jest jist, že i v tom separatismu pánů z ľudové strany má prsty Vídeň a zejména Budapešť). (záchrana a síla naše jest v nerozlučném svazku Čech, Moravy a Slovenska, neboť všichni jsme členy jedné rodiny, jednoho národa, z jedné krve). (ač-li ovšem nejsou skutečnými nepřáteli tohoto státu). Malík, 231. schůze... dne 26. listopadu 1923 (p. 588), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

The ľudák Marek Gažík defended Hlinka's honor, arguing that Hlinka had always defended the individuality of the Slovak nation, the only difference was that "Hlinka before held the view of the individual Slovak nation against the Magyars, and today holds the view of the individual Slovak nation against the Czechs." He took note of Engliš and rejected his conclusion as "untrue", arguing that Engliš had not provided a single proof of the unity of the Czech and Slovak nation, just empty phrases of the objective historical truth. The historical truth was, according to Gažík, that neither the Slovak nation nor the Czech nation had ever called itself a Czechoslovak nation, and still did not.

Besides, Gažík argued, the Slovak nation had in the last *župa* elections shown that "it does not recognize the Czechoslovak national unity, for 450,000 votes were delivered to an autonomist party representing the Slovak nation as a juridical person in this Parliament... (*Karlovský: But also including Magyars and Magyarones!*). Quite on the contrary, the Magyars robbed us of 60,000 more votes... It is not possible to tell someone that they are not an individual nation, when they are and want to be one – not even by invoking a historical truth."<sup>166</sup>

The Slovak National Socialist Igor Hrušovský replied that "a party representing a minority of the Slovak people" (i.e. the Slovak People's Party) declared that it saw the national existence of the Slovaks threatened. By calling the recognition of the Czechoslovak nation a crime against the Slovak nation, the ľudáks in his view were accusing a majority of the Slovak people, and the awakeners, of being renegades.

Hrušovský argued: "the conviction of the unity of the Czechoslovak nation is as old as our national endeavors and our national awareness. Our first awakeners and writers Horčíčka, Tablic, Ribay, Šafárik, Kollár, Benedikti and others were passionate defenders of the conscious idea of the unity of the Czechoslovak nation. [...] If Štúr and his school retreated from the Czechoslovak program in the forties, he did so for tactical reasons, because at a time of growth in Magyar power the Czechoslovak program seemed unfeasible for the time being. In the difficult political situation following from this, the Štúr circle introduced a Hungarian-Slovak language into literature, formed the concept of a Hungarian-Slovak nation and Hungarian-Slovak patriotism."<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> (Hlinka stál drier na stanovisku osobitného národa voči Maďarom a dnes stojí na stanovisku osobitného slovenského národa voči Čechom). (nepravdivá) (neuznáva československú národnú jednotu, lebo 450 tisíc hlasov odovzdal na stranu autonómnu a strana reprezentujúcu slovenský národ, čo právnu osobu v tomto parlamente (Posl. Karlovský: Ale i s Maďary a Maďaróny!) Práve naopak, Maďari odobrali nám ešte 60 tisíc hlasov..., nie je možno nikomu nahovoriť, ani odvolávaním sa na historickú pravdu, že nie je národom samostatným, keď on takým je a ním byť chce). Gažík, 231. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. listopadu 1923 (p. 592), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>167</sup> (Presvedčenie o jednote československého národa je tak staré, ako sú vôbec naše národné snahy a naše národné uvedomie. Prví naši buditelia a spisovatelia Horčíčka, Tablic, Ribay, Šafárik, Kollár, Benedikti a iný sú vážnymi zastánci vedomej myšlienky o jednote československého národa). (A jestliže Štúr a jeho škola v rokoch 40tych od československého programu ustupuje, tak to robí z dôvodov taktických, pretože československý program v časoch rozmachu politickej moci maďarskej zdá sa im byť na ten čas neuskutočniteľný. Z vtedajšej ťažkej politickej situácii vyplývajú, uviedli Štúrovci do literatúry uhorsko-slovenskú reč, utvorili pojem uhorsko-slovenského národa a uhorsko-slovenského vlastenectva). Hrušovský, 231. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. listopadu 1923 (pp. 603, 604), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

According to Hrušovský, this was to no avail, and "already before the war the young Slovak generation realized the necessity of declaring Czechoslovak reciprocity and unity, precisely in the interest of the Slovaks. October 28th and 30th, 1918, are nothing but logical steps in Slovak history." He denied that the Slovak centralists were paid renegades; Hlinka very well knew that they "professed to Czechoslovak unity also under Hungary. [...] We did not change, and certainly not out of egotistical interests." Finally, he declared: "We will never give our consent to the attempts at destroying Czechoslovak unity, and therefore we definitely reject the separatist plots, which we regard as a crime inflicted on the entire Czechoslovak nation."<sup>168</sup>

Apart from elements already familiar from the scholarly debate, the most striking feature of this debate were the many mutual accusations. This was typical of the political debate, especially in the 1920s and especially in exchanges between Slovaks.

### ***Main lines of argumentation***

Most disputes about the Czechoslovak question in the Parliament were initiated by the Ľudáks, either by asserting Slovak individuality and claiming its recognition or by attacking Czechoslovakism. In practice, this often amounted to the same. When they asserted Slovak individuality, they mostly did so without defining it. When they did, central elements were shared blood, language, soul, morality, history and territory.<sup>169</sup> Since the Slovak conception of nationhood has already been covered (page 245), I will not treat this separately here.

There was a clear parallelism in the argumentation of the two sides. The autonomists argued along three main lines against Czechoslovakism. First, they argued that the Czechoslovak nation was a fiction, a lie, and an unnatural monstrosity. Second, they argued that Czechoslovakism threatened Slovak national existence. This line of argument was associated with accusations of Pan-Czechism and treason on the part of the Slovak Czechoslovakists. Third, they argued that Czechoslovakism was contrary to Slovak interests.

The centralists countered the latter two arguments by insisting that Czechoslovakism was not a threat to the Slovaks. On the contrary, it was the Czechoslovak national idea that had saved the Slovaks from drowning in a Magyar sea, and that now safeguarded Slovak national existence. The reverse of this argument was that being against the idea of a Czechoslovak national unity was being against the state, because the state was founded on that idea. In line with this, the Slovak autonomists were accused of being renegades, Magyarones, irredentists and the like.

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<sup>168</sup> (mladá slovenská generácia videla už pred vojnou práve v záujme Slovákov nutnosť hlásania vzájomnosti a jednoty československej. Rok 1918, 28. a 30. október nie je iným, než logickým článkom v dejinách slovenských). (hlásili sa k jednote československé i za Maďarska. [...] sme sa nezmenili a najmenej zmenili z egoistických záujmov). (Nikdy nedáme svoj súhlas k pokusom rozbitia československej jednoty a preto odmietame rozhodne úklady separatistické, ktoré považujeme za zločin páchaný na celom československom národe). Hrušovský, 231. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. listopadu 1923 (pp. 603, 604), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>169</sup> See Arnold Bobok, 25. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 442), Jozef Tiso, 16. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 5. prosince 1935 (p. 54) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...



Finally, the Czechoslovakists argued that the Czechoslovak nation was at least as old as the first national endeavors of the Slovaks, and quoted various "awakeners" to prove this (*argumentum ad verecundiam*). By claiming continuity with these awakeners (and with their own efforts before the war), both sides sought to add legitimacy to their present efforts. The clashes over the national question were thus also a contest between Slovak politicians about who had the right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation. Here the election results came in handy.

In this there is an element of *argumentum ad populum*, with both sides arguing that they were right because the majority agreed with them. Hlinka e.g. insisted that "Not a few people, but the Slovak nation itself must say whether it wants to remain an individual nation."<sup>170</sup>

I will first present the three main autonomist lines of argumentation. Then I will turn to the Czechoslovakist counter-arguments, and finally, I will present the contest between Czechoslovakists and Slovak autonomists of who were the legitimate spokesmen of the Slovak nation.

#### THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATION IS A FICTION

The characterization of Czechoslovakism or Czechoslovak national unity as a fiction or a fixed idea, a phantom, a Fata Morgana, a lie, or a monstrosity was very common in the pages of *Slovák*,<sup>171</sup> as well as in the Parliament, especially in the 1930s. Such characterizations implied that while Slovak identity was natural, Czechoslovak unity was untrue or artificial.

Ferdiš Juriga refused to support the first Švehla government (1922) because it was based on "the untruthful foundation that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. We are not one nation. When that is claimed, it is either unawareness or a lie. We know from our scientific research, from biology and history, from linguistics, that we are an individual Slovak nation."<sup>172</sup>

In the budget debate of 1938, Jozef Tiso used the word "fiction" four times. He argued that "the rejection of the fiction of a Czechoslovak nation is not a departure from an accepted scientific definition of the nation. For according to that definition it is only admissible to seek it in a common language, culture, in shared morality and commonly inhabited territory, in the historical past of a homogeneous nation, which has its own natural name. [...] A Czechoslovak nation is not even heard of in history, which only knows of the Slovak nation."<sup>173</sup>

<sup>170</sup> (Nie niekoľko ľudí, ale sám slovenský národ musí povedať, či chce zostať svojráznym národom...). Hlinka, 4. schůze ... dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 54, 55). See also Hlinka, 6. schůze ... dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 176), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy*...

<sup>171</sup> e.g. *Slovák* no. 55, 1927; no. 53, 1928; no. 270, 1929; no. 63, 65, 66, 1930; no. 69, 1931; no. 112, 1933; no. 108, 1934.

<sup>172</sup> (na tom živom základe, že Česi a Slováci sú jeden národ. My nie sme jeden národ. Keď toto sa tvrdí, to je buď nevedomosť alebo lož. My vieme z našej vedy z prírodopisu a z dejín, z jazykozpytu, že sme osobitný slovenský národ), Juriga, 162. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. října 1922 (p. 314), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy*...

<sup>173</sup> (Odmietanie fikcie československého národa nie je odklonom od prijatej vedeckej definície národa, lebo dľa tejto definície prípustné je hľadať len v spoločnej reči, kultúre, v spoločných mravoch a spoločne obývanom území, v historickej minulosti homogénny národ, ktorý má svoje vlastné prirodzené meno [...] Nehovorí sa 'československý' národ ani v histórii, ktorá pozná len slovenský národ). Tiso, 117. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1937 (p. 45), in: *Těsnopisecké ...*

Likewise, after pointing out the lack of agreement between the various Czechoslovakist conceptions, *Slovák* conceded that "We knew and still know very well that it is hard to defend something which does not exist, which does not have any natural basis and which is in complete opposition to reality. And that is precisely the main difference between [the Czechoslovakists] and the Slovak autonomists."<sup>174</sup>

Rejection of Czechoslovakism as a fiction often went hand in hand with defense of Slovak individuality. In 1935, Pavol Florek complained that, even after 17 years, the entire state apparatus did not accept the individuality of the Slovak nation. Instead they pulled out "the Pan-Czechist fiction of a Czechoslovak nation in order to deprive us Slovaks of existence as a nation. Really not even existence, for they do not in fact recognize us as a nation, even though we have all criteria of a nation: Our past, our political and national manifestations, a fervent feeling of national community, our literary language, and what is most important, we have an unbreakable will to be and to remain an individual Slovak nation for ever."<sup>175</sup>

According to *Slovák*, "The fixed idea of Czechoslovak national unity gets in the way of understanding. [...] The Slovak youth stands up against the national unity, and the Czech youth is totally indifferent to the question of unity. [...] That fixed idea lives only in the heads of some senile politicians, yet it lives neither in the hearts and minds of the future upcoming generations, nor in the blood of the Czechs and Slovaks. [...] Czechs, if you want to keep this state strong and able to fight for its existence, throw away the fiction of Czechoslovak national unity, in which not even its originators believe."<sup>176</sup>

#### CZECHOSLOVAKISM IS A THREAT TO SLOVAK EXISTENCE

The argument that Czechoslovakism was a threat came in two versions. On the one hand, it was argued that Czechoslovakism was a threat to the *existence* of the Slovak nation. Common metaphors were that the Slovaks would "drown" in Czech nation, or that Czechoslovak national unity was possible only on the "grave" of the Slovak nation. On the other hand, it was argued that Czechoslovakism was contrary to Slovak *interests*. There is a slight, but important, difference here. What was at stake in the former case was Slovak national identity, while in the latter case, the stake were only the material interests of the Slovaks as a group.

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<sup>174</sup> (Vedeli sme a vieme veľmi dobre, že ťažko je obhajovať niečo, čo nejestvuje, čo nemá prirodzeného základu a čo je v úplnej protive so skutočnosťou. A to je práve hlavný rozdiel medzi nimi a slovenskými autonomistami). *Slovák* no. 108, 13.5.1934: 1.

<sup>175</sup> (pančechistická fikcia československého národa, aby nás Slovákov, ako národ, pozbavili jestvovania. Ba vlastne ani nie jestvovania, veď nás za národ vlastne neuznávajú, hoci máme všetky kritériá národa: svoju minulosť, svoje politické a národné prejavy, horúci cit národnej spolupatričnosti, svoju literárnu reč a čo je hlavné, máme nezlomnú vôľu byť a ostať navždy samobytným národom slovenským). Florek in the budget committee, published in *Slovák* no. 265, 23.11.1935: 1.

<sup>176</sup> (Do cesty dorozumenia zavalil fixnú ideu národnej jednoty československej. [...] slovenská mládež sa priamo stavia proti národnej jednote a českej mládeži je táto otázka jednoty úplne ľahostajnou. [...] táto fixná idea žije iba v hlavách niektorých skostnatelých politikov, nežije však v srdci a ume nastupujúcej generácie, nie je v krvi Čechov a Slovákov vôbec. [...] Česi, ktorí chcete mať tento štát pevný a schopný i biť sa za svoju existencia, odhodte od seba fixciu národnej jednoty československej, v ktorej už neveria ani jej pôvodca). Editorial, *Slovák*, no. 2, 3.1.1933: 1.

Hlinka argued along the former line, while Tiso favored the interest argument, especially in the 1930s. As early as in 1919 Hlinka, writing from his cell in the penitentiary in Mírov,<sup>177</sup> had stated categorically: "the Slovak nation is healthy. It does not want to drown in the Czech nation, because it has no reason to. Its individual features are so valuable that its mission is to revive the Czech nation, which has no ideals. The Slovaks did not yet start to live, and are already to die? They are supposed to lose their name, their character, their originality, and turn into national nonsense, into Czechoslovaks? I regard that as being out of the question."<sup>178</sup>

As we have already seen, Hlinka implied in the budget debate of 1924 that the Slovak Czechoslovakists were renegades. He had expressed similar views in 1922: "The Slovak soul is in us and with us. It is not the Slovak soul that speaks through those [Slovaks] who sit there on the government bench, but only personal interests."<sup>179</sup> In the inaugural debate of Udržal in 1929, Hlinka said that the Czechoslovakists "put power in the hands of people who were willing to realize an idea that cannot be implemented in any other way than on the grave of the Slovak nation."<sup>180</sup> Likewise, *Slovák* termed Czechoslovakism "that deadly plant, which can live, grow and flourish only on the grave of the individuality and sovereignty of the Slovak nation and its political aspirations."<sup>181</sup>

In the vocabulary of *Slovák*, Czechoslovakism was the same as Pan-Czechism. It was argued: "Czecho-Slovakism does not recognize a Slovak nation, it only recognizes a Czecho-Slovak nation, in truth a Czech; for the only role of the Slovak nation is to be poured into the Czech nation, so that it can be made into a 10-million-strong Czech nation, of which the Pan-Czechists and Hlasists dream. Czecho-Slovakism is thus meant to swallow up the Slovak people as a nation, to be the grave of the Slovak nation [...] This Czecho-Slovak nation does not exist in reality, it is only a fiction..."<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Hlinka was imprisoned upon his return from the infamous trip to the Peace conference in Paris, where he and František Jehlička, among others, presented a memorandum of the Slovaks that by Czechoslovak authorities was regarded as high treason. See also Chapter Thirteen.

<sup>178</sup> (Slovenský národ [...] je života schopný. One nechce, lebo nemá príčiny, vtopiť sa do národa českého. Individuálne vlastnosti jeho sú tak cenné, že je jeho povolaním obroditi český národ, nemajúci ideálov. Slováci ešte nezačali žiť a už majú umrieť? Majú utrať meno, ráz, svoju originalitu a obrátiť sa v národné nonsens, v čechoslovákov? To pokladám za vytvorené). *Balkanizovanie Evropy?* dated 16.10.1919 in: Andrej Hlinka: *Zápisky z Mírova* (1941: 30).

<sup>179</sup> (Duša slovenská je v nás a s námi. Tí, ktorí tam sedia na vládnych laviciach, z tých nehovorí duša slovenská, lež záujmy osobné). Hlinka, 161. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26 října 1922 (p. 210), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>180</sup> (Dali tu moc do ruky ľuďom, ktorí ochotní boli uskutočniť ideu, ktorá nedá sa previesť inak, než na hrobe slovenského národa. [...] Nie niekoľko ľudí, ale sám slovenský národ musí povedať, či chce zostať svojráznym národom...). Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 54, 55) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>181</sup> (čechoslovakizmus, táto smrtonosná bylina, ktorá sa môže živiť, rásť a kvitnúť len na hrobe samobytnosti a suverenity slovenského národa a jeho politických snáh). *Slovák* no. 92, 22.4.1934: 1.

<sup>182</sup> (Čečo-slovakizmus je popieranie národnej individuality slovenského národa! Čečo-slovakizmus nepozná národ slovenský, pozná len česko-slovenský národ, v pravde český: lebo v ňom slovenský národ má len tú rolu, aby sa vliat do národa českého, aby ho doplnil na 10 milionový národ český, o akom snívajú pan-čechisti a hlasisti! Čečo-slovakizmus má teda pohltiť slovenský ľud, ako národ, má byť hrobom slovenského národa [...] ten česko-slovenský národ v skutočnosti nejestvuje). Editorial in *Slovák* no. 224, 7.10.1927: 1.

According to *Slovák*, this Pan-Czechism lacked "moral foundation. An idea that can only be realized by fratricide, the basis of which is the robbing of a brotherly nation of its national and linguistic rights, is opposed to the fundamental moral principles of the whole world!"<sup>183</sup> Or also, "a Czechoslovak nation may only be built and consolidated in Slovakia to the detriment of the Slovak nation. [...] Consequently, in Slovakia the idea of a Czechoslovak nation means fratricide on the Czech part and betrayal of the Slovak nation on the Slovak part!"<sup>184</sup>

The latter idea seems to have been quite common, and the Slovak "traitors" were judged most harshly. Štefan Krčméry, secretary of the *Matica slovenská*, wrote in 1928: "We Slovak nationalists do not accept Pan-Czechism even as an idea, because it cannot be realized but at the expense of other Slav nations, but we may understand and excuse it in the Czechs. Indeed, in the final instance they did what they did out of a wish to augment their own Czech nation; but coming from Slovaks we definitely condemn it, for they go against the nation they descend from, and against their own mother tongue! Of that almost unbelievable view of the Slovak Pan-Czechists..."<sup>185</sup>

An unsigned article in *Slovák* in 1928 placed the Slovak Czechoslovakists in the role as useful idiots for the Czechs: "Having joined the Czecho-Slovak state voluntarily, the Slovak nation [...] never gave up its individuality and never acceded to any linguistic, cultural and national unity. The Czechs already at the time of the revolution knew what they wanted. What mattered to them was to increase the size of their Czech nation by three million Slovaks. They thus formed the concept of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. It was, however, necessary to mask this endeavor, dress it in Slovak garb, find janissaries of Slovak origin. Hlasists and Czechoslovaks associated with them are competing even today to kill and suppress the Slovak truth, and stifle the precious Slovak consciousness. [...] Among our ordinary people the false monstrosity of a Czechoslovak is totally unknown; this concept is recognized only by careerists and those climbing for governmental power."<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> (pančechistickej idey chýbe morálny podklad! Idea, ktorá sa dá previesť len bratovraždou, ktorej základom je orabovanie bratského národa o jeho národné a rečové práva: protiví sa základným zásadám morálky celého sveta!) *Slovák* no. 252, 11.11.1927: 3.

<sup>184</sup> (národ československý na Slovensko sa budovať a upevňovať nedá len na kor slovenského národa. [...] Nasledovne idea československého národa znamená na Slovensku so strane českej bratovraždu a so strany Slovákov zradu na národe slovenskom!) *Slovák* no. 154, 12.7.1929: 1.

<sup>185</sup> (My, Slovenskí nacionalisti neschvaľujeme pančechizmus ani ako ideu, lebo sa nedá uskutočniť len na úkor národného bytia druhých slovanských národov, ale vedeli by sme ho u Čechov, pochopiť a omlúviť. Veď konečne, čo robili, robili to v túžbe zveľadenia svojho vlastného českého národa; ale u Slovákov ho rozhodne zatracujeme, lebo títo stavajú sa proti svojmu vlastnému národu, z ktorého pochádzajú, proti svojej materskej reči, ktorou rozprávajú! O tomto, skoro neuveriteľnom stanovisku slovenských pančechistov). Štefan Krčméry in *Slovák* no. 71, 25.3.1928: 1.

<sup>186</sup> (Slovenský národ, pridajúc sa dobrovoľne k štátu česko-slovenskému, [...] svojej individuality sa nikdy nevzdal a nikdy nepristúpil k jednote rečovej, kultúrnej a vôbec jednote národnej. Česi už v dobe prevratovej vedeli, čo chcú. Im išlo o to, aby svoj národ český rozmnožili si o tri milióny Slovákov. Vytvorili preto pojem jednotného národa československého. Úsilie toto však bolo treba maskovať, obliecť do rúcha slovenského, najst' janičiarov pôvodom Slovákov. Hlasisti a týmto blízki čechoslováci pretekajú sa aj dnes, ako by mohli ubiť, utlačiť slovenskú pravdu, udusiť vzácne, slovenské povedomie. [...] Polovičitý netvor čechoslováka je medzi naším pospolitým ľudom úplne neznámy, tento pojem poznajú len karieristi a k vládnej moci šplhajúci sa fiškáli). *Slovák* no. 53, 4.3.1928: 3.

In *Slovák*, accusations of "careerism" and Pan-Czechism were fairly common. The Hlasists as a group were accused of Pan-Czechism, as were the most profiled Slovak politicians on the Czechoslovakist side – Šrobár, Dérer, Markovič, Štefánek, and Hodža. It was often implied that they had materialist or egotistical motives, especially Hodža. In the rather biblical language of Hlinka (in 1927): "Slovakia is ours, only we are Slovaks, you sold out the Slovak language for a bowl of Czechoslovak lentils eight years ago."<sup>187</sup> Czechoslovakist Slovaks were also attacked in religious terms as "Pharisees", "Herodes'es", and "sodomites" (the latter term was a play on words and referred to all the Social Democrats, i.e. also the Czechs).<sup>188</sup>

Direct accusations of Pan-Czechism were not especially common in the Parliament, although Juriga in a debate in 1927 did call Dérer and Hrušovský "Čechůň" (Czechist) and "pražák" (colloquial for Prague citizen, or perhaps alluding to Albert Pražák). He accused them of wanting the Slovaks to be swallowed up by the Czechs, and argued that "afterwards the unitary Czechoslovak nation would of course not be Slovak anymore, but little by little Czech."<sup>189</sup> In a budget debate in the Senate, Jozef Buday declared that "we Slovaks regard every attempt at pouring the Slovak nation into the Czech as brutal denationalization."<sup>190</sup> Likewise, Karol Sidor was "in favor of Czechoslovak *state* unity, because this is a guarantee of our national being", but against "a Czechoslovak *national* unity, which is a threat to our national development."<sup>191</sup>

#### CZECHOSLOVAKISM IS CONTRARY TO SLOVAK INTERESTS

Also the interest line of argument dates back to the early 1920s. In the Žilina Declaration of the Slovak People's Party (1922) it was argued: "by creating the 'Czechoslovak nation', *the greatest mystification of history*, they deny the existence of the Slovak nation. *By incorporating us into the Czech nation, they deprive us of the rights ensured to minorities* without granting us the same rights as the Czech people enjoy. [...] From the Czech standpoint creating the 'Czechoslovak' nation was a political scheme they invented to avoid recognizing the Slovaks' special rights. [...] In short they are cynically cheating the Slovak nation."<sup>192</sup>

<sup>187</sup> (Slovensko je naše, Slovákmi sme len my, vy ste od 8 rokov predávali slovenčinu za misu varenej šošovice československej). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 86, 16.4.1927: 1.

<sup>188</sup> See e.g. *Slovák týždenník* no. 4, 27.1.1924: 1; no. 9, 2.3.1924: 1–2; no. 13, 30.3.1924: 1; no. 20, 18.5.1924: 5–6, and *Slovák* no. 87, 20.4.1927: 1; no. 225, 8.10.1927: 3; no. 269, 3.11.1927: 1; no. 286, 21.12.1927: 1; no. 152, 10.7.1928: 1; no. 177, 8.8.1928: 3; no. 229, 9.10.1929: 1; no. 237, 18.10.1929: 3; no. 294, 29.12.1929: 3; no. 2, 3.1.1930: 2; no. 73, 29.3.1930: 4; no. 118, 24.5.1930: 1; Hlinka in: *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1933: 1, *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1933: 2; no. 2, 3.1.1933: 1; no. 3, 4.1.1933: 1; no. 6, 9.1.1934: 1; no. 258, 15.11.1934: 1; no. 279, 10.12.1935: 1.

<sup>189</sup> (a ten jednotný národ československý ovšem by potom nebol už slovenský, ale pomaličky český). Ferdiš Juriga, 91. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. června 1927 (p. 1977), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>190</sup> (I vyhlasujem, že my Slováci, každú snahu po vliatí slovenského národa do národa českého považujeme za násilné odnárodňovanie). Buday in a speech in the budget debate in the Senate, published in *Slovák* no. 284, 16.12.1934: 2.

<sup>191</sup> (Sme za čl. *štátnu* jednotu, lebo ona je garanciou nášho národného bytia, ale staviame sa proti čl. *národnej* jednote, ktorá je ohrožovateľkou nášho národného vývinu). Karol Sidor in *Slovák* no. 260, 17.11.1935: 1.

<sup>192</sup> The Žilina declaration [1922], in Mikuš (1995: 204). Emphasis in original. A Slovak version may be found under the title 'Hlas na zahynutie odsúdeného Slovenského Národa k civilizovanému svetu' in *Slovák*, December 16th 1922.

In 1929, *Slovák* argued: "the Czechs want to have [...] a unitary nation. Why? It is certainly not because Mr. Pražák, Weingart, Chaloupecký and the whole Czech bunch at the Slovak (*risum teneatis*) University of Bratislava have 'proven' it on the basis of scientific studies. Neither is it because Hušek and his likes acknowledge it [...] The Czechs need the idea of a unitary nation, as the Magyars needed 'egységes állameszme' [unitary nation-state] and the Habsburgs needed *Gesamtmonarchie* [unitary monarchy]. For the idea of a unitary nation breaks down the sovereignty of the Slovak nation, the individuality of Slovakia and the exclusive right of the Slovaks in Slovakia."<sup>193</sup>

Jozef Tiso used the interest argument most often. In the budget debate of 1934, he argued that "we will not renounce the concept of an independent, individual Slovak nation, for we would have to refute Slovak history, we would have to undermine the political basis for the Slovaks to assert themselves."<sup>194</sup> In a speech later that year, he argued that "if we gave up the existence of a Slovak nation, we would let the foundation for our just demands slip out of our hands."<sup>195</sup> Likewise, in the budget debate of 1935, he claimed that "the unity of the Czechoslovak nation as such will never be sympathetic to the Slovak nation because in that national unity it sees a threat to its social life and standard of living." And the reason was that in practice the unity of the Czechoslovak nation meant that it did not matter whether Czechs or Slovaks were hired to jobs in Slovakia, for they were one and the same, he argued.<sup>196</sup>

Tiso repeated these views in the budget debate of 1938, arguing that to give up their national individuality meant for the Slovaks "to give themselves over to the mercy of the stronger, of that our twenty years of political life has taught us enough. The fiction of a Czechoslovak nation serves neither the future of the nation nor the state. [...] We reject the fiction of a Czechoslovak nation, for not only does the Slovak nation gain nothing, it also makes unacceptable sacrifices for that concept. [...] The concept of a Czechoslovak nation certainly serves to strengthen the position of the Czech nation", but not of the Slovak nation, he asserted.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Česi chcú mať národ [...] jednotný. Prečo? No iste nie preto, lebo pán Pražák, Weingart, Chaloupecký a celý český sbor slovenskej (*risum teneatis*) univerzity bratislavskej na základe vedeckých štúdií tak tak "dokázali." Ani nie preto, že pán Hušek so seberovnými to tak "vyznáva" [...] Česi potrebujú ideu jednotného národa, ako potrebovali Maďari "egységes állameszme" a ako potrebovali Habsburgovia *Gesamtmonarchie*. Lebo na idey jednotného národa láme sa suverenita slovenského národa, osobitosť Slovenska a výlučné právo Slovákov na Slovensku). *Slovák* no. 238, 19.10.1929: 3.

<sup>194</sup> (My sa pojmu samostatného, samobytného národa slovenského nezriekame, lebo by sme museli poprieť históriu slovenskú, museli by sme vytiahnuť zpod svojej politiky základnú praktickú sa uplatňovania Slovákov). Tiso, 301. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1933 (p. 53), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>195</sup> (Keby sme sa vzdali existencie slovenského národa, vypustili by sme si z rúk podklad svojich spravdivých požiadaviek). Jozef Tiso reported in *Slovák* no. 49, 1.3.1934: 1.

<sup>196</sup> (jednota čsl. národa ako taká slovenskému národu nikdy nebude sympatická preto, lebo v tejto jednotke vidí ohrozenie svojho sociálneho života a svojej životnej úrovne). Tiso, 349. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1934 (p. 60), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>197</sup> (vzdat' sa na milosť a nemilosť silnejšiemu, o čom nás náš dvacaťročný politický život dostatočne poučuje. Fixcia česko-slovenského národa neposlúží ani budúcnosti národa, ani štátu). (odmietame fixciu československého národa, lebo z tohoto pojmu národ slovenský nielen že nič nemá, ba tomuto pojmu nesmierne obeti prináša). (Pojem československého národa iste že sa hodí k tomu, aby sa posilňovala pozícia národa českého) Tiso, 117. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1937 (pp. 45, 46), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

On the contrary, Tiso argued, the trouble they still had implementing Slovak as a state language showed that the Slovak nation had no advantages from the concept; moreover, the nation made "bloody sacrifices" for it, in terms of power and especially economically. In this perspective, Czechoslovakism was unacceptable, not least because it allowed the Czechs to occupy jobs the Slovaks should have. It is no coincidence that this interest argumentation was heard most during the economic crisis of the 1930s: This was when young Slovak generation in particular had trouble getting jobs, as we shall see in Chapter Twelve.

### STRENGTH THROUGH CZECHOSLOVAK UNITY

The strength-through-unity argument was the Czechoslovak counterpart to the autonomist arguments above. The general idea was that Czechoslovak unity was not a threat, but rather the salvation of both the Czechs and the Slovaks – especially the Slovaks: "The condition of our national freedom and Czechoslovak independence is Czechoslovak unity. And the Slovaks would actually have lost everything without the Czechs", Edvard Beneš argued in 1923.<sup>198</sup> This line of argument naturally applied both to the Czechoslovak nation and the Czechoslovak nation-state, and was thus used against the existence of a Slovak nation as well as against autonomy. I will return to the latter side of this in Chapter Thirteen.

The argument had an emotional version, and a more instrumentalist version. Štefánek's formulation was of the former kind: In 1923 he argued that "the Slovaks will perish under the Magyar yoke if we do not join the Czechs as one whole."<sup>199</sup> He admitted that it was the fear of drowning in a Magyar sea that had made him look for help in Czechoslovak unity before and during the war. Had it not been for the active Czechoslovak propaganda of the Hlasists and the Masaryk circle, the Slovaks would never have received such help from the Czechs, Štefánek claimed. "The Czechoslovak national idea saved the Slovaks from death, the Czechoslovak national idea opened the gates to the world for us."<sup>200</sup> Likewise, Igor Hrušovský argued that the Czechs had liberated the Slovaks in the 12th hour, and that in two or three more generations, there would have been no Slovaks left.<sup>201</sup>

Dérér argued: "The strength of the Czechs against the German assault is greater and more robust when they lean against the whole Czechoslovak nation, likewise the strength of the Slovaks against the Magyar aspirations is much greater when it can be supported by the Czechoslovak whole. [...] We are for Czechoslovak national unity, because only that renders possible a national and state formation strong enough to ensure the opportunity of full deve-

<sup>198</sup> (podmínkou naší národní svobody a československé samostatnosti je československá jednota. A Slováci vůbec bez Čechů by ztratili všecko). Beneš: *Smysl československé revoluce* (1923: 72). See also p. 36, and Beneš (1929b: 46).

<sup>199</sup> (Slováci hynú a zhnú pod jarmom maďarským, ak nespoja sa s Čechmi v jeden celok). Štefánek, *Československo a autonómia* [1923] in: Chmel (1997: 69).

<sup>200</sup> (Československá národná myšlienka ochránila Slovákov od smrti, československá národná myšlienka ortvára nám brány do sveta!) Štefánek, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. prosince 1929 (p. 62) in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy...*

<sup>201</sup> Hrušovský, 88. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1921 (p. 148). See also 162. schůze ... dne 26. října 1922 (p. 315), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy...*

lopment for both parts of the nation."<sup>202</sup> Since the state was founded on the idea of Czechoslovak unity, to undermine that idea was in his view to undermine the state, and thus to work for "the interests of our national enemies", the Germans and Magyars. He emphasized that the Slovaks had only been free in state unity with the Czechs – in Great Moravia and in the Czechoslovak state – and that the Slovaks had been liberated thanks to Czechoslovak unity.<sup>203</sup>

The idea that the Czechs had saved the Slovaks was quite common. After the election in 1925, Karel Kramář argued that it was important for every Slovak to be aware that "the Czech nation went to Slovakia in order to liberate a branch of its nation, [...] in order to strengthen that branch, so we together could form one strong Czechoslovak nation." Yet, he admitted that there was "some egoism in it when we said: After all, there are not 6 million of us, but 8 or 9 million with the Slovaks. We never wanted you to be separated from us, for we knew that if we are to be separated, that will be your and our death." At a time when German newspapers abroad were writing that in Czechoslovakia, a minority of 6 million was ruling a majority of 7 million just "because you regard yourselves as a separate and oppressed nation, then I must say that you thereby harm the independence of our nation", Kramář said.<sup>204</sup>

In the 1930s Czechoslovak unity was regarded as even more necessary because of the international situation. In 1934 and again in 1935, Beneš argued that the "development of Europe" required that the Czechoslovaks "destroy their destructive particularism and finally form full national unity." He based this view partly on the general European development towards larger units, partly on the need to be stronger in face of the enemy. The Slovaks had only one choice in their numerical smallness, he argued: "to stand before Europe together with the Czechs as a big nation, and thus protect not only their cultural and moral, but also their numerical material strength forever." In 1936 he argued that when the Czechoslovaks reached 15 million in thirty to forty years, the fear of a 60-70 million strong German nation would disappear, for a nation of 15 million could not be denationalized. This was combined with a strong emphasis on the necessity of national unity in the face of fascism.<sup>205</sup> According to this mode of thought, to discredit the Czechoslovak idea was to undermine the Czechoslovak state.

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<sup>202</sup> (Sila Čechov voči nemeckému náporu je väčšia a odolnejšia, keď sa opiera na celý československý národ, a podobne sila Slovákov proti maďarským aspiráciám je nepomerne väčšia, keď sa ona opierať môže o celok československý). (My sme za československú národnú jednotu, lebo [...] len táto umožní taký silný národný a štátny útvar, ktorý trvale zabezpečí obom vrstvám národa možnosť plného rozvoja). Déřer, Prečo sme proti autonómii? [1934] in: Chmel (1997: 179, 181).

<sup>203</sup> (práca pre záujmy našich národných nepriateľov). Déřer: *Československá otázka* (1935: 7–8, 107).

<sup>204</sup> (český národ šel na Slovensko jenom proto, aby osvobodil větev svého národa, aby tato větev jeho národa sílila a mohutněla, abychom společně tvořili jeden silný československý národ). (V tom bylo trochu egoismu, když jsme říkali: Vždyť nás není 6 miliónů, vždyť nás je 8 až 9 miliónů se Slováky. My nikdy nechťeli, abyste byli od nás odloučení, poněvadž jsme věděli, že je to vaše a naše smrt, když budeme odloučeni). (poněvadž vy se počítáte za zvláštní a utiskovaný národ, tedy musím říci, že tím poškozujete tu samostatnost a neodvislost našeho národa). Kramář, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 19. prosince 1925 (p. 140), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>205</sup> (vývoj Evropy od nich žiada, aby zničili svoj záhubný partikularizmus a vytvorili konečne svoju plnú národnú jednotu) (aby v svojej početnej malosti spoločne s Čechmi pred Európou stali sa národom veľikým a zabránili tak na veky nielen svojou silou kultúrnou a mravnou, ale i početnou silou materiálnou). Beneš (1934: 41, 43, 59). See also Beneš (1935: 15, 17) and Beneš (1936: 223, 225).



This was quite explicitly voiced by the National Democrat Jaromír Špaček in 1933: "Anyone who insults the Czechs in Slovakia, who spreads the insensible and uncultured idea of the total dissimilarity of the two branches of our nation, is committing treason in the true sense of the word, not only to this state, but also to his own Slovak nation." He regarded "our Slovak branch as a part of our unitary nation", and views to the contrary as Magyar propaganda.<sup>206</sup>

### THE MAGYARONE CARD

Accusations of Magyar influence and clericalism were closely linked to the strength-through-unity argument. Among the scholars, Pražák was most consistent in blaming the Magyars for everything. When Slovak nationalism started to turn against the Czechs after 1918, he argued, "this was possible because there were only a few hundred educated Slovaks before the upheaval, and after the upheaval tens of thousands of educated people declared themselves as Slovaks. These had nothing to do with the Slovak past and had only one thing in common with the Slovaks – that they knew or learned Slovak. These post-war Slovaks led Slovakia into a particular psychosis, that it would be safe and happy only under autonomism, in the negation of Czechoslovakism, in opposition to all ideas that have tied the Slovaks together over the centuries and that also liberated them during the great war."<sup>207</sup>

Chaloupecký cited Magyar influence as being at least part of the reason why fears of Czechization had been expressed in Slovakia from the very beginning: "This was the result of a national division which had lasted for almost three quarters of a century, but seemingly also of the Magyar whispers that the Slovaks would lose their individuality and perish in a state whole with the linguistically too close Czechs and Moravians." Both Pražák and Chaloupecký made Tuka responsible for spreading the Magyar propaganda in Slovakia right after the war. Chaloupecký wrote that "As a national convert [Tuka] soon gained an influential position in Hlinka's People's Party, yet [...] remained in the service of the Magyar irredenta."<sup>208</sup> It is true that Tuka was a Magyarone, but I find the claims of his great influence a little harder to believe. For one thing, his autonomy proposal was refused (see Chapter Thirteen).

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<sup>206</sup> (Každý, kdo Čechům na Slovensku nadává, kdo rozšiřuje tuto nesmyslnou a nekulturní myšlenku naprosté odlišnosti obou větví našeho národa, dopouští se v pravém slova smyslu velezrady nejenom na tomto státě, nýbrž na vlastním slovenském národě). (své slovenské větvi [...] pokládáme za součást našeho jednotného národa). Špaček, 302. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. listopadu 1933 (p. 24), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>207</sup> (Bylo to možné tím, že předvratových vzdělaných Slováků bylo již jen několik set a po převratě se k Slovákům hlásily desetitisíce vzdělanců, kteří se slovenskou minulostí nesouviseli a měli se Slováky jen jediný společný znak, že uměli nebo se naučili slovensky. Tito říjnoví a pořijnoví Slováci uvedli Slovensko do zvláštní psychosy, že bude bezpečno a šťastno jen v autonomismu, v negaci čechoslovakismu, v odporu vůči všem idejím, jež Slováky staletí svazoval a jež je i za velké války osvobodily). Pražák (1929a: 182–83).

<sup>208</sup> (Byly to důsledky skoro tři čtvrtě století trvajících národních rozkolů, ale, jak se zdá, i maďarského našeptávání, že Slováci v státním celku s jazykově s nimi příliš příbuznými Čechy a Moravany ztratí svůj svojráz a zaniknou). (Béla Tuka, jenž jako národní konvertita záhy získal si velmi vlivnou posici v Hlinkově straně lidově, jenž však [...] zůstal při tom v službách maďarské irredenty). Chaloupecký: *Martinská deklarace a její politické osudy* (1928: 14, 18). In *Zápas o Slovensko* (1930: 54) "ale, jak se zdá, i" is substituted with "a také", which means that he expresses greater certainty of the Magyar influence here. See also Albert Pražák: *Maďarská propaganda proti Československu* (1929b: 8, 9, 23).

Šrobár quite explicitly presented the autonomists as a bunch of Magyarones in an article from 1927, where he distinguished between two strong currents in Slovakia after 1918: "The current of the former Hlasists, who took upon themselves the duty of *forming the state*, and the current of the new Slovaks, who work fervently to *form a Slovak nation*. That is the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists. [...] The population census of 1919 showed that half a million more people in Slovakia declared Slovak nationality than before the upheaval. Those are our new Slovaks, whom we call Octobrists. Among them are certainly plenty of people who are delighted with their Slovak awakening and who are attached to their newfound nation. They are proud of *their new Slovak belief*, which makes them immensely aggressive and naturally – fanatics of the new faith. This movement mostly took roots among Catholic clergy [...] and who thinks differently is thus a heretic, a renegade of the new faith. [...] On the basis of a foreign Magyar culture [...] they build a Slovak superstructure and therefore it is not sufficiently solid and harmonic. They think Magyar and speak Slovak," he asserted. In Šrobár's view this movement would thus not last, because it was a political movement, rather than a national one. The parallel to Hodža's argument about Štúr's "*politicum Hungarum*" is striking.<sup>209</sup>

Of the government politicians, Ivan Déřer was most persistent in his use of the Magyarone card. In 1933, he interpreted Slovak history between 1867 and 1914 as a struggle between a large, powerful group of Slovak renegades and a small group of Slovak nationalists (*národovci*). This struggle was still going on: "The former pre-war Slovak nationalists today form the core of the Slovaks holding the Czechoslovak view. The majority of the leading Slovaks holding the autonomist and separatist view are recruited among former renegades. Also some pre-war Slovaks joined them." It was only thanks to the latter that the autonomists had adapted at least to Czechoslovak state interests, Déřer argued. He also claimed that the pre-war Czechoslovak Hlinka had turned into a rigid autonomist because of the influence of the Magyarones Jehlička and Tuka. In Déřer's view, the historical task of the young generation was to "remove everything Hungaro-renegade from the Slovak national body."<sup>210</sup>

In 1938 Déřer still wrote of "the dark forces of the former pro-Magyars (or Magyarones). [...] It is a historical fact that in the early years after the revolution Slovakia was overrun with such people who thus poisoned the atmosphere there." Moreover, he argued, although the Magyarones mended their ways and "discarded their former Hungarian orientation, relics of

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<sup>209</sup> (smer bývalých hlasistov, ktorí stali si do služby *tvoriť štát*, a smer novoslovákov, ktorí horlive pracujú *na tvorbe slovenského národa*. To sú Čechoslováci a autonomisti. [...] Popis ľudu z r. 1919 ukázal, že na území Slovenska prihlásilo sa k slovenskej národnosti o pol miliona ľudí viac, ako bolo tam pred prevratom. To sú naši Novoslováci, ktorých sme nazývali októbristami. Medzi nimi je iste hojne ľudí i takých, ktorí majú radosť zo svojho prebudenia slovenského a ktorí s láskou lnú k svojmu novonajdenému národu. *Ich nová slovenská viera*, na ktorú sú hrdí, činí ich nesmierne výbojnými a prirodzene – fanatikmi novej viery. Hnutia tohoto ujali sa poväčšine katolíckí kňazi a [...] kto ináč verí, je kačír, zradca novej viery. [...] Na podklade *cudzej* maďarskej kultúry [...] stavia nadstavbu slovenskú a preto nie dosť solídnu a harmonickú. Myslí maďarsky a hovorí slovensky). Šrobár: *Československá otázka a "hlasisti"* (1927: 5–6). Emphasis in original.

<sup>210</sup> (Jadro československy smýšľajúcich Slovákov tvoria dnes bývalí predvojnoví slovenskí národovci. Väčšina autonomisticky a separatisticky smýšľajúcich vedúcich Slovákov regrutuje sa z bývalých renegátov. K nim sa pridali i jednotliví predvojnoví slovenskí pracovníci). (odstrániť všetko hungaristicko-renegátske z národného tela slovenského). Ivan Déřer: *Československá otázka* (1935: 16, 17, 293). See also Anton Štefánek: *Československo a autonómia* in: Chmel (1997: 71).

this orientation are still to be observed in them when they are so anxious that the Slovaks should separate themselves nationally from the Czechs." Even after the First Republic was history, Dérier accused the autonomists of being renegades.<sup>211</sup>

### THE CONTINUITY ARGUMENT

A third common line of argument on the Czechoslovakist side was to invoke the awakeners and the pre-war national movement in order to show continuity with the past. The aim was to show that the Czechoslovak nation was not a fiction, and that there was nothing to be ashamed of. Also the Slovak autonomists sometimes invoked the awakeners, but their main defense against allegations that they were Magyarones (or Czechoslovaks) was to point out the continuity with their own past. This was, for example, the dominant strategy used by Hlinka.

As mentioned, the interpretation of history was not a central part of the political debate – with one major exception: Igor Hrušovský's speech in the debate of the regional reform in 1927. All the familiar elements are there: From Great Moravia as the first Czechoslovak state, to the codification of Slovak as a linguistic schism and a result of political influences. A main point was that the awakeners as well as the leadership in the Slovak People's Party had subscribed to Czechoslovak national unity also after the linguistic schism. Two declarations, the Manifesto of the Slovak National Council (1848), and the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918, were quoted as proof. Hrušovský argued along similar lines in several other debates as well.<sup>212</sup>

The favorite quotation on the Czechoslovakist side was a sentence from the 1848 Manifesto of the Slovak National Council, co-signed by Štúr, Hurban and Hodža: "We are one nation, you the sons of Bohemia and Moravia and you from under the Tatras. One language resounds in those regions." In a polemic with Juriga, Markovič argued that this showed that "we were not the first to voice Czechoslovak national unity", and suggested that Juriga should read it and afterwards try to "refute the truth."<sup>213</sup> In the budget debate of 1930, Markovič used the same quotation (albeit with slightly different wording) to defend his honor as a Czechoslovak: "We are one nation, you sons of Bohemia, you from neighboring Moravia and you Slovak sons from the banks of Váh, Hron and Danube. One language resounds over those regions." He concluded that "if those words, those principles were not shameful for Štúr, Hodža and Hurban, also we may proudly declare that we are Czechoslovak parties."<sup>214</sup>

<sup>211</sup> Dérier (1938: 34–35). See also Dérier: *Slovenský vývoj a ľudská zrada* (1946: 95, 108–10, 114–15, 235, 236).

<sup>212</sup> Hrušovský, 92. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. června 1927 (pp. 2027–34). See also 88. schůze ... dne 20. října 1921 (p. 148), 162. schůze ... dne 26. října 1922 (p. 316), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>213</sup> (nie my sme to boli, ktorí sme prví hlásali národnú jednotu československú). ("Jeden národ sme my, vy, synovia Čechov a Moravy a vy z pod Tatier, jedna reč sa v týchto krajinách ozýva"). (podvracia, čo je pravdou). Markovič, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 209), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>214</sup> ("Jeden národ sme my, vy tam, synovia Českej zeme, vy so susednej Moravy a vy slovenskí synovia, od brehu Váhu, Hrona a Dunaja. Jedna reč sa po týchto krajinách ozýva." Jestli takéto slová, tieto zásady neboly zahanbujúcimi pre Štúra, Hodžu a Hurbana, tedy i my hrde môžeme hlásiť, že sme československými stranami). Markovič, 20. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. února 1930 (p. 65), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*... Hrušovský used the same quotation in 1927.

In the budget debate of 1938, Markovič reacted to Tiso's claim that the Czechoslovak nation was a fiction, by repeating the quotation in the exact same words. In addition he quoted the Kiev Declaration written by Milan Rastislav Štefánik: "The Czechs and Slovaks, being aware that they are closely related in terms of life interests, culture and especially in blood, want to develop into a unitary, politically indivisible and free nation." According to Markovič, "the Czechoslovak national unity is thus no post-revolutionary fiction, as Tiso wanted to demonstrate", but belonged to "our ancient cultural, political and revolutionary traditions." He added that he was not surprised that Tiso had made such allegations, "for the pre-Revolutionary past of Slovakia is foreign to him."<sup>215</sup> Markovič thus insinuated that Tiso was a Magyarone.

The quotation also appeared in Markovič's article in R.W. Seton-Watson's *Slovakia then and now* (1931). Here he added a favorite quotation from the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918: "The Slovak nation is a part of the Czechoslovak nation, both in language and in culture and history." Between these two declarations of Czechoslovak unity, Markovič added, "lie seventy years of tragic [cultural] separation. [...] – We sought and received compensation in the culture of the Magyars instead of the Czechs. Thus we arrive at the canker eating into the very roots of the Slovak tree, namely moral and linguistic Magyarization."<sup>216</sup>

Hlinka's defense against the allegations that he was a Czechoslovak before the war was to insist that he was a Slovak. In the Udržal government inaugural debate in 1929, Hlinka confronted the "former Slovaks, today Czechoslovaks", stating that it had never occurred to him to doubt his Slovak origin or regard himself as a member of a Czechoslovak nation: "I have seen the smallness of my Slovak nation, [...] but it has never occurred to me to say that I am Czech and stop being Slovak, just because the Slovaks are poor and small. [...] We stood up as Slovaks before the war, during the war and still after the war. We never denied being the sons of the great mother Slavia; we acknowledged the great Slav linden-tree, but we never gave up our individuality, our Slovak originality. Until after the upheaval, when young Slovaks came to the fore, and started to speak in a wholly different tone, started to voice entirely other ideas, started to speak thus: There is no Slovak nation. We are a Czechoslovak nation."<sup>217</sup> This was at the same time a polemic against the strength-through-unity argument.

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<sup>215</sup> ("Česi a Slováci, súc si vedomí, že sú úzkospjatí navzájom ako životnými záujmami, tak i kultúrou a menovite krvnými sväzkami, prajú si vyvinúť sa v jednotný, politicky nedielný a slobodný národ." Československá národná jednota nie je tedy žiadnou popredratovou fixciou, ako chcel dokazovať p. posl. Tiso). (ponevác predprevratová minulosť Slovenska je jemu cudzou). (v našej dávnej kultúrnej a politickej i revolúčnej tradícii). Markovič, 122. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 4. prosince 1937 (p. 10), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>216</sup> Ivan Markovič: The Cooperation of Slovaks and Czechs in War and Revolution, in R.W. Seton-Watson: *Slovakia then and now* (1931: 92–93).

<sup>217</sup> (bývalých Slovákov, dnes Českoslovákov). (nikdy ma nenapadlo, aby som pochyboval o svojom slovenskom pôvode, aby som sa pokladal za člena československého národa). (videl som maličkosť svojho slovenského národa [...] ale nikdy mi nenapadlo, aby som povedal, že som Čechom a prestal som byť Slovákom za to, že sú Slováci chudobní a malí. [...]) My pred vojnou, počas vojny i pri prevrate stále vystupovali sme ako Slováci. My sme nikdy popreli, že sme synovia veľkej matky Slávie; my priznávali sme sa k veľkej lipe slavjanskej, ale svoju individuálnosť, svoju slovenskú originalnosť sme nikdy popreli. Až po prevrate, keď prišli k veslu mladí Slováci, začali hovoriť celkom inú pieseň, začali celkom iné ideje hlásať, začali hovoriť takto: Slovenského národa niet. My sme československý národ). Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1929 (p. 54, 55) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

Likewise, in 1934 Jozef Buday claimed the unbroken heritage of Slovak nationalism: "We Slovak nationalists have not changed in any way. What our Slovak forefathers pleaded, what they struggled for, we also plead and struggle for. They fought for the preservation and recognition of the Slovak nation, we are doing the same. They strove in all imaginable ways to endorse the use of Slovak in the civil service, in the schools and in public life, we are doing the same. They fought for a Slovak region (*Okolie*), we also demand Slovak autonomy."<sup>218</sup>

#### WHO ARE THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVES?

In the Parliament, mutual accusations between the two sides were also part of a contest between Slovak politicians as to who had the right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation. In the first election period, the Ľudáks used the *purity* argument: Only those who acknowledged the existence of a Slovak nation had the right to speak on behalf of it. The Czechoslovakists used the *democracy* argument and the Magyarone card against them.

As we have seen, the budget debate of 1924 provided examples of both. Malík hinted that Magyar interests were behind the "false thesis" that the Slovaks were a separate nation. When Gažík argued that almost half a million had voted for a party representing the Slovak nation (in the *župa* elections), he was interrupted by claims that some of those voters were Magyars or Magyarones. Hrušovský also pointed out that the Ľudáks only represented a minority (in the Parliament). The latter argument went back to the election of 1920, when Markovič argued that 75 percent of the Slovak voters confirmed the program of Czechoslovak national and state unity. The Ľudák countermove was to argue that the election had not been free because of the censorship, and that a great many Czech soldiers and civil servants had voted in Slovakia.<sup>219</sup>

In the Černý government inaugural debate in 1920, Hlinka claimed that the centralists had forgotten that they represented the Slovak nation, for the sake of personal gain. Hodža retorted that Hlinka had no right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation. Gažík answered that "only the People's Party recognize the Slovak nation. Neither the Agrarians nor the socialists recognize it, but declare it as some sort of 'branch'. (*Voice* [in Czech]: *Why did you not recognize the Slovak nation before the war?*) If you take a look at the entries in the prosecutor's office in Trenčín, you will discover that I was in the criminal record for the nation in 1914!", Gažík replied, thus invoking his past in order to defend himself.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>218</sup> (my slovenskí nacionalisti sme sa v ničom nezmenili. Čo hlásali naši slovenskí otcovia, o čo usilovali oni, to hlásame, o to usilujeme aj my. Oni sa borili za udržanie a uznanie slovenského národa, to robíme aj my. Oni všemožne sa pričiňovali, aby slovenčina sa uplatnila v úradoch, v školách a vo verejnom živote, to robili aj my. Oni bojovali za slovenské Okolie, slovenskú autonómiu žiadame i my). Buday in the 1934 budget debate, reported in *Slovák* no. 285, 18.2.1934: 2.

<sup>219</sup> (programom československej národnej a štátnej jednoty). Markovič, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 208, 209), Juriga, 5. schůze ... dne 10. června 1920 (p. 176) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>220</sup> (slovenský národ vyznáva jedine ľudová strana a neuznávajú ho ani agrári, ani socialisti, ale vyhlasujú ho za akúsi "vetev." (*Hlas: Proč jste před převratem neuznávali slovenský národ?*) Pozrite sa do zápisu trenčianskeho zastupiteľstva, presvedčíte sa, že r. 1914 som bol v kriminále za národ!). Hlinka and Hodža, 18. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 209, 216), Gažík, 21. schůze ... dne 12. listopadu 1920 (p. 328), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

In the budget debate a few weeks later, there was a new exchange. Arnold Bobok argued that the Slovaks were a nation, and emphasized the need to defend the integrity of the "juridical personality of the Slovak nation." Dérer said that the Ľudáks were arguing as if they and the Slovak nation were identical, but in reality "the Slovak People's Party represent only 22 percent of the Slovak nation."<sup>221</sup> The Agrarian Pavol Blaho asked the Ľudáks to acknowledge that the Agrarians and the Socialists were "at least as good Slovaks as you. (*Juriga: They are Czechoslovaks, we are pure Slovaks!*) [...] As long as the People's Party does not de-Magyarize the Magyar elements (*Voices: Why, we are Slovaks!*) who stick to you (*Protests*). You do not even know Slovak correctly (*Voice: But we are Slovaks!*) Please, I am speaking. When you remove those elements from your party (*Voice: and we give them to you!*) – we do not want them – after that, things will be totally different."<sup>222</sup>

In 1922, the National Socialist Jan Slavíček argued: "The Slovaks are one nation with us. [Protests from the Ľudáks] You are not the whole Slovak nation, you are not all Slovaks! [More protests] You are only a part of the Slovaks, the Magyarone oriented part [Protests] (*We are the Slovak People's Party!*) Yes, you are the Slovak People's Party and not Slovaks."<sup>223</sup>

In an exchange with Hrušovský the day after, Hlinka said: "Our viewpoint is purely Slovak. We were able to defend the Slovak nation against the Magyars during the long years of subjugation [...] here I promise you that we will defend the Slovak nation also against you."<sup>224</sup> Hrušovský called the comparison with old Hungary a "menace" to the Czechs, and again disputed the Ľudáks' right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation, arguing that they probably represented less than 20 percent. Morally they had no right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation, since all their actions were directed towards its annihilation, he argued.<sup>225</sup>

After the election in 1925, it was the Ľudáks' turn to use the democracy argument. Hlinka argued that the claims of the Slovak Czechoslovakists that the Ľudáks had no right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation were now refuted. "I speak here as the only representative of the Slovak nation. On November 15th, the Slovak nation proved my program and proceedings right. 61.2 percent of the Slovaks voted for the Slovak People's Party, 498,000 pure Slovak

<sup>221</sup> (integritu právneho osobníctva slovenského národa). (slovenská ľudová strana zastupuje len 22 % slovenského národa). Bobok and Dérer, 25. schůze ... dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 442, 466), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>222</sup> (alespoň tak dobrými Slovákmi ako Vy. (*Posl. dr. Juriga: To sú Čechoslováci, my sme čistými Slovákmi!*) [...] Dokiaľ ľudová strana neodmaďarští tie maďarské elementy (*Hlasy: Ved' sme Slováci!*) ktoré sa na Vás lepia (*Odpor*). Ani poriadne slovensky neznáte (*Hlas: Ale jsme Slováci!*) prosím, ja hovorím, keď tie elementy odstránite zo svojej strany (*Hlas: a dáme je Vám!*) – my ich nechceme – potom to bude docela inak u nás vypadat'). Blaho, 26. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1920 (p. 554–55), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>223</sup> (Slováci jsou s nám jeden národ. [...] Pánové, vy nejste celý národ slovenský, vy nejste všichni Slováci! [...] Vy jste jenom částí Slováků, částí orientovanou maďaronsky. [...] (*My sme slovenská ľudová strana!*) Ano, vy jste slovenská ľudová strana a nikoli Slováci). Slavíček, 160. schůze ... dne 25. října 1922 (p. 71–72), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>224</sup> (Naše stanovisko je čiste slovenské. My sme vedeli slovenský národ brániť počas dlhoročné poroby proti Maďarom, [...] tu vám sľubujeme, že budeme slovenský národ i proti vám brániť). Hlinka, 161. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. října 1922 (p. 210), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>225</sup> Hrušovský, 162. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. října 1922 (p. 317, 320), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

voters went with clean conscience to the ballots and judged those men who declared Czechoslovak nationality. And therefore it is not Hlinka the individual or even those 23 deputies who speak here today, but the Slovak nation", he said. (Ján Kovalík used the same percentage and the same argument in the Senate).<sup>226</sup> Tiso went further and argued that, from the viewpoint of the Slovak nation, the fact that 78 percent had voted autonomist showed that the individual Slovak nation wanted a homeland of its own within the Czechoslovak republic.<sup>227</sup>

While Tiso must have counted not only those who voted for Slovak parties but also people who voted for other autonomist parties in order to arrive at 78 percent autonomist voices, Hlinka counted only the votes of his own party, but the percentage was still too high. The Slovak People's Party did not get more than 52.1 percent of the votes cast for Czechoslovak parties in Slovakia, even if we keep the Communists out of it (this was common at the time – cf. Table 2). Hlinka must have subtracted the Czech votes in Slovakia to get 61.2 percent.

The reaction from the Czechoslovakist side was the usual one: The Agrarian Ján Halla claimed that there had been few nationally thinking Slovaks in 1918 and that part of the "intelligentsia and half-intelligentsia who did not feel with the nation" had found a platform in the Slovak People's Party, where they "stuck to the good name of Hlinka."<sup>228</sup> Likewise, his colleague Samuel Zoch quoted Hlinka's statement at his own trial in 1906: "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, it remains an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one race, one culture, one nation with the Czechs." This resulted in massive outbursts from the *ľudáks*.<sup>229</sup>

After the election in 1929, Hlinka presented the Slovak People's Party as the only Slovak party, and argued that despite the difficult times, 403,000 self-aware Slovaks had voted for the party and had sent 18 deputies to defend the individuality of the Slovak nation. In 1932 he repeated this, reminding the Parliament that he had been jailed by Hungary for the sake of the nation. "We were never Magyarones, we were never irredentists, we were always Slavs and beside that we were Slovaks", Hlinka said, assuring everyone that "my hair is falling out, my cheeks are becoming haggard, my complexion is fading, but my heart is as Slovak as ever!"<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> (hovorím tu ako jediný reprezentant slovenského národa. Slovenský národ 15. novembra môjmu programu a pokračovaniu dal za pravdu. 61,2 % Slovákov hlasovalo na slovenskú ľudovú stranu, 498.000 čistých slovenských voličov išlo s čistým svedomím pred urny a odsúdilo tých pánov, ktorí sa hlásili k národnosti československej a preto, pánovia, tuná nebude hovoriť dnes jednotlivec Hlinka, ani týchto 23 mužov, ale bude hovoriť slovenský národ). Hlinka, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 174). See also Senator Ján Kovalík, 5. schůze senátu N.S.R.Č. dne 19. prosince 1925 (p. 69), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>227</sup> Tiso, 3. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1925 (p. 78), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>228</sup> (inteligencie a polointeligencie, ktorá necítila s národom). (nalepili sa na skvele meno Hlinkovo). Halla, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 198) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>229</sup> (Či sa naším maďarským bratom páči a či nepáči, predsa zostane večnou pravdou, že my Slováci sme s Čechmi jedno plemä, jedna osвета, jeden národ). Hlinka (1906), quoted by Zoch, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 232) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>230</sup> (Áno, vlasy mi vypadaly, moje lice vyziably, moja plet' vyšedla, ale moje srdce je tak slovenské aké bolo!) (My sme nikdy maďaronmi neboli, my sme nikdy irredentistami neboli, my sme boli vždycky Slavjanmi a boli sme pritom Slovákmí). Hlinka, 213. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 4. listopadu 1932 (p. 17, 20, 23), Hlinka, 4. schůze ... dne 18. prosince 1929 (53–54), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

Štefánek replied that the Ľudáks got only "28.3 percent of the Slovak vote", and that even with the addition of the Slovak National Party they did not get more than 30 percent of the vote in Slovakia. (These figures included all voters in Slovakia, regardless of nationality.) Moreover, even in comparison with the other Czechoslovak parties, the Ľudáks got only 40.8 percent, against 59.2 for the non-Ľudáks. This showed that Hlinka suffered from megalomania in claiming to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation, Štefánek argued.<sup>231</sup> Hrušovský added that Hlinka could speak "only on behalf of those Slovaks, the minority of the Slovaks who elected the deputies of the Slovak People's Party." He claimed that the Ľudáks were 17 (they were in fact 18), while the deputies of the Czechoslovak parties were 21 (this included Rázus). He also found it distasteful that Hlinka always placed himself "on the pedestal of a martyr."<sup>232</sup>

In the 1930s both sides claimed to be the majority. In the budget debate of 1934, Tiso used "advanced math" to prove that he had the right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation. From the 560,320 votes cast for the centralists, Tiso subtracted 100,000 Czech votes and 60,000 Magyar votes, and ended up with 402,320 votes for the centralist parties and 427,443 votes for the autonomist parties (including the votes of the Slovak National Party). Then he compared the votes cast for the government parties with the votes cast for the opposition (including the Magyar and Communist parties), and concluded that the government parties were in minority. As a majority, the autonomists had the right to speak on behalf of the Slovak nation, Tiso argued. To this the Agrarian Juraj Slávik replied caustically: "You speak in the name of the Communists and the opposition Magyars. Congratulations!"<sup>233</sup> Finally, in the 1935 budget debate Viktor Ravasz maintained that the Ľudáks must speak in the name of all Slovaks, because the Slovak deputies were "so dispersed on the centralist Czech parties that they do not know how to defend specific Slovak needs, or they are not even allowed to."<sup>234</sup>

A Dérer specialty was the argument that "large numbers of Slovaks vote for the Hlinka party not because of its autonomist programme but rather because of its Catholic character." At the same time, he claimed that a majority voted for parties that subscribed to Czechoslovak unity; those who voted for his side, were thus convinced Czechoslovaks, while those who voted for the opposition were not convinced Slovaks. As late as in 1946, Dérer claimed that if the Ľudáks had been exclusively based on "the national and separatist idea" they would not have achieved more support than the Slovak National Party – one or two mandates at the most.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> (28,3 % slovenských hlasov). Štefánek, 214. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 8. listopadu 1932 (p. 8), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>232</sup> (na piedestal martyra). (Hlinka môže hovoriť [...] jedine menom tých Slovákov, tej menšiny Slovákov, ktorí volili poslancov slovenskej ľudovej strany). Hrušovský, 215. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1932 (p. 25), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>233</sup> (Slávik: Vy mluvíte menom komunistov a opozičných Maďarov! To vám gratulujem!). Tiso, 301. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1933 (p. 47, 48, 50), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...* Tiso used basically the same line of argument also after the election in 1935. See 5. schůze ... dne 25. června 1935 (p. 70).

<sup>234</sup> (lebo sú tak rozptýlení po centralistických českých stranách, že speciálne slovenské [...] potreby hájiť nevedia alebo ani nemôžu). Ravasz, 350. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 18), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>235</sup> Dérer (1935: 95); Dérer (1938: 12); Dérer (1946: 237).



\* \* \*

It is striking how the two sides accused each other of being renegades from the Slovak nation or the Czechoslovak nation. This argumentation was particularly common in exchanges between the Slovak autonomists and Slovak centralists. Although both sides used personal attacks (*argumentum ad hominem*), this was a more central part of the argumentation on the Czechoslovakist side. First, the Magyarone card was used to explain why the Slovaks turned away from the Czechs in the past and in the present. Second, the Magyarone card was closely associated with the instrumental strength-through-unity argument. Together, the strength-through-unity argument and the Magyarone card were most common in the debates.

While the scholarly debate mainly concerned the interpretation of history, the arguments in the political debate were often instrumental or belonged to some category of argumentation errors. *Argumentum ad hominem* was the most common of these, but also *argumentum ad verecundiam* (invoking authorities, especially awakeners), *argumentum ad populum* (invoking the support of the majority), and *argumentum ad misericordiam* (emotional appeals) were represented, as we have seen.

### ***Changing identities?***

So far I have concentrated on the struggle over national identity at elite level. In this final part, I will try to assess what support the elite had for their endeavors at the mass level, and to what extent they succeeded in convincing people that they belonged to a Czechoslovak or a Slovak nation. Today, the answer to the latter question is easy enough: In the 1991 population census, only 3,464 persons in the Czech lands and 59 persons in Slovakia defined themselves as belonging to a "Czechoslovak nationality."<sup>236</sup> In the long run, Czechoslovakism thus failed. But was Czechoslovakism a failure already in 1938? I will address this matter first, and then discuss to what extent Magyarized Slovaks were won back to the Slovak nation as a result of the identity struggle. Finally, we will see to what extent voting behavior can be used as a guide to the support of the two competing nation projects.

### ***Czechoslovakism – a failed nation project?***

Ideally, we would need panel data to be able to say anything about individual changes of identity during the First Republic. Not only are such data lacking; we cannot even assess identity changes on aggregate level, since the census reports do not distinguish between Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak nationality. Census reports either presented the Czechs and Slovaks as one nation – which was most of the time – or they separated the Czech and the Slovak branch. Information on what people actually answered has never been published. It is however likely that most people answered "Czech" or "Slovak" rather than "Czechoslovak."

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<sup>236</sup> See *Lexikón slovenských dejín* (1997: 196).

For what it is worth, *Slovák* presented the results of the 1930 population census for Ružomberok, Hlinka's hometown. According to this report, there were 11,965 Slovaks, 1,736 Czechs and 139 Czechoslovaks in Ružomberok.<sup>237</sup> Who these "Czechoslovaks" were is impossible to tell. They could be Slovaks, but they could also be Czech state employees stationed in Slovakia. Assuming that all were Slovaks and that all had "converted" after 1918, the turn-over from Slovak to Czechoslovak identity would be a little over 1 percent in ten years – which is close to a complete failure. On the other hand, Ružomberok was hardly representative of the situation in Slovakia as a whole; the Slovak People's Party got 64.4 percent of the vote in the 1929 election, or more than twice the average. In such an environment, we would hardly expect to find a large number of convinced Czechoslovaks.<sup>238</sup>

An opinion poll from 1946 contains some really interesting answers, but unfortunately, it includes only the Czech lands. As far as I am aware, no such opinion poll was ever made in Slovakia. Three of the questions in the Czech opinion poll are especially interesting from our point of view. The results are presented in the table below.

**Table 9: Czech views of Czecho-Slovak relations (percentages)**

Czech and Slovak character is			Czechs and Slovaks are			Abroad I would present myself as		
Different	The same	Don't know	Two branches of the same nation	Two nations	Don't know	Czech	Czecho-slovak	Don't know
66	17	17	65	21	14	52	45	3

Source: Za hlasem lidu. Rok výzkumu veřejného mínění v Československu, in: *Československé epištoły* no. 2/1947:17-21.

The table shows that a large majority of the respondents thought that the national character of the Czechs and the Slovaks was different. Moreover, according to the report, "the better our people knew the Slovaks, the more often they tended towards [this] opinion."<sup>239</sup> At the same time, there were almost as many who regarded the Czechs and the Slovaks as two branches of the same nation. This idea thus permeated Czech society fairly well, yet a primary Czecho-slovak personal identity was not *so* common: 52 percent stated that they would present themselves as Czechs when traveling abroad. It is impressive that as many as 45 percent of the Czechs would present themselves as Czechoslovaks when abroad, although it is probably true that "people would surely feel themselves to be Czechoslovaks more often abroad" than at home.<sup>240</sup> The big question is of course just what we can infer from this.

<sup>237</sup> *Slovák* no. 294, 31.12.1930: 6.

<sup>238</sup> *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930: 31).

<sup>239</sup> (čím lépe naši lidé poznali Slováky, tím častěji se kloní k názoru). Za hlasem lidu. Rok výzkumu veřejného mínění v Československu, in: *Československé epištoły* no. 2/1947: 20.

<sup>240</sup> (V cizině by se zajisté lidé cítili Českoslováky častěji). Za hlasem lidu. Rok výzkumu veřejného mínění v Československu, in: *Československé epištoły* no. 2/1947: 21.

First, we cannot infer that it was a result of agitation during the First Republic, since it seems to have been quite common to regard the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation also before 1918. The change from Czech to Czechoslovak may thus merely be a change of labels. Second, we *can certainly not* infer that the result would have been the same among the Slovaks. While a Czech and a Czechoslovak identity were complementary, a Czechoslovak identity was regarded by a large group of the Slovaks as a negation of Slovak identity. The share of the Slovaks who would present themselves as Czechoslovaks even abroad must be expected to be lower than 45 percent, albeit probably higher than the one percent noted in Ružomberok. Czechoslovakism can thus be said to have been a conditional success in the Czech lands, but hardly in Slovakia.

### ***From Magyar(one) back to Slovak identity***

While the Czech nation was fully formed by 1918, the Slovak nation was not. The Czech statistician Antonín Boháč stated that, in the census of 1921, "there were whole regions in Slovakia where people, when asked about their nationality, did not understand the question."<sup>241</sup> In addition to the nationally unaware, who seem to have been especially many in Eastern Slovakia, there were quite a few Magyarized Slovaks. A report in *Československý statistický věstník* from the preliminary census in Slovakia in 1919 suggests that some Slovaks still registered as Magyars. This was the case in Spišská and Abovská-Turnianská župa and especially in Košice when the official was a Magyar; in Bratislava when Slovak servants were interviewed in the presence of Magyar employers; and in Banská Štiavnica, parts of the Magyar-educated Slovak intelligentsia registered as Magyars. There were also reported examples of Slovaks citing Magyar nationality because Magyar was the only language they could read and write.<sup>242</sup> It is hard to ascertain exactly how many changed their subjective national identity from Magyar to Slovak between the census of 1910 and the census of 1921, and between this and the census of 1930. The table below shows the actual changes in the number of Magyars and Slovaks from the last Hungarian census in 1910 to the second Czechoslovak census in 1930 in comparison to population growth in Slovakia as a whole.

***Table 10: Slovaks and Magyars in Slovakia (changes)***

	1910	1921	absolute	in percent	1930	absolute	in percent
Slovaks	1,709,360	1,942,059	+ 232,699	+ 13.6	2,224,983	+ 282,924	+ 14.6
Magyars	1,209,186	637,183	– 572,003	– 47.3	571,988	– 65,195	– 10.2
Slovakia total	3,350,600	2,998,244	– 352,356	– 10.5	3,329,793	+ 331,549	+ 11.1

Sources: *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé* (1920:3), *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I (1924:60\*-61\*), *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934:46\*).

<sup>241</sup> (Na Slovensku byly celé kraje, kde otázce, jaké jsou národnosti, vůbec nerozuměli). Antonín Boháč in: *Československý statistický věstník* (1921: 56).

<sup>242</sup> See Josef Mráz: O předběžném sčítání lidu na Slovensku roku 1919, in: *Československý statistický věstník* (1921: 135).

The natural growth rate in Slovakia between 1911 and 1920 was 5.8 percent or 171,320 persons, while 97,274 people (3.3 percent) emigrated. This includes soldiers who did not return after the war. Even if birthrates were higher among the Slovaks than among the Magyars, and even if we assume that not a single Slovak emigrated (we know this is not true), this can still not explain the sizeable discrepancy between the number of "Slovaks" in 1910 and in 1921. The only possible explanation of the Slovak growth of 13.6 percent is that an estimated 155,000 of those who had reported Magyar nationality in 1910 changed to Slovak in 1921.<sup>243</sup>

The natural growth rate for Slovakia between 1921 and 1930 was 15.1 percent or 453,492 persons. In the same period 121,943 persons or 4.1 percent of the population emigrated. Part of the large Slovak population growth is due to natural growth – but the natural growth rate of the Magyar population in Slovakia was not very much lower. The Czechoslovak population in Slovakia had an average of 2.2 children per family, while the Magyar population had 2.0. This is also reflected in the age composition of the population. In 1930, 33.0 percent of the Czechoslovak population in Slovakia were under 15 years of age, compared to 28.6 percent of the Magyar population. Further, 50.4 percent of the Czechoslovak and 51.9 percent of the Magyar population were between 15 and 50 years old, while 16.6 percent of the Czechoslovak and 19.5 percent of the Magyar population were 50 or older.<sup>244</sup>

Moreover, emigration patterns worked in the opposite direction. Between 1922 and 1930, there were issued 276,185 emigration passports in the Czechoslovak republic. Of these, 202,364 were issued to "Czechoslovaks", while only 15,287 were issued to Magyars. In Slovakia, 153,339 passports were issued. A great majority of the Magyar passports must have been issued in Slovakia, considering that most of the Magyars lived there. It is also likely that more than half of the 202,364 passports issued to "Czechoslovaks" were issued to Slovaks. In 1930, 14,142 of 18,969 passports issued to people of "Czechoslovak nationality" were issued in Slovakia – almost 75 percent. Total Slovak emigration may thus well be around 135,000.<sup>245</sup>

In the census report of 1930, two explanations are given for the reduction in the number of Magyars between 1921 and 1930. First, in 1930 a larger number of the Magyars were counted among the foreigners than in 1921 (i.e. they were not Czechoslovak citizens). The second reason was that in 1930, a larger share of the gypsies and Jews reported having these nationalities rather than Magyar – meaning that they had been posing as Magyars during the times of Hungarian rule. However, according to the report, the low number of Magyars "is mainly associated with the growth of Slovak national consciousness, which was always most suppressed precisely in Slovakia."<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> A large number of Magyars must have left Slovakia around 1918 in addition to the 97,274 registered emigrants – cf. the large Magyar decrease. See *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934: 29\*).

<sup>244</sup> *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934: 29\*, 48\*).

<sup>245</sup> *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé* IV. (1932: 41–42).

<sup>246</sup> (souvisí hlavně s postupem slovenského národního vědomí, jež právě na Slovensku byl vždy nejvíce potlačováno). *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934: 46\*).

The total number of people who switched their professed national affiliation from Magyar to Slovak between 1910 and 1930 cannot be ascertained precisely, but an educated guess is that it was under half a million and over 250,000. If we assume that the Slovak population growth and emigration was the average of Slovakia's, the number of "converts" was 274,912 persons. My guess would be that the actual number was higher, because of the large Slovak emigration.

### ***Voting behavior as a guide to identity?***

Since we lack individual panel data, it is not possible to say anything precise about what support the idea of a Czechoslovak or an individual Slovak nation had among the Slovaks throughout the First Republic. As we have seen, both sides claimed to have a majority of the Slovaks behind them in the 1930s, and both argued as if a vote for their party meant a vote for their nation project. If this were the case, voting behavior *would* be an indication of how people felt about a Czechoslovak, respectively a Slovak nation.

Who, then, really *was* the majority? If we assume that the Slovak share of the voters in Slovakia roughly equaled the Slovak share of the population (72.1 percent), and that voting behavior followed national lines completely, then the Slovak People's Party got 39.3 percent of the Slovak vote, and the Czechoslovakist parties got 56.2 percent of the vote in the 1929 election. This leaves only 0.5 percent of the Slovak vote for the Communist Party, which is probably too low, since the Communists emerged with 10.7 percent of the total in Slovakia. Some Magyars and Germans thus must have voted for Czechoslovak or Slovak parties, but probably not a large share. Despite Tiso's "advanced math", there is thus little doubt that the Czechoslovak parties did get more votes than the ľudáks in the 1929 election.

Can we infer from this that a majority of the Slovaks supported the Czechoslovak nation project, as Ivan Dérier claimed? I do not think so. Norwegian election research has shown that the voters do not agree with their parties on all issues: At best, it may be hoped that people agree with their parties on issues that are central to the party program.<sup>247</sup> This follows from the sheer logic of numbers, as the possible combination of views will always be many times the number of parties. We thus must assume that most voters disagree with their own party on several issues, and I do not see why the Czechoslovak question should be any different.

Apart from the National Socialists and the National Democrats, the Czechoslovakist parties were class-based, and the national question was not a central part of their agenda. It is thus likely that people who voted for these parties also had a class-based agenda – meaning that they voted for the Agrarians because they were peasants, or for the Social Democrats because they were workers. We can thus not assume that they supported Czechoslovakism, but perhaps that they were not strongly against it. Moreover, the only party with an explicit Czechoslovakist program, the Czechoslovak National Socialists, managed to gain more than 50,000 votes only in the last election, and never achieved 5 percent of the Slovak vote (see Table 2).

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<sup>247</sup> See Henry Valen and Bernt Aardal: *Et valg i perspektiv. En studie av Stortingsvalget 1981* (1983: 211–25).

If Czechoslovakism was a priority for people, why then did they not vote for the National Socialists, or for Dérer's Social Democrats? Instead it was the Agrarians who did the best of the Czechoslovak parties throughout most of the period. Although Štefánek and Šrobár were actively promoting Czechoslovakism in the Parliament, Hodža was the front figure of the party in Slovakia, and he down-played the Czechoslovak rhetoric, especially in the 1930s.<sup>248</sup> He also fronted regionalism and a gradual shift towards a political nation concept. In the 1930s almost the entire Slovak flank of the Agrarian Party (except a hard core around Šrobár) turned away from Czechoslovakism. Central were the young Agrarians around the journal *Zem* (from 1935). Some of them even recognized the existence of a Slovak nation in the Parliament.<sup>249</sup> The only thing we can infer from the fact that a majority of the Slovaks voted for Czechoslovakist parties is thus that they did not have the Slovak nation as their *first* priority.

While the national question was secondary to a class-based agenda in most of the Czechoslovak oriented parties, it was a very central part of the agenda of the Slovak People's Party. This party's agenda became increasingly nationalist, especially in the 1930s. Since the national question was a core issue, it is quite likely that the voters of the Slovak People's Party supported the idea of an individual Slovak nation. It even seems reasonable to assume that the Slovak nation was a priority for a majority of them.

A recurrent claim in the political debate was that the Ľudáks got their main support from the Magyarones, Slovaks who had been partly assimilated during the Hungarian period. Assuming that assimilation requires contact with Magyars, we may expect to find most Magyarized Slovaks in areas with many Magyars. Conversely, there would probably not be many Magyarones in areas where the Slovaks were an overwhelming majority. If there were more Magyarones among the voters of the Slovak People's Party than among the voters of the Czechoslovakist parties, we would expect the Ľudáks to do better in these areas than the Czechoslovak parties – compared to their average results. We should expect the converse in the Slovak areas.

There were 13 municipalities in Slovakia where the Magyars comprised a majority of more than 50 percent. There were 8 more municipalities where the Magyars comprised a larger share of the population than the average for Slovakia as a whole. The table below shows the percentage of Magyars and Slovaks according to the 1930 census in these municipalities, the percentage of Catholics, and the election results for the four largest parties in Slovakia. If we are correct in assuming that the number of Magyarones was largest in Magyar-speaking areas, then this refutes the claim that the Ľudáks had especially many Magyarones among their voters. In fact, their support was so low in the Magyar-speaking areas that even if we assume that they and the Communists *only* got Magyar votes, the Agrarians (Agr.) and the Social Democrats (ČSD) together still exceeded the share of Slovaks in six of the municipalities.

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<sup>248</sup> Dérer criticized him for this even after the war. See Dérer (1946: 229–30)

<sup>249</sup> On the reorientation in the Agrarian Party, see Vladimír Zuberec: Českoslovakizmus Agrárnej Strany na Slovensku v rokoch 1919–1938, in: *Historický časopis* 4, 1979, especially p. 574. See also Ján Ursíny, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. června 1935 (p. 44), and 118. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1937 (p. 38), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

**Table 11: Nationality, religion and election results in Slovakia, 1929**

<i>Municipality</i>	Religion	Nationality		Election results				
	% Catholics	Slovaks <sup>250</sup>	Magyars	Agr.	ČSD	HSLŠ	KSČ	Together
Stará Ľada	80.2	27.6	70.1	13.2	4.2	6.0	21.0	44.4
Feledince	65.0	14.0	77.4	9.0	1.7	3.4	19.6	33.7
Galanta	86.0	31.6	62.0	8.6	6.1	8.5	23.5	46.7
Kráľovský Chlumec	33.2	10.5	78.9	26.3	5.9	2.3	20.6	55.1
Veľké Kapušany	36.4	36.8	55.7	28.1	1.2	4.8	5.7	39.8
Komárno	68.0	12.3	82.9	10.5	8.2	2.1	29.3	50.1
Moldava nad Bodvou	71.5	26.7	56.3	18.7	3.6	5.9	15.7	43.9
Parkan	82.4	15.6	81.6	10.9	4.5	2.4	21.0	38.8
Dunajská Streda	77.9	4.9	88.2	10.0	1.6	3.0	16.1	30.7
Šaľa	81.1	40.5	55.5	12.1	3.3	11.2	21.5	48.1
Šamorín	89.8	11.4	76.9	11.0	5.7	3.9	9.6	30.2
Tornaľa	44.9	12.3	83.1	9.3	2.3	1.4	15.6	28.6
Želiezovce	60.7	14.9	79.9	13.7	2.1	2.7	28.5	47.0
Modrý Kameň	60.0	66.9	31.5	45.0	1.3	11.8	5.2	63.3
Košice mesto	62.8	66.0	18.0	2.7	11.6	9.3	14.2	37.8
Krupina	75.2	61.0	36.4	29.8	4.6	24.4	5.4	64.2
Levice	67.8	69.0	27.4	17.2	4.5	30.0	9.9	61.6
Lučenec	64.4	70.1	24.7	25.5	9.0	15.9	16.5	66.9
Rožňava	43.7	55.6	35.0	19.2	10.5	4.0	24.3	58.0
Vráble	86.8	71.9	25.7	26.0	4.4	22.2	14.6	67.2
Nové Zámky	90.4	63.9	31.6	11.6	11.2	22.0	13.9	58.7
<i>Slovakia</i>	71.6	72.1	17.6	19.5	9.5	28.3	10.7	68.0

Sources: *Štatistický lexikon obcí v republike československej, III. Krajina slovenská* (1936:XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX).  
*Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930:28-33).

The table shows that of the Czechoslovak and Slovak parties it was not the Ľudáks who did particularly well in Magyar-speaking areas, but the Agrarians. In Kráľovský Chlumec and Dunajská Streda the Agrarians had more than twice as many votes as there were Slovaks – probably because the Magyar-speaking areas were also predominantly agricultural. The Communist Party (KSČ) did on average better in the Magyar-speaking areas than in Slovakia as a whole, which is not surprising: This party was declared multi-national, and at this point, it supported the Comintern policy of national self-determination for all minorities.

Of the 79 municipalities, 49 had a Slovak majority that was above average. In 1929, Ľudák support was above average in 38 of these 49 municipalities; and in 12 of them, Ľudáks got more than half of the vote. Of the 11 municipalities where Ľudák support was below average, 8 had a non-Catholic majority. The lowest result was achieved in Myjava (5.0 percent), where 99.2 percent of the inhabitants were Slovaks, but 83.4 percent were Protestants. The three remaining were Bratislava *vonkov* (the area surrounding Bratislava), Banská Bystrica and Nitra – town areas where the Ľudáks polled only a little below average.

<sup>250</sup> These figures also include Czechs, since Czechs and Slovaks were not separated in the statistics – as usual.

Dérér was right that the Slovak People's Party *was* a Catholic party in addition to being a national party, but Catholicism was secondary in importance. The party did best in areas with both a large majority of Slovaks and a large majority of Catholics, while having many Catholics did not help much if the area was predominantly Magyar. In 1929, the party exceeded 10 percent in only one municipality with Magyar majority (Šaľa). The best result (88.5 percent) was achieved in Námestovo – a municipality where the population was 99.4 percent Slovak and 98.5 percent Catholic. The lowest result (1.4 percent) was achieved in Tornaľa – a municipality with 83.1 percent Magyars and 44.9 percent Catholics. (See also Appendix H.)<sup>251</sup>

In order to get an impression of how the electoral strength of the various parties was related to nationality structure and religion, I have calculated Pearson's *r*. The results are shown below:

	<i>Agr.</i>	<i>ČSD</i>	<i>HSLŠ</i>	<i>KSČ</i>
Share of Slovaks	0.436	0.456	0.828	-0.484
Share of Magyars	-0.391	-0.513	-0.792	0.490
Share of Catholics	-0.690	0.251	0.549	-0.009

The most interesting is the strong negative correlation between the support of the Slovak People's Party and the share of Magyars, and the strong positive correlation between the share of Slovaks and Ľudák support. The tendency is the same for the Social Democrats and the Agrarians, but the correlation is weaker. Their support was less dependent on the nationality structure – which confirms the impression that the national question was more central in the Ľudák case. For the Communists, the coefficients only confirm that they were strongest in minority areas. As for religion, the most striking result is the clear negative correlation between support for the Agrarians and the percentage of Catholics. This partly reflects the strong position of the party in Protestant areas, but also in Eastern Slovakia, where there were many Uniates.<sup>252</sup> The support of the Social Democrats and the Ľudáks was positively correlated with Catholicism, whereas no significant correlation was found for the Communists.

### ***Summary and conclusion***

Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, I think it is safe to assume that proponents of Czechoslovakism lost out in the struggle for the "Slovak soul." In the Czech lands, Czechoslovakism seems to have been a conditional success – for the same reasons that there was no substantial Czech opposition to it. First, the Czech conception of Czechoslovakism was not contrary to the existence of a Czech nation. Since Czech and Czechoslovak amounted to the same for them (in reality a switch of labels), Czechoslovakism was not perceived as nationally threatening. Besides, the Czechs were for all practical purposes the ruling nation of the Czechoslovak republic, and they had no historical experience with denationalization.

<sup>251</sup> *Štatistický lexikon obcí v republike československej, III. Krajina slovenská* (1936: XVII–XX), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930: 28–33).

<sup>252</sup> A branch of the Catholic Church preserving the Eastern rite and discipline but submitting to papal authority.



Second, as this chapter and Chapter Nine have shown, the Czechoslovakist reinterpretation of history proved to be chiefly a reinterpretation of Slovak history. Czech history was narrated basically the same way as before, with an additional sentence or two about Slovakia or the Slovaks, but only to the extent that it had any connection with Czech history. This did not require any major reinterpretation of the important events in Czech history, and the Czechoslovak interpretation of history was thus fully compatible with the traditional Czech interpretation. In order to succeed in forming a Czechoslovak nation, however, the Czechoslovak elite needed the endorsement not only of the Czechs, but of the Slovaks as well. A fuller explanation of why Czechoslovakism failed will be offered in the concluding chapter, but some answers can be indicated already here, on the basis of a summary of the most important controversies in the struggle between the Czechoslovakists and the Slovak autonomists.

In a general sense, the arguments above can be turned around. First, for a large part of the Slovak elite, Czechoslovakism *did* run contrary to Slovak national identity. Second, the Czechoslovakist reinterpretation of history affected Slovak history in particular, contradicting the traditional Slovak interpretation on important points. Third, the Slovaks were part of the ruling nation only in name; moreover, they had recent experience with Magyarization, where the refusal to recognize the Slovaks as a nation had been followed by discrimination.

The nation concept was predominantly cultural on both sides, which is in line with the usual conception of nationhood in East Central Europe. In the case of Czechoslovakism, this was also a part of the heritage of Czechoslovak reciprocity. However, there was a slight difference: the Czechoslovakists tended more towards a voluntarist nation concept, while an organic conception of nationhood was not uncommon on the Slovak autonomist side. Likewise, while the Slovak autonomists generally took the Slovak nation for granted, the Czechoslovakists more often regarded a Czechoslovak nation as a project.

The interpretation of the two critical historical junctures – the demise of Great Moravia and the codification of Slovak – was strikingly different. The Czechoslovakists regarded Great Moravia as the first Czechoslovak state, and thus as the historical predecessor of the Czechoslovak republic. This was a status Great Moravia shared with the historical Czech state. The Slovak autonomists, however, saw Great Moravia as a predominantly Slovak state, especially since a Czech state had existed alongside it most of the time. They also blamed the Czechs for its breakdown.

Both sides agreed that there had once been a Czechoslovak unity, but while the Czechoslovakists treated this as a national unity, the Slovak autonomists emphasized that it was merely a tribal unity. Both sides agreed that the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks were caused by the long separation, but while the Czechoslovakists saw them as regional differences or differences in cultural level that could and should be overcome, the Slovak autonomists viewed them as permanent national differences. On the Czechoslovakist side, there were nuances with respect to the cause of the differences between the Czechs (who emphasized the negative Magyar influences), and Hodža (who emphasized the cultural isolation and explained part of the differences by German influence on the Czechs).

What Hodža and the Slovak autonomists had in common was that both saw Slovak as an older, more original language than Czech, and they also emphasized the (negative) Roman-German influences on the Czech language. A central part of Hodža's argumentation was also that the Slovaks had something to offer the Czechs; they were important for the balance.

On the Czechoslovakist side, all contacts between the Czechs and Slovaks were cited as proof that a Czechoslovak unity had been preserved over the centuries. The reign of the Přemyslids in the 10th century and the early conversion to Christianity was emphasized. Importance was attributed to Charles University in Prague (where the Slovaks were a part of the *natio Bohemica*), and the German colonization (which brought Czechs and Slovaks into contact with the same Western influences). But greatest emphasis was put on Hussism, Jan Jiskra, the Czech Protestant exiles, and the national revival. Hussism brought the Slovaks into direct and lively contact with the Czechs, and it led to the diffusion of Czech culture and especially language. A similar role was attributed to the Czech Protestant exiles after the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. Again Hodža's (and partly Šrobár's) interpretation differed somewhat from the rest, emphasizing Slovakia's role as a shelter for these exiles. In the context of the national revival, the role of Kollár and Šafařík was especially emphasized. Finally, the efforts of Detvan, the Hlasists, *Československá jednota* and the joint liberation efforts were pointed out. Many of these elements are familiar from the school textbooks in history – apart from the focus on the German colonization, which was often presented negatively in the schoolbooks.

Against this, the Slovak autonomists argued that most of the contacts were either irrelevant or contrary to Czechoslovak national unity. Christianity was supra-national, the German colonization had brought the Slovaks into contact with German culture, not with Czech, and besides it was an expression of the rulers' material interests, not of Czechoslovak unity. The visits of Hussites and Protestants had a religious rather than a national meaning – and Hussism probably even served to separate the Czechs and Slovaks, because of the many wars. In the Ľudák conception, the Hussites were plunderers who burned and looted, while Hus himself was a heretic. There was full agreement between the two sides that Charles University and the Czech exiles had served to strengthen the use of the Czech tongue in Slovakia, but while the Czechoslovakists regarded this as positive, the autonomists viewed it negatively. In their conception, the use of Czech in Slovakia was an obstacle to the development of a Slovak language. They also argued that a Czechoslovak unity could not be inferred from the use of Czech in Slovakia; it had the same function as German or Latin, and besides only the educated classes had used it.

All the Czechoslovakists regarded the codification of Slovak as a linguistic schism, but their interpretation of the motives behind it differed. Some saw it as a reaction to the Magyarization pressure. Others argued that the awakeners were under Magyar influence, or did it for political reasons or else were motivated by Pan-Slavism. The Slovak autonomist view was that the awakeners were motivated by a wish to save the Slovaks from annihilation – in Škultéty's words, they seized literary Slovak in a hurry in 1843 so the very roof would not burn down over their heads. The conception of the codification of Slovak as a result of Magyar influences (Pražák's version) was obviously the most insulting to nationally minded Slovaks.

At the same time, the Czechoslovakists did not see the existence of literary Slovak as contrary to Czechoslovak unity. In contrast to the 19th century, during the First World War or the First Republic nobody advocated that the Slovaks should give up their own language in favor of Czech, not even in scholarly writings, as Masaryk had advocated in 1897.<sup>253</sup>

The Slovak autonomists for the most part defended the existing Slovak interpretation of history. Slovak history was presented as a history of suffering, but the Slovaks were not only victims. The autonomists emphasized the early Christianizing of the Slovaks and their civilizing mission towards the Magyars. The national disaster thus started not with the demise of Great Moravia, but with the arrival of the German colonizers after the Tartar onslaught in the 13th century, and it continued with the Hussite and then the Ottoman Wars. Thereby the Czech Hussites were also included among the former enemies. The Hungarian state did not become a national threat until the Magyarization policy got underway in the 19th century. Through all this suffering, the Slovak preserved his pure soul, but without literary Slovak it would not have been possible to withstand Magyarization in the final period, it was argued.

During the national revival and afterwards, Slovak identity was defined mainly in opposition to that of the Magyars, but also to the Germans and the infidel Ottoman Turks. During the First Republic, the Czechs were added to the list of "important others", but they did not replace the three former ones. Apart from different mentality, the Slovak autonomists most often emphasized religious differences (Catholic–Hussite) and differences in piety. Slovak symbolic demands generally concerned recognition of the Slovak nation or issues where this was the underlying motive. The importance attributed to the celebration of the first church in Nitra must be seen in the context of the strong religious accent of the Slovak autonomist movement. This was at the same time a struggle about Slovak history: the church in Nitra was to support the antiquity of the Slovak nation, not of the Czechoslovak nation.

The main difference between the scholarly and the political debate was that the political debate was less preoccupied with the interpretation of history, while instrumental arguments were more common. The strength-through-unity argument and the Magyarone card dominated on the Czechoslovak side, but mention was also made of the historical continuity with the Czechoslovak reciprocity of the national awakeners.

Part of the reason why Czechoslovakism failed probably lies in the ideology itself: Not only were Slovak nationalists accused of being Magyarones, but the Czechoslovakist ideology was strongly Czech-biased. It placed the Slovaks in the role of passive receivers of Czech (positive) and Magyar (negative) cultural impulses. The role of Hussism was exaggerated totally out of proportion, and it was presented as an ideal, whereas Catholicism was evaluated negatively, in line with Hungarism and Magyarism. Everything Slovak was said to be the result of Magyar influences. Neither of this strikes me as tactically wise.

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<sup>253</sup> Zdeněk Urban: K Masarykovu vztahu ke Slovensku před první světovou válkou, in *T.G. Masaryk a Slovensko* (1991: 82).

## *Eleven*

### *A struggle for cultural equality*

*The Slovaks not only defend their material possessions, but also their spiritual possessions, nationality, language, and traditional religion. And the Slovaks value those spiritual possessions even higher (...) They demand that their religion be respected and that Slovak be granted total equality with Czech, nothing more and nothing less...*

**Jozef Buday, 1926<sup>1</sup>**

The preceding two chapters focused on the struggle over identity, and the proposed contents of the respective identities. I will now turn to conflict issues of a more "practical" nature, expressed through national demands in the Parliament, and how the government coped with them. The focus of this chapter is the *cultural* dimension. In Chapter Four, I argued that national cultural demands are aimed at preserving national identity and developing the national culture. We may thus expect such demands to correspond to the attributes that were regarded as important for national identity: language, history and religion.

The Czechs were for all practical purposes the ruling nation in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Very few national complaints/demands were thus presented on their behalf, and the demands that *were* made were moreover mostly of a temporary nature, since they were soon taken care of by the government. Most of the remaining unfulfilled Czech cultural demands from the Austrian period found a solution already in the Revolutionary Parliament. The few Czech complaints after 1920 mostly concerned Czech schools in German-speaking areas.

While the Czechs enjoyed the prerogatives of a ruling nation from the outset, the Slovak position was more ambiguous. On the one hand, the Constitution declared that the Slovaks were a part of the "Czechoslovak state-nation", which protected the rights of the Slovaks vis-à-vis the minorities. On the other hand, they were in no position to assert the cultural rights belonging to them as a part of the "Czechoslovak state-nation" vis-à-vis the Czechs – especially in the beginning. Slovak cultural demands can be divided into four main categories: Linguistic demands, religious demands, demands for the expansion of the educational system, and demands for a Slovak spirit in the schools. Associated with the latter was also the demand for the establishment of a separate Slovak school board. With one possible exception, all Slovak cultural demands involved public arenas, like the school system, the administration and the courts. Of these, the educational system was by far the most important arena.

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<sup>1</sup> (Slovák háji si svoje nielen hmotné statky, ale i statky duchovné, národnosť, reč a tradičné náboženstvo. A Slovák tieto svoje duchovné statky ešte vyššie cení [...] nič viac a nič menej si nežiada, ako to, aby ich náboženstvo bolo šetrené a aby slovenčina bola úplne zrovnoprávnená s češtinou). Buday, 45. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1926 (p. 161), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé*.

I will start by presenting briefly the remaining Czech demands from the Austrian period, since these matters were for the most part solved before 1920. Czech demands for Czech schools in German-speaking areas will be treated along with Slovak demands for the expansion of the school system. Of the Slovak demands, I will discuss religious issues first, because religious complaints were most common in the early 1920s. Then I will turn to linguistic issues, which were salient throughout most of the period. Closely associated with language issues in the schools were demands for a "Slovak spirit." Finally, I will present the demands for the expansion of the educational system, where the demand for the establishment of a Slovak polytechnic was the major issue, especially in the 1930s. This sequence thus reflects a certain chronological shift of focus between the various demands, but for the sake of clarity the narrative is organized by topics rather than chronologically.

Since the Constitution of 1920 and the separate Language Act provided the foundations for the government policies regarding language and religion, a natural starting point for the discussion of each of these issues is the Constitution and the debate that led up to its promulgation.<sup>2</sup> The main points of dispute were the Language Act, separation of church and state, and the abolition of the historical lands. I will return to the latter dispute in Chapter Thirteen.

### *Unfinished Czech business*

One of the most important Czech cultural demands remaining from the Austrian period was the demand for a second Czech university. As early as in November 1918, Alois Jirásek and Karel Engliš had filed a proposal for the establishment of a Czech-medium university in Brno.<sup>3</sup> There was some debate about the location of the university. Olomouc (northeast of Brno) was presented as an alternative, and one deputy proposed a joint university for Moravia and Slovakia in Bratislava. However, the Education Committee made it quite clear that "it is neither possible nor thinkable that Moravia and Silesia, who have been striving hard for a university for more than fifty years, should be disregarded." Besides it had long since been decided that a second Czech university should be located in Moravia.

Antonín Cyril Stojan proposed the "Cyrillo-Methodian University" as the name of the new university, but the majority opted for "Masaryk University." In the committee's own words, this was not only meant as an acknowledgment of Masaryk's scholarly and educational work and his great efforts in the *Reichsrat* for a second Czech university, but also as a "bright monument forever reminding the Czech nation of his great liberation work."

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<sup>2</sup> The original Constitutional draft was the work of four Czechs: Professor Dr. Jiří Hoetzel, the chairman of the Constitutional Committee Dr. Alfréd Meissner (ČSD), the vice chairman Dr. František Hnídek (Agr.) and Professor Dr. František Weyr (ČND). In addition, Antonín Švehla (chairman of the Agrarians and Minister of the Interior) played an important part. See Eva Broklová: *Československá demokracie* (1992a:25), Eva Broklová: *První československá ústava* (1992b:8). The latter consists of excerpts from the debate in the Constitutional Committee, based on the stenographic reports.

<sup>3</sup> See Tisk 17 (Jirásek and Engliš' original proposal) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám o Národního shromáždění republiky československé* Svazek I and II (1919).

The bill concerning a "second Czech university" was presented to the Parliament on January 9th, 1919. Masaryk University in Brno was to be divided into four faculties: for law, medicine, philosophy, and natural sciences. The first two were operative already from the fall semester of 1919, the latter two from the fall semester of 1921. However, the foundation stone of the first modern building was not laid until 1928.<sup>4</sup>

An early proposal with high symbol value was presented by František Mareš and Bohumil Němec, professors at the Czech part of Charles Ferdinand University. One part of the proposal concerned a new division of the properties and funds of the Czech and the German university "according to which nationality they were originally meant for." The buildings, collections, libraries and museums were to be used by both universities according to need (defined in terms of the student number), and the archive was to be the property of the Czech university. This represented a reversal of the balance between the German and Czech part of the university in favor of the Czechs. The symbolic part of the proposal concerned the name and was undoubtedly nationally motivated: "The Czech Charles Ferdinand University will revert to its old name, Charles University." "Ferdinand" had been added when Charles University was united with the Jesuit Clementinum in 1654 through a decree by Ferdinand III, and was thus closely associated with the Counter-Reformation and the Czech *temno* (darkness).<sup>5</sup>

A third matter involving the university was the transfer of the insignia of the original Charles University from the German to the Czech university. Josef Václav Najman accused the government of cowardice: "The Czech king Václav IV, of whom we often say that he was a weak king, [...] had enough courage to issue the Kutná Hora decree. [...] Our government was not able to do what the king did" – to give the Czechs what belonged to them – he argued.<sup>6</sup>

Another symbol issue was the removal of a statue of Josef II by a group of Czech legionaries in 1920, which became an issue in the Parliament. František Hnídek argued that the Habsburgs had never been anything but "a curse" for the Czechs. He accused Josef II of being a "symbol of centralization and Germanization", and argued that there was "nothing more self-evident and natural, than [the idea] that all memorials of the Habsburgs should be removed." In the same debate Viktor Dyk demanded that all portraits of Habsburgs be removed from the schools, so the teachers would no longer have to teach in their shadow (!).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> (není možno ani myslitelné, aby Morava se Slezskem, kteráž po více než padesát roků se úsilovně university domáhala, byla pominuta). (světlou památkou připomínající českému národu na věčné časy jeho veliké osvobozovací dílo). See Tisk 375 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I and II (1919); *Slovník českých dějin* (1994).

<sup>5</sup> (§1. Česká universita Karlova Ferdinandova přijímá staré jméno "University Karlova"). (podle toho, pro kterou národnost byly původně určeny). Tisk 161 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1919). About the situation after 1882, see Marie Štemberková: *Universitas Carolina Pragensis* (1995:41–55).

<sup>6</sup> (Český král Václav IV, o kterém říkáme často, že to byl slabý král, [...] měl odvahu vydati "Kutnohorský dekret." [...] A co dovedl král, [...] nedovedla udělat naše vláda). Najman, 349. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1934 (pp. 66, 68). See also Antonín Hajn, 351. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1934 (pp. 26–27), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>7</sup> (kletbu). (symbolem centralisace a germanisace). (nic není přirozenějšího a samozřejmějšího, než že mají býti odstraněny všechny památky na Habsburky). Hnídek, 25. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 24. listopadu 1920 (pp. 491–92), and Dyk, 23. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 23. listopadu 1920 (pp. 387–91), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

The problems of the Austrian heritage had for the most part been redressed by 1920, after which few Czech complaints were voiced, apart from school issues. One complaint was that German officials did not bother to learn the Czech language, or that they refused to speak it.<sup>8</sup>

### ***Religious issues***

The religious dimension played a rather paradoxical role in Czecho–Slovak relations. On the one hand, an overwhelming majority of the Czechs as well as of the Slovaks were Catholics. The Counter-Reformation had been more successful in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, and the Protestant minority was thus larger among the Slovaks, but the religious cleavage nevertheless crossed the national divide. In 1910, 96.6 percent of the Czechs in Bohemia and 96.2 percent of the Czechs in Moravia were Catholics, while respectively 2.1 and 3.4 percent were Protestants. Among the Slovaks, 76.5 percent were Catholics and 18.8 percent were Protestants, mostly Lutherans.<sup>9</sup> As Table 12 shows, the Catholic Church did suffer a major loss of support among Czechs after the war, but the clear majority remained Catholic.

***Table 12: Religious denomination of Czechs and Slovaks***

<i>Confession</i> <sup>10</sup>	Census of 1921						Census of 1930					
	Catholic	Uniate	Protestant	Czechoslovak Church	Without confession	Other & unknown	Catholic	Uniate	Protestant	Czechoslovak Church	Without confession	Other & unknown
<i>Region</i>												
Bohemia	70.9	0.01	3.6	10.0	14.6	1.0	67.6	0.03	4.7	13.1	13.8	0.9
Moravia	89.7	0.03	4.0	3.6	2.4	0.3	85.1	0.03	4.4	6.2	3.7	0.6
Slovakia	76.7	4.5	16.8	0.1	0.3	1.6	76.6	4.6	15.7	0.5	1.85	2.6

Sources: *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl III (1924:5\*), *Statistický obzor* (1933:185), Owen V. Johnson: *Slovakia 1918–1938. Education and the making of a nation* (1985:84).

Where religious cleavages cross national divides, religious conflicts are unlikely to become nationally relevant, because they tend to unite across national divides, and divide co-nationals into opposing camps. My findings in terms of religious complaints/demands of a tangible nature correspond to this expectation: Religious issues were not very important to the Slovak national program, and they were raised most often in the beginning. The fact that the Slovak People's Party joined forces with the Czechoslovak People's Party more often than not in religious matters is also according to expectation.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. Stříbrný, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18 prosince 1929 (p. 13), Dubický, 347. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 8. listopadu 1934 (p. 45), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>9</sup> *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl III (1924:4\*).

<sup>10</sup> "Other & unknown" comprise Orthodox, Jewish, Old Catholic, other and not given. Jews were the most numerous.

On the other hand, although there was not any substantial difference between the Czechs and the Slovaks in terms of religion, there was a difference in *religiousness*, and the deep-rooted Czech anti-clericalism did not strike any chords in Slovakia. In the radicalized environment after the war, a religious reform movement arose within the Czech Catholic Church. After the Pope had refused most of its demands, a Czechoslovak Church was established in January 1920. By 1921, more than half a million Czechs had joined, and another 700,000 were without confession. Both these phenomena were almost exclusively confined to the Czech populace.

Czech anti-clericalism went back to the national movement of the 19th century. It found expression in the popular conception of Czech history, which saw the Habsburgs and the Papacy as the joint oppressors of the Czech nation. They were also seen as jointly responsible for the Czech *temno* following the Battle of the White Mountain. When the Czechoslovak Church was established in 1920, it was declared that the "Czech national question was solved on a religious basis." In line with this the Church celebrated Jan Hus. The new Church was recognized by the Minister of Education in September 1920, but only in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. Recognition in Slovakia had to wait until September 1925.<sup>11</sup>

Even after 1925 the Czechoslovak Church remained an almost exclusively Czech phenomenon. According to the census of 1921, the Church had 525,333 members; of these, 83.3 percent lived in Bohemia, 11.8 percent in Moravia, 4.6 percent in Silesia and only 0.4 percent in Slovakia. Only 564 of the members of the Czechoslovak Church belonged to a nationality other than "Czechoslovak." It is likely that most of the members also in Slovakia were Czechs. In 1930 the total number of members had increased to 793,385; of these, 77.9 percent lived in Bohemia, 20.3 percent in Moravia/Silesia, and 1.4 percent in Slovakia.<sup>12</sup>

According to the census of 1921, there were 724,507 individuals without a confession in Czechoslovakia: and of these 97.7 percent were "Czechoslovaks" (in practice Czechs). Of those without a confession, 90.8 percent lived in Bohemia, 6.8 percent in Moravia, 1.3 percent in Silesia and 0.9 percent in Slovakia. According to the text part of the census, the few persons in Slovakia were also "probably for the most part Czechs." In 1930 the total number of people without a confession had increased to 851,292 – of these, 85.6 percent lived in Bohemia, 12.4 percent in Moravia and 2.0 percent in Slovakia. These figures show that both being without confession and being a member of the Czechoslovak Church were *Bohemian* and *Czech* phenomena.<sup>13</sup> Bohemia was also the region where the Socialist parties polled best, whereas the Czechoslovak People's Party had its stronghold in the more Catholic Moravia (see Table 2).<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> (řešení české otázky národní na základě náboženském). *Československá vlastivěda*, díl V (1931:359). See also *Album reprezentantů všech oborů veřejného života československého* (1927:453–54).

<sup>12</sup> *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I (1924:88\*), díl III (1924:4\*–5\*), *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934:51\*).

<sup>13</sup> *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I (1924:89\*), *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934:51\*).

<sup>14</sup> See also Oskar Krejčí: *Kniha o volbách* (1994:150).



From a Slovak, especially Catholic, point of view, the problem was thus Czech anti-clericalism combined with progressive atheism, which was seen as a joint threat to the more "pious" Slovak character. The Czech glorification of Jan Hus was a special problem in Slovakia, where a majority still regarded him as a heretic. Here Slovak and Czech Catholics parted company, since the latter honored Hus for national reasons. As most tangible religious issues were solved in concert with the Czechoslovak People's Party, the remaining Slovak religious complaints generally concerned rhetoric and symbols.

The matter of confessional schools in Slovakia was in fact the sole recurrent religious issue, and it was not even always voiced in nationalist terms. This issue did, however, trigger the formal break between the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Slovak People's Party towards the end of 1920. Other religious issues were the administration of church property in the land reform, and the Law of Public Holidays, which created a row in 1925. An important reason why religious issues were not dominant is also that the major points of dispute were solved quite early in the 1920s. Before turning to the specific Slovak complaints, we shall have a look at how the matter of religion was treated in the Constitution, and at the changes in the relationship between church and state.

### ***On the separation of church and state in the Constitution***

There was broad consensus in the Revolutionary Parliament that Czechoslovakia would have to be a liberal-democratic republic with extensive minority rights, in order for this new state to be able to present herself as different from the old Austrian "prison of nations." This applied to religious as well as national minorities. In Austria, Catholicism was *de facto* the state religion. In contrast, the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 established full freedom of conscience and religious belief (§121), including the right to exercise any faith publicly and privately (§122), and made all religious confessions equal before the law (§124). Finally, §119 stated that public education should not be in conflict with the results of scientific research.

On these articles, there was general agreement. The original draft also contained a sentence in §121 calling for separation of church and state, which was in line with the anti-Rome current in the national Czech movement and Masaryk's ideas as expressed in the Washington Declaration of October 18th, 1918.<sup>15</sup> Yet, the church hierarchy saw this as an attack on the Catholic Church, which it undoubtedly was. On the Czech side, the proposal met with strongest opposition from the Catholic oriented Czechoslovak People's Party, with the entire Slovak Club following suit, while the progressives and the socialist parties were most strongly in favor.

In the deliberations of the committee, four different proposals regarding the relationship between church and state circulated. The proposal that went farthest simply stated that church and state were separated. The original government proposal was "there will be introduced separation between state and church" (i.e. in the future), or literally "let there be..." (*budiž*).

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<sup>15</sup> *Declaration of independence of the Czechoslovak nation by its provisional government* (1918:7). Cf. Chapter Nine, p. 188.

The revised government proposal merely stated that "the relationship of the state to the church will be regulated by separate laws", which was in effect a postponement. This was evidently the result of a compromise between the Czechoslovak People's Party and Švehla.<sup>16</sup> A final proposal was to drop the matter altogether – which in the end became the solution.

Václav Bouček (Progressive Party) preferred the matter-of-fact "the state and church are separated."<sup>17</sup> Although he was the spokesman of the Constitutional Committee, he defended this view also in the Parliament, arguing that "for us as for Hus, religion must be a matter of conscience and not a political matter."<sup>18</sup> Likewise, he defended §119 thus: "For me this is about Czech history. [...] We want Czech history to be taught in our schools only according to the results of scientific research. [...] We want our children to get to know already in primary school about the Hussites with Hus at the helm, and the Czech Brethren with Komenský at the helm, without any exemption or distortion." Jan Šrámek (Czechoslovak People's Party), could not see any conflict between true science and true religion.<sup>19</sup>

In the Constitutional Committee, František Hnídek (Agr.) was critical to the revised government proposal, and argued that if the original government proposal could not be adopted, why say anything about it in the Constitution at all. His colleague, the former priest Isidor Zahradník agreed, arguing that "every respectable Czech, even the most orthodox Czech priest, is convinced that it must come to separation of the church from the state."<sup>20</sup>

Theodor Bartošek (ČS) argued that separation between church and state was only a logical result of a republican state form, and pointed out that there were proponents of the most far-reaching proposal also in Slovakia. He even submitted it to the Parliament, but it was withdrawn before it came to a vote.<sup>21</sup> Ivan Dérer confirmed that a majority of the Slovak deputies favored the separation of church and state, but, in view of the clericalist agitation in Slovakia (accusing the Czechs of taking the faith away from the Slovaks), the Slovak Club felt that separation should not take place now. The way things were in Slovakia, it would only make the situation worse, Dérer warned. The main speaker of the Slovak Club in the parliamentary debate, Ivan Markovič, repeated the view that a final decision should be put off.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Švehla went directly against Masaryk on this issue. See Jaroslav Pecháček: *Masaryk – Beneš – Hrad* (1996:15, 118).

<sup>17</sup> (Stát a církev jsou odloučeny). See Bouček in Broklová (1992b:56)

<sup>18</sup> (Náboženství musí být nám, jako Husovi, věcí svědomí a ne politiky). Bouček, 125. schůze Národního shromáždění republiky československé dne 27. února 1920 (p. 3675), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>19</sup> (Pánové, mně šlo o české dějiny. [...] My chceme, aby českým dějinám mohlo být a musilo být vyučováno na našich školách jen podle výsledků vědeckého bádání. [...] My chceme, aby naše děcko poznalo hned v obecné škole bez každé výsady a bez každého znešvařování, co to byli Husité s Husem v čele, co to byli Čeští bratři s Komenským v čele). Bouček, 125. schůze ... dne 27. února 1920 (p. 3674); Šrámek, 126. schůze ... dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3752), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>20</sup> (každý pořádný Čech, i ten nejpravověrnější český kněz, jest předvzděčen, že k odluce církve od státu dojíti musí). Zahradník, excerpt in: Broklová (1992b:57). See also Weyr (pp. 56–57) and Hnídek (p. 57).

<sup>21</sup> Bartošek, excerpt in Broklová (1992b:58); 126. schůze dne 28. února 1920 (pp. 3773 and 3862), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>22</sup> Dérer, in Broklová (1992b:60–61), Markovič, 126. schůze ... dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3725), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

The stand of the *Slovak Club* was an obvious concession to the Ľudáks and the Catholic majority in Slovakia. The relation to Slovakia also seems to have played an important role for the Czech majority, but the opposition from the Czechoslovak People's Party also carried weight. Weyr's view was that it would be tactically unwise to choose a solution that would collide with the views of a large group of deputies as well as of the population, especially since stating that church and state were separate did not make it come true.<sup>23</sup> According to Ferdinand Peroutka, the view of the political realist Švehla prevailed over the ideological position of President Masaryk. For Švehla, consolidation of the state was the primary goal.<sup>24</sup>

The Constitution thus established full freedom of conscience and religious belief, while a decision in the matter of separation of church and state was postponed, thanks to the concerted effort of the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Slovak Club and the Catholic Church. In this particular dispute, the Slovaks were united behind the proposal to postpone the matter, albeit for various reasons, while the Czechs were divided into a progressive, anti-clerical camp and a Catholic-oriented camp. In later conflicts involving religion, the Slovak socialists joined the Czech progressive camp against the Ľudáks and the Czechoslovak People's Party, with the Agrarians hovering somewhere in the middle.

### ***"Away from Rome" and Švehla's religious realpolitik***

The socialist parties invited to a rematch on the separation of church and state already after the election of 1920. The need to avoid internal strife in the Czechoslovak camp sealed the fate of this proposal, as well as all later proposals: In face of the hostile German opposition, a strong Czechoslovak majority was necessary in the new Parliament, and this was not possible without the Czechoslovak People's Party. The Ľudáks were of course strongly against, but so were also other Slovak deputies, among them Hodža.<sup>25</sup> The socialists raised the issue every now and then until around 1925, in order to "redress the wrongs of the White Mountain, to compensate for 300 years of suffering of the Czech nation, caused by the Habsburgs and Rome",<sup>26</sup> but Švehla's realpolitik always prevailed.

Although church and state were never fully separated in principle or in practice, a number of changes *were* made. One category of changes concerned the relationship between the Church and the individual. The most important concerned marriage. In 1919 Václav Bouček of the Progressive Party proposed the introduction of compulsory civil marriage, while the Slovak People's Party wanted to change the existing Hungarian laws of 1894, according to which civil

<sup>23</sup> See e.g. Karel Viškovský, 126. schůze ... dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3725), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*; Weyr, excerpt in Broklová (1992b:59).

<sup>24</sup> Ferdinand Peroutka: *Budování státu III* (1991:936–43).

<sup>25</sup> Peroutka (1991:945).

<sup>26</sup> (odčiníme křivdy bělohorské, že odčiníme dobu 300letého urpení českého národa, kterou zavinili Habsburkové a kterou zavinil také Řím). Bohuslav Vrbenský, 25. schůze ... dne 24. listopadu 1920 (pp. 457–58), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...* The Social democrats still had separation of church and state on its program in 1927. See *Československá sociální demokracie. Její cíle, program a postup* (1925:12), *Program Československé sociálnědemokratické strany dělnické* (1927:9).

marriage was already compulsory. The result was a compromise, where civil and church weddings were made equal before the law. At the same time, divorce became legal also for Catholics.<sup>27</sup> Another law from 1919 allowed cremation, which had been forbidden in Austria. In 1925, a law was adopted that harmonized legislation in the Czech lands and Slovakia with respect to entering or leaving a Church, and regarding the right of the parents to decide the religion of their children (until the age of 16). This law also gave people the right to abstain from celebrating the holidays of other confessions; nobody could be forced to take the day off.

A second category of changes concerned the relationship between the Church and education. The first Minister of Education, Gustav Habrman, ruled that religious drills, visits to churches and the like were not an inseparable part of school instruction. There were several proposals already in the Revolutionary Parliament aiming at making religion a voluntary subject (to be taught outside the normal school day) and to introduce civics as a subject in all schools. The progressives argued that religion in the schools collided with §119 of the Constitution (see page 319). In this matter a compromise was reached only in 1922. Through an amendment to the Law of Elementary Schools, civics was introduced, and it became possible to be exempted from religious instruction, but only children without confession could be totally exempted.<sup>28</sup>

Another side of the relationship between the Church and education was the matter of theological faculties. Jan Herben proposed the establishment of an independent Protestant theological faculty in Prague already in 1918, named after Hus. Following the proposal of Antonín Cyril Stojan (ČSL), the theological faculty in Olomouc had its name changed to the Cyrillo-Methodian Faculty of Theology. A proposal to establish a theological faculty at the new Masaryk University was rejected, while the Revolutionary Parliament agreed to the proposal of František Jehlička to establish a Catholic theological faculty in Bratislava, with the addition that the languages of instruction would be Czech and Slovak.

A third category of changes concerned the relationship of the churches and their organs to the state. From our point of view the most important change was the amendment to the Law of Preaching, which made it illegal for the clergy to speak against existing or proposed laws or to recommend certain parties in their sermons, religious instruction in the schools, or other official religious acts. This was a direct reply to the pastoral letters that had been circulated.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, a few words about relations to the Vatican: The first ambassador (1920–22) to the Vatican was Kamil Krofta, and there was a papal nuncio in Prague. Both Masaryk and Beneš well understood the influence of the Papacy, and thus the necessity of maintaining good diplomatic relations. Masaryk always emphasized that separation of church and state would have to

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<sup>27</sup> The 1894 religion laws were the reason why the Hungarian People's Party (*néppárt*), from which the Slovak People's Party originated, was founded in the first place. See Rychlík (1997:78); *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928:920), and *Zákon 320/1919 in Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1919).

<sup>28</sup> *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928:921–27).

<sup>29</sup> *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928:927–31).

be resolved through an agreement.<sup>30</sup> Immediately after the war, the most important questions from the government's point of view were the appointment of new, nationally reliable bishops in Slovakia (of the six bishops, only one spoke Slovak), and border adjustments to make sure that dioceses did not straddle state borders. Three Slovak bishops were appointed only in the beginning of 1920.<sup>31</sup> A crisis in the relationship with the Vatican erupted in 1925, following official government participation in the Jan Hus celebration. I will return to this later.

Although formal separation of church and state was never implemented, the Catholic Church did lose its privileged position. The main principle of the First Republic in religious issues was full equality among the various confessions and between believers and non-believers. In the words of Ferdinand Peroutka, "separation was realized for those who wanted to live in separation from the Church, but not for those who wanted to live in some relationship with the Church."<sup>32</sup> The aim was to keep the religious peace in the Czechoslovak camp through broad compromises, which for the most part also accommodated the Slovak People's Party.

### *Slovak religious demands*

While the number of tangible religious demands was fairly low, there were numerous examples of religious metaphors in Ľudák rhetoric, especially in *Slovák* and in Hlinka's speeches and writings, as we have already seen in the preceding chapter. Prior to the 1925 election, Hlinka wrote that it was a matter of who would rule the Slovaks: "Christ or Lucifer, Bethlehem or Sodomy." Likewise, *Slovák* constantly referred to the Social Democrats as "Sodomites", a play on words twisting an abbreviation of the party name around (*Social democrats*). *Slovák* also claimed that the Ľudáks worked for the rights of the Slovak nation on the basis of God's laws and the Pittsburgh agreement. According to Hlinka there were two pillars in the Ľudák program: Autonomy and Christianity; he felt certain that "our truth will prevail, for it is joined to Christ."<sup>33</sup> Juriga even on one occasion stated that the Czechs "believe that they descend from apes, but we believe in Gods creation."<sup>34</sup>

This rhetoric was mostly directed at political adversaries (the socialists) and non-believers rather than against the Czechs as such.<sup>35</sup> However, the Czechs in Slovakia were sometimes presented as godless, and accused of lacking respect for Slovak piety. This was most common in the beginning, which is perhaps not surprising.

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<sup>30</sup> Peroutka (1991:945–46), Antonín Klimek and Eduard Kubů: *Československá zahraniční politika 1918–1938* (1995).

<sup>31</sup> *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928:932), Rychlík (1997:77).

<sup>32</sup> (odluka byla uskutečněna pro ty, kteří chtějí žít v odloučenosti od církve, však nebyla uskutečněna pro ty, kteří v nějakém spojení s církví žít chtějí). Peroutka (1991:942–43).

<sup>33</sup> (Naša pravda zvíťazí, lebo je spojená s Kristom!). *Slovák* no. 55, 27.12.1925:1. See also *Slovák* no. 2, 3.1.1927:1; *Slovák* no. 82a, Easter 1928:1; *Slovák* no.74, Easter 1929:1.

<sup>34</sup> (veria, že pochádzajú z opice, ale my veríme zase v božské stvorenie). Ferdiš Juriga in *Slovák* no. 202, 6.9.1929:1.

<sup>35</sup> See e.g. the program of 1919, where 5–6 pages are accusations against the socialists, for instance that they forswore God and persecuted the Church. *Naša Slovenská Ľudová Strana. Čo ona chce a za čo bojuje?* (1919:2–7).

The Memorandum of the Slovaks to the Peace Conference of 1919 is illustrative: "The heresy of Hus, unknown in Slovakia until now, is strongly propagated by the Czechs in our unfortunate country. On July 6, 1919, commemorative bonfires were lighted in the villages throughout Slovakia. Speeches were made against the religion of the Slovak people. Czech soldiers, Sokols, and employees make fun of the Slovaks' piety. Many statues of saints have been mutilated, numerous churches profaned. [...] The Czech professors and teachers who were sent to the Slovak schools try to destroy the religious spirit of our youth." The memorandum also contained complaints that the Czech regime confiscated Slovak Catholic secondary schools.<sup>36</sup> This alleged behavior of the Czechs in Slovakia was later used as an argument for reserving jobs in Slovakia for Slovaks (see Chapter Twelve).

Religious *demands* were mostly raised early in the period. Hlinka, for instance, presented a memorandum to the Minister for Slovakia in 1919 where he demanded autonomy for the Catholic Church, the appointment of Slovak bishops in the Catholic Church, the establishment of a theological faculty in Bratislava, and the preservation of confessional schools. Šrobár agreed to support the contents of the memorandum, apart from preservation of the schools.<sup>37</sup> It is symptomatic that religious issues were on the grievance list in the Memorandum of the Slovaks of 1919, but not in the Žilina Manifesto of the Slovak People's Party of 1922 or the Trnava Manifesto of 1925. In the 32 demands of the Slovak People's Party from 1935, the only religious demands were the return of state-held Catholic *gymnasias* and the fulfilling of a Catholic theological faculty at Comenius University.<sup>38</sup> The demand for the preservation of the confessional schools and the Law of Holidays thus stood out as *ľudák* grievances.

### THE STRUGGLE FOR CONFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

In one of the very first debates in the Parliament after the 1920 election, Ferdiš Juriga protested against the robbery of the confessional *gymnasias* in Slovakia. He warned the Czechs against thinking that the "Slovak nation is ungodly and does not want instruction in religion, and that it will allow the Church to be robbed of church buildings and of all property." In the same debate he demanded religious autonomy, arguing that "we will not be dictated by you in matters of conscience", and added that they did not need "Hussites" to make church laws. A few months later Hlinka read a resolution of the Executive Committee of the Slovak People's Party, which included the demand for a return of Church property and schools. However, he did not make any great point out of it in his speech. Neither did Jozef Buday in 1922 when he simply demanded the return of all "stolen Slovak secondary schools."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> The Memorandum of the Slovaks to the Peace conference of 1919, printed as document no. 25, in Mikuš (1995:166–67).

<sup>37</sup> Jan Rychlík: *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století* (1997:75–76).

<sup>38</sup> These are published as document no. 28, 29 and 31 in Mikuš (1995:pp. 199, 208, 210–11).

<sup>39</sup> (Že národ slovenský je bezbožnícky a nechce vyučovania náboženstva, že chce nechať olúpiť cirkev o kostoly a o všetok majetok). (My si od vás diktovať na naše svedomie nedáme). Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 181); Hlinka, 18. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 208); (všetky ukradené slovenské stredné školy). Buday, 160. schůze... dne 25. října 1922 (p. 110), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

In the budget debate of 1924, Buday complained that a school building belonging to a Catholic boys' school in Nitra had been confiscated and given to the state-run school. Anton Hancko pointed out that Catholics and other believers were in the great majority in Slovakia, and complained that a small number of progressives and unbelievers who were "in reality Czechs in Slovakia" ruled Slovakia. Hancko claimed that apart from some 6,000 – 8,000 Czech unbelievers, the whole Slovak nation was determined to fight for the confessional schools on life and death, especially since they were identical with the idea of the Slovak nation. He pointed out that 75 percent of the schools in Slovakia were confessional, and argued that by closing them down the Minister of Education was initiating a struggle with the entire Slovak nation. He also renewed the complaint that the Slovak Catholic *gymnasia* had been taken over by the state.<sup>40</sup> The main emphasis was, however, at this point moved to the primary schools. In the 1928 budget debate, Hancko claimed that the unbelievers in the state school administration were systematically trying to suppress the people's religious spirit, but especially the Catholic spirit, and in Slovakia they were thereby also suppressing the Slovak national spirit.<sup>41</sup>

The image of the Catholic schools as vital for the preservation of Slovak national spirit was even clearer in a speech Hlinka held immediately after the election in 1929. Hlinka pointed out that until 1873, "when the Magyarization started" there had not been a single state school in Slovakia. Had it not been for the confessional schools, he argued, there might not have been a single Slovak left. "All that we have, national conviction, Slovak patriotic feeling and love for Slovakia, we got from the confessional schools", he argued. These schools should therefore be supported: "If the government had any understanding of the soul of the Slovak nation, [...] it would not create artificial antagonism and misunderstandings."<sup>42</sup>

In the same debate, Anton Štefánek pointed out that the division according to religious confession often meant small one-class schools. Yet, he regarded every anti-religious step (e.g. against religious instruction) as unacceptable, because it would endanger a harmonious and solid "cultural, state-political and national-Czechoslovak development." He polemized against the alleged Slovak character of the confessional schools under the Magyar regime. He argued that there were only 94 purely Slovak schools in 1914, and of these there were very few Catholic confessional schools, only between five and ten, while most of the Slovak schools were Protestant. As for the Catholic *gymnasia*, he said, they were only nominally Catholic and without exception served Magyarization. This was also the reason why he had personally turned them into state schools when serving as official in charge of education under Šrobár.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Buday, 230. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 23. listopadu 1923 (p. 480), and Hancko, 232. schůze ... dne 27. listopadu 1923 (p. 713), in *Těsнопisecké zprávy*...

<sup>41</sup> He also repeated the demand for the return of the Catholic *gymnasia* in this budget debate. Hancko, 109. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1927 (pp. 87, 90), in *Těsнопisecké zprávy*...

<sup>42</sup> (Všetko, čo máme, národné presvedčenie, vlastenecko-slovenské cítenie a lásku k Slovensku, to všetko dostali sme od cirkevných konfesionalných škôl). (Keďby slávna vláda mala porozumenie pre dušu slovenského národa, [...] nevyvolávala by umelé rozpory a nedorozumenia). Hlinka, 4. schůze ... dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 63, 64), in: *Těsнопisecké zprávy*...

<sup>43</sup> (nebezpečný pre harmonický a solídny vývoj kultúrny, štátno-politický a národno-československý), Štefánek, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. prosince 1929 (pp. 58–60), in: *Těsнопisecké zprávy*...

A new clash over the matter came in the budget debate of 1930, when Martin Mičura of the Czechoslovak People's Party was the first to defend the confessional schools by referring to the "glorious past" of these schools. "Before 1868 there were only church schools in Slovakia. [...] For the Slovak nation they meant much more: life. Without the confessional elementary schools there would hardly be Slovaks today. In the time of the harshest Magyarization the confessional elementary schools were the shelter of the Slovak language." Mičura defended the national honor of the Catholic schools, and found it unfair that the Slovak character of these schools was doubted. The Ľudák František Mojto was against unification of the school system according to the Czech model because the instruction in Czech schools was anti-Catholic. This was also evident from the many pupils who professed no confession, he said.<sup>44</sup>

Ivan Markovič (ČSD) wanted unification of the Slovak school system and its separation from the church, while Václav Sladký (a Czech National Socialist), characterized the preservation of the "backward, church confessional lowly organized schools" in Slovakia as an anachronism. He argued that the school system should be united and turned over to the state in the interest of accelerating the "cultural development of the very talented and very able Slovak people", which in his view was retarded by the present system.<sup>45</sup>

The Ľudáks filed an interpellation about "the brutal battle against the church schools" in 1930, where Anton Šalát asked the government to stop establishing competing state schools in small villages with a longstanding tradition of confessional schools, confiscating schools buildings, etc. He cited several examples, but the Minister of Education, Ivan Dérer, had an answer to all of them. For example, one state school had been established because of the need to provide the Slovak minority in a village with an alternative to the existing Magyar confessional school. Dérer's tone was rather conciliatory; he emphasized that an improvement of Slovak schools was the important thing, and denied being against confessional schools.<sup>46</sup>

Confessional schools had a long history in Slovakia. As Table 13 shows, an overwhelming majority of the schools in the Slovak counties were confessional before the war. Although 723 state-run schools with Slovak language of instruction had been established by the school year 1920/21, 67 percent of the primary schools were still confessional, a figure that dropped to 53.4 percent by 1931/32. I have not been able to find later figures, but the figure is likely to have remained high throughout the 1930s. In the Czech lands there were no such schools.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> (Do r. 1868 na Slovensku [...] bolo len cirkevné školstvo. [...]Pre slovenský národ znamenalo ono o veľa viac: život. Bez cirkevných ľudových škôl dnes sotva bolo by Slovákov. V dobe najtuhšej maďarizácie cirkevné ľudové školy boli útulňami slovenčiny). Mičura, 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (pp. 36–37), and Mojto, 21. schůze ... dne 21. února 1930 (p. 69), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>45</sup> (zaostalé církevní, konfesijní, níže organizované školy). (kulturního vývoje velmi nadaného a velmi schopného slovenského lidu). Sladký, 21. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. února 1930 (p. 60), and Markovič, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (p. 67), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>46</sup> (zastavenia krutého boja oproti cirkevným školám). See Tisk 402/III (interpellation) and Tisk 674/XVII in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám*..., Svazek III and V (1930).

<sup>47</sup> See O. Chlup, J. Kubálek, J. Uher (eds): *Pedagogická encyklopedie* (1938:635).



**Table 13: Schools with Slovak and Magyar as medium of instruction**

Language of instruction year		Public schools		Confessional schools					Other	Total
		State-run	Municipal	Roman Catholic	Uniate	Calvinist	Lutheran	Jewish		
1904/5	Slovak	–	38	653	16	–	223	–	–	930
	Magyar	475	103	1,259	240	343	309	144	73	2,946
1907/8	Slovak	–	26	333	1	–	42	–	–	502
	Magyar	539	112	1,584	316	345	392	138	75	3,501
Nov. 1. 1918	Slovak	–	4	43	–	–	93	–	–	140
	Magyar	836	111	1,459	302	244	320	77	32	3,381
1920/21	Slovak	723	53	1,091	75	7	391	44	16	2,400
	Magyar	74	32	360	10	198	29	30	3	736
1931/32	Slovak	1,353	158	1,117	162	23	398	36	3	3,250
	Magyar	81	80	346	10	191	28	18	–	754

Source: *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920:37; 1925:26), *Slovenské školstvo v prítomnosti* (1932:11,17–18).

I have not found any complaints concerning confessional schools in the Parliament after 1930, only in *Slovák*.<sup>48</sup> However, Šalát filed an interpellation in 1932 against rumors of reduced religious instruction in Slovak secondary schools in order to bring Slovak schools in line with Czech schools. This was allegedly proposed by the "progressive" teachers. Dérer reassured the ľudáks that no such reform was planned.<sup>49</sup>

#### AGAINST HUS DAY

While the matter of the confessional schools was a recurrent issue, the controversy about the Law of Public Holidays took place mostly in 1925. A new law was needed in order to decide when schools, public offices etc. should be closed, and to ensure that the same rules applied throughout the whole territory. In the process, some of the traditional Catholic holidays were abolished, but quite a few remained, thanks to the position of the Czechoslovak People's Party in the government coalition.<sup>50</sup> The day of Jan Nepomucký, the Counter-Reformation saint, was among the religious holidays that were abolished. Some new public holidays were also established. October 28th had been instituted as Independence Day as early in 1919. In addition, May 1st was recognized as the international workers' day, July 5th as the day of Cyril and Methodius, July 6th as Jan Hus Day, and September 28th as the day of Saint Václav.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup> See *Slovák* no. 4, 5.1.1933:3, *Slovák* no. 6, 8.1.1933:1, *Slovák* no. 35, 12.2.1933:1.

<sup>49</sup> See Tisk 1628/IX (interpellation) and Tisk 1754/II, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX and X (1932). According to Owen V. Johnson: *Slovakia 1918–1938. Education and the making of a nation* (1985:114), there were two differences in terms of curriculum in secondary schools: Religion was compulsory in Slovakia, German in the Czech lands.

<sup>50</sup> Kept were January 1st and 6th (Epiphany), Ascension Day, Corpus Christi, June 29th (the Apostles Peter and Paulus), August 15th (Virgin Mary's ascension to heaven), November 1st (All Saints), December 8th (Immaculate Conception) and December 25th. Abolished were e.g. Easter Monday, Whitsun Monday, and several days honoring the Virgin Mary.

<sup>51</sup> See Tisk 5061 (government proposal) and Tisk 5119 (report of the Constitutional-Judicial Committee) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXIV (1925).

As usual, the government proposal was the result of a compromise. The socialist parties wanted to remove more religious holidays, and the Czechoslovak People's Party wanted to keep more, including Jan Nepomucký Day, but did not object to a Hus Day, which was by far the most controversial on Slovak side. Already in May 1924, before the bill had even been drafted, Florián Tománek filed an interpellation against making Jan Hus Day a public holiday and thereby obliging Catholics to celebrate it. This was "simply a provocation to the religious feelings of the Catholics of the republic, and especially of the Slovak Catholics, who do not even have anything in common with Hus nationally."<sup>52</sup> Jozef Tiso regarded it as a new attack on the Catholics on the part of the "progressives", and wrote in *Slovák týždenník* that he would like to see the Slovak who would be in favor of abolishing Catholic holidays only to establish new ones. "Our Catholic holidays are for us the heritage of our forefathers, a source of spiritual light and firmness, and we are therefore not giving them up", he concluded.<sup>53</sup>

The Law of Public Holidays was debated in the Parliament on March 21st, 1925, and the spokesman of the Constitutional-Judicial Committee was the Agrarian Josef Černý. His argumentation in favor of the various new public holidays is a splendid example of Czech national rhetoric, and reflects how, apart from July 5th (the day of Cyril and Methodius), the new public holidays celebrated Czech historical persons and events rather than Slovak ones. Indeed, while the reason for making July 5th a public holiday was given in one sentence (where the apostles Cyril and Methodius were credited with founding Slav literature), Černý spoke at great length about Saint Václav and Jan Hus. A few examples may illustrate the tone:

"In Saint Václav, the Czech nation has already for a thousand years seen its national patron, with whose name the symbol of Czechoslovak statehood, the Crown of Saint Václav, coalesced, and whose cult became so widespread in the Czech lands that this day [September 28th] was regarded not only as a purely Christian holiday, but mainly as a national holiday." Černý's praise of Jan Hus was even greater: "In Master Jan Hus the overwhelming majority of the Czechoslovak nation sees its great son and greatest Czech, with whose name a part of the heroic past, of our most glorious national history, is connected. Hus became the first awakener of the nation, a great defender of its rights and freedom, a fearless combatant for the moral and spiritual liberation of humanity. Precisely in this lies the gigantic importance of Hus, and not only for the Czechoslovak nation, but also for the entire cultural world."<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> (iba dráždenie náboženského citenia katolíkov republiky a zvlášte však Slovákov-katolíkov, ktorí ani z národného ohľadu s Husom nič spoločného nemajú). Tisk 4636/V, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXII (1924).

<sup>53</sup> (Sviatky naše katolícké sú nám dedictvom otcov našich, sú nám zdrojom svetla a otuženia duševného, preto sa ich nezriekneme!) Tiso, *Slovák týždenník* no. 23a, 8.6.1924:1–2.

<sup>54</sup> (sv. Václava, ve kterém český národ už téměř po tisíciletí vidí svého národního patrona, s jehož jménem srostl symbol československé samostatnosti, koruna svatováclavská, a jehož kult stal se v Čechách tak rozšířeným, že den tento byl považován nejen za svátek čistě církevní, ale hlavně i za svátek národní). (Mistra Jana Husi, ve kterém vidí převážná část československého národa svého velikého syna a největšího Čecha, s jehož jménem je spojen kus heroické minulosti našich nejslavnějších národních dějin. Hus stal se prvním buditelem národa, slavným zastáncem jeho práv a svobody, neohroženým bojovníkem za mravní a duchovní osvobození lidstva. V tom právě spočívá gigantický význam Husův, a to nejen pro československý národ, ale i pro celý kulturní svět). Černý, 336. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1484), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

Finally, Černý spoke of the "greatest holiday of the Czechoslovak nation": "On October 28th, 1918, the oppressed nation's hundreds of years of struggle with foreign powers and the foreign hostile dynasty was brought to an end. On this glorious and memorable day the bonds of slavery and national subjugation were definitely severed and national freedom was proclaimed before the entire world. On this day the government of national affairs was returned to the nation according to the prophetic words of the great teacher of the nation Jan Amos Komenský. [...] Through October 28th the unity of the two national strata, the Czech and Slovak, was established for ever."<sup>55</sup> Note how Černý spoke of "the Czechoslovak nation" in the context of October 28th as well as Jan Hus, as if these were shared rather than Czech traditions. This was of course entirely in line with the Czechoslovakist view in the scholarly debate, and the tendency of the school textbooks in history. In fact, the heretic Jan Hus was certainly no hero in the eyes of the majority in Slovakia. By contrast, the cult of Jan Nepomucký was quite widespread, albeit on a religious basis.<sup>56</sup> The Ľudáks must have been well aware of the association of Jan Nepomucký's name with the Counter-Reformation and the *temno*, which was the reason why it was decided to abolish Jan Nepomucký Day as a public holiday in the first place. They nevertheless openly preferred him to Jan Hus in the debate.

October 28th was the day when the Czechoslovak National Committee in Prague had proclaimed the establishment of a Czechoslovak republic. As we have seen, this Committee was exclusively Czech until the day of the founding of the republic, when Vavro Šrobár joined as the only Slovak (cf. page 189). For the Slovaks, the Martin Declaration of October 30th served a similar function, but this day was not turned into a national holiday, which Andrej Hlinka did not fail to point out. He called this omission a "trampling of Slovak traditions",<sup>57</sup> and assured the Parliament that the Slovaks would keep celebrating October 30th anyway – which they did, as the numerous reports in *Slovák* about public rallies show.<sup>58</sup>

The Ľudáks proposed in the Constitutional-Judicial Committee that Jan Hus Day be replaced with Jan Nepomucký Day and October 28th be replaced with October 30th as public holidays in Slovakia. This proposal was of course unacceptable to the majority, in view of the predominant Czechoslovakist ideology. Allowing October 30th to a public holiday instead of October 28th would in effect mean acknowledging the Slovaks as a separate nation with a right to autonomy – especially since the Martin Declaration was so central in the Ľudák argumentation in favor of autonomy, as we shall see in Chapter Thirteen. Likewise, if the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation, and Jan Hus was a great Czech, then he was also a great

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<sup>55</sup> (největší svátek národa československého). (28. října r. 1918 dobojován byl staletý zápas utlačovaného národa s cizí mocí a s cizí nepřátelskou dynastií. V tento slavný a věkopamátný den svržena byla definitivně pouta otroctví a národní poroby a proklamována byla před celým světem svoboda národní. V tento den vrátila se podle věšteckých slov velikého učitele národa Jana Amosa Komenského vláda věcí národních v ruce národa. [...] 28. říjnem vtělena byla na věky jednota obou vrstev národních, české a slovenské). Černý, 336. schůze ... dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1485), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>56</sup> Ferdiš Juriga e.g. complained that the ungodly Czechs had torn down a statue of Jan Nepomucký, the only holy Czech in Slovakia. Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 184), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>57</sup> (to je šliapanie slovenských tradíc). Hlinka, 336. schůze ... dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1505), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>58</sup> See e.g. *Slovák* no. 246, 1.11.1931, which contains an especially lively report.

son of the "Czechoslovak nation", and should thus be celebrated throughout the territory of the republic. Conversely, if Jan Nepomucký was a false saint who did not deserve a public holiday in the Czech lands, how could he be celebrated in Slovakia?

The speech of Františka Zeminová (ČS) illustrates how symbol-laden the names of Jan Hus and Jan Nepomucký were: "500 years of history is concentrated in them. The moments of the highest glory and the most terrible suffering. The awakening and death of the freedom of conscience, the sunlight glare and the midnight darkness of the freedom of the nation is associated with them. Two symbols, illuminating the sharp thousand-year long struggles of the Slavs with Rome. We admit that the bill abolishing the holiday of Nepomuk and forever introducing the day of Master Jan Hus as public holiday in the republic fills us with deep emotions. [...] The saint of the darkness (*temno*) Jan Nepomucký will fall into oblivion, the genius of the nation and the saint of truth Jan Hus will live for ever in the hearts of the grateful nation."<sup>59</sup> She explicitly used the words "false saint" about Nepomucký, stating that he had been declared holy for political rather than for religious reasons.

She also reproached the Ľudáks and Magyars for being against the abolition of the day of Saint Štefan (Stephen/István), arguing that he was not a martyr, but "an aggressive, barbarian prince, who got the title of apostolic king from the Pope." He established bishoprics, archbishoprics and monasteries with such wealth that the church dignitaries in Slovakia were still among the richest in the world. This was not a matter of religious symbols, she argued, but of "preserving the memory of the Magyar king who was the greatest exterminator of Slavs, [...] who took away the freedom of the Slavs and gave privileges and wealth to the clergy."<sup>60</sup>

In contrast, Andrej Hlinka defended Jan Nepomucký and opposed a Jan Hus Day. He presented St. Václav, St. Vojtech and St. Jan Nepomucký as his ideals, arguing that the whole Czech national development was associated with these names. He polemized against Zeminová's claim that Nepomucký was a false saint, and asked why there were 25,000 statues of him in the Czech lands alone if that were the case. Because the Slovaks saw "in the Czechs our brothers", he said, "we went to these statues every May 16th and prayed for Slav victory, for the brotherhood of all Slavs. [But] you tear up and ruin the Slav ideal and our holy Christianity, which united us, and give us Jan Hus. [...] You come to Slovakia and start burning

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<sup>59</sup> (500 let naší historie je v nich soustředěno. Chvilé nejvyšší slávy i nejstrašnějšího utrpení. Je spjato s ní probuzení i smrt svobody svědomí, záře sluneční i půlnoční temno svobody národa. Dva symboly, osvětlující pronikavě tisíciletý zápas Slovanů s Římem. Přiznáváme, že předloha rušící svátek Nepomuka a zavádějící na věky v republice památný den mistra Jana Husi, naplňuje nás hlubokým pohnutím. [...] Světec temna Jan Nepomucký padá do propasti zapomenoutí, genius národa a světec pravdy Jan Hus živ bude věčně v srdcích vděčného národa). Zemínová, 336. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1491–1492), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>60</sup> (Štěpána výbojného, barbarského knížete, který přijal od papeže titul apoštolského krále). (udržení památky maďarského krále, který byl největším hubitelem Slovanů, [...] který Slovanům svobodu bral a privileje i bohatsví kněžím dával). Zemínová, 336. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1492), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

bonfires for Master Hus and present the Hussites as some sort of ideal in the schools. We have our Slovak ideals, [...] we are going to keep them, and we will never celebrate Hus."<sup>61</sup>

Hlinka remained opposed to Hus Day. In July 1927, for instance, he denounced Hus as a heretic and condemned the "Hussites, who killed, burned and plundered all [over] the Czech lands and Slovakia [...]. Thus, in our republic only historical illiterates or blind warmongers will celebrate the memory of the proud Hus. [...]. The Slovaks will always celebrate their fathers Cyril and Methodius – let the renegades and apostates celebrate Hus", he concluded.<sup>62</sup>

Václav Myslivec of the Czechoslovak People's Party took a middle position, recognizing Hus for national reasons, but at the same time defending Nepomucký. He assured the Parliament that the party honored Jan Hus as a defender of the nation, and said that as a Catholic he could also accept some 90 percent of Hus' religious teachings. He was, however, not willing to give up Nepomucký, and would strive to give him back the position he deserved in the nation.<sup>63</sup>

On Jan Hus Day June 6th, 1925, a massive public assembly was held in the Old Town square in Prague, where Masaryk, Beneš and Prime Minister Švehla were present. The following day the papal nuncio, Monsignor Marmaggi, left Prague after delivering a protest note against government participation in what he called a strongly anti-Catholic manifestation. This incident led to several interpellations in the Parliament. The National Socialists found the act of the papal nuncio unheard-of, especially because it happened on the day of the first official commemoration of the incineration of Jan Hus, "the greatest son of our nation and one of the greatest figures of world history." They asked whether the government would now break off diplomatic relations with the Vatican and recall the envoy. They also used the opportunity to repeat their call for a separation of church and state.<sup>64</sup>

Three of the same National Socialists filed a new interpellation concerning government participation in the Hus Day celebration the year after, where they demanded that the caretaker government of Jan Černý take part in the celebrations in 1926.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> (preto, že sme v Čechoch svojich bratov videli, každého 16. mája chodíme k tým sochám a modlíme sa za víťazstvo slavianske, za sbratrenie všetkých Slovanov. [...] tento ideál slavianstva a kresťanstva nášho svätého, ktorý nás pojal, strhnete a zničíte a dáte nám Majstra Jána Husa. [...] pridete na Slovensko a začínate na Majstra Husa vatry páliť a po školách nám Husitov ako nejaký ideál dávať. My máme svoje slovenské ideály [...] a tých se budeme pridržovať a Husa svätitiť nikdy nebudeme). Hlinka, 336. schůze ... dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1504), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>62</sup> (Husiti, ktorí vykynožili, vypálili a vydrancovali celé Čechy a Slovensko. [...] Preto v našej republike len historický analfabet alebo zaslepený štváč oslavuje pamiatku pyšného Husa. [...] Slováci budú oslavovať vždycky svojich otcov Cyrilla a Methoda – zradcovia a odpadlíci nech oslavujú Husa). Andrej Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 147, 3.7.1927:1. See also *Slovák týždenník* no. 12, 22.3.1925:1, no. 15, 12.8.1925:8; no. 42, 18.10.1925:3, and *Slovák* no. 149, 3.7.1930:1; no. 110, 16.5.1934:1.

<sup>63</sup> Myslivec, 336. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. března 1925 (p. 1510), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>64</sup> (největšího syna našeho národa a jedné z nejskvělejších postav světových dějin). Tisk 5259 in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám*..., Svazek XXVI (1925). See also *Československá vlastivěda*, Díl II, Dějiny Svazek 2 (1969:447–48). The German Social Democrats filed a second interpellation, also calling for diplomatic relations to be broken off. See Tisk 5260 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám*..., Svazek XXVI (1925).

<sup>65</sup> Tisk 373 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám*..., Svazek III (1926). I have not registered any reply to this interpellation.

Andrej Hlinka filed an interpellation on behalf of the "11 million Catholics, mainly Czechs and Slovaks", admitting that the act of the papal nuncio had been rash and untactical, but blaming it on the anti-Catholic Czech press. Hlinka criticized the government for participating in the celebration and especially for the use of the Hussite flag (white with a red chalice) at the President's residence and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This he characterized as a "gross insult to our loyalty to the state and our Catholic feelings", and an "insult to 85 percent of the loyal Catholics, for whom the Hussite wars bring forth the saddest memories. It is a demonstrative insult to Slovak Catholicism, which does not have anything in common with the heretic Master Jan Hus." Hlinka asked the government to take the steps necessary to renew diplomatic relations with the Vatican as soon as possible, and to stop the President's use of the Hussite flag.<sup>66</sup> The Czechoslovak People's Party also regretted the departure of the papal nuncio, although it did not file any interpellation to that effect.

The tone of the government statement of July 19th was reconciliatory, emphasizing that the government wanted a solution of the conflict with the Vatican as soon as possible. According to Prime Minister Švehla, there had been negotiations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the papal nuncio also prior to July 6th. However, the government did not back down. It was made absolutely clear that the matter of Jan Hus Day also in the future would be regarded as solved by the Law of Holidays. Likewise, it was emphasized that it would still be entirely up to the elected representatives of the Czechoslovak people to decide how the day should be celebrated and to what extent the government should participate.<sup>67</sup>

#### THE MODUS VIVENDI OF 1928

Czechoslovakia was the last remaining state with which the Vatican did not have an agreement. The so-called *Modus Vivendi* of 1928 took care of this and re-established diplomatic relations. These negotiations were the object of interpellations. In December 1926 the Social Democrats Josef Stivín and Václav Jaša reacted to rumors that the government was negotiating a Concordat with the Vatican. They argued that a Concordat would threaten the power of the state and its authority, because it would necessarily mean the mixing of Church power with the legal power of the state. Prime Minister Švehla assured them that a Concordat was out of the question, and that the government would seek a solution that would be in the interest of the whole state.<sup>68</sup> On January 24th, 1928, Stivín filed another interpellation, this time referring to rumors in the press about a *Modus Vivendi* with the Vatican, where he asked for a report about the contents of the agreement. This was given a week later through the press.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> (za hrubú urážku našej štátnosti a našich katolíckych citov). (dráždenie 85 % roduverných katolíkov, ktorých na husitské války tie najsmutnejšie rozpomienky upamätávajú. Je to ostentatívne dráždenie slovenského katolicizmu, ktorý nemá s Mistrom Jánom Husom, kacírom, nič spoločného). Tisk 5261, in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXVI (1925).

<sup>67</sup> Tisk 5320, in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXVII (1925). See also Pecháček (1996:56).

<sup>68</sup> Tisk 776/V (interpellation) and Tisk 1197/III (reply) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek V and VII (1927).

<sup>69</sup> Tisk 1443, in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX (1928).

The *Modus Vivendi* between Czechoslovakia and the Papacy was sanctioned by the government in January 1928, and contained six points, of which two are of special importance in our context. First, it was agreed that no part of the Czechoslovak republic could be placed under Church authorities located outside the borders of the republic, and that no Czechoslovak diocese could cross the state border. This first and foremost concerned Slovakia, where the old diocese borders did cross the new state border, sometimes with the seat on the wrong side of the border, as was the case with Esztergom (Ostrihom).

Second, it was agreed that the Papacy should have the right to appoint high church dignitaries, which was a concession to the Papacy. At the same time it was agreed that the Czechoslovak government should be informed of the names of candidates who were to become archbishops, bishops of dioceses, coadjutors *cum jure successionis* and army chaplains, in order to ensure that they were not unacceptable for political reasons. Such reasons could be irredentism, separatism, and activities directed against the Constitution or public order. It was also agreed that the above-mentioned categories of clergy had to be Czechoslovak citizens. These exemptions were important because Magyar church dignitaries used their positions to propagate the views of the Hungarian government in Slovakia, especially regarding the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. The need to stop them was also reflected in a third point obliging church dignitaries to swear an oath of allegiance to the Czechoslovak republic.<sup>70</sup>

Of the remaining three points, one concerned the government obligation to implement the agreement by legal proceedings, one concerned monasteries and one concerned the administration of church property. In order to ensure domestic control over the vast landed estates owned by the Catholic Church, the land of cross-border dioceses was put under administration by the Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia (Vavro Šrobár) after 1918.<sup>71</sup> According to the *Modus Vivendi*, this land would remain under administration until the agreement was implemented.

Before the contents of the *Modus Vivendi* were made public, *Slovák* opposed the agreement and demanded a Concordat. However, when the agreement was published, the paper merely reported it, and the year after, Hlinka complained that it had not yet been implemented. The Ľudáks did not polemicize against the agreement once it was adopted.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> The *Modus Vivendi*, and Beneš' letter to the Pope is published in *Slovák* no. 27, 2.2.1928:1. See also Alena Bartlová: *Účast' HSLS na politickom vývoji Slovenska (1930–1938)* (1972:17), and Václav Chaloupecký: *Die Modus Vivendi und die Slowakei* (1931, especially pages 291–92 and 305–6).

<sup>71</sup> The administration of this church property was the object of an interpellation by Florián Tománek in 1923, where he complained that the old central commission for the administration of Catholic large estates (consisting of Slovak Catholic clergy) had been dissolved and a new commission consisting of four Czechs (among these at least one Social Democrat) and one Slovak had been appointed. See Tisk 4313, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XX (1923).

<sup>72</sup> On the contrary, they used it as a point of departure when defending church interests. See *Slovák* no. 285, 20.12.1927:1, *Slovák* no. 28a, 4.2.1928:1, *Slovák* no. 230, 10.10.1929:1, *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1930:1. See also an interpellation by Andrej Hlinka concerning church property, Tisk 527, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IV (1930).

Why were religious issues so insignificant in terms of practical national demands, and why were such issues mostly raised in the beginning? The main reason was that most controversial religious issues were solved during the early period through compromises that were not too offensive to devout Catholics. This was largely due to the position of the Czechoslovak People's Party. Apart from the two Tusar cabinets in 1919–20, the party was a member of every single government coalition in the entire First Republic – and the price for this participation was something close to a veto in issues affecting the position of the Catholic Church. This means that the Czechoslovak People's Party served the interests of the Catholics also in Slovakia. It also means that religion was normally not allowed to constitute a nationally relevant conflict between Czechs and Slovaks.

A second reason why religious issues were raised mostly in the beginning may be that the clerical wing of the Slovak People's Party was reduced over time. In the first election period, 7 of 12 deputies were Catholic clergymen; in the next period they were down to 8 of 23; in the third period, 6 of 18 were clergymen, while in the last election period only 4 of 19 could boast the same. This reduction from 58.3 percent in the first period to 21.1 percent in the last is reflected in a shift of emphasis from clerical to national concerns, especially in the 1930s. On the other hand, the importance of this should not be overemphasized; although Hlinka was a priest and his rhetoric was often religious in tone, he was always first and foremost nationally oriented, and in the case of Jozef Tiso even the rhetoric was almost exclusively national.<sup>73</sup>

More important is probably the fact that the Ľudáks tried to form alliances in the 1930s, partly with the Czechoslovak People's Party, partly with the Slovak National Party. The former made it necessary to distinguish between progressive (and by implication bad) Czechs and Catholic Czechs, who constituted a majority. The latter made it necessary to emphasize the Christian rather than the Catholic dimension of Slovak identity. This search for alliances may thus be another reason why religious issues were not very high on the Ľudák agenda – at least not in the Parliament.<sup>74</sup>

What was then special about the struggle about the confessional schools and the Law of Public Holidays? The former was a Slovak issue because of the dominant position of confessional schools in Slovakia, while the Czech lands did not have such schools. In the latter case, the views of the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Slovak People's Party differed with respect to Jan Hus Day. It was acceptable to the former for Czech national reasons, but not to the latter. Making October 30th a public holiday was a specifically Slovak national demand that was unacceptable to the Czechoslovakist majority (including the Czechoslovak People's Party) because it would mean recognition of a separate Slovak nation. The *Modus Vivendi* resolved the conflict between the government and the Catholic Church.

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<sup>73</sup> For the occupation of the Ľudák deputies, see *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928, 1938), Vladimír Záděra: *Politické strany v národním shromáždění* (1930), Appendix C, and Appendix G (for the names).

<sup>74</sup> For a discussion of Ľudák attempts at forming alliances, see James Ramon Felak: *At the price of the republic. Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1929–1938* (1994:70 pp).



### ***Language issues***

The language policy of the First Republic was regulated primarily by the special Language Act in pursuance of §129 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the linguistic rights of all national groups, but gave the "Czechoslovak state, official language" a privileged status. In addition, the Parliament adopted a law regulating language instruction in the schools in 1923, confirming its privileged status. Since "Czechoslovak" was not one language but two, the balance between the Czech and Slovak version of the state language became a major point of dispute. Two government decrees regarding this matter were adopted, in 1926 and 1927.

Most Slovak linguistic grievances concerned the violation of existing language rights, the way the autonomists interpreted them, and they mostly concerned the schools, the administration, the railways and Comenius University. Apart from the linguistic provisions in the three autonomy proposals (1922, 1930 and 1938),<sup>75</sup> I have found only two Ľudák proposals aiming at amendment of the language regulations: a proposal from 1926 concerning the medium of instruction in Slovak schools, and a proposal from 1937 concerning the Language Act. First, we shall have a look at the language provisions in the Constitution, including the debate that led up to its promulgation, and the school law of 1923. Then we will see what these principles meant in practice, before we turn to Slovak linguistic grievances.

### ***The "Czechoslovak state, official language" in the Constitution***

There is no doubt that the members of the Revolutionary Parliament regarded Czechoslovakia as a nation-state, and all agreed that the "Czechoslovak language" should have a special status in the republic. The main disagreement thus concerned what should be required of the national minorities. Here the principle of justice for the minorities clashed with the need to ensure that no Czech (or Slovak) would feel as a minority in his own state.

The protection of national, religious and racial minorities was laid down in Section VI of the Constitution. According to §128, subsection 1, all citizens were equal before the law and had the same civil and political rights. Subsection 2 gave all citizens, regardless of language or religion, the right to enter public services or offices, obtain promotion or dignity, and exercise any trade or calling. Subsection 3 gave all citizens the right to use any language in private and business intercourse, in all matters pertaining to religion, in the press and other publications, and in public assemblies. Article 131 granted "considerable minorities" speaking "a language other than Czechoslovak" the right to receive instruction in their own tongue, but stated that "instruction in the Czechoslovak language" may be made a compulsory subject. Finally, §134 outlawed all forms for "forcible denationalization."<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> The autonomy proposals all contained provisions for linguistic self-determination for the Slovaks. See Chapter Thirteen.

<sup>76</sup> The latter article was Masaryk's idea. See Broklová (1992b:63–71). For the Constitution, see Zákon číslo 121. ze dne 29. února 1920, kterým se uvozuje ústavní listina československé republiky, in *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920). My quotations are mostly from an English version in: J. A. Mikuš: *Slovakia. A political and constitutional history (with documents)* (1995:170–198).

There was no explicit mention of the privileged status of the "Czechoslovak language" in the Constitution as such. Instead the provisions pertaining to language were stipulated in a special Language Act in pursuance of §129.

According to article 1: "The Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the Republic [...]. It is thus in particular the language 1. in which the work of all the courts, offices, institutions, enterprises and organs of the Republic shall be conducted, in which they shall issue their proclamations and notices as well as their inscriptions and designations. [...] 2. in which the principal text of state and other bank notes shall be printed. 3. which the armed forces of the country shall use for the purpose of command and as the language of service; in dealings with men and companies not knowing this language their mother tongue may also be used. Detailed regulations will be issued concerning the duty of state officials and employees, as well as officials and employees of state institutions and enterprises, to know the Czechoslovak language."

Article 2 of the Language Act defined "a considerable minority" (i.e. those who had the right to receive instruction in and to be addressed in their own language by courts, offices and state organs) as minimum 20 percent of the population of a law district (*okres*) belonging to the *same* national minority. The rule thus did not apply to mixed minorities of 20 percent. Article 5 stated that "the instruction in all schools established for members of a national minority shall be given in their language. Likewise educational and cultural institutions set up for them shall be administered in their language. (Article 9, Treaty of Saint Germain)."

In contrast, article 3 established the "duty of autonomous offices, representative councils and all public corporations in the state whatsoever to accept and to deal with oral or written matter in the Czechoslovak language." In other words, for the "Czechoslovak" state-nation the 20 percent rule did not apply. This was especially important for the status of the Czech minorities in the predominantly German-speaking border areas. Article 4 clarified when the Czechoslovak state language meant Czech and when it meant Slovak: "The State offices, using the state official language, shall, in their official proceedings as a rule use the Czech language in [the Czech lands], and the Slovak language in Slovakia. Matters presented in the Czech language and officially dealt with in Slovak, or presented in Slovak and dealt with in Czech, shall be deemed to have been dealt with in the language in which they were presented."

There were four major points of dispute. Of these, only one concerned the relation between the Czechs and the Slovaks, while the rest concerned the relation to the minorities, and especially to the Germans. Two of the controversies were about the wording of the first sentence in §1 of the Language Act (disputed words in *italics*): "The *Czechoslovak* language shall be the *state, official* language of the republic." The controversy concerning the wording *Czechoslovak* language was the only one involving Czecho–Slovak relations. The other controversy concerned whether this language should be called the *official* (oficiální) or the *state* (státní) language of the republic. The latter issue was the more disputed of the two.

The original draft of the Language Act read in §1 that "the *Czech* language shall be..." – which was identical with the Treaty of Saint Germain. In the Constitutional Committee this was changed to the *Czechoslovak* language. Ivan Dérer asked that *Czechoslovak language* be replaced with *Czech and Slovak language*. Dérer explained: "Personally neither I nor my colleague [Ludevít] Medvecký would have any objections [...], but it met with opposition in the [Slovak] Club. It was argued that in reality no Czechoslovak language exists, [only] a Czech language and a Slovak language, and that [the formulation] would not express what they wanted, that the Slovak language be on equal terms with the Czech language."<sup>77</sup>

Švehla pointed out that "we made that adjustment [...] assuming that we were accommodating the Slovak Club." Medvecký thought that the problem could be solved by the formulation "the Czechoslovak language (that is the Czech and Slovak language) is the official language...", but this was rejected by the chairman.<sup>78</sup> Švehla argued that it would have to be "the Czecho-Slovak language" with only a hyphen between, or else remain the way it was. The matter had been thoroughly discussed, he said, and although there were some philological doubts, they had been dissipated: "It actually already forms one language. Minister Šrobár showed me a letter of which nobody could tell whether it was Czech or Slovak. Especially in Bratislava it will certainly form. When the Czechoslovak nationality was formed, and [the term] Czechoslovak was used, everyone at first wondered what that was. When we formed it [one unit?] for the nation and the state, it is also possible for the language, for they are in reality two dialects."<sup>79</sup> In Švehla's view this solution was the simplest and best.

Zahradník had assumed that, after the merger, the Slovak intelligentsia would embrace the conviction that "the stone cast between us by Hungary is removed, and that we are one body and one soul. For in the last instance, the people around Strážnice, Hodonín and Slovenský Brod [in South-East Moravia] speak just like you, and it would not cross anybody's mind to say that they are not of our blood. [...] I assumed that the Slovak intelligentsia would influence the people to say: We are one nation, our language is one. [...] I cannot recognize the Slovaks as a separate nation and their language as a separate language." Zahradník was afraid that people would see Czecho-Slovak discord in the proposal from the Slovak club, and asked them to at least consider "Czecho-Slovak language" with a hyphen.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>77</sup> (Osobně já ani p. kol. Medvecký bych proti návrhu [...] žádné námitky neměl, ale v klubu narazilo to na odpor, poněvadž se řeklo, že československý jazyk vlastně neexistuje, ale že existuje jazyk český a jazyk slovenský, a že by tím jaksi nebylo vyjádřeno to, co oni chtějí, že by slovenský jazyk byl rovnoprávný s jazykem českým). Dérer in Broklová (1992b:72).

<sup>78</sup> (My jsme tuto úpravu udělali [...] předpokládající, že právě vycházíme vstříc pánům ze slovenského klubu). (Jazyk československý, t.j. jazyk český i slovenský [...] jest oficiálním jazykem). Švehla, Medvecký in: Broklová (1992b:72).

<sup>79</sup> (On se fakticky tvoří již jeden jazyk. Ministr Šrobár mi ukazoval jeden dopis, ze kterého již žádný nevěděl, je-li to čeština nebo slovenština. Speciálně v Bratislavě se to jistě bude vytvářet. Když se tvořila národnost československá a když se řeklo Čechoslovák, každý se zprvu ohlížel, co to je. Když jsme to vytvořili pro národ a stát, je to docela možno i pro jazyk. Vždyť jsou to vlastně dva dialekty). Švehla in: Broklová (1992b:72).

<sup>80</sup> (ten kámen vržený mezi nás Maďarskem je odstraněn a že jsme jedno tělo a jedna duše. Vždyť konečně lidé kolem Strážnice, Hodonína a Slovenského Brodu mluví právě tak jako u vás a nikoho nenapadne říkat, že to není naše krev. [...]) jsem si představoval, že inteligence slovenská bude působiti na lid, aby si řekl: My jsme jeden národ, naše řeč je jedna [...] nemohu uznati Slováky za samostatný národ a jejich jazyk za samostatný jazyk). Zahradník in: Broklová (1992b:72–73).

Hnídek asked the Slovak deputies to remind the Slovak Club that the original wording had been "the Czech language." He added: "By the present wording we wanted to express that Slovak is placed on equal terms with Czech. We wanted to accommodate the Slovak Club and indicate that Czech shall not even formally have preference before Slovak, and we insist that there is absolute parity between the Czech and Slovak dialect."<sup>81</sup> After this, Ludovít Medvecký declared that he agreed, and promised to raise the issue in the Slovak Club already the same day. He also asked Švehla to take part in the meeting. The meeting was held on January 15th, and the day after, Ivan Dérer informed the Constitutional Committee that the Slovak Club had agreed to the formulation "Czechoslovak language."<sup>82</sup>

The spokesman of the Constitutional Committee, Dr. Hnídek, emphasized also in the parliamentary debate that making the "Czechoslovak language" the state, official language meant full parity between the Czech and Slovak tongues. By this formulation, he said, the Committee wanted to signalize that "there is absolutely no difference between Slovak and Czech; the same rights that apply to Czech, apply to Slovak and vice versa...." He also argued that §4 of the Language Act (see page 336) "stipulates that absolute parity and equality of the Slovak language with the Czech language. There is thus no difference between Czech and Slovak. Something presented in Czech is exactly as valid in Slovakia as something [presented] in Slovak e.g. in Plzeň."<sup>83</sup> The Language Act in principle gave the Slovak language the same privileged position as the Czech language, but in practice the law did not offer Slovak much protection vis-à-vis Czech, since §4 did not prevent the use of Czech in Slovakia.

The second controversy involving §1 in the Language Act seems like a petty quarrel about philology, but its symbolic value at the time should not be underestimated. The original draft had translated the French "*langue officielle*" of the peace treaty into the Czech "*úřední jazyk*" (official language). Not finding this precise enough, a subcommittee of the Constitutional Committee had settled for "*oficiální jazyk*", rather than "*státní jazyk*" (state language), which was a Czech parallel to the German term "*Staatssprache*." In the Constitutional Committee, a majority conceded to including the term "*státní*", but only in a parenthesis as an explanation – "*oficiální (státní) jazyk*." This was not good enough for the most nationalist Czech party, the National Democrats, and neither was the final compromise "state, official language."

The preferred wording to a certain extent also reflected a disagreement over just *how* privileged the "Czechoslovak" language should be. The proponents of the term "state

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<sup>81</sup> (Nynějším zněním chtěli jsme vyjádřiti, že slovenština je postavena na roveň češtině, chtěli jsme vyjítí vstříc slovenskému klubu a naznačiti jim, že čeština ani formálně nemá mítí přednost před slovenštinou, a trváme na tom, že jest naprostá parita mezi nářečím českým a slovenským). Hnídek, excerpt in: Broklová (1992b:73).

<sup>82</sup> See Broklová (1992b:81).

<sup>83</sup> (není naprosto žádného rozdílu mezi slovenštinou a češtinou, táž práva, co platí pro češtinu, platí pro slovenštinu a vice versa). (§4 petrifikuje onu naprostou rovnocennost a rovnost jazyka slovenského s jazykem českým. Tedy zde není rozdílu mezi češtinou a slovenčinou, podání české jest právě tak na Slovensku platné, jako slovenské na př. v Plzni). Hnídek, 125. schůze Národního shromáždění republiky československé dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3682–83), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Národního shromáždění republiky československé*.

language" wanted to turn the "Czechoslovak language" into a compulsory subject in all schools, and oblige all public employees, (also in German- and Magyar-speaking areas) to know this language. These were the two last matters of dispute. Those who favored the term "official language" were concerned with following the peace treaty to the letter, in order not to give the German minority extra ammunition. "State language" historically meant oppression, and the Czechs could not now take up the Austrian nationality policy which they had been fighting against for so long, it was argued.<sup>84</sup> The choice of *official* language was thus meant to signal a different attitude to the minorities than the old Austrian prison of nations.

The majority decided to leave to the school law (to be adopted in 1923) to decide whether the "Czechoslovak" language should be a compulsory subject in the schools. An article regarding the obligation of public employees to know the "Czechoslovak" state language was deemed unnecessary, because "it follows from §1–2 that civil servants must be familiar with Czech."<sup>85</sup> As a compromise a new sentence was added to §1, calling for "detailed regulations" regarding the duty of state officials and employees to know the "Czechoslovak language."

The spokesman of the Constitutional Committee, František Hnídek, said that the main object of the Language Act was to eliminate the old linguistic struggles that had haunted Austria, remove "the old wrongs that were committed to our mother tongue for centuries" and fulfill the peace treaty. He argued that the Parliament gave the Germans and Magyars much more than they were obliged to, even "more than they deserve, considering their behavior towards the Czechoslovak republic, and we give it to them voluntarily." He also emphasized the need to solve the minority problem "in a way that shows that this state is ours, that this state is Czechoslovak, but [...] at the same time is also just."<sup>86</sup>

The chief opposition spokesman Karel Kramář insisted that a state language did not mean oppression, but simply stated "the fact that the state has its language."<sup>87</sup> He accused the majority of not having the courage to state clearly that every civil servant must know Czechoslovak. "These are not details, but a fundament. If you want to have civil servants who know the Czechoslovak language [...] then you must give them the opportunity in the schools, and teach them the Czech language." (Note Kramář's slip of the tongue). By not deciding this issue in the Revolutionary Parliament, Kramář argued, the majority would only carry it over into the new Parliament, where the German-speakers would also be represented.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> See Švehla and Beneš, excerpts in Broklová (1992b:75,180–183)

<sup>85</sup> (To vyplývá samo sebou z §1. ve spojení s §2., že úředníci musejí umět také česky). Hnídek, 125. schůze Národního shromáždění republiky československé dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3682–83), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy*...

<sup>86</sup> (staré křivdy, které byly na naší mateřštině páchány). (My jim dáváme více než dle svého chování k Československé republice zasluhují, a my jim to dáváme dobrovolně). (abychom ukázali, že tento stát je náš, že tento stát je československý, [...] ale zároveň také bychom ukázali se spravedlivými). Hnídek, 125. schůze Národního shromáždění republiky československé dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3680–81), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy*...

<sup>87</sup> (je prostě konstatování fakta, že stát má svůj jazyk). Kramář, excerpt in Broklová (1992b:180–183).

<sup>88</sup> (To nejsou žádné podrobnosti, to jest fundament. Chcete-li, abyste měli úředníky, kteří by uměli jazyk československý [...] pak musíte jim k tomu dát příležitosti ve školách a musíte je tam učit českému jazyku). Kramář, 126. schůze Národního shromáždění republiky československé dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3846), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy*...

A main concern of the Czech nationalist opposition was to protect the Czech minorities in the German-speaking areas by ensuring that all civil servants would be familiar with the Czech language.<sup>89</sup> Yet, they shared the wish to appear as "better than the enemy": Apart from Jaroslav Brabec (ČND),<sup>90</sup> nobody argued against giving the Germans more than they were entitled to in the peace treaty. Besides, all agreed that civil servants *as a rule* should be familiar with the state language. In practice, the two sides were thus not very far apart. The language law was first and foremost a solution to one of the most important remaining unfulfilled Czech cultural demands from the Austrian period: Czechization of the administration in Czech areas. A function of the debate was also to settle the score with the former German oppressors.

### *Language policy in principle and in practice*

In 1923 the Parliament adopted a separate law pertaining to language instruction in secondary schools and teachers' academies, which confirmed the privileged position of the "Czechoslovak state, official language." Article 1 of this bill stated that the state language was a compulsory subject in all secondary schools, regardless of language of instruction (i.e. also minority schools). Article 2 stated that minority languages *could* be taught as a compulsory or voluntary subject also in schools where they were not the language of instruction. Article 3 left it up to the Minister of Education to decide whether a minority language should be compulsory for Czech and Slovak students, and which language. According to Owen V. Johnson, German *was* a compulsory subject in secondary schools in the Czech lands, but not in Slovakia.<sup>91</sup> The introduction of the state language as a compulsory subject was deemed to be in the interest of the state administration and the economy, while practical and economic conditions required that Czech and Slovak students learn minority languages.<sup>92</sup>

Also this law was explicitly placed in the context of the national struggle for Czech language rights. The main speaker Emil Špatný (ČS) concluded thus: "Our awakeners struggled for the admission of the Czech language into the middle schools. They succeeded only for a short time in getting bilingual schools, but even this small gain was taken away from us. Bilingual schools were the maximum demand of our Czech awakeners, and we are at last introducing the Czechoslovak language as the state language in all middle schools in the whole state, while respecting the rights of our national minorities."<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Viktor Dyk and Václav Freiman, 126. schůze ... dne 28. února 1920 (pp. 3776 and 3812–13), in: *Těšnopisecké zpravy...*

<sup>90</sup> Brabec argued against giving the Germans more than what was necessary in the Constitutional Committee. Broklová (1992b:82).

<sup>91</sup> Johnson (1985:114).

<sup>92</sup> See Tisk 4093 (the government proposition) and Tisk 4139 (the report of the Cultural Committee), in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XVIII (1923).

<sup>93</sup> (Naši buditelé usilovali o připuštění českého jazyka do středních škol. Jen na krátký čas dosáhli úspěchu, utrakvistické školy, ale i tento nepatrný úspěch byl nám vzat. Utrakvistická škola byla maximem požadavků našich českých buditelů a my konečně do středních škol celého státu zavádíme československý jazyk jako jazyk státní, respektující při tom práva našich národních menšin). Špatný, 211. schůze ... dne 12. května 1923 (p. 365) in: *Těšnopisecké zpravy...*

In principle, Czech and Slovak both enjoyed the privileged status granted to the Czechoslovak language. The problem was that by allowing Czech officials to reply to a Slovak in Czech and vice versa (see page 336), article 4 in the Language Act in practice treated Czech and Slovak as one language. This formal parity worked to the disadvantage of Slovak because of the difference in size and the gap in cultural development between the two nations. The Slovak intelligentsia was not even large enough to fill the necessary positions in Slovakia after 1918, let alone in the central administration in Prague. The result was that the Czechs dominated the central administration, and they made up a significant share of the state-employed intelligentsia also in Slovakia. I will return to the personnel question in Chapter Twelve.

The absence of special quotas for the Slovak language enabled the predominantly Czech civil servants in Prague to use their own language, and we can safely assume that most administration and government proceedings were in fact conducted in Czech. I have not found any statistics pertaining to this, but the official documents I have seen confirm the impression. The number of laws originally written in Slovak was for instance indeed low, and until 1921, the Czech text was always treated as the original.<sup>94</sup> The text of all statistical handbooks covering the entire republic was Czech; only tables pertaining to Slovakia were in Slovak.<sup>95</sup>

In the Parliament all deputies spoke their own language, which is reflected in the stenographic reports, the exception being that the main text contains translations of the speeches of minority representatives, while the original version is printed as an appendix. In the beginning, all breaks, references to noises etc. were recorded in Czech; later they were written in the same language as the main text. Czechs and Slovaks were reported in their own language, while German speakers were consistently translated into Czech and Magyar speakers into Slovak, except in the beginning, when also their speeches were translated into Czech. The same applies to interpellations. This was no doubt simply an effect of the fact that Slovak stenographers were more familiar with Magyar and Czechs with German.

### ***For that our Slovak language***

Linguistic demands can be directed at the central level, the territorial homeland of the nation in question, or both. In the Slovak case, most of the demands and complaints concerned the use of Slovak in Slovakia, while I have found hardly any complaints concerning the use of Slovak at the central level. Apart from one complaint concerning the nationality of the stenographers (see next page), the only complaint I have found concerned the language on the 20 crown note. The bulk of the complaints concerned the use of Slovak in Slovakia. Finally, the dispute about the Slovak orthography deserves special mention.

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<sup>94</sup> See *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení statu československého* (volumes 1918–1939), Rychlík (1997:82).

<sup>95</sup> See e.g. *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921* (1924–25), *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze 1. prosince 1930* (1934–38), *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920, 1925, 1928, 1932), *Statistická ročenka republiky československé* (1934–1938), *Statistický přehled o československé republice* (1936), *Statistický přehled republiky československé* (1930).

The use of Czech or Slovak in parliamentary proceedings does not appear to have been a problem. I have registered only one complaint regarding stenographic records: In 1920, the Ľudák Ľudevít Labaj demanded Slovak stenographers, claiming that the Czech stenographers often did not understand the Slovak speakers and misinterpreted them. In a reply, Igor Hrušovský (ČS) blamed the lack of Slovak stenographers on the quality of the schools of former Hungary. Evidently, this problem was soon solved.<sup>96</sup>

#### THE 20 CROWN NOTE

The original bank law of 1920 stated that "the text of bank notes is Czech", adding that the value should also be indicated in Slovak, Ruthenian, German, Polish and Magyar. This law was amended in 1925, after which "the text of the bank notes is in the state, official language..." Of the minority languages, German, Magyar and Ruthenian were kept, but not Polish.<sup>97</sup> After 1925 the law no longer required bank notes to be in both Czech and Slovak. The 20 crown note was the first to be issued by the Czechoslovak National Bank (founded 1926), and it had a portrait of Milan Rastislav Štefánik on one side and of the former finance minister Alois Rašín on the other. It was also the first bank note where the text was printed in only one of the two versions of the official language – of course, Czech.

An editorial in *Slovák* criticized how "the National Bank issued its first note without a single Slovak word and with the disfigured face of the Slovak General M. R. Štefánik." Reactions against this offense to "the most holy national feelings" of the Slovaks had allegedly been strong. The Club of the Slovak People's Party presented the Prime Minister with a letter demanding that all bank notes in the future be printed in Czech on one side and in Slovak on the reverse. The Club also demanded that the Czech 20 crown notes be withdrawn from circulation. The editorial presented this as a matter of prestige for the Ľudáks and for the Slovak nation, and wrote as if the government had accepted it – which was not the case.<sup>98</sup>

The day after, *Slovák* attacked the former Agrarian Slovak deputy Ľudevít Medvecký for not serving Slovak interests on the Board of the National Bank. Likewise, Jozef Hanzalík accused the National Bank of Austrian bureaucratism and of being in the service of Czech chauvinism. The fact that Slovak had been omitted, while the German, Magyar, and Ruthenian text was kept, was seen as an attempt to use Czech only as the state language.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Labaj and Hrušovský, 33. schůze ... dne 15. prosince 1920 (pp. 1358 and 1963), in: *Těsnopisecké zpravy...*

<sup>97</sup> (§18. Text bankovek jest český...). (čl. VI. (1) Text bankovek jest v jazyku státním, oficiálním...). Zákon ze dne 14. dubna 1920 o akciové bance cedulové (no. 347), and Zákon ze dne 23. dubna 1925, kterým se mění a doplňuje zákon ze dne 14. dubna 1920 č. 347 Sb. z. a n., o akciové bance cedulové (no 102), in: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920:860; 1925:507).

<sup>98</sup> (Národní banka vydala první bankovky bez jediného slovenského slova a so zpotvorenou tvárou slovenského generála M.R. Štefánika). (urážaný vo svojich najsvätejších národných citoch). *Slovák* no. 75, 2.4.1927:1. The Ľudák complaint must have gone straight to the government, for it has not been registered as an interpellation in the Parliament.

<sup>99</sup> *Slovák* no. 76, 3.4.1927:1, *Slovák* no. 78, 6.4.1927:1.



**Figure 1: Czechoslovak 10 and 20 crown bank notes after 1926**



Czechoslovak 20-crown note with Czech text, issued by the National Bank on October 1st 1926. To the left a drawing of Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Slovak general and co-founder of the state. To the right the small Coat of Arms.



Czechoslovak 20-crown note, reverse side. To the right a drawing of Alois Rašín, former finance minister. To the left the words "twenty crowns" in Czech, German, Magyar and Ruthenian.



Czechoslovak 10-crown note with Slovak text, issued by the National Bank on January 2nd, 1927. In the middle the small Coat of Arms. This bank note was first issued in 1920, and this side of the note had an identical form in 1920 and in 1927.



Czechoslovak 10-crown note, reverse side. The illustrations were the same in 1920 and in 1927 also on this side, but the Czech and the Polish text was removed in the 1927 version.

In the same article Hanzalík claimed that Prime Minister Švehla had intervened in favor of a Slovak 10-crown note, but he insisted that every language in the republic belonged on every bank note.<sup>100</sup> The 10-crown note was the only one that already had Slovak as its main language, while Czech shared the reverse side with the minority languages. Now the Czech text was removed. The coverage in *Slovák* ended a few days later by an article about the legal situation, where the 1925 amendment of the law was seen as an attempt at linguistic centralization.<sup>101</sup>

The 20-crown bank note remained Czech as long as it was in circulation. Of the emissions of the Czechoslovak National Bank after 1926, the 10 crown note, the 50 crown note and the 500 crown note had Slovak text, while the 20 crown note, the 100 crown note and the 1000 crown note were in Czech. Whether this was a result of Ľudák pressure or the plan all along is hard to tell. The fact that the Slovak 10 crown note was issued on January 2nd, 1927, (three months before *Slovák* wrote about it), suggests that the National Bank indeed *had* planned to issue some bills in Czech and some in Slovak. This way, Czech and Slovak were equal as the "state, official language" on Czechoslovak bank notes, while at the same time, the exclusion of one language on every note symbolized the idea of one Czechoslovak language with two versions, rather than two languages. If this was according to plan, it was not a very good idea to start with a bank note with Czech text, considering the Slovak sensitivity in these matters.<sup>102</sup>

### "SLOVAK IN SLOVAKIA!"

An overwhelming majority of the Slovak linguistic grievances concerned the use of Czech in Slovakia, which the autonomists regarded as a violation of §4 of the Language Act. This was of course closely related to the large influx of Czechs after 1918.<sup>103</sup> A pre-election demand in 1925 and 1929 was that "the Slovak language be the official language and the language of instruction in the schools",<sup>104</sup> while a more specific demand concerned the obligation of Czech public employees to learn Slovak within a time limit after their arrival in Slovakia.<sup>105</sup> This was expressed in slogans like "Slovak in Slovakia" and "Slovakia for the Slovaks." The former slogan only required that the Czechs in Slovakia learn Slovak, the latter implied expelling them. This part of the struggle had a strong socio-economic character (see page 348) in addition to its cultural significance, and will be treated in the next chapter.

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<sup>100</sup> *Slovák* no. 78, 6.4.1927:1.

<sup>101</sup> *Slovák* no. 81, 9.4.1927:3–4.

<sup>102</sup> *Slovák* (no. 134, 15.6.1928:1) merely registered the introduction of Slovak 50 and 500 crown notes. For the other bank notes, see *Československé bankovky, stávkovky a mince 1919–1992* (1993:64–66).

<sup>103</sup> According to the census of 1910, there were only 7,947 Czechs in Slovakia. By 1921, the number of Czechs had increased to 71,733, and by 1930 to 120,926. Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:184).

<sup>104</sup> The Trnava manifesto of the Slovak People's Party (from November 1925), in: Mikuš (1995:208). The same demand was voiced in *Slovák týždenník* no. 42, 18.10.1925:1, and *Slovák* no. 240, 22.10.1929:3. All three were pre-election statements.

<sup>105</sup> See Andrej Hlinka, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 208), and 88. schůze ... dne 20. října 1921 (p. 143). See also Marek Gažík, 21. schůze ... dne 12. listopadu 1920 (p. 328), and Anton Hancko, 232. schůze ... dne 27. listopadu 1923 (p. 717), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

One group of complaints concerned the behavior of the Czechs in Slovakia; it was argued that they were unwilling to learn Slovak, that they did not respect the Slovak language, and that they expected the Slovaks to speak Czech to them. In Ferdiš Juriga's view (1920), Czechs who learned Slovak and loved the language deserved praise and honor, and love of the heart, while those who "come to Slovakia and ask why should they learn the 'stupid' Slovak language, those we will not love. If we wanted Magyar civil servants to learn Slovak, also Czech civil servants in Slovakia can learn Slovak at least within a year", he argued.<sup>106</sup> Various examples of Czech insensitivity were provided; as late as 1930 *Slovák* reported of a young Czech *gymnasium* teacher who allegedly told his Slovak students that "an intelligent person simply cannot speak Slovak", and that he himself would be ashamed to do so.<sup>107</sup>

As usual, the Czechoslovak-oriented Slovaks defended the Czechs in Slovakia. Pavel Blaho, for instance, argued in 1920 that the Czechs were actually protecting Slovak in the schools, and that many of the Czechs had learned Slovak admirably well in only one year. He also commended the Czechs for writing Slovak textbooks.<sup>108</sup> Igor Hrušovský and Ivan Markovič played the Magyarone card, arguing that Slovak in Slovakia was threatened not by Czech, but by Magyar.<sup>109</sup> Karel Kramář assured the Slovaks in a debate in 1925 that the Czechs did not want to take their language rights away. Juriga interjected: "Why do the Czechs in Slovakia not learn Slovak?", and Kramář replied that "the Czechs in Slovakia are learning Slovak, and their children are raised as Slovaks, and we have never looked upon that as denationalization, because we cannot see anything but a member of our nation in the Slovaks."<sup>110</sup>

A second group of complaints concerned the effects of the use of Czech, like Czech dominance in public places and Czechization of Slovak pupils, students and soldiers. In 1923, Jozef Buday invoked §4 of the Language Act, and presented several examples where Slovak was not used as a rule. In the army barracks and state bank in Nitra, signs were in Czech. The signs on all railway wagons were in Czech, also those trafficking only Slovakia, even to a point where Slovak place names were changed. The military, railways and financial institutions in Slovakia had not to his knowledge yet issued out a single document in Slovak, and the situation was almost as bad in the courts. Since the Czechs did not bother to "stutter" in Slovak, Buday argued, and "because there are disproportionally more Czech than Slovak civil servants in Slovakia, [...] as a rule the administration is in Czech and only provisionally in Slovak, despite the clear formulation of the Constitutional Law." In Buday's view the

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<sup>106</sup> (prijdú na Slovensko a hovoria, že načo by sa tu "blbú" slovenčina učili, tých milovať nebudeme. Jestliže sme chceli u maďarských úradníkov, aby se naučili slovensky, tak sa môže i českí úředníci na Slovensku aspoň do roka slovensky naučit'). Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (pp. 176–77) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>107</sup> Juriga, 110. schůze ... dne 26. ledna 1920 (p. 3270), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* and *Slovák* no. 117, 23.5.1930:2.

<sup>108</sup> Blaho, 26. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1920 (p. 554) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>109</sup> Hrušovský and Markovič, 88. schůze ... dne 20. října 1921 (pp. 148, 176) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>110</sup> (Juriga: Prečo sa Česi na Slovensku neučia slovensky?) (Češi na Slovensku se učí slovensky a jejich děti jsou vychovávány jako Slováci a my se na to nikde nedíváme jako na odnárodnování, poněvadž my ve Slovákovi nedovedeme viděti nic jiného, než příslušníka našeho národa). Kramář, 5. schůze ... dne 19. prosince 1925 (p. 141) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

situation was even worse in the schools. He accused the government of wanting to "use the schools for the complete Czechization of the Slovaks", and of thereby pronouncing the "death sentence" on the Slovak nation.<sup>111</sup>

In 1926, the Slovak People's Party with Ignác Grebáč-Orlov at the helm proposed a regulation clearly designed to put an end to this. "Elementary (*obecný*) schools in Slovakia are to be taught exclusively in Slovak. City (*občianský*) schools and secondary schools in Slovakia are to be taught in Czech to the same extent as they are taught in Slovak in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Teaching Czech and Slovak as one subject is out of the question." It was argued that since Slovak was the administrative language in Slovakia, it was necessary that Slovak children first and foremost had a good command of Slovak, which was possible only if Slovak were taught from the lowest level of the school system. The rather cryptic formulation in the second sentence above of course implied that Czech would not be taught in Slovakia at all.<sup>112</sup> The proposal was forwarded to the Cultural Committee, where it was stopped.

It seems that something did happen when the Slovak People's Party joined the government in 1927. Evidently the government issued two decrees, in October 1926 and November 1927, where all ministries were told to implement the language regulations regarding the use of Slovak as the state language in Slovakia, and to take action against negligent state organs.<sup>113</sup>

*Slovák* complained in 1927 that despite the government decree, all signs and commands in the army division in Bratislava were in Czech. "In order to realize the linguistic decree, also the officers must learn Slovak. For not even the present-day schools have such a Czechization influence as the military service."<sup>114</sup> Likewise, Štefan Surovjak complained that nothing had changed in the railways and postal service in Slovakia; everything was in Czech as before, even in places where only the director was Czech.<sup>115</sup> After returning to opposition in 1929, Hlinka complained that Czech was still used in the army and the railways. He also pointed out that, after ten years, only two professors at Comenius University lectured in Slovak, and argued that this was not because the Czech professors lacked an ear for language or did not know the Slovak grammar, but rather because of animosity and negligence.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> (A ponevác na Slovensku je nepomerne viac úradníkov Čechov, než Slovákov, [...] i proti zreteľnému zneniu ústavného zákona zpravidla sa úraduje po česky a len výmínečne i po slovensky). (použiť školy k úplného počestieniu Slovákov). (ortel smrti). Buday, 230. schůze ... dne 23. listopadu 1923 (pp. 478–79), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>112</sup> (Na obecných školách na Slovensku vyučuje sa výlučne slovenčina. Na občianských a stredných školách na Slovensku sa vyučuje čeština v takých rozmeroch, v jakých rozmeroch sa vyučuje slovenčina v Čechách, ne Morave a v Sliezsku. Vyučovanie češtiny a slovenčiny jako jedného predmetu je vylúčené). Tisk 299 in: *Tisky k...*, Svazek II (1926).

<sup>113</sup> Tisk 2422/II in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIII (1934).

<sup>114</sup> (Aby jazykové nariadenie bolo uskutočnené, musia sa i dôstojníci naučiť slovensky. Lebo ani dnešná škola nemá taký čechizujúci vliv, ako má prezenčná služba na vojne). *Slovák* no. 2, 3.1.1927:4.

<sup>115</sup> Surovjak, 111. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1927 (p. 74), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>116</sup> Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 57, 61), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... He also referred to the decree in *Slovák* no. 230, 10.10.1929:1. See also *Slovák* no. 107, 13.5.1927:1, where he complained that Czech still dominated in the schools, the armed forces, the railways and the postal system.

Surovjak also filed interpellations concerning the use of Czech in the state railways in Slovakia in 1931 and 1932, claiming that most printed material that was used throughout the republic was in Czech. The government replied that printed material with low circulation was issued in only one of the state languages for purely economic reasons, and that no discrimination was intended.<sup>117</sup> Likewise, Buday argued in an interpellation to the Senate in 1931 that the decree had been sabotaged, and that some sections of the administration in Slovakia still used only Czech.<sup>118</sup>

Comenius University was the object of several language complaints over the years. While §4 in the Language Act stated that Slovak should be used "as a rule" in Slovakia, the law of 1919 establishing Comenius University in Bratislava stated that lectures should be "conducted in Czech or Slovak." (Since the Law establishing the university was adopted before the Constitution, the term "Czechoslovak state, official language" had not yet been coined). The aim was obviously to rule out lectures in Magyar, which had been the medium of instruction at the existing Elizabethan University. That the lectures would have to be in Czech was self-evident, considering the size of the Slovak intelligentsia in 1918. When the university was established, the spokesman of the Cultural Committee Otakar Srdínko fittingly referred to the university as the "third Czech university with Czech and Slovak language of instruction."<sup>119</sup>

Hlinka filed the first complaint that the professors at Comenius University of Bratislava were lecturing in Czech and in an anti-Slovak spirit already in 1923, but Minister of Education Rudolf Bechyně simply cited the law of 1919 and deemed lectures in Czech legal.<sup>120</sup>

*Slovák* launched a series of attacks in 1927. The occasion was that a new student dorm was being built, and when the founding stone was laid down, the Czech professors presented a memorial document written in Czech. At the banquet the same evening, there were strong student reactions to the "scandal", after which the Czech professors left. In the same issue, the speech of Štefan Krčméry, the secretary of the Matica Slovenská, was quoted: "We Slovaks demand that Slovak be everywhere where it belongs. Not only on the founding stone of the dorm of the Slovak learned young people, but also in the publications of Comenius University and on the cover of the journal issued by the Šafárik Learned Society."<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Tisk 1181 and 1603 (interpellations) and Tisk 1414 and 1712 (replies) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII, IX, X (1931, 1932).

<sup>118</sup> Buday, *Slovák* no. 35, 13.2.1931:3.

<sup>119</sup> (třetí česká universita s vyučovacím jazykem českým a slovenským). Srdínko, 61. schůze N.S.R.Č. dne 27. června 1919 (p. 1904), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*, Zákon ze dne 27. června 1919, kterým se zřizuje československá státní universita v Bratislavě, č. 375 in: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1919:513), and Tisk 954 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IV (1919).

<sup>120</sup> Tisk 4381/VIII (interpellation), Tisk 4550/III (reply), in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXI, XXII (1924).

<sup>121</sup> Editorial in *Slovák* no. 99, 4.5.1927:1. (My Slováci si žiadame, aby slovenčina bola všade tam, kam patrí. Nielen v základnom kameni domu slovenského učeného dorastu, ale i na publikáciách univerzity Komenského i na obálke časopisu, ktorý vydáva Šafárikova učená spoločnosť). Krčméry's speech at the banquet, quoted in *Slovák* no. 99, 4.5.1927:1.

The next day, *Slovák* referred to a provocative letter to the student union from Professor Václav Chaloupecký, in which he defended the use of Czech. This was seen as an attack on the primacy of Slovak in the administration and schools of Slovakia. In a later issue, the student union was asked to make the contents public.<sup>122</sup> A few days afterwards, the whole letter was indeed published (in Czech original), courtesy of Chaloupecký himself, it seems. Chaloupecký explained that he had left the banquet because he had felt offended by Krčmery's speech, and argued that the Czech professors were happy to serve Slovakia and contribute to her cultural elevation and flowering. "We are however not in the service of the Slovaks for them just to demand from us or dictate us. And as long as Slovakia accepts our Czech services and our Czech work, she must also accept our Czech language." He branded Krčmery's demand that everything be published in Slovak as "faint-hearted and leprous chauvinism."<sup>123</sup>

Diplomacy was obviously not Chaloupecký's strong side, but *Slovák* replied in kind: "As long as you eat Slovak bread, as long as you accept Slovak money, as long as you are at the Slovak university, dear sir, you must endure that the Slovaks you hate dictate you, that they demand (not ask, Mister Chaloupecký!) that you respect the right of the Slovak language and the Slovak nation at the Slovak university. If you do not like that, you can stuff your scholarship in your bag and leave the bastard nation that your brain does not want to understand, and go somewhere you can find more obliging morons."<sup>124</sup> Chaloupecký eventually followed this advice – probably against his will – in 1939 (see Appendix C<sub>II</sub>).

Many of the language complaints of the 1930s were directed at Comenius University. *Slovák* raised the issue time and again,<sup>125</sup> and the Ľudáks filed several interpellations. In an interpellation in 1930, Hlinka argued that the provision in the Law of 1919 establishing the university, allowing lectures in Czech as well as in Slovak, had been meant only as a temporary measure until the Czech professors learned Slovak. He complained that, after 10 years, 99 percent of the lectures were still in Czech, and that the professors cultivated an anti-Slovak spirit. In Hlinka's view, it was against the principles of Komenský himself to teach Slovak students in another language than Slovak. Once again he referred to §4 in the Language Act, according to which Slovak as a rule should be used in Slovakia, and he found it absurd that "the use of Slovak in Slovakia be permitted to depend on the predilections of individual university professors, whether it suits them to recognize the constitutional right of Slovakia or not!" Prime

<sup>122</sup> *Slovák* no. 100, 5.5.1927:3, *Slovák* no. 108, 14.5.1927:1. See also Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 107, 13.5.1927:1.

<sup>123</sup> (Nejsme však v službách Slovákov, aby títo, mohli od nás prostě požadovati a nebo nám diktovati. A dokud Slovensko přijímá naše české služby a naši českou práci, musí přijímati i náš český jazyk). (maloduchý a malomocný šovinismus). Chaloupecký in *Slovák* no. 110, 17.5.1927:3.

<sup>124</sup> (Kým však papkáte slovenský chlieb, kým beriete slovenské peniaze, kým ste na slovenskej univerzite, dotiaľ, milý páňko, musíte trpieť, aby vám tí Vámi nenávidení Slováci diktovali, že si žiadajú (neprosia, pane Chaloupecký!), aby ste na slovenskej univerzite respektovali práva slovenskej reči a slovenského národa. Ak sa vám nepáči, soberte svoju učenosť do pinklíka a nechajte ten bastardný národ, ktorý vaše rozumy nechce chápať, a idzte ta, kde si nájdete ochotnejších hlupákov). *Slovák* no. 110, 17.5.1927:3.

<sup>125</sup> See e.g. *Slovák* no. 77, 4.4.1931:9–10, where it was argued that the university was a foreign element, and *Slovák* no. 254, 10.11.1935:6, where it was complained that lectures in Slovak literature and language were in Czech.

Minister František Udržal merely referred to the provision in the law allowing lectures in Czech and Slovak. As for §4 in the Language Act, Udržal simply stated that this only applied to "the use of the state language in the administration, and not to instruction in the schools." He also rejected the charge that the professors lectured in an anti-Slovak spirit.<sup>126</sup>

In a new interpellation in January 1932 the Ľudáks pointed out that the Language Act was a constitutional law, and argued that the provision about language in the Law of 1919 establishing Comenius University could not be valid since it contradicted the Constitution. They also reacted strongly to the exclusion of the schools from the provision in §4 of the Language Act, arguing that this would mean to take away from the Slovaks the right to education in their own language that was granted to the minorities in §5. It would also mean that the use of Slovak in the schools of Slovakia would depend on the predilections of individuals, and this they regarded as being against the spirit of the Constitution and as "an unfair attack on the language rights of the Slovaks." The government simply referred to the 1931 reply of Udržal.<sup>127</sup>

In an interpellation in April 1932, the Ľudáks again disputed the government interpretation of the Language Act that allowed professors to lecture in Czech in Slovakia in the 14th year of the republic. They called the government view illogical and immoral, and argued that full parity between Czech and Slovak required that Slovak be used in Slovakia just as Czech was used in the Czech lands. Udržal again referred to the answer of 1931, and pointed out that Slovak professors and docents at Czech universities lectured in Slovak, even without there being any provision for it in the law. Under the present circumstances, he argued, the government could not force anyone to use "the Czech or the Slovak version of the unitary state language" in their lectures, "because both versions are guaranteed full parity."<sup>128</sup>

In an interpellation of June 1932, containing various national demands, the Ľudáks simply asked when the government intended to start respecting "the rights of Slovak as state language in the administration and schools of all levels." Prime Minister Jan Malypetr answered that the government was not aware of any instances where the provisions of the Language Act with respect to the position of Slovak were not generally being respected. He also emphasized that the words "as a rule" in §4 allowed employees in the schools and administration of Slovakia to use Czech in isolated cases, and the other way around outside Slovakia.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> (aby užívanie slovenčiny na Slovensku mohlo závisieť od ľubovôle jednotlivého univ. profesora, či sa mu totiž páči toto ústavným zákonom zabezpečené právo Slovenska uznať, alebo nie!) Tisk 427 (interpellation). (pre užívanie štátneho jazyka v úradoch pri úradovaní, a nie vo školách pri vyučovaní). Tisk 552 (with addition) (reply) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek III, IV (1930).

<sup>127</sup> (nespravodlivý útok na rečové práva Slovákov!). Tisk 1596 (interpellation) and Tisk 1750 (reply) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX, X (1932).

<sup>128</sup> (českého alebo slovenského znenia jednotného štátneho jazyka, lebo obidvom jeho zneniam zaručená je plná parita). Tisk 1791 (interpellation) and Tisk 1947 (reply) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek X (1932). The same argument was used by Štefánek already in 1929. See 6. schůze ... dne 20. prosince 1929 (p. 60) in: *Tēsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>129</sup> (rešpektovania práv slovenčiny jako štátneho jazyka v úradoch a v školách všetkých stupňov?) Tisk 1913 (interpellation) and Tisk 2064 (reply), in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek X, XI (1933). The reply is dated November 23rd.

This answer enraged the Ľudáks, who returned with a 28-page interpellation in March 1933, where the main emphasis was on the interpretation of §4 in the Language Act. They regarded the government interpretation of the words "as a rule" above as "proof that everything is done in the interest of the sinful attempt to extend the territorial competence of Czech in Slovakia." This was in their view illegal. They argued that the government was undermining Slovak language rights even more by not only exempting the schools from teaching in Slovak, but now also by accepting that the administration used Czech, admittedly only in isolated cases – except that Czech was *not* used only in isolated cases. The government was protecting those who violated the law against those who defended their legal rights, and was thereby cultivating legal anarchy, disturbing legal safety and leading employees to illegal actions, they argued.<sup>130</sup>

The government response was to point out that the earlier answers regarding the validity of §4 in the educational system applied to the university. There was thus no reason to draw conclusions about the language of instruction in the rest of the schools in Slovakia on the basis of these replies. This may be interpreted as a minor concession. Malypetr repeated that the Language Act did not outlaw exceptions to the rule that Slovak was to be used in Slovakia, but he also emphasized that, over the years, the government had repeatedly instructed that "the linguistic provisions of the law about the use of Slovak be fully implemented." In doing so, he pointed to the government decrees of October 1926 and November 1927 (see page 346).<sup>131</sup>

The Ľudáks were still not satisfied, and filed a new interpellation in February 1934, where they pointed out that the government had explicitly exempted "instruction in the schools" from §4, and thus clearly expressed the view that this applied to all schools in Slovakia, not only the university. They also argued that the professors at Comenius University were setting a bad example for the rest through their violation of the rights the Slovak language. Otherwise the old arguments were repeated. The government again answered that no linguistic discrimination of Slovak was attempted, and expressed willingness to look into concrete examples.<sup>132</sup>

The disagreement between the Ľudáks and the government over the interpretation of §4 in the Language Act thus concerned whether "as a rule" meant that Slovak should be used in Slovakia *without exception*, and whether the language requirement also applied to the university. In 1937 the Ľudáks finally decided to propose an amendment to the Language Act, instead of bickering with the government about the interpretation of the existing law. While most of the interpellations were evidently written by Hlinka, the young lawyer Martin Sokol is listed as author of this amendment. The literary styles of the two men were quite different – Hlinka's flamboyant and with many exclamations, Sokol's more logical and analytic. The aim was, however, the same – to defend Slovak linguistic rights in Slovakia.

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<sup>130</sup> (dôkazom, že všetko toto robí sa v záujme hriechneho úsilia rozšíriť teritoriálnu kompetenciu češtiny na Slovensku). Tisk 2243, in: *Tisky k tšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XII (1933).

<sup>131</sup> (aby předpisy jazykového zákona o užívání slovenštiny byly přesně plněny). Tisk 2422/II in: *Tisky k tšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIII, 1934. The reply is dated December 12th 1933.

<sup>132</sup> Tisk 2601/I (interpellation) and Tisk 2738/IV (reply) in: *Tisky k tšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIV (1934).



According to Sokol, the Language Act of 1920 was imperfect, especially from a Slovak point of view. He wanted the "fictive concept" of a Czechoslovak language removed, also because it allegedly impaired the freedom of scholarly endeavor by taking a stand in a linguistic dispute concerning whether Czech and Slovak were one or two languages. This was resolved by removing all references to a "Czechoslovak language", and substituting them with "Czech or Slovak." For instance, Article 1 of the amendment stated that the state, official language of the Czechoslovak republic is the Czech language and the Slovak language.

Second, Sokol argued that the law was ambiguous and open to conflicting interpretations. This especially applied to §4, where he proposed two changes. The first change was directly related to the dispute over the right of the professors at Comenius University to lecture in Czech. The original §4 of the Language Act only mentioned "State offices in their official proceedings" (see page 336). Sokol wanted §4 to contain a detailed list of where the language provisions would apply (– schools, offices, courts, institutions, firms, the army, the police and "all other state organs").

The object of the second change was to make it absolutely clear that Slovak would be used in Slovakia *without exception*. In Sokol's view, the words "as a rule" (*zpravidla*) was the main weakness of the Language Act. When the law could not even ensure that Slovak was used as a rule, especially in the army and in the police, it was intolerable, he argued. He thus proposed to remove the words "as a rule", as well as the sentence in §4 allowing Czech officials to answer Slovaks in Czech and the other way around. Instead petitions were to be answered in the state language valid in the region in question. An addition to §9 abolished all provisions adopted after October 28<sup>th</sup> 1918 that were in violation of the Language Act. This would e.g. apply to the Law of 1919 establishing Comenius University, which allowed lectures in Czech, and was explicitly aimed at stopping this.<sup>133</sup>

Complaints concerning the use of Czech in the administration and in the school system became fewer towards the end of the 1920s, although there were still some.<sup>134</sup> There were also complaints that Czech was being used at Comenius University,<sup>135</sup> in the railways,<sup>136</sup> in Slovak radio<sup>137</sup>, and in the Slovak national theater.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Tisk 1071 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VIII (1937).

<sup>134</sup> See *Slovák* no. 35, 13.2.1931:3; *Slovák* no. 80, 10.4.1931:2; *Slovák* no. 195, 29.8.1931:2; *Slovák* no. 248, 4.11.1931:1; *Slovák* no. 45, 24.2.1933:4; *Slovák* no. 217, 29.12.1933:2; *Slovák* no. 83, 12.4.1934.

<sup>135</sup> See Emil Boleslav Lukáč (ČS), 119. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1937 (p. 53), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>136</sup> Jozef Sivák filed one concerning Czech identity cards in Slovak railways in 1937. The Minister of Railways responded by issuing identity cards in Slovak. Štefan Surovjak filed two more interpellations concerning the use of Czech in printed matter meant for employees in Slovakia in 1938, but received no reply. See Tisk 799/VII, 1342/III and 1342/V (interpellations) and Tisk 925/XII (reply) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VI, XI (1937, 1938).

<sup>137</sup> *Slovák* complained in 1931 that only 10 percent of the programs of the radio in Bratislava were in Slovak and in 1938 the Ľudáks filed an interpellation concerning the negligence of Slovak in the state radio. See *Slovák* no. 24, 30.1.1931:4 and *Slovák* no. 103, 8.5.1931:4, and Tisk 1347/XIII in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XI (1938).

<sup>138</sup> *Slovák* no. 28, 5.2.1931:1; *Slovák* no. 66, 21.3.1933:4; *Slovák* no. 100, 3.5.1933:1. Tisk 4952/XIV, Svazek XXIV (1925).

### THE NEW SLOVAK ORTHOGRAPHY

One last language issue deserves special mention: The conflict over the new Slovak orthography in 1931. Already in 1927 *Slovák* complained about the negative influence of Czech on the pure Slovak language. Under the title "For the purification of Slovak", it was argued that "our pure, genuine, fluid mother tongue is threatened", especially in the secondary schools, where Czech teachers were teaching an odd mixture of Czech and Slovak. The result was that the writings of the young Slovak intelligentsia were full of Czechisms, and the Czechoslovak-oriented journals in Slovakia supported this development, it was argued. *Slovák* therefore welcomed an initiative from the Saint Vojtech Society to purify Slovak.<sup>139</sup>

An editorial under the title "Are we becoming Czechized?" in 1928 pointed out that although the Slovak language had been able to withstand Germanisms and Magyarisms, the Slovaks now had to be alert to the danger of Czechization. There were enough occasions for Czech terms to creep into the Slovak language, especially because of the expansion of higher education, where Czech teachers used Czech scientific terms. But even Czech observers were surprised at how few Czech words had entered the Slovak language, it was argued. The reason was that "Slovak, the most well preserved among the Slav languages, has in it so much unconcealed strength and verbal resources" that attempts to make Slovak closer to Czech had been unsuccessful so far. It was now up to the Slovaks to be conscious about emphasizing "the Slovak individuality and the old character of our language", the editorial concluded.<sup>140</sup> This editorial was thus more optimistic on behalf of the Slovak language.

This was only the overture. In 1931 an expert commission under the auspices of the *Matica slovenská* in Turčiansky Svätý Martin (in cooperation with the Czech Academy of Sciences) published *Pravidlá slovenského pravopisu* (Rules of Slovak orthography), a revision of "Slovak orthography." The commission was led by the Czech Professor and linguist Václav Vážný of Comenius University, and had a pro-Czechoslovak bias. This was reflected in the introduction of several Czechisms and in the attempt at making Slovak as close to Czech as possible, e.g. by codifying the word most similar to Czech in cases where there existed two Slovak words with the same meaning. The autonomist camp protested vehemently against the revision, which they regarded as an attempt at Czechization of the Slovak language. According to James Ramon Felak, 130 Slovak writers, journalists, and publicists signed a letter condemning the new Slovak orthography and calling for the resignation of the commission that had prepared it.<sup>141</sup> The *Matica slovenská* held deep symbolic meaning for Slovaks of all political persuasions, which is probably why the reaction was so strong.

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<sup>139</sup> (Čistá, rýdza, samotečená materčina naša je natoľko ohrozená...). *Slovák* no. 191, 27.8.1927:1.

<sup>140</sup> (Slovenčina, zpomiedzi slavianských rečí najzachovalejšia, má v sebe toľko neodkrytej sily a slovných prameňov). (slovenskú svojráznosť a starý charakter našej reči). *Slovák* no. 160, 19.7.1928:1.

<sup>141</sup> Rychlík (1997:83), Felak (1994:87).

*Slovák* wrote about the new orthography already in January 1931, before the committee had finished making its recommendations, commenting on Anton Štefánek's hope that the new orthography would be the first step on the road to unification of the Czech and Slovak literary languages. *Slovák* saw this as proof that the new orthography was in the service of Pan-Czech ideas, and accused Štefánek of raising Czech hopes of complete assimilation of the Slovaks. Hlinka reminded Štefánek that the Slovaks had fought under the motto "for that our Slovak language" in the past and argued that they would also triumph under that motto. An article in February referred to "well-informed" sources, according to which the new Slovak orthography implied a Czechization of Slovak numbers.<sup>142</sup> Under the telling title "Will we have a linguistic battle?" a Ľudák argued in March that the party would have to use every means at its disposal in order to fight "the soiling of the Slovak language." Czechization efforts were also underway in the Slovak secondary schools, he argued, and the result of this was that graduates of Slovak schools were able to write neither Slovak nor Czech correctly.<sup>143</sup>

In October, *Slovák* quoted an article by Professor Jozef Škultéty in *Národné Noviny*, where he denied that the Czech Academy of Sciences had exerted any pressure on the commission. In his view, it would be unfair to say that the new orthography was to the detriment of the Slovak character of the language. He argued that non-Slovak elements would get lost on their own account, and then the *Matica* would issue a new edition. These words were taken as an admission that the revised orthography was indeed non-Slovak, and as a promise of a new edition. Finally, *Slovák* found it ridiculous and repulsive that a Czech who did not even know Slovak well enough to write it correctly (examples were provided) should head the commission. It was resented that the language was turned into a guinea pig by adding "more than 500 words foreign to the spirit of the Slovak language."<sup>144</sup>

Before the annual general assembly of the *Matica slovenská*, held on May 12th, 1932, the autonomists mobilized and were able to oust the pro-Czechoslovak board members, including Vážný, Štefánek and Milan Ivanka. Then the general assembly established a new linguistic commission and empowered it to issue a new orthography in a Slovak spirit.<sup>145</sup> While the autonomists lost many other battles, they did win the battle over the *Matica*. In the meantime, however, the Minister of Education (Ivan Déřer) had approved the orthography of the first commission for use in the schools. Hlinka warned him in the Parliament that this meant that there would be two sets of rules. "You will teach the second orthography to the students in the *gymnasia*, but we adults and independent citizens will write Slovak."<sup>146</sup>

<sup>142</sup> *Slovák* no. 19, 24.1.1931:1; *Slovák* no. 21, 27.1.1931:3; *Slovák* no. 31, 8.2.1931:2.

<sup>143</sup> (Budeme mať jazykový boj?). (znečistenie slovenčiny). *Slovák* no. 49, 1.3.1931:3.

<sup>144</sup> (vyše 500 duchu slovenskej reči cudzích slov). *Slovák* no. 240, 23.10.1931:4, *Slovák* no. 235, 17.10.1931:2. It is likely that the issue was raised in *Slovák* also in 1932, but the National Library in Prague did not have the 1932 volume.

<sup>145</sup> Felak (1994:88).

<sup>146</sup> (Budete dávať sekundu študentom v gymnáziách pre pravopis, ale my dospelí a neodvislí občania budeme písať slovenský). Hlinka, 213. schůze ... dne 4.11.1932 (p. 22), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*, Déřer: *Československá otázka* (1935:263).

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To what extent were the various Ľudák claims and complaints true? In order to answer this question, we need to distinguish between motives and effects and between early and late in the period. I sincerely do not believe that the Czechoslovak government intended an assimilation of the Slovaks into the Czech nation, although some scholars and politicians probably hoped – at least initially – that it would come to that eventually (see page 337).

According to Jan Rychlík, Czech public opinion abandoned the conception of Slovak as a Czech dialect as time went by, and towards the end of the First Republic started to consider Slovak as a separate language. This is also my impression. Moreover, if assimilation were the goal, it would not make much sense to issue government decrees ordering Czech employees in Slovakia to learn Slovak, or at least to use Slovak in written contacts. These government decrees were also evidently concessions to the Ľudáks.<sup>147</sup> Claims that the government had Czechization as its aim must thus be characterized as unfounded.

It is hard to ascertain to what extent the complaints about the use of Czech in Slovakia reflect a reality, especially as far as the schools are concerned. Statistics habitually labeled the language of instruction in Czech as well as Slovak schools as "Czechoslovak." This mostly meant Czech in the Czech lands and Slovak in Slovakia. Officially, there were no Czech schools in Slovakia whatsoever, so the children of Czech employees in Slovakia attended Slovak schools. There was even a report in *Slovák* in 1927 stating that the Czech minority in Slovakia wanted their own schools – which the paper supported, because it "proved" that the Czechs and Slovaks were separate nations.<sup>148</sup>

The schools were thus *nominally* Slovak from the start, but it must have taken some time before the Czech teachers learned Slovak well enough to be able to teach in Slovak. The number of Czech teachers was largest in the *gymnasias*, and the recruitment problems also lasted longer there than in the primary schools (see Chapter Twelve). It is thus likely that the use of Czech as the medium of instruction was most common at the higher levels of the educational system. The use of Czech at the university was even allowed by law, and was closely associated with the strong dominance of the Czech professors during the entire First Republic. But the attitudes of people like Chaloupecký also played a role. According to Jan Rychlík, several of the professors kept lecturing in Czech rather demonstratively.<sup>149</sup>

The number of Czechs was larger in the public administration of Slovakia than in the educational system, and in 1921 the Czechs actually outnumbered the Slovaks slightly. Even assuming that most of the Czech intelligentsia who came to Slovakia were highly motivated and talented, it must have taken some time to become fluent in Slovak, and it is obvious that

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<sup>147</sup> Rychlík (1997:83–84).

<sup>148</sup> *Slovák* no. 211, 21.9.1927:1. See also Ivan Dérer: *The unity of the Czechs and Slovaks* (1938:50).

<sup>149</sup> Quite a few even stayed after 1939. See *Comenius University Bratislava 1919–1994* (1994:39), Rychlík (1997:83).

not all were equally motivated. There are enough reports to attest to the fact that at least some Czechs did not bother, especially since Czech and Slovak are similar enough for anyone to get by in Czech also in Slovakia; (of this I have first-hand experience). The attitude that it was not necessary for the Czechs in Slovakia to learn Slovak was also voiced publicly.<sup>150</sup>

This attitude seems to have become less common in the 1930s, however. The exceptions are the state police, the gendarmery and the army, where the Czechs and the Czech language remained dominant. Czechs comprised 63 percent of the gendarmes, and 46 percent of the state police in Slovakia, while Slovaks comprised respectively 35 and 51 percent. In the army, Czechs dominated totally: as late as in 1938, Slovaks comprised only 3.4 percent of the total officer corps, and there was only one Slovak in the general staff.<sup>151</sup> Otherwise, most of the written material in the 1930s was in Slovak, according to Rychlík's study of the local archives from the 1920s and the 1930s. This means that the Czech public employees either learned Slovak or also hired Slovak secretaries.<sup>152</sup> This is probably also the reason why complaints concerning the use of Czech in the administration and in the school system became fewer towards the end of the 1920s. The reason is *not* that there were fewer Czechs in Slovakia; on the contrary, the number of Czechs increased from 71,733 in 1921 to 120,926 by 1930.<sup>153</sup>

### *Slovak schools with Slovak spirit*

As we have seen in Chapter Nine, the Slovak school textbooks in history were more Czechoslovak in orientation than were the Czech textbooks. Considering the strong overall argumentation against Czechoslovakism, in *Slovák* as well as in the Parliament, I had expected to find more complaints of Czechoslovakism in the schools. Complaints regarding the contents of textbooks were surprisingly few, and some concerned the language issue more than the alleged lack of Slovak spirit, although these were related issues. In addition, there were general demands for a more Slovak spirit in the schools and especially at Comenius University. In fact, most of the interpellations demanding lectures in Slovak at Comenius University also contained demands for a more Slovak spirit.

The first complaint pertaining to *textbooks* was raised in an interpellation by Karol Kmeťko in 1920, and concerned the lack of textbooks in Slovak. The Minister of Education (Gustav Habrman) answered that they were working on it.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> *Slovák* e.g. attacked a Communist paper for presenting this view in 1928. See *Slovák* no. 207, 13.9.1928:5.

<sup>151</sup> Čulen (1994:109, 112, 123); Jan Anger: Národnostná štruktúra dôstojníckeho zboru česko-slovenskej armády v rokoch 1918–1938, in: *Historický časopis*, 5–6 (1993:636). Slovak was more commonly used in the state police than in the gendarmerie. The same goes for the local police, which was under municipal jurisdiction.

<sup>152</sup> Rychlík (1997:83).

<sup>153</sup> Boháč (1935:187). Some of the Czechs seem to have become so Slovakized that they returned Slovak identity in the census of 1938. Only 77,488 persons identified themselves as Czechs in this census, but 93,193 were born in the Czech lands – a discrepancy of 15,705. Part of the reason why there were so many "converts" may be the lack of Czech schools. See Rychlík (1997:9).

<sup>154</sup> Tisk 119 (interpellation) and Tisk 502 (reply) in: *Tisky k tēšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I, II (1920).

I have also found an early Czech example from 1921, where the National Socialists wanted a revision of all school textbooks to make sure they corresponded to the new political reality. One complaint was that the former Austrian emperor Franz Josef I was presented as if he were still the ruler in a book for German boys' schools published in 1920.<sup>155</sup>

In 1922, Jozef Buday filed an interpellation complaining that textbooks used in Slovak schools contained anti-Catholic statements. Two of his complaints involved anti-Catholic passages in texts about Jan Hus – such as a sentence where the burning of Hus was described as a sin on the part of the Church (from one of the books in my sample – Jozef Koreň's *Dejepis československého národa*). He also reacted to the claim in another textbook that Jan Nepomucký was a "surrogate saint." The Minister of Education promised to go through the books before the next edition, but did not agree that there was anything wrong with those two instances.<sup>156</sup> Also the Czechoslovak People's Party filed an interpellation concerning the anti-Catholic contents of textbooks – as late as in 1933. The Minister answered that he had already issued a decree according to which all textbooks had to be approved, where an important aim was national, social and religious harmony.<sup>157</sup>

In the budget debate of 1924, Hlinka complained that three Slovak textbooks in arithmetic, ethics, and national history and geography (*vlastiveda*), which were published in Prešov, had been banned from Slovak schools. As far as he was concerned, said Hlinka, "two times two equals four also when it is not printed in Prague." The fate of these three books was symptomatic of the situation, he argued, and pointed to some readers published by the Saint Vojtech Society, which had been banned by the former Magyar regime. When they tried to have them republished, they were met with the argument that it was an anachronism to praise Jesus and were told to remove all references to Christianity. Hlinka assumed that the textbook in arithmetic had been banned because it contained a religious verse.<sup>158</sup>

I have found very few examples of complaints in *Slovák* concerning the contents of school textbooks. In November 1927 Milan Hodža (Minister of Education) called for the revision of incorrect and judgemental school textbooks with respect to nationality, religion and class. This occasioned an editorial in *Slovák*, where it was admitted that such textbooks were especially a problem in Czech schools, but even in Slovakia there existed textbooks that offended the Catholic clergy and undermined church authority. What was worse, according to *Slovák*, was that "in Slovakia we have readers for the eighth grade of Slovak middle schools, in which two thirds of all texts are written in Czech and merely one third in Slovak. In another reader for Slovak middle schools the evolution of literary Czech is explained at length, [...] but of the evolution of Slovak there is not a word for the pupil to find."

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<sup>155</sup> See Tisk 2473, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým...*, Svazek IX (1921).

<sup>156</sup> Tisk 3610/XVI (interpellation) and Tisk 3847/X (reply) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIV, XVI (1922).

<sup>157</sup> Tisk 2204/XV (interpellation) and 2344/XI (reply) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XII (1933).

<sup>158</sup> (2krát 2 ostane 4 aj vtedy, keď to nebudú tlačiť v Prahe). Hlinka, 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 367) See also Anton Hancko, 232. schůze... dne 27. listopadu 1923 (p. 717), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

The strongest words were, however, reserved for textbooks in history: "In addition to their excessive Hussite coloring, it is simply a scandal that it is possible to teach history in Slovakia without mentioning also the history of the Slovaks. It is not true that the Slovaks have no history. Just those who negate the existence of the Slovak nation want to take our history away from us." *Slovák* complained that the Czechs colluded with their greatest enemies, the Magyars, by allowing Slovak heroes to be turned into Magyar ones instead of helping the Slovaks "dig out of the massive dust of forgetfulness what is Slovak. [...] We have our Slovak history", the editorial concluded, "it is simply necessary to disentangle it from the history of the Magyar, Czech, Polish and German nation and present it to our youth. In today's books our youth get to know almost nothing of the past fate of Slovakia and the Slovaks."<sup>159</sup>

This criticism was followed up in a new article two days later, where the situation in Slovak elementary schools was characterized as "unbelievable": "Slovak schools were simply flooded by readers where the language is some miserable conglomerate of Czech and Slovak", not to mention readers with erotic stories, totally unsuitable for young children, it was argued.<sup>160</sup> A book review in 1930 criticized the Czechoslovakist tendency found in a school reader edited by Pražák for the secondary school. More than a third of the articles were in Czech, and one article by Šafářík was even printed with the old Czech spelling of the 19th century, which was characterized as ridiculous, because it made the text even more difficult to understand.<sup>161</sup>

Finally, there was an article in January 1931 polemizing against the proposed state monopoly on the publication of school textbooks. The state publishing house was accused of aiming at the "denationalization of the Slovak youth", and of not paying enough attention to the language of Slovak books (which contained an admixture of Czech). *Slovák* expressed the fear that new textbooks would not even be acceptable from a religious-moral viewpoint, and complained that textbooks with an anti-Catholic, Hussite or atheist tendency were still being published. Hodža's promise to revise and cleanse the textbooks had not been honored, it was claimed. A main concern was for the confessional schools to be able to issue their own textbooks, so that they would not have to use state textbooks containing statements that were objectionable on religious grounds. A major argument was that other democracies did not have state monopolies – it was only the Czech progressives who wanted it, so that they could freely install progressive ideas in the heads of the young people.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> (Na Slovensku máme čítanky pre ôsmu triedu slovenských [...] stredných škôl, v ktorých sú dve tretiny všetkého textu písané česky a iba jedna tretina po slovensky. V inej čítanke pre stredné školy slovenské vykladá sa per longum et latum vývin spisovnej reči českej, [...] ale o vývine slovenčiny nedočíta sa tam žiak ani slova). (odhliadnuc od ich prílišného husitského zabarvenia, je priamo škandál, ako možne na Slovensku učiť dejepisu bez toho, že by sa spomínala aj historia Slovákov. To je nie pravda, že Slováci nemajú historie! Iba tí, čo negujú jestvovanie slovenského národa, chceli by nám oddišputovať našu historiú). (vyhrabávať z omšného prachu zabudnutia, čo je slovenské). (My máme svoje slovenské dejiny, len ich treba vylúštiť z dejín národa maďarského, českého, poľského a nemeckého a predložiť našej mládeži. – Z dnešných kníh sa naša mládež o dávnych osudoch Slovenska a Slovákov nedozvie skoro nič). *Slovák* no. 263, 23.11.1927:1.

<sup>160</sup> (Slovenské školy boli priamo zaplavené čítankami, ktorých reč je akýsi mizerný konglomerát češtiny a slovenčiny). *Slovák* no. 265, 25.11.1927:3.

<sup>161</sup> *Slovák* no. 255, 11.11.1930:6.

<sup>162</sup> *Slovák* no. 5, 8.1.1931:2. The article continued the day after with arguments around the economy of Slovak publishers.

These are the *only* examples I have found regarding school textbooks. I may of course have overlooked a few, but the total cannot have been high. There were no Slovak interpellations regarding the matter apart from Buday's; and in speeches in the Parliament, the autonomists mostly spoke of the lack of a Slovak spirit rather than of the contents of the school textbooks.

Complaints as to the lack of "Slovak spirit" were also surprisingly few. Hlinka demanded in 1921 that the Slovak spirit be respected in the schools, in the administration and in the courts. This included the use of the Slovak language.<sup>163</sup> In 1925 he filed an interpellation demanding a "Slovak spirit" at Comenius University. He found it unacceptable that some of the teaching staff at the faculty of philosophy were opposed to Slovak as the independent literary language of the individual Slovak nation, and that they served the denationalization, Czechoslovakization and ultimately the Czechization of the young generation of Slovaks. Slovak nationalism and national fervor must not be smothered among Slovak students, he demanded.<sup>164</sup>

Anton Hancko complained in 1927 that Milan Hodža, the Minister of Education, did not pay enough attention to Slovak schools, and demanded purely Slovak schools with Slovak teachers for the Slovak nation. In his view, it was high time that a Slovak national spirit be disseminated from the top. "It is most necessary to revise the curriculum of all categories of schools in Slovakia in a Slovak national spirit, and in such a way that the careful cultivation of Slovak, its purity, and religious-moral education are guaranteed through definite instructions", he argued. This way, the teachers could finally spread Slovak national culture without being harassed and persecuted for it. This was reported in *Slovák* under the heading: "We demand Slovak schools with Slovak teachers, Slovak spirit and Slovak label!"<sup>165</sup>

The Convention of the Union of Slovak *Gymnasium* Teachers in 1929 was critical to the attempts at replacing Slovak national awareness with "some unreal Czechoslovak awareness." The Convention declared that its members would fight for "the Slovak-ness of our schools, for a national spirit" and strive to educate "a moral, scholarly able and nationally aware youth."<sup>166</sup> This was entirely in line with the aim of the Union – "to maintain our individual national life in Slovakia, to protect what is ours, what is Slovak." Especially important here was the use of Slovak as the language of instruction, and the associated demand that "Slovak schools should educate true republicans in a Slovak-national and moral-religious spirit."<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Hlinka, 88. schůze ... dne 20. října 1921 (p. 144), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>164</sup> Tisk 4952/XI, in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXIV (1925).

<sup>165</sup> (Je nanajvýš nutné, aby učebné osnovy všetkých kategórií škôl na Slovensku v slovenskom národnom duchu byly prepracované, a to tak, aby pečlivosť o pestovanie slovenčiny, jej čistoty, nábožensko-mravnej výchovy, určitými smernicami bola garantovaná). Hancko, 109. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1927 (p. 90), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...* (Žiadame slovenskou školu, so slovenským učiteľom, slovenským duchom a so slovenským nadpisom!). *Slovák* no. 278, 8.12.1927:1.

<sup>166</sup> (za slovenskosť našich škôl, za národného ducha). (mládež mravnú, vedecky zdatnú a národne uvedomelú). (akýmsi nereálnym povedomím československým). *Slovák* no. 153, 11.7.1929:3.

<sup>167</sup> (aby sme svojský národný život na Slovensku udržali, chránili si, čo je naše, čo je slovenské). (slovenská škola má vychovávať verných republikánov v duchu slovensko-národnom a mravno-náboženskom). General secretary Mikuláš Horňák in: Pavol Florek: *Pamätnica spolku profesorov Slovákov 1921–1931* (1932:53, 54).



Also Martin Rázus, the chairman of the Slovak National Party, complained about Comenius University – "not because the professors are lecturing in Czech, but because we are seeing that especially at the faculty of philosophy in Bratislava the spirit that should be arising from Slovak roots and soil is not growing. We cannot as a nation live in contradiction with our highest education institute." He could not accept that the university polemized "against us" from the lectern and in public life about "the Slovak past, which is dear and special to us and from which we as a nation want to go on living and educate our youth idealistically." In the program of 1925, his party demanded Slovak textbooks in Slovak and with a Slovak spirit.<sup>168</sup>

Most of the complaints about Czechoslovakism in the schools and/or lack of Slovak spirit were directed at Comenius University and the *gymnasia*. Since, as we have noted, the Czechoslovakist tendency was strongest in primary school textbooks, this runs contrary to expectations. Why were there so few complaints? Why were they directed at higher education?

First, we cannot exclude the possibility that the textbooks in my sample were not extensively used in Slovak schools. If the confessional schools published their own books in Slovakia, it is possible that these were less Czechoslovakist in orientation. As we have seen, quite different books were in fact approved by the Ministry of Education. Second, if the books in my sample were used in the elementary schools, having nationally oriented Slovak teachers may have outweighed them. Likewise, the many Czech teachers in secondary schools and at the University were probably more Czechoslovakist oriented than the average Slovak teacher. This was no doubt the case at the University. Third, older students are more likely to be critical, and perhaps also more likely to be nationally conscious enough to complain.

In my view, the main reason why complaints pertaining to Slovak history or Slovak spirit in the schools were less common than linguistic grievances, was that language was historically a more important part of Slovak national identity than was Slovak history. Although they still do not like to admit it, the Slovaks were regarded as a nation without a history; their entire struggle for national existence was waged under the motto "for that our Slovak language." It thus seems only logical that complaints regarding the lack of Slovak spirit nearly always were closely associated with linguistic grievances. An extension of the demand for Slovak schools with Slovak teachers and a Slovak spirit was the demand for a separate Slovak school board, as Bohemia and Moravia already had. This was voiced by Marek Gažík in a debate in 1920, and reiterated over the years.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> (nie preto, že profesorstvo prednáša česky, ale preto, lebo vidíme, že zvlášte na filozofickej fakulte v Bratislave nerastie ten duch, ktorý pochodil by z koreňa a pôdy slovenskej. My ako národ nemôžeme žiť v kontradikcii s našou najvyššou školskou ustanovizňou). (o našej minulosti, ktorá je nám drahá a vzácna a z ktorej my ako národ chceme žiť ďalej a idealisticky vychovávať našu mládež). Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (p. 85) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... See also *Program Slovenskej národnej strany* (1925:2).

<sup>169</sup> Gažík, 21. schůze ... 12. listopadu 1920 (p. 328), Hlinka, 4. schůze ... dne 18. prosince 1929 (p. 61), Sivák, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 45), Teplanský (Agrarians), 3. schůze ... dne 19. června 1935 (p. 16), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... See also *Slovák* no. 153, 11.7.1929:3, *Slovák* no. 45, 25.2.1931:3, *Slovák* no. 45, 24.2.1933:4, and *Tisk* 1913 (an interpellation raising several demands, including the school board) in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám*..., Svazek X (1932).

### ***Demands for a complete educational system***

The final category of demands concerns the development of the educational system. Also here most of the demands were filed on behalf of the Slovak nation. Among these, the call for the establishment of a Slovak polytechnic predominated, especially in the 1930s, while grievances associated with Comenius University came in second. The former was not only a matter of providing opportunities for Slovak youth to take technical education in their home area, but also had a bearing on the economic life and infrastructure of Slovakia. Due to the chronic lack of technical personnel, the construction of e.g. roads and railways was delayed (see Chapter Twelve). In addition, Czech deputies raised demands for the building of Czech schools in the border areas in the 1920s. We shall first have a look at the Czech demands.

### ***Czech schools for the "state nation"***

After 1920, demands that schools be established for the Czech minority in the German-speaking areas comprise the majority of Czech cultural demands.<sup>170</sup> In the budget debate of 1921, Bohuslav Vrbenský (ČS) argued that it was "a holy duty to erect Czech schools everywhere where there were hitherto none", so that Czech children could attend Czech schools. In the same debate, Viktor Dyk complained that Czechs in the border areas were harassed for sending their children to Czech schools.<sup>171</sup> In the 1924 budget debate, Antonín Vahala (Agr.) pointed out that in the rich areas, the school system was long since fully developed, while there were still 100 children crammed into one classroom in East Moravia. He asked for money to build a new school, and asked that superfluous German schools be closed down.<sup>172</sup>

In the budget debate of 1930, the National Socialist Václav Sladký demanded the establishment of more "Czechoslovak frontier schools." He did not want to call them minority schools, for the Czechoslovaks were never and nowhere a minority in the Czechoslovak state: "Czech children belong in Czech schools, and today, in its own state, the liberated nation has an absolute duty to give every child the possibility of education in a Czechoslovak school and in the mother tongue, regardless of what it costs, so that not even one child of the liberated Czechoslovak nation will have to attend a school of a foreign language and a foreign spirit."<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> There were also numerous clashes in the Parliament between Czech and German deputies, where the Germans complained that German schools were being closed down, and the Czechs defended this on the ground that they were superfluous. See e.g. Kramář, 16. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 4. listopadu 1920 (p. 95), and 160. schůze ... dne 25. října 1922 (p. 107), Zeminová, 17. schůze ... dne 5. listopadu 1920 (p. 157), Prokeš, 26. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1920 (p. 581), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>171</sup> (svatou povinností, abychom zřizovali všude tam, kde českých škol dosud není). Vrbenský, 25. schůze ... dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 454), and Dyk, 23. schůze ... dne 23. listopadu 1920 (p. 390), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>172</sup> He also complained that the Czech language was not sufficiently taken care of in state-run companies. Vahala, 228. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. listopadu 1923 (pp. 243, 246), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>173</sup> (české dítě patří do české školy, pak dnes ve vlastním státě má osvobozený národ bezvýjimečnou povinnost dáti každému svému dítěti možnost výchovy v československé škole a v mateřské řeči bez ohledu, co to stojí, aby ani jediné dítě osvobozeného československého národa nebylo nuceno chodit do škol cizího jazyka a cizího ducha). Sladký, 21. schůze ... dne 21. února 1930 (pp. 60–61), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

Finally, in the 1934 budget debate, the National Democrat Jaromír Špaček complained of the way the demands for "education in the mother tongue for all members of our nation in this Czechoslovak nation-state of ours" had been met. Hundreds of schools were still located in buildings unworthy of a cultured nation, he argued, and pointed to the situation in his own home region Těšín. At the same time schools like the second German polytechnic were being retained, which in his view only "served further Germanization of our people."<sup>174</sup> Typical of these Czech complaints was that they were raised by deputies from the border areas.

**Table 14: Czech and German schools in the Czech lands**

schools	Language of instruction	Bohemia				Moravia				Total			
		1914	1922	1927	1930	1914	1922	1927	1930	1914	1922	1927	1930
Secondary	Czech	77	94	125	102	40	53	69	60	117	147	194	162
	German	51	53	59	49	42	35	31	27	93	88	90	76
	Total	128	147	184	151	82	88	100	87	210	235	284	238
Primary	Czech	3741	4570	4881	5157	2252	2805	2986	3110	5993	7375	7867	8267
	German	2576	2630	2575	2589	1118	1074	1025	1019	3694	3704	3600	3608
	Total	6317	7200	7456	7746	3370	3879	4011	4129	9687	11079	11467	11875

Source: *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920:34–36; 1925:7–8, 21; 1928:7, 12; 1932:355, 362).

As of 1918, Czech schools were in general badly equipped and too few and/or too small compared to the number of children, although the situation had improved since the 19th century. Table 14 shows that although some German schools were closed down, the balance between the old state-nation and the new was mainly redressed by founding new Czech schools. Moreover, the German minority was still better off than the Czech majority in terms of the number of schools: In 1926, the German elementary schools in the Czech lands had only 29.3 percent of the pupils, but 31.4 percent of the schools. Classes also tended to be smaller in German primary and secondary schools: In the school year 1921/22, for instance, the average German secondary school class in the Czech lands had 28 pupils, while the Czech average was 36.<sup>175</sup>

How many Czechs had to attend German schools, and vice versa? Unfortunately, only data for the universities and other institutions of higher education were available for the pre-war period. They do show that more Czechs than Germans attended schools with a foreign language of instruction, but also that those who attended foreign schools did not comprise a large part of the total student body.<sup>176</sup>

<sup>174</sup> (výchovy jazykem mateřským všech příslušníků našeho národa v tomto našem československém národním státě). (dále umožňovat germanisaci našich lidí). Špaček, 302. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1933 (p. 29), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>175</sup> See *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920:34; 1925:9, 20, 24; 1928:12–14; 1932:362).

<sup>176</sup> See *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920:36).

**Table 15: Czech and German pupils in German/Czech schools**

	Czech pupils in German primary schools						German pupils in Czech primary schools					
	Bohemia	%	Moravia	%	Total	%	Bohemia	%	Moravia	%	Total	%
1921	3101	0.44	471	0.11	3572	0.32	4154	1.19	661	0.50	4815	1.00
1926	2827	0.55	429	0.13	3256	0.39	7168	2.83	979	1.01	8147	2.33

Source: *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:24 and 1928:14).

In the First Republic, the relationship between Czechs and Germans was reversed. The number of Czech children in German schools was reduced between 1921 and 1926 in absolute, but not in relative numbers, while the share of German children in Czech schools doubled in five years. It was more common for Czech *and* German pupils to attend schools with a foreign language of instruction in Bohemia than in Moravia.

I have not been able to find figures for secondary schools by regions. Assuming that most of the "Czechoslovak" children (360) enrolled in German secondary schools were Czechs, and that most of the Germans (576) enrolled in schools with "Czechoslovak" language of instruction were enrolled in Czech schools, then some 0.7 percent of the Czech children attended German schools, and some 2.3 percent of the German children attended Czech schools in the school year 1921/22.<sup>177</sup> The share of the pupils attending schools with a foreign language of instruction was thus higher in secondary than in primary schools for both nations.

The same goes for the school year 1926/27, when the number of Czechs in German schools was 229, compared to 815 Germans in Czech schools. There were altogether 70,340 "Czechoslovak" pupils in schools where "Czechoslovak" was the medium of instruction. If we assume that around 25 percent of these were Slovaks, the share of the Czech pupils attending German schools was down to around 0.5 percent, while around 3.6 percent of the German pupils attended Czech secondary schools.<sup>178</sup> The demand for Czech schools for the Czech minority in the German-speaking areas thus did not concern very many pupils at any time.

### ***More Slovak schools***

There is no doubt that the new Czechoslovak regime did a tremendous job in building up a Slovak educational system almost from scratch. Due to the Magyarization policy of the former Hungarian government, there were only 140 Slovak elementary schools left in November 1918, most of which were confessional schools (see Table 13, page 327). There was not a single secondary school, and the newly founded Elizabethan University in Bratislava lectured only in Magyar. It did not even have a chair for the study of Slovak language and literature.<sup>179</sup>

<sup>177</sup> See *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:7–8, 10).

<sup>178</sup> See *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1928:8).

<sup>179</sup> See *Comenius University Bratislava 1919–1994* (1994:14).

Of the most important tasks of the Minister of Slovakia, Vavro Šrobár, and his official in charge of education Anton Štefánek was thus to turn Magyar schools in Slovak areas into Slovak schools. Štefánek personally toured Slovakia to make sure that the teachers were able to teach in Slovak.<sup>180</sup> Those who could not, or would not, were dismissed. As Table 13 shows, the balance between Slovak and Magyar schools in Slovakia had been more or less redressed already by the school year 1920/21. In the beginning, the total number of Slovak and Magyar primary schools actually went down slightly, but then increased sharply. The number of Slovak secondary schools rose from zero in the school year 1913/14, to 24 schools in 1918/19, 50 schools in 1920/21, and after this the figure varied between 51 and 53. By contrast, the 60 Magyar schools of the school year 1913/14 were reduced to 37 schools in 1918/19 and 14 in 1920/21. By 1926/27, there were only 9 Magyar schools left.<sup>181</sup>

I have not found many complaints regarding the number of Slovak primary and secondary schools, and absolutely none after 1930. The few demands there were mostly concerned school buildings. For example, in the 1928 budget debate, Anton Štefánek pointed out the need to build more schools, and especially secondary schools. He mentioned a *gymnasium* that was located in a building so miserable that it would not suffice as "a prison for gypsies."<sup>182</sup>

The only major exception I have registered is Hlinka's speech in the inaugural debate of the Udržal government in 1929, where he argued in great detail that Slovakia was deprived of schools of all kinds. He started with Comenius University, where two faculties were still lacking, and where the language of instruction was Czechoslovak. Slovakia did not have a single polytechnic, while the Czech lands had four. Furthermore, Hlinka claimed, in Slovakia there was one secondary school per 61,244 inhabitants, while in Bohemia there was one school per 43,885 inhabitants and in Moravia one school per 36,477 inhabitants. Slovakia only had 49 schools but was entitled to 65 according to her share of the population. Similarly, he announced, Slovakia was entitled to 54 vocational academies (*odborné školy*) but had only 28.

The greatest wrong had been committed to Slovakia with respect to elementary schools, Hlinka argued, claiming that while the Czech lands got 1,047,218,000 Czechoslovak crowns over the state budget, Slovakia only got 98,031,000 crowns. In this case he complained of the number of classes: While the 966,144 pupils in the Czech lands were divided into 27,122 school classes, the 405,109 pupils in Slovakia had 6406 classes in all. The result of this was that the average class in the Czech lands had 34 pupils, while the average class in Slovakia had 63. There were even schools with over 100 pupils in a single class, Hlinka said. In order to be on a par with the Czech lands, Slovakia should have 11,915 classes, or 5509 more.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> See Štefánek's report in Vavro Šrobár: *Osvobodené Slovensko* (1928:429–433)

<sup>181</sup> *Slovenské školstvo v prítomnosti* (1932:33–34).

<sup>182</sup> (ani nestačila na šatľavu pre cigánov). Štefánek, 107. schůze ... dne 26. listopadu 1927 (p. 38), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* The Slovak attitude towards gypsies (still valid today) is reflected in the verb *cigániť*, which means to lie or to cheat.

<sup>183</sup> Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 61–63), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* The speech was also printed in *Slovák* no. 294, 29.12.1929:3.

Anton Štefánek confronted Hlinka a few days later, and pointed out that the progress of Slovak education was "very obvious." In 1918 there had been 94 purely Slovak schools, whereas by 1927 there were 2813 Slovak elementary schools, he said. He found Hlinka's criticism of the fact that there were more secondary schools in the Czech lands than in Slovakia "very superficial, false and unreasonable. Czech education has almost a hundred years of intensive, self-supporting work behind it. The number of institutions founded after the revolution is minimal." Štefánek argued that economic and cultural conditions in the Czech lands were different, and that increasing the number of secondary schools in Slovakia so as to achieve proportional equality with the Czech lands was in nobody's interest. It would only serve to increase the hyper-production of an intelligentsia proletariat. Yet, he agreed with Hlinka that more vocational schools were needed, especially industrial and trade schools.<sup>184</sup>

They were both partly right. The development of a Slovak educational system in the course of only a few years was a tremendous achievement, but it is true that classes remained much larger in Slovakia. One reason for this was the lack of teachers, which was partly due to the government's strict limitation of admissions to the teachers' academies in the mid-1920s. This policy was aimed at preventing a surplus of teachers when the small wartime generation came of school age. For Slovakia, the admission rules were far too strict.<sup>185</sup> This was also pointed out by Pavol Teplanský (Agr.) in the 1930 budget debate. Because of the strict admission regulations that had led to a lack of qualified teachers, 800 unqualified teachers were teaching in Slovak elementary schools, he argued.<sup>186</sup> Otherwise, the lack of vocational schools was the main complaint concerning the lower levels of the educational system in the 1930s.<sup>187</sup>

#### A COMPLETE UNIVERSITY

The majority of the Slovak complaints concerned Comenius University and the polytechnic. The need was recognized already in January 1919, as the following exchange between Vavro Šrobár, and two of his officials, Anton Štefánek and Ivan Dérer shows: "*Dr. Dérer*: What will become of the university in Pressburg [Bratislava]? *Štefánek*: We do not have a generation of scholars, so it is a big problem to erect a university. *Dr. Dérer*: But we need a faculty of law. *Štefánek*: That should be possible. *Minister [Šrobár]*: The university will be in Pressburg and a polytechnic in Košice."<sup>188</sup>

<sup>184</sup> (veľmi zrejmý). (veľmi povrchný, falošný a nerozumný. České školstvo má za sebou bezmála storočnú intenzívnu prácu svojpomocnú. Počet ústavov po prevrate založených je minimálny). Štefánek, 6. schůze ... dne 20. prosince 1929 (pp. 59–60), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* The number of new Czech schools was not "minimal", as Table 14 (page 361) shows.

<sup>185</sup> See Owen V. Johnson: *Slovakia 1918–1938. Education and the making of a nation* (1985:141).

<sup>186</sup> Teplanský, 21. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21 února 1930 (p. 43), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>187</sup> The issue was raised by Hodža already in 1919. See Hodža, 63. schůze N.S.R.Č. dne 11. července 1919 (p. 1963), Štefánek, 351. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. listopadu 1934 (p. 45), Emil Boleslav Lukáč, 119. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1937 (p. 52), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>188</sup> (Dr Dérer: Čo bude s univerzitou v Prešporku? Štefánek: Nemáme vedeckej generácie, preto zakladať univerzitu je ťažkým problémom. Dr Dérer: Ale právnickú fakultu potrebujeme. Štefánek: To se dá zariadiť. Minister: Univerzita bude v Prešporku a vysoká škola technická v Košiciach). From Štefánek's report (as official in charge of education), in: Šrobár (1928:435).

The Law of 1919 founding Comenius University mentioned four faculties – Law, Medicine, Philosophy and Natural Sciences – of which the former three already existed at the Elizabethan University. The medical faculty was the first to open in the fall semester 1919, but was only followed by the philosophical faculty and the faculty of law in the academic year 1921/22 due to the lack of suitable facilities.<sup>189</sup> The fourth faculty, the natural science faculty, was postponed and became the object of complaints in the years to come. Otherwise, the demand for better facilities (including student dormitories) was the most common demand concerning Comenius University, and not without reason. The rooming situation was worst in the faculty of philosophy and the faculty of medicine.<sup>190</sup>

In December 1929, the National Socialists with Igor Hrušovský at the helm filed a bill asking the government to speed up the construction of the necessary facilities for the medical faculty, and another for the establishment of a faculty of natural sciences.<sup>191</sup> A few months later Hrušovský, Ján Zeman and Anton Štefánek (Agr.), Milan Ivanka (ČND), and Martin Rázus (SNS) proposed that a Protestant theological faculty be created in Bratislava. They only succeeded the next time, in 1933. The Protestant theological faculty (not a part of Comenius University) took up the heritage of the Theological Higher School of the Protestant Church in Slovakia, formerly the *Akadémia*. This was the only Slovak institution of higher learning under the Hungarian regime; in the words of Ján Zeman, it educated 75 percent of the "famous Protestant Slovak men who sustained the Slovak nation during the hard times of bondage."<sup>192</sup>

In 1936, the Ľudáks with Jozef Sivák in the forefront made a new attempt at getting the government to establish a natural science faculty at Comenius University, preferably already from the academic year 1937/38. As long as the fourth faculty was missing, Comenius University was not complete, it was argued. Sivák especially pointed to the situation of Slovak students who wanted to teach natural sciences in secondary school; they had to leave Slovakia for their studies. Because of this, the number of Slovak secondary school teachers was unduly small. Likewise, it was argued that as long as there was no natural science faculty, there would be no growth of Slovak scholars who could lecture in natural sciences. The professors would have to be Czech in the beginning, but this was not openly admitted. The faculty of natural sciences was finally opened in 1941. By then Jozef Sivák had become Minister of Education in the Slovak republic.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Zákon ze dne 27. června 1919, kterým se zřizuje československá státní univerzita v Bratislavě, Číslo 375, in: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení ...* (1919:513), *Comenius University Bratislava 1919–1994* (1994:14–17).

<sup>190</sup> See Jan Halla, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 200), Martin Mičura, 106. schůze ... dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 55), Martin Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (pp. 35–36), Jozef Sivák, 303. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1933 (p. 35), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*; Tisk 4952/XIII (interpellation concerning dorms and facilities), in *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XXIV (1925); *Slovák* no. 104, 8.5.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 119, 25.5.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 272, 2.12.1931:1, *Slovák* no. 250, 17.11.1934:4, *Comenius University Bratislava 1919–1994* (1994:14–17).

<sup>191</sup> Tisk 73 and Tisk 98 in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1929).

<sup>192</sup> (slávných evanjelických mužov slovenských, ktorí udržovali slovenský národ v ťažkých dobách poroby...) Tisk 399, Tisk 2380 (proposals) and Tisk 2487 (committee report) in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek III, XIII (1930, 1934).

<sup>193</sup> Tisk 457 in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek III (1936); *Comenius University Bratislava ...* (1994:40–41).

### **SLOVAKIA WITHOUT A POLYTECHNIC – A SLOVAKIA WITHOUT A FUTURE ?**

The struggle for a Slovak polytechnic started already in 1919, with Michal Ursíny, a Slovak professor at the Polytechnic in Brno, as a driving force. As we have seen, even Šrobár foresaw the establishment of a Slovak polytechnic at this point. The first bill was filed by Jozef Sivák on behalf of the Ľudáks in 1926. He filed a second proposal in 1930, and a third in 1936. He also filed interpellations on the matter in 1930, 1932 and 1935, and voiced it in the Parliament several times. In addition, Ivan Dérer and Ján Bečko filed an interpellation in 1929. There were public rallies in support of a polytechnic on September 21st, 1930; the regional assembly of Slovakia adopted a resolution on October 30th, 1930, and an action committee was established in 1936 under the leadership of Juraj Hronec, also he a Slovak professor at the Polytechnic in Brno. The proposal to erect a polytechnic in Košice was finally taken up by the Hodža government in 1937, with the parliamentary debate taking place in June.

I will not go into every proposal, interpellation, speech or news article in detail; they are simply too many, and besides it would only be repetitive. Instead, let us have a look at the main lines of argument. The substantial arguments in favor of a Slovak polytechnic can be divided into four main categories: first, Slovakia needed a polytechnic in order to develop her economy and infrastructure. Second, Slovak students should have the opportunity to study technical subjects in their home area. Third, it was a matter of justice for the Slovak nation. Finally, it was argued that the entire nation/ Slovakia stood behind the demand for a polytechnic. In addition, the usual *argumentum ad hominem* was present in the allegation that the government would not allow a Slovak polytechnic to be established because that would not serve their Pan-Czech aims. There were also other arguments of a more rhetorical nature.

The economic arguments for a Slovak polytechnic were emphasized in all Sivák's law proposals, and especially in the 1930 proposal. A recurrent general argument was that without a polytechnic, industrial progress and a healthy economic life in Slovakia would not be possible. Sivák also emphasized Slovakia's great natural resources, and argued that a polytechnic was necessary in order to exploit these riches. This is eminently illustrated in an article in *Slovák* in 1930 with the dramatic title "A Slovakia without a polytechnic – a Slovakia without a future." Here Sivák argued that "our mountains, our valleys, our unheard-of natural richness, but also our misery and poverty call for a polytechnic."<sup>194</sup>

A more specific argument in 1926 was that there was a great shortage of land surveyors and engineers. The former were sorely needed because of the land reform, while the lack of Slovak engineers was especially felt in the state building department, in the railways and in private firms, it was argued. Also Dérer and Bečko used the need for land surveyors as an argument in their interpellation in 1929.<sup>195</sup> Sivák's 1930 proposal focused even more on the need for Slovak construction engineers, especially within railway construction, as did Martin Rázus in the 1930

<sup>194</sup> (Slovensko bez techniky – Slovensko bez budúcnosť). (naše hory, naše doly, naše neslýchané prírodné bohatstvo, ale súčasne i bieda a chodoba naša volá po technike). Sivák in *Slovák* no. 215, 21.9.1930:1. See also *Slovák* no 82a, 1928:3.

<sup>195</sup> Tisk 176, in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1926), Tisk 2025/XIV (Dérer and Bečko), Svazek XII (1929).



budget debate. In 1930 as well as in 1936 a special point was made of the needs of the Slovak wood industry for more efficient production methods.<sup>196</sup> The Slovak regional assembly gave the economic argument the most concentrated form, pointing to the need for 2000 school buildings and other public buildings, constructing east–west links, sorting out the land register, improving the waterways, making repairs and improvements, etc. For all these tasks, qualified technical personnel were needed, it was argued. The regional assembly proposed the establishment of three departments: two within building engineering (construction and transport, and water management and cultivation), and land surveying engineering.<sup>197</sup>

The second, student-oriented argument was played two ways. On the one hand, it was argued that the student interest was large enough to erect a polytechnic. Sivák presented statistics showing the number of Slovak students at polytechnics in the Czech lands to prove this. Conversely, it was argued that few Slovak polytechnic students proved the need for a Slovak polytechnic. Economically disadvantaged Slovak students (the majority) could not afford to go to the Czech lands, and the result was that too few young Slovaks devoted themselves to technical studies. If there had only been a polytechnic in Košice, there would be more Slovak students, it was argued. To "prove" this, the Ľudáks referred to how few students there were at the Czech Polytechnics when these had been founded (106 in Prague and 58 in Brno).<sup>198</sup>

There were also several varieties of the argument that made the establishment of a polytechnic into a matter of justice for the Slovak nation. Generally put, the argument was that "we are only asking for what belongs to Slovakia: our fair share of higher education." Alternatively, it was argued that Slovakia was not getting her fair share of the *budget* for higher education.<sup>199</sup> In the 1926 proposal Sivák said that the Czech lands had 11 institutions of higher education, while Slovakia had only one, and that was incomplete. The most used argument was however that the Germans had two polytechnics, while the Slovaks had none.<sup>200</sup> A slight shift in the argumentation can be noted in the early 1930s as a result of the economic crisis: Slovak politicians realized that there was not room for more schools, so they argued in favor of replacing one of the German polytechnics with a Slovak polytechnic. Sivák called two German polytechnics a luxury, but also Rázus and Ivanka wanted one of them shut down.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (p. 36), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*; Tisk 565 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám* ..., Svazek IV (1930), Tisk 176 in Svazek I (1926), Tisk 454 in Svazek III (1936), *Slovák* no. 118, 24.5.1930:3.

<sup>197</sup> Tisk 898 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1937).

<sup>198</sup> Rázus, 20. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. února 1930 (p. 36), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*; Tisk 565 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám* ..., Svazek IV (1930), Tisk 176 in Svazek I (1926), Tisk 454 in Svazek III (1936), *Slovák* no. 82a, Easter 1928:3, *Slovák* no. 129, 7.6.1930:5, *Slovák* no. 118, 24.5.1930:3.

<sup>199</sup> Tisk 176, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1926), Tisk 454 in Svazek III (1936).

<sup>200</sup> Tisk 176, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1926), Tisk 1821 in Svazek X (1932), Tisk 454 in Svazek III (1936), Prof. Ursíny in *Slovák* no. 82a, Easter 1928:3, *Slovák* no. 40, 18.2.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 216, 23.9.1930:3.

<sup>201</sup> Tisk 1821 (interpellation by Hlinka and Sivák) in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek X, 1932; Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (p. 36), Sivák, 303. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1933 (p. 36), Milan Ivanka, 305. schůze ... dne 4. prosince 1933 (p. 38), Sivák, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 48), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

The argument that the entire Slovak nation and/or Slovakia demanded a polytechnic (*argumentum ad populum*) only became common in 1930. This reflects when the issue was placed high up on the agenda. There were reports in *Slovák* about "the day of the Slovak Polytechnic" (September 21st, 1930); students initiated rallies all over Slovakia demanding a polytechnic. These were later used to show the support of "entire Slovakia."<sup>202</sup> A semi-substantial argument was that the Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia Vavro Šrobár in 1919 and 1920 had promised Professor Michal Ursíny (at the Brno Polytechnic) that a polytechnic would be erected in Košice by the school year 1921/22, a promise that had not been honored.<sup>203</sup> *Slovák* also used against Dérer that he had been in favor of a Slovak polytechnic as a deputy in 1929 and against as Minister of Education in 1930. The paper demanded that Dérer must go.<sup>204</sup>

Finally, *Slovák* was also alone in using *argumentum ad hominem*. It was argued that anti-Slovak ideas were behind the refusal of the Czechs and their Slovak "Pan-Czechist" collaborators to erect a polytechnic in Slovakia. The Czech politicians would not allow it because they saw in it "a frustration of the Pan-Czech dream of a 10-million Czech nation." They were accused of wanting all higher education to serve their Pan-Czech aims. A variant of this argument was that the Czechs and their Slovak collaborators wanted to keep the Slovaks in a culturally inferior position because that would make them easier to Czechize. This was based on the premises that a nation without a sufficiently large well-educated intelligentsia was not self-sufficient culturally, economically or nationally (it was "like a statue without a head"), and that a such an intelligentsia was possible only through the establishment of higher schools.<sup>205</sup>

The standard government answer was that conditions in Slovakia were not yet ripe, while it generally denied that budget concerns had anything to do with it. Consequently, merely closing down one of the German polytechnics would not automatically lead to the establishment of a polytechnic in Slovakia.<sup>206</sup> Ivan Dérer's main arguments were the lack of qualified Slovak professors and the allegedly low number of Slovak students, not economic arguments. On the contrary, he argued in 1930 that such a school was needed in Slovakia because of the economic crisis, but could not be started because of the lack of professors and students. *Slovák* suggested that his insisting on Slovak professors was only an excuse.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> (celá slovenská verejnosť). Tisk 565, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IV (1930), Tisk 454 in Svazek III (1936), Tisk 658/VIII (interpellation) in Svazek IV (1930), Tisk 1821 (interpellation) in Svazek X (1932), Tisk 8/IV (interpellation) in Svazek I (1935). (žiadost' celého Slovenska...). Ivanka, 305. schůze ... dne 4. prosince 1933 (p. 38), Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (p. 36), Sivák, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 48), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*; *Slovák* no. 212, 18.9.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 215, 21.9.1930:1,3.

<sup>203</sup> Ursíny confirmed this in an interview with *Slovák* no. 82a Easter 1928:3. See also Tisk 565, in: *Tisky k ...*, Svazek IV (1930), Tisk 176 in Svazek I (1926) Tisk 1821 (interpellation) in Svazek X (1932), *Slovák* no. 217, 24.9.1930:1.

<sup>204</sup> *Slovák* no. 108, 13.5.1930:1, *Slovák* no. 112, 17.5.1930:1, *Slovák* no. 217, 24.9.1930:1.

<sup>205</sup> (ako socha bez hlavy). *Slovák* no. 220, 27.9.1930:4, *Slovák* no. 40, 18.2.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 131, 11.6.1930:4.

<sup>206</sup> The government's view was voiced in various replies to interpellations. See Tisk 1158/I, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1931), Tisk 1986 in Svazek X (1932), Tisk 74/VIII in Svazek I (1935).

<sup>207</sup> *Slovák* no. 105, 9.5.1930:1, *Slovák* no. 107, 11.5.1930:2, *Slovák* no. 131, 11.6.1930:4. See also Dérer's comment during Sivák's speech, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 48), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

The lack of Slovak professors was a dilemma for the autonomists. They must have known that a polytechnic could only be erected with Czech help, but they could not admit it openly. Instead, they tried to substantiate that there were enough qualified Slovaks professors. In 1926, Sivák pointed to "excellent qualified Slovak professors" presently working at other polytechnics, while Senator Janček mentioned four such professors in a speech in 1930.<sup>208</sup>

Some elements were the same in all the ľudák proposals: The location in Košice, Slovak as the language of instruction, and the implementation of the law within a year. The differences concerned the branches of this new polytechnic. According to the 1926 proposal, the polytechnic should include mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, cultivation, construction and chemistry. A two-year study for land surveyors got its own article.<sup>209</sup> The 1930 proposal required the immediate establishment of one department for building engineering (divided into transport construction and building of waterways), one for electrical engineering, one for hydrometer engineering, and one for mechanical and chemical processing of wood. In the near future the school should also get departments of agriculture, forestry and mining/smelting.<sup>210</sup>

The 1936 proposal called for departments of agriculture, forestry, wood processing, and building engineering. The other departments from the 1930 proposal were left out, but the bill contained a separate article providing scholarships for Slovak students who wanted to study technical subject not covered in Slovakia. The 1930 proposal was thus most ambitious on behalf of the Slovak polytechnic.<sup>211</sup>

The government proposal of 1937 seconded the location in Košice, but the "state language" was given as the language of instruction rather than "Slovak." The following study departments were to open in the academic year 1938/39: 1. Building engineering – section of construction and transport, 2. building engineering – section of water management and cultivation, 3. Land surveying engineering. The three departments were seen as a first step; other departments would be added. This was in line with the resolution of the regional assembly of 1930, as well as with the recommendations of a gathering of economic experts, and representatives of districts (*okresy*), towns, cultural and political organizations assembled in Košice in November 1936. The only changes that were made in the Cultural Committee were to name the polytechnic after Milan Rastislav Štefánik – and to translate the law text from Czech to Slovak. Ironically, it was a Czech Minister of Education (the National Socialist Emil Franke) who got the honor of writing the proposal.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> (výborne kvalifikovanými profesormi – Slovákmi). Tisk 176, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1926), senator Janček in: *Slovák* no. 129, 7.6.1930:5.

<sup>209</sup> Tisk 176 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek I (1926).

<sup>210</sup> Tisk 565 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IV (1930).

<sup>211</sup> Tisk 454 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek III (1936).

<sup>212</sup> Tisk 898 (government proposal), Tisk 932 (Cultural Committee), in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým ...*, Svazek VII, VIII (1937).

How did the government argue, once it decided to grant Slovakia a polytechnic? It embraced the *economic* arguments. The three study departments were chosen because they were the areas where the lack of qualified personnel was most pressing. The needs within road building and railway construction were pointed out in especially great detail here. Finally, the government admitted having to take into consideration that the entire population of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had called for a polytechnic. Justice for Slovakia/the Slovak nation was of course absent from the list of arguments.<sup>213</sup>

In the debate in the Parliament, the spokesman of the Cultural Committee Emil Boleslav Lukáč (ČS) repeated the economic arguments, and admitted that the need for a polytechnic in Slovakia had been felt for a long time. He also agreed that the number of Slovak students in polytechnics elsewhere in the country testified to that need. Pavol Teplanský (Agr.), the spokesman of the Budget Committee, pointed out the lack of technically skilled personnel in Slovakia, also within other branches, but argued that more departments could not be established at this time because of the shortage of qualified teaching staff. He emphasized that the three departments that would be established were only a first step.<sup>214</sup>

This was not good enough for the opposition, who wanted more departments than the three proposed by the government. It is true that the gathering held in Košice in November 1936 had proposed this as a first phase, but the 1936 action committee for the establishment of a Slovak polytechnic went further. In addition to the government's three departments, the action committee wanted a chemical-technological department for processing of wood, a forestry department and a department of economics. Sivák raised this proposal in the Cultural Committee, where it was turned down.

In the debate, Sivák argued that what the government was proposing was not a polytechnic, but a halfway solution – a weak "embryo of a polytechnic" that did not serve Slovakia's needs. This again showed how little understanding the leading circles had for Slovakia and her needs, he argued. In addition to the proposal to call the polytechnic the Milan Rastislav Štefánik Polytechnic (which was adopted), Sivák also tried to change the language of instruction to Slovak, but in vain. He concluded that the struggle for more departments would go on, for "everybody" wanted it, and Slovakia had the right to a complete polytechnic.<sup>215</sup>

Among the Czechoslovak parties, also the National Unity and the Communist Party joined the Ľudáks in the demand for a complete Slovak polytechnic. They disagreed with the government and the Ľudáks about the location in Košice, however, arguing that Bratislava would be a better choice. The reasons given were that the national composition of Košice (too many non-Slovaks) did not provide a suitable environment for a Slovak center of higher education. It was also argued that Bratislava needed to be strengthened as a Slovak cultural center, and finally it

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<sup>213</sup> Tisk 898 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1937).

<sup>214</sup> Lukáč and Teplanský, 100. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 3. června 1937 (pp. 5–9), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>215</sup> (zárodok vysokej školy). Sivák, 101. schůze ... dne 4. června 1937 (pp. 3–10), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

was argued that a polytechnic, if located in Bratislava, could cooperate with Comenius University and possibly also lead to the establishment of a natural science faculty there at long last. The Communist Vladimír Clementis claimed that the main reason why Košice was chosen was that Hodža had promised to locate the polytechnic in his own election district.<sup>216</sup>

The scarcity of qualified technical personnel in Slovakia was well beyond doubt. As we shall see in the next chapter, this had an adverse effect on the restructuring and modernization of Slovak economy, and especially on the development of Slovak infrastructure. The establishment of a Slovak polytechnic was thus long overdue for economic reasons. We have seen that the government's main argument for postponing the establishment of a polytechnic in Slovakia was an alleged lack of students and professors. Dérer repeated the latter view after the law founding the polytechnic was adopted, but before it was implemented: "We shall have to be assisted by a Czech staff, for we do not possess enough qualified technical experts of our own."<sup>217</sup> Indeed, when the school opened in 1938, there were four ordinary professors (1 Slovak and 3 Czechs), five extraordinary professors (1 Slovak, 3 Czechs, 1 other) and six assistants (4 Slovaks and 2 Czechs). Yet, by 1944, there were 16 professors (of these 10 Slovaks and 3 Czechs), 16 extraordinary professors (of these, 14 Slovaks and one Czech), and 49 assistants (of these, 46 Slovaks and 2 Czechs).<sup>218</sup>

In the case of the alleged lack of students, however, an appendix in the government proposal provided ample evidence that Dérer had been wrong all along. Apart from the first year, there had been more than 500 students from Slovakia enrolled in Czech and German polytechnics in the Czech lands (see Table 16). Moreover, the Slovak share had been steadily increasing. The great majority of the Slovaks attended Czech polytechnics, while minority students from Slovakia mostly attended the German schools.

**Table 16: Students from Slovakia attending polytechnics in the Czech lands**

Year	1919/20	1920/21	1921/22	1922/23	1923/24	1924/25	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28	1928/29	1929/30	1930/31	1931/32	1932/33	1933/34	1934/35	1935/36	1936/37
Students from																		
Slovakia	398	672	742	744	708	673	625	682	581	516	527	550	570	590	545	582	584	558
Slovaks	102	198	202	255	254	298	304	294	298	?	?	?	339	352	355	377	377	384

Source: Tisk 898, Appendix A in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1937).

<sup>216</sup> See Karel Domin (National unity), 100. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 3. června 1937 (pp. 11–13), Viliam Široky (Communist), 101. schůze ... dne 4. června 1937 (pp. 11–12), Clementis, 102. schůze ... dne 8. června 1937 (pp. 5–9), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>217</sup> Ivan Dérer: *The unity of the Czech and Slovaks. Has the Pittsburgh declaration been carried out?* (1938:52–53).

<sup>218</sup> See Konstantín Čulen: *Česi a Slováci v štátnych službách ČSR* (1994:147).

Moreover, the development in the number of students after a Slovak polytechnic was founded suggests that Jozef Sivák was right when predicting that more Slovaks would choose technical studies if they could only study in Slovakia. In the opening year 1938/39 the Polytechnic in Košice had 70 students, increasing to 1724 students in the academic year 1943/44, or almost 4.5 times in only seven years. With most of the Magyar-speaking areas gone, it is likely that most of the 1724 students enrolled in the polytechnic in 1943/44 were Slovaks. It must be admitted that this figure probably would have been lower if the students (especially from West Slovakia) still had the opportunity to enroll in Czech polytechnics.

In the meantime the Slovak polytechnic had moved from Košice (after it became a part of Hungary in the Vienna award of 1938), first to Prešov, then to Martin and finally to Bratislava, while the number of departments increased from three to six. These were 1. Building engineering, 2. Department of special theory (*náuka*), 3. Forestry and agricultural engineering, 4. Machine and electrotechnical engineering, 5. Chemical-technological engineering, and 6. Business management. As a Minister of Education in the Slovak state, Jozef Sivák was thus able to finish also the second long struggle for the completion of Slovak higher education.<sup>219</sup>

Why did the government hesitate to start a polytechnic in Slovakia? The Ministry of Education kept track of the number of students from Slovakia attending polytechnics, and the government was aware of the shortage of technical specialists. It is true that there were not nearly enough qualified Slovaks to run a Slovak polytechnic, but this had not been an obstacle for founding a university in Bratislava, nor was it an obstacle for the establishment of a polytechnic when it came. It is of course possible that there was a general shortage of qualified teaching staff on a countrywide level, and that establishing another polytechnic would have made this worse. It is also possible that the government did not want to give the autonomists more ammunition by founding another institution of higher education in Slovakia where the language of instruction would have to be Czech. Although the government denied that budget concerns had anything to do with it, a more plausible reason is that a Slovak polytechnic did not have priority in the allocation process at a time when the economic crisis necessitated major budget cuts. In a sense, the timing was bad: The establishment of a Slovak polytechnic was put high on the agenda at a point when the economic crisis was well under way, in the fall of 1930. Even Sivák realized that a polytechnic could not be founded in the midst of the crisis; yet, he did argue that it should at least be planned.<sup>220</sup>

If budget concerns were the reason, why did the government not just abolish one of the German polytechnics to satisfy the Slovaks? For one thing, this would only have given the German nationalist parties more ammunition – probably not a good idea considering the landslide election victory of the Heinlein party in 1935. Second, the government coalition included two (after 1935 three) so-called activist German parties that certainly would not have accepted losing a polytechnic. For the government, it was a typical no-win situation.

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<sup>219</sup> Čulen (1994:146–47).

<sup>220</sup> Sivák in the budget debate of 1934, 303. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1933 (p. 36), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

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The Czechoslovak government made a tremendous effort to build a Slovak educational system almost from scratch. Although school classes remained larger in Slovakia, partly due to a shortage of teachers, great progress was made in few years. The emphasis put on improving the lower levels of the educational system did not, however, extend fully into higher education. It took time to get Comenius University in Bratislava off the ground – the teaching facilities and student housing schemes were inadequate, lower-level courses in medicine took a long time to start, and the natural science faculty did not open until after 1938. Likewise, although the lack of qualified technical personnel and thus the need for higher technical education was beyond doubt, a Slovak polytechnic did not come into operation until the very final months of the First Republic, despite all the complaints, demands, and proposals.

In contrast to the other demands, demands for the expansion of the educational system were voiced not only by the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party, but also by Slovak deputies from other parties. It may well be that a separate Slovak higher education was never a priority for the government, or that a shared Czechoslovak (i.e. Czech) higher education was deemed sufficient. In any case, the fact that a majority of the demands concerning the expansion of the educational system was directed at higher education did reflect a reality.

### ***Summary and conclusion***

The Czechs were for all practical purposes the ruling nation in the new Czechoslovak state. Most of the Czech "unfinished business" from the Austrian period was taken care of during the first years, and the remaining cultural demands mostly concerned the Czech schools in the border area. When the government tried to redress the Austrian heritage by depriving the Catholic Church of its privileged position and separating church from state, however, it ran into problems internally in the Czech camp, as well as in relation to the Slovaks.

An important function of the Constitution of 1920 was to settle the account with the former oppressors, while making the Czechs look morally superior. For the majority in the Revolutionary Parliament, an important argument was that they could not give the minorities less than the Czech national movement had demanded from the Habsburg rulers, nor could they adopt a nationality policy that they had been fighting against for decades. Another main argument was that internal peace was needed in order to build the state economically, socially and culturally. An explicit concern was to gain the respect of the international community by appearing as nationally more just than the old Austrian "prison of nations."

The new Constitution was thus a liberal constitution with extensive minority rights. Only the special Language Act in pursuance of §129 gave privileges to the "Czechoslovak" state-nation by making the "Czechoslovak" language the state, official language. This was at the same time a solution to a major remaining Czech cultural demand from the Austrian period: Czechization of the administration in Czech areas.

Finally, it should also be noted that both issues where the Slovak Club disagreed with the Czech majority were solved in the Constitutional Committee. Neither issue was allowed to create an impression of Czecho–Slovak discord in the Revolutionary Parliament.

Expectations that cultural demands would correspond to the attributes that were regarded as constituting the national identity (language, history and religion) were met to varying degrees. Slovak linguistic demands stand out in terms of their number as well as their saliency throughout the period, while tangible religious demands were few and mostly limited to the early 1920s. Slovak demands for a "correct" interpretation of history in the schools were also surprisingly few, especially considering the Czechoslovak orientation of the school textbooks in history. Apart from language demands, the demands for the completion of the Slovak higher educational system dominated in the 1930s, with a Slovak polytechnic as a core demand.

The educational system was the major arena for cultural demands for both our nations. The *Czechs* raised demands for the expansion of the educational system in the early 1920s. A long unfulfilled demand from the Austrian period was met through the establishment of Masaryk University in Brno in early 1919. In contrast to Comenius University in Bratislava, all the faculties of Masaryk University were operative by 1921, although the facilities were often provisional. Otherwise, Czech demands mostly concerned the establishment of Czech schools in the German-speaking border areas, and they were raised by deputies from these areas.

*Slovak* demands associated with the educational system cover all the main categories of demands. First, there were *religious* demands for the preservation of the confessional schools, for the return of Catholic *gymnasia* and against anti-Catholic school textbooks. These were most common early in the 1920s. Second, there were *language* demands for the use of Slovak at all levels of the educational system, and complaints that lectures were given in Czech, especially at Comenius University. In the 1930s, most of these complaints centered on Comenius University. Third, there were complaints that Slovak history was neglected in textbooks, and complaints of an anti- or non-Slovak *spirit*, again especially at the university. Fourth, there were demands for the expansion of the *educational system*, mostly concerning higher education (Comenius University and the polytechnic). A possible reason why these demands were most common in the 1930s is that the student body at Comenius University was all but Slovak in the beginning, because of the former lack of Slovak secondary schools.<sup>221</sup> Finally, a regional *school board* in Slovakia was a recurrent demand.

The reason why the educational system was the major arena for cultural demands was probably the bad shape it was in; even the otherwise well developed Czech educational system had deficits. The Magyarization policy of the former Hungarian regime, which deprived the Slovaks of a national system of education, was the fundamental cause of all the Slovak grievances – from the lack of Slovak schools, to the use of Czech as the medium of instruction, textbooks neglecting Slovak history, and readers where more than half the texts were Czech.

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<sup>221</sup> Johnson (1985: 221).



Although the government made a tremendous effort to build a Slovak educational system almost from scratch, I think it is safe to say that preference went to the expansion of Czech and not Slovak higher education. Due to the shortage of technical personnel in Slovakia, the refusal to erect a polytechnic probably had the most adverse consequences for Slovakia's economic development, if not for her cultural development.

As we have seen, Slovak language demands were the highly salient. Language rights were in principle laid down by the Language Act and the school law of 1923, according to which the Slovak language enjoyed the same privileges as Czech vis-à-vis the minority languages. Article 4 of the Language Act pronounced that "as a rule" Slovak should be used in Slovakia. At the same time, however, a Czech was allowed to answer a Slovak in Czech and vice versa. This formal equality worked to the disadvantage of the Slovaks and the Slovak language because of the difference in size and the gap in cultural development between the two nations. The Czech intelligentsia not only dominated the central administration; it also made up a large share of the public employees in Slovakia. Czech was thus commonly used in Slovakia, while Slovak was rarely used in the Czech lands.

A large majority of the Slovak linguistic demands concerned the implementation of existing language rights based on a strict interpretation of §4 in the Language Act. This also reflected an alternative conception of equality, focusing on the exclusive use of Slovak in Slovakia and Czech in the Czech lands, rather than parity for Czech and Slovak throughout the territory of the state. Realizing that it was not possible to get the government to accept their interpretation of the existing Language Act, the Ľudáks finally filed a law proposal to amend the Act in 1937.

Most of the Slovak linguistic demands concerned the use of Slovak in Slovakia, while complaints regarding the central level were not very common. Complaints about use of Czech in the administration, courts and schools in Slovakia were most common in the (early) 1920s, while complaints about the use of Czech at Comenius University, in the army and in the railways remained salient also in the 1930s. This probably reflected a reality, as the use of Czech in Slovakia seems to have been most common in the 1920s. The government decrees of 1926 and 1927 ordering public employees to use Slovak at least in written contacts must have helped. In addition, a certain change of attitude among the Czech employees in Slovakia is evident, except perhaps among the professors at Comenius University. Finally, even talented and motivated people would need some time to become fluent in Slovak.

Only one conflict concerned the Slovak language as such: the dispute over the new Slovak orthography in 1931, which ended in the establishment of a new commission and the autonomist (Ľudák and Slovak National Party) takeover of the *Matica slovenská* the following year. The alleged Czechization of the Slovak language was thus halted.

As for religion, it was generally not allowed to constitute a nationally relevant conflict, since the religious cleavages crossed the national divide between Czechs and Slovaks. The Constitution made all confessions equal before the law, thus limiting the former privileges of the Catholic Church, but the matter of separation of church and state was postponed, thanks to

the concerted efforts of the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Church hierarchy and the Slovak Club. The socialist parties tried halfheartedly to raise the issue time and again, but the *realpolitik* of Švehla always prevailed. Broad compromises that could be accepted by all the coalition partners, including the Czechoslovak People's Party, were the basic model for the solution of most matters involving religion. The Agrarians were pragmatics, whose main concern was the interest of the countryside, but they also had religious conciliation as an explicit goal. More importantly, however, the coalition partners simply could not afford to alienate Jan Šrámek and his Czechoslovak People's Party.

Most matters with a bearing on religion were thus solved fairly early in the 1920s, and the broad compromises for the most part also accommodated the *ľudáks*. It is thus not surprising that tangible religious demands were most common in the early 1920s and that they were often raised in concert with the Czechoslovak People's Party, while the remaining Slovak religious complaints mostly concerned rhetoric and symbols. The two issues I have treated in some detail involved opposition to the celebration of a "heretic" (the dispute about Jan Hus Day), and defense of Slovak piety through the protection of the confessional schools. Both these issues had a bearing on Slovak identity.

Complaints concerning the Czechoslovakist orientation of school textbooks or the lack of a Slovak spirit were surprisingly rare. As I have already indicated, this may be because the books in my sample were not much used, or because nationally oriented teachers could counteract them, or because history was a less important part of Slovak identity than language. On the other hand, the general crusade against Czechoslovakism may be interpreted as a struggle against all expressions of Czechoslovakism everywhere – also in the schools.

Finally, most of the cultural demands concerned Slovakia, and they aimed at equality more than autonomy. There are some important exceptions, however. The demand for a Slovak regional school board with power to decide over Slovak education is a typical cultural autonomy demand. Likewise, Hlinka and Juriga demanded religious autonomy in the first few years. The most important cultural autonomy demands, however, came with the three proposals of constitutional amendment in 1922, 1930 and 1938. According to all three, legislative power in linguistic, religious, and education matters, as well as matters of local administration, would be the prerogative of the autonomous Slovak political organs, and Slovak would be the official language. I will return to these in greater detail in Chapter Thirteen.

In short, the national cultural demands seemed to reflect a reality, and their composition thus changed as the underlying conditions changed. They were closely associated with the attributes that were regarded as basic to Slovak identity (especially language); and their saliency was inversely related to the degree of government accommodation.

## *Twelve*

# *A matter of Slovak bread?*

*Defining ethnonational conflict in terms of economic inequality is a bit like defining them in terms of oxygen: where you find one, you can be reasonably certain of finding the other.*

Walker Connor<sup>1</sup>

There are various ways of approaching the relationship between national conflict and economic deprivation, ranging from economic reductionism to the bold statement of Connor quoted above. Connor's argument is that the geographical distribution of ethnonational groups in distinctive homelands in itself ensures economic inequalities between groups, because regional economic development tends to be uneven. The fact that fairly large regional inequalities are accepted in homogeneous nation-states, while this is typically not the case in multinational states, suggests that national conflict is not a matter of economic inequality *alone*.<sup>2</sup> Many scholars (including Connor) have, however, pointed out that when economic inequality coincides with national divides, it does tend to reinforce them.

A nationally relevant conflict of a socio-economic character may be deemed to exist *objectively* when national divides coincide with an economic conflict of interest. Such conflicts need not involve the interest of the whole nation to have effect on the conflict level. Often what is presented as the "national interest" is, in Hroch's words, "the transformed and sublimated image of the material interests of concrete classes and groups."<sup>3</sup> Such conflicts must however be *subjectively* perceived as a problem by the wronged national group to be salient, which normally requires that they be articulated publicly.

The main difference between the cultural and the economic dimension is that while most cultural demands relate to matters under government control, there may exist nationally relevant conflicts of a socio-economic character that are not primarily the result of government policy, and that may not easily be remedied by government action. This is especially true in a situation where there exists some measure of market economy. An interesting question is to what extent nationally relevant conflicts caused by external economic forces lead to complaints. This is also a matter of what caused the most important nationally relevant conflicts between Czechs and Slovaks – external economic forces, or government policies (or lack of such). In order to get an impression of this, I will go into the economic context in some detail.

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<sup>1</sup> Walker Connor: Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism?, reprinted in: *Ethnonationalism. The quest for understanding* (1996:147).

<sup>2</sup> Connor (1996:147–53).

<sup>3</sup> Miroslav Hroch: *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe* (1985:185).

Rather than following the usual chronology of the economic literature,<sup>4</sup> I have chosen to structure this chapter around the main economic challenges facing Czechoslovak governments throughout the period, how they tried to cope with them, and how this affected Czecho–Slovak relations. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me to place the economic complaints and demands into a context, while at the same time making the economic restraints on government action more obvious. Since many of the economic problems of the First Republic were closely related to the heritage from the Habsburg Empire, we shall first have a look at this.

### *The Czech lands and Slovakia – worlds apart*

For one thing, the Czech lands were more industrialized, in absolute and relative terms. The Czech lands had 36 percent of the population in the Austrian part and 52 percent of the Austrian industry and business in 1913, while Slovakia's share of Hungary's industrial production (18.6 percent) barely approximated her share of the population.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, because of the Austrian–Hungarian division of labor Hungary was less industrialized than the Austrian part, although progress was made from the 1890s, with government support (tax relief, favorable railway tariffs, state contracts and the erection of a tariff wall).<sup>6</sup> Slovakia's low industrialization was also reflected in the composition of the working force, as Table 17 shows.

The Czech lands were also more urbanized than Slovakia. In 1910 there were eighteen cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants in Bohemia, seven in Moravia and three in Silesia, but only two in Slovakia (Bratislava and Košice). Bratislava was only the fifth largest, ranking behind Prague, Brno, Plzeň and Vinohrady Královské (today a part of Prague).<sup>7</sup>

**Table 17: Population according to sector (percentages)**

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Region</i>	Census of 1910			Census of 1921			Census of 1930		
		Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia	Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia	Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia
Agriculture, forestry, fishery		32.3	38.6	62.0	29.7	35.3	60.6	24.1	28.6	56.8
Industry and business		40.7	37.2	18.8	40.6	37.8	17.4	41.8	40.8	19.1
Trade and finance		6.5	5.1	* 8.2	6.9	5.3	4.1	8.9	6.7	5.4
Transportation		5.2	4.3	*	5.6	5.0	3.5	6.2	5.5	4.7
Public & liberal professions		5.5	5.0	4.4	6.1	5.4	5.1	6.3	5.9	6.3
Other and unemployed		9.9	9.8	6.6	11.2	11.2	9.3	12.8	12.5	7.6

*Sources:* *Statistická příručka republiky československé IV.* (1932:13). *Statistická ročenka republiky československé* (1934:14). Silesia is included in Moravia.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Ludovít Hallon: *Industrializácia Slovenska 1918–1938* (1995), Vlastislav Lacina: *Formování československé ekonomiky* (1990), J. Faltus – V. Průcha: *Prehľad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku 1918–1945* (1969).

<sup>5</sup> Lacina (1990:22), Karel Půlpán: *Nástin českých a slovenských hospodářských dějin do roku 1990* (1993:405).

<sup>6</sup> Hallon (1995:11), Půlpán (1993:404), Lacina (1990:44).

<sup>7</sup> *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920:10).

Second, the Czech lands also had the most market-oriented agricultural sector in the entire monarchy. Labor productivity increased three times over in the period 1850 to 1913. It was thus fairly intensive and specialized, with emphasis on industrial plants like sugar beets, potatoes, and grain (barley), providing the basis for various food industries. By contrast, Slovak agriculture was still fairly extensive, had in part a subsistence character, and was not very specialized. Climate and soil were also less favorable than in the Czech lands. It has been indicated that Slovakia lagged 50 years behind the Czech lands in 1918. The only market-oriented part was the large estates in the Magyar-inhabited areas to the south, which sold their produce on the Magyar and Vienna markets.<sup>8</sup> The extensive Slovak agriculture could not feed the overpopulated villages, and part of the Slovak male population thus had to earn a living as traveling craftsmen or seasonal workers in Budapest or Vienna.<sup>9</sup> Many also emigrated.<sup>10</sup>

Third, while Czech capital was weak compared to the German-Austrian bourgeoisie and nobility, who dominated the economic life of the Czech lands, Slovak capital was almost non-existent. Czechs controlled somewhere between a fifth and a third of the capital value of the industry in the Czech lands, while Slovak ownership comprised less than 5 percent. Czech ownership was stronger in banking and finance, and Prague developed into a second (albeit provincial) financial center in the western part of the empire during the final two decades. While Czech banks controlled 13.3 percent (1,022 million crowns) of the total share capital of the western part of the empire in 1913, Slovak banks controlled only slightly over 0.5 percent (13 million crowns) of the total share capital in Hungary in 1912.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 18: Czech and Slovak infra structure**

<i>Region</i>	Population		Area		State roads		Railways		Post offices			Telephones	
	in persons	%	sq. kilo-meters	%	kilo-meters	%	kilo-meters	%	total	people /office	km <sup>2</sup> /off.	phone boots	had a phone
Bohemia	6,670,583	49	52,064	37	4,401.8	52	6,692	50	2,175	3,067	24	800	49,818
Moravia	2,662,884	20	22,315	16	1,058.5	13	2,189	16	1,059	2,514	21	372	16,398
Silesia	672,268	5	4,423	3	423.2	5	598	4	279	2,409	16	142	3,814
Slovakia	3,000,870	22	48,936	35	1,975.6	24	*3,826	29	1,045	2,871	47	279	7,317
Ruthenia	606,568	4	12,656	9	524.0	6	*	—	92	6,573	138	21	433
<i>Total</i>	13,613,172	100	140,394	100	8,383.0	100	13,305	100	4,650	2,956	30	1,614	77,770

*Source:* *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:279, 280, 288, 292, 360). The figures are from 1920, 1921 or 1922 (only the road figures).

<sup>8</sup> Půlpán (1993:464–65).

<sup>9</sup> According to the Hungarian census of 1910, 31 percent of those employed in agriculture in Slovakia were agricultural workers. Faltus/Průcha (1969:133).

<sup>10</sup> In the years 1905 to 1914 the net average was 13,718 Slovaks a year. *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1920:28).

<sup>11</sup> Lacina (1990: 28–39, 46–47, 50). Půlpán (1993:343, 347, 405), Faltus/Průcha (1969:19). According to Hallon (1995:14), the Slovaks controlled only 2.4 percent of the industrial capital.

Finally, as Table 18 demonstrates, the Czech lands had a higher average standard of living, and a better infrastructure. Slovakia's share of roads and railway tracks was not particularly small compared to her share of the population, only compared to her geographical extension. Apart from the fairly low railway density, much of the railway network in Slovakia was privately owned, resulting in high and varying freight rates. In addition to the lack of (cheap) coal, this was a clear disadvantage for the development of Slovak industry, while the abundance of black and brown coal formed the basis for the rapid industrial growth of the Czech lands from the last third of the 19th century up to the war.

What the Czech lands and Slovakia had in common was that they were both economic peripheries dependent on, respectively, Vienna and Budapest for capital, and their infrastructure was oriented southwards, resulting in weak east–west links between Slovakia and the Czech lands. Moreover, because of the trade policies of the Habsburg government, most of their products were sold on the domestic Austrian-Hungarian market. Likewise, the ownership structure was predominantly German and Magyar in industry as well as agriculture. In Slovakia, the (Magyar-dominated) nobility and the Church controlled 46.4 percent of the land, compared to a third in Czechoslovakia as a whole.<sup>12</sup> Czechs and Slovaks were thus over-represented among those desperately longing for (more) land. Light industry was concentrated in the German-speaking area along the northern rim of the Czech lands, and in the two largest towns of Slovakia (Bratislava and Košice), where Slovaks were a minority.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Economic challenges***

The two most immediate tasks of the new Czechoslovak government were, first, to build up a new state and local administration, an army and a police force, for which money and reliable personnel were needed; and second, to liberate Czechoslovakia economically from the other successor states of the Habsburg Empire. It was deemed especially important to increase Czech and Slovak ownership in industry, commerce, banking and agriculture.

A third task was to integrate the Czech lands, Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia into one economic system and one market. The main problem-areas were the weak east–west links and the existence of two different legal systems. Finally, a reorientation of the economy was necessary, the most pressing task being to find new markets for the industry. While Czech and Slovak industry had been able to sell 80 percent of its production on the protected Austrian-Hungarian market before 1918, suddenly some 70 percent of the production had to find markets abroad.<sup>14</sup> Because of this export dependency, the economic crisis of the 1930s put an extra strain on Czechoslovak economy. Paradoxically, the industrial strength of the Czech lands thus became a liability after 1918.

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<sup>12</sup> Lacina (1990: 43–44, 125), Půlpán (1993:465).

<sup>13</sup> Respectively 14.9 and 14.8 percent in Bratislava and Košice declared Slovak to be their mother tongue in 1910. See *Štatistický lexikon obcí v republike Československej III.* (1936:164–65).

<sup>14</sup> Lacina (1990:21), Půlpán (1993:407).

Finding a successful solution to the latter three of these tasks was crucial to the economic viability of the state, but the most salient nationally relevant conflict in the First Republic was associated with *staffing*. Topping the economic agenda of the Slovak autonomists was the complaint that the Czech intelligentsia were occupying jobs to which the Slovak intelligentsia were entitled. This was a matter of job opportunities, and thus of state hiring policy. Other economic complaints of a more spatial character were associated with distribution of government spending (especially investments and state purchases); building of infrastructure and railway tariffs; inequality in terms of taxes and regulations; and the land reform. I will return to the various economic complaints/demands in their appropriate contexts.

Since the financing of the new state administration did not create any particular problems for the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, I will not go into this in any detail. The acute funding problems were solved by four state loans in Czech banks in the period 1918–20. In addition, the government borrowed money abroad to finance the purchase of food, repatriation of the Czechoslovak legions and for military purposes. In fact, the external share of the state debt was only around 20 percent of the total public debt in the period 1927–37.<sup>15</sup>

The question of staffing will be discussed later in this chapter, because this was intimately related to the unemployment situation as a whole, and because the problems that arose can be fully understood only in the context of the general economic situation. For the same reason, the distribution of government spending will be left to the end. I will address the structural matters first, including economic liberation from the other successor-states of Austria-Hungary and the problems associated with infrastructure. Then I will turn to economic development and its consequences for Czecho–Slovak relations, and finally I will address the distribution of government spending and the staffing problem.

### ***Economic liberation from Austria-Hungary***

The government took three important steps in 1918 and 1919 in order to disentangle the Czechoslovak economy from the economies of the other successor states, and to strengthen the position of the Czechoslovak "state-nation." First, a monetary reform was implemented in February 1919. Second, in December 1919 the Parliament adopted a law calling for domestication of industry, banks and insurance companies with head offices outside the republic. Third, the foundations of a land reform were laid through a freeze on landed estates in November 1918 and a framework law for the execution of a land reform in April 1919.

Of these steps, monetary reform was the most pressing issue. As long as Austrian-Hungarian currency was valid throughout the old empire, there was no way of escaping the inflationary pressure of the Austrian and Hungarian economies. A separate Czechoslovak currency was established in the beginning of March 1919 by sealing the border and adding a stamp to the

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<sup>15</sup> Lacina (1990:80, 174, 175), Alice Teichová: *An economic background to Munich* (1974:27, 371). See table page 368–69 for details.

existing Austrian bank notes.<sup>16</sup> Although the action was a success, forgery of the stamps soon became a problem, and the emission of new Czechoslovak notes thus had to be speeded up. The first emission was complete by February 1920.<sup>17</sup> Parallel with the monetary reform, in order to create a shortage of money and thus a need for credits, Finance Minister Alois Rašín wanted to withdraw 80 percent of the notes from circulation through mandatory loans. He believed that this would stop the inflation and increase the value of the crown. The government accepted 50 percent as a goal, but in the end only about 28.6 percent were withheld.<sup>18</sup>

The institution responsible for the emission of Czechoslovak media of exchange was from the outset the Bank Institute under the Ministry of Finance. A Czechoslovak National Bank was not established until 1926, because of large state debts, and the lack of assets and foreign currency reserves. The most influential organ was the ten-member board, composed mainly of National Democrats and Agrarians. As there was never more than one Slovak and one German on the board, Czechs dominated the decisions of the National Bank.<sup>19</sup>

Rašín wanted to strengthen the Czechoslovak crown through a deflationary monetary policy, but the Czechoslovak crown nevertheless dropped from 33 centimes on the Zürich stock exchange in May 1919 to 10 centimes in December. As Minister of Finance in 1920 and 1921 Karel Engliš succeeded in stabilizing the crown at a level between 6 and 9 centimes. The renewed deflationary monetary policy of the group around Rašín led to an abrupt rise in the value of the Czechoslovak crown starting in August 1922, to a peak of 19.2 Swiss centimes in October. This deepened the economic recession already under way. The deflation policy was abandoned in favor of stabilizing the Czechoslovak currency after the assassination of Rašín in January 1923. The new goal was 16 Swiss centimes, which was in essence achieved.<sup>20</sup>

A second important step towards economic independence from Vienna and Budapest was the policy of *nostrifikace* ("domestication"). The first proposal, presented to the Parliament already towards the end of 1918, required firms with factories in Czechoslovakia to transfer their head offices to Czechoslovak soil. The law of December 11th, 1919, was somewhat more lenient, allowing the responsible minister to decide which firms to deal with first. Some firms had moved their head offices voluntarily even before the law was passed, either to the location of the factories or to Prague. In addition, action had been taken against 17 private railway companies in the Czech lands in July 1919.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Půlpán (1993:321–22).

<sup>17</sup> The Austrian-Hungarian bank notes (with stamps) are photographed in *Československé bankovky, státkovky a mince 1919–92* (1993:57–58), while the first emission may be found on pages 59–61.

<sup>18</sup> Lacina (1990:83–85).

<sup>19</sup> See *Československé bankovky, státkovky a mince 1919–92* (1993:19–20).

<sup>20</sup> Lacina (1990:179, 191, 194), Faltus/Průcha (1969:37). Between 1924 and 1938 the value of the crown was below 15 centimes only in the years 1934, 1935 and 1936 (no doubt a result of the devaluations in 1934 and 1936), and above 16 centimes only in 1924. See *Statistická ročenka Protektorátu Čechy a Morava* (1941:212–13), and Hallon (1995:148).

<sup>21</sup> Lacina (1990:100–102). See also Faltus/Průcha (1969:20).



The law required that firms with factories in several countries be split up, that head offices be moved to Czechoslovakia, and that a majority of the new board members be Czechoslovak citizens. Most of the firms in question had their base in Vienna or Budapest, and the Austrian and Hungarian governments predictably tried to obstruct their transfer. An agreement was reached with Austria already in the spring of 1920; relations with Hungary proved less cordial, and an agreement was not reached until 1927. This delayed the domestication process in Slovakia substantially. Most of the domestication in 1921 thus involved companies that had their base in Austria and their factories in the Czech lands. The domestication process was carried out in the Czech lands until 1924 and in Slovakia throughout the 1920s.

The domestication process strengthened Czech ownership. The conversion to peace-time production in itself required investments – investments that had to be made in Czechoslovak crowns, which only Czech banks had.<sup>22</sup> Often investments were financed by issuing new shares, and this way Czech capital increased its part of the stocks. The Austrian domination was thus weakened before the domestication process started. The transfer of head offices resulted in new offers of shares for subscription, and Czech banks bought shares from Austrian owners on the Vienna stock exchange. This was facilitated by the deflation policy of the government in 1922–23.

After domestication was completed, foreign interests had the majority in only two major companies: the Škoda factory, and *Báňská a hutní společnost* (the mining and metallurgical company). In both cases, French interests were involved, on the direct initiative of Beneš. Beneš and Rašín had sought Allied help already at the Peace Conference in order to ease Czechoslovak dependence on Austrian and Hungarian capital. They succeeded: In 1937, Austrian capital accounted for 13.1 percent of foreign direct investments, while Hungarian capital was reduced to merely 0.5 percent. Around 25 percent of the capital was foreign owned in 1937.<sup>23</sup>

Through the domestication process, Czech capital improved its position not only in the Czech lands but also in Slovakia, and Czechs were thus able to assume economic hegemony over the state. Czech private capital was most active in Slovakia in the beginning; it backed out during the 1921–23 economic recession, but returned in the 1930s, especially during the new investment wave after 1934. By 1936, 79 percent of the capital invested in Slovakia and Ruthenia was domestic, i.e. Czechoslovak, but of this only some 15 percent was Slovak.<sup>24</sup> Czech takeover of Slovak industry and banks was not among the most incendiary issues, although the Memorandum of the Slovaks (1919) did contain a complaint that "the Czechs put their hands on all the exploitations of mines, petroleum, and watering resorts of Slovakia."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The Slovak banks were too small and too few to play any important role. See table in Lacina (1990:114). See also page 110 and Faltus/Průcha (1969:20).

<sup>23</sup> See table IV in Alice Teichova: *An economic background to Munich* (1974:40–42, 48–49). See also Lacina (1990:111, 143, 147). The figures are investments by 31.12.1937.

<sup>24</sup> Hallon (1995:157–58, 198)

<sup>25</sup> Memorandum of the Slovaks to the peace conference of 1919, reprinted in: Joseph A. Mikuš: *Slovakia. A political and constitutional history* (1995:165).

The Žilina Manifesto of the Slovak People's Party (1922) likewise voiced complaints that Czechs banks had gained control over Slovak banks by dubious means, then used their financial monopoly in Slovakia to gain control of Slovak industry as well, and finally, used their power to fire Slovak workers and replace them with Czechs.<sup>26</sup> This argumentation has a parallel in the argument that the Czechs treated Slovakia as a colony. This was most common in the early 1920s, but was occasionally repeated in *Slovák*.<sup>27</sup> I have not registered any complaints of Czech economic hegemony in the 1930s.

A third important step that affected the ownership structure in *agriculture* was the land reform. The freeze on large estates in November 1918 was designed to buy time. The framework law adopted in April 1919 laid down the basic principles of the reform, but did not take any land into possession. The law merely gave the state the right to take over and partition the expropriated land at some future date. In practice, more than half of the land that the law applied to was left with the original owners, the former nobility and the Catholic Church.<sup>28</sup> The years 1922–26 were the most active period in the Czech lands, with a culmination before the election in 1925, and again before the election of 1929. After that the land-reform process slowed down, and in the 1930s no large buy-outs occurred. Land reform was delayed in Slovakia, where most of the land was distributed in the late 1920s/early 1930s.<sup>29</sup>

The first Slovak comments to the land reform concerned precisely the tempo. Ivan Déřer (ČSD), Pavel Blaho, Kornel Stodola and Milan Hodža (Agr.), and Andrej Hlinka (HSL'S) all agreed in speeches in the Parliament in 1920 and 1922 that the implementation of the land reform must be speeded up. The reasons cited were the need to help small peasants out of their present economic misery, and to stop "irredentism."<sup>30</sup>

In the literature from the Communist period it has been argued that the land reform was designed to stop the revolutionary tide in the countryside.<sup>31</sup> Yet, only a smaller portion of the expropriated land was actually parceled and sold to peasants with little or no land – 643,695 hectares of arable land were distributed among 638,182 recipients. The State Land Bureau in addition created 2,291 so-called "rest estates" from 226,306 hectares of the best land. The main effect was, however, to strengthen the medium-sized holdings (see Appendix D<sub>6</sub>).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The Žilina Manifesto, in Mikuš (1995:201–202).

<sup>27</sup> See e.g. the editorial in *Slovák* no. 12, 16.1.1927:1.

<sup>28</sup> Lacina (1990:126), Jan Rychlík: Pozemková reforma v Československu v letech 1919–1938 in: *Vědecké práce zemědělského muzea* no. 27/1987–88 (pp. 132, 136, 137).

<sup>29</sup> Půlpán (1993:140), Rychlík (1988:135), Lacina (1990:127, 129), Alena Bartlová: Triedne boje proletariátu na Slovensku v rokoch 1929–1934, in: *Historický časopis* 2, 1986:173.

<sup>30</sup> Déřer and Blaho, 25. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 469), and 26. schůze ... dne 25. listopadu 1920 (p. 555), Hlinka and Hodža, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (pp. 209, 218), and Stodola, 161. schůze ... dne 26. října 1922 (p. 211), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé*.

<sup>31</sup> Lacina (1990:129), Rychlík (1988:128), Faltus/Průcha (1969:135), *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:54–55).

<sup>32</sup> Lacina (1990:125–28).

The Agrarians were often accused of using their control of the land reform for their own benefit. According to Jan Rychlík, 56 percent of the rest estates were left in the hands of estate caretakers who had lost their jobs because of the partitions. The remainder were distributed among notabilities of the Agrarian Party and other coalition parties, at low prices.<sup>33</sup>

The reform served to strengthen Czech and Slovak ownership in agriculture.<sup>34</sup> It thus had a strong national character, perhaps even more so in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. While the large estates that were partitioned in the Czech lands were located in predominantly Czech areas, some 70 percent of the large estates in Slovakia were located in the fertile, Magyar-inhabited southern rim. The land reform thus involved a certain migration of Slovaks from the mountainous areas of central and northern Slovakia to the south. According to Milan Hodža, historical wrongs had pushed the Slovaks back into the mountains, and now "the Slovak people must reacquire its lost settlements through the land reform."<sup>35</sup>

The distribution of land did, however, lead to Ľudák complaints that land confiscated under the land reform was sold to Czech colonists. In the Žilina Manifesto it was argued that "not only were Slovak farmers who formerly worked on this land cheated of the property promised to them, but thousands had to emigrate since their only means of survival had been taken away."<sup>36</sup> Likewise, under the title "New Czech colonists in west Slovakia", *Slovák týždenník* wrote that Czech colonists were getting the best land, and at favorable prices, while "the Slovak people is perishing from hunger." Not only was the administration full of Czechs; now a new Czech nobility was taking the place of the Magyar magnates as owners of the land.<sup>37</sup> In a later issue, Hlinka is quoted to the same effect.<sup>38</sup> In the budget debate of 1928, even Martin Mičura of the Czechoslovak People's Party demanded that the land reform be executed according to the principle "Slovak land to the Slovaks." In the same debate the Ľudák Ignác Grebáč-Orlov complained that land was given to Agrarians, Protestants and Czechs, and demanded that it instead be given to those it belonged to – Slovak peasants.<sup>39</sup>

To what extent land *was* given to Czech colonists is not clear, but the census figures show that the number of Czech peasants in Slovakia increased from 203 to 1,031 between 1921 and 1930. Those Czechs who got land were mostly former legionaries.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Rychlík (1988:132), Lacina (1990:128), Faltus/Průcha (1969:138–39).

<sup>34</sup> According to Rychlík (1988:144), the buyers of land were not only Czechs and Slovaks, but they were over-represented.

<sup>35</sup> (potom cestou pozemkovej reformy musí nadobudnúť slovenský ľud opäť svoje stratené sídla). Hodža quoted in Faltus/Průcha (1969:138). See also p. 133 in the same book.

<sup>36</sup> Žilina manifesto in: Mikuš (1995:202).

<sup>37</sup> (Nové české kolónie na západnom Slovensku). (Ľud slovenský hladom hynie). See *Slovák týždenník* no. 13, 29.3.1925:3.

<sup>38</sup> *Slovák týždenník* no. 18, 3.5.1925:1.

<sup>39</sup> (Slovenská pôda Slovákom). Mičura, 106. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 61), Grebáč-Orlov, 110. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1927 (p. 103), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>40</sup> Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku, in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:188–90).

### *A matter of reorienting the infrastructure*

There were two main obstacles to economic integration of the Czech lands and Slovakia. First, there were two different legal systems regulating economic life. Second, all infrastructure was centered on Vienna and Budapest (i.e. running north–south), while the east–west links were weak. Of these, the latter problem caused most grievances.

Czechoslovakia simply adopted most of the existing Austro-Hungarian laws and regulations. In the Czech lands, the Austrian code remained in force, in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the Hungarian code was valid. A Ministry of Unification of the Laws was established in December 1919, with Milan Hodža as the first minister, but it did not get much done during the first five years. In the 1924 budget debate, the Ľudák Florián Tománek complained of the tempo, asking what the ministry was there for, since nothing was happening.<sup>41</sup>

The central administration generally understood unification as a matter of extending Austrian laws to Slovakia, which caused resentment in Slovak industrial circles.<sup>42</sup> The main grievance associated with the unification of laws was that the Hungarian – and consequently the Slovak – tax level was higher than the Austrian/Czech. While the Hungarian subsidy schemes for the industry were abolished, however, the higher Hungarian taxes were kept. Hallon argues that the tax burden caused bankruptcies in Slovak industry, until the taxation was evened out by the reform of 1927.<sup>43</sup> The Slovak People's Party claimed in the Žilina Manifesto that "the tax system in Slovakia is still another means by which to strangle economic activity", and complained of the tax level in the Parliament several times.<sup>44</sup> Kornel Stodola (Agr.) pointed out that the higher taxes were a heritage from Hungary, although they were more rigidly enforced now, but he also urged the unification of the Czech and Slovak tax system.<sup>45</sup>

Different pension rules in the two parts of the former empire also created discontent. Martin Mičura (ČSL) complained that Slovak civil servants who had worked in Hungarian municipalities before 1918 did not get the pensions to which they were entitled because Austrian law was made valid in Slovakia.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, the Ľudák Anton Hancko complained that former teachers in confessional schools were receiving low pensions according to an old Hungarian law that was not even valid in Hungary anymore.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Tománek, 233. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1923 (p. 863), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>42</sup> Lacina (1990:207).

<sup>43</sup> Hallon (1995:47).

<sup>44</sup> The Žilina Manifesto, in Mikuš (1995:202). See e.g. Marek Gažík, , 231. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. listopadu 1923 (p. 593), and Florián Tománek 233. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1923 (p. 862), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* See also interpellations printed as Tisk 265 and 558, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé, svazek II, III* (1926).

<sup>45</sup> Stodola, 161. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 26. října 1922 (p. 213), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>46</sup> Mičura, 106. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 53), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>47</sup> Hancko, 232. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 27. listopadu 1923 (p. 716), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

The integration of the Czech lands and Slovakia in terms of infrastructure was one of the most important tasks. The number of *telephone* cables even between Bohemia and Moravia were insufficient, and there was no direct connection with Slovakia whatsoever. During the first two years, 10,000 kilometers of telephone lines were erected. In addition to linking up Prague, Brno and Bratislava, internal connections in the Czech lands and Slovakia were improved.<sup>48</sup>

The largest problems, however, involved road and railroad construction and railway tariffs – especially in Slovakia. Because of the very limited number of motorized vehicles<sup>49</sup> railways were the main means of transporting goods and people over long and intermediate distances. Reconstruction of the railway system was thus a key task for the new state. With the Bratislava–Parkan (today: Štúrovo)–Lučenec and Bratislava–Miskolc–Košice lines interrupted by the new state border, the only remaining east–west connection in Slovakia was the privately owned Košice–Bohumín line (see Map 1). Czech infrastructure was more dense, and it was not nearly as centered on Vienna as the Slovak was on Budapest. There was only a limited need for new tracks in the Czech lands.<sup>50</sup>

A plan for 556 kilometers of new railway tracks was adopted by the Parliament as early as in 1920. Of the 556 kilometers of new tracks that were planned, only 58 kilometers were to be built in Moravia, 113 in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and 385 kilometers in Slovakia, including 148 kilometers of links between Slovakia and Moravia.<sup>51</sup> Map 1 shows that most of the new tracks laid during the First Republic, as well as the reconstruction (including the laying of double tracks), were east–west bound or were designed to connect Slovakia to Moravia. The plan was supposed to be executed in the period 1920–25, but actual track-laying was delayed because of financial problems and lack of technical personnel.

The slow progress in the execution of the plan was the object of repeated complaints in the Parliament from Slovak members of various political parties. Ján Halla (Agr.) complained in 1925 that only 34 kilometers of the planned tracks had been laid, and that was not even a track of any great economic importance. The economic importance of the planned tracks should be obvious even to non-experts, he argued, considering the predominant north–south orientation of the existing Hungarian-laid tracks. Halla said it was a hair-raising experience to travel in Slovakia because of the lack of east–west connections, and looked with "a certain envy at the investments" of the state railways in double tracks in the historical lands.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Prague was linked to Olomouc and Ostrava, Bratislava got direct links to Trenčín, Žilina and Košice. Lacina (1990:189).


<sup>49</sup> There were 9,929 motor vehicles registered in Czechoslovakia in 1922, of these 7,108 in Bohemia, 1,651 in Moravia, 490 in Silesia (i.e. 93.2 percent altogether), while only 621 (6.3 percent) were registered in Slovakia and 59 (0.6 percent) in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. See *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:311).

<sup>50</sup> Lacina (1990:182), Faltus/Průcha (1969:77–79, 92, 93), Hallon (1995:45). See also Table 18, page 379. The Treaty of Trianon admittedly allowed Czechoslovakia to use the railway over Hungarian territory between Parkan and Lučenec.

<sup>51</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:80), Lacina (1990:203), Imrich Karvaš: *Sjednocení výrobních podmínek v zemích českých a na Slovensku* (1933:87)

<sup>52</sup> (s istou závisťou na investície). Halla, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1927 (p. 199–200), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

### Map 1: Slovak railways 1918 – 38



Source: J. Faltus and V. Průcha: *Prehľad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku v rokoch 1918 – 1945* (1969:82).

Ján Bečko, Ivan Dérier and Jaromír Nečas (ČSD) filed an interpellation in March 1927 complaining that only the Krupina–Zvolen link (A) had been built. Now the building of the only project in progress was stopped. They argued that railway construction was "one of the most important and relevant needs of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia", and asked the government to provide money so the building could go on. The deputies also demanded that the lines Handlová–Štubňa (D) and Červená Skala–Margecany (E), and Užhorod–Mukačevo–Hust (in Ruthenia) be built. The Minister of Railways, Josef Václav Najman, replied that they were building railways as fast as the financial means allowed, and promised to return with plans for laying the lines in question.<sup>53</sup>

In the budget debate of 1928, the Ľudák railway spokesman Štefan Surovjak characterized the status of the railway investments as regrettable and unbelievable. Although money was allocated every year, tracks were not being laid. It was now high time the plan was implemented, he argued. In the budget 1930 debate, it was Martin Mičura's turn to complain that of the 15 projects, only three had been completed: Krupina–Zvolen, Vsetín–Bylnice (C) and Veselí–Nové Mesto on the Váh River (B). Also Milan Ivanka (ČND) complained of the sorry state of the infrastructure and the lack of railways.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> (jednou z nejdůležitějších a nejaktuálnějších potřeb Slovenska a Podk. Rusi). See Tisk 934 for the interpellation, and Tisk 950 for the answer, in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VI (1927).

<sup>54</sup> Surovjak, 111. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 1. prosince 1927 (pp. 72–73), Mičura, 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 29), Ivanka 21. schůze ... dne 21. února 1930 (p. 36). See also Mičura, 106. schůze ... dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 58), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

There was a reality behind these complaints. The laying of new railway tracks did not go particularly fast. Of the original 556 kilometers, only 156 kilometers had been laid by 1931, i.e. less than a third of the planned tracks. These were, on the other hand, hard kilometers to build, and some of them were economically important. The new track between Veselí nad Moravou and Nové Mesto by the Váh river (B) was important for the connection between Slovakia and Moravia, and the longed-for Handlová–Štubňa track (D) was finished in 1931. The two longest tunnels in Czechoslovakia to date were built in this period, and the state did invest close to 600 million Czechoslovak crowns in railway construction from 1921 to 1931. In Karvaš' view, the finances did not allow extensive borrowing in order to speed up this work.<sup>55</sup>

At the same time, the Slovak deputies continued to file demands. In the 1934 budget debate, Ján S. Vančo (Agr.) urged the construction of east–west links for defense reasons. He especially mentioned the connection Margecany–Prešov–Vranov–Užhorod (F), "without which it is not possible to defend our east Slovakia." He added that also agriculture and forestry suffered because of insufficient railway connections in east Slovakia.<sup>56</sup> This emphasis on east Slovakia reflects that the infrastructure was still weaker there.

Work on the longest track, connecting eastern and central Slovakia, the Červená Skala–Margecany line with 93 kilometers (E), started in the midst of the economic crisis in 1931, and was completed in 1936. This was partly used to alleviate the crisis and give people work. Then started the construction of the technically most complicated track in Slovakia, the mountain line from Banská Bystrica to Diviaky, which included the longest tunnel in Czechoslovakia (G). Further, the track Horná Lideč–Púchov (H) was laid in 1935–37 and the track Zbehy–Zlaté Moravce (I) in 1936–38. It has been estimated that a total of 1.6 billion Czechoslovak crowns were invested in the laying and reconstruction of railways in Slovakia during the First Republic, which was by far the lion's share.<sup>57</sup>

Besides the lack of railway connections, the cost of railway transport in Slovakia was a major source of discontent. There were two main problems: First, the level of the freight tariffs was generally higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, regardless of ownership, and second, private railway companies (of which Slovakia had more) charged more than state railways. In 1920, state railways in Slovakia were charging 110 percent higher freight rates than state railways in the Czech lands, while the difference was 52 percent on private railways, according to Karvaš. This difference was caused partly by higher Hungarian railway tariffs, and partly by higher freight tax in the Hungarian part of the empire. In addition, Hungary had introduced a special war tax that was not abolished until 1921.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Karvaš (1933: 87–88), Hallon (1995:88–89), Faltus/Průcha (1969:80–81).

<sup>56</sup> (bez ktorej nie je možné brániť naše východné Slovensko...). Vančo, 303. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 1. prosince 1933 (p. 31), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>57</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:81), Hallon (1995:152–53), Karvaš (1933:88).

<sup>58</sup> Karvaš (1933:82, 83), Faltus/Průcha (1969:85, 86).

A more serious problem was that private railways were more expensive than state railways. This affected Slovakia more than the Czech lands because the former had more private railways. The (mostly north–south bound) main railway lines were normally state-owned, while the less important local lines were in private hands. In Hungary even main tracks were sometimes private (cf. the Košice–Bohumín line). Before 1918 most transport in Slovakia went on state railway lines, where the industry received favorable treatment under the state support scheme. When the main direction of the transportation changed, many of the state-owned, former main tracks in effect became local lines, while former local lines gained in importance. The result was that a disproportionate share of transportation in Slovakia took place on privately-owned railways where tariffs were higher.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, changes in ownership structure made the discrepancies even larger. In the Czech lands, most of the private tracks had private owners (and those that did not were "domesticated" starting in 1919). By 1925, the private share of the railway tracks in the Czech lands was down to 4.3 percent, with only 1.5 percent of the transport carried out by these private companies. In contrast, not a single private railway in Slovakia was domesticated before 1925; 44.7 percent of the tracks and 60 percent of the transport remained in private hands. The important Košice–Bohumín line was "domesticated" and taken over by the state as late as in 1927. This means that the gap between Czech and Slovak transport costs widened even though tariff differences on state railways between the two parts of the state were reduced by 1924. In fact, goods transported from stations east of Košice via the privately owned Košice–Bohumín line to stations west of Bohumín got a tariff reduction of 40 percent, while tariffs remained unchanged for goods transported within Slovakia.<sup>60</sup> This led to Ľudák claims that "even the railroads became an instrument used to economically annihilate Slovakia in the hands of the Prague Government."<sup>61</sup>

Tariff differences were reduced step by step, but it did take time. The first reduction of Slovak tariffs came with the removal of the war tax in 1921, followed by a gradual reclassification of various goods in the state railways. By 1924 the tariffs on state railways were evened out; the new tariffs of March 1924 implied a reduction of 11.5 percent on state-owned and state-run railways. Lower tariffs were also introduced in those Czech railways that had been taken over by the state. Then started the process of lowering the tariffs of the local and privately owned railways to the level of the state railways. The Košice–Bohumín line and three other important Slovak lines had their tariffs reduced to state level in April 1926. By the end of the 1930s the railway tariff difference between the Czech lands and Slovakia was down to 10 percent.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:292), Lacina (1990:204), Faltus/Průcha (1969:84–85), Hallon (1995:45).

<sup>60</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969: 79, 83, 84, 86–87), Hallon (1995:45), Karvaš (1933:84).

<sup>61</sup> The Žilina Manifesto of 1922 in: Mikuš (1995:203).

<sup>62</sup> For details on the tariff reduction, see Faltus/Průcha (1969:88), Karvaš (1933:85–87).



Complaints in the Parliament were many – from all political camps. In 1922, Kornel Stodola (Agr.) claimed that railway transport was 40 percent more expensive in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. He demanded the leveling of tariffs and an extra discount for transport over long distances. In 1925 Ján Halla demanded an immediate state take-over of the private railways in Slovakia for tariff reasons. He argued that the Slovak industry was losing 300 million a year. "The transport tariffs are thus undermining our industry, ruining millions worth of lumber that cannot be exported, making it more expensive to live, and causing general bitterness towards the republic."<sup>63</sup> These were strong words from a Czechoslovakist.

The ľudáks repeatedly demanded that tariffs be lowered, as did Martin Mičura (ČSL), Martin Rázus (SNS), Pavol Teplanský (Agr.) and Milan Ivanka (ČND), who argued that "the inequality of the tariffs, the lack of railways and the deflation" had finished whatever industry Slovakia had left.<sup>64</sup> That the tariff question was a burning one is also clear from the fact that it was the object of concerted action from deputies of all important Czechoslovak parties in Slovakia, except the Communists. An interpellation in February 1932, demanding the lowering of the tariffs of local railways to the state level, was signed by among others Milan Hodža (Agr.), Andrej Hlinka (HSLŠ), Ferdinand Benda (ČSD), Ján Liška (ČSŽ), Vladimír Polívka (ČS), Milan Ivanka (ČND), Martin Mičura (ČSL) and Martin Rázus (SNS).

The signatories pointed out that higher tariffs were still charged on 31.5 percent of the Slovak railway tracks, arguing that a tariff reduction would benefit the economic life of the entire state, and that it would only cost around 50 million crowns. The protests were finally heard; after November 1932 all tariffs were calculated according to distance.<sup>65</sup> According to Karvaš, Slovak economy lost a total of 600–700 million Czechoslovak crowns on the higher freight tariffs over the years.<sup>66</sup> If the estimate of 50 million was accurate, this figure is not too high.

After the tariff reform of 1932, the remaining problem was the long distances. Milan Ivanka argued in the 1934 budget debate that east Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia suffered because there were not sufficient tariff discounts for transport over long distances. This problem was also the object of an interpellation filed by the ľudák Martin Sokol in 1937. A major tariff reform should have taken effect on January 1st, 1939, but was not realized.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> (Dopravné tarify podlamujú preto náš priemysel, ničia milionové hodnoty dreva, ktoré je neschopné vývozu, zdražujú životné pomery a budia všeobecné roztrpčenie proti republike). Halla, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1927 (p. 200). See also Stodola, 161. schůze ... dne 26. října 1922 (p. 213), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*


<sup>64</sup> (Nerovnosť tarifov, nedostatok železníc a deflácia dobily ešte tie ostatky nášho priemyslu). Ivanka, 21. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. února 1930 (p. 36). See also Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (p. 34), Teplanský, 21. schůze... dne 21. února 1930 (p. 45), Hlinka, 4. schůze ... dne 18. prosince 1929 (p. 59), Mičura, 106. schůze... dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 58), and 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 29), Surovjak 111. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1927 (p.73), Polívka, 112. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1927 (p. 65), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>65</sup> See Tisk 1628/IV for the interpellation, and Tisk 2210/X for the answer of the government in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Sv. IX (1932), and Sv. XII (1933).

<sup>66</sup> Karvaš (1933:88).

<sup>67</sup> Ivanka, 305. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 4. prosince 1933 (p. 38), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*; Tisk 853/XVII in: *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1937), Hallon (1995:153).

**Map 2: State roads and planned east–west links in Slovakia**



Source: J. Faltus and V. Průcha: *Prehľad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku v rokoch 1918 – 1945* (1969:95).

The Slovak road standard and the extent of the road system were a third source of discontent that became important only in the 1930s. Again insufficient east–west connections were a main problem, and again Slovakia was worst off – with a road network density only half that of the Czech lands, and a much worse road standard. Only half of the state roads in Slovakia were tarred, while most of the rest lacked paved surface, and were thus unsuited for transporting heavy goods in all but dry weather.

Again, most of the state roads went north–south, while the east–west connections were regional or local roads. Already in 1920 a plan was adopted for rebuilding state roads in Slovakia and the construction of four new parallel roads linking them together in the east–west direction (see Map 2). The whole plan implied the construction of 250 kilometers of new state roads, upgrading of 2,450 kilometers of existing state and regional roads, and reconstruction of 150 kilometers of local roads, including the building of necessary bridges. The estimated cost was 600–700 million Czechoslovak crowns. This plan was implemented even more slowly than the railway plan, but it did not become an issue until after 1927.

The explanation is that road transport in Slovakia remained of local importance until the end of the 1920s. Due to the lack of motorized vehicles and the low road standard, most road transportation of goods was carried out by horse and carriage, or other animals. As late as 1929/30, motorized vehicles accounted for only 18.7 percent of the road transportation of goods in Slovakia, compared to 39.3 percent in Czechoslovakia as a whole, while respectively 75.8 percent and 91.4 percent of the person transport on roads was motorized.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:91–96).

The increase in the number of motorized vehicles and especially of heavy trucks made the quality of the roads increasingly important, especially in the 1930s.<sup>69</sup> This was also reflected in increased attention from the Ľudáks as well as from Slovak deputies of the government parties. They demanded that Slovakia should get her share of the road investments, that something should be done about the local roads, that money should be invested in new links and paved roads, and that more bus lines should be provided.<sup>70</sup>

The plan of 1920 was never fully realized because of a chronic lack of financial means, and a permanent shortage of experienced construction engineers and companies. The limited means were concentrated on construction of the Danubian (southern) and the northern link, improving the links to Moravia, and reconstruction of the road between Nové Zámky and Martin and between Rožňava and the Polish border (two of the important north–south links; see Map 2). Road construction activity increased around 1933, as a part of the employment scheme.<sup>71</sup> This was in line with Slovak demands, as voiced e.g. by Polyák, who especially requested the completion of some important links between Slovakia and Moravia.<sup>72</sup>

A new road construction plan for Slovakia was adopted in 1937, and by the end of 1938, around 600 kilometers of roads at a total cost of 400 million Czechoslovak crowns had been upgraded or built.<sup>73</sup> Although the cry for more roads increased in the 1930s, the tariff question and insufficient investments in railways were far more burning issues.

### ***The 1920s: Restructuring of the economy***

One of the most pressing problems in 1918 was that the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had cut Czechoslovak industry off from a large part of its former markets and supply of raw materials. However, while the government actively pursued economic liberation from the other successor-states and rearrangement of the ownership structure, it played a more marginal role in the readjustment of the economic structure to post-war conditions. The main reason for this was that economic liberalism was the prevailing ideology in the 1920s, limiting the scope of state intervention. This is probably also an important reason why the developmental gap between the Czech lands and Slovakia did not receive proper attention.

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<sup>69</sup> The number of motorized vehicles increased from 9929 in 1922, to 100,474 in 1930 and 202,233 in 1937. Of these 621 (6.2 percent) were registered in Slovakia in 1922; 9,071 (9.0 percent) in 1930, and 20,365 (10.1 percent) in 1937. While there were 187 inhabitants for each motorized vehicle in Czechoslovakia as a whole in 1930, there were 364 in Slovakia. See Faltus/Průcha (1969:92), *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:311), (1932:183).

<sup>70</sup> Mičura, 106. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1927, (p. 58), Polyák, 112. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1927 (p. 66), Hlinka, 4. schůze ... dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 60–61), Mičura and Ravasz, 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (pp. 27, 77), Ivanka, 21. schůze ... dne 21. února 1930 (p. 36), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* See also *Slovák* no. 241, 23.10.1929:2.

<sup>71</sup> Faltus/ Průcha (1969:95–98), Hallon (1995:89).

<sup>72</sup> Polyák, 304. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 2. prosince 1933 (p. 9), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>73</sup> Faltus/ Průcha (1969:95–98), Hallon (1995:89). See also *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1925:279), *Statistická ročenka republiky československé* (1938:117) .

Among the immediate problems that required state intervention in 1918 was the difficult supply situation, which lasted to the end of 1920 and was especially bad in Slovakia. In order to cope with this, the government regulated trade in scarce commodities through supply centers. The state allocation practice, especially with respect to food, was an object of Slovak disaffection until state regulation of trade with food was abolished in 1921.<sup>74</sup>

There were complaints about the requisition practice, and in the Memorandum of the Slovaks (1919) it was argued that "the Czech government founded supply centers for wheat, beets, sugar, coal, leather etc. in Slovakia, which permit Czech civil servants to get rich, whereas the Slovak country becomes exceedingly poor."<sup>75</sup> In 1920, Juriga spoke up against sending grain out of Slovakia as long as there was not enough to feed Slovakia's own population. Even though the Czechs and Slovaks were brothers, he argued, "our stomach is more important than the Czech stomach." Likewise, Hlinka demanded equal supply and the abolishment of the central allocation, as did Arnold Bobok.<sup>76</sup>

I have not been able to establish to what extent Slovakia was deprived in the allocation of food, but it seems that industry in Slovakia *was* discriminated against in the state-run central allocation of coal, most of which came from the Czech lands. While 59 percent of the demand for coal was met in Czechoslovakia as a whole in 1920 and 60 percent in 1921, only 36.8 percent of the demand was met in Slovakia in 1920 and 48.8 percent in 1921. According to Faltus and Průcha, this was because Slovak industry was still owned by Magyars.<sup>77</sup>

Important segments of Czechoslovak industry were dependent on raw materials not available at home. These items had to be purchased at the international market, for which credit was needed. The supply problem was only gradually solved in 1919–20, and with unfavorable conditions, which especially affected the textile industry.<sup>78</sup> A second problem was the mismatch between industrial capacity and home market. Czechoslovakia had two thirds of the industry in Austria-Hungary, but only one third of the market. High new tariff walls were raised between Czechoslovakia and other successor-states, making it difficult for Czechoslovak industry to compete on its former markets. It also had trouble competing with West European industry, because the technical level was lower. On the other hand, some branches were missing because they were located elsewhere in the empire – such as the electro-technical industry, and industries producing vital defense items, like planes and weaponry.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:15), Lacina (1990:185–87), *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:66).

<sup>75</sup> Memorandum of the Slovaks to the peace conference of 1919, in: Mikuš (1995:165).

<sup>76</sup> (Náš žaludok je prednejší ako český žaludok). Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (pp. 178, 185), Hlinka, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 209), Bobok, 25. schůze ... dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 444), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>77</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:31–32, 78), Hallon (1995:47).

<sup>78</sup> Lacina (1990:171, 183).

<sup>79</sup> See Lacina (1990:132, 169, 172), *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:64–66).

For Czechoslovak industry as a whole, a shortage of money was the real problem. Money was needed for investments in new equipment to make the switchover to peace production and to improve the technical level and thereby make industry more competitive. Money was needed to establish new enterprises that could produce the missing products, especially for defense purposes. Finally, money was needed to purchase the raw materials necessary to resume production. The problem was that there was simply not enough of a domestic money supply to finance all this, the domestication process (which admittedly also brought capital in) and support the Czechoslovak currency at the same time.<sup>80</sup>

It seems that in this situation, gaining independence of the former Austrian and Hungarian economic centers and ensuring Czech ownership of industry were higher priorities than the interests of the (export) industry. First, foreign loans that could have been used for investments were employed to strengthen the Czechoslovak crown. The limited credit supply especially affected Slovak industry; the predominantly Magyar-owned firms were cut off from their money supply in Vienna and Budapest, and it was more difficult for them to get loans in Czechoslovak crowns because Slovak capital was so weak. Moreover, even Czech credit was limited, and because of the political insecurity in Slovakia, the first investment wave of 1919–22 was mostly concentrated to the Czech parts of Bohemia and Moravia. Some firms in Slovakia were even closed down, while others were moved to Hungary. Much more industrial capacity was disassembled and moved out of Slovakia than was the case in the Czech lands.<sup>81</sup>

Second, the protective customs policy introduced in December 1921 made foreign machinery more expensive. This hampered the restructuring process, while serving the interests of the industry producing for the home market.<sup>82</sup>

Third, while the deflation policy of the Rašín group facilitated the domestication process by making it cheaper to buy stocks of Czech industry in Austria, it negatively affected the competitiveness of the then-recovering export industry (see figure 2, page 399) and deepened the economic recession. Slovak industry was harder hit by the economic crisis in 1922–23 than was industry of the Czech lands, because it was more dependent on external markets. While the industrial production of Czechoslovakia as a whole was reduced by 25 percent in this period, it has been estimated that it was reduced by 30 percent in Slovakia. In the last four months of 1922 alone, 32 Slovak firms with 12,510 employees closed down. Many of the firms that were closed during the crisis never resumed production. Slovakia thus faced de-industrialization at a time when the opposite was desperately needed.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> It did not help that Czechoslovakia had to pay a total of 13 billion Czechoslovak crowns to cover her share of Austrian and Hungarian pre-war debts, as well as a "liberation fee." See Lacina (1990:181–82).

<sup>81</sup> Lacina (1990:113, 184), Faltus/Průcha (1969:31–32, 34, 78), Hallon (1995:47–49).

<sup>82</sup> Lacina (1990:175–77), Hallon (1995:52).

<sup>83</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:37, 39), Hallon (1995:55), Lacina (1990:202–203, 209). For details on the 32 firms, see Faltus/Průcha (1969:39–40).

Stabilization of the Czechoslovak crown in 1923 had a positive effect on the competitiveness of the export industry. More important was the so-called Ruhr upswing, caused by the collapse of the coal and iron industry in the German Ruhr area. French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr area from January 1923 to July 1925 as security for the payment of German war indemnities, leading to passive resistance in the Ruhr area and easier access to the market for Czechoslovak industry.<sup>84</sup> The industrial production of Czechoslovakia as a whole reached the pre-war level in 1924, as did agricultural production in 1925.<sup>85</sup> The period between 1924 and 1929 saw economic growth, characterized by a new investment wave and increased export. New enterprises were established especially within the electro-technical, automobile and airplane industries. After a minor setback in 1926 because of German re-entry into the central and east European market, Czechoslovak export again increased in 1927.<sup>86</sup>

The recession of 1921–23 was more severe in Slovakia; moreover, the growth period that followed was not nearly as strong as in the Czech lands. Slovak industrial production regained pre-war level only in 1929–30. Although the credit situation became somewhat better when the large Czech banks opened branches in Slovakia, credit remained limited and more expensive in Slovakia, and investments were mainly oriented towards reconstruction, modernization and (in successful branches of industry) expansion of existing companies.<sup>87</sup> Investments within the new branches (electro-technical industry etc.) were mostly made in the Czech lands, also because Slovakia lagged behind in electrification.<sup>88</sup>

During this period of economic restructuring, very little was done to bridge the gap in industrialization and economic development between the Czech lands and Slovakia. The initial period of state intervention (state supply centers, monetary reform, domestication process and land reform), was followed by a policy of non-intervention, leaving economic development more or less to the market forces. This liberal economic policy was problematic, since it tended to reinforce economic differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia.<sup>89</sup>

The two main reasons why the developmental gap was not closed in the 1920s were the limited credit supply and the weak infrastructure: The weakness of Slovak capital made Slovakia more vulnerable in a situation with shortage of capital, and her weak infrastructure and the higher tariffs were drawbacks in the competition on the Czechoslovak market.

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<sup>84</sup> Faltus/ Průcha (1969:41–42).

<sup>85</sup> This only goes for heavy industry. Light industry never reached pre-war level before the next crisis set in. See *Přehled hospodářského vývoje Československa v letech 1918–1945* (1961:179), Lacina (1990:212).

<sup>86</sup> Hallon (1995:77).

<sup>87</sup> Hallon (1995:85, 91), Karvaš (1933:92–108), Faltus/Průcha (1969:45–46).

<sup>88</sup> In spite of the state involvement in the Slovak electrification process, only 6.9 of the municipalities in Slovakia had been electrified by 1928, compared to 50.5 percent in Bohemia and 39.3 percent in Moravia. State ownership of electrical power plants in Slovakia increased from 44 to 52 percent between 1925 and 1930. See Faltus/Průcha (1969:27, 44–45), Lacina (1990:189), Hallon (1995: 62–62, 104).

<sup>89</sup> See Dušan Kováč: *Slováci & Česi. Dejiny* (1997:68–69).

In addition, the Magyar invasion in 1919 led to destruction of railways, bridges, and industry that was not compensated,<sup>90</sup> and because of the strained relationship with Hungary a trade agreement was concluded only in 1927, delaying the domestication process in Slovakia and retarding the industrial renewal. Finally, Slovak industry was worse off than Czech industry from the outset, suffering the loss of a larger part of its market as well as the state support it used to enjoy. On top of this, it had to compete with the more developed Czech industry.<sup>91</sup> The result was that the share of the population employed in industry in Slovakia was only slightly higher in 1930 than in 1921, and the share employed in agriculture was only slightly lower. The difference between figures for Slovakia and the Czech lands was about the same (see Table 17, page 378).

In order to remove Slovakia's disadvantages in the competition with the more developed Czech economy, and bridge the gap, it would have been necessary to invest more in Slovakia at an earlier stage, especially in infrastructure. Yet, it is doubtful whether the government was at liberty to do so economically, even if it had wanted to. The de-industrialization of Slovakia during the recession of 1921–23 and the weaker growth in the latter part of the 1920s were thus probably *not intended*. According to Hallon, "the main causes of the economic problems of Slovakia in the inter-war period were associated with [...] objective economic factors", while the economic policy of the government was only of secondary importance.<sup>92</sup>

There were surprisingly few complaints concerning general economic development in the 1920s. Apart from complaints associated with the considerable emigration from Slovakia and government spending (to be discussed later), the only big row was over the Mint in Kremnica in 1927. The object of dispute was a plan for a new Mint in Prague: five million crowns were allotted to this in the 1928 state budget. Even the Communists were against, arguing that a mint in Prague meant closing down the mint in Kremnica that had existed for 600 years.<sup>93</sup>

Likewise, *Slovák* accused the Czechs of being selfish in wanting to "kill our Mint in Kremnica" and protested against the idea that the Mint should be located in Prague "in case something happened." Evidently Finance Minister Karel Engliš had argued that five million would be just a small payback for the government support of Slovak industry. *Slovák* retorted: "If anyone sacrificed something for the republic and for the Czechs, it was Slovakia." The allegations that the Mint in Kremnica was of Magyar origin were characterized as "absurd" and "cynical." *Slovák* pointed out that most firms in Slovakia were of Magyar origin, and asked if this meant that all Slovak firms should be abolished.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:31).

<sup>91</sup> Hallon (1995:44), Lacina (1990:135, 202), Alena Bartlová: Integrovaný proces československej ekonomiky v medzivojnovom období in: *Historický časopis* 3, 1988:365.

<sup>92</sup> (hlavné príčiny hospodárskych problémov Slovenska v medzivojnovom období spočívali v pôsobení [...] objektívnych faktorov). Hallon (1995:73).

<sup>93</sup> See Tisk 1163/VI, in *Tisky k teshnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1927).

<sup>94</sup> (zabit' našu kremnickú mincovňu). (pre prípad "kdyby se něco stalo"). Editorial in *Slovák* no. 196, 2.9.1927:1. (ak dosiaľ niekto obetoval za republiku a za Čechov niečo, bolo to len Slovensko). *Slovák* no. 265, 25.11.1927:1.

Martin Mičura (ČSL) asked Czechs not to provoke: From all over Slovakia an unending series of protests was heard against the establishment of a mint in Prague, he argued. Slovaks feared that this would be the end of the mint in Kremnica in a situation when unemployment, misery and emigration were already a problem. "This plan must fall", he concluded. Likewise, the Agrarian Anton Štefánek pointed out that the way the matter had been handled offended every loyal Slovak deeply, regardless of party and confession.<sup>95</sup>

A short news bulletin in *Slovák* a week later informed that the struggle over the Mint had been won. The next day, a longer article stated that the plan for a mint in Prague had been called off and that the five million crowns had been taken out of the state budget because of the resistance of the Slovak deputies of the government parties (including the Ľudáks). "It was a great struggle, but the Slovaks emerged as victors", *Slovák* proclaimed.<sup>96</sup>

### ***The 1930s: Economic crisis and depression***

The collapse of the New York Stock Exchange on October 24th, 1929, is generally acknowledged as the start of the great economic depression in the 1930s. Internationally 1932 was the maximum crisis year, whereas the nadir was reached a year later in Czechoslovakia. Industrial production was down by 39.8 percent compared to the 1929 level, and export was reduced by 42 percent.<sup>97</sup> However, Czechoslovakia had a positive trade balance except during the maximum crisis years of 1932 and 1933 (see Figure 2). Unemployment reached an all time high in February 1933, with 920,000 persons registered as out of work. It has been estimated that the true figure was closer to 1.3 million.<sup>98</sup> In addition, most of the industry ran only half the week, which means that there were many semi-employed.

The economic crisis of the 1930s affected all sectors of the economy and all parts of the country, albeit to varying degrees. The number of bankruptcies tripled from 1928 to 1933. Export industry was naturally affected first, followed by industry providing raw materials and machines for other industry, while industry producing for the home market was least and latest affected. The hardest hit industries happened to be located in German-speaking areas of Bohemia and Moravia, where unemployment exceeded 40 percent many places in 1933. This is generally acknowledged as a primary cause of the strong support for fascism.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> (Plán tento musí padnúť!) Mičura, 106. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č, dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 56), and Štefánek, 107. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č, dne 26. listopadu 1927 (p. 40). See also Bečko, who found it less important where the Mint was located, in: 111. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1927 (p. 57), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>96</sup> (Bol to boj veľký, ale Slováci vyšli z neho víťazne). *Slovák* no. 272, 2.12.1927:1 and no. 273, 4.12.1927:3.


<sup>97</sup> *Přehled hospodářského vývoje Československa v letech 1918–1945* (1961:322). See also Leif Johansen: *Offentlig økonomi* (1988:68), Faltus/Průcha (1969:46), Hallon (1995:148).

<sup>98</sup> *Přehled hospodářského vývoje Československa v letech 1918–1945* (1961:438) and Věra Olivová: *Československo v rozrušené Evropě* (1968) both indicate 1.3 million. Půlpán (1993:153) even suggests 1.5 million. See also Appendix D<sub>3</sub>.

<sup>99</sup> *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:323–324), Faltus/Průcha (1969:47), *Historická statistická ročenka...* (1985:833), Karel Kříž: *Tragický vývoj nezaměstnanosti u nás. Léta krise 1929–1934* (1934). See especially the map page 43.



**Figure 2: Czechoslovak import – export balance 1920-37**



The agricultural crisis started as early as in 1928 in crop farming, where the crisis culminated in 1931/32. The crisis in animal husbandry started later, peaking only in 1933/34. The latter crisis was caused exclusively by reduced purchasing power on the domestic market, while the former was caused by overproduction on the world market of certain crops (cotton, sugar and grain), and by increased overseas competition in the latter half of the 1920s.<sup>100</sup>

The economic crisis also affected the public sector. As Finance Minister Karel Trapl pointed out in the 1934 budget debate, the crisis meant reduced revenues from taxes, larger expenditures on unemployment benefit, and a reduction of goods transport by rail, which affected revenues from the state railways. State-run companies went from surplus to deficit already in the first crisis year, and lost nearly a billion in the worst year (1932). Worst off were the state railways, and cutbacks in personnel would therefore be necessary, Trapl announced. He emphasized the importance of budgetary balance for the economic development and for the Czechoslovak currency.<sup>101</sup> The intention of retrenchment was clearly expressed in nominal budget cuts of more than 20 percent between 1931 and 1934 (see Appendix E).

Reality, however, proved different. In fact, 1929 was the last year that the Czechoslovak financial statement showed a surplus; deficits were enormous in the 1930s. The reason was partly that revenues sank even more than expected, but higher expenditures accounted for most of the discrepancy. The financial statement showed only a 14 percent reduction in state expenditure, which was less than budgeted, and substantially lower than the fall in the wholesale price index (close to 30 percent).<sup>102</sup> This means that the state helped to keep activity up.

<sup>100</sup> See *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:22), Půlpán (1993:469–70).

<sup>101</sup> See *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:831), Trapl, 297. schůze poslanecké snemovny N.S.R.Č. dne 6. listopadu 1933 (pp. 5–12), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>102</sup> *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:831). See also Appendix E.

Part of the extra expenditures went to unemployment benefit (over 300 million crowns every year from 1932) and employment schemes, including the construction of railways and roads in Slovakia (see page 389 pp.). The state also invested substantial sums in industrial production, rising from 1.5 billion in 1934 to 5 billion by 1937.<sup>103</sup>

The main tasks were to get the economy going, and to secure market access for Czechoslovak industry. Trapl pointed out that this made protectionism problematic, but, at the same time, Czechoslovak agriculture needed protection. In his view, the large price fall was the greatest problem, especially regarding agricultural products. The government's answer to this problem was the cartel law of 1933, forcing firms within certain sectors to join price cartels. The state "helped" the process in parts of light industry and the food industry from 1934 through forced syndicalization. This limited competition and strengthened already strong firms. Other government measures were devaluation of the Czechoslovak crown in 1934 and 1936 (by 29.9 percent), and lower taxes and export credits to the export industry.<sup>104</sup> While the government had remained passive during the 1921–23 crisis, it did intervene in the economy in the 1930s.

In Slovakia, the crisis in industry developed more slowly, and was comparatively milder than in the Czech lands. Until the end of 1930, only branches that were producing predominantly for export were affected, and registered unemployment remained comparatively low (below 1 percent) until the last 3 months of 1930 (see Table 19). In 1931–33 also firms producing for the domestic market were affected, but according to Hallon, the crisis mainly killed off antiquated firms with low competitiveness, and it affected Slovak industry less than the crisis in 1921–23.<sup>105</sup> This time, Slovakia did not face de-industrialization; on the contrary, a new wave of investments in the period 1934–38 brought new industry to Slovakia, especially in branches hitherto lacking, including defense industry. State investments played an important part, e.g. railway investments.<sup>106</sup> And, as the Table shows, unemployment was lower than in the Czech lands in every single month during the maximum crisis years.

On the other hand, the economic crisis lasted longer in Slovakia. While average registered unemployment dropped by 5.6 percentage points from 1933 to 1935 in Bohemia, and by 5.8 percentage points in Moravia, it dropped by only 1.1 percentage points in Slovakia from 1933 to 1934, and stood still in 1935 (see Appendix D<sub>1</sub>). Yet, even during this period, average *annual* unemployment remained higher in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, although the seasonal variations were larger in Slovakia because of her agricultural structure. Slovakia thus had relatively higher registered unemployment than Bohemia (but not than Moravia) only in the winter months of 1935 and 1936 (shaded in Table 19).

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<sup>103</sup> See *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:833), Půlpán (1993:150–152).

<sup>104</sup> Trapl, 297. schůze poslanecké snemovny N.S.R.Č. dne 6. listopadu 1933 (p. 11), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*, Půlpán (1993:150–152), Hallon (1995:147–148).

<sup>105</sup> Faltus/Průcha (1969:48), Hallon (1995:133–35).

<sup>106</sup> See Hallon (1995:151, 157).

**Table 19: Unemployment in percentage by region 1930–36**

1930												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	3.1	3.6	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.8	4.5	5.3	6.6	10.4
Moravia	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.7	3.0	3.8	5.9
Slovakia	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.6	1.9
1931												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	13.5	15.0	14.7	12.6	10.5	9.2	8.8	8.9	9.4	10.4	13.8	19.0
Moravia	7.9	8.6	8.7	8.0	6.5	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.7	8.7	12.9
Slovakia	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.8	3.7	5.3	9.6
1932												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	22.4	23.8	23.7	20.5	17.5	16.7	16.3	16.4	17.1	18.5	20.9	25.3
Moravia	16.4	18.3	19.1	17.7	16.4	15.9	15.4	15.7	17.2	19.0	21.7	27.1
Slovakia	11.7	13.6	13.1	11.0	9.8	9.4	8.8	9.4	10.0	11.3	13.5	16.9
1933												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	29.5	31.0	29.2	26.0	23.7	21.9	17.6	16.9	16.5	16.7	18.2	20.8
Moravia	31.6	33.3	32.6	30.3	27.7	26.2	22.4	22.5	22.6	22.6	24.3	26.4
Slovakia	20.2	21.7	20.7	18.9	17.3	15.8	12.2	12.1	12.7	13.4	15.8	18.4
1934												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	22.3	22.3	20.5	18.0	16.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.2	15.9	18.0	20.1
Moravia	28.0	28.4	27.3	25.2	21.2	22.4	20.9	20.9	20.8	21.8	22.9	25.1
Slovakia	20.1	21.0	19.8	17.2	15.1	13.1	11.2	11.7	11.8	11.8	14.7	18.2
1935												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	19.7	19.9	19.1	17.4	15.8	14.6	13.9	13.8	14.4	15.1	16.8	19.2
Moravia	24.5	24.9	24.2	22.3	20.9	19.5	18.4	17.8	18.0	18.7	20.6	23.6
Slovakia	20.3	21.6	20.9	18.9	15.9	12.6	10.1	10.1	10.4	11.3	14.4	19.6
1936												
year												
month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bohemia	18.5	18.6	17.2	15.8	14.2	12.8	11.9	11.2	11.1	9.8	11.1	12.4
Moravia	23.1	23.2	21.7	20.0	18.2	16.5	14.6	13.9	13.5	12.7	13.7	17.5
Slovakia	21.1	22.6	20.3	16.6	13.1	9.9	7.4	7.5	8.1	9.0	12.9	18.1

Sources: Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé, r. 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, Statistická ročenka republiky československé (1938:216). The percentages for 1935 and 1936 are my compilations. See also Appendix D<sub>2</sub>.

While Slovakia was less affected by the industrial crisis, the agricultural crisis affected her more. In crop farming the crisis was felt already in 1928, after cheap sugar cane from overseas replaced sugar beets, forcing Czech agriculture to switch to wheat, which again pressed Slovak wheat out of the Czech market. The export of industrial crops from Slovakia to the Czech lands dropped by 70 percent, leading to an abrupt price fall. Large estates in Slovakia were able to switch to more profitable production, while the small and medium peasants had no choice but to grow grain and potatoes to feed themselves and their animals. The prices were substantially lower in Slovakia, and the profitability of animal husbandry in Slovakia was too low to cover even the costs of production, according to Bartlová.<sup>107</sup>

The dramatic price fall in agricultural products only worsened the existing problems of Slovak agriculture. The income on one hectare of agricultural land in Slovakia was 74 percent of the income in the Czech lands, due to poorer soil quality, lower mechanization and less use of commercial fertilizers in Slovak agriculture.<sup>108</sup> Because the income level was lower to begin with, Slovak agriculture had less to go on, and the way to misery was shorter.

Workers' average wages were also lower in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Since agricultural workers earned less than industrial workers, and they were over-represented in Slovakia, the average income differences were even greater than the wage differences of 10–15 percent suggest. The gap only increased during the economic crisis, between the Czech lands and Slovakia, as well as between industrial and agricultural workers.<sup>109</sup>

Moreover, the fact that there were not substantially more people employed in industry in Slovakia in 1929 than in 1914,<sup>110</sup> in itself suggests that the still rather old-fashioned Slovak agriculture was overpopulated when the crisis began. When 56.8 percent of the population still earned a living in agriculture in 1930, this was mainly because other employment was hard to find. Although the land reform had been partly implemented by 1930, 39.6 percent of the holdings in Slovakia were still below 2 hectares.<sup>111</sup> These holdings were generally worked by the wife and family members, while the husband had other work outside the farm, in agriculture or in industry. Subsistence agriculture was still quite common on plots of this size in Slovakia, where only a small portion of the products were sold at the market. Where the soil was less fertile or the families larger, the same applied to farms of 2–5 hectares.

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<sup>107</sup> See Bartlová: *Hospodářská kríza na Slovensku v rokoch 1929–1933*, in: *Historický časopis* 2, (1984:220–221).

<sup>108</sup> See table 47 in Faltus/Průcha (1969:195), *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:23).

<sup>109</sup> In 1929, an industrial worker earned on average respectively 29.45 (Bohemia), 27.68 (Moravia) and 25.07 (Slovakia) crowns a day, a male agricultural worker earned 21.75 (Bohemia), 17.72 (Moravia) and 19.58 (Slovakia) crowns, while a female agricultural worker earned only 13.62 (Bohemia), 13.59 (Moravia) and 12.32 (Slovakia) crowns. See *Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé*, číslo 110 (1932), *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:834–835).

<sup>110</sup> In 1914, there were 28,921 employed in industry in Slovakia. By 1923, this figure was down to 19,942, increasing to 26,046 in 1927, and finally just exceeding the pre-war level in 1929, at 29,234 persons. See Faltus/Průcha (1969:46).

<sup>111</sup> A larger share of the holdings in the Czech lands was actually below 1 hectare, but their economic significance was smaller. 32.9 percent of the holdings in Bohemia and 39.3 percent of the holdings in Moravia were 1 hectare or less in 1921, while only 25 percent of the holdings in Slovakia were that small. See *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:46).

Close to half of the farms thus needed extra income. In times of unemployment, however, these smallholdings often became the only means of subsistence for a whole family. Seasonal workers also represented a hidden unemployment, since they were often only employed part of the year (i.e. "semi-employed"), even in fairly good times.<sup>112</sup> Besides, the situation in Slovak agriculture was made worse by the fact that population growth in Slovakia was rocketing, so that families were becoming larger. Population growth in Slovakia was actually more than double that of the Czech lands for most of the period.<sup>113</sup>

In the 1920s, emigration still provided an outlet. Slovakia was grossly over-represented in emigration statistics, accounting for more than half of the emigration at any point. Emigration was substantially lower in the 1930s, mostly because it was blocked at the receiving end.<sup>114</sup> In addition, a large number of seasonal workers went to the Czech lands or abroad to find work – between 58,500 and 65,500 in the 1920s. The number was more than halved from 1930 to 1933.<sup>115</sup> The crisis thus made the overpopulation in Slovak agriculture even worse, as extra job opportunities and other outlets dried up, one by one.

Moreover, hidden or unregistered unemployment was higher in Slovakia. Official unemployment statistics were based on information from the employment agencies, and Slovakia had an insufficient number and dispersion of these. Of the 525 employment agencies in Czechoslovakia in 1931, only 67 were located in Slovakia (12.8 percent), increasing to 109 in 1934. Moreover, the largest group of unemployed, agricultural workers (permanent and seasonal workers) often did not use these agencies. Official figures thus do not give an accurate picture of the extent of the crisis in Slovakia.<sup>116</sup>

We can get some idea of the discrepancy between official and the real unemployment figures by comparing the official figures with census data. The 1930 census was carried out on December 1st, while the unemployment figures for November 1930 are from the day before, so these figures should be comparable. According to official unemployment statistics, there were 114,831 unemployed in Bohemia (6.6 percent), 30,756 in Moravia (3.8 percent), and 8,260 in Slovakia (1.6 percent). According to the census, there were 186,844 unemployed in Bohemia (around 10.7 percent), 61,776 in Moravia (around 7.6 percent), and 39,245 in Slovakia (around 7.6 percent). The discrepancy is largest in the case of Slovakia.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> See Faltus/Průcha (1969:120–21), Bartlová (1984:223–224), Půlpán (1993:469).

<sup>113</sup> 1920–24: 15.9 ‰ in Slovakia versus 8.5 ‰ in the Czech lands. 1925–29: 13.1 ‰ versus 6.0 ‰. 1930–34: 11.3 ‰ versus 4.3 ‰. 1937: 8.6 ‰ versus 1.5 ‰. See *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:868).

<sup>114</sup> 1920–24: 60.5 percent. 1925–29: 61.1 percent. 1930–34: 56.7 percent. 1935–37: 68.4 percent. The figures are averages. See *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:869), Pavel Horváth: *Průručka hospodářské statistiky Slovenska* (1935:46).

<sup>115</sup> Bartlová (1984:229). See also Dez. Benau: *Slovenská otázka* (1937), where Slovakia's problems are elaborated on.

<sup>116</sup> See Bartlová (1984:226–7), Bartlová (1986:174), Půlpán (1993:153).

<sup>117</sup> See *Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé, ročník XII., číslo 39–40* (1931:316), and *číslo 109* (1931:891). See also Pavel Smutný: Je v Československu skrytá nezaměstnanost? in: *Statistický obzor* (1936:195).

It is likely that the discrepancy between official and real unemployment figures was reduced with the establishment of more employment agencies in Slovakia in the 1930s. We have no other census data to compare with, but Alena Bartlová has compiled unemployment figures for Slovakia on the basis of information regularly given by the public notaries to the Slovak regional administration, starting in 1931. Her data are presented in Table 20 below.

**Table 20: Average unemployment in Slovakia, the 1930s**

<i>unemployed persons</i>	1931 <sup>118</sup>	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
A. Official figures	21,329	58,634	88,006	87,017	92,300	87,700	78,217
B. Bartlová's total	104,221	132,016	132,083	99,012	100,118	92,141	72,618
– industrial workers	30,909	46,256	49,823	41,130	44,041	41,783	33,761
– agricultural workers	28,992	32,255	30,362	21,897	20,281	16,760	11,867
– seasonal workers	44,486	53,504	51,899	35,984	35,795	33,598	26,990
Difference B – A	82,892	73,449	44,077	11,995	7,818	4,441	– 5,598

Sources: Alena Bartlová: *Triedne boje proletariátu na Slovensku v rokoch 1929–1934* in: *Historický časopis* 2, (1986:175). For the official figures, see Appendix D<sub>2</sub> and D<sub>3</sub>.

If Bartlová's figures are reliable, the discrepancy between official and real unemployment figures was indeed reduced over the years. The discrepancy was largest in 1931, 1932 and 1933, while her figure for 1937 is actually lower than the official figure, which means that it is probably *too* low. If official statistics are reliable for the Czech lands (which is not likely), then Slovakia had the highest unemployment in the country in 1931 and 1932, with respectively 16.6 and 25.9 percent unemployed. Further, Slovakia had slightly higher unemployment than Bohemia in 1933, 1935 and 1936 (24.9 – 16.8 – 14.6 percent), and slightly lower than Bohemia in 1934 (17.6 percent). Unemployment was highest in Moravia (see Appendix D<sub>1</sub>).

From a national point of view, the low registered unemployment in Slovakia was a problem for two reasons: first, because state unemployment benefit followed the number of registered unemployed, and second because it gave the impression that the economic crisis was less severe in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, reducing the likelihood of special measures. Slovakia received less unemployment benefit than the Czech lands because she had higher unregistered unemployment, but also because a majority of the unemployed in Slovakia did not meet the criteria for unemployment benefit. This was especially the case with seasonal agricultural workers.<sup>119</sup> In this situation it became important to find other indications of the misery in Slovakia, and here the emigration figures came in handy.

<sup>118</sup> The notaries only started to collect this information in the second half of 1931. Bartlová's figure for 1931 is an average of the last six months. In order to make the figures comparable, also the official figures are an average of the last six months.

<sup>119</sup> Bartlová (1986:176). Only organized labor received unemployment benefit. From 1925 the amount depended the length of employment and the amount paid in social insurance, while the state's share was maximum 12 crowns a day. Unorganized labor employed *at the same place of work* for a minimum of three months was entitled to state food vouchers from 1930.

Already in the budget debate of 1930 Jozef Tiso pointed out that it was impossible to determine the precise number of unemployed in Slovakia because of the lack of employment agencies. At the same time he used the sizeable emigration from Slovakia as proof that Slovakia was suffering the most from unemployment and misery.<sup>120</sup> In March 1931 Jozef Buday wrote an article in *Slovák* under the title "Numbers that cry", where he argued that the high Slovak emigration was linked to the low unemployment benefit, and that in reality unemployment was higher in Slovakia. "A Slovak loves his native land and leaves it only out of extreme necessity, and even then with pain", he claimed.<sup>121</sup>

In August 1931 *Slovák* protested vehemently against a statement by Josef Matoušek, Minister of Commerce, to the effect that the crisis was less severe in Slovakia. Matoušek based his judgement on the low unemployment figures, whereas, according to *Slovák*, employment agency data did not even show a fraction of the real unemployment. To corroborate this, the paper referred to the census of 1930, and pointed out that only 21 percent of those unemployed in Slovakia were registered. The crisis was not any milder in Slovakia, it was argued – on the contrary, it was worse than in the Czech lands. Can we Slovaks expect understanding and help from the government when its ministers do not acknowledge our wounds? *Slovák* asked.<sup>122</sup> When the crisis was at its most severe, in the winter of 1933, *Slovák* blamed the high unemployment at least partly on the government's faulty economic policy and tax policy. Likewise, it was argued that reducing the pay of state employees was leading to more unemployment, because it reduced the purchasing power of hundreds of thousands of people.<sup>123</sup>

*Slovák* also voiced complaints that the republic was living on Slovak sacrifices, that the economic policy of the government was a tragedy and to the detriment of Slovakia, and that the Czechs were not carrying any economic burdens at all.<sup>124</sup> Apart from this, most of the economic complaints and demands in the 1930s concerned the situation of the Slovak intelligentsia, or also the distribution of budgets, investments and state orders (to which I will return later). In addition, the Slovak People's Party took up the difficult situation of Slovak agriculture in three interpellations in 1932, where the party asked for protective measures against import of livestock, and for food relief for peasants and seasonal workers.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Tiso, 17. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. února 1930 (p. 91), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...* *Slovák* also pointed out the lack of employment agencies on several occasions. See *Slovák* no. 7, 10.1.1933:1; no. 53, 6.3.1934:1.

<sup>121</sup> (*Slovák miluje svoju rodnú vlasť, opúšťa ju len z krajnej nutnosti a i to s bolesťou*). *Slovák* no. 61, 15.3.1931:1. See also *Slovák* no. 141, 23.6.1933:4, where emigration figures were again used as proof that Slovakia was worse off.

<sup>122</sup> *Slovák* no. 191, 26.8.1931:1.

<sup>123</sup> *Slovák* no. 7, 10.1.1933:1. See also *Slovák* no. 29, 4.2.1933:1, *Slovák* no. 30, 7.2.1934:1. In reality the state employees were much better off. It has been estimated that the total income was reduced by 23 percent between 1929 and 1934. While large groups of workers had their income reduced by 37 percent, state employees reduced theirs by less than 10 percent. See *Přehled hospodářského vývoje...* (1961:434–439), *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:831).

<sup>124</sup> See *Slovák* no. 234, 16.10.1931:1, *Slovák* no. 244, 28.10.1931:1, *Slovák* no. 259, 17.11.1931:1, *Slovák* no. 68, 23.3.1933:3, *Slovák* no. 211, 19.9.1933:1.

<sup>125</sup> See Tisk 1434, 1604, 1605 (interpellations), and Tisk 1610, 1655, 1787 (government replies), in *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé*, Sv. IX, X (1932).

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While the brief economic crisis in 1921–23 was at least in part self-inflicted (cf. the monetary policy of the government), the new crisis in the 1930s was more linked to developments in the world market. In 1921–23, the government's attitude was non-intervention, while it was much more willing to intervene in the economy in the 1930s. Paradoxically, more was done to bridge the developmental gap between the Czech lands and Slovakia in the 1930s than in the 1920s. The government was able to build roads and railways in Slovakia and invest in (defense) industry only by running up large deficits in the accounts.

At the same time, the gap in income level between the Czech lands and Slovakia was not closed, and wage differences between workers increased, especially in the agricultural sector. Because the income level was generally lower in Slovakia to begin with, she had less to go on, and the misery was probably even greater than in the Czech lands. A particular problem was that the overpopulation in the rather old-fashioned and ineffective agricultural sector only increased when emigration ceased to be an option, and unemployed seasonal workers and industrial workers returned to the countryside.

### ***A matter of "Slovak bread"***

The most salient issue and the most common complaint in the columns of *Slovák*, as well as in state budget debates and interpellations, was that Czechs were getting jobs in the public sector to which the Slovak intelligentsia were entitled.<sup>126</sup> More than half of the interpellations concerning economic issues of national relevance concerned this one nationally relevant conflict of interest. This was a matter of state hiring policy, first limited to the public sector in Slovakia, later also including the central administration in Prague. The conflict dated back to the early days of the First Republic, but became much more burning in the 1930s.

The salience of the issue is of course the main reason why I have decided to go into it in some detail, but it is also interesting because it shows the importance of *perceptions* in constituting nationally relevant conflicts. In the absence of precise information, the presentation of the employment problems of the Slovak intelligentsia became as important as the reality. Until 1934 there existed no exact information about the extent of unemployment among the Slovak intelligentsia. There was thus no way of knowing the actual number of Slovaks with secondary school or university education who were affected. Second, since Czechoslovak official statistics tended to present "Czechoslovaks" as one category, there was no way of knowing how many Czech teachers, civil servants or railway employees there actually were in Slovakia. Third, for the same reason, the statistics did not show how many Slovak employees there were in the central administration in Prague.

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<sup>126</sup> The term intelligentsia was at the time used of persons who worked with their pen and their head, or in practice of people who had at least a secondary school education and had been awarded the *maturita* (a matriculation certificate). See Owen V. Johnson: *Slovakia 1918–1938. Education and the making of a nation* (1985:7–9).



Unemployment figures for the Slovak intelligentsia were published in the papers in 1934, while the first and only reliable figures I have found of the number of publicly employed Czechs in Slovakia are given in an article by Antonín Boháč, published in 1935 and prepared on the basis of census data. Information on the number of Slovaks in the central administration was never published during the First Republic, and reliable figures have been hard to come by. For most of the period, complaints were thus based on individual examples and fragmented data from unauthorized sources. This does *not* mean that they were totally divorced from reality. On the contrary, the increased saliency of the issue in the 1930s did reflect a reality.

My objective is to explain why the conflict arose in the first place, and why it remained so salient throughout the inter-war period. I have divided the analysis chronologically in three: The first years after the republic was established were a formative period when the principles for state hiring policy were laid down. There seems to be a watershed in state hiring policy as well as the argumentation of the nationalists around 1925/1926. The next watershed came with the economic crisis in the early 1930s and the personnel cutbacks that accompanied it.

One of the first tasks of the new regime in 1918 was to build up a new state and local administration. Staffing was a much easier task in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, for two main reasons. First, the national reliability of the *existing* personnel was not a problem. In the Austrian part of the former empire, anyone who pledged loyalty to the Emperor could serve in the state administration, regardless of nationality – with some exceptions (Czechs were e.g. barred from higher-level posts in the army and the diplomatic corps).<sup>127</sup> As a result, the number of state employed Czechs had been increasing since the turn of the century, even in the ministries in Vienna. In the Czech lands, the new regime could thus take over the existing system. Second, *gymnasia* and institutions of higher education had been turning out a surplus of candidates in the period before 1918, creating unemployment among the intelligentsia.<sup>128</sup>

In Slovakia, the situation was far more chaotic. There were almost no state-employed Slovaks. In the census of 1910, there were registered 46,519 civil servants, state employed clergy, notaries, judges, and teachers in Hungary *as a whole*, but only 150 Slovaks (0.3 percent).<sup>129</sup> This was a legacy of a Magyarization policy that required people to pose as Magyars at least outwardly, in order to get state employment. All state organs in Slovakia were thus staffed predominantly with Magyars and Magyarones, many of whom now fled the country.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>127</sup> See e.g. Jan Rychlík: *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století* (1997:85–86).

<sup>128</sup> See Jozef Pšenák: *Českí profesori na Slovensku za prvej československej republiky*, in: Edmund Hleba (ed.): *Česko-slovenské vzťahy v rokoch 1918–1938*, (1991:15).

<sup>129</sup> 36 of the 13,063 state officials, 12 of the 2,189 state employed Catholic clergy, 19 of the 4,106 county officials, 12 of the 7,201 municipal officials, 38 of the 5,313 public and district notaries, one of the 2,893 judges and crown law officials, 16 of the 5,125 court officials, 13 of the 3,859 secondary school teachers, and 3 of the 2,770 teachers of higher level elementary schools indicated their nationality as Slovak. See Antonín Boháč: *Češi na Slovensku* in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:183).

<sup>130</sup> According to Alena Bartlová, some 70,000 people left Slovakia for the politically unstable Hungary between 1918 and 1920. Yet, all of these cannot have been publicly employed. See Alena Bartlová: *Vztahy Čechov a Slovákov v medzivojnovom období*, in: *Češi a Slováci ve střední Evropě ve 20. století* (1993b:18).

Moreover, quite a few of the remaining state employees were hostile to the new regime and put up passive resistance. According to Vavro Šrobár, "we had no office, no courts, no railway station in Slovakia manned by trustworthy people at the time of the revolution. Everywhere, almost without exception, there were Magyars, or even worse, Magyarones."<sup>131</sup> Large-scale replacement of Magyar(one) staff with nationally reliable personnel was deemed necessary. The trouble was that most of the jobs in question required formal education, and the Slovak intelligentsia was too small to fill the vacancies, which was again a Hungarian legacy.

How large was the Slovak intelligentsia really? A much-quoted estimate of the number of "educated and nationally conscious Slovaks" in 1918 is R.W. Seton-Watson's "from 750 to 1000."<sup>132</sup> Šrobár indirectly corroborated this estimate when he presented a list of 516 Slovaks registered by the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior as *the* list of nationally conscious Slovaks. If Seton-Watson's figure was correct, the Hungarian government managed to register more than half of the educated and nationally conscious Slovaks – which does not seem very likely.

**Table 21: Slovak activists registered 1913**

Župa:	Clergy		Liberal professions			Academics		Business, crafts & agriculture					Other	total
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	
Oravská	12	4	3		1	2				6	4	1	9	42
Zvolenská	1	5	10	1	1	3		2	1	5	4	2	3	38
Trenčianská	6	7	6	4		2	1	3	12	7	12	1	8	69
Nitrianská	8	22	13	5	1	12	1	7	9	7	7		21	113
Bratislava	5	3	4	3	2	2		2					1	22
Turčianská		4	13	3	3	3	2	4	7	5	13	1	5	63
Liptovská	6	6	5	3		2		10	6	4	1		8	51
Spišská	5	1							3		1		1	11
Hontianská	2	15	3	1		6		2	4	3	3		1	40
Gemer-Malohont		2	5			5	1	2	4	6	1	1	1	28
Budapest		1	2	1	4	1	1	1	4			2	1	18
Other <sup>133</sup>	3	1	6			3	1	1		1		1	4	21
Total	48	71	70	21	12	41	7	34	50	44	46	9	57	516

Legend: A: Catholic clergy. B: Protestant clergy. C: lawyers. D: Doctors. E: Writers. F: Teachers (38 Protestant). G: Students (3) and scholars (4). H: Businessmen. I: Craftsmen. J: Bank functionaries and managers. K: Peasants and landowners (6). L: Functionaries. M: Other and unknown (the "other" category includes 1 judge, 2 private businessmen, 1 clerk, and 2 burghers).

Source: My own compilations based on V. Šrobár: *Osvobodené Slovensko* (1928:159–181).

<sup>131</sup> (Na Slovensku v dobe prevratu nemali sme spoľahlivými ľuďmi obsadený žiaden úrad, žiaden súd, žiadnu železničnú stanicu. Všade, temer bez výjimky, sedeli Maďari alebo od nich horší maďaróni). Vavro Šrobár: *Osvobodené Slovensko* (1928:332). Šrobár gives a rich picture of the problems (see also page 335, 339, 341, 344).

<sup>132</sup> See R.W. Seton-Watson: *Slovakia then and now* (1931:30). He also published this estimate in *The new Slovakia* (1924).

<sup>133</sup> Tekovská, Sárišská, Novohradská, Ostrihomská, Abauj-Torňanská, Pešť-Piliš-Šolt-Kiškúnská, Békéšská, Torontálská, Báč-Bodrogská. There were not registered more than three in any of these nine župy, except the last, where five names were registered. Most of these were wholly or partly on Magyar territory, the exception being Tekovská and Sárišská župy.

Šrobár's list is nevertheless interesting as a list of nationally *activist* Slovaks. If representative, it can give a rough indication of the social composition and the strongholds of the Slovak national movement before the war. There were registered most Slovak activists in the Slovak core *župy* of Nitrianská, Trenčianská, Turčianská, and Liptovská, and most of the registered activists belonged to the intelligentsia, neither of which is surprising. Clergymen are the largest group with 119 registered, followed by lawyers. The Protestant intelligentsia was over-represented, especially among the clergy and teachers (respectively 71 and 38 Protestants). Protestants were also over-represented among the lawyers. Of those for which Šrobár indicates religious denomination, 44 were Protestants and 7 were Catholics.<sup>134</sup> It is hard to establish how representative these data are, but the Hungarian registrations do confirm Boháč's thesis that liberal professions were most compatible with Slovak patriotism.

According to Boháč, the only professions open to those of the Slovak intelligentsia who wanted to remain faithful to their Slovak origin, were liberal professions like law and medicine, as well as the priesthood and teaching in non-state schools. According to the Hungarian census of 1910, there were 19,072 Slovak public employees and members of the liberal professions (0.9 percent of the total), of these 7,296 were still active.<sup>135</sup> Considering the Magyarization pressure against the intelligentsia, it is likely that these 7,296 self-declared Slovaks belonging to the intelligentsia were nationally conscious Slovaks, albeit not activists. In light of this, it seems apparent that Seton-Watson's figure was too low.

Moreover, it is very likely that there were far more than 150 persons of Slovak origin among the state employees, even under Hungarian rule. While it is well known that many Slovaks became totally Magyarized, others progressed through the education system without changing identity. In addition to the nationally activist Slovaks and the fervent Magyarones, there was a third group of nationally "neutral" Slovaks, who for various reasons did not wear their Slovak identity on their sleeves. These did not come forward until after the Hungarian invasion had failed and it seemed certain that the new Czechoslovak state would be permanent, i.e. around 1920. The Slovak intelligentsia thus consisted of two groups: the nationally conscious and activist Slovak intelligentsia, and the nationally neutral, or "silent" Slovaks.

The number of silent Slovaks was probably highest in precisely those areas where the new regime needed to hire (or keep) personnel with higher education – in teaching and the state administration. As Owen V. Johnson has pointed out, the silent Slovaks were not backward in terms of education or training, although they were not always proficient in Slovak.<sup>136</sup> The trouble was that since so few Slovaks had been able to rise in the Hungarian system, the very fact that the "silent Slovaks" had experience made them suspect. The replacement of personnel thus also affected people of Slovak origin whose newly declared Slovak identity was questioned – admittedly not always without reason.

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<sup>134</sup> See Šrobár (1928:355–56), where he lists Catholic and Protestant lawyers eligible to the new administration separately.

<sup>135</sup> Referred by Boháč (1935:183).

<sup>136</sup> Johnson (1985:279).

The motives behind the replacement of nationally untrustworthy personnel were loud and clear: To get rid of Magyar influences, to Slovakize Slovakia and to consolidate the state. It was especially important to remove teachers who were unwilling or unable to teach in the Slovak tongue. Yet, neither Šrobár nor his official in charge of education Anton Štefánek would allow unqualified Slovak teachers: We have had enough dilettantism, a time of serious scientific work must begin, the minister argued.<sup>137</sup> Rather than employing untrained people, the government and Šrobár thus solved the immediate staffing problem by recruiting Czechs. The government first called on patriotic Czechs to volunteer for the cause. Then various bonuses were added, and when this was not enough, the government resorted to drafting.

As a result of this, the number of Czechs in Slovakia increased from 7,947 to 71,733 between the census of 1910 and 1921, i.e. nine times. Of these, 18,364 were soldiers with temporary residence in Slovakia. Of the remaining 53,369 Czechs, 16,611 did not have an occupation of their own, and 1,663 were domestic servants. Of the 35,095 Czechs who had an occupation, 1,481 were active in agriculture, 556 in forestry and fishing, 8,956 in industry and business, 3,012 in trade and finance, 7,735 in transport, 11,291 in public service and the liberal professions, and 2,064 in other occupations. Table 22, which is a simplification of Boháč's figures, shows the national distribution of public employees in Slovakia in 1921.<sup>138</sup>

**Table 22: Public employees in Slovakia, 1921**

<i>Sector</i>	Czechs		Slovaks		Magyars		Germans		Others		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Public administration	8654	39.4	8258	37.6	3661	16.6	860	3.9	553	2.5	21986	100
School & education	1423	15.5	4283	46.7	2290	25.0	508	5.5	666	7.3	9170	100
Other public/liberal profess.	1214	7.7	5753	36.7	4764	30.4	1399	8.9	2559	16.3	15689	100
Postal employees	1788	33.4	2623	49.0	686	12.8	148	2.8	105	2.0	5350	100
Railway employees	5736	19.4	18705	63.4	3475	11.8	847	2.9	731	2.5	29494	100
Total/Average	18815	23.0	39622	48.5	14876	18.2	3762	4.6	4614	5.6	81689	100

Source: Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:184).

Was it possible to fill all these public jobs with Slovaks? The general answer is no, but we need to make a distinction between jobs that required education and jobs that did not. In R.W. Seton-Watson's words: "Judges, university professors or district assessors cannot be stamped out of the ground, and until a new generation could be trained up, the Czechs were indispensable: but this obviously did not apply to railway porters, or booking clerks, or janitors!"<sup>139</sup>

<sup>137</sup> See Šrobár (1929:380).

<sup>138</sup> See Boháč (1935:183–84). The simplification concerns the "other category", where I have lumped together Ruthenians, Jews, others and foreigners.

<sup>139</sup> R.W. Seton-Watson (ed.): *Slovakia then and now* (1931:34).

If lack of education were the only reason for recruiting Czechs, we would expect to find most Czechs where education was most needed, and most Slovaks in menial jobs. According to Table 22, the largest share of Slovaks in 1921 may be found among railway and postal employees, which is consistent with the expectation. At the same time, these sectors of public employment had the second and third largest share of Czechs, but the lowest share of Magyars. In actual numbers, Czech railway employees were the second largest group of publicly employed Czechs in Slovakia, not counting the soldiers. In this case national trustworthiness was obviously more important than educational requirements, and in the railways and postal service Slovaks probably could have filled at least some of the positions.

If we turn to the kind of jobs that required education and experience to a much larger degree, like public administration, education and the liberal professions, the picture changes. In 1921, there were 12,541 Slovaks employed in public administration and education alone, i.e. over 5000 more than the number of Slovak public employees and members of the liberal professions in Hungary *as a whole* in 1910. And still 5,753 Slovaks were listed under liberal professions/other public employment. This suggests that quite a few "silent Slovaks" had already come forward by then, in addition to the nationally conscious "pre-1918" intelligentsia. It is quite unlikely that another 10,000 educated (silent) Slovaks could have been "stamped out of the ground" to fill positions in the administration and the schools.

In primary schools, the share of Czech teachers was comparatively low, as some 2,000 Slovak teachers were "re-nationalized" without much difficulty. Yet, there was still a lack of teachers in Slovakia, and the government did not stop drafting Czechs until 1926/26. According to Johnson, the teaching vacancies testify to the fact that the Czechs were needed. The Czech share of the teachers in middle schools, *gymnasias* and at the university was much higher. This is not surprising, considering the lack of such schools under Hungary and the stricter education requirements. In middle schools the Czech proportion of the teachers decreased gradually until 1925/26, and after that dropped also in absolute figures as the Ministry stopped drafting Czechs. Czech teachers by then represented about half of the teachers. In the *gymnasias*, the Czech teachers comprised a majority of the teaching staff for most of the period.<sup>140</sup> At Comenius University, Czech professors were an overwhelming majority. When the medical faculty of the university was established as the first faculty in 1919, there was not a single Slovak professor. The faculties of arts and law were established in the academic year 1921/22, with one active Slovak professor in each (Jozef Škultéty and Augustín Ráth).<sup>141</sup>

Likewise, in December 1918, only 5 of the 600 judges and court notaries in Slovakia could write Slovak and another 50 could speak it ("silent" Slovaks?). There were only 150 Slovaks who were qualified for such jobs, and most of them were not even interested, since they could earn more money by practicing law privately than by working for the state.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Johnson (1985:273–274, 280).

<sup>141</sup> See *Comenius University 1919–1994* (1994:15, 17), and Pšenák in: Hleba (1991:20–21).

<sup>142</sup> Johnson (1985:271–72). Rychlík (1997:86).

There is thus no doubt whatsoever that the help of the Czech intelligentsia was sorely needed in Slovakia in the beginning, especially in building up a Slovak system of education. It is also beyond doubt that the Czechs in Slovakia as a whole did a good job.<sup>143</sup> This was even acknowledged by Ferdiš Juriga in the debate on the state budget in January 1920, where he took the opportunity to thank the Czech civil servants, who "came to Slovakia and built up again the house ruined by the tyranny and oppression of the former Magyar state idea." According to Juriga, "they deserve the eternal thanks and remembrance of the Slovak nation, for without Czech civil servants Slovakia would not only have remained under the Magyar yoke, but murder, anarchy, and arson would be the order of the day [...] there are still not enough Czech civil servants in Slovakia, in my opinion we need 1 million Czechs in Slovakia [!]."<sup>144</sup> These were, however, rare tones from the Slovak People's Party.

Initially, the source of Slovak resentment was not so much the number of Czechs, as their behavior and their privileges. Already the *Memorandum of the Slovaks* to the peace conference of 1919 contained such complaints: "the best paid positions are held by Czechs. Czech employees and teachers receive in addition to their salary a supplement of thirty or forty crowns a day while Slovaks are only very slightly awarded for the same work. The Slovak intellectual class is in a desperate way; it is never sure of its material position; the Czechs often remove Slovak civil servants and employees from office on the pretext that they are 'Magyarones', that is Magyarized Slovaks. The Czech soldiers sent into Slovakia are paid six crowns a day and given excellent food, with meat for dinner and supper; on the other hand, Slovaks who are obliged to do their military service in Bohemia get only three crowns a day, are badly nourished and clothed, and further are humiliated in all sorts of ways."<sup>145</sup> The matter of equal pay for the same job was to be recurrent issue in 1920.<sup>146</sup>

What is interesting is that in 1919 Hlinka did not complain that there were too many Czechs. Ľudák argumentation seems to have changed on this point in the course of 1920. While Juriga argued in January that there were still not enough Czechs in Slovakia, by November, Arnold Bobok was claiming that there were too many: "Our Czech brothers came to Slovakia with the slogan that they came to help us. Being aware of our shortcomings, we gladly accepted it. [...] But that help is generally no longer work helping the Slovaks, but simply a substitution of work for the Slovaks with work for our Czech brothers in Slovakia. [...] Slovaks are slowly

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<sup>143</sup> This is documented by Hleba (1991), and even acknowledged by the Ľudák author Konštantín Čulen in *Češi a Slováci v štátnych službách ČSR* (1994) [originally 1944]. See also Ján Mlynárik: *Českí profesori na Slovensku*, I. diel (1994), and Jan Rychlík: *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1914–1945* (1997:84–85).

<sup>144</sup> (vďaka českému úradníctvu, ktoré prišlo na Slovensko a zhrútený dom tyranstva a otrokárstva bývalej štátnej idey maďarskej znova postavilo). (Oni si zaslúžia na večné veky vďaka a večnú pamiatku od slovenského národa, lebo bez českého úradníka Slovensko nielen že by bolo ostalo v maďarskom jarme, ale vraždy, anarchie, zhárstvo bolo by tam na dennom poriadku [...] ešte nenie dosť Čechov – úradníkov na Slovensku, stojím na tom, že my potrebujem na Slovensku 1.000.000 Čechov). Juriga, 110. schůze ... dne 23. ledna 1920, (pp. 3269–70) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>145</sup> Memorandum of the Slovaks to the peace conference of 1919, in Mikuš (1995:165).

<sup>146</sup> See Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č dne 10. června 1920 (p. 177), Hlinka, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 209), Gažík, 21. schůze ... dne 12. listopadu 1920 (p. 327), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

being totally excluded from the work they, with help from their brothers, want to do themselves in the interest of their nation."<sup>147</sup> It seems that this shift in Ľudák argumentation roughly coincided in time with when the silent Slovaks started to come forward.

The Žilina Manifesto of the Slovak People's Party (1922) took the argument one step further: "In occupying Slovakia, the Czechs brought tens of thousands of civil servants and school teachers who were given administrative, juridical and educational positions. They stated that they had come to help us set up our administrative machine since Slovakia did not have a sufficient number of qualified people for the various positions. Once Slovaks were capable of assuming these positions, the Czechs would leave. [...] All the same, Slovak offices and schools are still full almost exclusively with these intruders who, in the majority, are dubious in nature. After having taken a mediocre preparatory course for a few weeks, they were given diplomas and then began replacing Slovak civil servants and teachers who had already proven their capabilities at their jobs." The Manifesto also complained that a Slovak who wanted a job "must repudiate his nationality and serve the Czech machine in order to succeed", and still he would be hired on a provisionary basis, subject to dismissal on "the flimsiest evidence" of political disloyalty. The claims that Czechs got the best jobs and the highest salary were repeated. It was argued that "a Slovak can never reach a decision-making position. These are reserved for Czechs even if they were formerly servants or if they served time in prison for heinous crimes, or if nobody in their own country would even shake their hands."<sup>148</sup>

There was a pattern in the Ľudák argumentation. First, it was argued that the Czechs were privileged in terms of pay and job security. Bonuses and promotions *were* provided in order to get the Czechs to move to Slovakia voluntarily, and later to reduce discontent with being drafted. The justification for this was that their stay in Slovakia was seen as temporary, meaning that they had to maintain two homes. In addition, a "Slovak advantage" (*Slovenská výhoda*) was adopted, giving a permanent bonus to all teachers who took up permanent teaching positions in Slovakia before 1922. Few Slovaks were eligible for such posts at this early point, and the advantaged were thus mainly Czechs. Besides, many of the qualified Slovak teachers who arrived from various parts of old Hungary were hired as lower-paid contract (*smluvný*) teachers while awaiting qualification.<sup>149</sup>

There was thus a certain reality behind the complaints, but the differences between Czech and Slovak teachers were a side effect of a policy that valued merit over nationality – not the result of national discrimination.

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<sup>147</sup> (Naši českí bratia prišli s tým heslom na Slovensko, že nám idú pomáhať. My, vedomí si svojej nedostatočnosti, sme to s radosťou prijali. [...] Ale, bohužiaľ, táto pomoc vo všeobecnosti rečeno, nie je viac napomáhaním, ale jednoduchým zamenením práce Slovákov s prácou našich bratov Čechov na Slovensku. [...] pomaly Slováci úplne budú vylúčení z tej práce, ktorú pri pomoci svojich bratov sami chcú konať v záujme svojho národa). Bobok, 25. schůze ... dne 24. listopadu 1920 (p. 443). See also Hlinka, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 209), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>148</sup> See the Žilina manifesto, printed in Mikuš (1995:201).

<sup>149</sup> Johnson (1985:276–277, 280). Štefánek explicitly stressed the need to pay the Czechs more to attract them to Slovakia. See his report in Šrobár (1928:433).

Second, the Ľudáks argued that the Czechs were unqualified, morally unfit, or did not understand Slovak conditions.<sup>150</sup> It must be admitted that some of the Czechs did lack understanding, although most were well-meaning. Some offended Slovak religious feelings by their anti-clericalism.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, a second group of Czechs were sent to Slovakia because they were so compromised by their past as former Austrian civil servants that they were not wanted in the Czech lands. These did considerable harm to Czecho-Slovak relations, in Ivanka's view by their "merciless enacting and execution of laws and prescriptions." Even Hodža complained that the bureaucracy was too Austrian influenced.<sup>152</sup> Heřman Tausik, a Czech Communist elected from Slovakia, brought all the complaints together in 1920, arguing that the government had made a big mistake by sending in people who did not know Slovak conditions, mostly Austrian monarchists or people with dubious qualifications.<sup>153</sup> Complaints on Czech behavior were most common in the very first years.

Third, the claim that the Czechs were unqualified or morally unfit was combined with the assertion that qualified Slovaks were being replaced because they were deemed nationally untrustworthy – wrongly so, the Ľudáks argued. The implication was that Czechs were taking up positions to which the Slovak intelligentsia were entitled. As we have seen, only one group was directly affected by the "intrusion" of the Czech intelligentsia on the Slovak labor market in the early 1920s: the "new" or "silent" Slovaks. This is on closer inspection also reflected in Ľudák argumentation. They were not at this point concerned with the situation of the young Slovak intelligentsia, but with the situation of people who were being sacked or denied employment on the charge of being Magyarones.

The year 1925 seems to mark a watershed in argumentation on the matter of employment for the Slovak intelligentsia. On the one hand, complaints of insensitive Czech behavior<sup>154</sup> and complaints that the Czechs were being privileged in terms of pay, which had been common during the first years, were heard less often – the latter probably because of a law of 1926 regulating the wage system of public employees. Yet, this led to demands for compensation, and complaints that public employees within various sectors were not being treated the same way. The National Socialists, who were strongly represented among civil servants and teachers, raised the matter in several interpellations in 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929, and the Social Democrats in one interpellation, but mostly without any national angle.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> See Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920, (p. 178), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>151</sup> This was acknowledged even by Czechoslovak oriented scholars and politicians. See e.g. Milan Ivanka: *O autonomistických snahách na Slovensku* (1923:14). See also Johnson (1985:270).

<sup>152</sup> (vynášanie a nemilosrdné exekvovanie zákonov...). Ivanka (1923:14). See also Bartlová (1993b:19). Hodža, 3. schůze ... dne 2. června 1920, (p. 56), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>153</sup> Tausik, 21. schůze ... dne 12. listopadu 1920 (pp. 323–24), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>154</sup> *Slovák* sometimes complained of the provocative attitudes of Czech civil servants. See e.g. *Slovák* no. 26, 2.2.1927:1.

<sup>155</sup> See Tisk 595, Tisk 1403/VI, Tisk 1593, Tisk 1804, Tisk 2025/IV in *Tisky k těšnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IV, IX, X, XI, XII (1926, 1928, 1929).



In a separate interpellation in 1927, the National Socialists accused the Ministry of Education of leading a campaign against the drafted Czech teachers according to the wishes of "the Magyarized Ľudák teachers." The background for this claim was that Czech teachers who had been drafted were given the choice of staying in Slovakia without the benefits they had hitherto enjoyed, or returning to the Czech lands. Teachers who did not choose either within the deadline were sent off to fill vacant positions in Slovakia, regardless of where they had been serving before, the National Socialists complained. The Minister of Education Milan Hodža replied that this was not the first time Czech teachers were given this choice, and pointed out that abolition of the benefits (the supplement and the Slovak advantage) was necessary to equalize wage levels. Hodža denied that this was a campaign against Czech teachers in Slovakia. There were still 223 drafted teachers who had not entered permanent teaching positions in Slovakia or returned to the Czech lands, he informed.<sup>156</sup> In this case the Czechs were the "wronged" part, in the sense that they were losing privileges.

The complaints that loyal Slovaks were dismissed or did not get a job because of charges of being Magyarones also became far less common. This was associated with a gradual shift in the argumentation in direction of the recent graduates. At the same time, there was a growing understanding for the problems on the Czechoslovakist side. It was acknowledged that sending unqualified Czechs only complicated matters, and even agreed that Slovaks should be preferred in cases of equal qualifications.<sup>157</sup> The Ľudáks of course went one step farther, demanding that public employment in Slovakia should be reserved for Slovaks only. This was expressed in the slogan *Slovensko Slovákom* (Slovakia to the Slovaks). Immediately before the Ľudáks joined the government, Buday claimed that in order to calm down the situation in Slovakia, it was necessary to fill *all* administrative positions in Slovakia with Slovaks.<sup>158</sup>

Unemployment among the Slovak intelligentsia was also beginning to appear as an argument: "Today the number of unemployed qualified Slovaks has risen to thousands, for whom the only obstacle for success was honesty and Slovak national conviction. [...] In Slovakia, Slovak civil servants must have priority before the helping Czech civil servants."<sup>159</sup> Around 1927, an additional demand started to appear: namely that Slovaks be given a fair share of the positions in the central administration,<sup>160</sup> which implied that the demand for national equality was stepped up from the local level to state level. However, this issue did not gain importance until towards the end of the First Republic.

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<sup>156</sup> (kampaň dle přání zmaďařeného Ľudáckého učitelstva na Slovensku proti exponovaným českým učitelům). See Tisk 1050 (interpellation) and Tisk 1130 (Hodža's reply) in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VII (1927).

<sup>157</sup> See Ján Halla (Agrarians), 6. schůze ... dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 200), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>158</sup> Buday, 45. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č dne 20. října 1926 (p. 161), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>159</sup> (Dnes na tisíce vztúpnu počet nezamestnaných kvalifikovaných Slovákov, ktorým jedinou prekážkou uplatnenia sa bola poctivosť a slovenské národné presvedčenie. [...] Slovenský úradník musí mať na Slovensku prednosť pred českým výpomocným úradníkom). *Slovák* no. 26, 2.2.1927:1. Claims that the Czechs were eating Slovak bread was also voiced in *Slovák* no. 122, 1.6.1927:1.

<sup>160</sup> *Slovák* no. 25, 1.2.1927:3, *Slovák* no. 124, 3.6.1927:1.

The main emphasis was on jobs in Slovakia. Specific complaints concerned the difficulties of Slovak secondary school teachers in getting a job, and demands that Slovaks be appointed as principals and inspectors in Slovak schools.<sup>161</sup> Apart from the situation of Slovak teachers, a major concern of the Ľudáks was Slovak employment in the railways (and to a lesser extent) the postal service. For instance, Surovjak argued that the reorganization of the railways was robbing Slovakia of employees, since Slovakia had fewer employees compared to the length of the tracks than the Czech lands.<sup>162</sup> Considering that the number of railway employees was reduced by 3,000 between 1921 and 1930, this emphasis on railway employment is understandable. This made it harder for new Slovaks to get employment, but the number of Slovaks was not reduced compared to 1921 (cf. Table 22 page 410, and Table 23 below).

**Table 23: Public employees in Slovakia, 1930**

Sector	Czechs		Slovaks		Magyars		Germans		Others		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Public administration	9874	41.3	11363	47.5	1486	6.2	642	2.7	546	2.3	23911	100
School & education	2309	20.1	6606	57.4	1521	13.2	532	4.6	537	4.7	11505	100
Other public/liberal profess.	2304	8.8	13042	49.8	4971	19.0	2355	9.0	3495	13.4	26167	100
Postal employees	1980	29.3	4321	63.9	295	4.4	108	1.6	57	0.8	6761	100
Railway employees	5272	20.0	18738	71.0	1534	5.8	501	1.9	332	1.3	26377	100
Total/Average	21739	23.0	54070	57.1	9807	10.4	4138	4.3	4967	5.2	94721	100

Source: Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku, in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:188–190).

It has often been pointed out that the number of Czechs in Slovakia increased considerably also between 1921 and 1930 (by 68.6 percent). Of the 120,926 Czechs, 20,652 were soldiers with temporary address in Slovakia. Of the remaining 100,274 Czechs, 49,449 did not have an occupation of their own, while 1,731 were domestic servants.<sup>163</sup> Family members comprised a large share of the increase, which simply means that the Czechs who arrived before 1921 brought their families. The number of family members increased by 197.7 percent. In comparison, the increase in the number of publicly employed Czechs in Slovakia was only 15.5 percent. Moreover, the Czech share of the public employees was exactly the same on both points, which means that the Czech increase equaled the total.

After the liberation of Slovakia it was most important for the new regime to fill central positions in the public administration, the postal service and the railways with reliable people, and in 1921 the share of Czechs was thus highest in these areas (see Table 22, page 410).

<sup>161</sup> *Slovák* no. 202, 7.9.1928:1, *Slovák* no. 206, 13.9.1928:5, Hancko, 109. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1927 (pp. 90–91), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>162</sup> *Slovák* no. 204, 13.9.1927:1, Surovjak, 111. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1927 (pp. 71–72), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>163</sup> Boháč (1935:187).

Between 1921 and 1930, the Czech share of employees in public administration only increased, while the share of railway employees remained stable, and the share of the postal employees was reduced. The increase in the number of Czechs was largest in school and education, and the other way around for the Magyars. Between 1921 and 1930, the number of Magyars working in the public sector decreased from 14,876 to 9,807 (or by 34.1 percent).

Slovaks increased their share in every area of public employment, from 39,622 public employees in 1921 to 54,070 in 1930 (up 36.5 percent). In the same period the total number of state employees in Slovakia increased by 13,032 persons or 16 percent. The Slovak increase was thus larger than the total. The increase in the number of Slovak railway employees was close to nothing in absolute terms, but their percentage increased because the total was reduced. This reduction affected the Magyars the most.

Between 1921 and 1930, the Slovak school system improved immensely, and was churning out an increasing number of graduates. How large unemployment really was among the young Slovak intelligentsia before the economic crisis set in is hard to ascertain due to lack of data. But according to Jozef Pšenák, by "the end of the first decade of the republic, Slovakia already had a big enough Slovak intelligentsia of its own, which however had a very small chance of asserting itself since all positions were occupied by teachers from Bohemia and Moravia."<sup>164</sup> The way Pšenák describes it, this was a classic case of blocked social mobility, where Czechs with experience were keeping jobs from newly educated Slovaks. Conversely, Owen Johnson argues that this is to "ignore the relative ease with which the Slovak intelligentsia found employment in the 1920s."<sup>165</sup>

Johnson is probably right that it *was* easier for the Slovak intelligentsia to find employment in the 1920s than during the economic crisis. There are three reasons for this: First, the number of public employees in Slovakia increased in absolute terms between the census of 1921 and 1930. Second, the diminishing number of Magyars in the public sector provided a safety valve. Some of those who were listed as Magyars in 1921 probably changed national allegiance (the "new" Slovaks), but many of them also retired or went into other professions. Third, the number of graduates from middle schools, *gymnasias* and the university increased over the years, and the cumulative effect started to become apparent only as the crisis started.

In the 1930s, the number of public employees was reduced as a result of the retrenchment policy. At the same time, the public sector was less affected by the economic crisis than the rest of the economy, and greater job safety in the public sector made such jobs more attractive. The job supply for the intelligentsia thus decreased, while demand increased. In Slovakia there was no longer a large reservoir of Magyars that could be retired, which meant that in order to employ more Slovaks, Czech officeholders had to be fired. The demand from the Slovak (ľudák) side was for all vacancies to be filled exclusively by Slovaks, and for the

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<sup>164</sup> See Pšenák: Českí profesori na Slovensku za prvej československej republiky in: Hleba (1991:18).

<sup>165</sup> Johnson (1985:311).

government to keep track.<sup>166</sup> Yet, the economic crisis was no less severe in the Czech lands, and there were no vacant jobs there for the unwanted Czechs. Czechs who already had jobs in Slovakia held on to them, and in addition new Czechs were looking eastward for employment. In a situation when the number of public jobs was decreasing, the interests of the Czech and the Slovak intelligentsia became irreconcilable, as gains for one meant losses for the other.

The 1930s did not witness any major shift in the argumentation of the Slovak nationalists. The message was still "Slovakia to the Slovaks", but the issue gained urgency, especially during the worst crisis years. A main point was that the Slovak intelligentsia was large enough to run things in Slovakia on its own, and that Czech "help" was no longer necessary. A typical line of argument was that the Czechs in Slovakia were taking "the state bread out of the hands of the Slovaks", and that the Slovaks only demanded what belonged to them.<sup>167</sup> This bread metaphor was quite common. At a protest rally in Bratislava in April 1933 against the tide of Czechs in Slovakia, Jozef Sivák argued that "we do not have a unitary Czechoslovak nation, and neither do we have a unitary Czechoslovak bread. It is Czech bread and Slovak bread."<sup>168</sup> From the government, the standard response was that Slovaks were not being discriminated against; and that state employment policy was based on merit, nothing else.

Because of the transport reduction during the economic crisis, cutbacks were largest in the state railways. A majority of the interpellations about Slovak public employment in the 1930s concerned railway employees, and it was also a recurrent issue in *Slovák*. A common complaint in 1930 was that superfluous Czech employees were being transferred to Slovakia, while the government replied that this was done for transport-technical reasons only.<sup>169</sup>

The Ľudáks with Anton Šalát at the helm argued that employment in Slovakia should first and foremost be for qualified Slovaks, but they were now being dismissed as superfluous. "As long as there is one 'drafted' [Czech] in Slovakia, no qualified Slovak should be regarded as superfluous in his liberated Slovakia. [...] Instead of dismissing Slovak railway employees, the 'drafted' railway employees should definitively be gradually called out of Slovakia", the Ľudáks argued. They also claimed that Slovakia was especially affected by the crisis. The Minister of Railways, Rudolf Mlčoch, answered that transport activity was more reduced in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, and the number of dismissals was thus also higher there.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> See Tisk 1550, in *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX (1932).

<sup>167</sup> See e.g. senator Hancko in: *Slovák* no. 129, 6.6.1934:3; *Slovák* no. 62, 16.3.1933:1; Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 88, Easter 1933:1; *Slovák* no. 173, 4.8.1931:3; Hlinka and Rázus, 213. schůze ... dne 4. listopadu 1932 (pp. 20, 36), in *Tēsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>168</sup> (Nemáme jednotného československého národa – nemáme ani jednotného československého chleba. Je chlieb slovenský a chlieb český). Sivák in: *Slovák* no. 94, 25.4.1933:3.

<sup>169</sup> See Tisk 542 (interpellation) and 623 (reply) in *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IV (1930). See also Tisk 284 and 404 in Svazek III (1930), Tisk 1095 and 1175 in Svazek VIII (1931), and *Slovák* no. 169, 27.7.1930:5.

<sup>170</sup> (kým je len jeden "exponovaný" na Slovensku, zatiaľ žiadny kvalifikovaný Slovák vo svojej oslobodenej slovenskej krajine nemá, nesmie byť považovaný za prebytočného. [...] Miesto prepúšťania Slovákov-železničiarov by rozhodne mali byť postupne zo Slovenska odvolávaní "exponovaní" železničiar. See Tisk 933 (interpellation) and Tisk 1036 (answer), in *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek VI and VIII (1931).

*Slovák* made a big point out of the appointment of a Czech railway director in Košice, which the paper called a "provocation beyond limit" in the title, and a "crime" in the conclusion. The Czech in question allegedly had no knowledge of Slovakia – and besides, better-qualified Slovaks had been passed over. *Slovák* also reacted with horror to the decision of the Minister of Post and Telegraph Emil Franke to give priority to 600 postal employees who had become superfluous in Prague, if work became available in Slovakia. Jozef Sivák found this decision unbelievable and simply absurd, and quoted various statistics showing that more Czechs than Slovaks were being employed, compared to the number of applicants.<sup>171</sup> In 1936 a ľudák interpellation complaining about "new import of Czechs" to Slovak railways received the reply that almost all Slovak applicants had been taken in, and the reason why Czechs were accepted (as trainees in this case) was that there was not enough interest among Slovaks. Similar interpellations were filed in 1937 and 1938. At this point, the ľudáks explicitly rejected the claim that there was not enough interest among Slovaks. There were also a few complaints that Slovak employees were discriminated against in the distribution of Christmas bonuses, and there were some cases concerning individuals.<sup>172</sup>

As for the intelligentsia "proper", most of the complaints and demands concerned teachers. A common technique was to refer to statistics showing that the Czechs were a majority.<sup>173</sup> This was not true for the teachers as a whole (see Table 23), but the Czechs *were* a majority among the secondary school teachers. In the school year 1931/32, there were 1,129 secondary school teachers in Slovakia, of these 284 Slovak (25.2 percent) and 671 Czech (59.4 percent). Of these, 238 Slovaks and 665 Czechs served in Slovak schools. In addition, 46 Slovaks and 6 Czechs were working in minority schools (44 of the Slovaks in Magyar schools).<sup>174</sup>

It is perhaps not surprising that secondary school teachers were mentioned most often in the complaints. In the crisis year of 1933, *Slovák* attacked the Minister of Education Ivan Déer for dismissing 11 Slovak assistant teachers who had only a few months to go before they were fully qualified, and hiring Czechs. Now some Czech without deeper knowledge of the Slovak language would take over the language instruction. "Slovak will still be a Cinderella", the paper complained. "Slovak teachers are still white crows [i.e. quite rare] in our secondary schools, and are lost in the might of the Czech professors as a drop in the ocean."<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> (Provokácia bez hraníc) (zločinom). *Slovák* no. 85, 16.4.1931:2. See also *Slovák* no. 88, 19.4.1931:3, *Slovák* no 53, 5.3.1933:1, Sivák in *Slovák* no. 55, 8.3.1933:1, and *Slovák* no. 89, 21.4.1931:3.

<sup>172</sup> See Tisk 386/XI (interpellation), and Tisk 602/V (reply) in: *Tisky k tēsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek III (1936). See also Tisk 446/XIII, 469/XV, 469 XVI, 497/I (interpellations) and Tisk 608/XVIII, 663/III, 663/V, 768/XI (replies) in Svazek III, IV (1936, 1937). Tisk 769/XXV, 771/I, 785/I, 785/III (interpellations) and Tisk 925/V, 925/VIII (replies) in Svazek VI and VIII (1937), concern various types of alleged discrimination, including the Christmas bonus. See also *Slovák* no. 173, 4.8.1933:1, where an overview over Slovak and Czech railway employees was given.

<sup>173</sup> See e.g. Sivák in *Slovák* no. 94, 25.4.1933:3.

<sup>174</sup> *Slovenské školstvo v prítomnosti* (1932:37–38). "Secondary schools" here refer to *gymnasia* of all kinds, so-called *reálky* (secondary schools without Latin and Greek, with special emphasis on math and natural sciences) and teachers' academies.

<sup>175</sup> (i ďalej bude slovenčina popelkou). (Profesori-Slováci dosiaľ sú len bielymi vranami na našich stredných školách a ztrácajú sa v mori profesorov-Čechov ako kvapka v mori). *Slovák* no. 202, 8.9.1933:2. See also *Slovák* no. 102, 5.5.1934:1.

In a debate in the Parliament in 1932, Andrej Hlinka told Dérer that "you are obliged as a Slovak to know that positions in Slovakia belong to the Slovaks first and foremost. [...] From you I expect that you appoint Slovaks in Slovakia. [...] We only demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks are given the slice of bread that belongs to them." Dérer, who had decreed in 1931 that Slovaks should have preference in teaching jobs in Slovakia, could not brag about it for political reasons. He answered Hlinka: "*Never have so many Slovaks been appointed as today! [...] Every Slovak teacher got a position in the high schools. Czech teachers must wait 15 years to get a position!*".<sup>176</sup> In 1934 Dérer claimed that there was not a single unemployed qualified elementary school or secondary school teacher.<sup>177</sup>

Martin Mičura (ČSL) complained in the 1935 budget debate that the school administration did not employ Slovak graduates in the 100-odd positions that became vacant in Slovakia every year. Instead teachers from the Czech lands were employed, he argued, "and today we have a lot of those graduates, who only spread dissatisfaction at the expense of Czechoslovak reciprocity." In order not to make it easy for the instigators who claimed that the Czechs were depriving the Slovaks of work, Mičura argued, "applicants from Slovakia must be accepted in all vacant positions" in the civil service, the railways, the postal service etc. in Slovakia.<sup>178</sup>

To what extent did such complaints reflect realities? This is first, a matter of whether Czechs were replacing Slovaks in public jobs in Slovakia, but also whether the Czech share of the public employees in Slovakia increased. I have not been able to find figures fully comparable with the census data for 1921 and 1930, but the total number of Czechs in Slovakia was down to 77,488, according to the Slovak census of December 31st, 1938.<sup>179</sup>

According to Čulen, there were 20,541 Czechs employed in the public sector as of October 1st, 1938. Since he does not supply his source, the accuracy of the figures cannot be controlled. Of these 20,541 Czechs, there were 3,200 in education, 5,024 in the railways, and 1,825 in the postal service, which should be comparable with the 1921 and 1930 figures. Further, 4,384 Czechs were employed within the purview of the Slovak Ministry of the Interior, 3,747 in finance, 98 in economy (*hospodárstvo*), and 537 in public works, altogether 8,766 Czechs. This figure may be comparable with the category "Public administration" in the 1921 and 1930 censuses.

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<sup>176</sup> (vy ste vinen ako Slováč, máte vedieť, že na Slovensku miesto v prvom rade patrí Slovákom. [...] od vás čakám, aby ste na Slovensku Slováka menoval. [...] My si žiadame, aby na Slovensku Slovákom bol daný ten kúsok chleba, ktorý im patrí. (*Ministr dr Dérer: Nikdy nebolo menované toľko Slovákov ako teraz! [...] Každý slovak profesor dostal miesto a je umiestnený na stredných školách! 15 rokov musia čakať českí profesori až dostanú miesto!*)). Hlinka, 213. schůze ... dne 4. listopadu 1932 (p. 20), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... Johnson (1985:275) refers to official information from the Ministry of Education about the decree.

<sup>177</sup> Ivan Dérer: *Československá otázka* (1935:38).

<sup>178</sup> (dnes máme spústu tých maturantov, ktorí iba šíria nespokojenosť na úkor československej vzájomnosti). (na všetky uprázdnené miesta majú byť prijímaní uchádzači zo Slovenska). Mičura, 349. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1934 (pp. 77–78), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>179</sup> *Slovenská vlastiveda* (1943:190). If we also include the Czech converts (based on birthplace) there were 93,193 Czechs in Slovakia on the last day of 1938. See Rychlík (1997:9, 192).

Finally, 627 Czechs worked under the Ministry of Defense, 102 in state mining companies and 270 in the state forests. I have placed these under "Other public/liberal professions" below, but the figures are not directly comparable, since the liberal professions (presumably lawyers, doctors and the like) are missing.

**Table 24: Czechs in public-sector employment in Slovakia**

Year	Public administration	School & education	Other public/liberal prof.	Postal employees	Railway employees	Total
1921	8,654	1,423	1,214	1,788	5,736	18,815
1930	9,874	2,309	2,304	1,980	5,272	21,739
1938	8,766	3,200	999	1,825	5,024	20,541

Sources: Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku, in *Statistický obzor* (1935: 183–90).  
Konštantín Čulen: *Česi a Slováci v štátnych službách ČSR* (1994:76).

If Čulen's figures are reliable, the number of Czechs was reduced in absolute terms in two of the categories for which we have comparable data (postal and railway employees), while the number of Czechs in education increased between 1930 and 1938. The number of employees in public administration and the postal service was back to 1921 level, while the number of Czech railway employees was reduced, also compared to 1921. The total number of employees is not given, and it is thus not possible to ascertain whether the Czech percentage of public employees went up or down in the 1930s. My guess would be that the Czech share was *not* any lower, since the number of public employees was reduced during the crisis.

Were Czechs actually replacing Slovaks during the crisis years? Because of the lack of reliable statistics, this is hard to ascertain. According to Ivan Dérier, there were 1,161 Czech postal employees (24.4 percent) in Slovakia in 1934, 3,274 Slovak (68.9 percent), 251 Magyar (5.3 percent), and 61 German (1.3 percent), totaling 4,747 postal employees.<sup>180</sup> If these figures are correct, the Czech share of *postal* employees in Slovakia was reduced, meaning that more Czechs than Slovaks lost their jobs in Slovakia during the recession (cf. Table 23).

In Slovak railways, the situation was the opposite. According to Dérier, there were 22,924 railway employees in Slovakia in 1934. Of these 6,384 were Czechs, 14,562 were Slovaks, 1,362 were Magyars, 284 were Germans, and there were 332 others, mostly Ruthenians.<sup>181</sup> Compared to the 1930 census, Czechs increased their share of the railway employees in Slovakia in absolute as well as relative terms, and now comprised 27.9 percent. Slovaks reduced their share to 63.5 percent, while the changes were only slight for the minorities. If these figures give a correct picture of the situation in 1934, new Czechs *were* getting jobs in Slovakia at the expense of the Slovaks. Dérier presumably had access to official figures, and I have no reason to suspect him of deliberately inflating the number of Czechs.

<sup>180</sup> In addition there were presumably a few "others." See Dérier (1935:38).

<sup>181</sup> See Ivan Dérier: *Československá otázka* (1935:38).

Ironically, the Ľudák Konštantín Čulen's figures from 1938 show a lower share of Czechs. His total is 23,878 railway employees in Slovakia, of these 5,024 Czechs (21.0 percent), 16,439 Slovaks (68.8 percent), 1,563 Magyars (6.6 percent), 344 Germans (1.5 percent) and 508 others (2.1 percent).<sup>182</sup> Compared to the 1930 figures, this is still a slight increase in the Czech share and a slight decrease in the Slovak share. Since the figures are four years apart, both may be correct. In that case, the Czech gain in the worst crisis years was reversed in the late 1930s.

The other main conflict area besides railways was education. Unfortunately, Čulen only indicates the number of Czech and Slovak employees in education. My compilations based on Čulen's data shows that of the 12,412 Czech and Slovak teachers, professors etc., 3,266 were Czech (26.3 percent), and 9,146 Slovak (73.7 percent). In 1930, there were 2,309 Czechs (25.9 percent) and 6,606 Slovaks (74.1 percent). If Čulen's figures are reliable, the ratio between Czech and Slovaks employees remained the same in the 1930s. There was, however, a difference between the elementary schools and the rest. Both Dérer's figures from 1937 and Čulen's figures from 1938 show that Czechs comprised some 20 percent of the Czech and Slovak elementary school teachers, while Slovaks comprised the remaining 80 percent.<sup>183</sup>

As to the secondary schools, Čulen claims that there were 345 Slovak teachers, 523 Czech, 11 German, 29 Magyar and 24 others (including two Jews) as of October 1st, 1938. According to Dérer, there were 493 Slovak secondary school teachers, 479 Czech, 114 Magyar and 64 German teachers in Slovakia in 1937. Even the lowest figure shows that there were *more than 40 percent Czech secondary school teachers in Slovakia around 1938*. Were there enough qualified Slovaks to fill these posts? Dérer's answer was no: "if we do as some of the extreme autonomists demand, and dismiss all the Czech professors in Slovakia today, we should have to close half the Slovak secondary schools, for at present we have no qualified Slovak candidates to fill their places." Čulen's figures show that the number of Czech secondary school teachers was reduced to 122 by the last day of 1939 and to 73 the year after. This suggests that there must have been some qualified Slovaks, unless Czechs were fired and unqualified Slovaks employed, which I find unlikely.<sup>184</sup> However, Czechs were most dominant in the police and the army in Slovakia.<sup>185</sup>

The extent to which there was a reality behind the complaints that the Czech intelligentsia were getting jobs to which the Slovak intelligentsia were entitled also depends on how much unemployment there was among the Slovak intelligentsia. On this, data are lacking. Recent graduates were not eligible for unemployment benefit, and the employment agencies had no jobs for them anyway. Many unemployed graduates thus probably did not bother to register.

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<sup>182</sup> Konštantín Čulen: *Česi a Slováci v štátnych službách ČSR* (1994:155).

<sup>183</sup> Dérer figures show 79.8 percent Czechs, Čulen's 80.0 percent. See Ivan Dérer: *The unity of the Czechs and the Slovaks. Has the Pittsburgh declaration been carried out?* (1938:48), Čulen (1994:128).

<sup>184</sup> Dérer (1938:52), Čulen (1994:133).

<sup>185</sup> Čulen (1994: 109, 112, 123); Jan Anger: *Národnostná štruktúra dôstojníckeho zboru česko-slovenskej armády v rokoch 1918–1938*, in: *Historický časopis*, 5–6 (1993:636). See also Chapter 11, page 355.



According to Alena Bartlová, the first evidence of unemployment among the intelligentsia was presented in 1934: "In Slovakia there were 25,000 unemployed young high school and university graduates, who had recently finished their studies." Čulen refers to an estimate by the Union of Slovak students, also from the fall of 1934, stating that there were "more than 3,000 unemployed Slovak intelligentsia." Johnson's estimate, based on a limited study of career opportunities of the young Czech and Slovak intelligentsia, is 1,500 unemployed Slovak secondary school graduates in 1934. Johnson suggests that even this figure was too high, and argues that there was no surplus of Slovak intelligentsia.<sup>186</sup>

It is hard to know what figures to believe, since the discrepancy is so great, especially between Bartlová's figure and the other figures. Bartlová wrote to this author on October 30th, 1997, that the journal *Politika* (her source) was "a serious journal of the young intelligentsia, which was associated with the Social Democratic and Agrarian party, or at least sympathized with the government coalition. The information is on the whole hard to verify, but is in my opinion quite real, although the figure may be rounded off."<sup>187</sup> In any case, the reality was here less important than the perception, considering how it was used in autonomist rhetoric.

That it *was* regarded as a problem is obvious from the fact that a separate unemployment agency for the intelligentsia was set up in Slovakia in 1934. As of March 1936 the agency had 1,015 applicants registered. The real unemployment was certainly higher than this, as it is unlikely that a majority of the unemployed intelligentsia registered. Johnson's figure must thus be too low. In addition, a law on trainees was adopted in 1934, according to which law, university and secondary school graduates were accepted into state service as "aspirants" or "candidates", as a reserve to fill vacant positions. These trainees had to work three months for free, and an additional 4–16 months for a wage of 270–660 crowns a month. In addition, they could be fired without further notice.<sup>188</sup>

This led to complaints of exploitation. Martin Rázus begged that the law should not be implemented: "Today, when the graduate student, hungry and naked, comes to apply for work, he is told: For three months you will get nothing, and for some years, 450 or something crowns a month! As long as we, who have two to five or ten thousand a month, are content with looking at it, it is hard to speak of a just democracy."<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> (Na Slovensku bolo 25.000 nezamestnaných mladých vysokoškolákov a stredoškolákov, ktorí nedávno ukončili štúdium). See Bartlová (1986:179). Her source is *Politika* from November 11st 1934. (nezamestnaných slovenských inteligentov je vyše 3000). Čulen (1994:32). His source is *Slovenský denník*, 28.10.1934. See also Johnson (1985:305–308).

<sup>187</sup> (Časopis *Politika* bol celkom seriózný časopis mladej inteligencie, ktorá pôsobila v sociálno-demokratickej a agrárnej strane, resp. s vládnuou koalíciou aspoň sympatizovala. Údaj sa dá ťažko celkom preveriť, ale je podľa mňa dosť reálny i keď môže byť to číslo zaokrúhlené). Alena Bartlová in a letter to the author.

<sup>188</sup> Pavel Horváth: Nezamestnanosť inteligencie na Slovensku in: *Statistický obzor* (1936:244). See also Bartlová (1986:179), Johnson (1985:307).

<sup>189</sup> (Dnes, keď príde ten skončený študent, hladový, nahý a hľadá miesto, povie sa mu: Tri mesiace nedostaneš nič a za niekoľko rokov 450 alebo koľko korún mesačne! Dokiaľ my, ktorý máme od dvoch do päť či desať tisíc mesačne, budeme vedieť na to hľadať, dotiaľ o spravdlivej demokracii ťažko hovoriť). Rázus, 345 schůze ... dne 6. listopadu 1934 (pp. 48–49), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

Likewise, Jozef Sivák claimed that the trainee law hurt the Slovak educated youth the most. If the school administration wanted to use that law to alleviate the surplus of secondary school teachers, it was mistaken: There was no surplus of teachers in Slovakia. "In Slovakia there is still not even 30 percent Slovak secondary school teachers", he argued, and presented several examples of schools with "hardly any" Slovaks. In his view, the young Slovak intelligentsia "had a natural right to occupy all positions in Slovakia, but not as 'aspirants'".<sup>190</sup>

**Table 25: Teachers, railway and postal employees by status**

1930	Clerical workers		Employees		Workers		Day laborers	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Czechs, railways	2,916	55.3	2,216	42.0	123	2.3	17	0.4
Slovaks, railways	2,436	13.0	10,735	57.3	4,494	24.0	1,073	5.7
Czechs, postal service	1,456	73.5	517	26.1	7	0.4	(see footnote 192)	
Slovaks, postal service	2,233	51.7	2,025	46.9	63	1.4		
1931/32	Principals		Permanent teachers		Temporary teachers		Substitute/helping	
Czechs, secondary schools	34	5.0	348	51.9	178	26.6	111	16.5
Slovaks, secondary schools	20	7.0	138	48.6	57	20.1	69	24.3

Sources: Antonín Boháč: Češi na Slovensku, in: *Statistický obzor* (1935:189–190).  
*Slovenské školstvo v prítomnosti* (1932:37–38).

The aspirant matter was associated with a theme that grew in importance in the 1930s: the complaint that Czechs were over-represented in leading and well paid positions in Slovakia. Statistics to this effect were sometimes presented. For this reason, there were strong reactions against the appointment of Czechs as principals at the *gymnasia* in Prešov and Martin and the middle school in Košice in 1930.<sup>191</sup> That Czechs were over-represented in higher positions is an undeniable fact, especially in the postal service and the railways, as Table 25 clearly indicates. I have also included figures showing the number of Czechs and Slovaks in the secondary schools. There was less Czech over-representation in the most attractive positions there, but because Czechs were in majority among the secondary school teachers, there were more of them in higher positions, numerically, but not in percentage terms. As Čulen shows, a similar pattern can be observed in several other areas.<sup>192</sup>

<sup>190</sup> (Na Slovensku niet ešte ani 30 % slovenských profesorov). (Slovákom, ktorí majú prirodzené právo na to, aby všetky miesta na Slovensku odsadili, ale nie ako aspiranti). Sivák, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (pp. 47–48), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>191</sup> See e.g. *Slovák* no. 173, 4.8.1933:1, *Slovák* no. 272, 1.12.1934:1, *Slovák* no. 191, 23.8.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 221, 28.9.1930:1. See also *Slovák* no. 95, 28.4.1931:1.

<sup>192</sup> Boháč distinguishes between four categories of railway employees, with clerical workers (*úředníci*) as the top category, employees (*zřízenci*), workers (*dělníci*) and day laborers (*nádeníci*). He only gives information for the first two categories of postal employees. "Workers" are the difference between these and the total (see Table 23). See also Čulen (1994).

A second theme that grew in importance in the 1930s was the matter of Slovak employment in the state administration in Prague. The issue was first raised in 1927, but was not very hot then. When it was raised in the early 1930s, the point of departure were statistics published in *Slovák* (see Table 26). There were some complaints in 1930 and 1931 of how difficult it was for a Slovak to get a job in Prague, but at this point there was not much reality behind it. The matter of Slovak jobs in Slovakia was always far more important, even in the late 1930s, although proportional representation in Prague *was* among the ľudák demands of 1935.<sup>193</sup>

There were not published any statistics showing the number of Slovaks in the central administration in Prague while the First Republic still existed. In Table 26 I present the figures I have been able to find.

**Table 26: Slovaks in the central administration**

Year <i>Resort</i>	1930	1934			1936			1938		
	Slovaks	Total	Slovaks	%	Total	Slovaks	%	Total	Slovaks	%
Parliament	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	223	1	0.44	224	1	0.44
Office of the President	—	N/A	N/A	N/A	96	2	2.08	96	3	3.12
Office of the Prime Minister	—	[35]	3	8.57	153	4	2.60	153	9	5.88
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2	[1053]	27	2.56	1246	35	2.80	1246	33	2.64
Ministry of the Interior	—	[110]	2	1.81	383	3	0.78	386	2	0.51
Ministry of Justice	1	[71]	3	4.23	132	8	6.06	143	12	8.39
Ministry of Unification	2	[29]	3	10.3	51	4	7.84	51	6	11.76
Ministry of Defense	1	[78]	3	3.84	1294	6	0.46	1300	6	0.46
Ministry of Education	—		—	—	382	—	—	417	4	0.95
Ministry of Agriculture	1	[46]	3	6.50	391	5	1.27	391	11	2.81
Ministry of Post & Telegraph	3	[97]	2	2.06	441	7	1.58	305	7	2.29
Ministry of Railways	—	[222]	3	1.35	689	5	0.72	1006	9	0.89
Ministry of Public Works	—		—	—	464	—	—	862	4	0.46
Ministry of Industry	—	[70]	3	4.3	322	1	0.31	322	1	0.31
Ministry of Social Affairs	—		—	—	397	2	0.50	397	4	1.01
Ministry of Health	—	[30]	3	10.0	182	3	1.65	182	6	3.29
Ministry of Finance	1	[447]	4	0.89	630	8	1.26	630	12	1.90
Supreme Court/Admin. Court	1	[95]	3	3.15	303	3	0.99	305	16	5.25
Supreme Control Commiss.	—		—	—	163	—	—	180	—	—
Statistical Bureau	—	[719]	8	1.11	781	8	1.03	781	7	0.90
Postal Bank	1	N/A	N/A		2102	17	0.80	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other <sup>194</sup>	2	[69]	3	4.34						
Total	16		74		10825	123	1.13	9377	153	1.63

Sources: **1930 figures:** *Slovák* no. 140, 22.6.1930:3. **1934 figures:** Rychlík: *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století* (1997:319–21). **1936 figures:** Čulen: *Češi a Slováci v státních službách ČSR*, (1994:83). **1938 figures:** *ibid.* (N/A = not given).

<sup>193</sup> See *Slovák* no. 140, 22.6.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 219, 26.9.1930:1, *Slovák* no. 256, 12.11.1930:3, *Slovák* no. 94, 26.4.1931:9 (*Ohlas*), *Slovák* no. 142, 26.6.1931:1, *Slovák* no. 77, 2.4.1933 (*Ohlas*). See also the 1935 demands in Mikuš (1995:210).

<sup>194</sup> The "other" category of 1930 includes the ministry of supply, the patent office, (no Slovaks), the social security office (1) and the curative fond for state employees (1). The "other" category of 1934 comprises the State Land Bureau.

The 1930 and the 1936 figures were most likely compiled by the Ľudáks, since they were first published in *Slovák*. Seen in isolation, their reliability seems dubious.<sup>195</sup> Čulen noted that he based his detailed figures for the various units on "administrative information from January 1938", but he did not supply the source, so the accuracy cannot be confirmed.<sup>196</sup> The 1934 figures are based on a report from the Office of the Prime Minister to the Office of the President, printed as an appendix in Rychlík's book. The report gives the number of Slovaks among various categories of employees within each unit, and the percentage of Slovaks within that category. It does not give totals, and categories with no Slovaks are omitted. Because of this, the percentages are in general too high, and the estimated totals are not comparable with the other totals. I have therefore put the totals in brackets. This report is certainly an official source, and all the more interesting because it is stamped "not for publication." The Office of the Prime Minister was probably well aware of what the Slovak reactions would be.

If we disregard the Postal Bank, the Parliament and the Office of the President, the comparable figures are respectively 14 Slovaks in 1930, 74 Slovaks in 1934, 103 Slovaks in 1936 and 149 Slovaks in 1938. There are no large discrepancies between the figures, but the number of Slovaks employed in the state administration was increasing, which seems reasonable. The fact that the Ľudák figures and the figures of Čulen correspond roughly with the report from 1934 lends credibility also to these figures. Moreover, in a recent article, Valerián Bystrický gives similar figures based on data from the central state archive in Prague: "In November 1934, there were only 74 Slovaks working in the central organs, and in 1935 only 95 Slovaks. This figure increased to 125 by January 1st, 1936, while, according to a very detailed study of all Slovak employees in the state service in Bohemia and Moravia, there were 375."<sup>197</sup> The latter figure probably comprises also other state organs than those listed in Table 26.

There cannot have been many Slovaks in the central administration in 1930. According to the census, 6307 of the 44,451 Slovaks in the Czech lands were employed in public service, liberal professions and the military. If we subtract the military (5,472), we get 835 Slovaks, of these 507 in Bohemia. Forty-nine were "independent" – probably members of the liberal professions. This leaves us with 458 Slovaks. Of these, 175 were officials (*úradníci*), 203 were attendants (*zriadenci*), 79 were workers (*robotníci*), and one was an apprentice (*učňovia*).<sup>198</sup> It is quite likely that many of the 458 had jobs in the municipal or regional

<sup>195</sup> It cannot be ruled out that the Ľudáks only counted party members, as Johnson (1985:299) suggests.

<sup>196</sup> (Údaje, ktoré tu publikujeme, sú úradné údaje z januára 1938). Čulen (1994:89).

<sup>197</sup> (v novembri 1934 pracovalo v ústredných orgánoch len 74 a v roku 1935 len 95 Slovákov. Tento stav sa zvýšil k 1.1.1936 na 125, pričom podľa veľmi podrobného prieskumu všetkých Slovákov zamestnaných v štátnych službách v Čechách a na Morave bolo 375). Valerián Bystrický: Vysťahovanie českých štátnych zamestnancov zo Slovenska v rokoch 1938–1939, in: *Historický časopis*, 4, (1997:599–600). He found the information in Státní ústřední archiv in Prague, fond Předsednictvo ministerskej rady, kartón 3868.

<sup>198</sup> The 44,451 Slovaks in the Czech lands were distributed thus: 13,041 (29.3 percent) in agriculture (of these 12,155 agricultural workers); 9,587 (21.6 percent) in industry and business (of these 5,499 workers); 3,836 (8.6 percent) in commerce, finance and transport; and 6,307 (14.2 percent), in public service, liberal professions and the military. Of the 5,472 in the military, all but 160 were privates. 350 were domestic servants. The "other" category comprises 2,279 persons, of these 1,658 students. See Pavel Horváth: Slováci v Českých zemích, in: *Statistický obzor* (1938:223–24).

administration, since positions in the central government often required a level of education and experience that the Slovaks did not start to achieve until the 1930s. The low number of Slovaks in the central administration was probably the effect of the lack of qualifications more than discrimination. In addition, Johnson is probably right in arguing that the Slovak intelligentsia showed practically no interest for such jobs in the 1920s.<sup>199</sup> In the 1930s, there were not many vacancies, and the government could not start firing Czechs to hire Slovaks.

### ***Who was contributing to whom?***

Finally, there is the question of what Slovakia received in terms of state orders, state investments and state expenditures compared to her contribution to state revenues. The general complaint was that Slovakia was not getting her share. Also in this area lack of information played an important part. Czechoslovakia was a unitary state, and the state budgets as well as the financial statements were thus organized according to unit rather than region. After the regional reform was implemented in 1928, information on the *revenue* and the expenditures of the Slovak *krajina* was given, but Slovakia's total share of the state *expenditures* cannot be read out of the state budgets or financial statements even after 1928.

Information on the tax revenue from the various regions was given from the beginning. There is no doubt that Slovakia's contribution was lower than her share of the population, which is not surprising. It also seems certain that Slovakia's contribution sank in the course of the economic crisis, although my sources disagree about the exact contribution. I have comparable figures only for the period 1918–33. In 1918 and 1919, Slovakia's contribution was close to non-existent (less than one percent), because she was not yet consolidated politically. For the other years, the development was as follows:<sup>200</sup>

1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
8.4	9.6	9.6	9.3	11.1	9.4	10.6	11.5	12.1	11.4	11.7	11.7	10.6	10.3

According to a different statistical overview, Slovakia's contribution for 1930 was about the same in million crowns (1,236 compared to 1,234), but the percentage figure for tax returns becomes larger because the total is lower. The trend is the same in both cases: Slovakia's share is reduced over the crisis years. According to this source, the percentages were:<sup>201</sup>

1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
13.1	13.3	12.2	11.9	11.4	11.7	11.2	10.7

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<sup>199</sup> Johnson (1985:299–301).

<sup>200</sup> *Statistická příručka republiky československé* (1932:428–29) gives information for the years 1918–30. Pavel Horváth: *Príručka hospodárskej štatistiky Slovenska* (1935:135) gives information for the years 1929–33. The figures for 1929 and 1930 are identical in the two cases, and the figures should thus be comparable. Karvaš (1933:111) presents almost identical figures for 1922, 1924, 1926, 1928 and 1929.

<sup>201</sup> *Statistická ročenka protektorátu Čechy a Morava* (1941:277).

According to Půlpán, a taxpayer in the Czech lands paid on average 550 Czechoslovak crowns in taxes, while a taxpayer in Slovakia paid on average 198 crowns. Slovakia contributed 12 percent of the revenue, but got 20 percent of the expenditures. Půlpán does not say what period this average covers.<sup>202</sup>

I will first discuss the matter of state orders and investments, of which the former was the most burning issue. How large Slovakia's share was is not certain, but the highest estimate from the mid-1920s gave Slovakia a share of 6 percent of state orders, while other estimates indicate 4 or 5 percent. Obviously, this share was nowhere close to Slovakia's share of the tax revenue, let alone her share of the population. If the estimate of 5–6 percent is correct, Slovakia's share of state orders in the 1920s was even lower than her share of Czechoslovakia's industry (around 8.5 percent). A side effect of this was that Slovakia did not profit fully from the state investments.<sup>203</sup>

According to the national economist Imrich Karvaš, state orders were of vital interest to the weak Slovak industry, part of which could survive only because of them. In 1923, the government partly recognized the arguments of Slovak industrial circles by granting firms from Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia a price benefit. Their bids could, however, not be more than 5 percent higher than the cheapest bid, and had to be satisfactory otherwise. Lack of data does not permit any precise evaluation of the effect of this, but it does not seem likely that the price benefit outweighed the competitive disadvantage caused by higher railway tariffs.

In the 1928 budget debate, Martin Mičura pointed out that the domestic market had become more important for industry, and that the state and other public corporations were an important part of this. In the interest of the Slovak workers (not the owners, who were still largely foreign) central organs must mend their ways and their attitudes towards bids from Slovakia. Mičura demanded that Slovak industry get 15 percent of state orders, corresponding to her share of the tax revenue. He also demanded that the 5 percent price benefit be extended to state orders in the Czech lands. He renewed his complaint in the 1930 budget debate. In 1934, he demanded that the 5 percent price benefit for Slovakia be continued, and that statistics showing Slovakia's share be published. Both demands were repeated in 1937.<sup>204</sup>

While Mičura paid special attention to the matter of state orders, the Ľudáks and Martin Rázus also demanded that Slovakia get her share of investments. In the 1928 budget debate, Hancko demanded that Slovakia get her share of the investments in all areas, while Polyák in addition demanded that the budget be implemented. A significant part of the budgeted investments were not used, he argued, and presented several examples.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> See Půlpán (1993:149).

<sup>203</sup> See Karvaš (1933:108–13).

<sup>204</sup> Mičura, 106. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. listopadu 1927 (p. 57), 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 27), 349. schůze ... dne 28. listopadu 1934 (p. 74), 118. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1937 (p. 61), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>205</sup> Hancko, 109. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1927 (p. 90), and Polyák, 112. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1927 (pp. 63–65), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

In 1929, Hlinka invoked *Slovenský Denník*, stating that Slovakia's share of state orders linked to investments was only 4 percent, and demanded quotas for the regions with respect to state orders. In the 1930 budget debate, Martin Rázus raised the question of a just distribution of state orders as well as state investments, and argued that this would benefit the state and the Slovak *krajina* as well, through increased tax revenue. He also argued that Czech industry would benefit from investments in Slovakia, because it needed the Slovak market. Milan Ivanka went even further and argued that Slovakia needed "relatively more investments than the historical lands", or in other words more than her share, because in his view a national and political Czechoslovak unity was possible only through economic unity and equality.<sup>206</sup> There is a clear difference between the lines of argument here. Although all wanted more money for Slovakia, Hlinka and Rázus used a grievance argumentation on behalf of the Slovaks, while Ivanka invoked the effect on Czechoslovak unity as an argument.

When the regional (*země*) reform was implemented in 1928, it became possible to compare the budgets of the various units. Even in 1929, *Slovák* complained that Slovakia was being deprived, compared to her share of tax revenues. The paper presented detailed statistics to this effect. According to the financial statement of 1930, however, Slovakia's share of the total expenditures under the jurisdiction of the regions was 157 million or 15.7 percent, thus approximating what *Slovák* presented as Slovakia's share of the revenue. In 1930 the complaint was that Slovakia was not getting her share of the school budget.<sup>207</sup>

I have found three exchanges in the Parliament concerning the matter of who was subsidizing whom in a more general sense. In the 1924 budget debate there was a brief exchange only, while in 1934 several people had comments. The last exchange was in the budget debate of 1938. Before Christmas in 1923 the issue was raised by the former (and later) Minister of Finance, Karel Engliš, who claimed that "we gave billions" to Slovakia. He added that he only said that to maintain unity, not because he was counting the money. The Ľudák Marek Gažík replied that the Czechs were not paying for the Slovaks, but for their own people, whom they had "assembled from the whole world and settled in Slovakia as in a colony."<sup>208</sup>

The exchange in the 1934 budget debate was also initiated by the Czech side. The speakers all referred to a speech by Prime Minister Jan Malypetr a month before. Malypetr said that he had asked the Supreme Control Commission to find the truth about Slovakia's share of state revenue and expenditures by going through the financial statements for the years 1919–32 and disaggregating the sums by region. He realized that this was a complicated task, and at present only the following information was available, he said:

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<sup>206</sup> Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1929 (pp. 58–59), Rázus, 20. schůze ... dne 20. února 1930 (pp. 31–34), Ivanka, 21. schůze ... dne 21. února 1930 (p. 36), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>207</sup> *Slovák* no. 280, 10.12.1929:3, *Slovák* no. 114, 20.5.1930:4, *Slovák* no. 119, 25.5.1930:3, Horváth (1935:176).

<sup>208</sup> (že jsme tam miliardy dali). Engliš, 229. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 369). (kterých sohnali z celého světa a osadili na Slovensku ako na kolóniu). Gažík, 231. schůze ... dne 26. listopadu 1923 (p. 593), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

"For the administrative and executive organs functioning in the various regions, stipulated expenditures for the years 1919 to 1932 were 61,793,040,104 Czechoslovak crowns. Conversely, 99,316,652,776 Czechoslovak crowns were registered in these organs as actual payment on state revenue. Of the stipulated expenditures 15,647,581,084 Czechoslovak crowns were allotted to Slovakia, and 46,145,459,020 Czechoslovak crowns to the other regions. Of the registered revenue payments 14,015,392,549 Czechoslovak crowns came from Slovakia and 85,301,260,227 Czechoslovak crowns came from the other regions."

Malypetr continued: "It follows from these data that not only was no revenue paid in Slovakia used to cover shared expenses (the president of the republic, legislative organs, central administration, the army, state debt etc.), but this revenue was not even sufficient to pay for the expenditures stipulated for the administrative and executive organs functioning in Slovakia, i.e. expenditures spent in Slovakia. If the data above are judged according to the share of the population in Slovakia compared to the total, this can be observed: The proportion of the population in Slovakia of the total population is around 1:3.5. However, the ratio between the stipulated expenditure in Slovakia, 15.647.581.084 Czechoslovak crowns, and the stipulated expenditures in the other regions, 46.145.459.020 Czechoslovak crowns, is roughly 1:3. In terms of revenue, the difference is absolutely striking: In Slovakia 14.015.392.549 Czechoslovak crowns came in, in the other lands 85.301.260.227 Czechoslovak crowns.

The ratio between the revenue from Slovakia and the revenue from the other regions is thus only around 1:6." From these figures Malypetr concluded that "the state administration was never a [wicked] stepmother to Slovakia."<sup>209</sup>

The motive for giving this information was obviously to meet the grievance argumentation of the autonomists, but also to show that Prague centralism was an advantage for Slovakia financially. According to Malypetr's figures, Slovakia received 25.3 percent of the expenditures and but contributed only 14.1 percent of the revenue in the period 1919–32. Malypetr made it quite clear that his aim was to block the struggle for Slovak autonomy by spelling out the inadequate financial basis for a broad autonomy. The underlying threat was obvious: If the autonomists were to succeed, the Czech lands would no longer subsidize Slovakia.

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<sup>209</sup> (U správních a výkonných úřadů působících v jednotlivých zemích za rok 1919 až 1932 předepsáno na výdajích 61.793.040.104 Kč, naproti tomu bylo jako skutečná platba u těchto úřadů na státních příjmech vyúčtováno 99.316.652.776 Kč. Z těchto předepsaných výdajů připadá: na Slovensko 15.647.581.084 Kč, na ostatní země 46.145.459.020 Kč. Z vyúčtovaných příjmových plateb připadá na Slovensko 14.015.392.549 Kč, na ostatní země 85.301.260.227 Kč. Z těchto dat vyplývá, že z příjmů na Slovensku zaplacených nejen nebylo nic použito na krytí výdajů společných (prezident republiky, zákonodárné sbory, ústřední úřady, vojsko, státní dluh atd.) nýbrž že příjmy tyto nestačily ani k hrazení výdajů předepsaných pouze u správních a výkonných úřadů na Slovensku působících, tedy výdajů na Slovensku spotřebovaných. Posuzují-li se hořejší data s hlediska kvoty obyvatelstva na Slovensku k celkovému počtu obyvatelstva, lze podotknouti toto: Poměr počtu obyvatelstva na Slovensku k celkovému počtu obyvatelstva jest přibližně jako 1:3 ½. Předepsané výdaje na Slovensku 15.647.581.084 Kč mají se však k předepsaným výdajům v ostatních zemích 46.145.459.020 Kč zhruba jen jako 1:3. U příjmů je rozdíl přímo nápadný; na Slovensku přijato 14.015.392.549 Kč, v ostatních zemích 85.301.260.227 Kč, tedy mají se tyto příjmy ze Slovenska ku příjmům z ostatních zemí zhruba jen jako 1:6. (nebyla státní správa Slovensku nikdy macechou). Malypetr, 296. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1933 (pp. 55, 56), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...



In the budget debate Martin Rázus pointed out that, according to Malypetr's figures, Slovakia had a deficit of 1,632,188,535 Czechoslovak crowns between 1919 and 1932, which meant that she was not self-sufficient. Since the "Prime Minister's speech had been posted all over Slovakia" in order to stop the criticism of the Slovak national opposition, he felt obliged to respond. As the first autonomist speaker, Rázus formed a model for how the challenge was met. First, he doubted the accuracy of the figures – a classic ploy when confronted with inconvenient facts – and asked for more details. Second, he tried to explain (away) why Slovakia had a deficit, blaming it in part on the government. Third, he argued that the Slovak deficit only showed the results of an economic policy that did not serve Slovakia. In order to make Slovakia self-sufficient, he argued, it was necessary to invest large sums of money.

Pursuing the second strategy, Rázus used a speech by Milan Hodža (Minister of Agriculture at the time) as his point of departure. First, Slovakia had a higher interest rate than the Czech lands (equaling around 200 million a year). Second, she lost around 500 million a year on state orders. Third, the high railway tariffs lead to losses of around 100 million a year. Finally, large banks and industrial companies which had their main offices in the historical lands were taxed there, even though they had branches in Slovakia (equaling several 100 million). According to Rázus, Hodža had claimed that the incomes which provided the basis of Slovak revenue were reduced by at least a billion a year because of all this. Rázus added some elements of his own, including more rigorous taxation of property in Slovakia and the transfer of factories to the Czech lands, and argued that Hodža's estimate was too low. As a minimum, Rázus claimed, the Slovak revenue basis was reduced by 14 billion in 14 years – and, compared to this, the 1,632,188,535 Czechoslovak crowns that had been paid for Slovakia was not a large sum. Besides, he argued, investments in railways in Slovakia were to the benefit of the whole republic, and the Czechs in Slovakia should not be added to Slovakia's bill. All in all, he concluded, "Prague is not paying a penny for Slovakia!"<sup>210</sup>

Jozef Tiso thanked the Prime Minister for presenting a rough Slovak budget, even if it showed a deficit. Repeating that the Czechs were paying for their own people in Slovakia, he argued that because of the strong centralism, large incomes and tax revenues had become artificially concentrated in Prague. Tiso's main strategy was, however, to cast doubts on the accuracy of Malypetr's figures. Where Rázus merely asked for more detailed data, Tiso claimed that the figures were not comparable. He accused Malypetr of taking the expenditure figures from the budget and the revenue figures from the financial statement, and argued that there was "an enormous difference between the budgeted expenditures and the real expenditures" in Slovakia, meaning that the whole budget had not been spent. He then presented some examples, mostly concerning investments and state orders. Finally, he asked for a detailed, separate budget for Slovakia, "so that we can know where to save" to avoid a deficit.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> (bola premiérova reč po celom Slovensku i plakátovaná). (Praha na Slovensko nedopláca ani jedného halliera!) Rázus, 301. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1933 (pp. 27, 28), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... See also Slovák no. 217, 29.12.1933:2.

<sup>211</sup> (je ohromny rozdiel medzi preliminovanými výdavky a skutočnými výdavky vynaloženými na Slovensku). (aby sme vedeli, kde nám treba šetriť). Tiso, 301. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1933 (pp. 48, 49), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

If Tiso had been right about the comparability of the figures, the effect on Slovakia's deficit would in fact have been the *opposite*. In the period 1919–32, the financial statements showed a total expenditure that was 12.4 billion *higher* than the budget, while the revenue was 12.5 billion higher. Real expenditure was lower than budgeted expenditure in two years only – 1919 and 1923 (see Appendix E). It is not likely that real expenditures in *Slovakia* were substantially lower than the budget, when the total was so much higher. Moreover, if Tiso was right, Malypetr's revenue figures for Slovakia would be artificially high compared to her share of (budget) expenditures, since real revenue was much higher than budgeted revenue in the period as a whole. This means that *if* Tiso were right, Slovakia's deficit would have been even larger than Malypetr's figures showed. There is, however, no reason to believe that he was correct, since Malypetr had stated that the figures were based on the financial statements.

Ján Liška (ČSŽ) accepted the figures, but pointed to the explanations of Hodža and Rázus for the low revenue from Slovakia. He was glad that the Prime Minister had presented the figures, and was sure they would liquidate all doubts among the public. Štefan Polyák argued along the same lines as Rázus and Tiso. The last Slovak deputy to speak, Milan Ivanka, repeated his view from the 1930 budget debate that Slovakia should get help according to her need, not according to her share of the revenue, but even he doubted that the deficit was real.<sup>212</sup>

As for the Czech deputies, only three commented on Malypetr's figures. Jiří Stříbrný was the first to raise the issue. He argued that Czechs must find a way to friendly co-existence and full understanding with their Slovak brothers, and added that "if it is true that we are paying for brotherly Slovakia [...] the more tragic it is to receive neither love nor understanding there, and the greater is the inadequacy of our policy."<sup>213</sup> Ferdinand Richter (ČS) was not convinced by Rázus, and stated that "I strongly believe what Prime Minister Malypetr has told us, that nobody can complain that Slovakia has been in any way discriminated against during the republic. The deputies from Slovakia complain a lot about the difficult economic and social conditions in Slovakia. I declare that the conditions are equally bad here, or even worse", he said. Jaromír Špaček (ČND) regarded Slovakia as an indivisible part of the state, and as such she had the same right to everything as the other parts of the shared homeland. He argued that the historical lands would have to transfer considerable sums to Slovakia in order to make up for 1000 years of Magyar oppression, and thought it was beyond doubt that Slovakia did have a deficit, in spite of all "artificial" statistics that were presented to the contrary.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Ravasz, 302. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1933 (p. 7), Liška, 303. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1933 (p. 19), Polyák, 304. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1933 (pp. 4–6), Ivanka, 305. schůze ... dne 4. prosince 1933 (p. 37) in: *Těsnoipsecké zprávy*...

<sup>213</sup> (Je-li pravda, že na Slovensko bratrský doplácíme [...] tím tragičtější je doplaceti a nezískati tam ani lásku ani porozumění, tím větší je neschopnost naší politiky). Stříbrný, 301. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1933 (p. 17), in: *Těsnoipsecké zprávy*...

<sup>214</sup> (pevně věřím tomu, co říkal náš p. min. předseda Malypetr, že si nikdo nemůže stěžovati, že by za republiky bylo Slovensko nějakým způsobem odstrkáváno. Pánové ze Slovenska si hodně stěžují na těžké poměry hospodářské i sociální na Slovensku. Prohlašuji, že u nás jsou poměry stejně zlé, ba horší). Richter, 301. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1933 (p. 61), and Špaček, 302. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1933 (p. 23), in: *Těsnoipsecké zprávy*...

In the budget debate two years later, the Ľudák Martin Sokol repeated that Malypetr's figures had not been convincing, and asked again for more detailed statistics. He argued that "if the Czechs really paid for Slovakia, they would have proven it to us long ago. But even if it were true [...] the cause of this is not the non-viability of Slovakia, but the present centralist system, which does not give Slovakia the same as the other regions of the republic." He added that no good Slovak would claim that Slovakia had gained nothing, but the question was whether "we have gained all we should and would have gained in our own state, if we always and in everything were measured by a just standard."<sup>215</sup>

Finally, Tiso claimed in the 1938 budget debate that Slovakia's share of budget expenditures was proportional neither to her contribution to the revenue nor to her political importance: "This budget is another gift from Slovakia to the historical lands", he claimed. This is also the only debate I have seen where the budget claims of the Ľudáks went beyond mere equality. Tiso argued that Slovakia should not get "crumbs of mercy", but an automatic quota corresponding to her share of the revenue. The only way to get this was on the basis of autonomy, he argued. Ján Ursíny (Agr.) repeated that the Czechs were not paying for Slovakia.<sup>216</sup> Ivan Markovič (ČSD) reacted strongly to Tiso's claims, and argued that Czechoslovak interests and the interests of the whole state should guide economic policy, not the interests of its various parts. The state should give more to the parts where it was most needed, and take more from the richest sources. "For Slovakia it would be absolutely fatal if we were to accept the solution of deputy Tiso, that Slovakia should get exactly as much – and that would in reality mean only as much – as she contributed", he argued.<sup>217</sup>

What was the reality behind this controversy? It seems clear that Slovakia was deprived in terms of state orders, and possibly also in terms of some types of investments in the 1920s, like amelioration, water supply and drainage. Especially in the latter part of the 1930s, Slovakia got much more than her share of railway investments, because she needed them most. Likewise, it is beyond any reasonable doubt that Slovakia was at the receiving end in terms of her share of the total state expenditures, compared to her share of the revenue. Whether the share of the expenditures received by Slovakia was proportional her share of the population is not equally clear. According to Malypetr's figures, Slovakia received slightly more than her share (25.3 percent), according to Půlpán's figures she received slightly less (20 percent).

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<sup>215</sup> (keby Česi na Slovensko skutočne doplácali, boli by nám to dávno už i dokázali. Ale i keby to bola pravda, [...] príčinu toho nie je životaneschopnosť Slovenska, ale dnešný centralistický systém, ktorý nežičí Slovensku tak, ako ostatným krajinám republiky). (či sme získali v svojom štáte všetko to, čo sme získať mali a mohli vtedy, keby sa nám vždy a vo všetkom bolo meralo mierou spravедливou). Sokol, 17. schůze ... dne 6. prosince 1935 (p. 49), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>216</sup> (tento rozpočet je ďalším darom Slovenska historických zemí). (Nie odrobinky z milosti). Tiso, 117. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1937 (pp. 42, 43), and Ursíny, 118. schůze ... dne 1. prosince 1937 (p. 39) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>217</sup> (Bolo by však pre Slovensko priamo osudným, keby sme mali prijať devízu pána posl. Tisu, že Slovensko [...] má dostávať práve toľko – a to v skutočnosti by znamenalo: len toľko – koľko do nich prispieva). Markovič, 122. schůze ... dne 4. prosince 1937 (p. 8), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

### ***Summary and conclusion***

Part of the heritage of the Habsburg Empire was similar on both sides of the Czecho–Slovak divide: The Czech lands and Slovakia were economic peripheries, depending respectively on Vienna and Budapest for capital. The infrastructure of both parts of the country was oriented towards the center of the old empire, i.e. southwards, while the east–west connections were weak. Finally, industry was dependent on the domestic Austrian-Hungarian market in order to sell their products. However, all of the above was true of Slovakia to a greater extent than the Czech lands. The domestic Slovak capital base was far weaker than the Czech; almost non-existent before 1918. Slovak infrastructure was weaker than Czech and it was even more north–south bound. And Slovak industry was even more dependent on the Hungarian market than Czech industry was on the Austrian. The heritage that proved most fatal, however, was the developmental gap between the Czech lands and Slovakia – in terms of industrialization, urbanization, standard of living, and labor efficiency in agriculture. Overpopulation was a problem in the rather old-fashioned Slovak agriculture already before the war.

Four economic challenges faced the new Czechoslovak state in 1918. First, Czechoslovak economy had to be disentangled from the economy of the other successor states of Austria-Hungary. This task included reducing the importance of Vienna and Budapest as economic centers and strengthening Czech and Slovak ownership in industry, commerce, banking and agriculture. Second, the state needed money and personnel to staff and run the new state administration. Third, the various parts of the new state had to be integrated into one market, legally and in terms of infrastructure. Finally, economic restructuring was necessary, and the most pressing need was to find new market outlets and supplies for Czech and Slovak industry to replace the former Austrian-Hungarian system.

How did the government cope with these challenges, and how did this affect Czecho–Slovak relations? First, the obvious should be stated: The economic heritage of the Habsburg Empire was, in combination with the economic crisis, much more important for the overall economic situation in Slovakia (and the rest of the country) than government policies. Second, to the extent the government did something "wrong" with respect to Slovakia, these were sins of omission rather than acts of deliberate discrimination. The government lacked a consistent policy designed to bridge the developmental gap between the eastern and the western parts of the state. In order to remove Slovakia's disadvantages in the competition with the more developed Czech economy it would have been necessary to invest more in Slovakia at an earlier stage, especially in infrastructure, but probably also directly in industrialization. The liberal economic policy in the 1920s was problematic, because such policies could only serve to cement or increase existing regional economic differences.

Part of the reason why Slovakia did not receive proper attention was that, especially in the beginning, other economic concerns were more pressing. There can be no doubt that gaining economic freedom from the former Austrian and Hungarian economic centers and ensuring Czech ownership through domestication were top priorities at the time. Money that could have been invested in industry or used to improve infrastructure was instead used to

strengthen the Czechoslovak crown, thereby facilitating the "domestication" process, which again enabled Czech capital to win economic hegemony also in Slovakia. This policy obviously served Czech interests more than Slovak, but this may not have been intentional.

In a situation with shortage of capital, industry in Slovakia was more vulnerable because of the weak domestic capital base, especially after Czechs started withdrawing during the economic crisis of 1921–23. Because of the war with Hungary and the strained political relationship between the two states resulting from this, a trade agreement was not concluded until 1927, and the domestication process was delayed. Combined with the shortage of capital, this also delayed the restructuring process in Slovakia, and as a result, some firms were closed down and others transferred to Hungary. Slovakia thus faced de-industrialization at a time when the converse was desperately needed.

Slovakia was harder hit by the economic crisis of 1921–23 than the Czech lands mainly because Slovak industry had lost more of its former markets and was also losing against the more developed Czech industry in the competition on the domestic Czechoslovak market. In addition, limited credit supplies, weak infrastructure and higher freight rates worked against Slovakia in this competition. As we have seen, almost nothing was done in the early 1920s to alleviate the problems by building railways and roads, or by supporting Slovak industrialization. The unification of laws dragged on, taxes were not evened out, and the railway tariffs remained higher than in the Czech lands until 1932.

Not only was the economic crisis of 1921–23 deeper in Slovakia, there was also lower growth in the late 1920s. As a result, industrial production barely reached pre-war level before the next crisis set in (in 1929–30), five years after the Czech lands, and the percentage of the population employed in agriculture was not substantially lower than in 1921. Slovakia thus entered the world economic crisis of the 1930s with an overpopulation in the agricultural sector that could only grow worse as unemployed industrial and agricultural workers returned to their home villages, and emigration no longer provided an outlet. No wonder "Slovak bread to the Slovaks" became a slogan with strong appeal.

When I first started to study the inter-war period, I was looking for causes of the (relative) success of the Slovak nationalist movement in economic deprivation. I expected to find that the economic crisis was deeper in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, and that the unemployment rate was higher. I was thus surprised to find that *registered* unemployment was substantially lower in Slovakia than in the Czech lands most of the time. As we have seen, the registered unemployment in Slovakia was probably artificially low, not least because employment agencies were fewer and more scattered in Slovakia. This situation was remedied in the 1930s. Another reason was that a large portion of the unemployed in Slovakia were seasonal workers who did not qualify for unemployment benefit and did not have any hope of finding employment during the winter, and thus often did not bother to register. The seasonal variations in unemployment were also larger in Slovakia for the same reason. Even if we accept the highest known unemployment figures, however, Slovakia was still not worse off than Moravia, and only slightly worse off than Bohemia in the worst crisis years.

On the other hand, unemployment may not be a very good measure of relative misery. Even though the industrial crisis of the 1930s was somewhat milder and developed more slowly in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, the road to misery was shorter because of the overpopulation in the agriculture and the lower general income level. The economic situation was thus probably no less serious. This is also reflected in the fact that Slovakia's share of state revenues sank during the crisis, and it was already much lower than her share of the population. This also indicates that the developmental gap between the eastern and the western part of Czechoslovakia was not being closed – rather the contrary.

Yet, because all official unemployment figures showed that the situation in Slovakia was less severe than in the Czech lands, the Slovak autonomists were in a defensive position. While unemployment was a highly politicized issue in the German case, the possibility of using the economic crisis in nationalist argumentation was more limited in the Slovak case. Most of the argumentation around unemployment actually concerned the accuracy of official figures.

The slogan "Slovak bread to the Slovaks" was a typical example of the transformation of the material interests of concrete classes and groups into national interests. In this case, the concrete group was the Slovak intelligentsia, since the slogan generally concerned jobs for the Slovak intelligentsia or railway/postal employees. The demand concerned the young generation more than the old, and since the young represent the future of any nation, their interests could be (and were) equated with the interests of the nation.

It seems that Slovakia's needs became a more important concern towards the end of the 1920s than they had been in the early 1920s. In the late 1920s and the 1930s laws and tariffs were unified, but most important was the increased construction of railways and roads. Slovakia did get the lion's share of the large investments in infrastructure. I have argued in this chapter that it is doubtful whether the government was at liberty economically to invest more in Slovakia at an earlier stage. On the other hand, there is a certain paradox in the fact that more was actually done in the 1930s than in the 1920s, at a time when the state finances were in a much worse shape. The increased attention Slovakia received in the 1930s may be seen as a response to the many Slovak complaints and demands in the Parliament and elsewhere. However, the investment wave in the latter half of the 1930s can also be explained in terms of the defense needs of the Czechoslovak state at a turbulent time.

If we turn to the most common economic complaints/demands, one distinction springs to mind. On the one hand, demands were presented on behalf of Slovakia, where members of the Czechoslovakist parties were as active as, sometimes even more active than, the members of Slovak autonomist parties (the Ľudáks and the Slovak National Party). These were demands of a spatial or regional character. The most important such demands involved infrastructure and unification of laws, especially the construction of railways and roads and equalization of railway tariffs. It did take time, but most of the spatially oriented complaints were alleviated, especially if all Slovaks joined forces in the Parliament, as in the case of the tariff question. The matter of state orders for Slovak industry may have been an exception, but in this case Slovakia did actually receive preferential treatment.

On the other hand, demands were presented on behalf of the Slovaks. These were nationally relevant conflicts of a more typical kind. The main demand in this category was of course the demand embedded in the slogan "Slovakia to the Slovaks", which in practice concerned public employment for the Slovak intelligentsia. In addition, there were complaints that Czech colonists were getting agricultural land to which Slovak peasants were entitled. The demands that jobs in Slovakia should be reserved for Slovaks were contrary to the government's employment policy based on merit, and were of course not met. The number of Czechs in Slovakia increased in absolute terms between 1921 and 1930, but the Czech share of public employment did not increase in relative terms, mainly because a large part of the increase was due to family members without an occupation of their own. If the number of public employees did not increase between 1930 and 1938, the share of Czechs in public employment remained stable also in the 1930s. If the information given by Johnson is correct, Dérer did meet Slovak demands to a certain extent by his "Slovaks first" hiring policy in the schools, although he was not at liberty to brag about it.

This distinction should, however, not be overemphasized. For the Ľudáks and Martin Rázus Slovakia and the Slovaks were in practice the same: Slovakia was the land of the Slovaks, the Slovak *krajina*; what served Slovakia, served the Slovaks. Their motives and line of argumentation were thus always associated explicitly or implicitly with the wellbeing of the Slovak nation, whether they filed demands on behalf of Slovakia or the Slovaks. For Slovaks of the Czechoslovakist brand, this was not the case. The way in which the two sides argued was strikingly different. Martin Mičura, for instance, would embark on a rather harsh volley of criticism by emphasizing that he was doing it out of love. And the reasons why Slovakia (or the Slovaks) should receive preferential treatment were not linked to the wellbeing of the Slovak nation, but to the wellbeing and unity of the Czechoslovak nation and state. From the Czechoslovakist side, it was often argued that Slovakia's problems had to be solved in order to ensure Czechoslovak integration. An implicit assumption here was that if the ammunition could be taken away from the autonomists, they would stand no chance of winning.

Finally, there is the question whether the complaints were primarily related to issues the government had control over. Here the answer is a surprisingly clear "yes." Apart from some of the early Ľudák complaints, all important issues were issues under the political purview of the government.

In short, the historical heritage and the economic crisis of the 1930s were together more important causes of national conflict issues than were government policies. Most Slovak grievances seemed to reflect a reality, although perception also played an important part, especially in the case of "Slovak bread" because of the lack of reliable information. The existence of nationally relevant conflicts of a socio-economic kind probably also served to strengthen Slovak national identity as opposed to Czech – or in practice Czechoslovak. In a way, the Slovak nation-forming process was thus completed as a result of the struggle against Czechoslovakism, where the Slovak autonomists used nationally relevant conflicts to mobilize people behind the Slovak national cause.

# *Thirteen*

## *Centralism against Slovak autonomism*

*Our aim is the wellbeing of the Slovak nation. If we saw that served in the existing centralist system, it would be an anomaly to demand autonomy. (...) The aim of the social endeavors of us Slovaks is the Slovak nation – the means are autonomy.*

**Editorial in *Slovák*, 1933<sup>1</sup>**

The preceding two chapters have shown that most Slovak cultural and economic demands concerned national equality. While demands for equality are generally related to the outcome of politics, demands for autonomy concern decision-making rules and distribution of political power, and are thus less related to nationally relevant conflicts – unless political rights are unevenly distributed according to nationality. Since Czechoslovakia was a democracy, Slovak complaints mainly concerned violations of existing rights.

The main focus of this chapter is, however, the admittedly highly unequal "tug-of-war" between Czechoslovak centralists and Slovak autonomists over the power distribution and political-administrative organization of the state. These matters were closely related, since a territorial homeland is a precondition for devolution of power. The political system established after 1918 was rather centralized, and Czechoslovakia was (in principle) carved up into 22 counties. The regional reform of 1927 reversed this, dividing the Czechoslovak republic into four regions: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. The Slovaks thus got their homeland, but the government coalition consistently rejected all autonomy proposals until after Munich.

The chapter seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What did the Slovak autonomists mean by autonomy? (2) How did the autonomy proposals relate to other national demands and to nationalism as ideology? (3) Why did the government accommodate the demand for a Slovak *krajina*, but not the demand for autonomy? The first question is addressed by comparing the three autonomy proposals of the Slovak People's Party, while the latter two questions are addressed through an analysis of the political debate.

For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to treat the debate about the political-administrative structure and power distribution as two separate topics. I will first present Slovak complaints concerning individual political rights, including representation. Second, the debates of the county and regional reforms in 1920 and 1927 will be compared. I then turn to the autonomy proposals, and finally I will present the main lines of argumentation on either side.

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<sup>1</sup> (naším cieľom je blaho slovenského národa. Keby sme ho videli zaistený v terajšom centralistickom systéme, požiadavka autonómie bola by anomaliou. [...] Cieľom spoločenských snažení nás Slovákov je slovenský národ – prostredníctvom autonómie). *Slovák* no. 93, 34.4.1934:3.



## ***Civil rights***

In principle, all citizens were equal before the law.<sup>2</sup> The rights guaranteed by the Constitution were, however, limited by other laws, chiefly the 1923 Law of the Protection of the Republic. In practice some were thus more equal than others. What was by far the greatest blemish on Czechoslovak democracy was the practice of censorship. Compared to the other successor states of Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia remained fairly democratic throughout the period.

## ***The Law of the Protection of the Republic***

The Law of the Protection of the Republic was put into force in March 1923, immediately after the assassination of Finance Minister Alois Rašín, a fact that was used in the debate.<sup>3</sup> The law was motivated by a need to protect the independence, democratic-republican form of government, the unity of the state, and the work of the constitutional organs against "unfounded and dangerous attacks on the results of our liberating struggle and our state-forming activities" and "evident untruths, gross inflammatory statements and actions directed at harming the state."<sup>4</sup> It was bitterly opposed by the German and Magyar parties, the Communists, the Ľudáks and even the Small Traders' Party. In the debate Arnold Bobok described the law as "anti-Constitutional and anti-popular [...] the grave of democracy and the end of all civil freedoms."<sup>5</sup>

For our purposes, the most important part of the law was Section three. §14 made it illegal (1) to incite people against the state, its independence, Constitutional unity or democratic-republican form; (2) to instigate violence or other unfriendly action against particular groups because of their nationality, language, race or religion; (3) to instill hatred against particular groups for the same reasons; (4) to instigate violence or other unfriendly action against individuals because of their nationality, language, race or religion; and (5) to slander the republic, a nation or national minority publicly in such a gross or inflammatory way that it may reduce the respect of the republic or endanger its internal peace or international relations. An amendment of July 10th, 1933, also outlawed public slandering of the Parliament and its organs.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Joseph A. Mikuš: *Slovakia. A political and constitutional history (with documents)* (1995:170–198). Otherwise, see Zákon číslo 121. ze dne 29. února 1920, kterým se uvozuje ústavní listina československé republiky, in *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého*.

<sup>3</sup> See Kramář, 194. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 6. března 1923 (p. 2400) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé*.

<sup>4</sup> (zákon na ochranu republiky má ráz obrany proti neoprávněným útokům na výsledky našeho osvobozovacího zápasu a státotvorné naší činnosti). (zřejmých nepravd, surové štvavosti nebo činů, směřujících k poškození státu). The quotations are by Josef Patejdl (ČS) and Minister of interior Jan Malypetr, 194. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č dne 6. března 1923, p. 2399 (Patejdl), and p. 2368 (Malypetr) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>5</sup> (je hrobov demokracie a koncom všetkej občianskej slobody). Arnold Bobok (HSLŠ), 194. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č dne 6. března 1923 (p. 2379). See also Jaroslav Rouček (KSČ), 194. schůze ... dne 6. března 1923 (p. 2359), Ludwig Czech (DSA) (in Czech translation), 194. schůze ... dne 6. března 1923 (p. 2374), Rudolf Mlčoch (ČSŽ), 194. schůze ... dne 6. března 1923 (p. 2385), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>6</sup> See Zákon ze dne 19. března 1923 na ochranu republiky, číslo 50, and Zákon ze dne 10. července 1933, kterým se doplňuje zákon na ochranu republiky in: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého*.

Periodicals could be closed down, e.g. for breaking §14, point 1 and 2 above. In the amendment of 1933, §14 point 3 was added to the list. At the same time a new §34a was added, which gave the government right to expand the criteria for closing down periodicals and extending the period of closure. The reason given for the amendment was that the existing law was not "sufficient in the extraordinary times we are going through."<sup>7</sup> This was also basically the motivation for the ensuing wave of laws restricting civil rights, e.g. regulating "anti-state activities" of public employees, imposing further restrictions on the freedom of press, and legalizing the dissolution of parties.<sup>8</sup>

The law regulating the banning of political parties and suspension of their activities allowed the government to take such action in cases when the activities of political parties clearly threatened the independence, constitutional unity, integrity, democratic-republican form of government or security of the Czechoslovak republic.<sup>9</sup> Part of the motivation was of course that such a party did exist – the *Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei*. This party had been banned already on October 4th, 1933, because of irredentist activities, i.e. before the law was adopted. In addition, it was a clear signal to the Ľudáks to behave.

### ***The right to assembly and association***

I have registered 6 interpellations and one urgent question concerning the right to assembly in the entire period, of these only two in the 1930s. There were two interpellations in late February 1919, concerning the banning of all public meetings in Slovakia, respectively the banning of the meetings of the Slovak People's Party. According to a decree issued by the Minister of Slovakia, the program and location of all public gatherings must be reported to the *župan* a week in advance. This was a precaution against hostile Magyar propaganda.

The Ľudák meeting in question was banned "because it could be judged from posters and other indications that the adherents of the [Slovak] People's Party may attack the Czechoslovak republic and the Czechs, and that it thus might come to clashes between them and friends of the Czechoslovak republic. [...] In order to limit clashes and even possibly bloodshed, the Minister of Slovakia banned the holding of that meeting. Under these circumstances the ban is fully substantiated,"<sup>10</sup> Prime Minister Antonín Švehla concluded in his reply.

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<sup>7</sup> (prostředky, které tento zákon poskytuje, nevystačí se v mimořádné době, kterou prožíváme). See Tisk 2293 (government proposal), in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny, Národního shromáždění republiky československé*, Svazek XII (1933).

<sup>8</sup> See Tisk 2314 (government proposal) in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XII (1933); Tisk 2646 (government proposal) and Tisk 2686 (Constitutional-Judicial Committee), in Svazek XIV (1934).

<sup>9</sup> See Tisk 2355 (government proposal) and Tisk 2358 (Constitutional-Judicial Committee), in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIII (1933).

<sup>10</sup> (bylo toto zakázáno proto, že dle plakátovaného pozvání a jiných příznaků dalo se souditi, že stoupenci lidové strany by napadali Československou republiku a Čechy a by tak mezi nimi a přáteli Československé republiky mohlo dojít ku srážce. [...] Aby bylo zamezeno srážkám a po případě krveprolití, zakázal ministr pro Slovensko konání schůze této. Zákaz ten jest uvedenými okolnostmi plně odůvodněn). See Tisk 549 and 580 (interpellations) and Tisk 727 (answer), in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích Národního shromáždění československého*, Svazek II (1919).

In February 1920, the Ľudáks raised an urgent question regarding the ban on a meeting in Zemplín, and the violation of the immunity of the deputy Ján Kovalík. Švehla claimed that the meeting had been banned because the Ľudáks had failed to notify the *župan* as to the place, time and speakers, and that Kovalík had been released as soon as he had proven his identity.<sup>11</sup>

Kovalík insisted that the *župan* had been notified in time by telegraph. He asserted that his immunity had been violated, since he had been arrested although the gendarme knew who he was. His main concern was, however, to clean up what he called the "unhealthy, non-normal conditions" in Slovakia, and to "end the injustice." "If we want to build the republic, let us build it on freedom; let that 'liberté' be for everyone, also for the Slovak People's Party;" Kovalík argued. He assured the assembly of the Ľudáks' loyalty to the republic, and denied any association with Magyarones: "We are loyal subjects of the Czechoslovak state, we have nothing to do with renegades, we condemn Jehlička and all his kind. Who are against the republic, is against the Slovak People's Party." His last plea was to "give Slovakia what she needs; freedom, justice, the right of assembly, the right of association, and there will be peace. Let us work concertedly, let us be brothers and not enemies, for the Czechoslovak republic is not strong enough to indulge in the luxury of one fighting the other."<sup>12</sup>

The Slovak deputies of the Czechoslovakist brand obviously did not believe him. According to Karol Anton Medvecký, the Ľudaks assured the Parliament of their loyalty, "but among the people they instigate against the Czechs. The whole time their most loyal people incite the people against the Czechs, they ascribe all defects and shortages in Slovakia to the Czechs and thus contradict their former conclusions."<sup>13</sup> He thus accepted Švehla's report.

There were two interpellations concerning the freedom of assembly and association in the election period of 1920–25. In addition, the so-called "murders at Námestovo" were the object of one interpellation, and the raid against *Slovák* was the object of another. In the aftermath of a Ľudák meeting in Námestovo, where some 2000 people were gathered, Czechoslovak soldiers shot and killed two people and wounded five. According to reports, they were involved in name-calling before the incidence, charging the Ľudák speakers of being clericalists and Magyarones. In return, the crowd called the soldiers Austrians. The Námestovo incident was debated in the Parliament in December 1920. The Minister of Defense, General Otakar Husák, claimed that the deaths were accidental, since the soldiers had been shooting in the air. He also

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<sup>11</sup> Švehla 120. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 17. února 1920 (p. 3600), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>12</sup> (chcem prikročiť k uzdraveniu týchto nezdravých, nenormálnych pomerov). (aby bol koniec nesprávností). (My sme verní oddaní československého štátu, my nemáme s vlastizradcami nič, my odsudzujeme Jehličku a všetkých jeho druhov. Kdo je proti republike, je proti Slovenskej ľudovej strane. [...] Tedy chceme-li budovať republiku, budujme ju na základoch slobody; "liberté" nech je pre každého, i pre stranu ľudovú). (dajte Slovensku, čo mu je treba, slobodu, spravdnosť, právo shromážďovanie, právo organizovať sa a vtedy bude pokoj. Pracujme svorne, buďme si bratia a nebuďme si nepriatelia, lebo československá republika není tak silná, že by si mohla dovoliť ten luxus boja jedného s druhým). Kovalík, 120. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 17. února 1920 (pp. 3602, 3604, 3605), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>13</sup> (medzi ľudom ale štvú proti Čechom. Pri tom všetkom ich najvernejší ľudia štvú ľud proti Čechom, všetky chyby a nedostatky na Slovensku pripisujú Čechom a tým kontradiktujú svoje drevňajšie uzavretie). Karol A. Medvecký, 120. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 17. února (p. 3608), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

argued that this would not have happened if the people had not been artificially roused against the soldiers. Ľudevít Labaj, who was present at Námestovo and thus an eyewitness, claimed that the soldiers had at first been shooting in the air, but when people were leaving, shots were also fired into the crowd. He argued that they must have been aware that someone could get hit. In Labaj's view, the soldiers were thus responsible for the deaths.<sup>14</sup>

A Ľudák interpellation of May 1922 called attention to the raid undertaken against *Slovák*. Members of the Czechoslovak Community of Legionaries, assembled in Bratislava, had evidently raided the office of *Slovák* and devastated the place. According to the official report, the police tried to stop them, while Ferdiš Juriga claimed that the state police and several civil servants had participated in the destruction. The Slovak People's Party presented the incident as a case of violation of civil rights, but the debate in the Parliament in June 1922 was generally about everything but that. The government parties spent most of their speaking time criticizing the Slovak People's Party (including the usual Magyarone charges) and the editorial line of *Slovák*, thus indirectly saying that they got what was coming to them.<sup>15</sup>

Another interpellation of May 1922 complained of the illegal dissolution of the local division of the Slovak People's Party by a civil servant, to which the Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia, Jozef Kállay, answered that the interpellators were right; the dissolution was illegal. Finally, an interpellation of March 1924 complained that an internal party meeting of the Slovak People's Party had been interrupted and dissolved. To this the Ministers of Interior and Justice, respectively Švehla and Dolanský, replied that the official, in light of the number of people present (around 500), had determined that the meeting was a public meeting, for which it was necessary to seek permission. No fault was thus admitted.<sup>16</sup>

I have not registered any such complaints for the period 1925–29, and only one in each of the periods 1929–35 and 1935–38. An interpellation of June 1934 complained that permission had been denied to celebrate the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement in Košice, although this had been a tradition ever since the revolution and no incidents had ever occurred. The Minister of Interior, Jan Černý replied that the official had made the decision on the basis of the conviction that the celebration might disturb the public peace and order. No fault was admitted.<sup>17</sup> Finally, Martin Sokol submitted an interpellation in November 1937, protesting against the government ban on public political gatherings. This was removed already on December 1st, 1937.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> For the interpellation, see Tisk 630 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...* Svazek III (1920). See Husák and Labaj, 33. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 15. prosince 1920 (p. 1356–61), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>15</sup> For the interpellation, see Tisk 3584 in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIV (1922). For the debate, see 150. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. června 1920 (pp. 1189 ff.) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>16</sup> See Tisk 3610/XV and 4065/IV (answer), Tisk 4443/IX and 4796/XIV (answer) in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIV, XVIII, XXII and XXIII (1922, 1923, 1924).

<sup>17</sup> See Tisk 2610/IV and 2734/XII (answer) in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám ...*, Svazek XIV (1934).

<sup>18</sup> See Tisk 1094/I and 1221/IX (answer) in *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám ...*, Svazek IX, X (1938).

The interpellation of June 1934 was referred in *Slovák*, and there was an editorial criticizing the ban on the day the celebration in Košice was supposed to take place. In September 1933, Hlinka complained that a public meeting which the Ľudáks had planned in Ružomberok had been banned. The reason given by the authorities was that the meeting might threaten public peace and order. Three days later it was reported that the meeting had been allowed after all, but the report from the meeting in *Slovák* was censored,<sup>19</sup> as was Hlinka's article in part.

Complaints concerning violations of civil rights were also quite common in other debates, especially the first years. For instance, Hlinka demanded that the new Černý government in 1920 ensure the freedom of press, assembly and organization, and put an end to the censorship of the Ľudák press.<sup>20</sup>

### *The law of protection of the republic and the censorship practice*

Complaints of censorship were the most numerous among parliamentary interpellations pertaining to civil or political rights. Prior to 1923, censorship of Slovak periodicals was justified by reference to, e.g., §172 of the Hungarian penal code (still valid in Slovakia), according to which inciting nationalities and confessions against other nationalities and confessions was prohibited. After 1923 the Law of Protection of the Republic, and especially the provisions in §14, were used extensively. In addition, §34 (regulating the stopping of periodicals) was used at least twice against the Slovak autonomists after 1933.

**Table 27: Interpellations on censorship/confiscation 1918–38**

<i>Complaints made by members of</i>	1918–20		1920–25		1925–29		1929–35		1935–38	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Czechoslovak government parties	2	50	22	6.1	3	2.0	5	3.7	4	3.4
Hlinka's Slovak People's Party			39	10.8	–	–	11	8.2	29	24.6
Other Czechoslovak opposition parties <sup>21</sup>	2	50	3	0.8	20	13.5	3	2.2	33	28.0
German parties			176	48.6	74	50.0	62	46.3	20	16.9
Magyar parties			12	3.3	6	4.1	5	3.7	2	1.7
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia			110	30.4	45	30.4	48	35.8	30	25.4
Total	4	100	362	100	148	100	134	100	118	100
Average per year	2	–	72	–	37	–	22	–	39	–

Source: My own compilations based on *Index k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé, I–IV volební období (1927, 1929, 1935, 1939).*

<sup>19</sup> See *Slovák* no. 197, 2.9.1933:1; no. 199, 5.9.1933:1; no. 121, 30.5.1934:1; no. 128, 7.6.1934:1.

<sup>20</sup> Hlinka, 18. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 208), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy ...*

<sup>21</sup> In 1918–20: The Czechoslovak People's Party (1 complaint) and the National Democrats (1 complaint), in 1920–25 the Socialist Unity (1 complaint) and the Small Traders' Party (2 complaints); in 1925–29 the Czechoslovak National Socialists (9 complaints) and the Social Democrats (11 complaints); in 1929–35 the League against obligatory candidate lists; in 1935–38 National Unity (18 complaints), The Ruthenian Peasants' party (1 complaint) and the Polish Party (14 complaints).

Table 27 shows the distribution of complaints on censorship. Of 766 interpellations complaining of unlawful censorship, all but 97 were made by Slovak, German, Magyar or Communist opposition parties on behalf of their newspapers and journals, while government parties accounted for only 36 of the complaints, or merely 4.7 percent. Although the government parties and their organs probably *were* less exposed to censorship, the distribution of the complaints may not be representative of the actual situation. In parliamentary systems, interpellations are often used by the opposition to make the government answer to the Parliament, whereas members of government parties have other channels of influence.

The fact that the Slovak People's Party did not file a single complaint of censorship in the period 1925–29 need not imply that there was no censorship. On the contrary, 1929 was a particularly bad year for *Slovák* because of the Tuka trial. According to the editorial statistics, it had been censored 75 times during the trial, and a total of 2145 lines had been stricken, mostly in Hlinka's articles.<sup>22</sup> Before the parliamentary elections of 1929, *Slovák* demonstrated against censorship. All it read on the front page was: "Our number is 18" and "18 must win!" The only article was a complaint on the censorship practice. Page two was occupied by one sentence in large types: "Our only defense against censorship is 18." Likewise, an article in *Slovák týždenník* before the 1925 elections expressed the hope that the voters would see through the censorship practice and punish the Centralists.<sup>23</sup>

The practice of censorship seems to have been stricter in Bratislava than in Prague. There are even instances where articles from the Prague press were censored when quoted in *Slovák*. To quote others was otherwise a strategy commonly applied to evade censorship.<sup>24</sup> There was also an element of arbitrariness; certain passages could be stricken one day and allowed the next. For example, *Slovák* was allowed to publish interpellations containing censored passages, as in this case: "Our autonomism is the driving force of our national organism, it is the burning blood in all limbs of the national body – we should go forward for the national goals, bravely and without fear. We will only live to see the fulfillment of our national aspirations if we exact their recognition through boldness and determination. [...] For the recognition of national rights it is necessary to fight. Out of pity, gratefulness and love beggars are only given alms. Never the right to equality, shared sovereignty and shared decision-making."<sup>25</sup> After it became an offense to slander the Parliament (in 1933), the Ľudáks filed interpellations complaining that they were not allowed to criticize the National Socialists and Social Democrats.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> See *Slovák* no. 229, 9.10.1929:3. I will return to the Tuka case later.

<sup>23</sup> See *Slovák* no. 244, 26.10.1929:1, *Slovák týždenník* no. 40, 4.10.1925:1. There was one number for each party that ran for election, varying from one election to the next. In this particular election, HSES was number 18.

<sup>24</sup> See e.g. *Slovák* no. 125, 4.6.1934:3 or no. 237, 18.10.1929:3, where Dérier (!) is quoted on the alleged corruption of Hodža.

<sup>25</sup> (Náš autonomizmus je hybnou silou nášho národného organizmu, je horúcou krvou vo všetkých údoch národného tela – my máme ísť vpred za cieľom národným smelo a neohrožene. Len tak sa dožijeme splnenia našich národných túžob, keď si ich uznanie vynútime svojou smelosťou a stálosťou [...]. Za uznanie národných práv sa bojuje. Z ľútosti, uznanlivosti a lásky dáva sa iba žobrákom almužna. Nikdy nie právo na rovnocennosť, spolusuverennosť a spolurozhodovanie). Interpellation on censorship in *Slovák* no. 252, 8.11.1934. See also *Slovák* no. 188, 23.8.1933:1; *Slovák* no. 110, 16.5.1934:3.

<sup>26</sup> See *Slovák* no. 142, 24.6.1933:3 and no. 252, 8.11.1934.

To what extent the Slovaks *were* victimized more than others cannot be established. In order to do that, I would need to know how many cases of confiscation and censorship there were, and the national distribution of these, and preferably the same with respect to convictions. Aggregate figures for the confiscation exist for the years 1929 through 1936, but they say nothing about national distribution. An average of 3,524 cases was registered, of these 2,534 concerned periodicals.<sup>27</sup> As for convictions, I have only been able to find figures for the years 1934 through 1937; on average there were 1,491.<sup>28</sup> Some of the convictions probably contained more than one case of censorship or confiscation of text, and it is thus impossible to tell the extent of unlawful confiscation. It is known that the editor-in-chief of *Slovák* in the 1930s, Karol Sidor, was sentenced to jail several times. A report in *Slovák* claims that he had to appear before the court 115 times in 1931 alone. Andrej Hlinka had to use his parliamentary immunity at least once to avoid being jailed. He also took the blame for articles in *Slovák* he did not write, in order to save Sidor.<sup>29</sup>

*Slovák* was closed down for three months from September 24th, 1933, probably as a punishment for the Nitra event, and *Národné noviny* for six months from September 18th, 1934.<sup>30</sup> Martin Rázus remarked that not even a regime as repressive as the old Hungarian regime had ever closed down the party organ.<sup>31</sup> It is also a well-documented fact that the opposition movements, including the Slovak autonomists were under surveillance of the secret police.<sup>32</sup> Although all this to a certain extent impeded the activities of the Slovak autonomists, they were nevertheless able to articulate what they perceived as Slovak national interests.

### ***Political representation***

Complaints regarding political rights were infrequent, and mostly concerned representation. As we have seen in Chapter Eight, the Slovaks were under-represented compared to their share of the population in the Parliament in all election periods but the second (see Tables 3 and 4), and even more under-represented in the governments (see Table 5). Yet, other than in 1918–20, I have not registered complaints that the Slovaks were under-represented in the *Parliament*, only that *Slovakia* was under-represented. There were also a few complaints that the Slovaks were insufficiently represented in the government.

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<sup>27</sup> For the period 1929–33, see *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, III. volební období, Tisk 640 (p. 223), Tisk 1410 (p. 253), Tisk 2100 (p. 219), Tisk 2366 (p. 214), Tisk 2750 (p. 225). For the period 1934–36, see *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, IV. volební období, Tisk 125, Tisk 640 (p. 268), Tisk 1100 (p. 283).

<sup>28</sup> See *Statistická ročenka Protektorátu Čechy a Morava* (1941:261).

<sup>29</sup> See reports in *Slovák* no. 290, 24.12.1931:4, *Slovák* no. 60, 14.3.1934:1; *Slovák* no. 120, 29.5.1934:1; *Slovák* no. 123, 2.6.1934:1; James Ramon Felak: *At the price of the republic. Hlinka's Slovak people's party 1929–38* (1994:124). The article in question in Hlinka's case was about the event in Nitra.

<sup>30</sup> The closing down of *Národné Noviny* was referred in *Slovák* no. 216, 23.9.1934:1, with the comment of Martin Rázus, in the following number (no. 217, 25.9.1934).

<sup>31</sup> See *Slovák* no. 224, 4.10.1934:1–2.

<sup>32</sup> See e.g. Dorothea H. El Mallakh: *The Slovak autonomy movement 1935–39: A study in unrelenting nationalism* (1979).

The reason why the complaints about Slovak representation were concentrated to the first few years is probably that the Slovaks *were* numerically under-represented in the Revolutionary Parliament. Even after the supplementary appointment in 1919, the Slovak Club comprised only 20.5 percent of the deputies (55 out of 268). Moreover, this figure also included some Czechs, and the Club was not very representative of the political situation in Slovakia. Protestants and pro-Czechoslovakists were clearly over-represented, something the Ľudáks did not fail to point out later, for instance when it was argued that the Slovak Club had accepted the Constitution of 1920.<sup>33</sup>

The Memorandum of the Slovaks (1919) complained that the deputies were "not elected by the people, but appointed by the government, who chose them in part from Czechs (for example Pilát, Pfeffermann, Kolísek, Cholek, Rothnágel, and Miss Alice Masaryk, daughter of the president); in part from the bad Slovaks, pro-Czechs, Centralists, unionists, enemies of Slovak autonomy. From the autonomist party – although the entire Slovak nation is with them – only four have been admitted (Andrej Hlinka, Karol Kmeťko, Jozef Sivák, and Ferdinand Juriga). From a 'Slovak Club' made up in this wise there is no hope for the Slovaks."<sup>34</sup>

After 1920, there were sporadic complaints that Slovakia was deprived of deputies. Most of the complaints concerned the fact that Slovakia had fewer deputies than she was entitled to by law. In a book published during the wartime Slovak republic, Konštantín Čulen claimed that in the election of 1935, Slovakia got three mandates less than she was entitled to by law, and 11 less than she was entitled to according to population size.<sup>35</sup> According to the law, Slovakia was entitled to 61 deputies. Table 28 shows that in terms of her share of the population, Slovakia was clearly under-represented throughout the entire First Republic, and the under-representation grew worse election by election. In terms of her share of the voting population (adults above the age of 21), however, she was not. In terms of the voter–mandate ratio, Moravia was worse off than Slovakia in the last three elections.

It is easy to explain why the under-representation of Slovakia grew worse with each election: The population growth rate in Slovakia (and in Carpathian Ruthenia) was well above the Czechoslovak average both before and after 1918. One reason why the net growth rate of Slovakia was not even higher, was that a larger part of the population surplus in Slovakia than in the Czech lands emigrated.<sup>36</sup> Slovakia thus had a younger population than the Czech lands, which accounts for the discrepancy between the voter–mandate ratio and the population–mandate ratio. In order to maintain representativeness, it would have been necessary to reallocate seats between the regions in pace with the growth in population.

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<sup>33</sup> See e.g. Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1933:1.

<sup>34</sup> See Memorandum of the Slovaks to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, in: Mikuš (1995:167).

<sup>35</sup> See Konštantín Čulen: *Česi a Slováci v štátnych službách ČSR* (1994:95).

<sup>36</sup> While the population of Slovakia grew by 11,1 percent between 1920 and 1930, and the population of Ruthenia by 20 percent, Bohemia and Moravia had a population growth of respectively 6,6 and 6,8 percent. See the text part of *Sčítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 1. prosince 1930*, Díl I (1934:28\*–29\*).



**Table 28: Distribution of deputies and population size**

<i>Region:</i>	Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia	Ruthenia <sup>37</sup>	Total/average
1920 – mandates	157	73	61	(9)	300
citizens per mandate	42,452	45,639	49,073	(67,303)	45,319
voters per mandate	24,599	25,704	24,631	–	24,978
1925 – mandates	160	70	61	9	300
citizens per mandate	41,105	46,271	48,745	64,376	44,562
voters per mandate	25,367	27,087	26,361	32,552	26,186
1929 – mandates	160	70	61	9	300
citizens per mandate	43,731	51,429	54,115	79,222	48,703
voters per mandate	26,575	28,565	26,579	34,518	27,278
1936 – mandates	160	70	61	9	300
citizens per mandate	45,129	51,770	56,908	86,677	50,320
voters per mandate	29,500	31,704	30,817	41,022	30,628

*Sources:* *Volby do národního shromáždění v dubnu roku 1920* (1922:16), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v listopadu 1925* (1926:8), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930:8), *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935* (1936:8). "Voters per mandate" in 1920 was calculated by finding the average of the election districts by region. The same figure for 1929 is my own compilation based on an overview of the number of voters in: *Volby do národního shromáždění. Historický přehled výsledků voleb za období 1920–1935* (1990:10).

As mentioned page 168, the mandates were distributed in three rounds according to a proportional formula. In round two and three, the whole country was one election district, and it was thus possible to transfer votes from one election district or region in order to get a mandate in another election district or region. In practice, the system worked in favor of Bohemia and against Slovakia. The latter had fewer representatives the entire period than she was supposed to according to the official key (61). How many fewer is not altogether clear. According to figures given by Mikuš, Slovakia received 57 mandates in 1920, 1925 and 1929, and 58 mandates in 1935. The 1935 figure corresponds to the figure given by Čulen.<sup>38</sup>

After the election in 1925, Hlinka asked the Parliament how it was possible that the Constitution ensured Slovakia 61 deputies, and she only had 57. "Where are our four mandates?", he asked. Likewise, Tiso pointed out in 1933 that there were 58 mandates from Slovakia, while there should have been 61.<sup>39</sup> This was also the subject of an unsigned article in *Slovák* after the election in 1929. The complaint was that Slovakia had been deprived of 7 mandates – receiving 54 instead of 61, and that the Czechoslovak parties "robbed Slovakia of representation in the Parliament." Likewise, Martin Rázus complained in an article from 1934 that

<sup>37</sup> Since the election law required Czechoslovak citizenship and permanent residency in one of the municipalities of the republic, elections were not held in Carpathian Ruthenia in 1920. Nine deputies were elected in a supplementary election in 1924. Data on the voter population of Ruthenia in 1920 are lacking. For the same reason, elections were not held in Těšín, Spíš, Orava, Hlučín, Vitorazsko and Valticko in 1920. Six of the 300 seats were thus not filled.

<sup>38</sup> See Čulen (1994:95).

<sup>39</sup> (Kde sú naše štyri mandáty?) Hlinka, 6. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. prosince 1925 (p. 184), and Tiso, 301. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1933 (p. 50), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

Slovakia had 54 instead of 61 deputies because Slovak votes had been transferred to the Czech lands.<sup>40</sup> There is a discrepancy between the figures of Tiso (58 mandates), Mikuš (57) and *Slovák*/Rázus (54). *Slovák* presented all the names, and it is possible that 54 mandates from Slovakia was the correct figure for 1929. In any case, Slovakia got at least 3–4 deputies less than she was entitled to. The irony is that the Ľudáks contributed to the use of Slovak votes to get Czech mandates by providing the Czech Antonín Čuřík with enough spare votes to get a mandate from Moravia in 1929. Čuřík got 20,406 votes, but no mandate in the first round. Likewise, the Ľudáks helped the Polish autonomist Leon Wolf to a mandate in 1935.<sup>41</sup>

There were also sporadic complaints that Slovaks were not sufficiently represented in the government, or also represented by the wrong kind of Slovaks. Juriga argued already in 1920 that "the Slovaks should have at least three ministers in order to control everything in the government and defend our rights."<sup>42</sup> In 1925, *Slovák týždenník* complained that of the three Slovak ministers, there was not a single Catholic, and only two of the six *župans* were Catholics. The latter was repeated in 1928, when *Slovák* asked how it was possible for a predominant Catholic region like Slovakia to be ruled by a non-Catholic minority. In 1929 Hlinka pointed out that Slovakia was represented in the government by two Czechoslovak Protestants (Dérer and Slávik), but not a single Slovak Catholic.<sup>43</sup>

In 1930 Ravasz used the few Slovak ministers as an argument in favor of autonomy. He pointed out that of 16 ministers, only two were Slovaks: "Are we [in] Slovakia only an eighth of the republic? In Moravia and Bohemia autonomy is not necessary, for 16 ministers defend the interests of those citizens in the state."<sup>44</sup> Finally, in 1931 *Slovák* claimed that the Slovak representation was insufficient, because the 1–2 ministers who were supposed to represent Slovakia "were Slovak by origin all right, but representatives of a Czech policy. Their first obligation was to defend Czech interests in the government, and only afterwards Slovak."<sup>45</sup>

The Slovaks as a nation were not grossly under-represented, although the Protestant Slovaks of a Czechoslovak orientation naturally comprised a clear majority of the Slovak ministers. In the struggle over the political-administrative organization and territorial distribution of power, they sided with the Czechs. I will now turn to the debate on the political-administrative organization of the state.

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<sup>40</sup> See *Slovák* no. 251, 6.11.1929:3. Martin Rázus: Ako prísť k československej dohode? in: Rudolf Chmel (ed.): *Slovenská otázka v 20. storočí* (1997:171).

<sup>41</sup> Hlinka wrote of the distribution of mandates in the second and third round in *Slovák* no. 252, 7.11.1929:1, where he informed that the party would give one mandate to the Moravians for their 20.000 votes. See also Table 2.

<sup>42</sup> (Aspoň tri by mali mať Slováci, aby mohli všetko tu pri vlade kontrolovať a naše práva hájiť). Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10 června 1920 (p. 180), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>43</sup> See *Slovák týždenník* no. 10, 8.3.1925:1, *Slovák* no. 172, 2.8.1928:1, and Hlinka in: *Slovák* no. 292, 24.12.1929:1.

<sup>44</sup> (Sme my Slovensko len 8. čiastka republiky? Na Morave a v Čechách netreba autonómie, lebo záujmy týchto občanov háji v štáte 16 ministrov). Ravasz, 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 80), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>45</sup> (1–2 ministrov, sice rodom Slovákov, ale reprezentantov českej politiky. Ich povinnosťou bolo najsamprv hájiť záujmy české vo vládě a až potom slovenské). *Slovák*, no. 244, 28.10.1931:1.

### ***Political-administrative organization: Counties or regions?***

The political-administrative structure was a major point of dispute in the debate about the Constitution. The territories that were included in the Czechoslovak state after 1918 had different traditions. In the Czech lands, the highest division was the semi-autonomous regions with their own Diets – or as they were generally called, "the historical lands" (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia). Slovak territory had been an integral part of the Hungarian county (*župa*) system, and was divided in 20 counties, ten of which were exclusively on Slovak territory, while the rest crossed the new state border.<sup>46</sup> In order to get a uniform political-administrative structure in the whole country adjustments were thus necessary.

This could be done by transferring the old Hungarian system of counties (*župy*) to the Czech lands or by establishing a Slovak region (*země* or *krajina*). While the normal procedure was to transfer the Austrian system to Slovakia, the Czechoslovak political elite in this one case tried to introduce a revised version of the Hungarian system in the Czech lands. The *župa* law of 1920 meant dissolution of the old historical lands into nine (Bohemia) and six (Moravia and Silesia) counties, and the abolition of their Diets, while legislative power was transferred to the central government. This represented a centralization of political power compared to the Austrian system. At the same time, the existing small Slovak counties were restructured into six larger ones (Bratislava, Nitra, Turčiansky Svätý Martin, Zvolen, Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš and Košice). The counties were to be ruled by a *župan* directly responsible to and appointed by the central government – and an elected county assembly.<sup>47</sup>

### ***The debate over the Constitution***

The debate reflected that the "unification of the entire territory of the Czechoslovak republic" was a major concern for the government. The main argument against the old regional structure was that regional autonomy would endanger the unification of the state and set the Czechoslovak nation apart. It was argued that the state should be built on a new basis rather than to "preserve old feudal forms", and that the county reform meant turning away from the Austrian ways. The establishment of counties was also seen as a democratic reform, because "a considerable part of the tasks of public administration" would be decentralized to smaller units, and finally, it was argued they were nothing new historically, and certainly not in Slovakia.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Slovak župy were: Trenčianská (Trencsén), Oravská (Árva), Turčianská (Turóc), Liptovská (Liptó), Spišská (Szepes), Šarišská (Sáros), Bratislavská (Pozsony), Nitrianská (Nyitra), Tekovská (Bars), and Zvolenská (Zólyom). Otherwise (parts of) the following župy were on present-day Slovak territory: Rab (Győr), Komárno (Komárom), Ostrihom (Esztergom), Hont, Novohrad (Nógrád), Gemer-malohont (Gömör és Kishont), Abov (Abaúj-Torna), Zemplín (Zemplén), Uh (Ung) and Mosony (Moson). See László Szarka: The Slovak national question and the Hungarian nationality policy before 1918, in *The Hungarian Quarterly* (1994: 98,101), Paul Robert Magocsi: *Historical atlas of East Central Europe* (1993:81). See also map 7, appendix to *Scítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I (1924).

<sup>47</sup> See Eva Broklová: *Československá demokracie* (1992:53).

<sup>48</sup> (Unifikace celého území republiky československé). (nemůžeme zachovávat staré feudální formy) (přenáší značnou část úkolů veřejné správy do krajů). Bohumil Fišer (Pokrok.), 126. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 28. února 1920 (pp. 3830–31), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Národního shromáždění československého*.

There was considerable Czech opposition against replacing the historical lands with counties, especially from the Czechoslovak People's Party and the National Democrats. They argued that the county system was too complex, and that the counties would be too large to be convenient for the people because of distances, yet too small to fulfill their tasks. From a national point of view, the main arguments were that the proposed county system would "tear apart and ruin what hundreds of years of historical development had built up",<sup>49</sup> and throw away those very historical forms which had helped "form an independent Czech state."<sup>50</sup> It was also used as an argument that two of the proposed counties were overwhelmingly German in composition: Karlovy Vary (99.2 percent), and Česká Lípa (95.7 percent).<sup>51</sup> These arguments were clearly Czech nationalist. At the same time, the opposition underlined that it did not sanction any form of separatism or autonomy that would endanger the unity of the state.

The spokesman of the Constitutional Committee was Václav Bouček (the Progressive Party). He emphasized the unity and indivisibility of the state: "We had our hearts set on the unity of our state. [...] §7 of the Constitution dissolve the Diets. Our intention was to carry out the unity of the state to the utmost consequence, and we see a possible beginning danger to the unity of our state in §63 of the act establishing counties." (§63 allowed associations of counties at regional level. This was a compromise worked out in the Constitutional Committee, clearly a concession to the opponents of the counties).<sup>52</sup> An interesting feature of Bouček's argumentation is the attempt to write off Moravian patriotism as something that had evolved under Austrian rule: "Just as they prevented you Slovaks in Hungary from feeling as one with us, such a tendency was supported in Moravia by the Vienna government. [...] When we have formed our own state, we naturally feel strongly about removing everything that might still divide our national unity. [...] The large majority of the Czechoslovak nation wants unity. There is thus no reason whatsoever [...] why it should be necessary to form any federalist scheme in the first place, [and] we are too small a state to be a federal state, considering our location."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> (Zákon, o kterém dnes jednáme, trhá, ničí to, co zbudoval staletí historický vývoj). The main arguments were concisely summed up by Ludvík Vaněk (ČND), 126. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3807), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>50</sup> (My však jsme pomocí zemí koruny České a pomocí našeho historického útvaru utvořili samostatný český stát). Jaroslav Brabec (ČND), 126. schůze ... dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3795), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>51</sup> See *Sčítání lidu... 1921*, Díl I, table VI; Oskar Krejčí: *Kniha o volbách* (1994:142).

<sup>52</sup> The act establishing the county system has not been translated to English. It can be found in Zákon 126 ze dne 29. února 1920 o zřízení župních a okresních úřadů v Republice československé in *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920:255 pp). See especially §63 and §31.

<sup>53</sup> (Ta jednotnost našeho státu ležela nám na srdci. [...] §7. ústavní listiny zrušuje sněmy. Úmyslem naším bylo, provést jednotu státní až do nejkrajnějších důsledků a my spatřujeme v §63. župního zřízení možný počátek nebezpečí a ohrožení jednotnosti našeho státu). (Tak jako v Maďarsku bránili vám Slovákům, abyste se necítili za jedno s námi, tak takováto tendence byla podporována vládami vídeňskými na Moravě. [...] Když jsme si utvořili svůj vlastní stát, přirozeně záleželo nám na tom, aby zmizelo všechno, co by mohlo dále ještě dělit naši jednotnost národní. [...] ohromná většina národa československého chce jednotě. Proto není pražádného podnětu [...] aby nějaký federalistický útvar třeba v začátcích a v zárodcích byl tvořen. Jsme státem příliš malým, abychom mohli se zřetelem na položení, které máme, býti státem federativním). Václav Bouček (Pokrok.), 125. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3666–67), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

Prime Minister Vlastimil Tusar (ČSD) admitted that by splitting the historical lands into *counties* the Czechs gave up the historical basis of their demands for state rights. On the other hand, he argued, "now we do not only have historical state rights, but the subject of that right – we have our state, and that is for all future a much more potent and stronger legal title."<sup>54</sup>

Conversely, Karel Kramář (ČND) accused the majority of being influenced by old Austrian ideas, and argued against the dismembering of the historical lands: "We love our Bohemia the way we were used to loving her for so many years, and fought for her. I am convinced that our Moravians likewise love their Moravia. (*Juriga: And the Slovaks Slovakia!*) Yet, above that love to Bohemia and Moravia we love the republic outright passionately, and I think the Slovaks feel the same way." Kramář's defense of the historical lands did not, however, imply autonomy: "The unity of the republic must be preserved in all matters where the republic needs its strength and power [...] Therefore we cannot have any separate parliaments which would undermine our unity", he argued. Kramář was also against giving the counties any political importance: "That would mean making the counties into small parliaments, and we would have two German parliaments in Bohemia, where there would be no Czech to answer them. [...] A county is not and cannot be anything but an administrative organ."<sup>55</sup>

Jan Šrámek (ČSL) strongly disagreed with Bouček on the dissolution of the old historical lands, and he was in particular upset by the arguments about his home region Moravia: "Moravia remains that Moravia which is a historical fact of the Czech nation. Moravia was not formed by any Austrian element. I ask you kindly to keep that in mind, and not constantly come on to us with that so-called separatism. [...] We never were and we are not in favor of any kind of separatism now. [...] When we saw and we even today feel the outright incomprehensible hostility to the regions, the historical Czech lands of ours, you should not be surprised of the persistent work for autonomy of the regions, in order to recover something, to force at least something out of the hands of the so centralist oriented coalition and government."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> (Avšak teď máme nejen historické státní právo, nýbrž my máme již subjekt toho práva, my máme svůj stát a to je pro všechnu budoucnost právním titulem mnohem účinnějším a silnějším). Tusar, 126. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 28. února 1920 (pp. 3679–80), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>55</sup> (My milujeme svou českou zem tak, jak jsme ji byli zvyklí milovati po tolik let a jak jsme za ni tolik bojovali. Já jsem přesvědčen, že naši Moraváné zrovna tak milují svoji Moravu (*Posl. Juriga: Slováci Slovensko!*) My však přes tu lásku k Čechám a Moravě přímo vášnivě milujeme republiku a totéž myslím o Slovácích). (jednota republiky ve všech věcech, kterým republika potřebuje ke své síle a moci, musí býti naprosto zachována [...]) Proto nesmí býti u nás žádných zvláštních parlamentů, které by podlamovaly naši jednotu). (to by udělalo ze žup malé parlamenty a my bychom měli v Čechách dva německé parlamenty, kde by snad nebyl žádný aneb jeden Čech, který by jim mohl odpovídati. [...]) Župa není a nesmí býti ničím jiným, nežli orgánem správním, orgánem administrativním). Kramář, 125. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3713–14), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>56</sup> (Morava zůstane i nadále tou Moravou, která jest dějinným faktem českého národa. Žádné rakušáctví nevytvořilo Moravy. To prosím, abyste laskavě vzali všechno na vědomí a nechodili pořád na nás s tak zvaným separatismem. [...]) My jsme nikdy nebyli a nejsme pro nějaký separatismus. [...] Když jsme viděli a cítíme přece ještě dnes, ten přímo nepochopitelný odpor proti zemím, proti těm našim českým historickým zemím, nedivte se, že to byla úporná práce, aspoň něco vynutiti z rukou té tak centralisticky naladěné koalice a vlády pro autonomii zemí). Šrámek, 126. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3749) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

Although the need to unify the territory had a lot to do with Slovakia and the Slovaks, the fear that Slovak autonomists might strengthen their position in Slovakia was not used openly as an argument for the centralized Constitution by its proponents. Only Viktor Dyk (ČND) mentioned it, and he warned against alienating the Slovaks: "I do not think we can lead a campaign against Magyars, Germans and – strengthened Slovak autonomists at the same time, without putting the entire development of the state at risk. [...] It is thus necessary that we do not aggravate the situation in Slovakia by laws and speeches, for we may and must get along with the Slovaks, but it will not be possible to met with the Germans and Magyars for a long time. I would therefore recommend [...] more tact and overall more love. [...] If we help the Slovaks, let us not expect gratitude. It is an installment on Kollár, whom they gave to our revival. If we solve the Slovak problem correctly when building this Constitution, if we find a way to an agreement between us, if our internal national relations recover, we may much more calmly deal with citizens of other languages, other nationalities."<sup>57</sup>

The spokesman of the Slovak Club was Ivan Markovič, who stated that "there is not one Slovak in Slovakia who would demand that Slovakia be united with Hungary and who would protest against the state unity of the Czechs and Slovaks, two branches of one nation." He then read the following statement from the Slovak club:

"The Pittsburgh Agreement originated at a time when there was still hope that a community of nations for the preservation of world peace would become a reality. That hope did, however, unfortunately not come true. The Czechoslovak republic is still today surrounded by unfriendly states, and Slovakia is so weakened culturally and materially by the former Magyar regime that without Czech support, she would not be able to build nor to defend her autonomy. Autonomy would impose on the Slovak nation an enormous economic burden. Slovakia still does not have a large enough intelligentsia to fill the administration and schools. No danger of exploitation or denationalization threatens us from our Czech brothers' side, quite on the contrary. We are part of all rights as equal citizens of the Czechoslovak republic, and [get] every spiritual and material support.

Thus the Club of Slovak deputies assures our American brothers that the proposed Constitution, according to which schools, church, administration, agricultural questions, health, commerce and industry will be administered by autonomous associations of counties and shared regional organs, gives Slovakia in essence everything the Pittsburgh Agreement contains, except a Parliament, which in the present conditions would definitely but be to the detriment of Slovakia.

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<sup>57</sup> (Nemůžeme, tuším, bez ohrožení celého státního vývoje vésti současnou kampaň proti Maďarům, Němcům a – sesíleným slovenským autonomistům. [...] Nutno tudíž, abychom i ve zákonech i v řečích neztěžovali vývoj na Slovensku, neboť se Slováky můžeme a musíme se najít, ale s Němci a Maďary, na dlouho aspoň, nebude možno se sejít. Doporučoval bych tudíž panu zpravodaji více taktu a hlavně více lásky. [...] Pomáháme-li Slovákům, nečekejme dočasný dík. Je to splátka za Kollára, jehož dali našemu probuzení. Vyřídíme-li správně problém slovenský při budování této ústavy, najdeme-li cestu k dohodě mezi sebou, ozdraví-li naše vnitřní národní poměry, s mnohem větším klidem můžeme se zabývat občany jiného jazyka, jiné národnosti). Viktor Dyk, 126. schůze ... dne 28. února 1920 (p. 3776), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

The special linguistic, religious, cultural and material interests of Slovakia will be sufficiently looked after through that autonomous order, democratically elected Slovak deputies, some Slovak ministers, freedom of assembly and association, and Slovak publications on the one hand, and the brotherly feeling of the Czech nation on the other hand. In those institutions the Club of Slovak deputies sees every guarantee of the interests of the Slovak nation, which our American brothers had in mind when they formed the Pittsburgh Agreement so dear to us."<sup>58</sup>

There are two interesting features of this statement. First, the existence of a Slovak nation was not denied, on the contrary, it was argued that autonomy was not in the interest of the Slovak nation. Second, the arguments against autonomy were of a temporary nature (the Slovaks did not currently have the strength or resources), implying that autonomy was conceivable at a later time. This also makes it easier to understand how the Slovak autonomists could vote in favor of this admittedly very centralist constitution. Neither of them spoke in the debate, apart from Juriga's shouting during other people's speeches (e.g. "Federalism! Federalism is the most democratic constitution!", "Autonomy for Slovakia! Without any centralist yoke!".<sup>59</sup>

With Hlinka in prison and Juriga absent during the voting, the autonomists were only six: Jozef Buday, Karol Kmeťko, Ján Koválik, Štefan Onderò, Jozef Sivák and Florián Tománek. They did not see it fit to vote against the Constitution out of the higher interest of its unanimous acceptance, but they did issue a declaration stating that they by their affirmative vote "in no way gave up the demand for autonomy of Slovakia, including a legislative assembly." Dérier later claimed that there was full agreement in the Slovak Club that autonomy was not desirable, because they feared the influence of Magyarone and anti-state elements.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> (niet na Slovensku Slováka, ktorý by žiadal pripojenie Slovenska k Maďarsku a ktorý by protestoval proti štátnej jednote Čechov a Slovákov, dvoch vetví jedného národa). (Pittsburská dohoda vznikla v dobe, keď ešte bola nádej, že sväz národov, ktorý by mal zabezpečovať svetový mier, sa uskutoční. Táto nádej sa však dosiaľ neuskutočnila. Československá republika je obkľúčená i takými štátmi, ktoré sú nám ešte i dnes nepriateľské, Slovensko je bývalým maďarským režimom kultúrne a hmotne tak oslabené, že by svoju autonómiu bez českej podpory ani vybudovať ani ubrániť nemohlo. Autonómia uplavila by na slovenský národ ohromné peňažné ťarchy. Slovensko ešte nemá dosť inteligentných pracovníkov, ktorí by zaplnili úrady a školské katedry. So strany bratov Čechov nie len že nám nehrozí nijaké nebezpečenie vykoristenia a nebezpečenie odnárodnenia, ale práve naopak. Sme účastníkmi všetkých práv, čo rovnocenní občania československej republiky a každej duševnej i hmotnej podpory. Preto Klub slovenských poslancov uisťuje bratov amerických, že v návrhu zákona o ústave, podľa ktorého menovitě školstvo, cirkev, administrácia, poľnohospodárske otázky, zdravotníctvo, obchod a priemysel budú spravované autonómnyimi sbormi žup a spoločným zemským výborom, pro Slovensko zabezpečené je v podstate všetko, čo pittburská dohoda obsahuje, vyjímajúc snem, ktorý by ale za terajších pomerov bol rozhodne na újmu Slovenska. Zvláštné rečové, náboženské, kultúrne a hmotné záujmy Slovenska budú takýmto autonómnyim sriadením, demokraticky volenými slovenskými poslancami, niekoľkými slovenskými ministrami, slobodou shromážďovacou a spoločnou, slovenskou publicistikou na jednej, bratským citom českého národa na druhej strane dostatočne obhájené. Klub slovenských poslancov v týchto inštitúciách vidí všetky garancie záujmov slovenského národa, ktoré mali pred očami naši americkí bratia vtedy keď utvorili pittburskú pre nás tak vzácnú dohodu). Statement of the Slovak club, February 27th 1920, read by Ivan Markovič, 125. schůze ... dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3713, 3721–22) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>59</sup> (Federace! Federace je nejdemokratičtější soustava!). (Samospráva Slovenska! Bez centralistického chomoutu!) Juriga's exclamations, 125. schůze ... dne 27. února 1920 (pp. 3667, 3714), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>60</sup> (však nijako nezavdávajú svoju žiadosť ohľadom samosprávy Slovenska s legislatívnym snemom). *Slovák* no. 156, 14.7.1928:3. The declaration is published in German translation in Jörg K. Hoensch: *Dokumente zur Autonomiepolitik der Slowakischen Volkspartei Hlinkas* (1984:130). The German wording is "daß sie damit aber keineswegs ihre Forderung nach der Selbstverwaltung der Slowakei durch einen gesetzgebenden Landtag aufgeben." See also Ivan Dérier: *Slovenský vývoj a ľudská zrada* (1946:112).

### ***The regional (země) reform of 1928***

The county law of 1920 was supposed to be implemented within three years, but in practice the new counties were only introduced in Slovakia (in 1923). The administrative dualism between the Czech lands and Slovakia thus continued. In 1928 the county system was abolished also in Slovakia. Instead four regions were established: Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. This reform had two major effects from a national point of view: First, it made Slovakia into a single administrative unit for the very first time. Second, by uniting Silesia with Moravia, the government made sure that the Germans were not able to dominate politically in any of the units. Of the historical lands, Silesia was least Czech in national composition, with the Germans and Poles together forming a majority.<sup>61</sup>

The regional reform was debated and adopted by the Parliament during the summer of 1927, but did not take effect until 1928. The law of July 14th, 1927, also established a regional presidency, and an assembly with rather limited powers in each of the regions. The regional assemblies counted 120 members in Bohemia, 60 in Moravia, 54 in Slovakia and 18 in Ruthenia. The law stipulated that two thirds of the members were to be elected by citizens over the age of 24, while one third was to be appointed by the government among "experts" (*odborníci*) on economic, cultural, national and social matters (Part II, §11). The president was to be appointed by the president of Czechoslovakia (in reality the decision was in the hands of the minister of interior), and was to be the chairman of the regional assembly.<sup>62</sup>

The principal issue in the debate was of course whether it was a good idea to introduce four regions instead of the 22 counties. This was at least partly a replay of the 1920 debate. As in 1920, the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Czechoslovak National Democrats defended the *země* system, and the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and the Czechoslovak National Socialists favored the county system. The Agrarians had a sudden change of heart, and defended in 1927 what they had spoken against in 1920 – a point the opposition did not let pass unnoticed. Two other main points of dispute were the government's right to appoint one third of the members of the regional assemblies, and the age requirement of 24 years to be eligible to vote. The latter question is of minor interest here.

The arguments can be divided into two categories; practical-economic and nationally oriented arguments. The former category need not concern us here; suffice it to say that these arguments in favor of the regional structure were related to communication, economic costs, personnel, and redistribution. The main arguments against were that the new regions would be too big to be efficient, and that Bratislava was anything but a center in Slovakia<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> There were 40.5 percent Germans and 11.2 percent Poles. See *Scítání lidu v republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921*, Díl I (1924:60). See also Map 6 attached to it.

<sup>62</sup> See Zákon ze dne 29. února 1920 ve znění zákona ze dne 14. července 1927, č. 125 o organizaci politické správy, in: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1927:1462).

<sup>63</sup> See Kramář (ČND), 90. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 27. června 1927 (pp. 1852–58), Josef Patejdl (ČS) 91. schůze ... dne 28. června 1927 (pp. 1924–33), Igor Hrušovský (ČS), 92. schůze ... dne 30. června 1927 (p. 2038) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*



In the following, I will concentrate on the second category, the nationally oriented arguments. In 1920, Karel Kramář (ČND) had argued in favor of keeping the *země* because of the loyalty that they commanded (see page 451). In 1927, he insisted that it took decades and centuries to form the kind of solidarity present in the regions, and reminded the Parliament that "Bohemia lived a common life for a thousand years, here interests were formed that cannot be broken, and that not even national struggles were able to sever." In contrast, the counties were in his view "simply inorganic, they had no historical continuity." At the same time, he repeated that the regional assemblies may "under no circumstances be legislative."<sup>64</sup>

Karel Viškovský (Agr.) admitted to a change of heart since 1920, but argued that introducing the regional system was necessary in order to unite the state administratively. He also admitted that "the artificial construction of counties did not strike any chord in the population [...] We wanted to wipe out the past, that is the regions, but that past could not just be suppressed after all. The regions were thus not something accidental, but natural units lasting for centuries, and they could not be shrugged off...." According to Viškovský, the reform was "not only a return to the historical units, but [...] progress."<sup>65</sup>

Ladislav Daněk (ČSL) was satisfied that the regions would become juridical units, and that they at least would get a certain competence in economic and social matters. However, he confessed that the reform was not ideal from his party's point of view, although it was a great step forward compared to the county system. He pointed out that although a Slovak territory had only been formed after the revolution of 1918, claims for rights as a region had started to appear from that time. He accused former governments of making a tactical error "by not grasping in time what may have prevented the many mistakes that took place in Slovakia, and which turned the sympathy of large parts of the Slovak people away from the brotherly feelings of the population in the Czech lands." In his view, "establishing a region in Slovakia may only speed up the quick development of Slovakia and calm things down."<sup>66</sup>

Josef Patejdl (ČS) argued that counties were not a departure from a thousand-year-old tradition; on the contrary, they had a longer history in the Czech lands than the regions: "The regions as juridical bodies are invented by the Habsburgs; they are thus of foreign origin, not our Czech." He also warned that establishing a Slovak region would not calm down the situation in Slovakia: on the contrary, the Slovak People's Party would only use it as a base for

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<sup>64</sup> (naprosto neorganickými, neměly žádné historické spojitosti). (Čechy žily společným životem po tisíciletí, vytvořeny tu byly zájmy, které nelze rozervati a které nedovedly rozervati ani národnostní boje). (Zemská zastupitelstva za žádnou cenu nemohou být zákondárná). Kramář, 90. schůze ... dne 27. června 1927 (pp. 1855–57) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>65</sup> (Zdá se také, že tato umělá konstrukce žup nechytla v obyvatelstvu [...]) Chtěli jsme smazati minulost, to jest země, avšak tato minulost nedala se přece jen potlačit. Země nebyly totiž ničím náhodným, nýbrž přirozenými staletými celky a nedaly se odbýt. (nejen pouhý návrat k historickým celkům, nýbrž [...] pokrok). Viškovský, 90. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 27. června 1927 (p. 1877) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>66</sup> (Považuji za taktickou chybu dřívějších vlád československých, že včasné nebylo zychyceno, co mohlo zabrániti tolika nepřístojnostem, které na Slovensku se staly a které odvrátily sympatie širokých vrstev lidu slovenského od bratrských citů obyvatelstva historických zemích). (Zemské zřízení na Slovensku mohlo jen uspišiti rychlý vývoj Slovensko a jeho uklidnění). Daněk, 91. schůze ... dne 28. června 1927 (pp. 1934, 1935). in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

further operations. The problem of Slovakia cannot be solved by dubious political concessions, he argued, but by concerted economic, cultural and social work. "On the basis of experience, [...] I argue that the unity of Czechoslovakia is deep-rooted in the Slovak people. The Slovak people wants fair economic and social support."<sup>67</sup>

The first Slovak speaker was Ferdiš Juriga, who stated that "we, the [Slovak] People's Party are looking at this law purely from the viewpoint of Slovak individuality, at how much it serves the individuality of the Slovak nation, to preserve and perfect it." He also used the opportunity to condemn Dérer and Hrušovský's "fixed idea of the unitary Czechoslovak nation", whose aim was for "the Czech nation to swallow up the Slovak nation", and accused them of copying the old Austrian and Magyar unitary state idea. According to Juriga, the main concern of the socialists was to "take away from us even the name, to step on the sacred name of the Slovak *krajina*, on the sacred name of the Slovak nation, centralize us again, annihilate us, as you annihilated us when you were in government."<sup>68</sup>

Juriga's use of national metaphors in this debate is almost worth a study in itself. He compared the Slovak nation to a fir tree growing in the high Tatra mountains: "There is no soil there, only rock everywhere – and the fir tree grows, tears apart the rock and lives! Just like that is also the Slovak idea, that is the Slovak nation and the Slovak *krajina*: Out of inner strength, it broke through that hard Czech skull, that hard Czech heart, the Slovak fir tree grew nicely on the Czech head [...] the Slovak *krajina* – the regional assembly, the Slovak assembly." Elsewhere he compared the Slovak *krajina* with a newborn child, or even (indirectly) with the infant Jesus: "Beware of those critics [the Centralists and Czechoslovakists], for they want to kill that child of Bethlehem, the Slovak *krajina* that is being born."

Juriga pointed out that through the reform, the Slovak *krajina* became a juridical person for the first time. The *krajina* got her own assembly with at least some jurisdiction, and the president would have at least the same power as the minister of Slovakia, since the affairs of the ministry were to be transferred to the presidential office. At the same time, however, he made it plain that he considered the reform proposal to be a compromise, and as such, less than what "we Slovaks" really wanted, which was "the right of self-determination in the Slovak *krajina*." He explicitly warned the Czechs against thinking otherwise: "Do not imagine that this is the autonomy of the Slovak region (*krajina*), do not believe that the Slovak question is hereby solved, do not expect that we will be satisfied with this. As we grow, we will demand more rights, more power to our Slovak *krajina*."

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<sup>67</sup> (země jako správní tělesa jsou vynálezem Habsburků, tedy původu cizího našeho českého). (Jednota Československa je – tvrdím na základě zkušeností [...] – jest u lidu slovenského vžita. Lid slovenský chce spravedlivou hospodářskou a sociální podporu). Patejdl, 91. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. června 1927 (pp. 1925–27) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>68</sup> (My, ľudová strana, dívame sa na tento zákon čiste s hľadiska slovenskej osobitosti, nakoľko to osoží osobitosti slovenského národa, ju zachovať a ju zdokonaľiť). (fixnú ideu jednotného československého národa). (Ich snahou je, aby český národ pohltit slovenský národ). (prvou jejich starosťou by bolo sobrat' nám ešte meno, šliapať po svätom mene slovenskej krajiny, po svätom mene slovenského národa, znova nás centralizovať, kynožiti' nás, ako ste nás kynožili, pokiaľ ste boli vo vláde). Juriga, 91. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. června 1927 (pp. 1976, 1977) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

He made it clear that the party did not envisage Slovak independence or Slovakia's return to Hungary, and thus distanced himself from the Communists and the Magyars: "It would be against nature, bad and unhappy [...] for the Slovak nation to return to the Magyar yoke. [...] The Slovak nation [...] will fight of all might on life and death to defend its Slovak *krajina*, the nation and this republic, the only framework within which a Slovak *krajina* is possible."<sup>69</sup>

Igor Hrušovský (ČS) reproached the governing majority for "unbelievable negligence [and] astonishing gambling with the future of the state" by allowing "an experiment which must split the unity of the Czechoslovak nation." Far from calming down the situation in Slovakia, the reform would only serve as a fundament for "further separatist aims", Hrušovský argued. In his view, this was dangerous because it affected the unity of the Czechoslovak nation and state: "If we were to accept the view of the [Slovak] People's Party about two nations, a further question inevitably emerges: Is it at all possible for two national wholes to live permanently together in one state? And after declaring the concept of a Czechoslovak nation as a fiction, is there no fear that a Czechoslovakia with Czechoslovak dualism will become exactly the kind of lie that Austria-Hungary was during her entire problematic existence?." Hrušovský argued that there was no historical foundation whatsoever for any kind of federalism; the state was too small, and besides, "a great majority of the Czechoslovak nation wants unity." He claimed that the reform was built on a "Magyar formula" and would help the Magyar policy.<sup>70</sup>

Ivan Dérer (ČSD) said that Juriga's speech was the best proof that the reform would not disarm autonomism and separatism in Slovakia. "We are against these efforts, not because we would want to take away from Slovakia her individuality, her Slovak language, her Slovak features and her own Slovak needs, [...] but because it may lead to, or rather must lead to a dangerous end not only for the Czechoslovak republic, but first and foremost for Slovakia herself." Dérer added that "we, here in Central Europe, where we are surrounded by hostile tendencies cannot afford" to follow the example of Norway and Sweden; Slovakia would only become an easy prey of the "wild and inferior neighbors" (evidently the Magyars).

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<sup>69</sup> (Žiadna pôda nie je tam, len a tá skala – a tá jedľa rastie, roztrhne tú skalú a žije! Tak je to i s tou slovenskou myšlienkou, to je slovenský národ a slovenská krajina: Tú tvrdú lebku českú, to tvrdé srdce české z vnútornej sily prerazila, pekne na hlave českej rastla tá slovenská jedľa [...] slovenská krajina "zemské zastupiteľstvo", slovenský snem). (my Slováci chceme sebaurčavacie právo v slovenskej krajine). (Nemyslite tým, že toto je autonómia slovenskej krajiny, nemyslite si, že týmto je otázka slovenská vyriešená, nemyslite si, že my budeme s týmto spokojní. Tak ako porastieme, tak si budeme žiadať viac práva, viac moci našej slovenskej krajine). (Bolo by to len proti prírode, bolo by to zlé a nešťastím [...] aby bol slovenský národ vedený späť do maďarského jarma. [...] slovenský národ [...] bude bude s celou silou na život a na smrť bojovať, brániť svoju slovenskú krajinu, národ a tú republiku, v ktorej rámci je jedine možná slovenská krajina). (Počkaj, dávaj pozor na týchto kritikov, tí chcú vraždiť to betlemské dieťa, tú rodiacu sa slovenskú krajinu). Juriga, 91. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. června 1927 (pp. 1978, 1981, 1984) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>70</sup> (neuveriteľnou ľahkomyselnosťou, úžasným hazardovaním s budúcnosťou tohoto štátu ide sa tu do experimentu, ktorý [...] musí priviesť k ďalšiemu rozviazaniu jednoty československého národa). (ďalším separatistickým cieľom). (Jestli by sme prijali stanovisko ľudovej strany o dvoch národoch, vynorí sa neúprosne ďalšia otázka: Je trvanlivým alebo vôbec možným život dvoch národných celkov v jednom štáte alebo nie? A či niet obáv, keď po vyhlásení pojmu československého národa za fixciu nestane sa Československo s československým dualizmom práve takou lžou, akou bolo Rakúsko-Uhorsko s celou jeho problematickou existenciou?). (ohromná väčšina národa československého chce jednotu). Hrušovský, 92. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. června 1927 (pp. 2025–27, 2034–35) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

Dérér pointed out that the concept of a Slovak "*krajina*" did not have any long historical precedence: on the contrary, he argued, it was first implemented by the Magyars in 1919: "Seen from abroad, this government twist is not due to the success of Hlinka and Juriga, but to the success of the universal, so-called Slovak movement systematically fostered by Magyar propaganda, whose representative abroad is the government of Jehlička and Unger and at home the party of Hlinka and Juriga [...] that universal movement fostered by Magyar propaganda in the interest of the restitution of the former integral 1000 year old Hungary." According to Dérér, the reform implied centralization and besides, it would "make the Czechoslovak republic more Austrian again." He also argued that the counties were a democratic system, while regions were aristocratic.<sup>71</sup>

Ján Halla (Agr.) defended his party's change of heart, stating that they had been right to support the county system in 1920, and were right to support the regional system now: "As it turned out, instead of uniting the state administration, the law caused a kind of dualism, because of the opposition of the historical lands against the implementation of the county system. [...] This situation with two kinds of administration in one state is untenable and dangerous", Halla argued. He pointed out that the system had been implemented in Slovakia, even though it had meant "dividing the region into weak, inorganic units." Halla did not see any risk in establishing a Slovak regional assembly, for it would have clearly limited competence. He admitted that the increased attention on Slovak national issues, whether cultural or economic, would awaken Slovak patriotism, but argued that this was not necessarily "something dangerous and anti-state": "In that patriotism I see a step towards loyalty to the state, which was foreign and unknown to Slovakia. In the success and welfare of the Slovak region and nation, I see the success and welfare of the republic."<sup>72</sup>

As for the composition of the regional assemblies, the official argumentation in favor of appointing one third of the members was to remove the assemblies somewhat from the struggle between the parties, and to raise the intellectual level of the assemblies. Patejdl asked wryly: "Would it not be more honest to say openly that they will be appointed according to the political key of the government parties?" Also Meissner expressed the same doubts, while

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<sup>71</sup> (My sa staviame proti týmto snahám, [...] nie] preto, že by sme rád' chceli Slovensko pozbaviť svojho svojrázu, svojej slovenskej reči, svojích slovenských zvláštností a slovenských zvláštnych potrieb, ale [...] preto že to môže viesť, a nielen môže, ale musí viesť k nebezpečným koncom nielen pre Československú republiku, ale v prvom rade pre samé Slovensko). (Ale tu u nás, tu v strednej Európe, kde odklonení sme nepriateľskými tendenciami, nemôžeme si dovoliť). (stane sa iba korisťou dravých a lačných susedov). (vláda ide Československú republiku zasa porakúšitiť). (V očiach zahraničia je táto vládna osnova úspechom nie pána Hlinku a pána Jurigu, ale úspechom toto všeobecného, maďarskou propagandou sústavne živeneho, tak zv. slovenského hnutia, ktorého reprezentantom v zahraničí je vláda Jehličskova a Ungova a reprezentantom vnútro-politickým strana Hlinkova a Jurigova. [...] toto všeobecného hnutia, živeneho propagandou maďarskou v záujme reštituovania bývalého integrovaného tisícročného Uhorska). Dérér, 92. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. června 1927 (pp. 2055–58, 2064) in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>72</sup> (Ukázalo sa, že odpor historických zemí proti uvedeniu župného sriadenia [...] spôsobil, že zákon, miesto aby unifikoval štátnu správu, bol príčinou akéhosi dualizmu). (na Slovensku [...] zavedené boli nové útvary, ktoré znamenali rozparcelovanie zeme na jednotky slabé, neorganické). (Tento stav dvojakej správy v jednom štáte je neudržateľný a nebezpečný). (niečo nebezpečného, protištátneho [...]) Ja v tomto patriotizme vidím stupeň ku štátnosti, ktorá Slovensku bola cudzia a neznáma. V prospechu a blahobyte zeme a národa slovenského vidím prospech a blahobyť republiky). Halla, 92. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. června 1927 (p. 2150) in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

Kramář protested against the allegation that the government parties needed this in order artificially to ensure a bourgeois majority. His would-be ally Juriga declared openly that the Ľudáks would strive to change the appointment rule at a later point. However, he did not want to "kill the child" just because it was not perfect from the outset.<sup>73</sup>

Appointment practice in Slovakia seems to confirm the doubts of the opposition. Of those appointed to the Slovak regional assembly in 1928, eight were Agrarians and six were Ľudáks, while the Social Democrats, the National Socialists, the National Democrats, and the Czechoslovak People's Party got one each.<sup>74</sup> The governing parties got 16 of the 18 appointees; it was thus hardly a disadvantage to be a party member. Considering that the Slovak People's Party was in opposition most of the period, Juriga's skepticism was well founded. However, thanks to the brief Ľudák participation in the bourgeois coalition, the first president of Slovakia was a Ľudák: Ján Drobný (1928–31). According to Alena Bartlová, the Ľudáks had several candidates, of which the weakest was picked.<sup>75</sup> A member of the Agrarian Party, Jozef Országh, became vice president. He served as president for the remainder of the period (1931–38).

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Comparing these two debates about the political-administrative structure, we can note some common features, and some differences. The main difference is perhaps that Slovak autonomism was a far more explicitly voiced concern on both sides of the 1927 debate. This was, however, emphasized by the Slovak speakers more than by the Czech. It was the Slovaks Dérer and Hrušovský who used the strongest words against Slovak autonomism as well as against the regional reform. Hrušovský had the most Czechoslovak-oriented speech, where Czechoslovakism and centralism went hand in hand. Most conspicuous in this context is that, among those speaking *in favor* of the reform, only Kramář spoke of Czechoslovak unity. Moreover, he spoke of *state* unity, not of the unity of the *Czechoslovak nation*.

In both debates a major concern was to unite the administration of the republic. It was argued that regions would endanger the unity of the Czechoslovak state and nation, and that a majority of the Czechoslovak nation wanted unity. Other, mostly rhetorical, arguments used against the regions in both debates were that the regions were feudal or aristocratic, and that they certainly were Austrian or Habsburg in origin (i.e. foreign). In 1927 an equally rhetorical argument was added: that the Slovak region was Magyar in origin.

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<sup>73</sup> (Nebylo by upřímnější říci hned otevřeně, že budou jmenováni podle politického klíče vládních stran?) Patejdl, 91. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. června 1927 (p. 1928). See also Kramář, 90. schůze ... dne 27. června 1927 (pp. 1852–53), Meissner, Kramář, and Juriga, 91. schůze ... dne 28. června 1927 (pp. 1967, 1984, 2079), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>74</sup> See Natália Krajčovičová: Politické strany na Slovensku a úsilie o samosprávu, in: *Slovensko v politickom systéme Československa* (1992:54); Xénia Šuchová: Administratívna samospráva v koncepciách slovenských centralistov Milana Hodžu a Ivana Déreera, in: *Historický časopis* 2, (1994:243).

<sup>75</sup> Alena Bartlová: Niektoré nové prvky v politickom systéme ČSR a v politickom živote Slovenska na prelome 20. a 30. rokov, in: *Studia Historica Nitriensia III* (1995:99). See *Slovák* no. 129, 9.6.1928:1, *Slovák* no. 134, 15.6.1928:1, *Slovák* no. 146, 29.6.1928:1 for reports on the controversy about who should get the president.

One argument in favor of the regions in both debates was that they were historical units to which strong loyalties were attached. In 1927 the need to calm down the autonomists was added to this, along with the argument that Slovak patriotism was a precondition for loyalty to the state. Arguments in favor of the counties were that they were more suitable to modern times, more democratic, and that they made the republic less Austrian in character. The latter was a rhetoric counterpart to the arguments against the regions presented above. Against counties it was argued that they were artificial/inorganic, and had no historical basis.

Finally, the debates were different in terms of who participated in them, although this point does not show very well in my presentation. In 1927, also the Communist Party and the parties of the national minorities took part in the debate. The two German activist parties that participated in the government, the German Agrarians (BL) and the German Christian-Socialist party (DCV), were in favor, while the rest of the minority parties and the Communists were against. Since the minorities are not the focus here, I have chosen not to go into their argumentation.

The main Communist speaker was Josef Haken, who argued that the reform was closely associated with efforts to stabilize capitalism and prepare for an imperialist war. Part of his speech was censored in the records, but immediately before the censored part, he spoke of the national minorities. It is thus likely that he spoke in favor of the right of every nation to self-determination, which had been Communist policy since 1925.<sup>76</sup>

What do these debates tell us about the motivation for choosing the county system in 1920 and the region system in 1927? An explicit aim in both cases was to do away with the administrative dualism that was a heritage from Austria-Hungary, but this could have been achieved with any system, as long as it was the same all over. Three questions emerge: Why was the county structure chosen in the first place? Why was it implemented only in Slovakia, and not in the historical lands? And why was it abolished also there in 1928, and replaced with a new variety of regions?

It is more than likely that the majority chose the county system in 1920 out of fear that a less centralized structure would endanger the unity of the state and thus its very existence – i.e. that the motives corresponded to the main arguments. At this point, the state was not yet fully consolidated. The secession attempt of the German minority in 1918, and continued demonstrations and unrest in 1919, the invasion of Slovakia by Magyar Communist forces in 1919, and Hlinka and Jehlička's trip to Paris,<sup>77</sup> were unsettling events from the point of view of state unity. Even the Ľudáks in the Slovak club refrained from voting against the Constitution "out of the higher interest of its unanimous acceptance"; although there is no doubt that they wanted autonomy also then (cf. Juriga's shouting – see page 453).

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<sup>76</sup> See Haken, 91. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. června 1927 (p. 1985) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*; Alena Bartlová: Boj o autonómiu Slovenska v rokoch 1918–1938, in: *Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století* (1993a:209).

<sup>77</sup> See Věra Olivová: *Československé dějiny 1914–39*, I (1993:81–88, 103–7), Joseph Rothschild: *East Central Europe between the two world wars* (1992:73 pp). I will return to Hlinka and Jehlička's trip to Paris on page 465.

According to the contemporary writer and political observer Ferdinand Peroutka, "the whole county law was designed [...] with the main aim of making the growth of Slovak separatism more difficult. Slovakia was to be deprived of the possibility to feel as a region of its own." The general idea was that an overarching solidarity could be cultivated by dissolving the regions into counties and erasing the borders between the regions. This was based on the premise that "counties cannot be separatist, but entire regions might. The most important was for Slovakia to disappear as a individuality of its own", Peroutka claimed. Eva Broklová basically seconds him.<sup>78</sup> This concern was hardly mentioned in the debate of 1920, but, one year later, Ivan Markovič argued that implementation of the county reform was "a condition for the elimination of subversive territorial, autonomist and separatist attempts." And in 1923, Ludevít Medvecký argued that only counties could "confront the autonomist movement."<sup>79</sup>

The county system was implemented in Slovakia on January 1st, 1923, after having been on the high-priority list of three governments.<sup>80</sup> In 1924, Pavel Macháček complained: "Slovakia is a guinea pig, on which the Prague government wants to try out its experiment. The historical lands, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia are left in their old ways. [...] The Czechs and Moravians resist the new county system with strength and power. Their demand is being heard, while we Slovaks have already become guinea pigs. Slovakia has paid heavy tolls for that experiment of the Prague masters."<sup>81</sup>

There seems to be broad consensus also among scholars that the system was not implemented in the historical Czechs lands because of the strong opposition against it. The opposition had to do with the German domination in two of the counties (Karlovy Vary and Česká Lípa). According to Peroutka, nobody believed in the loyalty of the Germans to the state, and they were afraid that these two nearly exclusively German counties would be "bastions of disloyalty and resistance." In addition, the Czech minorities in the German-speaking areas voiced concerns that the old German oppression would return.<sup>82</sup> (See also Map 3.)

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<sup>78</sup> (celý župní zákon byl udělán [...] s hlavním cílem ztížit vznik slovenského separatismu. Slovensku měla být vzata možnost cítit se zvláštní zemí. [...] Župy nemohou být separatistické, avšak celé země mohou. Hlavně záleželo na tom, aby zmizelo Slovensko jako zvláštní individualita). Ferdinand Peroutka: *Budování státu*, sv. III (1991:1008–9). See also Eva Broklová: O takzvaném českém centralismu, in: *Slovensko v politickom systéme Československa* (1992c:83).


<sup>79</sup> (predpokladom zániku rozvratných teritoriálnych, autonómnych a separatistických snah). Markovič, 88. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1921 (p. 175). (župné sriadenie [...] môže jedine čeliť autonomistickému hnutiu). Medvecký, 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 389), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>80</sup> The Tusar government e.g. promised to implement it soon in Slovakia, where the present administrative conditions required it the most. See Tusar, 2. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 1. června 1920 (p. 21) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... See also Krajčovičová (1992:48–52).

<sup>81</sup> (Slovensko je pokusným králikom, na ktorom pražská vláda chce vyprobovať svoje pokusy. Historické zeme, Čechy, Morava a Sliezsko boli v starej jakosti ponechané). (sa bránia silou-mocou Česi a Moravia oproti novému župnému zriadeniu. Ich žiadosť bude vyslyšaná, keďže sme sa my Slováci stali už pokusným králikom. Slovensko na tento pokus pražských pánov doplácalo ťažké tisíce). Macháček in: *Slovák týždenník* no. 1, 6.1.1924:1. See also Juriga, 86. schůze ... dne 18. října 1921 (p. 29), and Buday, 160. schůze ... dne 25. října 1922 (p. 110) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>82</sup> (že to budou dvě bašty neloajlnosti a odboje). Peroutka (1991:1020). See also Rothschild (1992:107), *Dějiny zemí koruny české*, II (1993:175), *Slovník českých dějin* (1994:372), Oskar Krejčí: *Kniha a volbách* (1994:141–42).

**Map 3: National distribution according to county and region (1921)**



Source: Sčítání lidu v republice Československé ze dne 15. února 1921, Díl I (1924), List 6 and 7.



In 1927 the aim was still to unite the political-administrative system in the Czech lands and Slovakia, but now the county system was abandoned for regions that were more centralist than the old Austrian system, but less centralist than the proposed county system. What was the motivation for this change? Most parties argued in the same vein as in 1920, the main exception being the Agrarians. Their motives are especially interesting also because they were the leading party in the coalition. First, the change of policy may have been motivated by a wish to mollify the Slovak autonomist opposition by accommodating it in part, without putting the unity of the state at risk. Second, it may have been motivated by the Czech opposition against the county system. Finally, it may have been motivated simply by political necessity, meaning that the reform was the fruit of a political pact with the Slovak People's Party. None of these explanations necessarily excludes the others.

It is a quite common view that a Slovak "*krajina*" was the price the bourgeois government coalition had to pay in order to get Hlinka's Slovak People's Party to join.<sup>83</sup> This impression was also actively promoted by the ľudák press, as well as by the leadership of the party. "The basis on which the party could enter the government, is the proposition to reorganize the political administration",<sup>84</sup> according to a report in *Slovák*. In an article written on the very same day as the ľudáks decided to join the government (January 15th, 1927), Andrej Hlinka presented the *země* reform as a great triumph: "We came out of the struggle as victors. We have sown the seed of autonomy, we have won respect and integrity for the Slovak *krajina* [...] We fought well, protected Slovakia and saved the autonomy of the region."<sup>85</sup>

The ľudák press left no doubt whatsoever that the Slovak People's Party saw the *země* reform as merely a first step towards Slovak autonomy, or as "a certain glint of autonomy." The executive committee announced that the proposal would not have the effect of any "political autonomy for the Slovak *krajina* on the basis of the right to self-determination of the individual Slovak nation." It should thus not be "regarded as the solution and ending of the Slovak national question in the republic of the Slovaks and Czechs. [...] We know and we believe that the Slovak national question [...] will only be solved the moment the autonomy of the Slovak *krajina* [...] is completed."<sup>86</sup> A few days before the reform was put into effect, *Slovák* reminded its readers that the establishment of a Slovak *krajina* was "but the skeleton, on which the full autonomy of Slovakia will be built in time."<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> See e.g. See James Ramon Felak: *At the price of the republic. Hlinka's Slovak people's party 1929–38* (1994:34), Rotschild (1992:113), Carol Skalník Leff: *National conflict in Czechoslovakia* (1988:78).

<sup>84</sup> (Bázisom na ktorom mohla strana vstúpiť do vlády, je návrh na reorganizáciu politickej správy). *Slovák* no. 28, 5.2.1927.

<sup>85</sup> (Ideme z boja ako víťazi. Zasiali sme semeno autonómne, vydobili rešpekt a celistvosť Slovenskej Krajiny. [...] dobrý boj sme bojovali, Slovensko zachovali, autonomiu zeme zachránili). Hlinka in: *Slovák* no. 13, 18.1.1927:1.

<sup>86</sup> (určitý záblesk autonómie). (politickej autonomii Slovenskej Krajiny na základe samourčujúceho práva osobitného slovenského národa [...] považovaný za vyriešenie a skoncovanie slovenskej národnej otázky v republike Slovákov a Čechov. [...] Vieme a veríme, že slovenská národná otázka [...] len vtedy bude riešená, keď autonómia Slovenskej Krajiny [...] bude vybudovaná). *Slovák* no. 28, 5.2.1927:1,2. See also *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1927:3 and *Slovák* no. 14, 19.1.1927:1.

<sup>87</sup> (krajinské sriadenie je len kostrou, z ktorej sa má časom zformovať úplná samospráva, autonómia Slovenska). *Slovák* no. 146, 29.6.1928:1. See also *Slovák* no. 147, 1.7.1928:1, 3.

There can thus be little doubt of the motives of the Ľudáks: They saw the establishment of the Slovak *krajina* as a first step towards political autonomy. As for the other parties, the Socialist Parties were against regions in 1920 and again in 1927, arguing that this would harm state unity. Likewise, the Czechoslovak People's Party and the National Democrats were in favor of regions at both points. Their motivation was hardly to accommodate the Slovaks, but to preserve the historical Czech lands. To what extent were the Agrarians motivated by a wish to accommodate the Slovak autonomists?

On the one hand, Czech opposition against the county system *was* strong enough to block its implementation, and it is not likely that this opposition would have evaporated if the government had not decided to drop the system. Moreover, the two parties most strongly against the county system in 1920, the Czechoslovak People's Party and the National Democrats, were now coalition partners. The administrative reorganization that took place thus may have been the only viable alternative to continued administrative dualism, which all parties saw as a greater evil. It may thus be argued that, without the strong Czech opposition to the county system, the Slovak *krajina* never would have come into being. The parallel to religious issues is clear; issues that were solved were those that united the national divide.

Carol Leff may also be right when she argues that other concerns were more important for the Agrarians. In her view, the main policy objectives of the coalition brokers were "agrarian advantage and religious conciliation." She argues that "welcoming the HSL'S was only secondarily concerned with any commitment to nationalist accommodation", and that "the administrative reorganization represented a sort of outer limit to the government's willingness to respond to Slovak political nationalism." Yet, she admits that co-opting the Ľudáks entailed "certain advantages in accommodating Slovak nationalism as well."<sup>88</sup>

On the other hand, accommodating the Slovak autonomists may have been at least a side motive. Peroutka argued that the government was looking for a way to "pacify the autonomist brawls of the [Slovak] People's Party, and in the regional system they saw an excellent opportunity to push back the autonomist slogans to a harmless riverbed of merely administrative regional autonomy. They gave this, in order not having to give more. It was believed that the regional system may take the edge off the problem of Slovak autonomy, which grew steadily."<sup>89</sup> Bartlová is probably right that it was the landslide election of the Ľudáks in 1925 that convinced the government that a new approach to the Slovak problem would have to be found. Kramář's speech at the government inauguration of Švehla in 1925 supports this view.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Leff (1988:76, 77, 80).

<sup>89</sup> (Hledal se tehdy způsob, jak pacifikovat autonomistické bouření strany Ľudové, a v zemském zřízení spatřovala se vhodná příležitost, jak odsunout autonomistická hesla do neškodného řečiště pouhé administrativní zemské samosprávy. Dávalo se toto, aby se nemusilo dát více. Myslelo se, že zemské zřízení může otupit problém slovenské autonomie, který stále vyrůstal). See Peroutka (1991:1022).

<sup>90</sup> See Alena Bartlová: Úsilie dr. Milana Hodžu pri vytváraní politických a hospodárskych blokov na Slovensku v rokoch 1918–1938, in: *Milan Hodža. Štátnik a politik* (1994:106), Kramář, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 19. prosince 1925 (p. 138), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

Bartlová's view is also supported by the fact that Milan Hodža, one of the driving forces behind the Agrarian turnaround, had been in favor of the county system as late as prior to the 1925 election. Some of the Agrarian *župans* remained against the establishment of a Slovak *krajina* also after 1925. Hodža had already in 1920 advocated administrative autonomy for Slovakia, but within the framework of the associations of counties (see also pp. 473). His own analysis was thus: "For the Slovaks in particular it was an urgent necessity to abate the movement for autonomy in its extreme form, by according as large a measure of self-government as was practically expedient, in such a form as would appease reasonable opinion. [...] It was the pressure from Slovakia that definitely turned the scales in favor of an administrative division of the Republic on lines representing a fair compromise between historic tradition and the needs of the day."<sup>91</sup> In one sense, the reform was a greater victory for Hodža than for Hlinka, since he had been in favor of administrative rather than legislative autonomy. From the perspective of state unity, this was also safer, since decentralization can always be reversed.

### *The struggle for Slovak autonomy*

The struggle for Slovak autonomy started almost immediately after the upheaval. The official version of the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918, admittedly did not say anything about the future organization of a Czechoslovak state, but it is quite certain that autonomy was discussed at a meeting of the Slovak National Council in Turčianský Svätý Martin on October 31st. According to Dušan Kováč, a majority of those present thought that the Slovaks would manage their own affairs in the future. But in the given situation, with liberation from the Magyars as the most pressing concern, they did not deem it wise to demand autonomy.<sup>92</sup>

The first proposal of Slovak autonomy was formulated as early as November 13th, 1918, by Ferdiš Juriga, on his way to the first meeting in the Revolutionary Parliament. It contained demands for a Slovak "*krajina*", "Slovak autonomy and administration", but no Slovak legislative assembly. "Autonomy" thus did not always mean the same, even in the vocabulary of the Slovak People's Party. According to Bartlová, the *ľudáks* started to see political autonomy as a possible solution to Czecho–Slovak relations in the spring of 1919, after the Pittsburgh Agreement became known in Slovakia. The demand for *samospráva* (autonomy) was in any case included in the election program of 1919.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> See Vladimír Zuberec: Milan Hodža in: Dušan Kováč a kolektív: *Muži deklarácie* (1991:182); Šuchová (1994:228, 234–35), Krajčovičová (1992:53); Milan Hodža: The political evolution, in: R.W. Seton-Watson (ed.): *Slovakia then and now* (1931:89–90), Milan Hodža: *Články, reči, štúdie, sv. VII. Slovensko a republika* (1934: 36–37, 97–104).

<sup>92</sup> (Väčšina deklarantov zastávala názor, že Slovensko sa v budúcnosti bude spravovať samo). Dušan Kováč a kolektív: *Muži deklarácie* (1991:19). On the Martin declaration, see also: Václav Chaloupecký: *Martinská deklarácie a její politické osudy* (1928), Martin Grečo: *Martinská deklarácia* (1946), Mikuš (1995:43–45).

<sup>93</sup> (svoju slovenskú krajinu). (slovensku samosprávu [...] so slovenskou správou). Alena Bartlová gave me a photocopy of the handwritten proposal, which is disposed in the Slovak National Museum in Bratislava. See also Alena Bartlová: *Boj o autonómiu Slovenska v rokoch 1918–38*, in: *Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století* (1993a:207, 214), *Naša Slovenská ľudová strana. Čo ona chce? a Za čo bojuje?* (1919:16).

Invoking the Pittsburgh Agreement, Hlinka and Jehlička claimed autonomy in the Memorandum of the Slovak Nation to the Paris Peace Conference, which they brought with them on their clandestine journey to Paris in September 1919. The immediate impulse for the journey was that Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had been promised autonomy in the peace treaty, and Hlinka wanted the same for Slovakia. Upon his return in October, he was arrested on charges of treason and brought to a state penitentiary in Mírov, Moravia. He was released on a presidential amnesty immediately before the first election in April 1920.<sup>94</sup>

Hlinka's actions brought out strong reactions also in the Parliament. On behalf of a unanimous Slovak Club, Juraj Slávik relieved Hlinka and Jehlička of their mandates. He charged them with instigating "against the brotherly harmony of the Czech and Slovak nation" and presenting "the conditions in Slovakia in such a light that it harms the good reputation and the interests of the Czechoslovak republic unduly."<sup>95</sup> Hlinka's answer from Mírov penitentiary was that the Slovak club had no right to deprive him of the mandate. He denied having cultivated anti-state interests or having harmed cooperation with the Czechs. Neither did he accept the Slovak club as his judge: "As the judge of my actions [...] I only recognize my conscience and the nation."<sup>96</sup> In light of the strong reactions on Hlinka's trip to Paris, it is understandable that the Ľudáks did not call for autonomy in the debate over the Constitution in February 1920.

### ***The first autonomy proposal of the Slovak People's Party (1922)***

During 1921, three autonomy proposals were formulated – by Ferdiš Juriga, Ľudovít Labaj, and Vojtech Tuka. The Ľudáks presented their first autonomy proposal to the Parliament in January 1922. They argued that "the right of the Slovak nation to self-determination" had not been asserted in the Constitution of 1920, and that the solution of the Revolutionary Parliament served neither the interests of Slovakia nor the interests of the Czechoslovak republic as a whole. The aim of the proposal was thus a final, valid resolution of the status of Slovakia, invoking the principle of "national self-determination and the Pittsburgh Agreement."<sup>97</sup>

The proposal was formulated as an amendment to the 1920 constitution. The most important changes were proposed in §3 under "general provisions." Instead of asserting that "the territories of the Czechoslovak republic shall form a united and indivisible *unit*...", the Ľudák proposal named the territories out of which the Czechoslovak republic had been formed, and

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<sup>94</sup> For the memorandum, see Mikuš (1995:163–170). For the text of the Pittsburgh agreement, see Chapter Nine, page 187). See also Alena Bartlová: *Andrej Hlinka* (1991a:65).

<sup>95</sup> (podnecovali proti bratskej shode českého a slovenského národa a predstavovali pomery na Slovensku v takom svetle, že to nad mieru škodí dobrej povesti a záujmom československého republiky). Slávik, 82. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 9. října 1919 (p. 2489), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>96</sup> (za sudcu mojich činov neuznávam nijaký klub, ale jedine moje svedomie a národ). Andrej Hlinka: *Zápisky z Mírova* (1941:80–83). The quotation is from page 81.

<sup>97</sup> (sebeurčujúce právo slovenského národa). (právo samourčenia národov a pittsburgskú dohodu). For the text, see Tisk 3403 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám*..., Svazek XIII (1922). This introduction was identical with Labaj's proposal, published in *Slovák* no. 26, 26.6.1921:1.

stated that these together "shall form a united and indivisible *state*." The original §3 also contained some provisions concerning the autonomy of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. This is where the Ľudáks put the provisions for Slovak autonomy. The introductory sentence was a reformulation of the original, which had promised Ruthenia "the widest measure of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czechoslovak republic." The Ľudáks added Slovakia.<sup>98</sup>

According to the proposal Slovakia was to have her own coat of arms and her own flag. In "internal affairs" she was to enjoy regional autonomy, including legislative as well as executive powers. Defined as "internal affairs" were administration, education, church affairs, trade, justice, agriculture, public employment, and welfare. To govern in internal affairs, the president should appoint a separate regional government consisting of Slovaks, which would be responsible to a Slovak regional assembly (*snem*). This assembly should have one chamber only, and should be composed of as many members as there were Slovak senators and deputies in the Czechoslovak Parliament (i.e. 92). This regional assembly was to decide independently on legislation related to the internal affairs of Slovakia. The president should sanction Slovak laws. The language of administration in Slovakia should be Slovak. The proposal also gave the Slovak government control over the employment of civil servants in Slovakia.

"Joint affairs" were armed forces, foreign affairs, public communications, constitutional law, and election of the president. The currency would remain common, but the main text should be in Czech on one side and in Slovak on the other side of the bank notes. According to the proposal one third of the Czechoslovak ministers should be from Slovakia, one third of the administration of joint affairs should be Slovaks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should use Slovak and Czech, and Slovak should be used in Slovak regiments. In peacetime, Slovak regiments were to be posted only in Slovakia. Slovakia should be represented by 31 senators and 61 deputies in the shared Parliament (according to the law). A provision that invalidated laws adopted by the Parliament if two thirds of the Slovak assembly voted against them, would have given the assembly veto power. This proposal was stopped at the initiative committee.<sup>99</sup>

Of the three original autonomy proposals from 1921, I have only been able to see those of Labaj and Tuka. According to Bartlová, the proposals of Juriga and Labaj were fairly similar. In content, Labaj's proposal was closest to the final Ľudák version, but there were some substantial differences: In Labaj's version, the state was called "the Czecho-Slovak republic" – with a hyphen. The president should appoint the government of Slovakia on the basis of recommendations of the Slovak assembly. Labaj also wanted one third of the central government to be "Slovak in origin and descent" (not only "from Slovakia"), and the president to be alternately of Czech and Slovak descent.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> (my emphasis). See Zákon č. 121. ze dne 29. února 1920, kterým se uvozuje ústavní listina československé republiky, in *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého* (1920), Mikuš (1995:170–198) for the original Constitution. For the proposal, see Tisk 3403 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek XIII (1922).

<sup>99</sup> See also Felak (1994:30–31).

<sup>100</sup> Labaj's proposal was published in: *Slovák* no. 26, 26.6.1921:1. See also Bartlová (1993a:217).

Tuka's was by far the most extreme of these autonomy schemes. In Tuka's view, the Constitution of 1920 was invalid because the Slovaks in the Revolutionary Parliament had not been elected. In his view it was now high time to settle the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks legally, on the basis of the right to national self-determination. To this end Tuka proposed that the president should dissolve the "temporary" (*dočasně*) Parliament within 30 days, and call new elections (§3). Slovak citizenship of October 28th, 1918, should be a condition to run for office in Slovakia (§4), which would effectively have excluded Czechs and even exiled Slovaks from running. The deputies should function in two separate parliaments, one in Prague, the other in Bratislava (§5), and the president should appoint two separate governments, one Czech and one Slovak (§7).

In an appendix entitled The "Federate Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic", Tuka laid down the principles of the federation. A shared president was to represent the unity of the federation (§3). Both states should have their own constitutions, their own legislation, their own national governments, national armies, administration and judiciary system, state finances, state territory, civil and political rights, state language and national flags (§5). Both states should be independent juridical subjects, represented individually in the League of Nations (§6), with the right to negotiate and sign international agreements (§7).

In the charter, the Czechs and Slovaks were presented as two nations, each with its own nation-state. In the preamble it spoke of "We two nations, the Czech and the Slovak...", and in §1, of "two nation-states, the Czech and the Slovak, [which] enter an eternal and inseparable brotherly association." In line with this, the name of the federation should be the "Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic." According to Tuka, "the new state formation contain two republics, and the correct thing would be to call it a confederation (Republikenbund) and not a federation (Bundesrepublik). However, practical considerations prescribe the latter term, which better expresses the condition of brotherly unity of the two republics."

Also Tuka proposed that presidents should be alternately of Czech and Slovak descent. The president should represent the states abroad, appoint ambassadors and consuls, declare war and mobilization, conclude peace with the consent of the parliaments of both states, and be commander-in-chief of the armed forces of both states, in war and peace (§31). Separate agreements would be formed in matters where shared regulations would be of benefit to the federation. Among the matters listed were: Foreign affairs, military, public communications (post, telegraph, railways, shipping, aviation), banking and currency, state credit, customs and foreign trade, administration, labor matters, legal power, measure and weight, tax and monopoly, patents, copy right, migration and supply (§51-52).<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> (Návrh svázovskej listiny Česko-slovenskej Svázovej Republiky). (My dva národy, český a slovenský...). (§1. Dva národné štáty, český a slovenský, vstupujú do večného a nerozlúčiteľného bratského sväzu. Meno sväzu je: Česko-Slovenská Svázová Republika). (Nový útvar obsahuje dve republiky a správne mal byť menovaný sväzom republikou (Republikenbund) a nie svázovou republikou (Bundesrepublik). Praktická cieľuprimeranosť odporúča ale toto pozdejšie pomenovanie, ktoré lepšie označuje pomer bratskej jednoty dvoch republík). Vojtech Tuka: *Návrh zákona o autonómii Slovenska* (1921:3, 4, 6, 9–12, 17, 21–22, 33).

***The second autonomy proposal of the Slovak People's Party (1930)***

The second Ľudák autonomy proposal was filed in May 1930. This was more modest than the first, in length and in contents. It contained three small paragraphs, aiming at extending the provisions of article 3 of the Constitution of 1920 (valid for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia) to Slovakia. This was an obvious rhetorical advantage, since the proposal could not be called anti-constitutional,<sup>102</sup> but it meant giving up a Slovak government. In principle, the original article 3 gave Ruthenia the right to "the widest measure of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czechoslovak republic", including its own Diet with legislative power in linguistic, educational, and religious matters, matters of local administration, and its own Governor responsible to the Diet. The article also required that public officials in Ruthenia be selected from the Ruthenian population. In addition, the Ľudáks wanted to extend the competence of "autonomous Slovakia" to justice.<sup>103</sup> The proposal was drafted by Karol Mederly, a close associate of Hlinka.<sup>104</sup> It was never put on the agenda of the Parliament.

In 1933, the Ľudáks established a political commission led by Jozef Buday in order to draft a new autonomy proposal. Among the members were Jozef Tiso and the brothers Ján and Ferdinand Ďurčanský, who formed the core in the circle of young Slovak intellectuals around the journal *Nástup*. In early 1934 the brothers presented a quite radical autonomy proposal worked out by the *Nástup* circle. It was first accepted by a sub-commission, then the General Secretary Martin Sokol made some substantial changes without the Ďurčanský brothers' knowledge. Enraged, they leaked it to the government in Prague, where it was made to look like an official Ľudák proposal. The strategy did not work, as the party disassociated itself from the proposal publicly. After this incident, efforts to draft a new autonomy proposal were abandoned.<sup>105</sup>

The *Nástup* proposal was formed as a Constitutional law instituting autonomy for Slovakia.<sup>106</sup> The autonomous territory of Slovakia would be a unitary and indivisible part of the Czechoslovak republic (§1), natives of Slovakia would have Slovak citizenship (§3), Slovak would be the official language (§4), Bratislava would be the capital, and Slovakia would have her own flag and coat of arms (§5). Slovakia would have full legislative and executive power in internal affairs, which included internal administration, education, religion and justice, including the entire court system. In matters of industry and trade, the proposal allowed legislative power to be executed in accordance with the central legislative power, especially in cases where the people of Slovakia had mutual interests with the rest of the republic. Slovakia was to have her own legislative assembly and a government responsible to this assembly.

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<sup>102</sup> Tiso e.g. argued in the budget debate of 1934 that if the Ľudáks were separatists, so was the Constitution. See Tiso, 301. schůze posl. sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. listopadu 1933 (p. 52), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>103</sup> For the proposal, see Tisk 425 in: *Tisky...*, Svazek III (1930). Ruthenian autonomy was implemented only in 1938.

<sup>104</sup> Bartlová (1993a:218). See also Bartlová: Situácia na Slovensku a štátoprávne úsilie politických strán v tridsiatych rokoch, in: *Slovensko v politickom systéme Československa* (1992:60).

<sup>105</sup> See Felak (1994:126–28).

<sup>106</sup> A German translation of the proposal of the *Nástup* circle is published in Jörg K. Hoensch: *Dokumente zur Autonomiepolitik der Slowakischen Volkspartei Hlinkas* (1984:200–215). The following presentation is based on this.

Joint affairs would be citizenship, foreign affairs, army and finance, but the proposal contained clear restrictions also here. International treaties that would impose burdens on Slovakia or affect Slovak property or state borders would need the consent of Slovakia; and Slovak inhabitants should serve in the Slovak national army, with Slovak as the language of command. In addition to these joint affairs, "matters of common interest" would be the joint responsibility of the governments and parliaments (currency, banking, duty, international trade agreements, and communications; post, telegraph, railways, shipping, aviation, and public roads).

The proposal required all legislation adopted by the central Parliament to be published in Slovak at once and forwarded to the Slovak assembly. It also required that the Slovak flag should be flown alongside the Czechoslovak whenever the central Parliament discussed joint matters (!). Under the government of the Czechoslovak republic, a separate ministry of Slovakia, led by a Slovak, should be established. The proposal also required special sections for Slovakia in all ministries of joint affairs. These sections were to be staffed exclusively by Slovaks, and Slovak should be the sole language. All government decrees should be published in Slovak at once, and forwarded to the Slovak government.

Since the proposal of the *Nástup* circle was less elaborate than both the 1922 proposal of the Slovak People's Party and Tuka's proposal, it is hard to say exactly how far-reaching it was compared to these. I would be inclined to place it somewhere between the other two. The proposal did involve a central Parliament and government, which makes it more of a federal arrangement than Tuka's proposal was. On the other hand, it also included a Slovak national army, and provisions for a Slovak veto in the case of international treaties that affected Slovak interests, even though armed forces and foreign affairs would in principle be common.

According to Bartlová, the proposal of the *Nástup* circle was unacceptable to the leadership in the Slovak People's Party. They did not identify with it, and while Hlinka was still alive, there was no chance that the party would present it to the Parliament.<sup>107</sup>

### ***The third autonomy proposal of the Slovak People's Party (1938)***

The third and last autonomy proposal was presented to the Parliament in June 1938, also signed by two Slovak Agrarians (Pavol Teplanský and Ján S. Vančo) and Ján Liška of the Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party. The proposal was formulated by Ferdinand Ďurčanský, A. Kočiš and Martin Sokol.<sup>108</sup> Andrej Hlinka was among the signatories, but he did not live to see it through. He died in August, whereas the Ľudák proposal was promulgated in November 1938, after the fateful Munich Agreement of September 30th that year, and the ensuing Czechoslovak capitulation. This also marked the end of the First Czechoslovak Republic.

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<sup>107</sup> See Bartlová (1993a:220).

<sup>108</sup> See Valerián Bystrický: Prestavba republiky na federáciu v roku 1938, in: *Slovensko v politickom systéme Československa* (1992:65); Bartlová (1993a:221).



There had been contacts between the government, represented by Hodža, and the Ľudáks soon after the 1935 election. The Ľudáks voted for Edvard Beneš in December 1935, in exchange for promises that the Slovak question would be solved.<sup>109</sup> The so-called Beneš Plan, dated September 22nd, 1938, contained nine points. They included a compromise on the matter of Slovak national individuality (both views were to be respected), a provision for proportional representation of the Slovaks in the civil service, equality of Czech and Slovak as official languages, and a Diet with legislative power in matters of social welfare, health, economy and education.<sup>110</sup> The executive committee of the Slovak People's Party accepted this as a basis for negotiations, but it came too late. Beneš resigned as President on October 5th, 1938.

The immediate pretext for promulgating the Ľudák proposal was the Žilina Agreement of October 6th, 1938, where representatives of the Agrarians, the Small Traders' Party, the National Socialists, the Fascists, the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party embraced the proposal, and vowed to do their best to see it through Parliament by October 28th (Independence Day). Significantly, the Social Democrats did not sign, presumably because of Dérer's resistance. It was also agreed that governmental and executive power should be put into the hands of a Slovak government, with Jozef Tiso as the premier. This part was carried out the day after. Tiso presided over the Agrarians Pavol Teplanský and Ján Lichner, and the Ľudáks Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Matúš Černák.<sup>111</sup>

The third autonomy proposal resembled the first proposal more than the second.<sup>112</sup> Under "general provisions", it stated that Slovakia was an autonomous part of the Czecho-Slovak republic (§1), and that Slovak was the language of administration and instruction on Slovak territory, but that citizens of other nationalities may use their mother tongue in public contacts (§2). It also endorsed a regional (*krajinská*) citizenship (§3). The Constitutional-Judicial Committee inserted a provision in §2 allowing members of the Czech nation and Bohemian and Moravian institutions and corporations to use Czech in contact with public organs in Slovakia, and a provision safeguarding the linguistic rights of national minorities.

Joint affairs would be the Constitution, foreign affairs, national defense, state citizenship, currency, measure and weight, customs, communications, post, telegraph and telephone, state credits, taxes, revenues and fees, monopolies and joint state ventures. The original Ľudák proposal exempted international agreements exclusively regarding Slovak cultural, religious and economic matters; and stated that in peace, a proportional share of the military contingents should be stationed in Slovakia (§4). The Constitutional-Judicial Committee accepted the latter, while deciding that the former would require the consent of the Slovak assembly (§9).

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<sup>109</sup> See Tiso in *Slovák* no. 290, 22.12.1935:1. See also *Slovák* no. 288, 20.12.1935:1, and *Slovák* no. 289, 21.12.1935:1. See Alena Bartlová: *Andrej Hlinka* (1991a:98–102) on the internal process in the party before the election of Beneš.

<sup>110</sup> See Mikuš (1995:55) for the details of the Beneš plan.

<sup>111</sup> The text of the Žilina agreement is published as document no. 33 in Mikuš (1995:214). A Slovak version may be found in: Pavol Čarnogurský: *6. október 1938* (1993:135). See Tomeš (1994:246), and Mikuš (1995:56) on the government.

<sup>112</sup> See Tisk 1429 (the Ľudák proposal) and Tisk 1432 (the proposal of the Constitutional-Judicial committee in: *Tisky k řešení sečským právům...* Svazek XI (1938).

The proposal established a Slovak government responsible to a Slovak assembly, with jurisdiction in all affairs not explicitly defined as joint, or administered jointly by consent of both parties (§15). A Constitutional veto was introduced, requiring the consent of a qualified majority of the deputies elected from Slovakia for Constitutional laws to be adopted (§5). The same kind of veto was established in the case of presidential elections (§10). Alterations of the borders of the Slovak *krajina* would require the consent of two-thirds of the Slovak *assembly* (§9). Laws valid in Slovakia should be published also in Slovak original (§7). Employees of the central state administration in Slovakia should be hired first and foremost among the domestic population of the Slovak *krajina*, and the population of Slovakia should be represented according to its share of the population in joint administrative organs (§13). These articles were, apart from small technical changes, left untouched by the Committee.

Finally, article 18 of the Ľudák proposal was very particular about how joint expenses should be handled. Slovakia should contribute according to her share of the tax revenue; she should not pay for services that did not serve the interests of the Slovak *krajina*; if Slovakia was receiving less than she was entitled to in terms of investments etc., quotas could be introduced. None of this was adopted by the Committee, which is not surprising.

The debate in the Chamber of Deputies on November 19th was no real debate; the spokesman of the Committee, Martin Sokol was the only speaker. Two more speakers were registered, but on the initiative of Sokol, Rudolf Beran (Agr.), and Antonín Hampl (ČSD), the Chamber of Deputies decided not to have a debate, allegedly because the moment of promulgation "will forever remain memorable. Not wanting to burden this historical moment with any speeches, we propose not to have any debate about it."<sup>113</sup> I strongly doubt that this was the real reason.

Sokol argued that the constitutional amendment was "extraordinarily important, not only for Slovakia, but also for the entire republic." Slovakia was now ensured the Constitutional position that belonged to her in the spirit of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Sokol left no doubt that he regarded the amendment as fulfillment of "the eternal aspirations of the Slovak nation. What not even long ago was only the wish of the Slovaks, today becomes reality. It is a political event so important in the history of the Slovak nation, that we with full right may call today's sitting of the Chamber of Deputies historical. [...] Who wants to win, must in the first place believe in the victory of the truth for which he works and struggles. The Slovaks triumphed after twenty years of struggle, because they did not lose their faith in God, and believed in the righteousness and viability of their own nation."<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> (Chvíle uzákonění obou těchto zákonů zůstane provždy památnou. Nechtějce tuto historickou chvíli zatěžovati jakýmkoliv projevem, navrhujeme, aby se o těchto osnovách rozprava nekonala). 155. schůze ... dne 19. listopadu 1938 (p. 8), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...* Vlado Clementis and Olexa Borkaňuk (both KSČ) had registered to speak.

<sup>114</sup> (mimoriadne dôležitá, nielen pre Slovensko, ale aj pre republiku...). (Uzákonením prejednávanej osnovy splňujú sa odveké túžby slovenského národa. To, čo ešte len nedavno bolo želaním Slovákov, stáva sa dnes skutočnosťou. Je to politická udalosť tak významná v dejinách slovenského národa, že dnešné zasadnutie poslaneckej snemovne môžeme označiť plným právom za historické. [...] Kto chce zvíťaziť, musí v prvom rade sám veriť vo víťazstvo pravdy, za ktorú pracuje a bojuje. Slováci po 20ročnom boji zvíťazili, lebo nestrácali vieru v Boha a veril vo spravdливость a životaschopnosť svojho národa). Sokol, 155. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 19. listopadu 1938 (pp. 3, 5–6) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

On November 22nd, the Senate confirmed the Constitutional amendment. Again, only the referent of the Constitutional-Juridical Committee spoke – in this case the Ľudák Gejza Fritz.<sup>115</sup> The preamble reflected that Czechoslovakism was finally abandoned: "Departing from the fact that the Czecho-Slovak republic originated through an agreement of the sovereign will of two equal nations, that the Slovak nation was guaranteed full autonomy by the Pittsburgh agreement, as well as by other agreements and declarations at home and abroad, and led by a determination to reconcile the Czech and Slovak nation in the spirit of the Žilina agreement, the Parliament adopts this Constitutional law."<sup>116</sup>

### *Other autonomy schemes*

Also other political currents formulated autonomy schemes. While Emil Stodola (SNS) saw the "need for Slovakia to have the administration of her affairs, as far as they are specifically Slovak, in her own hands", his autonomy scheme of 1921 did not go beyond decentralization. His conception of autonomy did not involve any legislative assembly, let alone a Slovak government. The point of departure was the law of 1920 establishing counties, which gave an opening for associations of counties (see page 450). Stodola proposed the establishment of a 24-member regional body (*zemský zbor*) and an 8-member regional committee (*zemský výbor*), to adopt the budget and control its balance. Also other tasks should be decentralized from central ministries, e.g. directing Slovak agriculture, construction of public buildings, church and education matters, directing municipal administration, and supplying the army.<sup>117</sup>

This was similar to what Hodža had voiced in the inaugural debate of the Beneš government in 1921. He contrasted the political autonomy of the Ľudáks with his own administrative autonomy, which meant giving the regional committee as much executive power as possible within the bounds of a unitary state administration. One year earlier he supported the principle of one "common legislative assembly as the main guarantee of state unity", but wanted to utilize the "principle of local autonomism to an extent that allows the Slovaks to administer themselves and decide in matters that only concern them."<sup>118</sup> He claimed that the associations of counties would make this come true. An important difference between Hodža's regionalism and the autonomy schemes, was that he combined administrative autonomy with a strong emphasis on centralized legislative power, precluding a Slovak legislative assembly and government. Regionalism also meant cooperation between Slovak deputies on Slovak issues.

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<sup>115</sup> Fritz, 123. schůze senátu N.S.R.Č. dne 22. listopadu 1938 (p. 4), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy o schůzích senátu ...*

<sup>116</sup> The Constitutional act of November 22, 1938 concerning the autonomy of Slovakia is printed as Appendix O in: Dorothea H. El Mallakh: *The Slovak autonomy movement 1935–39: A study in unrelenting nationalism* (1979: pp. 234 ff. )

<sup>117</sup> (potreba, aby Slovensko malo správu svojich vecí, nakoľko sú špeciálne slovenské, v svojich rukách). Emil Stodola: *O samospráve Slovenska* (1921:3, 36–37). See also Bartlová (1993a:209).

<sup>118</sup> (To znamená decentralizáciu správy). Hodža in 89. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. října 1921 (pp. 197–98). (spoločného zákonodárstva ako hlavnej garancie štátnej jednoty). (princip autonomizmu lokálneho tak daleko, aby Slovák vo svojich veciach, ktoré sa týkajú len jeho, sám sa spravoval a sám o nich rozhodoval). Hodža, 3. schůze ... dne 2. června 1920 (p. 55), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

The 1925 election program of the Slovak National Party demanded autonomy according to the Pittsburgh Agreement, with special emphasis on matters concerning the schools, the administration, the judicial system, the economy, church matters and cultural matters. There was still no demand for a legislative assembly.<sup>119</sup> The first few years after entering the Parliament on the ticket of the National Democrats in 1929, Martin Rázus and his party supported a regionalist position: that the best way of solving the Slovak question was to cooperate with other Slovak parties in favor of Slovak interests. During the process of rapprochement with the Slovak People's Party in 1932, the Slovak National Party was radicalized, and came to support autonomy. As a result, Rázus withdrew from the Club of the National Democrats in September 1932, and an alliance was announced between the two Slovak autonomist parties at a rally in Zvolen in October. A joint manifesto called for incorporating the Pittsburgh Agreement in the Constitution.<sup>120</sup>

An autonomy proposal endorsed at the Party Congress of the Slovak National Party in Banská Bystrica in August 1938 envisaged the establishment of a legislative assembly, a six-member regional government and various administrative-technical provisions. Central Czechoslovak organs were to be in charge of foreign affairs, defense, trade, state citizenship, currency, measures and weights, post and communications. This was never subject to political debate in the Parliament.<sup>121</sup> While the 1921 scheme of the Slovak National Party was nearer to Hodža's regionalism, the 1938 scheme more closely resembled the autonomy proposals of the ľudáks.

The Third International (Comintern) was founded in 1919 to coordinate the activities of the Communist parties. One of the basic principles of Leninism was to exploit national discontent for revolutionary purposes. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had accepted the conditions for admission to Comintern already at the founding congress in May 1921, and became one of the largest parties. Yet, the first Party Congress resolved that "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation."<sup>122</sup> The Party came under increased pressure to abandon Czechoslovakism, when the Comintern congress in 1924 again emphasized the need for "*the resolute and constant advocacy by communists of the right of national self-determination* (secession and the formation of an independent State)."<sup>123</sup> After the election in 1925, Bohumír Šmeral declared on behalf of the Communists that every nationality had full right to "self-determination, all the way to secession." Also the Slovak people had the right to decide about their own fate in their own assembly, he argued.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> *Program Slovenskej národnej strany* (1925:1).

<sup>120</sup> See Felak (1994:94–95).

<sup>121</sup> See Bystrický (1992:67–68). See also Emil Stodola: *O menšinách a o samospráve* (1938: pp. 146 ff.).

<sup>122</sup> Quoted in Leff (1988:218).

<sup>123</sup> (Original emphasis). Walker Connor: *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (1984:55–56).

<sup>124</sup> (sebeurčení až do odluky). Šmeral, 3. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1925, in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*... See also Bartlová (1993a:209).

It has been suggested that the object of this was not to meet Slovak national aspirations, but to paralyze the autonomy efforts of the Ľudáks and the Magyars irredenta. The catch was, of course, that the right to national self-determination was not to be exercised until the final goal of the Communist Party had been achieved: the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, with the fascist threat mounting in the mid-1930s, the party again changed emphasis, this time advocating that the state be maintained as a bulwark against fascism. In a statement of March 1938, read by Viliám Široký in the Parliament, the Communist Club rejected all autonomist schemes of the "Slovak-German-Magyar irredentists." At this point autonomy was seen as potentially weakening to the state.<sup>125</sup>

Finally, also the Magyar nationalists had autonomy for Slovakia on their program. Their object was naturally not to serve the best interests of the Slovak nation, but rather to facilitate re-entry of Slovakia, or at least its ethnically Magyar parts, into Hungary. To this end they enlisted the help of Magyarones like František Jehlička and Vojtech Tuka.<sup>126</sup>

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A comparison of the Ľudák autonomy proposals yields some interesting conclusions. First, the autonomy schemes of Tuka (1921) and the *Nástup* circle (1934) were more radical than all the proposals that were endorsed by the Club of the Slovak People's Party, which reflects that the moderates were in control. Of these, Tuka's proposal was by far the most extreme. While all the other autonomy proposals envisaged a central government and parliament, Tuka proposed the establishment of two separate Czech and Slovak governments and national assemblies, seated respectively in Prague and Bratislava, where only the president would be common. Each unit would have its own constitution, its own army, even its own membership in the League of Nations, and would thus for all practical purposes be independent states, only that the head of state would be the same person. In reality, this proposal was closer to a confederation than a federation in scope, as Tuka also admitted himself (see page 468).

Of the three proposals that were brought before the Parliament, the Ľudák autonomy proposal of 1930 was the most moderate, in essence only claiming for Slovakia what Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had already, in principle, been granted by the Constitution of 1920. (In reality, the constitutional provisions for Ruthenian autonomy were implemented only in 1938.) This proposal differed from the others first, in terms of the extent of the self-governing organs, by envisaging a Slovak assembly and a governor, but not a Slovak government. Second, the competence of the self-governing organs was more limited – only matters of language, education, religion, local administration and justice. In the aftermath of the Tuka trial, it was a great advantage that the proposal was within the bounds of the Constitution.

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<sup>125</sup> See Yeshayahu Jelinek: *The lust for power. Nationalism, Slovakia and the Communists 1918–1948* (1983:22, 26–28); Bartlová (1993a:210); Leff (1988:219); Viliám Široký, 143. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 29. března 1938 (p. 17), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>126</sup> See e.g. Bartlová (1993a:210).

The autonomy proposals of 1922 and 1938 were both more far-reaching. These proposals, as well as the proposals of Labaj and the *Nástup* circle, were clearly federal in form. The chief difference between federations and other forms of political devolution is that "regional autonomy and representation are not only more devolved but are constitutionally guaranteed. The centre does not have the juridical right to abolish, amend or redefine its territorial units."<sup>127</sup> This means that in federations regional autonomy, once achieved, will be constitutionally guaranteed, in the sense that a change requires the consent of the federal units. In practice, this is often a matter of veto arrangements.

According to the 1922 proposal, veto power was vested in the Slovak assembly. If two-thirds of the Slovak assembly voted against *any* law adopted by the central Parliament in Prague, constitutional or not, it would become invalid. Labaj's proposal was identical, while Tuka's scheme did not need any such provisions, since the two parts of the republic would have separate constitutions. The *Nástup* proposal required the consent of two thirds of the Slovak assembly to change the Constitution, while the proposal of 1938 gave the Slovak deputies in the central Parliament veto in constitutional matters and presidential elections (see page 472).

It is striking how *all* Slovak autonomy proposals include the main elements in the Pittsburgh Agreement: that "Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own parliament and its own courts." Apart from the 1930 proposal, all included a Slovak government in addition to a Slovak legislative assembly. Likewise, the requirement in the Pittsburgh Agreement that "the Slovak language shall be the official language in the school, in office and in public life in general",<sup>128</sup> was explicitly stated in all proposals but the one from 1930. It was implied even there, since the Slovak assembly would have legislative power in matters concerning language. There were also various other provisions for linguistic equality between Czechs and Slovaks: that laws valid in Slovakia should be published in Slovak original (*Nástup* and 1938), that Slovak should be the language of Slovak regiments (*Nástup* and 1930), and that all bank notes of the republic should be printed in Czech and Slovak (*Nástup* and 1922 proposals).

In addition, all proposals had some provision concerning the employment of Slovak personnel. All required that hiring of personnel within the regional areas of competence be put under the jurisdiction of the autonomous Slovak organs, while the solution varied with respect to employment of Slovaks in central organs. The *Nástup* circle proposed a Ministry of Slovakia and separate Slovak sections in each of the joint ministries. These sections would be staffed solely by Slovaks and the official language would be Slovak. The 1922 proposal required that one third of the employees in joint or central organs be from Slovakia, and that a third of the ministers in the central government be from *Slovakia*. Labaj wanted them to be *Slovaks* (not Magyars or Germans from Slovakia). The 1938 proposal required that the Slovaks be represented in joint administrative organs according to their share of the population.

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<sup>127</sup> See Graham Smith: *Federalism. The multiethnic challenge* (1995:7).

<sup>128</sup> See *The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh pact* (1934:27). See also See Chapter Nine, page 187.

Except the Tuka proposal, all Ľudák autonomy proposals included the following among the "joint affairs": State citizenship, foreign affairs, the armed forces, election of the president, constitutional law, and currency. Election of the president was included even in the Tuka proposal, while Constitutional law was not. Public communications, including transportation as well as postal services, telegraph and the like, were included either among the joint affairs, or were regarded as areas of mutual interest (Tuka and the *Nástup* circle).

The proposals of Tuka, Labaj and the *Nástup* circle, and the proposal of 1922 all had provisions for a separate Slovak flag and coat of arms (the very same that were to become the official Slovak emblems after independence in 1993). A curiosity is the *Nástup* demand that this flag was to be flown when the central Parliament was discussing joint matters. Tuka and Labaj wanted the presidents to be alternately of Czech and Slovak descent, but this was never proposed in the Parliament. The highly symbolic hyphen in the "Czecho-Slovak republic" was included in the proposals of Labaj, Tuka, the *Nástup* circle, and in the final 1938 proposal.

In spite of the variation, the Ľudák autonomy proposals thus had a common core centered on the Pittsburgh Agreement and on provisions ensuring "Slovak bread", i.e. employment of Slovaks in state as well as regional organs. Many of the Slovak grievances were sought alleviated through the autonomy proposals, especially those embedded in the slogans "Slovak in Slovakia" and "Slovakia for the Slovaks." The language of the army was especially mentioned in several of the proposals, and the Ľudáks wanted Slovakia to contribute to joint expenses in line with her share of the revenue. This also illustrates that autonomy was more a means to an end (the well-being of the Slovak nation) than a goal in its own right.

### ***The argumentation around autonomy***

Some of the arguments employed on the autonomist and centralist side have already been encountered in the two parliamentary debates on the administrative structure or in the context of the various autonomy proposals. I will now try to give a more concentrated and systematic account of the argumentation on both sides. The objective is first, to demonstrate the cohesion between the autonomy proposals and the autonomist argumentation, and between the various dimensions of the struggle between autonomists and Centralists/Czechoslovakists. Second, an analysis of the argumentation may give some clues to the motives of the principal agents.

As we have seen, the two first autonomy proposals were never put on the agenda of the Parliament, and there was no debate on the third. Autonomy as such was thus never an issue in the Parliament, but the Ľudáks routinely demanded Slovak autonomy in budget and government inaugural debates, except when they were in government. In periods of government participation or hope of government participation, the tone of the deputies was milder, but *Slovák* kept on criticizing government parties, political adversaries and Czechoslovakists unabated.

I have decided against giving a separate and chronological account of these debates, because of their fragmented character. Instead, examples from the Parliamentary debates and other sources will be used to illustrate the main lines of argumentation, and the changes over time.

The arguments of the Slovak autonomists fall in three broad categories. *Deprivation arguments* turned Slovak grievances into premises for autonomy; here autonomy became an instrument to alleviate Slovakia's ills. This category highlights the interconnectedness of the various national demands of the autonomists. The Centralists countered this in two ways: First, by repudiating charges that the Slovaks were discriminated against or deprived in any way, and second by rejecting autonomy as a suitable remedy to Slovakia's alleged ills.

*Contract-oriented arguments* invoked various documents that "guaranteed" the Slovaks autonomy, either as a contracting partner or as a beneficiary of certain rights granted by a sovereign (Masaryk). The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918, stands out in this respect. The Centralists questioned the validity of the Agreement as a pact and the legitimacy of the participants as representatives of the Slovak nation, and presented the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918, and the Constitution of 1920 as more relevant documents.

*Classical nationalist arguments* invoked the principle of national self-determination: The Slovaks had right to autonomy simply because they were a nation of their own. This was countered in three ways. First, the Centralists questioned the premise that the Slovaks were a separate nation, as we have already seen. Second, they argued that *if* the Slovaks were an individual nation, then the principle of national self-determination gave them the right not only to autonomy, but to secession. Third, they argued that because the state was founded on Czechoslovak unity, autonomy would jeopardize the integrity and even the very existence of the republic – and in the final instance also Slovakia. This strength-through-unity argument was the most common argument against autonomy and in favor of centralism. Often the Centralists lapsed into personal attacks (*argumentum ad hominem*), mostly in the form of the "Magyarone card." Hlinka and Juriga defended themselves by referring to their pre-war credentials, but the Ľudáks also replied in kind, as we have seen in Chapter Ten.

The parallelism of the argumentation between the identity struggle and the struggle over autonomy was thus clear on both sides, but more so on the centralist side. In the following, I have tried to keep the presentation of the strength-through-unity argument and the Magyarone card short, so as to avoid too much repetition.

### ***Deprivation arguments***

We need to distinguish between deprivation arguments associated with the demand for autonomy and the general "grievance politics" of the Slovak autonomists. The Ľudáks virtually never opened their mouths in the Parliament without complaining of some wrong being committed against Slovakia/the Slovaks. In the present context, Slovak grievances voiced by the autonomists are relevant only insofar that they were used as premises or arguments for autonomy. Much of the time, this link was at best implicit. Broadly speaking, the argument was that the Czechs/Czechoslovakists/government were to blame for everything that was wrong in Slovakia – or at least, it was *their* fault that nothing was being done about it. Autonomy was then presented as the ultimate solution to all Slovakia's ills. The underlying idea was that "if only we can decide for ourselves, everything will work out just fine."



The overall grievance tone was strongest in the early 1920s. The Memorandum of the Slovak Nation (1919) and the Žilina Manifesto of the Slovak People's Party (1922) were both loaded with deprivation rhetoric, but autonomy was not explicitly presented as *the* remedy against Czech atrocities. In the former, it was complained the Slovaks were exploited materially, oppressed linguistically and religiously, and mal-represented in the Parliament. The latter contained reference to various economic grievances, complaints of violations of civil rights and linguistic rights, while there were no religious complaints.<sup>129</sup>

Apart from these examples, most of the grievance arguments for autonomy were related to "Slovak bread." Already in 1920, Juriga complained that the Czechs were much better paid for the same jobs as those filled by Slovaks, adding: "We demand autonomy in order to be the masters of every penny, and to decide all over Slovakia, so that there will no such [unequal] wages." He also complained of the requisition practice, arguing that "supply should be in our hands. The Slovaks want to be the masters of their own bread, and do not want Prague to keep their loaf for them."<sup>130</sup>

"Slovak bread" was a symbol-word for all kinds of grievances, but especially for the demand that Slovaks be employed in white-collar jobs in Slovakia, as the following exchange between Juriga and Hlinka in 1921 shows. *Juriga*: "The autonomy question is a question of bread!" *Hlinka*: "Autonomy is not only a political, state question, but a question of existence, especially for our intelligentsia."<sup>131</sup> Prior to the election in 1925, Pavel Macháček argued that "the realization of autonomy will and must lead to conditions that enable every hard-working man here to make ends meet and support his family." Likewise, *Slovák týždenník* wrote that the only way to end the systematic robbery of Slovakia was autonomy, and that "without autonomy we perish!!!" In 1926, Macháček wrote that in the autonomy slogan, the national aspiration that "Slovak bread belongs first and foremost to the Slovaks" was expressed.<sup>132</sup>

During the economic crisis that started in 1929, "Slovak bread" became synonymous with the idea that Slovak applicants should be preferred in Slovakia, and autonomy was presented as a guarantee that this would happen. *Slovák* argued prior to the election in 1929 that "autonomy does not only mean political rights, but also bread. When we get our own administration, our own assembly and our own courts, only Slovaks will be employed there. [...] The autonomous administration of the Slovak *krajina* will compel the employers first and foremost to grant the

<sup>129</sup> These documents are printed in Mikuš (1995:163–170 and 1995: pp. 199 ff).

<sup>130</sup> (Vidíte, prečo my žiadame autonómiu, aby sme boli každého groša pánmi, aby sme na celom Slovensku rozhodovali, aby také platy neboli. Preto žiadame samosprávu, aby bola pravá demokratická správa). (Zásobovanie má byť v rukách našich. Slovák chce byť pánom svojho chleba a nie, aby mu jeho pecen v Prahe v rukách držali). Juriga, 5. schůze... dne 10. června 1920 (pp. 177–78) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>131</sup> (*Otázka autonómie je otázka chlebová!* Autonomia je nie iba politická, štátna otázka, ona je iste otázkou existencie, menovite u našej inteligencie). Juriga (italics) and Hlinka, 38. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1921 (pp. 144–45), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>132</sup> (uskutočnením autonómie nastanú a musia nastať také pomery, že každý pracovitý človek bude môcť tu vyžiť a svoju rodinu vyživiť). Macháček in *Slovák týždenník* no. 42, 18.10.1925:1. (Bez autonómie zahynieme!!!). *Slovák týždenník* no. 46, 15.11.1925:2. ("slovenský chlieb patrí v prvom rade Slovákov"). Macháček in *Slovák týždenník* no. 40, 3.10.1926:1.

Slovaks work and bread." Likewise, *Slovák* concluded: "they will continue to exploit us, as long as we do not achieve full national autonomy based on the equality of the Slovak nation with the Czech nation!"<sup>133</sup> Finally, in the budget debate of 1930, Viktor Ravasz stated: "Through autonomy we want to ensure existence, bread, for our nation and ourselves."<sup>134</sup>

Centralist Slovak deputies generally rejected as groundless and unfair the allegations that the Czechs were responsible for all Slovakia's ills, although there were nuances. Ivan Markovič found it unfair to blame the entire Czech nation for the incompetence or malice of a few, while Igor Hrušovský argued that instead of criticizing the Czechs, the Slovaks should thank them for the liberation. In Anton Štefánek's view, the Slovaks should thank the Czechs for being able to maintain a patriotic, Slovak and national spirit under the Magyar yoke, and for Czech help to liberate the Slovaks and build up an administration, etc., after 1918.<sup>135</sup>

On the other hand, Milan Ivanka in part blamed the autonomist efforts in Slovakia on the hyper-loyal centralization policy of Šrobár. He also blamed the Czechs for their radical progressive policies, which provoked resistance especially among Slovak clergy, and argued that the central administration in Prague and Czech civil servants, professors and teachers did not know Slovakia. "They did not know the Slovak people, its past and aspirations, its mentality, its feelings, they did not even know the geographic, climatic, or economic conditions of Slovakia. By offending religious feelings, by belittling the Slovak language in public offices and schools, by not hiring many Slovaks and favoring Czech applicants to positions, by merciless enacting and execution of laws and prescriptions etc.," they helped the cause of autonomy.<sup>136</sup>

Centralist Slovak deputies also argued that, in order to ensure harmony and Czechoslovak unity, Slovakia's real economic grievances must be removed. This point was neatly expressed by Pavel Teplanský (Agr.) in the 1930 budget debate: "As soon as we succeed in removing the cultural and economic problems stemming from the past and the geographical location of Slovakia [...], the Czechoslovak problem will be solved successfully and permanently."<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> (Autonomia znamená nielen politické práva, ale aj chlieb. Keď budeme mať svoju administratívu, svoj snem a svoje súdy – budú tu zamestnaní len Slováci. [...] Autonomná správa Slovenskej krajiny prinutí zamestnávateľov, aby v prvom rade Slovákom poskytli prácu a chlieb!). *Slovák* no. 240, 22.10.1929:3. (dotiaľ nás budú vykorisťovať, kým si nevydobujeme úplnú národnú autonómiu založenú na rovnoprávnosti Slovenského národa s českým národom!) *Slovák* no. 241, 23.10.1929:2. See also *Slovák* no. 283, 16.12.1931:1.

<sup>134</sup> (Autonomiou zaistiť chceme pre seba a náš národ existenciu, chleba). Ravasz, 18. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 19. února 1930 (p. 79), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>135</sup> Markovič, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 210), Hrušovský, 88. schůze... dne 20. října 1921 (p. 148) and 162. schůze ... dne 26. října 1922 (p. 316), Štefánek, 214. schůze...dne 8. listopadu 1932 (pp. 6–7), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>136</sup> (ktorí Slovenska vůbec neznali, neznali slovenského ľudu, jeho minulosti, jeho žiadosti, jeho mentality, jeho citov a neznali Slovenska ani v jeho geografických, klimatických, hospodárskych atď vzťahoch. Urážanie náboženských citov, bagatelizovanie slovenčiny v úradoch a školách, nevymenovanie mnohých slovenských a favorizovanie českých uchádzačov na úradné miesta, vynášanie a nemilosrdné exekvovanie zákonov). Milan Ivanka: *O autonomistických snahách na Slovensku* (1923:14).

<sup>137</sup> (Akonáhle podarí sa nám odstrániť kultúrne a hospodárske problémy vyplývajúce z minulosti a geografického polozenia Slovenska [...] československý problém budeme mať zadarmo a trvale vyriešený). Teplanský, 21. schůze... dne 21. února 1930 (p. 42), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...* See also p. 47, where he rejects autonomy as a solution.

In the inaugural debate of the Malypetr government in 1932, the Czech national economist František Hodáč (ČND) expressed understanding of the difficult situation of the young Slovak generation, but at the same time argued against the idea that increased autonomy for Slovakia would help. "If the economic conditions in Slovakia are to improve, we will have to go the exact opposite way in economic matters than the one leading to separation",<sup>138</sup> he said. Slovakia's problems, in other words, called for *more* integration, not autonomy. As we have seen in Chapter Twelve, all Slovak politicians (including the autonomists) wanted to remove such obstacles to the integration of Slovakia as higher taxes and freight rates.

### ***Contract-oriented arguments***

A great many declarations and agreements were formulated during the war, at home and abroad. Several of these were at various points used as arguments for or against autonomy. Two documents stand out here: The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30th, 1918, and the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918. While the Pittsburgh Agreement was a clear asset for the autonomists, the Martin Declaration soon became a liability. The debates over the significance of the two documents were closely related, but in this discussion I have tried to keep them apart for the sake of clarity.

### **THE BATTLE ABOUT THE PITTSBURGH AGREEMENT**

The autonomists invoked the Pittsburgh Agreement in every single debate where autonomy was mentioned, from the moment it became known in Slovakia in the spring of 1919, until autonomy was achieved in 1938. The first time it was invoked was in the Memorandum of Hlinka and Jehlička in 1919, where it went into the general grievance argumentation. The last time was in the preamble of the 1938 Constitutional amendment. At first glance, the Pittsburgh Agreement would appear to be a stable element in the argumentation for Slovak autonomy. However, usage shifted over the years. The Pittsburgh Agreement was alternately seen as a Magna Charta, as a pact between Czechs and Slovaks, and as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation in the past and present.

Each usage corresponds to one main argument in favor of autonomy. In the case of the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta, the argument was that it guaranteed the Slovaks right to autonomy. In the case of the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Pact (or a contract) the argument was that it was binding for the contracting parties, the Czech and Slovak nation – or also for Masaryk as president and representative of the Czechoslovak state. In the case of the Pittsburgh Agreement as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation, the argument was that autonomy should be granted because the Slovak nation had a right to national self-determination. Here the Pittsburgh Agreement was seen as expressing the will of the Slovak nation.

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<sup>138</sup> (Ale jestli sa má dojít k nápravě hospodářských poměrů na Slovensku, musí to býti právě opačnou cestou v hospodářských věcech než tím, že by docházelo k rozdělení. Hodáč and Bečko, 215. schůze... dne 9. listopadu 1932 (pp. 13–14 and 19–20), in *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

Hlinka combined all three notions in 1920: "We Slovaks have right to autonomy. We Slovaks stand on the foundation of the Pittsburgh Pact concluded between the Czech and Slovak nation, representatives of the Czech and Slovak nation. We stand on the basis of that historical Magna Charta and we never give in to anybody for any price."<sup>139</sup> References to the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta (often combined with the idea that it was sanctioned by President Masaryk's signature) were less common after 1930, but Hlinka referred to the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Golden Bull as late as in 1933.<sup>140</sup>

The obvious answer to the use of the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta was to point to the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920. After the election of 1920 Ivan Markovič argued that "Our Magna Charta is not the Pittsburgh Pact. Our charter, the charter of 75 percent of the Slovak voters, who sent us here, is the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic."<sup>141</sup> Likewise, Milan Hodža argued: "the Czechoslovak constitution does not today depend on the Pittsburgh Pact; the Czechoslovak constitution is completed." He also argued that the relation of the Slovaks to the republic could not and would not be decided by some meeting in Pittsburgh, in America, but by "ourselves, the representatives of the people."<sup>142</sup> The latter argument was used to counter the invocation of the Pittsburgh Agreement in general.

When Hlinka spoke of the Pittsburgh Agreement as a "Pact, concluded between the Czech and Slovak nation", he implied that those present at Pittsburgh were legitimate representatives of the Czech and Slovak nation, and that the pact was binding for the Czechs and Slovaks at home.<sup>143</sup> In the beginning, the Czech nation and the Slovak nation were regarded as the contracting parties. Increasingly, however, Masaryk's role was emphasized, especially after a Memorandum from the Slovak League to the Parliament in 1922 made it publicly known that Masaryk had actually drafted the agreement, not merely signed it. The Žilina Manifesto of 1922 presented "the Pittsburgh Pact drafted by Masaryk and signed May 30, 1918 between Czechs and Slovaks living in the United States" as the basis for the union of two "sister-nations" in a Czechoslovak state. The Pittsburgh Agreement was thus at this point seen as both a guarantee of Slovak rights, and a pact between Czechs and Slovaks.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> (My Slováci, máme právo na autonómiu, my Slováci stojíme na základe pittsburgskej smluvy, uzavrenej medzi českým a slovenským národom, medzi reprezentantom českého a slovenského národa, stojíme na základe tejto historickej magny charty a od tej za žiadnu cenu nikomu a nikdy neustúpime). Hlinka, 18. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 209), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>140</sup> See Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1933:1. See also Juriga, 5. schůze...dne 10. června 1920 (p. 176) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...; *Slovák Týždenník* no. 42, 18.10.1925:1, *Slovák Týždenník* no. 40, 3.10.1926:1; *Slovák* no. 121, 30.5.1928:2; *Slovák* no. 102, 4.5.1928:1; and in *Slovák* no. 194, 27.8.1930.

<sup>141</sup> (našou magnou chartou je nie Pittsburská smlúva. Našou chartou, chartou 75 procent slovenských voličov, ktorí nás sem poslali, je ústavná listiná československej republiky). Ivan Markovič, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (pp. 208, 209), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>142</sup> (československá ústava nezávisí dnes na pittsburgskej smluve, československá ústava je hotová). (len my sami, zástupcovia ľudu). Hodža, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 216), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>143</sup> See also Juriga, 30. schůze ... dne 3. prosince 1920 (p. 1170), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>144</sup> See Mikuš (1995:200).

There was thus a certain dualism with respect to who the contracting partners were: The Czechs and Slovaks, represented by the American Czechs and Slovaks, or the American (Czechs and) Slovaks on the one hand, and Masaryk on the other hand. In the latter case, Masaryk had the role of official representative of the Czechoslovak government. This dualism was still present in *Slovák's* coverage of the tenth anniversary of the agreement in 1928. On this occasion, the *Ľudáks* adopted a resolution arguing that "the Slovak nation, as one contractual part conscientiously and positively kept all its obligations", while "the other contractual part [...] did not keep the obligations of the Pittsburgh Agreement!" On the contrary, "the Pittsburgh Agreement was broken by the Czech brothers as the second contractual part." According to another article in the same paper, however, the Pittsburgh Agreement was concluded between "Masaryk and the American Slovaks."<sup>145</sup>

The autonomists turned Masaryk into a formal contracting party by pointing out that he had signed the Pittsburgh Agreement for the second time on November 14th after having received news from Prague that he had been elected president. For instance, *Slovák* argued in 1927 that "the Pittsburgh Agreement is the true spiritual child of T. G. Masaryk, because he after consultations conceived it and personally drafted it on May 30th, 1918. [...] A second and even more important legal consequence arises from the fact that Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Agreement not only on May 30th, when it was adopted by the American organizations, but once more after its calligraphic finish on November 14th." It was argued that Masaryk at this point signed it as president. He thus had a moral obligation to inform the Parliament before the adoption of the Constitution, and to influence the self-appointed representatives of the Czech and Slovak nation not to disavow it.<sup>146</sup> Karol Sidor repeated this in 1938, arguing that Masaryk's "signature is valid and binding for all citizens of this state, just as the presidential signature obligated us all on the day of the signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement."<sup>147</sup>

This change of contracting parties may also be seen as an answer to the centralist claim that the American Czechs and Slovaks were not the legitimate representatives of their co-nationals at home, and thus had no right to decide anything on their behalf. This view was voiced in the Parliament from the very beginning, e.g. by Ivan Dérer, who already in September 1919 spoke of the Pittsburgh Agreement as an agreement between *American Czechs and Slovaks*.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> (Národ slovenský, ako jedna smluvná stránka, dodržal svedomite a poctive všetky záväzky [...] Naproti tomu [...] druhá smluvná stránka [...] nedodržala záväzky Pittsburskej dohody! [...] Pittsburská Dohoda bola bratmi Čechmi, ako druhou smluvnou stránkou porušená...). (medzi [...] Masarykov a americkými Slovákmi). *Slovák* no 121, 30.5.1928:1, 2–3, 5. See also Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince 1929 (p. 53), and 213. schůze ... dne 4. listopadu 1932 (p. 28), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>146</sup> (Pittsburská Dohoda je vlastným, duševným dieťaťom T.G. Masaryka, lebo on ju po porade sám osnoval a vlastoručne napísal dňa 30. mája 1918. [...] Dohodu tú prijali bez zmeny naši americkí bratia a tamojšie české organizácie. Druhý a ešte dôležitejší právny význam vyplýva však z toho, že Pittsburskú Dohodu podpísal Masaryk nielen 30. mája, keď bola ona prijatá amerických organizáciami, ale ešte raz po jej kaligrafickom vyhotovení, dňa 14. novembra). *Slovák* no. 255, 15.11.1927:1–2.

<sup>147</sup> (Jeho podpis platí a zaväzuje všetkých občanov tohoto štátu tak, ako nás všetkých zaviazal prezidentov podpis, učinенý v den podpisu Pittsburskej dohody). Sidor, 119. schůze ... dne 2. prosince 1937 (p. 44) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>148</sup> Ivan Dérer, 73. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 18. září 1919 (p. 2268), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

President Tomáš G. Masaryk played a central role in the battle over the importance of the Pittsburgh Agreement both as an object of dispute, and as a participant. As president, Masaryk usually refrained from engaging openly in the political debate. In this case, however, he did his best to free himself and the government from any obligation, first in a letter to Prime Minister Tusar in 1920, then in his war autobiography of 1925, and finally in a letter to Hlinka in 1929. In the letter to Tusar, Masaryk claimed that the agreement had been formulated in order to frustrate the agitation against the unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. He presented the Pittsburgh Agreement as an agreement between American citizens. As one of many pre-Revolutionary programs made abroad, it had its historical value, he wrote, but if it were to be valid, both the Czechs and the Slovaks would still have to agree with its contents.

Masaryk also pointed out that the agreement contained a provision that left the detailed regulations of state organization to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives. "This was said because the Czechs and Slovaks at the Pittsburgh meeting very well knew that American citizens have no right to decide the definite arrangements of the Czechoslovak state." He also argued that the rightful representatives of the Slovaks had declared themselves in favor of a unitary Czechoslovak state already on May 1st in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, i.e. before Pittsburgh, as well as after Pittsburgh in Martin.<sup>149</sup>

In his war biography *Světová revoluce*, Masaryk wrote that he had signed the agreement in order to "appease a small Slovak faction that dreamed of God knows what independence for Slovakia", and that he had done so "without hesitation, because it was a local pact between American Czechs and Slovaks, signed by American citizens." He repeated many of his arguments from 1920 and argued that the Constitution had been adopted "not only by the Czechs, but also by the Slovaks; through this the legal representatives of Slovakia pronounced themselves in favor of total unity [...] It is this unity that matters."<sup>150</sup>

Masaryk's two first statements sum up the most serious arguments of the Centralists against giving the Pittsburgh Agreement legal status as a pact: (1) The American Czechs and Slovaks were not legitimate representatives of their co-nationals at home, and had no right to decide on their behalf; (2) The agreement was one of many, and thus had a certain historical value; but in order to be valid, it would need the consent of Czechs and Slovaks at home; (3) Legitimate Slovak representatives had consented to Czechoslovak national and state unity at assemblies before and after Pittsburgh (in Turčianský Svätý Martin and Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš), as well as in the Constitution of 1920.

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<sup>149</sup> (to bylo řečeno proto, že Čechové a Slováci na pittsburské schůzi dobře věděli, že zejména občané američtí nemají práva rozhodovat o definitivním zřízení česko-slovenského státu). T.G. Masaryk: *Cesta demokracie I* (1933:249–50). See also *Slovák* no. 258, 18.11.1927:3, where Masaryk's letter is quoted in full. For an English version, see *Slovakia's plea for Autonomy by an Autonomist* (1935:8), or *The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact* (1934:34). Šrobár, argued in the same vein, 73. schůze ... dne 18. září 1919 (p. 2275), in *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>150</sup> (k uspokojení malé slovenské frakce, která snila o bůh ví jaké samostatnosti Slovenska). (Podepsal jsem dohodu bez váhání, protože byla lokální smlouvou amerických Čechů a Slováků mezi sebou; je podepsána občany americkými). (přijetím naší ústavy nejen Čechy, nýbrž i Slováky; tím se legální zástupcové Slovenska vyslovili pro úplnou jednotu [...]) O tuto jednotu běží). Tomáš G. Masaryk: *Světová revoluce* (1925:262, 263).

In a long article in *Slovák* in 1927 before the ninth anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement, the Club of the Slovak People's Party blamed the intolerable conditions in Slovakia in part on Masaryk. They argued that he had made the Pittsburgh Agreement worthless and unworkable by stating that the sole aim had been to achieve the moral and material support of the Slovaks in America, or to appease a small Slovak fraction that 'dreamed of God knows what independence' of Slovakia. "But the development has shown that what Masaryk called a small faction, in reality meant all Slovaks in America", <sup>151</sup> they argued. Five years later – according to *Slovák* – "the whole Slovak nation was dreaming of it, from the Danube to the Tatras." <sup>152</sup>

*Slovák* also criticized the fact that the American Czechs and Slovaks were "denied the right to decide on those matters, for which their cooperation was called for" – despite their contributions to the liberation efforts. However, nobody questioned the dubious right of the Martin and Mikuláš gatherings to decide on the most important question for the Slovak nation, namely the matter of national individuality. *Slovák* polemized against the idea of the Pittsburgh Agreement being a local pact between American Slovaks and Czechs; how could it be meant for American conditions when the Czecho-Slovak state was formed in Europe? <sup>153</sup>

In his New Year's article in 1933, Hlinka questioned the legitimacy of one of the bodies that the Centralists referred to as legal representatives of the Slovak nation. "Who voted for the constitution in the name of the Slovaks? Zuckermann-Pfeffer, Alica Masaryková, Dr. Kolísek, Rotnág, Pavlů etc., [apparently Czechs] and tens of unknown people 'from Slovakia'. I protested to Šrobár against the nomination of unknown men [...] who had no past in Slovakia. [...] In hundred years, impartial historians will tell that there were very few conscious Slovaks in the constitutional assembly, or else they would not have voted for such a constitution as the present. [...] They were self-appointed from Slovakia, of which the largest part are today condemned and cursed by the Slovak nation." <sup>154</sup>

In short, it was argued that (1) Even if the American Czechs and Slovaks were not legitimate representatives of the Czech and Slovak nation at home, Masaryk certainly was, since he had signed it also after becoming president, (2) The Pittsburgh Agreement was an expression of the views not only of a small faction but of all American Slovaks, as well as the Slovaks at home, and (3) The American Czechs and Slovaks were not any less legitimate representatives than other self-appointed bodies. Neither the bodies that adopted the Mikuláš and the Martin Declarations, nor the Slovak Club in the Revolutionary Parliament, were elected by the Slovak nation: they were either self-appointed or, in the latter case, co-opted by Šrobár.

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<sup>151</sup> (ohrozená je i sama existencia národa nášho, nakoľko neuznáva sa ani jeho samobytnosť). (Ale vývin vecí ukázal, že p. Masarykom označená "nepatrná frakcia" znamená vlastne všetkých Slovákov v Amerike). *Slovák* no. 120, 29.5.1927:1.

<sup>152</sup> See *Slovák* no. 66, 21.3.1933:4.

<sup>153</sup> (popiera sa im právo rozhodovania v tej veci, na spoluprácu ktorej boli vyzvaní). *Slovák* no. 245, 26.10.1930:3.

<sup>154</sup> (Kto hlasoval za ústavu v mene Slovákov? Zuckermann-Pfeffer, Alica Masaryková, dr. Kolísek, Rotnág, Pavlů atď. a desiatky neznámych ľudí "ze Slovenska." Ja som u Šrobára protestoval proti nominácii neznámych pánov [...] ktorí nemali na Slovensku žiadnej minulosti [...] Boli to samozvanci zo Slovenska, z ktorých najväčšia čiastka je dnes už národom slovenským odsúdená a zatratená). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1933:1.

The arguments in Masaryk's letter to Hlinka were of a different caliber. This letter was dated October 12th, 1929: one week after the Tuka trial was finished. Masaryk claimed that he had the right to talk sincerely, because he was older: "I liberated Slovakia, and she is in my heart nonetheless than yours – the path you have chosen will not lead to victory. [...] Look at the blunders you have made with the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement. De facto you have had autonomy from the very coup d'état, and now you have attained all the stipulations of this pact (actually a verbal agreement). However, the main thing is that the document of this verbal agreement is forged. It is a forgery, because at the time when the American Slovaks wanted this verbal agreement, the [Slovak] League legally did not exist, and it was recognized by the Government only in 1919. Therefore, a serious politician, a statesman, cannot and must not operate with such a paper. A forgery cannot become a government act."<sup>155</sup>

*Slovák* published Masaryk's letter to Hlinka under the title "I liberated Slovakia" on the tenth anniversary of the Constitution on February 28th, 1930. According to a footnote, the letter was first published in *Stráž říše*, a Czech paper. The entire article is quoted from the Czech paper (in Czech), possibly to avoid censorship. In the following days there were polemics about who leaked it, while Masaryk's arguments were very briefly rejected as false. Evidently, Hlinka right away wrote the Slovak League to get their view on the forgery claim. According to *Slovák*, the League replied that "there could be no doubt whatsoever of the authenticity of the Pittsburgh Agreement."<sup>156</sup> The League also consulted American legal expertise, confirming that there was no difference between chartered and unchartered organizations with respect to entering such agreements. At the same time, the legal expertise refuted a claim (made by Šrobár) that the Pittsburgh Agreement was legally invalid because it had been concluded on Memorial Day, a legal holiday.<sup>157</sup> The forgery claims were thus effectively killed.

This is also evident from the fact that although Ivan Déřer repeated the entire catalogue of arguments against the Pittsburgh Agreement in *The unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Has the Pittsburgh declaration been carried out?* (1938), he made no mention of the forgery claims. Déřer pointed out that Masaryk was not explicitly identified as a contracting party anywhere in the so-called agreement, and that the words "pact or agreement" were not in the original. In fact, Déřer argued, the "Pittsburgh Protocol" was neither an agreement nor a pact, and certainly not a constitutional document, but a "political program which for the most part has already been carried out" – by the Centralists. Déřer claimed that Slovakia got the promised assembly through the regional reform in 1928<sup>158</sup> – which he had been against!

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<sup>155</sup> The letter is published as Document no. 30 in Mikuš (1995:209–210). See also *The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact* (1934:35–36), where parts of the letter are quoted. A Slovak version of the letter may be found in *Slovák* no. 49, 28.2.1930:2, a Czech version in Jaroslav Pecháček: *Masaryk – Beneš – Hrad* (1996:100–101).

<sup>156</sup> (o hodnovernosti Pittsburghskej dohody nemôže byť vôbec sporu). *Slovák* no. 194, 27.8.1930:1. See also *Slovák* no. 49, 28.2.1930:2.

<sup>157</sup> See *The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact* (1934:39).

<sup>158</sup> Déřer: *The unity of the Czechs and Slovaks* (1938:17, 22, 23, 25). See also Déřer: *Československá otázka* (1935:247–57). Already in the budget debate of 1924 Ludevít Medvecký (Agr.) claimed that the Pittsburgh Agreement had been implemented through the *county* reform See 229. schůze... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 389), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*



Karol Sidor categorically rejected this in the budget debate of 1938. "What we have in Bratislava in the regional assembly is neither a legislative assembly (*snem*), nor even a shadow of what the American Slovaks understood by an assembly in the Pittsburgh Agreement."<sup>159</sup> On this point Sidor and Hodža agreed; the latter had stated already in 1931 that the regional reform was "not the political autonomy envisaged by the Pittsburgh Convention."<sup>160</sup>

The third type of use of the Pittsburgh Agreement (as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation) appeared in two forms: The Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program", or as an expression of an unbroken heritage of Slovak nationalism. The former was common throughout the period, while the latter started to appear only in 1930s. According to a letter from Hlinka to the Slovak League in 1930, published in extenso in *Slovák*, the Ľudáks took the Pittsburgh Agreement into their program when it became known in Slovakia in 1919. "The Slovak People's Party is bound to the autonomist program in the rendering of the Pittsburgh Agreement not only by the living interest of Slovakia, but also by Slovak honor and Slovak consciousness."<sup>161</sup> The Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" was also quite explicitly expressed in Buday's speech in the budget debate of 1924: "Our program is the Pittsburgh Agreement, nothing more, nothing less. Incorporate that Pittsburgh Agreement in the Constitution, start implementing it, and we will be satisfied. And gentlemen, remember that our president conceived and signed it."<sup>162</sup>

This was voiced also before the elections. Prior to the 1925 election, *Slovák Týždenník* published a facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement, complete with the signatures, under the heading "Our election program." Before the election in 1929, it was argued that "Autonomy for Slovakia is not only an election slogan, but a program supported by the word of honor of our president, who signed the Pittsburgh Agreement. In this agreement the president guaranteed us... [then the agreement is quoted] This is what the Pittsburgh Agreement guarantees us, and for this we are fighting." Slovak bread, autonomy and the Pittsburgh Agreement were closely associated in Ľudák rhetoric. For instance, the Pittsburgh Agreement was seen as "a guarantee of bread for our children and a better future."<sup>163</sup> As we have seen, all the autonomy proposals contained the main provisions in the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was thus "our program" in Ľudák argumentation as well as in practical politics in the Parliament.

<sup>159</sup> (Čo máme v Bratislave v krajinskom zastupiteľstve, to nie je snem, ale ani tieň toho, čo pod snemom rozumeli americkí Slováci v Pittsburghskej dohode). Sidor, 119. schůze... dne 2. prosince 1937 (p.43), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>160</sup> Milan Hodža: The political evolution, in: R.W. Seton-Watson (ed.): *Slovakia then and now* (1931:89–90).

<sup>161</sup> (K autonomistickému programu v smysle Pittsburghskej dohody viaže slovenskú ľudovú stranu nielen životný záujem Slovenska, ale i slovenská česť, slovenské sebavedomie). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 194, 27.8.1930:1.

<sup>162</sup> (náš program je pittsburská dohoda, nič viac, nič menej. Vtelte túto pittsburskú dohodu do ústavnej listiny, začnite ju prevádzať a my sme uspokojení. A, pánovia, pamätajte, že túto osnoval a podpísal pán prezident). Buday, 230. schůze ... dne 23. listopadu 1923 (p. 482) See also Juriga, 5. schůze ... dne 10. června 1920 (p. 175); Tiso, 17. schůze... dne 18. února 1930 (p. 92); Ravasz, 350. schůze ... dne 29. listopadu 1934 (p. 20), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>163</sup> (Autonomia Slovenska nie je volebným heslom, ale programom, opierajúcim sa o čestné slovo nášho prezidenta, ktorý podpísal Pittsburghskú dohodu. V tejto dohode pán prezident zaručil nám: [...] Toto nám zaručuje Pittsburghská dohoda, a my za toto bojujeme). *Slovák* no. 240, 22.10.1929:3. (zagarantovaný chlieb našich detí, našu lepšiu budúcnosť!). *Slovák* no. 102, 4.5.1928:1. See also Buday in *Slovák* no. 245, 30.10.1928:5; *Slovák Týždenník* no. 44, 1.11.1925:1.

*Slovák* wrote of the Pittsburgh Agreement almost every year as May 30th approached. In 1930, it was argued that "the Pittsburgh Agreement is no longer a pact written on paper, but a condition for brotherly coexistence of the Slovaks and Czechs in a common state, a condition which is engraved in the Slovak hearts, and which will always demand its fulfillment through the mouths of the representatives of the Slovak nation. Today it is futile to debate whether the Pittsburgh Agreement is valid or not. The Pittsburgh Agreement was a moral obligation and as such it has much greater value than a two-sided arrested pact. The Pittsburgh Agreement is not a coincidental program proposed in a moment's whisper, but the words written down in it are heavy rocks from the Tatra mountains, rocks on which the basis of a better future for the republic of the Czechs and Slovaks will have to be formed." *Slovák* promised "to fight for the program expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement to the last drop of blood."<sup>164</sup>

In 1931 *Slovák* wrote that "the whole program of the Slovak political progression from 1848 is actually written down in the Pittsburgh Agreement." And in 1933: "We remember today the 15th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement with a promise on our lips and in our hearts. The principles of that agreement are long since in our blood and we will do everything to make it come to life and be the basis of a more beautiful future of our nation and our state!"<sup>165</sup> All the examples from the 1930s were most likely written by Karol Sidor, who served as editor-in-chief of *Slovák* from 1930.

Citing the Pittsburgh Agreement as an expression of the historical power of the Slovak nation became more common towards the end of the period. In the 1936 budget debate, Tiso claimed: "Slovak nationalism looks at the Pittsburgh Agreement as a heritage from our forefathers, which cannot and may not be irresponsibly squandered, or its obligation weakened. The Pittsburgh Agreement will remain a legacy of the forefathers, a sacred paladin of the Slovak nation for ever." Two years later he argued: "The Pittsburgh Agreement was and is the highest expression of the historical power of the Slovak nation, existing as an individual and ethnically distinct nation since Pribina, constantly claiming the assertion of its sovereignty."<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> (Dnes už Pittsburghská dohoda nie je smluvou napísanou na papieri, ale podmienkou bratského spolunažívania Slovákov a Čechov v spoločnom štáte, ktorá podmienka vrytá je do srdca slovenských a ktorá ústami reprezentantov slovenského národa vždy dožaduje sa svojho splnenia. Dnes je už márnou vecou debatovať o tom, či je Pittsburghská dohoda platná alebo nie. Pittsburghská dohoda bola morálnym záväzkom a ako taká má hodnotu o mnoho väčšiu ako dvojstranne zadržaná smluva. Pittsburghská dohoda je nie nahodilým programom, navrhnutým v chvíľkovej ješitnosti, ale slová v nej zapísané sú ťažkými kameňmi z tatranských hôr, ktoré kamene majú sa musia tvoriť základ lepšej budúcnosti republiky Čechov a Slovákov). (sľubujeme, že povedieme boj za program vyslovený v Pittsburghskej dohode do poslednej kvapky krvi). *Slovák* no. 122, 29.5.1930:1.

<sup>165</sup> (v Pittsburghskej dohode je napísaný vlastne celý program slovenského politického pokračovania od roku 1848). *Slovák* no. 121, 31.5.1931:1. (Spomíname dnes 15. výročie Pittsburghskej dohody so sľubom na ústach a v srdci: zásady tejto dohody sú už v našej krvi a urobíme všetko, aby ony prešli v život a staly sa základom krajšej budúcnosti nášho národa a nášho štátu!) *Slovák* no. 122, 30.5.1933:1.

<sup>166</sup> (na Pittsburghskú dohodu hľadá slovenský nacionalizmus ako na takéto dedičstvo otcov ktoré nesmie a nemôže svojvoľne zmáňať, alebo záväzok jeho oslabovať. Pittsburghská dohoda bude nám [...] svätým paládiom národa slovenského na veky). Tiso, 16. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 5. prosince 1935 (p. 54). (pittsburghská dohoda bola a je takýmto vrcholným prejavom dejinných síl národa slovenského jestvujúceho od Pribinu ako samobytný, etnický svojrázny, o uplatnenie svojej suverenity stále sa domáhajúci národ) Tiso, 117. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30. listopadu 1937 (pp. 43–44), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

If the nation has a right to autonomy qua nation, then there is no need for a Magna Charta or a pact. The redefinition of the Pittsburgh Agreement as an expression of the strength of Slovak national identity coincided closely with an increased emphasis on nationalist arguments. I will return to the arguments against the Pittsburgh Agreement as a program under this heading.

#### THE MARTIN DECLARATION, THE "SECRET CLAUSE" AND THE CONSTITUTION

From the outset, Centralists and autonomists sides used different aspects of the Martin Declaration for their diametrically opposite purposes. For the autonomists, the Martin Declaration derived its importance from the fact that through this, the Slovaks had "voluntarily joined the Czechs as equals in one state, the Czechoslovak Republic",<sup>167</sup> as Juriga put it in 1920. They thus used it in a similar way as the Pittsburgh Agreement, to show that the Slovaks were equal partners in the Czechoslovak state. This was also the purpose of the repeated attempt to have October 30th celebrated on par with October 28th (see Chapter Ten).

In a lecture in Bratislava on October 30th, 1924, Martin Rázus argued that the "Martin Declaration as a manifesto of the Slovak nation has its significance [...] in the will of the nation." This will "was expressed at the turn of history not only in Turčianský Svätý Martin, but all over Slovakia, in favor of self-determination and against slavery and injustice – [the nation] decided to live an individual, equal and worthy life together with the Czech nation in one republic." He continued: "What do the Martin Declaration and October 30th, 1918 mean for our future? A legal basis for Slovak-national efforts! We Slovaks did not get our freedom from anybody. We took it, when we declared our right to self-determination, like any other subjugated nation. We did not get our new homeland as a gift – we conquered it! [...] Precisely therefore we must understand the Martin Declaration as the voice of a nation that wants and also definitively has the right finally to be the master of its own affairs!"<sup>168</sup>

In effect, this meant ascribing state-forming significance to the Martin Declaration: through the Martin Declaration, the Slovaks had consented to the founding of the common state. Because the Slovak nation had made an independent decision to join the Czechoslovak state, the Slovaks had an equally large part in its founding as the Czechs; moreover, as an independent nation who had entered the state voluntarily, they had the right to manage their own affairs – i.e. autonomy.

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<sup>167</sup> (Za základ nášho národného vývinu uznávame turčiansko-svätomartinskú deklaráciu zo dňa 30. októbra 1918, ktorou sa Slováci svojimi prirodzenými predstaviteľmi dobrovoľne spojili s Čechmi, ako rovnoprávni v jeden štát Československej republiky). Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 175). See also J. Hlinka, 18. schůze ... dne 9. listopadu 1920 (p. 208), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>168</sup> (Martinská deklarácia, ako manifest slovenského národa, má svoj smysel [...] vo vôli národa, ktorý sa na zvrate dejín hlásil nielen v Turč. Sv. Martine, ale na celom Slovensku o samourčovanie a proti otročeniu, krivde – odhodlal sa žiť svojským, rovnoprávnym a dôstojným životom s národom českým v jednej republike). (Čo znamená martinská deklarácia a 30. okt. 1918 pre našu budúcnosť? Právny základ slovensko-národných snáh! My, Slováci, sme slobodu od nikoho nedostali, my sme si ju vzali, keď sme sa hlásili o samourčovanie právo, ako každý ujarmený národ. Svojú novú vlasť nedostali sme darom – my sme si ju vydobyli! [...] Ale práve preto martinskú deklaráciu musíme chapať, ako prejav národa chcjúceho a majúceho rozhodne i právo byť konečne pánom svojich vecí!) Rázus in *Slovák Týždenník* no. 46, 16.11.1924:3.

Conversely, the Centralists cited the Martin Declaration as proof of Czechoslovak national and state unity and of the will of the Slovak nation to enter into such a unity. In doing so, they primarily pointed to the sentence stating that the "Slovak nation is a part of the Czechoslovak nation, linguistically and cultural-historically." This was used against Hlinka already upon his return from Paris in 1919. Juraj Slávik, acting for the Slovak Club, accused him of "committing a sin against the national honor" by denying "the Czechoslovak national unity and agitating against it" – even though the Martin Declaration had stated that the "Slovak nation is a part of the Czechoslovak nation linguistically and cultural-historically."<sup>169</sup>

According to Igor Hrušovský (1921) "We know well that the Slovaks [...] through the declaration of the Slovak National Council of October 30th, 1918, a manifestation by all their political divisions, [...] declared the unity of the Czechoslovak nation. We know well that the Revolutionary Parliament, in which all the political divisions of the Slovaks were represented, unanimously adopted the Constitution [...] Therefore I do not intend to busy myself with the matter of the need of autonomy for the Slovaks."<sup>170</sup> Likewise, he argued in 1927 that "at the unforgettable moment on October 30th, 1918, in Turčianský Svätý Martin, all Slovak patriots, touched in the deep of their souls by the rising sun of freedom, unanimously and wholeheartedly declared Czechoslovak national unity."<sup>171</sup>

In the 1930 budget debate Milan Ivanka stated: "on October 30th, 1918, in Turčianský Svätý Martin, we native Slovaks, through the mouths of 106 intelligent, pre-Revolutionary, faithful Slovaks and defenders of the Slovak language, confirmed that we will unite our fate with the fate of the Czech nation for ever, and that we want to form one nation with the Czech nation. [...] There was not one Slovak voice that would have protested against the Martin Declaration.." Ivanka also argued that both declarations (the Pittsburgh and Martin) had lost their importance with the establishment of the Czechoslovak State, and were now merely "valuable historical expressions of the Slovak nation."<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> (Andrej Hlinka prehrešil sa proti národnej cti [...] tým, že [...] popieral československú národnú jednotu a agitoval proti nej, ačkoľvek sa v Turč. Sv. Martine dňa 30. Októbra 1918 slavnostne osvedčil, že "Slovenský národ je čiastka rečove a kultúrne historicky jednotného československého národa.") Slávik, 82. schůze Národního shromáždění československé dne 9. října 1919 (p. 2489), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>170</sup> (Vieme dobre, že Slováci [...] deklaráciou Slovenskej Národnej rady zo dňa 30. októbra 1918 prejavom všetkých politických složek svojich [...] vyhlásili jednotnosť národa československého. Vieme dobre, že revolučné Národné Shromáždzenie, v ktorom zasedali všetky politické složky Slovákov, jednomyselne prijalo tú ústavu [...] A preto nemienim sa obširnejšie zaoberať otázkou potreby autonómie pre Slovákov). (so slovenskou autonomiou manövrujú zručne z Pešti). Hrušovský, 88. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20 října 1921 (p. 147) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>171</sup> (v nezapomenuteľnej chvíli dňa 30. októbra 1918 v Turč. Sv. Martine všetci slovenskí patrioti, v hlbke duší svojich rozochvelí vychádzajúcim slnkom slobody, jednomyselne a nie dvojsmyseľne deklarovali československú jednotnosť národnú). Hrušovský, 92. schůze ... dne 30. června 1927 (p. 2027), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>172</sup> (My domorodí Slováci 30. októbra 1918 v Turč. Sv. Martine osvedčili sme sa ústami 106 inteligentných predprevratových verných Slovákov a bojovníkov za slovenčinu, že svoj osud s osudom českého národa na večné veky spájame, že s českým národom tvoríť chceme jeden národ. [...] Nebolo jediného slovenského hlasu, ktorý bol by proti martinskej deklarácii protestoval). (cenný historický prejav slovenského národa). Ivanka, 21. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. února 1930 (p. 37), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

Both sides thus agreed that the Slovaks had entered the state voluntarily. However, while the autonomist conception held that the Slovaks had entered a common state with the Czechs as an individual nation and on equal terms, the Centralists claimed that the Slovaks had subscribed to Czechoslovak national and state unity. What made the Martin Declaration a real asset from a Centralist point of view was the sentence stating that "the Slovaks form linguistically and cultural-historically a part of the Czechoslovak nation."

This constituted an embarrassment to the Slovak autonomists precisely because they accorded so great significance to the Martin Declaration. They thus had a desperate need to explain (away) the sentence. Various strategies were employed, from accusations of forgery to outright rejection. A 1922 article in *Slovenská Národná Jednota* (edited by Ján Bazovský), presented the declaration as a forgery, with Milan Hodža as the perpetrator. Rumor in Slovakia had it that the passage on Czechoslovak national unity was not in the original text. This was, however, refuted in 1923 by Emil Stodola and Samuel Zoch, who had drafted the declaration. It was then clear that apart from the deletion (at Hodža's request) of a sentence regarding Slovak participation at the Paris Peace Conference, no changes had been made to the original text.<sup>173</sup>

Hlinka and Juriga, who had been present at Martin, could not easily condemn the declaration. Their defense was thus that the offending sentence had been meant for foreign consumption. In a declaration in the Parliament on October 30th, 1924, the Ľudák Club complained that the Centralist majority in the Parliament, the government, and even the president constantly emphasized only the first part of the Martin Declaration, "that was made only for foreign use."<sup>174</sup> This idea was repeated by *Národné noviny* in 1932, and was categorically rejected by Anton Štefánek in the Parliament: "They are discrediting us and our entire nation before the world and before ourselves."<sup>175</sup>

Otherwise, the sentence referring to Czechoslovak national unity was rejected as a logical absurdity, plainly a stupidity, a sin, and as "the greatest cause of all evils that had befallen the Slovak nation." The act was explained by the international situation, Czech promises not to interfere, or even by the enthusiasm of the moment when the 1000-year long marriage with Hungary ended. "They declared separation from Hungary and the uniting in a common state with the Czechs as equals [...] in uncertainty, but also with enthusiasm and with tears of joy in their eyes. [...] No wonder that the declaration contains illogical elements and confusion regarding the future organization of things and the safeguarding of Slovak rights."<sup>176</sup>

<sup>173</sup> See Václav Chaloupecký: *Martinská deklaráce a její politické osudy* (1928:19–20)

<sup>174</sup> (ktorá bola urobená len pre cudzozemsko) The declaration was read by Juriga. See *Slovák týždenník* no. 45, 9.11.1924:3. See also Hlinka in: 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 364), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>175</sup> (takýmto spôsobom kompromitujú nás a náš celý národ pred svetom a pred námi). Štefánek quoted *Národné noviny* in: 214. schůze ... dne 8. listopadu 1932 (pp. 5, 6), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>176</sup> (vyhlásili odtrhnutie od Maďarska a pripojenie sa ako rovný k rovnému do spoločného štátu s Čechmi [...] v neistote, ale i v nadšení a so slzami radosti v očiach [...]) I nie je div, že v deklarácii sú nelogickosti a nejasnosť čo do budúceho usporiadania pomeru a zabezpečenia práv Slovákov). Karol Mederly in Bratislava on October 30th, as reported by *Slovák* no. 246, 1.11.1931:1. (bol najväčšou príčinou všetkého zla, ktoré sa valilo na národ slovenský!) . *Slovák* no. 251, 8.11.1928:3. See also *Slovák* no. 251, 10.11.1927:1, *Slovák* no. 265, 24.11.1928.

Václav Chaloupecký clearly sided with the Centralists in his otherwise scholarly *Martinská deklarace a její politické osudy* (1928). First, he argued that at Martin, "the Slovaks spontaneously declared themselves in favor of Czechoslovak national unity, and (astonishingly!) none of them knew of what had happened in Prague." He took this as a sign that they "wanted to demonstrate in favor of Czechoslovak unity, [...] that also they were Czechoslovaks and that they should be regarded as Czechoslovaks in the negotiations about the new world order. It was as if they at this fateful moment were afraid that Pest would take advantage of their separatist proclamations in the past about the differences of the Czech and Slovak nation!"

Second, Chaloupecký emphasized that "there is not a syllable about a Czechoslovak state in the declaration", and argued that the Martin Declaration had become important solely because of the uprising in Prague. Without this, the declaration "would have remained a resolution [...] – the Martin Declaration does not have constitutional significance. When the Slovaks went to Martin they were, without knowing it, in fact already members and subjects of the Czechoslovak state. [...] There is also no doubt that the Czechoslovak state would have come into being also without the Martin Declaration."<sup>177</sup> He thus rejected the autonomist view that the Martin Declaration had a state-forming function.

The most disputed matter was, however, whether there existed a "secret clause" in the Martin Declaration. According to the secret clause, which had allegedly been formulated by the Slovak National Council on October 31st, 1918, the Constitutional relationship of the Slovaks was to be settled within ten years by an agreement between legitimate representatives of the Czech and Slovak nations. The whole thing started in 1924 with an article by Jur Koza Matejov. He claimed that the secretary of the Slovak National Council, Karol Anton Medvecký had told him that the Council had decided that "our connection with the Czechs in the present form is only temporary", and that "the transition period cannot last longer than ten years." After ten years the Slovaks would meet the Czechs at the negotiation table, to decide "whether we want to be together with the Czechs also in the future, or without them."<sup>178</sup> Hlinka apparently coined the word "secret clause" the first time he denied having seen it (in 1924). Instead of supporting the crusade of the ľudák press, he stated publicly several times that he had not seen any such clause, nor was he aware of any record of October 31st, 1918.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> (Slováci spontánne sa prohlásili pro československou národnú jednotu a o tom, čo sa dalo v Prahe (ku podivu!) žiadny z nich nevedel). (Ale shromáždění chtělo veřejně demonstrovati pro československou jednotu). (že i oni jsou Čechoslováci a že při jednání o novém pořádku světa má se s nimi jako s Čechoslováky počítat. Jakoby se v této osudové chvíli báli, že Pešť zneužije jejich separatistických projevů z minulosti o různosti národa českého a slovenského!). (O československém státu není v deklaraci ani slůvka). (Převrat v Praze z 28. října dodal martinské deklaraci teprve jejího významu. Bez něho byla by zůstala pouhou resolucí). (– Státoprávního významu martinská deklarace nemá. Slováci, když šli do Martina, nevědouce o tom, byli vlastně již příslušníky a poddanými československého státu). (Není také pochyby, že k československému státu bylo by došlo i bez martinské deklarace). Chaloupecký: *Martinská deklarace a její politické osudy* (1928:13, 18). See also Chaloupecký: *Zápas o Slovensko 1918* (1930:47, 52, 60, 61) for nearly identical formulations. Albert Prážák argued along similar lines in: *Maďarská propaganda proti Československu* (1929:7).

<sup>178</sup> (naše spojenie s Čechmi je v dnešnej forme len dočasne) (Táto priechodná doba nesmie viac trvať, ako desať rokov). (či i ďalej chceme spolu byť s Čechmi, alebo bez nich). Koza Matejov in *Slovák Týždenník* no. 46, 16.11.1924:4.

<sup>179</sup> (som klauzuly žiadnej nevidel, ani mi je nie známa zápisnica z 31. okt. 1918). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 8, 11.1.1928:1.

With the so-called secret clause, contract argumentation also entered the use of the Martin Declaration as an argument for autonomy. The argumentation was concisely summed up in *Slovák Týždenník*: "1. Our present relationship to the Czechs is not definite, but only temporary; 2. A definite relationship must be settled within ten years; and 3. The Slovaks will settle the relationship with the Czechs as two legal parties."<sup>180</sup> The contract argumentation is even clearer in an editorial in *Slovák*: "On October 30th, 1918, the sovereign Slovak nation on the basis of the right to self-determination voluntarily concluded a pact with the Czech nation that it from that day on wanted to live together, as one sovereign nation in one sovereign state."<sup>181</sup>

In 1925, Emil Stodola wrote that during the two-day session of the Slovak National Council nobody had mentioned that the relation to the Czechs should be temporary. "Our maximum wish, which we also expressed in writing on October 31st, was that for the sake of brotherly harmony autonomy for Slovakia should be realized within ten years." *Slovák Týždenník* presented this as proof that a secret clause existed.<sup>182</sup> The matter ended up in court when editor Karol Hušek, *Slovenský Denník*, called the secret clause a lie, and Júr Koza Matejov sued him for libel. A total of 36 witnesses testified in April 1926, including Hlinka. The court ruled that the existence of a secret clause had not been substantiated. After this, things calmed down.<sup>183</sup>

On New Year's Day 1928, *Slovák* published Vojtech Tuka's infamous article entitled "Vacuum juris", which brought new life into the debate on the secret clause. In Tuka's view, two documents had been drafted in Martin: The declaration of October 30th, and a protocol of October 31st (the so-called secret clause). He argued that on October 31st, 1928, a juridical vacuum would arise in the Slovak part of the republic. This meant that if the secret clause was not carried out before ten years had passed, laws adopted by the Czechoslovak Parliament would become invalid in Slovakia, and state officials would become private citizens. The only way to solve this situation was by recognizing the right of the Slovak nation to self-determination.

According to Tuka, the Slovak nation had full right to separate from Hungary, to opt for some sort of federation, to join the Czechs in a common state, or, ultimately, to establish an independent Slovak state, and thus renew the state of Pribina. It was thus not logically but historically necessary to join the Czechs in one state. When the Slovak nation determined its permanent relation to the state, it could choose a unitary structure, an autonomist or a federal state construction, but not separation from the Czechs, he argued.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> (1. dnešný náš pomer k Čechom nie je definitívny ale len priechodný a že 2. definitívny pomer pomer má sa ustáliť behom 10 rokov! a 3. tento pomer ustália si Slováci s Čechmi ako dve právne stránky). *Slovák Týždenník* no. 5, 1.2.1925:1.

<sup>181</sup> (slovenský národ 30. Okt. 1918 suverenne a dobrovoľne na základe samourčovacieho práva uzavrel s českým národom smlúvu, že od toho dňa chcú spolu žiť, ako jedon suverenný národ v jednom suverennom štáte). *Slovák*, 30.10.1924, quoted in Chaloupecký (1928:20).

<sup>182</sup> (Maximum našich želaní bolo, čomu sme i zápisnične 31. okt. výraz dali, aby kvôli bratskej shode najneskoršie za desať rokov samospráva Slovenska uskutočnená bol). Emil Stodola, quoted in *Slovák Týždenník* no. 6, 8.2.1925:1.

<sup>183</sup> Chaloupecký (1928:22).

<sup>184</sup> Vojtech Tuka in a two page article in *Slovák* no. 1, 1.1.1928:3–4.

Just as he declined to confirm the existence of a "secret clause", Hlinka avoided defending the "vacuum juris" thesis. He did, however, point out that nobody disagreed that autonomy had been discussed at Turčianský Svätý Martin, and in a speech to the executive committee of the party, he defended Tuka as a good patriot, stating that there was nothing revolutionary in Tuka's article.<sup>185</sup> Buday defended Tuka's right to scholarly research, and reproached the Centralists for abusing him instead of taking up his arguments, yet he refrained from defending Tuka's views; the same goes for Karol Krčméry, although he defended Tuka and the party vehemently against allegations of treason.<sup>186</sup>

On January 17th, two interpellations on Tuka's "Vacuum juris" were presented in the Chamber of Deputies. One was filed by the Social Democrats, led by František Tomášek, who quoted Tuka's article in full. The fact that Hlinka, Medvecký and Stodola had declined to confirm that any secret clause existed, was in the signatories' view the best proof that Tuka's motive was not scholarly. On the contrary, it was "a refined political act, the aim of which was to help the anti-Czechoslovak propaganda abroad and to create domestic confusion precisely in the anniversary year of the Republic." This was not compatible with membership in a government party, they argued. They also claimed that the Ľudáks had officially accepted Tuka's view, and asked what the government would do with the fact that a government party "will work to undermine the unity of the state, the validity of its constitution and laws and the oath of the Czechoslovak soldiers."<sup>187</sup>

The second interpellation was filed by the National Socialists with Igor Hrušovský at the helm. They claimed that Tuka had throughout the duration of the state "worked on plans to separate Slovakia from the republic by revolutionary means, and that he received money from Pest to that purpose." Moreover, Tuka had "consciously falsified and distorted the Martin Declaration of October 30th, 1918, in order to shake the belief of the Slovak masses in Czechoslovak legislation and the Constitution, and in order to kindle hatred against the Czechoslovak state among the Slovaks." They pointed out that Tuka had "truthfully" registered as a Magyar in the population census of 1919.<sup>188</sup> Jan Šrámek replied on behalf of the government that the unity and indivisibility of the Czechoslovak republic was legally permanent and not limited in time. The idea of a *vacuum juris* thus lacked any legal foundation.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> *Slovák* no. 8, 11.1.1928:1, *Slovák* no. 11, 14.1.1928:1.

<sup>186</sup> Buday in *Slovák* no. 17, 21.1.1928:1, Krčméry in *Slovák* no. 18, 22.1.1928:1.

<sup>187</sup> (rafinovaný politický čin, jehož účelom je pomáhať protičeskoslovenské zahraničnej propagandě a vyvolať domáci zmatky práve v jubilejnom roku Republiky). (budou pracovať k tomu, aby podkopaná bola jednotnosť štátu, platnosť jeho ústavy a zákonů a prisaha čsl. vojaků?) See Tisk 1419, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX (1928).

<sup>188</sup> (pracoval na plánoch odtrhnutia Slovenska od republiky cestou revolučnou, že dostával k tomuto cieľu z Pešti peniaze). (turč. sv. martinskú deklaráciu z 30. ríjna 1918 vedome falsifikuje a zkrusluje tým cieľom, aby otriasol u širokých vrstiev slovenských dôveru v československé zákonodárstvo, v ústavu, a vznietil u Slovákov nenávisť proti československému štátu). See Tisk 1422, in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX (1928). See also Tisk 711, Svazek V (1927). The interpretation of Tuka's article as anti-state is echoed in scholarly works. See Chaloupecký (1928:18), Pražák (1929:8–9).

<sup>189</sup> See Tisk 1432 and 1437 in: *Tisky k těsnopiseckým zprávám...*, Svazek IX (1928).



On January 25th, Buday read a resolution from the Club of the Slovak People's Party in the Parliament, stating that neither Tuka or any other member of the Club wanted to dissolve the Czechoslovak republic. "Every participant knows that the Martin meeting took place to signal the separation from Hungary and the joining of a state formed together with the Czechs, but with the demand that the relationship between the two nations be settled within 10 years, in an autonomist fashion." Otherwise, Buday argued, whether the protocol existed or not was beside the point, since the Slovak nation had the right to self-determination anyway.<sup>190</sup>

In a letter to *Slovák* in February 1928, the Secretary of the Slovak National Council, Karol Anton Medvecký stated that (1) There had never been any secret or non-secret clause, (2) No report was written on October 31st (rumors had named him as secretary), and (3) Matejov had misrepresented his views totally. Medvecký added that even if such a report had existed, it would not under any circumstance have any constitutional importance.<sup>191</sup>

In an article in *Slovák* in March 1928, Hlinka stated that Tuka's article was misused by Magyarones to instigate people against the nation. "And because I want to believe that the Slovak nation believes in the eternity and inviolability of its state, I pronounce the vacuum juris – trash, an aberration of the mind, an error." With this statement from Hlinka, the idea of a juridical vacuum after October 31st, 1928, was stone dead. *Slovák* managed to produce a protocol in 1929 that, if genuine, shows that something along the above-mentioned lines was discussed. Among those allegedly present were Milan Hodža, Emil Stodola, Juraj Slávik, Ferdiš Juriga, Ivan Markovič, Matúš Dula, Samuel Zoch, Metód Bella, and Emanuel Lehocký.<sup>192</sup> The existence of a secret clause was, however, never corroborated.

With the aforementioned exception, the Ľudák focus on the secret clause dropped around the 10th anniversary of the Martin Declaration. At the anniversary Hlinka merely emphasized the state-forming significance of the declaration. Prior to that, however, a resolution demanding that administrative autonomy be turned into political autonomy by legal means by October 31st, 1928, had been adopted at a party rally in Trnava on October 7th that year.<sup>193</sup> When Ľudák speakers touched on the secret clause or the ten-year-period after this, it was presented as an understanding between those present, not as a clause. In 1930, for instance, Ravasz argued that "every participant of that national assembly in Martin had in mind and retained a so-called 'mentalis reservatio', written in their eyes were the letters autonomy of Slovakia." <sup>194</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> (Každý účastník vie, že martinské porady sa konaly v znamení odtrhnutia sa od Maďarska a pripojenia sa k štátu, utvorenému spolu s českým národom, ale so žiadosťou, aby pomer obidvoch národov bol za 10 rokov riešený, a to v konštrukcii autonomistickej). Buday, quoted in *Slovák* no.21, 26.1.1928:1.

<sup>191</sup> Medvecký's letter is printed in *Slovák* no. 39, 17.2.1928:1, where it was also commented.

<sup>192</sup> (A ponevác chcem veriť, že slovenský národ verí vo večnosť a neporušiteľnosť svojho štátu, preto vacuum juris – holotu vyhlasujem za aberratio mentis, za omyl). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 75, 30.3.1928:1. See also *Slovák* no. 154, 12.7.1928:3, *Slovák* no. 158, 17.7.1928:3 and *Slovák* no. 188, 21.8.1929:1 (the record).

<sup>193</sup> See *Slovák* no 245, 30.10.1928:1, *Slovák* no. 227, 9.10.1928:1.

<sup>194</sup> (každý účastník tohoto národného snemu v Martine prítomný mal na mysli a podržal si t.zv. "mentalis reservatio" vi očí napísanej litere autonomiu Slovenska). Ravasz, 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 78), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

In autonomist argumentation, the Martin Declaration (and the secret clause) were used to underscore that the Slovaks had entered the Czechoslovak state by their own free will as an individual and sovereign nation equal to the Czech nation, and thus had the right to manage their own affairs, i.e. autonomy. The protocol from the meeting of the Slovak National Council on October 31st (the secret clause) was used to show that even the Slovak Centralists had agreed back then that Slovakia should have autonomy within ten years. The secret clause/protocol was also clearly a countermove to the Centralist claim that the Slovaks had subscribed unconditionally to the concept of Czechoslovak national and state unity in Martin. In this context a statement from Ivan Markovič in the debate on the Constitution acquired special importance. Markovič had stated: "all participants [...] resolved that in the question of autonomy for Slovakia, let the elected Slovak representatives decide after ten years and let that decision be respected."<sup>195</sup> This was now used as a proof that the Ľudák view was correct, and that Czecho-Slovak relations would have to be settled within ten years.<sup>196</sup>

The arguments of Tuka's "*vacuum juris*" were not central to autonomist argumentation. While the Ľudáks defended Tuka against the charges that he was a renegade, they never defended his view that a legal vacuum would arise. However, Hlinka was correct in maintaining that the article was not revolutionary. Tuka argued that the Slovak nation had a sovereign right to decide for itself – but he also stated that the one solution that could not be chosen was separation from the Czechs. The reason why the Centralists reacted so strongly was probably that it would have been a problem politically if the Slovaks accepted it. "From a juridical standpoint it was of course impossible to take the theory of a Vacuum Juris at all seriously, especially as it rested upon a deliberate falsehood of the crudest kind",<sup>197</sup> as Hodža pointed out.

### ***Invoking the principle of national self-determination***

The third category of autonomist arguments may be termed classical nationalist, meaning that they directly or indirectly invoked the principle of national self-determination. This line of argument rested on three premises: (1) We Slovaks are a nation of our own, (2) Individual nations have the right to national self-determination, and (3) We represent the true national will of the Slovak nation, which is autonomy. In other words: "We Slovaks are a nation of our own, consequently we are entitled to autonomy." The first premise is the cornerstone in the argument, without which the whole logic breaks down. The Martin Declaration as the act by which the sovereign Slovak nation decided to join the Czech nation in a common state and the Pittsburgh Agreement as "our program" were also based on this.

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<sup>195</sup> (V otázke nutnosti autonómie jasno uvidíme len vtedy, keď budeme emancipovaní od mentality otroctva maďarského. K tomu je potrebný čas. Všetci účastníci shodli sa potom na tom a usniesli sa, že v otázke autonómie Slovenska nech rozhodnú po desiatich rokoch volení slovenskí zástupcovia a toto rozhodnutie nech je rešpektované). Ivan Markovič, 125. schůze ... dne 27. února 1920 (p. 3721) in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy* ...

<sup>196</sup> See *Slovák* no. 34, 11.2.1928:1, where much of the speech is quoted. See also Hlinka, 4. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. prosince (p. 56), and Tiso, 117. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1937 (p. 45), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>197</sup> See Hodža in: R.W. Seton-Watson: *Slovakia then and now* (1931:83).

The premise that the Slovaks were a nation of their own was voiced throughout the period, as documented in Chapter Ten. The second premise was implicit in the argumentation much of the time, while direct references to the principle of national self-determination were not very common, considering how often autonomy was voiced. The third premise, that the autonomists were the (only) true representatives of the Slovak nation, was a recurrent theme. The struggle over who were the legitimate representatives was treated in Chapter Ten.

#### **WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMY BECAUSE WE ARE A NATION**

As we have already seen, the principle of national self-determination was invoked in the introduction to the first autonomy proposal of the Slovak People's Party in 1922, and in Tuka's autonomy proposal (see pages 466 and 468). It was also invoked in the Žilina Manifesto of 1922: "Conforming to the peoples' right to self-determination, we demand that the Slovak nation [...] be granted the same status as a free nation as the Czech nation enjoys. In demanding self-government, [...] we are searching for our rights, the right of freedom and national existence that we deserve like any other people."<sup>198</sup>

Likewise, a resolution of the Ľudák Club (also from 1922) stated that the Slovak people will "live as an individual nation, with its own language, in its own territory with the right of national self-determination and autonomy, but nonetheless within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak republic."<sup>199</sup> Even when the Ľudáks were in government, they argued that "the Slovak nation is from the most ancient times an ethnographically, linguistically and culturally individual nation, which by its sovereign will founded a common state with the Czech nation." Thus "even fair Czechs must acknowledge that the foundation for the right of the Slovak nation to self-determination is as firm as nature itself."<sup>200</sup>

There were also other examples of references to the right of national self-determination, but they were generally related to the Martin Declaration (see page 489, 493) and/or the establishment of the Czechoslovak state. I will return to the latter in a moment. In addition, the autonomists referred to concepts associated with the principle of national self-determination, like "natural rights", or they left out the second and third premises and went directly to the conclusion. The Memorandum of the Slovak nation (1919) is an example of the latter: "Slovakia for the Slovaks: We are neither Czechs nor Czechoslovaks; we are just simply Slovaks. It is in the name of justice and lasting peace that we demand the autonomy of Slovakia."<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> See Mikuš (1995:207).

<sup>199</sup> (als eigenes Volk mit eigener Sprache in seinem eigenen Gebiet leben, mit nationalem Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Autonomie, allerdings im Rahmen der Tschecho-Slowakischen Republik). Quoted from: Hoensch (1984:172).

<sup>200</sup> (Slovenský Národ je od pravekov etnografický, rečové a kultúrne osobitný Národ, ktorý svojou suverénou vôľou založil si s českým národom spoločný štát). (ba spravodlivý Čech musí uznať, že základ sebaurčovacího práva Slovenského národa je pevný, ako sama príroda). Buday in the Parliament, in *Slovák* no. 21, 26.1.1928. Besides, Juriga spoke of the "the right of self-determination in the Slovak krajina" as the ultimate goal in the debate of the regional reform (see page 456).

<sup>201</sup> See Mikuš 1995:163. See also Juriga, 162. schůze... dne 26. října 1922 (pp. 314–15); Ravasz, 18. schůze ... dne 19. února 1930 (p. 79), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy...*

In the 1935 budget debate, Tiso claimed "autonomy on the basis of natural law and rights, on the basis of historical rights and on the basis of contractual rights. [...] On the basis of natural law, because we Slovaks regard ourselves as a nation, an ethnic nation, a nation who with its language, its history, past, its character and culture, has the courage to go on, in order to develop further and cultivate its cultural and national values more. Historical law: The Slovak nation always cultivated that Slovak national awareness in the past, and never gave it up." <sup>202</sup>

The budget debate of 1936 is one of the few places I have seen Slovak nationalism (*nacionalizmus*) adduced as a reason for autonomy. It was again Tiso who argued that "the Slovak problem is a problem of Slovak nationalism. [...] It is almost grotesque that after 17 years of existence of the common national state of two nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, it is still necessary to substantiate Slovak nationalism for [it] to appear as something special, natural and simple – the love of one's own. A Slovak loves his homeland, his family, he is satisfied with his own, he does not long for the foreign, and he has no other ambition than to preserve and to keep his own and to augment his own." Further: "the Slovak nation is an equal partner with the Czech nation, and therefore sees the solution of the Slovak problem only in autonomy, in its own management of all its spiritual and material values." <sup>203</sup>

#### A CZECH AND SLOVAK OR A CZECHOSLOVAK NATION-STATE?

For the autonomists, the Slovak nation was the main priority, with the state and even autonomy secondary in importance. This was clearly expressed in *Slovák*: "Our aim is the well-being of the Slovak nation. If we saw that served in the existing centralist system, it would be an anomaly to demand autonomy. Yet, the present political regime convinces us every day that it does not grant Slovak national interests, and we must thus claim decentralization, the separation of the fields of interest and power between Czechs and Slovaks. [...] The aim of the social endeavors of us Slovaks is the Slovak nation – the means are autonomy." <sup>204</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> (Domáha sa tejto autonómie na základe práva a zákona prírodného, na základe práva historického a na základe práva smluvného. [...] na základe zákona prírody, lebo my Slováci sa považujeme za národ, národ etnický, národ, ktorý so svojou rečou, svojou historiou, minulosťou, svojou povahou a kultúrou trýfa si ísť ďalej, aby sa ďalej vyvíjal a tieto svoje kultúrne a národné hodnoty ďalej pestoval. Zákon historie: slovenský národ, toto povedomie slovenské národné pestoval vždycky v minulosti a nikdy sa toho nezriekal). Tiso, 349. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1934 (p. 59). See also Tiso, 5. schůze... dne 25. června 1935 (p. 70), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>203</sup> (Slovenský problém je problémom slovenského nacionalizmu. [...] A je skoro groteskné, že po 17. rokoch jestvovania spoločného národného štátu dvoch národov, Čechov a Slovákov, treba ešte [...] dôvody prinášať o oprávnenosti slovenského nacionalizmu, aby sa ukázal slovenský nacionalizmus ako niečo svorázne, prirodzené a prosté, ktorého jediným prvkom je láska k svojej. Slovák miluje svoju vlasť, svoj rod, spokojný je so svojím, nebaží po cudzom a nemá inej ambície ako zachovať, udržať si svoje a zveľadovať si svoje). (slovenský národ je rovnocennou složkou s národom českým a preto vidí vyriešenie slovenského problému len v autonomii, v svojskej to správe všetkých svojich hodnôt duchovných i hmotných). Tiso, 16. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 5. prosince 1935 (pp. 54, 56). See also Sokol, 17. schůze... dne 6. prosince 1935 (p. 47), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>204</sup> (naším cieľom je blaho slovenského národa. Keby sme ho videli zaistený v terajšom centralistickom systéme, požiadavka autonómie bola by anomaliou. Doterajší politický režim nás však každodenne presviedča, že nevyhovuje slovenským národným záujmom, že teda musíme sa domáhať decentralizácie, rozdelením záujmových a mocenských oblastí medzi Slovákami a Čechmi. [...] Cieľom spoločenských snažení nás Slovákov je slovenský národ – prostredníctvom autonómie). *Slovák* no. 93, 34.4.1934:3.

In the words of Anton Hancko: "Let rather the state perish, if the Czech nation by the hands of unbelievers is to murder and eradicate the Slovak nation from Slovakia, for nobody may take our nationality away from us as long as we live." Similarly, Hlinka maintained that "we will never compromise the individuality, the sovereignty of the Slovak nation with all its attributes. Not even for the sake of the state."<sup>205</sup> Tiso argued that "the state should serve the nation, and it has the right to existence and loyalty as long as the interest of the nation is not threatened. [...] It is thus our national and moral duty to be loyal to the Czecho-Slovak State. [Yet] the moment we see the Slovak nation threatened, the nation takes precedence over the state."<sup>206</sup>

At the same time, however, the autonomists clearly saw the republic as "the nation-state of the Czechs and Slovaks", a state they had joined voluntarily and on equal terms, and thus had the same right to as the Czechs.<sup>207</sup> Andrej Hlinka's attitude to the Czechoslovak state and autonomy is succinctly expressed in a speech he held at his own 70th birthday celebrations in 1934:

"The revolution of 1918 was the happiest moment in my life. Through the foundation of the Czechoslovak republic my aspirations were fulfilled and the hopes of the nation were roused. [...] The Czechoslovak state originated through the common efforts, the common work of the Czechs and Slovaks at home and abroad, and it is an expression of the common will of the Czech and Slovak nation. [...] An understanding between the Czechs and Slovaks is not only in the Slovak interest, but also in the interest of the whole state. [...] Such an understanding is possible only when the individuality of the Slovak nation is acknowledged and the natural rights of the Slovaks are respected and ensured. [...] I see the historical mission of the Czechoslovak republic in safeguarding the existence of the Czech nation and the Slovak nation. [...] Because the present centralist policy does not respect the special and warranted demands of Slovakia, it does not satisfy the Slovaks and harms Slovakia and the state."<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> (radšej nech zhynie štát, jestli by český národ rukami nevercov mal zavraždit' a vykynožit' slovenský národ zo Slovenska, ponevác národnosť našu nikto nám nesmie vziať, dotiaľ žit budeme). Hancko, 232. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 27. listopadu 1923 (p. 719). (Ale samostatnosť, suverenitu slovenského národa so všetkými atribúty nikdy nezaďáme. Ani za štát). Hlinka, 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 364), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*... See also James Ramon Felak: "At the price of the republic." *Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1929–1938* (1994:xiii).

<sup>206</sup> (štát národu slúžiť má a preto má dotiaľ právo na jestovanie a právo na lojalitu, kým záujem národa nie je ohrozený. Záujmy národa slovenského sa ťažko uplatňujú, ťažké boje sa musia deň po deň prevádzať, no, korene jestvovania národa nie sú ohrozené, – preto národnou i mravnou našou povinnosťou je byť lojálnymi voči štátu česko-slovenskému [...] národ je prednejší než štát, akonáhle by sme slovenský národ ohrozený videli). Tiso in *Slovák* no. 291, 24.12.1930:2. See also Tiso, 349. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 28. listopadu 1934 (p. 61), and 16. schůze ... dne 5. prosince 1935 (p. 54), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*... See also *Slovák* no. 49, 1.3.1934:1 and *Slovák* no. 273, 2.12.1934:1. In the latter issue, parts of his speech in the budget debate of 1935 are printed.

<sup>207</sup> (Štát tento vytvorený bol ako národný štát Čechov a Slovákov). Tiso, 17. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. února 1930 (p. 82), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*... See also *Slovák* no. 103, 5.5.1928:1.

<sup>208</sup> (Štátny prevrat roku 1918 bol najradostnejším okamžikom môjho života. Vznikom Československej republiky splnila sa moja tužba a ožili nádeje národa. [...] Československý štát vznikol spoločným úsilím, spoločnou zahraničnou i domácou prácou Čechov a Slovákov, je výrazom spoločnej vôle českého a slovenského národa. [...] Dorozumenie Čechov a Slovákov je nielen záujmom slovenským, ale celoštátnym. [...] dorozumenie toto je možné len tak, keď uznaná bude individualita slovenského národa a rešpektované a zaistené budú prirodzené práva Slovákov. [...] Dejinné poslanie Československej republiky vidím v zaistení existencie národa českého a národa slovenského. [...] Dnešná centralistická politika tým, že nerešpektuje špeciálne a oprávnené požiadavky Slovenska, Slovákov neuspokojuje a Slovensko a štát poškodzuje). Andrej Hlinka in at the celebration of his 70th anniversary, published in *Slovák* no. 221, 30.9.1934:1.

In the 1930 budget debate, Tiso emphasized that the party did not by autonomy "want to destroy the state of the Czechs and Slovaks": what they desired was a return to the spirit of "our revolution, when Czechs and Slovaks hand in hand, harmoniously and unanimously entered the scene of history."<sup>209</sup> The autonomists were quite consistent: The Slovaks were a nation of their own, with the right to self-determination. Through the Martin Declaration the sovereign Slovak nation used this right to divorce the Magyars and join the Czech nation in one common state, "not because we are 'one nation' with them, but because we did not want to live with the Magyars anymore."<sup>210</sup> The Slovaks had not thereby given up their sovereignty.

The Centralists rejected the first premise in the autonomist argumentation, that the Slovaks were an individual nation, and the third premise, that the autonomists represented the true national will of the Slovak nation. As Chapter Nine and Ten show, much effort was put into promoting the image of a Czechoslovak nation with two tribes, and in arguing that the Slovak Centralists were the legitimate representatives of the Slovak nation. At the same time, they accepted the second premise, that nations have the right to self-determination. In their scheme, however, the Czechoslovak nation had already used its right to self-determination in founding the Czechoslovak republic, which became the nation-state of the Czechoslovak nation.

The centralist point of departure was that the unitary Czechoslovak state was founded on Czechoslovak national unity, and anything that could sever this state and national unity represented a danger to the integrity and future existence of the state. Giving Slovakia political autonomy would mean breaking with the idea of Czechoslovak unity, because the demand for autonomy was so closely associated with the idea of the existence of a Slovak nation. Autonomy would therefore be a threat to national and state unity alike. This was also clearly conveyed in the debates of the political-administrative organization of the state in 1920 and 1927. Since demands for autonomy were anti-state, the autonomists were, logically enough, renegades. Since the Czechoslovak nation and state was one, such treason could only be explained by foreign influences (Magyar) or by other loyalties (the autonomists were Magyarones).

In budget debates and government inauguration debates, Czech ministers and deputies often voiced the idea that the Czechoslovak republic was a Czechoslovak (or Czech) nation-state, but seldom as a response to Slovak autonomists. The German minority was mostly the target, and the message was that this is "*our* Czechoslovak (or Czech) state." This was one of Karel Kramář's favorites, which he employed even after the Germans had joined the government.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> (Štát tento vytvorený bol ako národný štát Čechov a Slovákov). (autonomia Slovenskej krajiny štát Čechov a Slovákov nie rozbiť chce, lež práve na podklade autonómie, hlásanej slovenskou ľudovou stranou, vrátíme sa k duchu našej revolúcie, keď Čech a Slovák ruka v ruke svorne a jednomyselne vystúpili na javište dejín). Tiso, 17. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18 února 1930 (pp. 82, 83), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>210</sup> (Nie preto, že sme s nimi "jeden národ", ale preto že sme ďalej žiť s Maďarmi nechceli). *Slovák* no. 249, 5.11.1931:1.

<sup>211</sup> See e.g. Vlastimil Tusar (ČSD), 2. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 1. června 1920 (p. 17); Karel Kramář (ČND), 5. schůze ... dne 10. června 1920 (p. 166); Kramář, 45. schůze ... dne 20 října 1926 (pp. 180, 186); Karel Engliš (ČND), 229. schůze ... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (p. 369); Rudolf Mlčoch (ČSŽ), 5. schůze ... dne 25. června 1935 (p. 25), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

When such statements were aimed at the autonomists, however, a "strength through unity" message was more or less explicitly conveyed. In the 1935 budget debate, Jan Malypetr (Agr.) advocated unity, and claimed that the Czechoslovak nation had learned the historical lesson that "national and political separation of its various tribes ended in the misery of all."<sup>212</sup> Even when he opened up for administrative decentralization in the government inauguration debate of 1935, Malypetr insisted "fully and consistently on the present policy of Czechoslovak state and national unity." In the same speech, he warned against "political movements that [...] may harm the state, and especially its constitutional unity and republican democratic form." He alluded to the Heinlein Party as well as the Ľudáks, and argued that in Slovakia, "instead of Czechoslovak national unity, the estrangement was deepened through the general and thus also alluring slogan of autonomy."<sup>213</sup>

Tiso strongly resented being lumped together with the Heinlein Party and the German minority.<sup>214</sup> In the same debate František Světlík (ČSL) stressed that "the Slovaks are no minority"<sup>215</sup> while Antonín Hampl (ČSD) found the prime minister's emphasis on Czechoslovak unity "heartwarming." He pointed out that other states, and especially states with indisputable stability, put very strong emphasis on maintaining state unity. Hampl said he understood Slovakia's special pains, but insisted that "the unity of the Czechoslovak state is much more than some momentous, temporary and smaller pains, and we must judge our political line accordingly."<sup>216</sup> This was one of the rare occasions when many Czechs commented on the autonomy question in a Parliamentary debate.

In budget debate of 1938, Hampl emphasized that "Czechoslovakia did not originate only on the basis of peace agreements, [...] the Czechoslovak republic originated as a historical necessity, as a remedy of historical wrongs, and the rebirth of Czechoslovakia contributed very effectively to the healing of the wounds left by the war on the body of Europe." He would not allow "our state to become the vassal of some foreign nation."<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> (národní a politické rozdrobení jeho jednotlivých kmenů skončilo porobením všech). Malypetr, 345. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 6. listopadu 1934, *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>213</sup> (Trvajíc plně a důsledně na dosavadní politice státní a národní jednoty československé chce vláda...). (na Slovensko pod všeobecným a tím i lákavým heslem autonomie bylo na místě československé národní jednoty prohlubováno odcizování). (politických hnutí, která by [...] mohla poškodit stát a zejména jeho ústavní jednotu a republikánsko-demokratickou formu). Malypetr, 2. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 18. června 1935 (pp. 3, 4), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>214</sup> Tiso, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 25. června 1935 (p. 70), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>215</sup> (Slováci nejsou žádná menšina). Světlík, 5. schůze... dne 25. června 1935 (p. 14), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>216</sup> (Je to potěšitelné). (zejména jednota československého státu je daleko víc než jakákoliv okamžitá, dochvilná a menší bolest a že s tohoto hlediska musíme naši linii politickou posuzovati). Hampl, 3. schůze ... dne 19. června 1935 (p. 28), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>217</sup> (Nemůžeme také připustit, aby se náš stát stal vasalem některého cizího národa...) (Československo nevzniklo jen na základě mírových smluv [...] Československá republika vzniklo jako historická nutnost, jako náprava dějinných křivd, a znovurození Československa přispělo velmi platně k zcelení ran, jež zanechala válka na těle Evropy). Hampl, 117. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 30 listopadu 1937 (pp. 34, 35–36) in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

While the approach taken by the Czech speakers was to emphasize Czechoslovak state and national unity, the Slovak Centralists usually addressed the matter of Slovak autonomy more directly. Ivan Markovič argued that "the political and national freedom, cultural growth, social development and economic growth of Slovakia is possible only as long as Slovakia is a free part of the Czechoslovak state unity."<sup>218</sup> Likewise, Ivan Dérer repeatedly argued that "only in a sincere and brotherly Czechoslovak unity and cooperation is a free Slovak life possible."<sup>219</sup> A Slovak variety of the "strength-through-unity" message underlies these arguments, as well as Hrušovský's and Dérer's statements in the debate on the administrative organization in 1927 (see page 457): namely, the idea that Czechoslovak national unity was necessary to protect the Slovaks against Magyar influences, or even against a return to Hungary.

This is also evident in several speeches made by Anton Štefánek. In 1929 he argued: "Our state is founded on Czechoslovak national unity, not on a federation of the Czechs and Slovaks, but on an organic and national unity."<sup>220</sup> In 1932: "Even its *raison d'être* is that idea. It contains everything that became the foundation of the Czechoslovak nation-state. As soon as we become foreign to it, the decay starts, and with it follows everything else that is associated with state decay." At the same time, he warned against an autonomy "founded on nationalist antipathy, isolation of Slovakia and resentment, which in the last instance cannot be satisfied even by a federal organization of the state", but which would lead to "the destruction of the state."<sup>221</sup> Finally, he argued in 1934 that "Autonomy means dualism, artificial isolation of Slovakia, the return of some duplicity. [...] God almighty save us from such a policy that would surely have to end by the death of this state and finally also Slovakia herself."<sup>222</sup>

Likewise, Igor Hrušovský warned against autonomy because it would lead to Czechoslovak dualism, which in turn would lead to the destruction of the state. "We must defend and protect the idea of the Czechoslovak unity with all our might, because if that idea falls, we Slovaks are lost for ever. [...] Slovakia as an independent state would not even last for a day; it would be taken apart. [...] We know what a Magyar, a Hungarian state means. It did not change and will not change. Our minorities in Hungary live an even worse life than we lived in former Hungary. A Magyar-Slovak state, gentlemen? Never! Maybe a Polish-Slovak state? Nonsense!

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<sup>218</sup> (politická a národná sloboda, kultúrny rozmach, sociálny rozvoj a hospodársky vzrast Slovenska je možný len dotiaľ, kým Slovensko bude slobodnou súčasťou štátnej jednoty Československej). Markovič, 122. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 4. prosince 1937 (p. 7), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>219</sup> See Dérer: *Československá otázka* (1935:178) for the quotation. See also the same collection of texts, p. 95.

<sup>220</sup> (Náš stát založený je na československé národní jednotě, nie na federácii Čechov a Slovákův, ale na organické a národní jednotě). Štefánek, 6. schůze... dne 20. prosince 1929 (p. 62), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>221</sup> (autonomie [...] založený na nacionalistické antipatii, na izolácii Slovenska a citovom odpore, ktorý sa vo svojich konečných výsledniciach nemôže uspokojiť ani federatívnym zriadením štátu, ale poňenie Slovákov [...] ku zničeniu tohoto štátu). (Jej *raison d'être* je iba táto idea. V nej je obsažené všetko, čo sa stáva podkladom národného štátu československého. Akonáhle sa jej odcudzíme, nastane rozklad a všetko ostatné vyplní samosebou, čo je s rozkladom štátu spojené). Štefánek, 214. schůze ... dne 8. listopadu 1932 (p. 4), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>222</sup> (autonomia znamená dualizmus, umelú izoláciu Slovenska, znovuzavedenie akejsi dvojakosti [...]) Boh všemohúci nech nás chráni pred takou politikou, ktorá by bezpodmienečne musela skončiť smrťou tohoto štátu a konečne i Slovenska samého). Štefánek, 351. schůze ... dne 30. listopadu 1934 (p. 17), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...



[...] We have a third possibility, the present state, the Czechoslovak republic, a Czechoslovak state, which recognizes also our tribe as state nation, as a part of a unitary state nation. [...] Our fate, our future is at stake. To tear Slovakia away means the end of Slovakia." <sup>223</sup>

Ivan Dérer warned against the argument that the Slovaks, being a nation, were entitled to autonomy: "If we take as our point of departure the assumption that we are an individual nation, then we are not only entitled to autonomy within the state of another nation, but even more. Every nation has a right to its own state sovereignty and independence." Moreover, he feared that the ideology of the individual and sovereign Slovak nation and the radical elements in the movement would outgrow the present leaders. The separatism that would inevitably follow was in his view most catastrophic for the Slovaks and their future existence.<sup>224</sup> *Slovák* warned against this argument, stating that it could return as a boomerang.<sup>225</sup> In a different context, however, Dérer argued that the Slovaks were not a nation since they did not strive for independence. His thinking on these points was thus not particularly consistent, to say the least.<sup>226</sup>

Ján Ursíny warned that separation had led to misery among Slav nations before, even if those who caused it did not want it to happen.<sup>227</sup> Ursíny was one of the group of increasingly influential young Slovak Agrarians who accepted the existence of an individual Slovak nation. In the 1938 budget debate, he categorically rejected "the identification of the concept of a Slovak nation with the concept of political autonomy for Slovakia. A great part of the Slovak nation [...] does not demand political autonomy, because they are convinced deep down that political autonomy would bring neither the nation nor the state a happy future; on the contrary it would limit the Slovak nation's chances of development. We do not separate the concept of a Slovak nation from the concept of a Czechoslovak state...." He argued that the Slovak nation contributed as much to the state as the Czechs, and "as equals, [...] we do not limit our competence to Slovakia, but remain equal factors in the whole state." <sup>228</sup>

<sup>223</sup> (Ideu československej jednoty musíme brániť a hájiť všetkými silami, lebo padne táto idea, tak sme my Slováci na vždy ztratení). Hrušovský, 162. schůze ... dne 26. října 1922 (p. 320). See also 215. schůze... dne 9. listopadu 1932 (p. 28). (Slovensko ako samostatný štátny útvar vy nevydržalo ani jeden deň, bolo by rozobraté. [...] To vieme, čo znamená maďarský, uhorský štát. Ten sa nezmenil a nezmení. Menšiny naše v Maďarsku žijú ešte horší život, než sme žili v bývalom Uhorsko my. Pánovia, maďarsko-slovenský štát. Nikdy! Môže byť polsko-slovenský štát? Nesmysel. [...] Máme tretiu možnosť, dnešný stav, Československú republiku, československý štát, ktoré uznáva i náš kmeň ako štátny národ, ako súčasť jednotného štátneho národa) (A náš osud, naša budúcnosť je v sázke. Roztrhať Slovensko znamená koniec Slovenska). Hrušovský, 347. schůze... dne 8. listopadu 1934 (p. 22), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>224</sup> (Keď totiž vychádzame z predpokladu, že sme osobitným, zvláštnym národom, tak nám neprislúcha len autonómia v rámci štátu iného národa, ale tiež viac. Každý národ má právo na svoju štátnu suverenitu a samostatnosť). Dérer (1935:88–90).

<sup>225</sup> See *Slovák* no. 106, 10.5.1934:1 and *Slovák* no. 111, 17.5.1934:1.

<sup>226</sup> Dérer (1935:51, 63).

<sup>227</sup> Ursíny, 6. schůze ... dne 26. června 1935 (p. 47), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>228</sup> (ako rovnocenní [...] neobmedzujeme sa vo svojej kompetencii len na Slovensko, ale ostaneme rovnocennými činiteľmi v celom štáte). (Treba opätovne rázne a kategoricky odmietnuť stotožňovanie pojmu slovenský národ s pojmom politickej autonómie Slovenska. Veľka časť slovenského národa [...] si nežiada politickej autonómie, lebo je z hĺbky duše presvedčená, že politický autonomizmus neprinesol národu ani štátu šťastnú budúcnosť, naopak obmedzil by vývojové možnosti slovenského národa. My pojem slovenského národa od pojmu československý štát neodlučujeme...). Ursíny, 118. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 1. prosince 1937 (p. 38), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy*...

Hodža expressed something similar as early as in 1921: "For us, legislative and territorial autonomy means, first, the disintegration of our state unity" and second, "a degradation to a broken, fragmented sovereignty which cannot be compared [...] to being co-owners of the sovereignty of the whole state.[...] Limited political autonomy would mean for us to exclude Slovakia from those affairs of the whole state that are most important to us all and the whole state..."<sup>229</sup> (finance policies, foreign affairs and defense), he argued.

***The Magyar(one) card or: It is our state, too, and we are loyal to it***

As already noted, demands for autonomy were seen as anti-state, and the emphasis on Czechoslovak state and nation unity was often combined with accusations that the autonomists were Magyarones, or also that they were pawns in a Hungarian irredentist plot. This line of argument was quite common from the very beginning, especially among Slovak Centralists. The Magyarone card was used both against the idea that the Slovak were an individual nation, as we have already seen in Chapter Ten, and against autonomism.

In 1919 Vavro Šrobár distinguished between autonomy as a slogan and autonomy as a program: "As a slogan it is a signal of opposition in Slovakia, as a program it is a device for separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands, a device for tearing apart the Czechoslovak republic. [...] 'Autonomy' for Slovakia as a political and constitutional program did not grow of Slovak soil, but was cultivated abroad, by our main enemies the Magyars."

Now, he argued, the "new Slovaks" were the loudest in demanding that "we throw the Czech civil servants, teachers and professors out of their positions, and place them there instead. [...] That is one reason for the incitement against the Czechs and the Czechoslovak republic, and also a reason why those Magyarones cry for autonomy in Slovakia. They understand autonomy thus: Once we have chased the Czechs out, we may again divide the administration in Slovakia among us, as it was in those days. I do not even want to think of what autonomy would mean today for Slovakia." In short, Šrobár argued, "to give Slovakia an autonomy that would allow those people [...] to govern Slovakia, is simply to give Slovakia to the Magyars, or return her to the state before October 28th."<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> (Pre nás znamená legislatívna a teritoriálna autonómia predovšetkým rozbitie štátnej jednoty...). (degradáciu na takú zlomkovitú, fragmentárnu suverénitu, ktorá sa s našimi žiadostmi – byť spolumajiteľmi celoštátnej suverenity – nedá srovnáť. [...] omedzenie sa na politickú autonómiu znamená pre nás vylúčiť Slovensko z tých celoštátnych záležitostí, ktoré sú pre nás všetkých a pre celý štát najdôležitejšie). Hodža, 89. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 21. října 1921 (p. 197), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

<sup>230</sup> (Jako heslo, je signálom pre opozíciu na Slovensku, ako program – je prostriedkom na odtrhnutie Slovenska od zemí českých, prostriedkom na rozbitie československej republiky). (žiadajú, aby sme z tých miest kde sú teraz českí úradníci, učitelia a profesori, týchto vyhnali a na ich miesto posadili ich. [...] To je jedna príčina štvania proti Čechom a proti československej republike a i príčina toho, že sa kričí s týchto maďaronských strán po autonómii na Slovensku. Oni autonómiu rozumejú takto: Keď zaženieme Čechov, rozdelíme si zase celú správu na Slovensku, ako bolo za onoho času. Nechcem ani domysleť, čo by dnes znamenala autonómia pre Slovensko). (Slovensku dať, povedzme, takú samosprávu, že by tí ľudia [...] spravovali Slovensko, je jednoducho vydať Slovensko Maďarom do rúk, alebo vydať ho do takého stavu, aký bol pred 28. říjnom). Šrobár, 73. schůze ... dne 18. září 1919 (pp. 2271, 2273–74), in: *Těšnopisecké zprávy*...

Juriga vehemently denied the allegations that every autonomist was a renegade: "If you want to call us renegades, address that word higher up, to him who signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, for we want what Professor Masaryk wants. It is stupidity to call every Slovak a Magyarone if he does not worship the centralist idol of Prague." Juriga pointed out that he "was in Budapest on October 18th, in the Diet risking my life when I wanted independent state rights for the Slovak nation, and in spite of this you call me a Magyarone today. This is childish."<sup>231</sup> This is a parallel to the continuity argument presented in Chapter 10 (pp. 297 ff.).

Milan Ivanka absolved Hlinka and Juriga, but nevertheless attributed the autonomy slogan to Magyarones and Magyars, and especially to former Magyar officials and Magyarone Catholic clergy, who were now hiding behind Hlinka, Juriga and other Slovak politicians. "The way I see it, there are only two political groups in Slovakia demanding 'state' autonomy: the Catholic clerics and the irredentists [...] the irredentists because they see a weakening, an atomizing of the unitary republic and the unitary nation in autonomy for Slovakia. Both sides are actually thinking of a federation of two sovereign states, the Slovak and the Czech-Moravian-Silesian when they speak of autonomy."<sup>232</sup>

The charges that the autonomists were a bunch of Magyarone were more common in the beginning than in the end of the period, apart from a peak in 1928 and 1929 linked to the *vacuum juris* article of Tuka and the ensuing trial. There were also charges during the trial that the Slovak People's Party had received Magyar money. This Hlinka vehemently denied.<sup>233</sup>

Even in 1938, Dérer claimed that "the great bulk of the autonomists and leaders of the movement for autonomy in Slovakia were, at the moment when the Pittsburgh deliberations took place, anti-Slovak and pro-Magyar in their views." One of the causes of autonomism was, in his view, "a Hungarian mentality. [...] The autonomist efforts, directed as they are towards an artificial separation of the Slovaks from the Czechs, are in substance relics of the thousand-year-old Hungarianism. [...] Even the breaking up of Hungary and the liberation of Slovakia has not entirely freed the Slovaks from the moral consequences of the thousand years of subjugation and serfdom. [...] The autonomist movement is the expression of this survival of servile spirit. [...] Yet this relic of a thousand-year-old servitude will also disappear."<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> (Keď náš chcete vyhlasovať za vlastizradcov, adresujte to slovo vyššie, na toho, kto podepísal pittsburskú smluvu, lebo my chceme to, čo chce prof. Masaryk. Je to hlúposť každého Slováka menovať Maďarónom, keď sa nekorí modle centralistickej a pražskej). (A ja som bol v Budapešti 18. októbra v snemovni v nebezpečí života, keď som chcel štátne samostatné právo slovenského národa, a dnes predseda nazývate ma Maďarónom. To sú detské). Juriga, 5. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 10. června 1920 (p. 180), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>232</sup> (Ako ja vidím veci, na Slovensku len dve politické grupy požadujú "štátnu" autonomiu: katolíckí klerikáli a irredentisti [...] irredentisti preto, lebo vidia v autonomii Slovenska oslabenie, atomizovanie jednotnej republiky a jednotného národa. Obe strany, keď hovoria o autonomii, myslia vlastne na federáciu dvoch suverenných štátov: Slovenského a Česko-moravsko-sliezskeho). Milan Ivanka: *O autonomistických snahách na Slovensku* (1923:14–15).

<sup>233</sup> See Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 177, 7.8.1929:1.

<sup>234</sup> Ivan Dérer: *The unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Has the Pittsburgh declaration been carried out?* (1938:17, 74–78).

At first glance, it may seem that the Czechoslovak state was a higher priority for the Centralists than for the autonomists. Yet, also the autonomists considered the Czechoslovak republic as their own state, and they repeatedly professed loyalty to its integrity and borders. This was of course also a defense against Centralist allegations that the autonomists were Magyarones, renegades and colluded with enemies of the state. The autonomists never stopped emphasizing that that they were state forming, that they built the republic, that they were in favor of the republic, that they were always loyal to it, and that they loved it. But most of all, they emphasized that "the state is our state, our republic."<sup>235</sup> Statements in favor of the integrity of the state reached a peak in 1927 and 1928 because of the activities of a certain Lord Rothermere, who wrote articles in the British press advocating revision of the Trianon Peace Agreement in favor of Hungary, and again in 1933 and 1934. Hlinka simply told Lord Rothermere to kindly stay out of it, and asked God to relieve him of false friends.<sup>236</sup>

The Club of the Slovak People's Party strongly condemned Lord Rothermere's activities, and insisted on the Trianon borders of Slovakia, its unity and inviolability, which was meant to protect the Slovak nation. "Slovakia is our inheritance, our body, our blood, our future!" they stated in a resolution in August 1927. At the same time, they were convinced that there would be no irredentist and separatist efforts in Slovakia if the ľudák demands had been fulfilled.<sup>237</sup> Buday argued that "who wants autonomy, ipso facto also wants the whole. Autonomy is thus a composite concept: it contains the concepts whole and part. The whole is the republic; the part is Slovakia. Who wants to protect Slovakia, must defend the republic as a whole."<sup>238</sup>

In 1933, Hlinka asserted that "we are in favor of this republic, more than anyone else. [...] Why, it involves our hide and our land, our nation. Every scoundrel shows his teeth at us. The Germans, Magyars and Ruthenians want revisions: they all go slicing from our live body."<sup>239</sup> Tiso made it perfectly clear that "with autonomy we do not mean, neither do we demand, any separatism. [...] Autonomy is possible without the unity of the republic, the unity of the state being affected, and autonomy does not have to be dualism or separatism."<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> (je naším štátom, je našou republiku). Hlinka, 88. schůze poslanecké sněmovny N.S.R.Č. dne 20. října 1921 (p. 142). See also Hlinka, 229. schůze... dne 22. listopadu 1923 (pp. 364, 368); Hlinka, 213. schůze ...4. listopadu 1932 (pp. 18, 27). (je štát náš, tedy i slovenský štát). Rázus, 213. schůze... dne 4. listopadu 1932 (p. 33); Rázus, 345. schůze ... dne 6. listopadu 1934 (pp. 48, 51), Hlinka, 5. schůze... dne 25. června 1935 (p. 50), in: *Těsnopisecké zprávy...*

<sup>236</sup> Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 179, 12.8.1927:1. On the Rothermere affair: R.W. Seton-Watson: *Slovakia then and now* (1931:44).

<sup>237</sup> (Slovensko je naša dedovizeň, naše telo, naše krv, naša budúcnosť!) Resolution of the Club of senators and deputies of the Slovak People's Party, printed in *Slovák* no. 184, 19.8.1927:1.

<sup>238</sup> (Kto chce autonomiu, ipso facto chce i celok. Autonomia je totiž pojem složený: obsahuje v sebe pojmy celku a čiastky. Celok je republika, čiastka je Slovensko. Kto chce zachrániť Slovensko, musí hájiť i republiku ako celok). Buday in a speech in the Parliament, printed in *Slovák* no. 290, 24.12.1928:3.

<sup>239</sup> (Ak je niekto za republiku, my sme za ňu. [...] Veď ide o našu kožu a našu zem, náš národ. Na nás si zuby cerí každý ničomník. Idú revidovať Nemci, Maďari, Rusíni: každý ide krájať z nášho živého tela). Hlinka in *Slovák* no. 197, 2.9.1933:1.

<sup>240</sup> (pod autonomiou nemyslíme, ani nežiadame žiadny separatizmus. [...] Autonomia je teda možná bez toho, že by rušila jednotnosť republiky, jednotnosť štátu a autonomia nemusí byť dualizmom alebo separatizmom). Tiso in a speech in the Parliament, printed in *Slovák* no. 216, 28.12.1933:4.

In the face of Hungarian revisionism, the Club of the Slovak People's Party and Martin Rázus signed a declaration in January 1934, stating that "we stand on the political principle of the widest [possible] autonomy of Slovakia, compatible with the oneness of the republic of the Czechs and Slovaks."<sup>241</sup> At the same time, all Slovak deputies and senators signed a declaration stating that František Jehlička in no way represented the Slovak nation, but the Magyar irredenta. This was a reaction to Jehlička's claims in English newspapers that Slovakia had been separated from Hungary and joined with the Czech lands against the will of the population. "The Slovak people, for decades subjected to the murderous Magyarization policy of the governments of former Hungary, greeted the divorce from old Hungary with joy and satisfaction, and left its framework voluntarily in order to form a new union with the Czech brothers. [...] The Slovak nation does not long for a return and for the fate of the Slovaks in Hungary, who are also today suppressed and in decay."<sup>242</sup>

I have not found a single statement in *Slovák* or in the parliamentary debates suggesting that the Slovak People's Party or the Slovak National Party wanted more than autonomy – i.e. that they wanted secession. In fact, not even Tuka advocated this in his *vacuum juris* article, even though he mentioned it as a possibility. On the other hand, in view of the censorship practice and the general political climate in the inter-war period, the autonomists may have considered it wiser not to go public, even if they held such views. According to information found in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ľudák radicals tried to prepare for Slovak independence already in October 1938, but this has not been corroborated by other sources.<sup>243</sup>

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It is about time to summarize the autonomy debate. In the following, I will address these questions: First, what were the core arguments on each side of the debate? Second, who were the participants in the occasional clashes in the Parliament over autonomy? Finally, what can the argumentation tell us about the motives of the participants?

If we turn to the core arguments first, an important point is that both sides founded their argumentation on alternative national ideologies. The cornerstone of the autonomist argumentation was the existence of an individual and sovereign Slovak nation, and the core message was that the Slovak nation was entitled to autonomy. The cornerstone of the centralist argumentation was that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation, and the core message was strength through unity. These cornerstones and core messages were also reflected in the choice of key documents and in the use of the various documents in the debate.

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<sup>241</sup> (trváme na politickej zásade najširšej autonómie Slovenska, slučiteľnej s jednotnosťou republiky Čechov a Slovákov). Published in *Slovák* no. 16, 20.1.1934:3.

<sup>242</sup> (Slovenský ľud, vydaný za dlhé desaťročia vraždenej maďarizačnej politiky vlád bývalého Uhorska, uvítal s radosťou a uspokojením rozklad starého Uhorska a opustil jeho rámec dobrovoľne, aby stvoril nové spojenie s českými bratmi. [...] Slovenský národ netúži po návrate a po osude Slovákov, ktorí i dnes sú v Maďarsku utláčaní a hynú). Published in *Slovák* no. 16, 20.1.1934:3.

<sup>243</sup> See Jan Rychlík: *Češi a Slováci v 20. století* (1997:9).

Both sides pledged loyalty to the state, and regarded it as *their* state. But while the Centralists presented the state as the nation-state of the Czechoslovak nation, the autonomists regarded it as the nation-state of two equal nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks. In the centralist scheme, the Czechoslovak nation had used the right to self-determination to reunite in a Czechoslovak nation-state. In the autonomist scheme, the Slovak nation had used its right to self-determination to divorce the Magyars and join the Czechs in a Czech and Slovak nation-state; furthermore, as a free and equal nation, they were entitled to manage their own affairs, i.e. autonomy.

The autonomists argued, first, that autonomy was the remedy for all Slovakia's ills. The deprivation arguments for autonomy were especially associated with the slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks" (Slovak bread) and to a lesser degree the slogan "Slovak in Slovakia" (linguistic demands). Religious issues were generally not a part of the grievance arguments for autonomy, other than in the Memorandum of the Slovaks (1919), which is also in line with the relatively insignificant role of religious demands in the Slovak national program.

Second, the autonomists argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement guaranteed the Slovak right of autonomy because it was a Magna Charta (here Masaryk was implicitly given the role of a sovereign, although he was of course a private person at the time), granting certain privileges. Alternatively, the Pittsburgh Agreement was seen as a binding contract between the Czech and Slovak nation – or between the American (Czechs and) Slovaks on the one hand, and President Masaryk as the representative of the Czechoslovak state, on the other. The view of the Pittsburgh Agreement as a Magna Charta was most common early in the period, while the contract argumentation changed character over time, involving Masaryk more and more.

The fact that Masaryk had signed the Pittsburgh Agreement was probably the reason why it became more important in autonomist argumentation than other wartime agreements involving Slovak autonomy: It simply held a greater symbolic potential as an official agreement binding the government. This is probably also why the Centralists tried so hard to downgrade it. It may be argued that the Agreement *was* morally binding, since all steps by the provisional government and its members (Masaryk, Beneš, Štefánik) were declared binding in a statement of October 31st, 1918, issued by a delegation of the Czechoslovak National Committee to Geneva. The same body declared the establishment of the Czechoslovak state, and it may be argued that if that act was valid, then the authorization of Masaryk's actions was valid as well.<sup>244</sup>

The singly most common usage at all times was, however, the Pittsburgh agreement as "our program"; an expression of the will of the Slovak nation and as the program of the Slovak People's Party. In their eyes this was the same, since they regarded themselves as the (only) legitimate representatives of the nation. This was associated with a third argument: that the Slovaks had right to autonomy because they were a nation. A premise for this is that an individual nation has the right to national self-determination and thus to autonomy *if it so wishes*. Yet, direct references to the principle of national self-determination were not very common.

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<sup>244</sup> For the text of this declaration, see Edvard Beneš: *Světová válka a naše revoluce*, vol III (1929a:490).

In Ľudák argumentation, the Martin declaration was the act by which the Slovak nation had decided to join the Czech nation in one common state. The declaration soon became more of a liability than an asset for the Ľudáks, and the same goes for their voting in favor of the Constitution in 1920. The former was used by the Centralists to show that the Ľudáks at the time of the Martin declaration had recognized Czechoslovak national unity. The latter was used as proof that they had accepted the centralist terms on which the state was built. Both constituted an embarrassment in the context of the struggle for autonomy on behalf of the individual Slovak nation. The "secret clause" and the forgery charges were clear counter-moves to the centralist use of the Martin declaration as proof of Czechoslovak national unity.

There is a striking cohesion between the Ľudák autonomy proposals and their main arguments. As we have seen, the proposals had in spite of certain variations a common core centered on the Pittsburgh agreement and provisions for "Slovak bread", i.e. employment of Slovaks in the regional administration and the state administration. This corresponds to the use of the Pittsburgh agreement as "our program", and to the deprivation arguments: The main argument was that if the Ľudáks were allowed to decide, there would only be Slovak employees in Slovakia.

The deprivation arguments of the autonomists were typically instrumental; Slovak autonomy was presented as the best instrument to solve Slovakia's problems. The answer of the Centralists to this was equally instrumental: In their view, what was needed to help Slovakia, was more unity, especially economically, and not separation. This was entirely in line with their overall "strength through unity" message. Yet, the main artillery of the Centralists was put into questioning the legitimacy of those present at Pittsburgh as representatives of the Czech and Slovak nation, and thus the right of the American Czechs and Slovaks to speak on behalf of their nations and close deals on their behalf. This went to the core of the autonomist argumentation around the Pittsburgh agreement: If they were not legitimate representatives, the Pittsburgh agreement would be invalid as a Magna Charta, as a binding contract and certainly as an expression of the will of the Slovak nation. It would thus at best be of historical importance, which is exactly what the Centralists argued.

While the autonomists focused on documents containing references to Slovak autonomy, the Centralists focused on documents implying Czechoslovak national and state unity. The Martin declaration was an asset for the Centralists for the exact same reason that it was a liability to the autonomists, namely the infamous sentence stating Czechoslovak national unity. As such it was also a domestic, potentially more legitimate alternative to the Pittsburgh agreement as an expression of the Slovak national will, and this is how it was used.

The use of the Magyarone card was a matter of internal logic: If the state was founded on Czechoslovak national unity, anything that could affect this unity necessarily constituted a threat to the state as well as to the Czechoslovak nation. Precisely because autonomy was so closely associated with the idea of an individual Slovak nation, it was against Czechoslovak national as well as state unity, and those involved were naturally renegades. Because the Czechoslovak nation was one, such individuals must in centralist logic either be under foreign influence, or have another identity – respectively Magyar and Magyarone.

The Magyarone card was also the centralist answer to the autonomist claim that they were the (only) legitimate representatives of the Slovak nation. The autonomist reply to the Magyarone charges was two-pronged: On the one hand, central leaders like Hlinka and Juriga defended their honor as Slovak patriots by referring to fines and prison sentences under Hungary. On the other hand, they replied in kind, accusing the Slovak Centralists of selling out their Slovak identity for a bowl of lentils. (This part of the argument was presented in Chapter Ten).

If we turn to the participants, I expected the debate on Slovak autonomy to be a debate between centralist Czechs and autonomist Slovaks. I was thus surprised to find that the participants in the direct clashes in the Parliament were mostly Slovaks, *on both sides*, and actually even more so than in the identity struggle (see Chapter Ten). The *result* was that clashes over identity and autonomy also turned out as a contest between Slovak autonomists and Centralists of being the (only) legitimate representative of Slovak interests/the Slovak nation.

If this Slovak domination was the outcome of a conscious strategy on part of the Centralists, the Slovak Centralists may either have been assigned to the task by their respective Czechoslovak parties, or alternatively, they may have defined Slovakia as their "turf." A third possibility is that Slovak domination simply reflected that the major concerns of the Czech and Slovak deputies were different. It is indeed my impression that the Czech agenda and the Czech "discourse" were less nationalist and more class based. This is also reflected in the fact that the Czech party system was more pluralist. Often the speeches of the Czechs in budget debates were totally devoid of national content, or the little there was had character of oaths of loyalty to Czechoslovak unity. In contrast, the speeches of the Slovak autonomists were never devoid of nationalist content and the speeches of the Slovak Centralists hardly ever.

There is, however, no reason to believe that the Czechs of the various parties disagreed with the arguments of their Slovak colleagues against Slovak autonomy, cf. the debates over the administrative reforms. Likewise, although one of the interpellations on Tuka's Vacuum Juris in 1928 was in Czech (Tomášek's) and the other was in Slovak (Hrušovský's), the argumentation was pretty much the same (see page 494). The main difference between Czech and Slovak Centralists was that the Slovaks used the Magyarone card to a much greater extent.

Finally, a few words regarding motives: It has been argued that the reason why the Czechs insisted on Czechoslovak national and state unity was that they needed the Slovaks in order to be stronger against the large and self-conscious German minority. The argumentation of the Czech deputies in the Parliament seems to confirm this. A general impression is that Czech speakers saw the Germans as their opponents far more often than the Slovaks. There is also a striking difference between the Czech and the Slovak Centralists in terms of how they argued. The Czechs used Czechoslovak national unity as a point of departure for the claim that the state was "our" state, which precluded German self-rule. The Slovaks addressed the Slovak question more directly, and argued that Czechoslovak unity was needed to save the Slovaks from national annihilation that would result from a return to Hungary. Broadly speaking, both used Czechoslovak unity against the respective enemies of their "branch" – the Germans and the Magyars. National self-protection thus seems to have been an underlying motive.



### ***Summary and conclusion***

The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 guaranteed all citizens equal individual political and civil rights, regardless of nationality. Individual rights were thus not a central part of the Slovak national agenda, although there were complaints of violations. The way the law of the protection of the republic was practiced, especially with respect to censorship, the opposition was affected more than the government. Since most of the government parties were Czechoslovak and these were stronger in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, the censorship was in praxis nationally biased in favor of the Czechs. Although this impeded the activities of the autonomists somewhat, the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party were able to articulate what they regarded as Slovak national interests and to run for election.

As we have seen in Chapter Eight, the Czechs were over-represented in the Parliament, and especially in the government throughout the period, while the Slovaks were represented more or less according to their share of the population in the Parliament after 1920, but not in the government. There were never more than three Slovaks at a time in the government, and the same two individuals – Ivan Dérer and Milan Hodža – put together served more than 23 years. Apart from the Ľudák ministers, all the Slovaks subscribed to official Czechoslovakism, and a clear majority was Protestant. The Slovak autonomists had access to the political decision-making system, and thus to an arena for articulation of their views, but they had little power, with the possible exception of the short period the Ľudáks participated in government.<sup>245</sup>

The main conflict issues within the political dimension thus concerned the political-administrative structure and power distribution. In praxis these issues were closely related, since autonomy for Slovakia required that Slovakia was a separate administrative unit. However, while the demand for a Slovak region was met in 1928, the ultimate political demand of *autonomy* was not accommodated – at least until the 1938 amendment of the Constitution, which turned Czechoslovakia into a federation of the Czech lands and Slovakia (the Second Czechoslovak Republic). Two questions arise: (1) Why did the Czechoslovak government accommodate the demand for a Slovak region, but refuse to accept any autonomy scheme? (2) What was the reason for the government change of heart in 1938?

The original administrative structure, adopted in 1920, was introduced only in Slovakia, and divided her in six *counties*. With the regional reform, Slovakia for the first time in modern history became one administrative and political unit, with an assembly and a president. The question is whether this was motivated by a wish to accommodate the Slovak autonomists. An argument in favor of this view is the fact that the reform was adopted and implemented during the election period when Ľudák support was strongest and while the party was in the government. It may be argued that the autonomist movement was becoming too large to be written off as a bunch of Magyarones. Moreover, Hlinka and other Ľudáks presented the reform as a great triumph, and clearly regarded the reform as a first step towards Slovak autonomy.

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<sup>245</sup> See also Leff (1988:71-73).

An argument against it is the fact that of the Czechoslovak parties that were in favor of the reform in 1927, only one party actually changed sides. The socialists were *against* regions at both points, arguing in 1927 that this would split the unity of the Czechoslovak nation and state and legalize the struggle for Slovak autonomy. The Czechoslovak National Democrats and the Czechoslovak People's Party were in *favor* of preserving the regions at both points. Their view evidently had more to do with internal Czech considerations and the relationship to the German minority than with Slovak concerns. The former party wanted to keep the Czech lands for national and historical reasons, but emphasized that legislative power for the regions was out of the question, the latter was driven by a certain Moravian patriotism (this party had its stronghold in Moravia). For these parties, accommodation of the Slovak autonomist movement was not a major concern – or if it was, it was not stated publicly.

The key Czechoslovak government party was the Agrarians, the largest party and the only party to change position from 1920 to 1927. On the one hand, this change of heart is consistent with the party's reputation as a pragmatic party for which the primary concern was the interests of the peasant population. On the other hand, the victory of the Ľudáks in the 1925 election may have convinced the Agrarians and the other Czechoslovak government parties that a new approach to the Slovak problem must be found, as Alena Bartlová has argued. It is noteworthy that Hodža, who was one of the driving forces behind the Agrarian turn-around, changed his mind only after the 1925 election, and moreover he claimed that it was the pressure from Slovakia that definitely turned the scale in favor of the regional structure (see page 465). In my view, a Slovak *krajina* probably never would have come into being without the strong Czech opposition to the county system and the reluctance to give the Germans their own counties.

The Slovak struggle for autonomy started almost immediately after the Czechoslovak republic was founded. The demand for Slovak autonomy was repeatedly voiced in the Parliament and in the autonomist press, but only three Ľudák autonomy proposals were presented to the Parliament. All three contained the main elements of the Pittsburgh agreement and provisions for "Slovak bread." The Ľudák autonomy proposals of 1922 and 1930 were stopped either in the initiative committee or the constitutional-juridical committee, and were not debated. The third autonomy proposal that was launched in 1938 was adopted, but there was still no debate.

It would have been easier to assess the motivation for this sudden change of heart on part of the Centralists if there had been a debate in the Parliament. On the other hand, the fact that there was no debate is rather telling of the uneasiness with which the decision was made. There is very little in centralist argumentation in the late 1930s to suggest that a turn-around of this magnitude was coming. As late as in the budget debate of 1938, Rudolf Beran expressed a will to come to terms with the German minority, but he did not mention any need to settle the Slovak problem, and official Czechoslovakism was as strong as ever. On the other hand, there was a growing group of young Slovak Agrarians (represented by Ján Ursíny in this chapter) who subscribed to the existence of an individual Slovak nation, albeit not to political autonomy (see page 503), and there were contacts between Hodža and the Ľudáks.

It may be argued that after Munich the Centralists did not have much choice if they wanted to save what was left of the state. It is quite obvious that the Munich agreement was a severe blow to the Czechoslovak republic, and it may be argued that it forced the Czech and Slovak Centralists to come to terms with the Slovak autonomists. At the same time, however, it also removed much of the motivation for insisting on Czechoslovak national and state unity. With the German minority gone, the strength through unity slogan was less relevant.

The Czechoslovak centralist government parties had a comfortable majority throughout the period, and as long as the socialist parties were included, they could do well without the Slovak autonomists. As Leff has pointed out, the government coalitions were generally larger than necessary.<sup>246</sup> It was thus entirely up to the centralist government coalition whether it wanted to accommodate the Slovak autonomists or not. For twenty years the Centralists chose not to, and when they finally acceded to the Ľudák autonomy proposal of 1938, they did so only because the circumstances forced them to. For the Czechs, the relation to the German minority seems to have been much more important than Slovak considerations.

This also helps explain why the demand for a Slovak krajina was accommodated and the demand for autonomy was not. The county system that was adopted in 1920, but never implemented in the Czech lands was an adaptation of the former Hungarian system, and thus foreign to the Czechs. The regional system that was adopted in 1927 was more in line with Czech historical traditions, and besides it had the advantage of ensuring that the Germans would remain a minority in all important political bodies in the state. In this case, the Slovak autonomists were thus able to form alliances with Czech interests, and besides the Slovak regionalists with Hodža at the helm supported the erection of a Slovak krajina.

Autonomy was an entirely other matter. The Czechs were for all practical purposes the ruling nation not only of the Czech lands, but of Czechoslovakia as a whole. Autonomy for the regions would mean a loss of political power at the central level, and thus also a loss of control over Slovak affairs. Moreover, considering the federal form of the autonomy proposals, this loss of power would be irreversible. Finally, accommodating the demand for autonomy in effect meant to abandon Official Czechoslovakism and thus the state's *raison d'être*, since the whole argumentation in favor of autonomy was based on the existence of a Slovak nation with right to self-determination.

I will return more fully to the matter of motives in the conclusion.

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<sup>246</sup> See Leff (1988:63).

# Conclusion

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*Very often people operate with the ethnic fiction that the Slovaks are a different nation from the Czechs, as if the Czechoslovak state barely had a unitary Slav (Czech) majority.*

*Our republic stands on two pillars. One pillar is the Slovak nation and the other pillar is the Czech nation. Whoever touches one of those pillars threatens the whole building.*

**Tomáš G. Masaryk, 1923<sup>1</sup>    Karol Körper, 1934<sup>2</sup>**

The primary objective of this thesis has been dual. One objective was to explain why the Czechoslovak nation project failed. The other was to analyze the basis for the increased national conflict between Czechs and Slovaks during the First Czechoslovak Republic. Drawing on theories of nations and nationalism and typologies of national conflict regulation, I developed a nationality policy framework that was used as a structuring device for the analysis and a point of departure for developing explanations.

In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the empirical findings, draw some conclusions, and discuss some theoretical implications. The first part of the chapter concentrates on summarizing findings *across* the previous chapters, with special emphasis on the cohesion and composition of the various Slovak national demands and the nationality policy of the government. The findings of each chapter have already been summarized along the way, and will only be repeated insofar that it is necessary in order to underpin the conclusions.

The second part of the chapter addresses the overarching problems that were raised in the introduction: (1) *What was the foundation for the increased national conflict between Czechs and Slovaks during the First Republic?* (2) *Why did the Czechoslovak nation project fail?* The focus is here on causes. This part also contains a discussion of what motivated the leading politicians, which has been a secondary theme of the thesis. Of special interest in this regard is why consecutive Czechoslovak governments kept insisting on a unitary Czechoslovak nation and state, long after it had become clear that Czechoslovakism had failed.

The third part of the chapter is a discussion of the theoretical implications of the study, with special emphasis on the debate as to whether nations can be constructed. In this context I will return to the question in the title: Was the Czechoslovak nation project doomed to failure? Finally, I will evaluate the nationality policy framework that formed the theoretical approach.

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<sup>1</sup> (Velmi často se dokonce operuje ethnickou fikcí, že Slováci jsou národ od Čechů různý, jako by československý stát sotva měl jednotnou (českou) většinu slovanskou. To je, jak řečeno, fikce, jíž se užívá proti Československu v nevěcných politických polemikách). T.G. Masaryk: *Slované po válce* [1923], printed in: T.G. Masaryk: *Slovanské problémy* (1928:13–14).

<sup>2</sup> (Naša republika stojí na dvoch pilieroch. Jedným pilierom je národ slovenský a druhým pilierom je národ český. Kto hýbe jedným z týchto pilierov ohrožuje celú stavbu). Karol Körper, referred in *Slovák* no. 151, 8.7.1934:1.

### ***Summary of the empirical findings***

First to the matter of *agency*: The main cleavage at the elite level was not between Czechs and Slovaks, but between Czech and Slovak Czechoslovakists/centralists on the one hand and Slovak autonomists on the other hand. One part of the Slovak political and intellectual elite thus supported the Czechoslovak nation project, while the other part defended the Slovak nation, in the spirit of the pre-war Slovak national movement. This also means that most of the national demands that were raised on behalf of the Slovaks were filed by the Slovak autonomists. The fact that the divide within the Slovak political elite at least partly followed the religious divide between Protestants and Catholics, was a historical legacy. On the Czech side, there was no substantial opposition to Czechoslovakism, for reasons to be discussed.

### ***Composition of national demands over time***

Among the symbolic demands, recognition as an individual Slovak nation was the most salient. This demand was closely related to the demand for autonomy, since it was a central premise in most of the arguments for autonomy. The more specific symbolic demands were in turn linked to recognition and/or autonomy. Good examples are the demand that October 30th be celebrated on par with October 28th, and that the name of the republic be spelled with a hyphen. Likewise, the complaint that the Slovak nation was missing as a separate category in the census was another way of demanding recognition.

Among the more practical national demands, the most salient demands within the cultural and the economic dimension were expressed through the slogans "Slovak in Slovakia" and "Slovakia for the Slovaks." Both were associated with the presence of a large (and increasing) number of Czechs in Slovakia. The former was a linguistic demand, claiming that Slovak should be used as the official language in all public organs in Slovakia, and usually concerned the implementation of § 4 in the Language Act. When this did not work, the autonomists tried to have the Language Act changed, without any success. This demand remained salient throughout the period, but the arenas to which it applied changed somewhat, from an emphasis on the administration and school system in the 1920s to an emphasis on the university, the railways, the police and the army in the 1930s. This seems to have reflected a reality.

The slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks" concerned work opportunities in the public sector, especially for the Slovak intelligentsia. In the early 1920s, the demand that jobs in Slovakia should be reserved for Slovaks mostly concerned the situation of the "new Slovaks", as also reflected in the argumentation. From the latter half of the 1920s, the focus shifted to the young Slovak intelligentsia. It has been claimed that by the end of the 1920s, there were enough educated young Slovaks to fill the public positions in Slovakia, but that more experienced Czechs blocked their way. This is a classical example of a nationally relevant conflict where the interests of one social group (the young Slovaks) were sublimated into the interest of the whole nation. Reliable data showing the actual extent of unemployment among the young Slovak intelligentsia were hard to come by. However, precisely because of this lack of accurate information, also at the time, the reality was less important than the perception.

Within the political dimension, the most salient Slovak national demand concerned autonomy. Autonomy demands started to appear almost immediately after the founding of the Czechoslovak state. Indeed, autonomy had even been discussed at Martin in October 1918, but was omitted from the Martin Declaration, evidently for tactical reasons. Likewise, if Dérier's version is correct, the entire Slovak Club (even the six *ľudáks*) agreed that it would not be wise to demand autonomy at the time when the Constitution was adopted.

What was meant by autonomy varied, but most autonomy schemes included some sort of federal arrangement. It is striking how all the three *ľudák* autonomy proposals that were presented to the Parliament echoed the elements of the Pittsburgh Agreement: namely that Slovakia should have her own administration, her own Parliament and her own courts. Likewise, all proposals sought to respond to the two most salient demands within the cultural and economic dimension, by ensuring the status of Slovak as the official language in Slovakia and by placing the hiring of personnel under the jurisdiction of the autonomous Slovak organs. Autonomy was a means to an end; that end was to safeguard the interests and the existence of the Slovak nation. The cohesion between the most salient Slovak symbolic and more practical demands was thus clear, and the same goes for the practical demands made within the political, cultural and economic dimensions.

Other demands were more restricted in time. If we take the *cultural* dimension first, religious demands were far apart, and mostly concentrated to the (early) 1920s. There were really only two issues that created any national turmoil: The clash over Hus Day in 1925, and the matter of the confessional schools. In the former case, the Slovak People's Party and the Czechoslovak People's Party – otherwise allies in religious matters – parted company. To the Slovak Catholics, Hus was a heretic; to the Czechs, he was a national figure. This was thus a symbolic as much as it was a religious issue. In the case of the confessional schools the Czechoslovak People's Party did side with the *ľudáks* (cf. Mičura's support), but since there were no such schools in the Czech lands, confessional schools remained a Slovak matter.

In the 1930s, the demands for the completion of the Slovak higher education system dominated, with a polytechnic as a core demand. The reason why these issues were lower on the agenda in the (early) 1920s was probably that Slovaks did not start to enter higher education in any large numbers until the late 1920s. The demand for a Slovak polytechnic was also associated with the chronic lack of technically skilled personnel, which had repercussion for the economic life of Slovakia because it slowed down the construction of roads and railways.

In the *economic* dimension, the temporal issues were generally of a spatial kind. The most burning spatial issues were insufficient investments in Slovakia, especially in infrastructure, and higher freight tariffs and taxes in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Railway construction became an issue already in the mid-1920s, whereas demands concerning road construction only began appearing in the late 1920s, since road transportation had not been economically important in Slovakia previously. These demands lessened in the second half of the 1930s. In addition, in the late 1920s there were some complaints of Czechs acquiring land in Slovakia through the land reform.

The main conflict within the *political* dimension, apart from the autonomy question, concerned the political-administrative organization of the state. In addition, there were some complaints concerning violations of civil rights (chiefly in connection with censorship), and a few concerning the "robbery" of Slovakia of some of the deputies that belonged to her by law. Otherwise, autonomists complained that the Czechoslovak-oriented, Protestant wing was over-represented in the Slovak Club in the Revolutionary Parliament and that some of the co-opted members were Czechs. Individual political or civil rights were not any major issue – which was to be expected, considering that Czechoslovakia remained fairly democratic.

While a whole battery of demands was filed on behalf of the Slovaks, Czech demands were exclusively of a cultural kind. Two of the most important unfulfilled Czech cultural demands from the Austrian period were attended to already in the Revolutionary Parliament: The founding of a second Czech university in Moravia, and the introduction of Czech as the administrative language in Czech-speaking areas. After 1920, the great majority of the Czech demands concerned Czech schools for the Czech minorities in the German-speaking areas.

### ***The nationality policy of the government***

The nationality policy of the Czechoslovak government during the First Republic cannot be summed up in a single word. It was a typically mixed strategy and thus hard to place on a scale from accommodating, via neutral to repressive strategies; moreover, it changed over time. Some national demands within each of the dimensions were accommodated, while others were not. Nevertheless, the nationality policy remained quite consistent, and was inversely related to Slovak national demands, in the sense that the most salient demands were those which were not met, while the demands that were met were more short-lived. This is in line with the expectation that demands that are accommodated will disappear from the agenda.

At the symbolic level, the policy was consistently non-accommodating or repressive. The government insisted on Czechoslovak national and state unity: those who opposed this ideology were accused of being Magyarones or renegades and of running the errand of foreign powers. The only Slovak symbolic demand that was met was the proposal to honor Milan R. Štefánik, and although he was counted among the Czechoslovakists, not even this proposal was accepted immediately. Only after the Munich settlement did the government coalition recognize the Slovaks as an individual nation – and even then the leading Czechoslovak politicians were not exactly happy about it.

Since Czechoslovak national and state unity were strongly interconnected in the Czechoslovakist national ideology, the refusal to recognize the Slovaks as an individual nation went hand in hand with a rejection of the demand for autonomy. Bearing in mind that the government did acknowledge the principle of national self-determination (according to which Czechoslovakia was founded), recognizing the Slovaks as a separate nation would mean recognizing their right to autonomy – or in the final instance even to secession. Conversely, allowing autonomy would mean recognizing the Slovaks as a nation, which in turn would undermine the status of Czechoslovakia as a nation-state.

To a certain extent, the stance of the government to demands for recognition and autonomy also affected policies within other dimensions. This is perhaps clearest in the case of the Language Act in pursuance of § 129 in the Constitution of 1920, where the "Czechoslovak language" was granted privileged status as the state, official language. First, a proposal from the Slovak Club to turn *Czechoslovak* into *Czech and Slovak* was turned down, because that would have been contrary to the notion of a single Czechoslovak nation. Second, although Article 4 decided that "as a rule" Czech should be used in the Czech lands and Slovak in Slovakia, a Czech public employee could always answer a Slovak in Czech and vice versa. In practice, this provision worked to the Czechs' advantage.

Although the government declined to amend the existing legislation with respect to language rights, the policy did in fact change. Around the time when the Ľudáks entered the government, two decrees were issued, ordering all ministries to implement the language regulations regarding the use of Slovak as the state language in Slovakia, and to take action against negligent public organs. This (and a Slovak *krajina*) were basically what the Ľudáks got out of their participation in the government. The language policy was thus partly accommodating in practice, and it seems that the situation did improve in the 1930s.

Finally, the insistence that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation also had consequences for the government's hiring policy in Slovakia. First, it legitimized the recruitment of Czechs to jobs in the public sector of Slovakia after 1918. Since the Slovak intelligentsia was too small at the time to fill the vacancies, Czechs were undoubtedly needed in order to run the Slovak schools and administration, especially in the early 1920s. This argument is not equally valid in the railways and postal service, where "national trustworthiness" was a more important reason for hiring Czechs. The fact that the Czechs were privileged in terms of pay in this period, was not a result of discrimination of the Slovaks, but of an employment policy that valued merit over nationality. In this area the nationality policy should thus be characterized as neutral. The pay privileges and drafting of Czech teachers were abolished around 1925/1926, when the recruitment of new Czechs was no longer needed.

Second, the insistence that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation became an obstacle to preferential treatment of the Slovaks once the Slovak intelligentsia became large enough to run Slovak affairs, in the late 1920s. The economic crisis that started in 1929 only made the situation worse, since the economic retrenchment policy reduced the number of public jobs. It was the Slovaks who lost out in the competition, since they tended to have less education and less experience than the Czechs, and official employment quotas for the Slovaks could not be introduced – that would imply recognizing them as a nation. Dérer's silent "Slovaks first" hiring policy in the case of qualified teachers applied only to the few vacant positions there were. It was politically impossible for the government to kick out Czechs in order to employ Slovaks, not least since the Czech lands were even more affected by the economic crisis than Slovakia. The combination of Official Czechoslovakism and merit as employment criterion thus worked against the interests of the Slovaks.



What the demands that *were* accommodated had in common, was that they did not run contrary to Official Czechoslovakism, and that the Slovak autonomists were able to form alliances with Czech interests, or also with Slovak deputies of the centralist parties. This follows from the political law of gravity. As long as the Ľudáks stood alone, they were simply too small with their 7 % of the deputies to play any important role at the central level. But it was also a matter of logic: for the government it represented less of a problem to go against a bunch of "Magyarones" than to go against all the political representatives of the Slovaks.

Three types of issues stand out. First, in spatial issues concerning Slovakia, the Slovak autonomists found allies among other Slovak politicians. In fact, the latter were often as active as the former. This especially goes for economic issues, like the Mint in Kremnica, the demand for leveling of railway tariffs and taxes, the demand for investments in Slovak infrastructure, but also the demand for the expansion of the Slovak school system. Solving some of these problems did take some time, but major progress was achieved during the 1930s, especially in railway construction, although the road plan of 1920 was never fully implemented. Not only was the accommodation of these demands compatible with the official Czechoslovakist doctrine; it was argued quite explicitly that if only all obstacles to Czechoslovak unity were removed, then this unity would eventually become a reality. Besides, construction works provided convenient emergency employment during the economic crisis in the mid-1930s.

Second, religious issues stand out, in the sense that most conflict matters were solved already in the early 1920s, and religious issues were generally not allowed to constitute nationally relevant conflicts between Czechs and Slovaks. An important precondition for this was of course that the Czechs and Slovaks were both predominantly Catholic, but it also seems that the government realized the conflict potential of religion, and consciously sought to steer clear. In most religious issues the two Catholic parties, the Ľudáks and the Czechoslovak People's Party united against the socialists, while the pragmatic Agrarians had religious conciliation as an explicit goal. Formal separation of church and state was never implemented, and religion remained a compulsory subject in Slovakia, even in state schools. To the extent that religious issues created national turmoil, they either had national-symbolic overtones (as in the case of Hus Day and the celebration of the first church in Nitra) or also concerned the degree of religiousness (the question of the confessional schools in Slovakia).

Third, in the case of the political-administrative organization of the state, the Slovak autonomists had allies among the National Democrats as well as the Czechoslovak People's Party, who actually represented the strongest opposition against the county arrangement of 1920. The former party feared what might come from the two almost exclusively German counties, while the latter invoked Moravian patriotism and also wanted more regional autonomy than the centralized system allowed. In 1920, the Slovaks were still organized in one Club, and no opposition was thus voiced in the Parliament, while reports in *Slovák* suggest that the main opposition to the new counties concerned the merging of the old counties into six larger units. When the regional reform was adopted in 1927, Slovak autonomists nevertheless presented it as a victory and as a first step towards political autonomy.

While part of the motivation behind the regional reform may have been to accommodate the Slovak autonomists, that can hardly be the whole picture. Of the Czechoslovak parties, it was really only the Agrarians who changed their minds between 1920 and 1927, and their argumentation in the debate on regional reform suggests that without the strong Czech opposition to the county system, a Slovak *krajina* would never have come into being. On the other hand, the Agrarians changed their stance on the political-administrative structure only *after* the election of 1925, which suggests that the fact that the Slovak People's Party had more than doubled its following did make an impression. In addition, policy objectives like religious conciliation and agrarian advantages (which could be achieved only through a bourgeois coalition) probably also played a role for the Agrarians. All in all, the *practical* nationality policy of the government was more on the accommodating than the repressive side.

### ***Why did Czechoslovakism fail and the conflict level rise?***

After this summary, it is time to turn to the more overarching questions. The questions of why Czechoslovakism failed and the national conflict level increased will be treated together, since the answer to the latter has a bearing on the former and (partly) vice versa.

I argued in Chapter Three that nation-forming processes seem to require as a minimum (1) the presence of a nation-forming elite that formulates what it means to be a nation and spreads this national identity to the masses, and (2) the necessary means to do so. Both conditions were present in the case of the Czechoslovak nation project. The Czechoslovakists and the Slovak autonomists were the carriers of competing national ideologies, but while the former had at its disposal the means of a ruling elite, the latter had the means of a national movement. Since Czechoslovakia was a democracy, the mass media were not under exclusive government control. The autonomists had their own journals and newspapers, whereas the school system was more or less under government control.

Furthermore, I argued that these two minimum requirements are not enough for the nation-forming process to succeed. I then suggested that the existence of nationally relevant conflicts is important – that national-cultural divides correspond to certain conflicts of interest.

Why did Czechoslovakism fail? The reasons can be divided in two. On the one hand, the failure of the Czechoslovak nation project can be attributed to the ideology itself, or more precisely, its contents and dispersal. The nature of the ideology is also the main reason why the competition only came from the Slovak side, while there was no substantial Czech opposition to Czechoslovakism. On the other hand, it may be argued that the Czechoslovak nation project failed because the conflict structure favored the Slovak autonomists – in other words, it failed for the same reasons that the conflict level between the Czechs and Slovaks rose. Several factors worked together to produce this result. First, the transition to independent statehood in combination with the heritage of Austria-Hungary provided the basis for many of the conflict issues. Second, the post-war economic crisis in 1921–23 and the worldwide economic crisis in the 1930s severely restricted the government's freedom of action. Third, the government made some mistakes, and was also more directly responsible for some conflicts.

### ***Reasons internal to Czechoslovakism as ideology***

Overarching nation projects in the West have often been of a political kind, and it has been claimed that also Czechoslovakism was based on a *political* nation concept. Our analysis has demonstrated that the features that were deemed to constitute Czechoslovak unity were ethnic and cultural affinity (based on the Slav forefathers and linguistic affinity), and partly shared history. In other words, we have seen that Czechoslovakism was based on a *cultural* rather than a political nation concept, albeit often combined with a voluntarist nation concept.

The foundations of Official Czechoslovakism were laid during the First World War, with the independence movement abroad with Masaryk at the helm playing an important part. The idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation was of course nothing new; it had roots in both national revivals. The same goes for the difference between the Czech and Slovak conception of Czechoslovak unity, where the Czechs tended to see the Slovaks as a part of the Czech nation, while the Slovak conception of Czechoslovakism was more that of two equal tribes. However, Official Czechoslovakism differed from the Czechoslovak reciprocity of the 19th century in three major respects. First, the existence of a Slovak literary language was taken for granted. Second, through a reinterpretation of history, Czechoslovakist scholars and politicians elaborated on what Czechoslovak national unity consisted in. Third, while Czechoslovak reciprocity had been cultural in orientation, a central aim of Official Czechoslovakism was political legitimization of Czechoslovakia as a nation-state.

There were two main problems with this ideology: For one thing, the projected Czechoslovak national unity was based on the same constituting features (shared history and language) as the existing Czech and Slovak identities. The latter obviously had an advantage over Czechoslovakism, both because of their head start and because the features that were said to unite the Czechs (respectively the Slovaks) in fact did; the Czechs (Slovaks) shared a history and a literary language. A considerable amount of construction, or even invention, was needed in order make these features appear as uniting the Czechs *and* Slovaks. The duplicity of the Czechoslovakist ideology suggests that this was no easy task. There was a dualism in terms of *language*, since no serious attempt was made at turning Czech and Slovak into one language – and, in view of the strong reactions to the new Slovak orthography, this was probably a wise choice. The solution was to construct a theoretical Czechoslovak linguistic unity by presenting Czech and Slovak as two variants of the same (Czech) language, to explain away the linguistic split, and/or to down-grade the importance of language as a cultural marker.

There was also a dualism in terms of *ethnicity*, since the Czechs and Slovaks were regarded as separate tribes of the Czechoslovak nation. Differences in national character were explained by the long separation of the Czechs and Slovaks. Finally, precisely because the Czechs and Slovaks had lived apart for almost one thousand years, it was no easy task to construct a Czechoslovak history to support this new identity, especially since alternative Czech and Slovak interpretations of that history had existed since the beginning of the national revivals. The solution was to use the few contacts there were between the Czechs and the Slovaks for what they were worth, which in practice mostly meant rewriting Slovak history.

The second problem was the Czech bias, which took several forms. First, there was an obvious one-sidedness in the presentation of who contributed to whom: The Czechs were always on the giving, while the Slovaks were on the receiving end. (On this point, Hodža's and partly Šrobár's interpretation differed somewhat from that of Czech scholars.) Moreover, all Czech influences were regarded as positive, whereas severing of the contact was seen as negative.

Second, especially the Czech scholars (and they were the majority) presented the Czechs as the norm, with the Slovaks as the deviation. Everything that separated the Czechs and Slovaks was thus caused either by isolation of the Slovaks from the positive Czech influences, or by cultural retardation caused by the long stay in a Magyar (by implication barbarian) environment. This tendency to present everything Czech as positive and normal and everything Slovak as negative and Magyar created strong reactions, and must have been counter-productive to the formation of an overarching Czechoslovak identity.

Third, the Czech bias showed itself in the extension of the Czech interpretation of history. The best example is perhaps implanting into Slovak history the view of Hussism as the most glorious period in Czech history. Great importance was attributed to the stay of the Czech Hussites in Slovakia. This and the introduction of the Czech language in the administration of Slovakia were held to strengthen Czechoslovak unity. In fact, Hussism was not important in Slovak history – indeed, to a majority of the Slovak (Catholic) population, Hus was still a heretic. The firm insistence on Hussism was thus most likely also counterproductive. In addition, it was probably not even true that Hussism had served to strengthen the bonds between the Czechs and Slovaks: invading forces are seldom welcomed by the native population.

The heavy emphasis on the role of the Protestant Czech exiles in strengthening Czechoslovak unity was more in line with the facts, and it was also understandable considering who the Slovak Czechoslovakists were. Nevertheless, it was tactically unwise to present Protestantism as a positive force and Catholicism as a negative force. Also on this point, the Czechoslovakist ideology was a continuation of a Czech tradition: the strong anti-clericalist current, and the negative evaluation of the Papacy and the Counter Reformation in Czech historiography. In this case an alternative was available: the Czechoslovakists *could* have emphasized that both the Czechs and the Slovaks were in majority Catholics. However, this might have alienated those Slovaks who were already Czech oriented – they were Protestants – as well as progressive Czechs. Moreover, it was Masaryk who founded the ideology, and it would have run contrary to all his earlier ideas to base Czechoslovakism on Catholicism.

While Czechoslovakism was contrary to Slovak historiography and attacked some of the core ideas in the national ideology, it did not introduce any new elements that were contrary to the existing Czech interpretation of history and the existing conception of Czech-ness. The new identity was complementary rather than competing, which is probably one of the reasons why there was no substantial *Czech* opposition to Czechoslovakism. For the Czechs, Czech and Czechoslovak amounted to the same; it was a mere change of labels. This was also reflected in the Czech proclivity towards using "Czech" and "Czechoslovak" synonymously, a striking feature of school textbooks in history as well as statements of politicians and scholars.

### ***The foundation for the increased conflict level***

The other part of the explanation of why Czechoslovakism failed is tied to the rising level of conflict. While they were still under Austria-Hungary, the Czechs and Slovaks were in a similar situation nationally, in that both were oppressed – by the Germans and the Magyars, respectively. And although there were large differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia, these differences did not constitute nationally relevant conflicts between Czechs and Slovaks, chiefly because they belonged to different parts of the empire. For the same reason, contacts between Czechs and Slovaks were limited and mostly of a cultural kind.

After 1918, the Czechs became in practice the ruling nation of the new state, dominating the political establishment, the central administration and economic life by virtue of their level of development as well as their numbers. In the course of only a few years, the cordial elite relations between the Czechs and Slovaks had changed dramatically. Once the political center of gravitation shifted from Vienna and Budapest to Prague, the large differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia became a problem, and it may be argued with some right that the government did not take the Slovak grievances serious enough in the early 1920s. However, to be fair, the tasks were formidable and the economic restraints on government action clear.

### **THE AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN HERITAGE**

The legacy of Austria-Hungary was perhaps the greatest obstacle to a harmonious development of Czecho-Slovak relations after 1918. The most important part of this legacy involved the different economic, political and cultural development in the two parts of the empire, which provided the *material* basis for many of the national conflicts of the inter-war period. The spatial economic issues associated with infrastructure, uneven development, and higher taxes and freight rates in Slovakia stand out in this respect, but also the demands for the expansion of the Slovak education system were directly associated with the Hungarian past – specifically the Magyarization policy of the former regime. These conflicts were thus not caused by government policy – other than indirectly, through sins of omission.

To some extent, the conflicts surrounding the Czechs in Slovakia were also indirectly caused by the historical heritage – specifically the Magyarization policy which had rendered the Slovak intelligentsia too small to fill the necessary public positions in Slovakia. These conflicts became exacerbated by the economic crisis of the 1930s, but also by a government hiring policy based on merit.

Finally, Magyarization had left an important *psychological* legacy. Part of the reason why the Czechoslovak nation project was perceived as threatening to Slovak national existence was probably that what had started as an Hungarian political nation had taken on the ambition of assimilating all non-Magyar groups in Hungary into a Magyar nation. Moreover, in Hungary non-recognition of Slovak nationhood was intimately linked to a refusal of Slovak national rights. The view that there was "no Slovak nation" thus had unfortunate historical antecedents. In the Czech case, however, this was not a problem, since forced assimilation had never been attempted in the Austrian part of the empire.

### ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

Throughout the period, the economic constraints on government action were severe, which only added to the problems created by the Austrian-Hungarian heritage. During the 1920s, very little was done to bridge the gap in industrialization and economic development between the Czech lands and Slovakia, although construction plans for railways and roads had been adopted already in 1920. Especially in the early 1920s, there was insufficient funding to finance investments in industry and infrastructure, and at the same time carry out the domestication process and support the Czechoslovak currency. It seems that, in this situation, top priority was given to becoming independent of the former Austrian and Hungarian economic centers and ensuring Czech ownership of commerce and industry.

The weakness of Slovak capital made Slovakia more vulnerable, and her weak infrastructure and the higher tariffs were drawbacks in the competition on the Czechoslovak market. Slovakia thus faced de-industrialization at a time when what was needed was the opposite. One result of this was that emigration was much higher from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. At this point, Slovakia was simply not high enough on the list of priorities. By the late the 1920s, the challenges associated with the economic restructuring process had been dealt with, and the problems of Slovakia were taken more seriously. There is a certain irony in the fact that more was done to bridge the gap and improve the infrastructure in Slovakia during the crisis years in the 1930s, than during the period of economic growth in the late 1920s, even at the cost of accumulating state debt. This shows that Slovakia had indeed become a priority.

As already indicated, the economic crisis of the 1930s did work as a restraint on government hiring policy. It would have been easier to introduce quotas for Slovaks in a situation with economic growth. As it was, the only way of employing more Slovaks in public jobs in Slovakia would have been to kick out Czechs, and a policy along these lines would certainly have led to strong reactions from the Czech ruling nation. Likewise, the postponement of a Slovak polytechnic was probably linked to the budgetary situation in the 1930s, although the lack of qualified teaching staff may have played a role as well.

I had expected to find that the economic crisis created more national tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks than it actually did. However, the Slovak autonomists were prevented from using the economic crisis fully in their agitation, because all official economic data showed that Slovakia was less affected by the crisis than the Czech lands. Registered average unemployment, for instance, was higher in the Czech lands than in Slovakia throughout the entire crisis. It is quite certain that the *un*registered unemployment was higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands; moreover, Slovakia had more "semi-employed" because of the large number of seasonal workers in agriculture. Considering the overpopulation in Slovak agriculture and the low income level in Slovakia to begin with, it is likely that the autonomists were right in arguing that the situation was as bad in Slovakia as in the Czech lands. Since they could not document this, however, the economic crisis could not be used effectively to mobilize the Slovaks behind the national cause, which is reflected by the fact that electoral support for the autonomists did not increase much between the elections of 1929 and 1935.

### THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY

As already indicated, the government was only partly responsible for the spatial economic conflicts, mainly through sins of omission. Economic constraints at least partly explain why little was done about the infrastructure in the early 1920s, but this is no excuse for the delay in the harmonization of laws, tax levels and railway tariffs. The neglect of Slovakia's economic needs in the early 1920s also stands in stark contrast to the tremendous effort that was put into building up a Slovak education system almost from scratch (the only exception being higher education, which did not have the same priority). It appears that the government did not start to take Slovakia's economic problems seriously until after the 1925 election.

These priorities may have something to do with the fact that the Slovaks in the government gravitated towards ministries that were important from a national, cultural point of view (including the Ministry of Education and Enlightenment), while they were almost absent in ministries of economic importance. Likewise, the Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia, Vavro Šrobár and his referent aide Anton Štefánek worked hard to put a Slovak education system in place. On the other hand, although all the Ministers of Unification of Laws in the 1920s were Slovaks, little was done, so perhaps it would not have made any difference.

The government (or rather its servants) made some early mistakes that served to antagonize an important part of the Slovak elite. First, Šrobár made two mistakes in selecting people to the Slovak Club of the Revolutionary Parliament: He picked Czechs to represent the Slovaks, and he gave preference to the Protestant and Czechoslovak-oriented wing of the Slovaks. This gave the Protestant elite (who were from the outset closer to the Czechs) a stake in the state, while alienating the Catholic majority. Part of the reason for Šrobár's choice was probably that he wanted people he could trust; and, as he was a central figure in the Hlas circle, it was not unnatural for him to choose his acquaintances from there. Furthermore, Protestants were over-represented among the known nationally aware Slovak elite, as Table 21 shows.

Second, the recruitment policy in Slovakia was ill advised. Although the Czechs were sorely needed in order to run the administration and schools, they were simply too many. Especially in the postal service and the railways, Czechs could and should have been replaced with Slovaks. Besides, it was not a good idea to send Czechs who were compromised by their past as Austrian civil servants to Slovakia. Finally, although the majority of the Czechs who arrived in Slovakia meant well and did a good job, tact was not always their strong side. In the anti-religious fervor after the war, they did not pay enough attention to Slovak religious sensitivities, and some refused to learn the Slovak language. Considering that the clergy was strongly represented in the Slovak nationally conscious elite, and that the Slovak battle cry had been "for that our Slovak language", such behavior served to alienate the Slovaks more.

Third, it was not a particularly smart move to arrest Andrej Hlinka upon his return from the Peace Conference in Paris. Technically, his clandestine travel and the message he presented could be viewed as an act of treason to the Czechoslovak state, but Hlinka did not see things that way. By ordering his imprisonment, the government made a strong enemy.

Finally, some conflict issues were more directly caused by government policy. This applies, for instance, to the introduction of Jan Hus Day, the attempt to abolish the confessional schools, the attempt to erect a Mint in Prague instead of the one in Kremnica, and the reluctance to change the language regulations. Complaints concerning the lack of Slovak spirit and the Czechoslovakist school textbooks were also directly associated with government policy. Most of all, the identity struggle was caused by the government's refusal to recognize the Slovaks as an individual nation and by the insistence that Czechoslovakia was the nation-state of the Czechoslovak nation with two tribes. This is entirely in line with the expectation that any attempt to advance an overarching nation project in the face of strong opposition from one of the target groups may serve to exacerbate national conflict.

### ***What were their motives?***

The next question is why the government coalition insisted on Czechoslovak national and state unity despite the opposition this generated – and why the Slovak autonomists were not willing to settle for less than autonomy. This is a matter of motives. Obviously, some caution is warranted here; people are often less than honest about their reasons for doing things, and this is no less true of politicians. Basically, there are two opposite options: we can either take the argumentation of each side in the political debate at face value, or we can assume that both sides had a hidden agenda that cannot be read out of their argumentation. In the latter case, we can use the other side's allegations as a point of departure.

Taking the arguments of both sides at face value, we find a striking difference between the Slovak autonomists and the Czechoslovakists. Judging from their argumentation, the Slovak autonomists believed in their Slovak nation and had it as their core value and main priority. Czechoslovakism was evaluated, according to this value, as a fiction, a threat to the existence of the Slovak nation (expressive version), and a threat to the interests of the Slovak nation (instrumental version). Conversely, autonomy was presented as the solution to all the ills of Slovakia, and as a right to which the Slovaks were entitled, either qua nation or by virtue of various documents. The autonomists thus seemed motivated by a wish to ensure the well-being of the Slovak nation and the interests of the Slovaks as a group.

In contrast, it is quite apparent that although the Czechoslovakists argued as if a Czechoslovak nation existed, Czechoslovak unity was an instrument, not a core value for them. This is reflected especially in the strength-through-unity argumentation. On the one hand it was argued that the Czechs and Slovaks would be stronger against their enemies if they could lean on a Czechoslovak unity (instrumental version); alternatively it was argued that the Slovaks (Czechs) would perish under the Magyar (German) yoke (expressive version). On the Czech side, the obsession with "strength" was closely related to the self-conception as a small nation, which goes back to Palacký. On the Slovak side, it was related to the fact that the Slovaks had been free and independent only when they were united with the Czechs. The strength-through-unity theme recurred in the school textbooks, and the instrumental version of the argument was used by Masaryk already during the First World War.



It seems quite clear that during the war, Czechoslovakism was advanced mostly for strategic reasons, in order to legitimize Czechoslovak independence as a matter of national self-determination. A second motive that was made quite explicit by Masaryk was to ensure the strength of the new state against its national minorities. It seems that these were also the reasons why it was kept after the war. Since the state had been established by invoking the principle of national self-determination, the Czechoslovak nation was its *raison d'être*. To recognize the Slovaks as an individual nation would thus weaken the state by turning it into a nationality state where the Czechs would comprise barely a majority.

At the same time, to grant the Slovaks autonomy would make it difficult not to grant the large German minority the same, which would endanger the state as well as jeopardize the Czech minorities in the German-speaking areas. The strength of the state was thus only seemingly the main priority. Behind this lay a wish to ensure the existence and the development of the Czechs and Slovaks. This was also voiced quite explicitly. The core value of both the Czechoslovakists and the Slovak autonomists was thus the *nation*; it was only the means that were different – Czechoslovak unity and Slovak autonomy, respectively.

Finally, that political power was at least a side motive is reflected by the fact that the identity struggle and the dispute about Slovak autonomy often turned into a contest between Slovak politicians about who were the legitimate representatives of the Slovaks. Each side accused the other of treason, and claimed to be the only pure Slovaks. In addition, at some point each side claimed to be backed by the majority, which entitled them to choose on behalf of the Slovaks. Given the weakness of the Ľudáks at the countrywide level, it is quite clear that they would have a better chance of influencing Slovak politics if power were to be devolved to a Slovak assembly. Conversely, the Slovak Czechoslovakists risked losing power if Slovakia were granted autonomy, since they would not be guaranteed a majority in the assembly.

If we take as our point of departure the allegations of the opposite side, the Slovak autonomists were a bunch of Magyarones whose real aim was to bring Slovakia back to the Magyar yoke. While there were some known Magyarones among the Ľudáks (chiefly Tuka), this hardly goes for a majority – and even less so as time went by and the movement was joined by a new generation, educated in the Czechoslovak republic. It was certainly not true of Andrej Hlinka, or other leading men who had been imprisoned during Hungary for "Pan-Slav activities." Prior to the First World War, it is hard to imagine any other reason for the struggle for the Slovak cause than a strong Slovak conviction, since no conceivable gain was in sight.

Moreover, if my assumption that there were most Magyarones in areas with many Magyars is correct, the Magyarone charges against the Ľudáks were certainly not true on the mass level. On the contrary, there was a strong correlation between Ľudák support and the percentage of Slovaks – stronger than for the parties that accused the Ľudáks of being Magyarones. In all likelihood, there were more Magyarones in the ranks of the Social Democrats and Agrarians than among the Ľudáks. These parties were even represented by Magyars in the Parliament. Likewise, while the Ľudáks did better in areas with many Catholics, the national dimension was more important in terms of politics as well as support.

If we take the Ľudák charges against the Czechoslovakists seriously, then the real goal of the Czechs and their Slovak partners was the Czechization of the Slovaks. While it is true that most of the Czechoslovakists did advocate Czech/Slovak rapprochement, the aim was not cultural or linguistic assimilation of the Slovaks, but to create a new overarching subjective identity. No attempt was made to abolish Slovak as a literary language; on the contrary, the use of Slovak in Slovakia was strengthened during the period. The only example was the revision of the Slovak orthography in 1931, but this was initiated by an expert commission under the auspices of the *Matica slovenská*, and cannot be attributed to government policy. The accusations of Pan-Czechism were thus unsubstantiated.

Whether it was the prospect of personal power or other reasons that made individuals like Dérer or Hodža join the Czechoslovakist side is hard to tell, but I really doubt that this can have been the main reason in Dérer's case. He remained opposed to Slovak autonomy also after any prospect of power was gone: as late as in 1968 he was against federation of Czechoslovakia.<sup>3</sup> As for Hodža, it seems to be a quite common view that he was more interested in power than in principles. On the other hand, it may be argued that this served to turn him away from Czechoslovakism over the years, since he wanted to ensure a largest possible electoral base in Slovakia. Hodža was clearly more Czechoslovakist in 1920 than he was in the 1930s, and his conception of Czechoslovakism went in the direction of a political nation concept. Likewise, his regionalism implied decentralization, if not legislative autonomy.

Finally a qualification should be made. In the 1930s, a group of young Slovak Agrarians abandoned the notion of a unitary Czechoslovak nation and recognized the Slovak nation. However, they did not go beyond regionalism (i.e. decentralization of power), retaining the unitary conception of the state. These young Agrarians thus divorced Czechoslovak national unity from state unity and Slovak individuality from autonomy, thereby attacking the cornerstone in the argumentation of both sides. It should also be noted that, while in government, the Ľudáks abstained from demanding autonomy in the Parliament, while still insisting that the Slovaks were an individual nation. In return, the other coalition partners kept quiet about the Czechoslovak national unity, while the socialist parties in opposition continued as before.

### ***Theoretical implications***

Following Yin's recommendation of generalizing case-studies to theoretical propositions rather than other empirical cases, this third part is devoted to the discussion of some theoretical implications of my findings.<sup>4</sup> First, I will discuss the theoretical implications of the fact that the Czechoslovak nation project failed, with special emphasis on the prospect of "constructing" nations. Second, I will evaluate the theoretical nationality policy framework, both as a structuring device and as a point of departure for developing explanations.

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<sup>3</sup> Dušan Kováč found a memorandum to this effect in Dérer's papers, deposited in the Archive of the National Museum in Prague, in the fund Ivan Dérer, inheritance/pozostalost.

<sup>4</sup> Robert K. Yin: *Case study research* (1991:21).

### ***Doomed to failure?***

The title of the thesis contains a question: Was the Czechoslovak nation project doomed to failure? Under the given circumstances, the answer must be *yes*, and it seems that this was realized in political circles, especially in Slovakia already in the mid-1930s. The question is whether it *could* have succeeded, given more time and other circumstances. Or was the Czechoslovak nation project doomed, also in principle?

Several arguments can be used to support the claim that, in *principle*, the Czechoslovak nation project could have worked. First, the Czechs and Slovaks were arguably closer linguistically, ethnically and culturally than many other groups out of which history has formed nations. If the Slav forefathers of the Czechs and Slovaks had remained united in one state after the fall of Great Moravia, the Czechs and Slovaks might even have been one nation. Moreover, in other cases where culturally heterogeneous groups were welded together into nations, the process went over several centuries. Twenty years is a very short time in a nation-forming process. It may be argued that, in due time, Czechoslovakism might have succeeded.

Against this it may be held that the disparate groups out of which nations were formed in the West were not "nations", hardly even *ethnie*. The fact that not even these nation-forming processes were completely successful suggests that nation forming across cultural divides has never been easy. In order to succeed, the Czechoslovak nation project would have had to win more souls in competition with more or less well-established Czech and Slovak national identities, and in the face of the active opposition of a large part of the Slovak national elite.

Second, it may be argued that if the economic situation had been more favorable, the government would have been able to do more to bridge the developmental gap between the Czech lands and Slovakia at an earlier point. Likewise, without the economic crisis of the 1930s, the contest for jobs in the public sector in Slovakia would not have become a zero-sum game, and a larger share of the young Slovak intelligentsia could have been employed without forcing more experienced Czechs out. Here it may be countered that the legacy of Austria-Hungary and the nationally relevant conflicts that followed from it were not that easy to remove, even if the government had had the economic freedom to do more at an earlier stage. This is illustrated by the fact that even though the Communist regime sought to bridge the developmental gap after the Second World War, the differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia have remained striking. Likewise, even with more public jobs, the Slovaks would still have had less education and less experience, and national quotas would thus have been necessary – which might again have provoked Czech reactions.

Third, it may be argued that if the Czechoslovak state had not included the sizeable German minority, the government would have been more at liberty to meet Slovak demands, which might have reduced the conflict potential. The counter-argument is that without the German-inhabited area, Czechoslovakia's borders would have been impossible to defend; moreover, the country would also have lost her most industrialized and economically developed parts – and that would have reduced the government's economic freedom of action.

This brief discussion shows that even though the Czechoslovak nation project might have had a better chance, given more time and more favorable circumstances, success would by no means be guaranteed. This brings us to the second part of the discussion: Was the Czechoslovak nation project doomed, not only in practice, but also in principle? To what extent *can* extent nations be constructed?

I would like to make three theoretical points here:

1. The study indicates that there are *clear limits to invention*. We have seen that actual contacts between Czechs and Slovaks throughout their history worked as a restraint on the reinterpretation or "construction" of a Czechoslovak history. Those contacts could be (and were) exaggerated and interpreted as strengthening for Czechoslovak unity, but the fact remained: Czechs and Slovaks had lived separate lives for most of the period. This is in line with A. D. Smith's argument that it is always the past of that particular nation that is reformulated,<sup>5</sup> or in our case the past of the Czechs and Slovaks. This study has also demonstrated that the features that are deemed to constitute national unity must correspond to a certain reality. It proved to be a complicated task to project Czechoslovak unity on linguistic unity in a situation where two literary languages already existed, and where these languages moreover were core constituting features of alternative identities. The room for invention thus seems to be restricted also by those features that members of the nation-to-be actually have in common.
2. The study indicates that the scope for reinterpretation of history is further limited by what will be *accepted* by the target groups. This is well illustrated by the Slovak reaction to the exaggerated role attributed to Hussism, which bordered on a falsification of history. There were also strong reactions to the reinterpretation of the Slovak national revival, and the presentation of specific Slovak features as being a result of Magyar influences. If the heavy Czech bias was an important reason for the Slovak opposition to Czechoslovakism, it logically worked the opposite way in the Czech case. This also means that a reformulation of Czechoslovakism might not have increased the chances of success, since a more balanced version might have included elements offensive to the Czechs.
3. The study indicates that *nations are more difficult building blocks* than are ethnies or ethnic groups without any widespread national consciousness. Not only did Czechoslovakism have to replace or supersede the existing national identities in order to succeed, but the existing identities also represented alternative interpretations of history and alternative uses of the same constituting features. Compared to the Czechoslovak reinterpretation of history, the Czech and Slovak interpretations had the advantage of being more in touch with reality, as well as of having a head start. At the same time, the Czech, respectively Slovak, cultural and linguistic cohesion was "thicker."

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<sup>5</sup> A. D. Smith: The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed? in: Marjorie Ringrose/Adam J. Lerner (eds.): *Reimagining the Nation* (1993:15–16).

To conclude: Does this mean that overarching nation projects are doomed to failure, also in principle? That would perhaps be to go too far, but our discussion has shown that the "construction" of nations against the actual historical "reality" is no easy task, at least when national unity is projected on a cultural cohesion that is bound to be thinner than the cohesion of the target groups. Overarching nation projects may have a greater chance if they are based on a political or a voluntarist nation concept that can also respect cultural differences. In that case, the overarching identity may be complementary rather than competing. However, it remains an open question whether a purely political or voluntarist nation project would be any match for the existing, culturally "thicker" national identities.

In our case, a political nation concept (including all citizens of Czechoslovakia) was no viable option. In the first place, a cultural nation concept was predominant in the area, and the historical antecedent of Czechoslovakism, Czechoslovak reciprocity, was based on cultural cohesion. More importantly, Czechoslovakia was founded by invoking the right of national self-determination on behalf of the Czechs and Slovaks against their former oppressors, the Germans and Magyars, which made it impossible to include them in a Czechoslovak nation.

### ***Evaluation of the theoretical approach***

I will first evaluate the usefulness of the nationality policy framework as a heuristic device. On the positive side, the nationality policy framework showed its usefulness in the collection of data, providing a theoretical checklist of what to look for. It also helped to illuminate the interconnectedness of national demands and government nationality policies and the dynamics between them over time. Finally, through the focus on agency, it helped make national conflicts more tangible – linked to real people and real events.

On the negative side, the focus on one level and one dimension at a time entails a risk that the cohesion of the national demands (respectively, nationality policies) may disappear, especially in a large and detailed narrative like this one. I have tried to solve this dilemma by cross-references. It also turned out that, in our case, autonomy demands within the cultural and economic dimensions were generally an integrated part of political autonomy demands, which made the distinction between them less useful. This may, however, not always be the case.

The nationality policy framework was also used as a point of departure for developing explanations. Official Czechoslovakism was an attempt at creating a new overarching identity without forcing the target groups to change their culture, and it may thus be regarded as a policy of integration more than one of assimilation. Yet, the Czechoslovak nation concept was cultural more than voluntarist, which accounts for its inherent dualism. Regarding the pre-conditions for success, I argued that assimilation and integration strategies can be expected to be more difficult to fulfill when national consciousness is strong, when the group in question is large and lives in its ancestral lands, and when nationally relevant conflicts between groups keep reinforcing national identity. I also argued that, in such cases, an attempt at forming an overarching identity might exacerbate conflict. This seems to be fully substantiated.

I also made some assumptions about the nature of national conflict. First, I assumed that, at least in a democracy, the most important national conflicts would be expressed politically, simply because governments control many of the things that national movements are interested in. This study seems to support this, since no substantial difference was found between the complaints and demands voiced in *Slovák* and those voiced in the Parliament.

Second, I assumed that differences in national identity must to a certain extent correspond to differences in power or access to goods and values in order to cause conflict. Although perception also played an important part – as the issue of "Slovak bread" for the intelligentsia demonstrated – national demands and complaints that were voiced on behalf of the Slovaks in the Parliament seemed to reflect a reality. This means that national demands were not the result of manipulation by an elite, but reflected nationally relevant conflicts; this even goes for the demand for autonomy, as it was indirectly linked to asymmetric power relations.

Third, I assumed that the level of satisfaction (and thus lack of open conflict) was linked to the accommodation of demands. The analysis clearly showed that politics do matter: Demands that were accommodated disappeared from the agenda, while those that (for various reasons) were not accommodated, remained salient. In these cases, an escalation of the conflict could often be observed (cf. the series of parliamentary interpellations concerning the Language Act). I also assumed that, in a functioning democracy, individual political and civil rights would not be a major issue. Also this was confirmed.

Apart from this, what are the implications of this study for the theoretical framework? There are two points I want to make.

1. The study has shown that alliances were important for the ability of the autonomists to achieve accommodation for their demands. These alliances were of two kinds: either a united Slovak bloc, or a cross-national alliance involving the Czech "ruling nation." National unity was an advantage and disunity a disadvantage for the Slovak national cause, and conflicts that crossed national lines were more easily solved. This is in line with established theory that crosscutting cleavages tend to lower the level of conflict.
2. Second, the study has demonstrated that, in a democracy, strong election support can be used as leverage against the government in order to get national demands fulfilled. It was only after the Ľudáks doubled their support in the 1925 election that the government coalition began to take them seriously.

In order to test the usefulness of the nationality policy framework in general, it would have to be applied to the study of national conflict also in non-democratic states. This may be more problematic. First, nationality policies would probably be more divorced from national demands, simply because articulation and aggregation of any kind of interest, including national, would not be free. Second, the link between nationally relevant conflicts and national demands may not be equally clear, since we cannot expect all national conflicts to be articulated politically. We would have to ask whether some demands may be prevented from being expressed because the personal risk for the national elite was too high.

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According to an English proverb, the road to hell is paved with good intentions – a pointed way of expressing that the results of our actions are sometimes the opposite of what we intended. That also applies to this case: Not only did the Czechoslovak nation project fail; the attempt at creating a Czechoslovak nation sharpened national conflict and probably helped complete the Slovak nation-forming process. What happened in the inter-war period proved fatal for the Czechoslovak state in the long run; without an overarching Czechoslovak national identity the original *raison d'être* of the state was gone, and a new one was hard to come by once the Communist regime was history. Indirectly, the failure to create a Czechoslovak identity thus contributed to the dissolution of the state in 1993.

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# *Appendixes*

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# Appendix A

## Czech founding myths

Czech founding myths, relating how the Czechs came to their present habitat and how they chose their first ruler, appeared in written form for the first time in the Czech Chronicle (*Chronica Boemorum*) of Kosmas (ca. 1045–1125). He was first canon, later dean at the St. Vitus chapter of Prague. Perhaps the best-known story is the legend of Forefather Czech (Praotec Čech). In Josef Pešek's *Matka vlast* (1923) the legend is retold thus:

"As the story goes, the Slavs were brought to our lands over three rivers in the distant past by an elderly man whose name was Czech. At the time, our lands were covered with dense forest void of human habitation, where the bees were buzzing, birds were singing, horses were whinnying and the sounds of countless other animals could be heard. In the clean and healthy Czech waters fish was playing. And also the climate pleased the newcomers.

Standing on the soil of our land, Forefather Czech cast a searching glance over mountains and valleys. The journey stopped at the foot of the mountain Říp [north of Prague], where he looked around, and 'Grand-dad' whom his people had carried with them on their shoulders, blissfully set foot on the ground. When he later was standing on the peak of the mountain with his companions, looking at the area again and again, he is said to have declared to the others:

'Oh friends, who have come with me on this long and tiring journey, set up camp and sacrifice to your forefathers; by their miraculous help you have reached the homeland that was long since predetermined for you by destiny. Look, here is the land I promised you.<sup>1</sup> Now consider carefully what name you will give this beautiful land." And they answered "Czech" in the next heartbeat: "How can we better name it? After our father, Čech, let the land be named Čechy!"<sup>2</sup> And their elderly leader, moved by the words of his friends, blissfully kissed the earth. Standing, he raised his hand to the sky and said: 'Be greeted, land that has been given to us! Keep us healthy, save us from misfortunes, and multiply our stock in every generation to come!' "<sup>3</sup>

To this compelling story, the author adds the comment that the time of Forefather Czech was a happy "Golden Age", and therefore his death was received with grief among his people.

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<sup>1</sup> According to Otto Urban, Forefather Czech spoke of the promised land as "a land under no-one's sway, full of birds and animals, flowing over with sweet honey and milk." See Urban: *České a slovenské dějiny do roku 1918* (1991:16).

<sup>2</sup> Čechy is the Czech name for Bohemia.

<sup>3</sup> Josef Pešek: *Matka vlast* (1923:19–20). My copy, which I obtained in an antique bookstore in Prague, is stamped *Šestá obecná škola pro chlapce na Kr. Vinohradech* (the sixth primary school for boys in Královské Vinohrady), today a part of Prague.

Another set of legends, originally told by Kosmas and elaborated by Václav Hanka and others in the false mediaeval manuscripts, describe how the Přemysl dynasty acquired the Czech throne. These are the legends of Krok and his daughters, the ruling of Libuše, and the choice of Libuše. This story is told in the following way:

"While Forefather Czech was still alive, there was a man called Krok living in that part of the country. He was highly respected for his wisdom, so much that people came to see him from far and near, and not only people of his own stock, but also the neighbors. Because of this Krok was elected as judge and ruler of the whole nation after the death of Forefather Czech. He chose as his place of residence a castle that he had built on the high cliff over the right bank of the river Vltava. The castle was named Vyšehrad. Krok had three daughters, Kazi, Tetka and Libuše. Each of them excelled in something. [...] Libuše, the youngest of the sisters, is said to have had a sharper mind and a kinder heart than the other two. She was noble-minded, lovable, friendly towards everyone, simply a flower of her generation of women. [!] Moreover, she had the gift of prophecy. As a 'fortune teller' she could fly on a magic horse through the night and return before dawn to her place of residence. Because she was also accomplished in law and customs, she was chosen as ruler of her people after the death of her father Krok.

Libuše ruled wisely and justly. Then two brothers, who were engaged in a quarrel over a piece of land, appeared before her court. She received them in her residence at Vyšehrad. Upon listening to their complaints, she pronounced her judgment. But one of the brothers was not satisfied with her ruling that they should come to their senses. He flew into a rage and [...] shouted: 'Oh, an injustice unbearable to man! A quarrelsome and cunning woman judges us men. And nevertheless, it is known, that women have long hair but short brains! It would be better for a man to die than to tolerate the rule of a woman! It is our shame only that we have a woman to rule us, who so obviously wrongs us through her rulings! Oh, shame on us!'

Everybody present stiffened at his words. The cheeks of the princess blushed. Hiding the hurt caused by the man's thoughtless words, she smiled painfully and announced: 'If that is how it is, then so be it! A woman I am and as a woman I behave. You think less of me, because I do not rule with an iron rod. And because you esteem me so little, you live without awe. I realize now that you need a stricter ruler than a woman can be. So also doves have sometimes dismissed the whitish buzzard and chosen the predatory hawk as their leader, the same way you now dismiss me!' Libuše was aware that the Czechs had a sincere wish to be ruled by a prince. Therefore she called a meeting of her people the day after. [...] 'If your minds are made up, I will let you know the name of your future prince.' Those present nodded assent. Libuše stood and pointed to the north:

'Look, behind those mountains flows a small river flows called Bílina. On its bank lies a village, where the Stadice clan lives. Close to that village is a field, 12 ells long and 12 ells wide. There your prince is ploughing with two brindled oxen; one has got a white ribbon on his head, the other is white from the forehead to the back, that color is also on its hind legs. If you want to set out on a journey to fetch your prince, bring with you a robe that befits a prince. Give that ploughman the message from the nation and me: tell him that you take him

as your prince and I take him as my husband. The name of that man is Přemysl, which means the one who thinks things over. His offspring will rule the whole country for a hundred years and more!"<sup>4</sup>

After that a delegation was chosen to journey in search of Přemysl. [They did not know which way to go, so Libuše gave them her horse; it would lead them safely straight to the village and back. And they went over mountains, through valleys and forests, before they finally came to the village, and found Přemysl just as Libuše had told them. After greeting him], the delegation gave him the message from Libuše. Right away they asked him to leave his work, dress in the princely robe, sit up on the horse and come back with them. Přemysl stopped the oxen, dropping his cleaning rod of hazel wood to the ground. Unharnessing the oxen from the plough, he told them: 'Go back where you came from!' And they did. While he spoke, three large branches, packed with leaves and nuts grew out of the rod. Seeing this, the delegation was thunderstruck. Přemysl then invited them for breakfast. He turned the plough over, and placed mouldy bread and a piece of cheese on it [...]

Noticing their bewilderment, their host explained: 'That means', he said, 'that from my stock many will stem, but one will rule over many.' To their question why he chose the ploughshare of iron as table, Přemysl told them: 'That ironclad table means that such will my rule be. Respect iron also in the future! In times of peace plough the earth with it, in times of war defend yourselves with it against your enemies. And only insofar that your descendants dine at such a table, will they be able to defend their freedom! It is a pity that your ruler was in such a hurry! If she could have awaited fate patiently and not sent for me so early, I would have finished ploughing up the field and there would always be enough bread in our land. Since I have had to leave my work unfinished, the land will often suffer from hunger.' [...]

Not forgetting his social standing, he brought with him his bast shoes and the bundle he had used to carry bread to the fields. The delegation asked him perplexedly why he brought with him a peasant's shoes and bundle. And Přemysl obligingly told them: 'I will tuck them both away for the future, so that our descendants will know where they came from, so that they will always live in awe and modesty, and not treat people that have been entrusted to them by God unfairly out of pride, for we are equally virtuous by nature.' As he finished speaking, he jumped on the horse, [...] and they set off for his new home. Before they knew it, they were standing in front of the gates of Vyšehrad, where Princess Libuše and her followers waited for the bridegroom. [...] The marriage of Libuše was celebrated for hours on end in the light of campfires and torches to the ring of happy song, laughter, shouts and dancing."<sup>5</sup>

There are several aspects of these legends that are interesting. First, there is the parallel between the legend of the Forefather Czech and the Biblical story of Moses, who led his people through the desert to the Promised Land. The notion of a land promised to the Czechs implies that they had every right to settle there. The style of the legend is also Biblical in tone.

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<sup>4</sup> The Czech verb *přemýšlet* means to reflect over (something).

<sup>5</sup> Josef Pešek: *Matka vlast* (1923:22–26).

Second, it is interesting to note how the Czech lands are presented as void of human habitation prior to the arrival of the Czechs. This was a recurrent motif also in the Czech revival. It served a specific purpose: to emphasize how the Czechs came first. A corollary is that the Czechs belonged there, whereas the Germans were intruders and colonizers. Finally, through the story of Forefather Czech, the Czechs are presented as peaceful settlers, not aggressive conquerors of a land that was already inhabited.

As for the legends about Libuše and Přemysl, these are Přemyslid founding myths, which probably at the time served to legitimize Přemyslid rule. The "miraculous" elements of the story originally served to emphasize the elevated position of the ruler, and the same goes for the seemingly humble peasant origins of the Přemyslids. In ruling circles of the Middle Ages, ploughing was a symbol of charisma and of the extraordinary power of kings, according to Vladimír Karbusický.<sup>6</sup> Incidentally, the story about how the Czech ruling dynasty came to power, not by way of conquest, but through election came to fit the Czech self-conception as an inherently democratic nation well. Likewise, the "humble" peasant origins of the Czech ruling house took on a different meaning when the Czechs started to see the peasant as the bearer of nationhood in the course of the national revival. Together these legends fit the picture of the Czechs as a democratic, peaceful and pious people who are more interested in working the land than in warfare and conquest.

The style of the legends, even those that are genuinely medieval, cannot be attributed to Kosmas. The way they are retold by Pešek in *Matka vlast*, they are almost certainly based on a version by the Czech Romantic writer Alois Jirásek (1851-1930).

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<sup>6</sup> See Karbusický: *Báje, mýty, dějiny* (1995:163). In this book he places the old Czech legends into a European context.

# Appendix B<sub>I</sub>

## Czechoslovak ministers 1918–38

Total	Govt	Name:	Department	Period	Duration	Total		Other positions
						years	months	
15	15 1	Beneš, Edvard Dr. ČS	foreign affairs Prime Minister	14.11.1918 - 18.12.1935 26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922	17 years 1 year	17	0	MP 1918-26, and 1929-35, President 1935 - 1938
12	1 1 1 2 7	Šrámek, Jan Dr. ČSL	railways health post and telegraph social affairs unification	26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922 7.10.1922 - 9.12.1925 9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926 12.10.1926 - 7.12.1929 7.12.1929 - 22.9.1938	1 yr. 1 m. 3 yr. 2 m. 3 months 3 yr. 2 m. 8 yr. 9 m.	16	5	chairman 1919-38,  MP 1918-39
11	2 1 2 6  3 1	Hodža, Milan Dr. (S) Agr.	unification  education agriculture  Prime Minister foreign affairs	6.12.1919 - 25.5.1920 12.10.1926 - 15.1.1927 12.10.1926 - 20.11.1929 7.10.1922 - 18.3.1926 29.10.1932 - 9.11.1935 5.11.1935 - 22.9.1938 18.12.1935 - 29.11.1936	5 months 3 months 3 yr. 1 m. 3 yr. 5 m. 3 yr. 2 y. 10 m. 11 m.	12	10	MP 1918-38,  vice chairman of the Agrarian party 1922-38
10	2 1 7  1 1	Franke, Emil Dr. ČS	railways  supply post and telegraph  finance education	8.7.1919 - 25.5.1920 20.7.1925 - 9.12.1925 7.10.1922 - 9.12.1925 18.2.1924 - 9.12.1925 7.12.1929 - 23.1.1936 17.-28.3.36/ 21.7.-2.10.37 23.1.1936 - 22.9.1938	11 m. 4 months 3 y. 2 m. 1 y. 10 m. 6 yr. 1 m. 3 months 2 yr. 8 m.	11	10	vice chairman of the National Socialist Party 1918-38,  MP 1918-39
9	2 3 4	Spina, Franz Dr. (G) BL	public works health without portfolio	12.10.1926 - 7.12.1929 7.12.1929 - 4.6.1935 4.6.1935 - 23.3.1938	3 yr. 2 m. 5 yr. 6 m. 2 yr. 9 m.	11	9	MP 1920-38
9	1 7  1	Bechyně, Rudolf ČSD	education railways  supply	7.10.1922 - 3.10.1924 9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926 29.10.1932 - 22.9.1938 7.12.1929 - 29.10.1932	2 years 3 months 5 y. 11 m. 2 y. 10 m.	11	0	MP 1918-38
5	4  2	Udržal, František Agr.	defense  Prime Minister	26.9.1921 - 9.12.1925 12.10. 1926 - 16.9.1929 1.2.1929 - 29.10.1932	4 yr. 2 m. 2 y. 11 m. 3 yr. 9 m.	10	10	MP 1918-37
9	1 1 2 5	Dérer, Ivan Dr. (S) ČSD	Slovakia unification  education justice	25.5.1920 - 15.9.1920 26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922 5.1.1926 - 18.3.1926 7.12.1929 - 14.2.1934 14.2.1934 - 22.9.1938	4 months 1 yr. 2 months 4 yr. 2 m. 4 yr. 7 m.	10	3	MP 1918-39, chairman of the Slovak branch
7	6 1	Dostálek, Jan Ing. ČSL	public works  commerce	7.12.1929 - 14.2.1934 4.6.1935 - 22.9.1938 14.2.1934 - 4.6.1935	4 yr. 2 m 3 yr. 3 m. 1 yr. 4 m.	8	9	MP 1925-39
7	2 1 4	Czech, Ludwig Dr. (G) DSA	social affairs public works health	7.12.1929 - 14.2.1934 14.2.1934 - 4.6.1935 4.6.1935 - 11.4.1938	4 yr. 2 m 1 yr. 4 m. 2 y. 10 m.	8	4	chairman 1923-38, MP 1920-38
7	2  5  2	Černý, Jan * (without party)	Prime Minister  interior  supply	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921 18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926 15.9.1920 - 7.10.1922 12.10.1926 - 7.12.1929 29.10.1932 - 14.2.1934 12.10.1926 - 7.12.1929	1 year 7 months 2 years 3 yr. 2 m. 1 yr. 6 m. 3 yr. 2 m.	7	3	President of Moravia 1920- 39

6	3 3	Švehla, Antonín Dr. Agr.	interior Prime Minister	14.11.1918 - 15.9.1920 7.10.1922 - 18.3.1926 12.10.1926 - 1.2.1929	1 y. 10 m. 3 yr. 5 m. 2 yr. 3 m.	6	6	chairman 1909-33 MP 1918-33
4	1 3	Malypetr, Jan Agr.	interior Prime Minister	7.10.1922 - 9.12.1925 29.10.1932 - 5.11.1935	3 yr. 2 m. 3 years	6	2	MP 1918-39
3	1 2	Bradáč, Bohumír Agr.	agriculture defense	7.12.1929 - 29.10.1932 29.10.1932 - 4.6.1935	2 y. 11 m. 2 yr. 7 m.	5	6	MP 1918-35
4	2 2	Meissner, Alfréd Dr. ČSD	justice social affairs	7.12.1929 - 14.2.1934 14.2.1934 - 4.6.1935	4 yr. 2 m. 1 yr. 4 m.	5	6	MP 1918-39
6	2 4	Najman, Josef Václav ČSŽ	railways commerce	12.10.1926 - 27.10.1929 4.6.1935 - 4.12.1937	3 years 2 yr. 6 m.	5	6	MP 1920-37 chairm. 1930-37
3	3	Novák, Ladislav Ing. ČND	commerce	26.9.1921 - 9.12.1925 28.4.1928 - 27.10.1929	4 yr. 2 m. 1 yr. 4 m.	5	6	MP 1918-35
5	3 2	Habrman, Gustav ČSD	education social affairs	14.11.1918 - 15.9.1920 26.9.1921 - 28.3.1925	1 y. 10 m. 3 yr. 6 m.	5	4	MP 1918-32
4	1 2 1	Tučný, Alois ČS	public works post and telegraph  health	26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922 7.10.1922 - 18.2.1924 23.1.1936 - 22.9.1938 9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926	1 yr. 1 m. 1 yr. 4 m. 2 yr. 8 m. 3 months	5	4	MP 1918-39
6	6	Engliš, Karel Dr. ČND	finance	25.5.1920 - 21.3.1921 9.12.1925 - 25.11.1928 7.12.1929 - 16.4.1931	10 m. 3 years 1 y. 4 m.	5	2	MP 1920-25
6	6	Trapl, Karel Dr. (without party)	finance	16.4.1931 - 17.3.1936	4 y. 11 m.	4	11	
5	5	Černý, Josef Dr. Agr.	interior	14.2.1934 - 22.9.1938	4 yr. 7 m.	4	7	MP 1918-39
3	2 1	Dolanský, Josef Dr. ČSL	justice supply	26.9.1921 - 9.12.1925 9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926	4 yr. 2 m. 3 months	4	5	MP 1918-35
4	4	Kállay, Jozef Dr. (S)(without party)	Slovakia <sup>7</sup>	7.10.1922 - 15.1.1927	4 yr. 3 m.	4	3	
5	1 3  1	Sříbrný, Jiří ČS (to 1926)	post and telegraph railways  defense	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919 8.7.1919 - 17.9.1919 25.5.1920 - 15.9.1920 7.10.1922 - 20.7.1925 9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926	8 months 2 months 4 months 2 y. 10 m. 3 months	4	3	MP 1918-28, 1929-35
2	2	Matoušek, Josef Dr. ČND	commerce	7.12.1929 - 14.2.1934	4 yr. 2 m.	4	2	MP 1919-39
2	2	Srba, Antonín ČSD	post and telegraph supply public works	26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922 26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922 7.10.1922 - 9.12.1925	1 year 1 year 3 yr. 2 m.	4.	2	MP 1918-39
2	1 1 1	Slávik, Juraj * Dr. (S) Agr.	agriculture unification interior	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926 18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926 7.12.1929 - 29. 10.1932	7 months 7 months 2 y. 10 m.	3	5	MP 1918-20, 1929-35
3	1 2	Srdínko, Otakar Dr. Agr.	education agriculture	9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926 12.10.1926 - 7.12.1929	3 months 3 yr. 2 m.	3	5	MP 1918-30
2	1 1 1	Markovič, Ivan Dr. (S) ČSD	defense unification education	16.7.1920 15.9.1920 7.10.1922 - 9.12.1925 3.10.1924 - 9.12.1925	2 months 3 yr. 2 m. 1 yr. 2 m.	3	4	MP 1918-25, 1929-39
3	1 1 1	Mlčoch, Rudolf ČSŽ	public works railways commerce	9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926 7.12.1929 - 9.4.1932 13.12.1937 - 22.9.1938	3 months 2 yr. 4 m. 9 months	3	4	MP 1918-39
3	1 2	Viškovský, Karel Dr. Agr.	justice defense	9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926 16.9.1929 - 29.10.1932	3 months 3 yr. 1 m.	3	4	MP 1918-19, 1925-32

<sup>7</sup> Kállay resigned when the Ľudáks joined the government. The abolishment of his ministry was executed by a commission (Hodža, Tiso and Gažík), then its jurisdiction was transferred to the provincial administration in Bratislava 28.6.1928.

4	4	Machník, František <i>Agr.</i>	defense	4.6.1935 - 22.9.1938	3 yr. 3 m	3	3	MP 1925-39
4	4	Nečas, Jaromír Ing. ČSD	social affairs	4.6.1935 - 22.9.1938	3 yr. 3 m.	3	3	MP 1924-39
3	1 2	Nosek, František Dr. ČSL	interior post and telegraph	9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926 12.10.1926- 27.10.1929	3 months 3 years	3	3	MP 1918-35
2	2	Mayr-Harting, Robert Dr. (G) DCV	justice	12.10.1926 - 7.12.1929	3 yr. 2 m.	3	2	MP 1920-38
5	3 3 1 1	Šrobár, Vavro Dr. (S) <i>Agr.</i>	health Slovakia unification education	14.11.1918 - 15.9.1920 14.11.1918 - 25.5.1920 25.5.1920 - 15.9.1920 26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922	1 y. 10 m. 1 yr. 6 m. 4 months 1 year	3	2	MP 1918-35
1	1	Bečka, Bohdan Ing. ČND	finance	18.2.1923 - 9.12.1925	2 y. 10 m.	2	10	MP 1918-29
4	1 2 1	Staněk, František <i>Agr.</i>	public works post, telegraph agriculture	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919 8.7.1919 - 15.9.1920 26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922	8 months 1 yr. 2 m. 1 year	2	10	MP 1918-36
4	4  1	Winter, Lev Dr. ČSD	social affairs  unification	14.11.1918 - 15.9.1920 28.3.1925 - 18.3.1926 9.12.1925 - 5.1.1926	1 y. 10 m. 1 year 1 month	2	10	MP 1918-35
3	3	Zadina, Josef Dr. <i>Agr.</i>	agriculture	9.11.1935 - 22.9.1938	2 y. 10 m.	2	10	MP 1925-39
2	2	Tiso, Jozef Dr. HSLŠ	health	15.1.1927 - 8.10.1929	2 yr. 9 m.	2	9	MP 1925-39
2	2	Krofta, Kamil Dr. ( <i>professor in history</i> )	foreign affairs	29.2.1936 - 22.9.1938	2 yr. 7 m.	2	7	diplomat, 1920-7
5	5	Krčmář, Jan * Dr. ( <i>professor</i> )	education	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926 14.2.1934 - 23.1.1936	7 months 1 y. 11 m.	2	6	
2	2	Kalfus, Josef Dr. ( <i>without party</i> )	finance	28.3.1936 - 21.7.1937 2.10.1937 - 22.9.1938	1 yr. 4 m. 1 year	2	4	
2	2	Gažík, Marek Dr. (S) HSLŠ	unification	15.1.1927 - 27.2.1929	2 yr. 1 m.	2	1	MP 1920-35
2	2	Peroutka, František * Dr.	commerce	18.3.1926 - 28.4.1928	2 yr. 1 m.	2	1	
2	2	Mičura, Martin (S) * Dr. ČSL	Slovakia *	15.9.1920 - 7.10.1922	2 years	2	0	MP 1925-39, chairman of Slovak branch 1925-38
3	1 1 1	Vrbenský, Bohuslav Dr. ČS to 1923, then KSČ	supply public works health	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919 25.5.1920 - 15.9.1920 26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922	8 months 4 months 1 year	2	0	MP 1918-23
3	3	Klofáč, Václav Jaroslav ČS	defense	14.11.1918 - 25.5.1920	1 y. 10 m.	1	10	MP 1918-39, chairman 1918-38
2	2	Zajiček, Erwin (G) Dr. DCV	without portfolio	2.7.1936 - 24.3.1938	1 yr. 8 m.	1	8	MP 1925-38
2	2	Fatka, Maximilián* Dr.	post and telegraph	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921 18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926	1 year 7 months	1	7	

3	3	Prášek, Karel <i>Agr.</i>	agriculture	14.11.1918- 24.6.1920	1 yr. 7 m.	1	7	MP 1918-25
2	2	Hampl, Antonín <i>ČSD</i>	public works	8.7.1919 - 25.5.1920	1 yr. 2 m.	1	2	MP 1918-39, chairman 1924- 38
2	2	Hotowetz, Rudolf * Dr.	commerce	25.5.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 yr. 2 m.	1	2	
2	2	Tusar, Vlastimil <i>ČSD</i>	Prime Minister defense	8.7.1919 - 15.9.1920 25.5. - 16.7.1920	1 yr. 2 m. 2 months	1	2	MP 1918-21
1	1	Veselý, František Dr. <i>ČS</i>	justice	8.7.1919 - 15.9.1920	1 yr. 2 m.	1	2	MP 1918-35
1	1	Brdlík, Vladimír* Dr.	agriculture supply	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921 24.1.1921 - 25.4.1921	1 year 3 months	1	0	
1	1	Burger, Václav* Dr. Ing.	railways	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Fajnor, Vladimír * (S) Dr. <i>ČND</i> ( <i>Law professor</i> )	unification	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	president of the supreme court 1930-39
1	1	Gruber, Josef * Dr.	social affairs	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Husák, Otakar* general	defense	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Kovařík, František * Dr.	public works	21.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Novák, Augustin ( <i>without party</i> )	finance	26.9.1921 - 7.10.1922	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Popelka, August * Dr.	justice	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Procházka, Ladislav * Dr.	health supply	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921 25.4.1921 - 26.9.1921	1 year 5 months	1	0	
2	2	Rašín, Alois Dr. <i>ČND</i>	finance	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919 7.10.1922 - 18.2.1923	8 months 4 months	1	0	MP 1918-23
1	1	Šusta, Josef * Dr. ( <i>professor</i> )	education	15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921	1 year	1	0	
2	2	Vlasák, Bohumil Dr.( <i>without party</i> )	finance	25.11.1928 - 7.12.1929	1 year	1	0	
1	1	Heidler, Ferdi- nand Dr. <i>ČS</i>	commerce	8.7.1919 - 25.5.1920	11 months	0	11	none
1	1	Sonntág, Kuneš <i>Agr.</i>	finance supply commerce	9.10.1919 - 25.5.1920 1.4.1920 - 25.5.1920 25.5.1920 - 15.9.1920	7 months 2 months 4 months	0	11	MP 1918-22
1	1	Houdek, Fedor <i>Agr. (S)</i>	supply	8.7.1919 - 1.4.1920	9 months	0	9	MP 1918-20
1	1 1	Štefánek, Anton Dr. <i>Agr. (S)</i>	unification education	8.10.1929 - 7.12.1929 20.2.1929 - 7.12.1929	2 months 9 months	0	9	MP 1918-20, 1925-35
1	1	Hruban, Mořic Dr. <i>ČSL</i>	without portfolio	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919	8 months	0	8	MP 1918-39
1	1	Kramář, Karel Dr. <i>ČND</i>	Prime Minister	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919	8 months	0	8	MP 1918-37, chairman 1918- 35
1	1	Soukup, František Dr. <i>ČSD</i>	justice	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919	8 months	0	8	MP 1918-39



1	1	Štefánik, Milan R. Dr./general (S)	armed forces <sup>8</sup>	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919	8 months	0	8	none
1	1	Stránský, Adolf Dr. ČND	commerce	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919	8 months	0	8	MP 1918-25
1	1	Zahradník, Isidor Dr. Agr.	railways	14.11.1918 - 8.7.1919	8 months	0	8	MP 1918-20
1	1 1	Hausmann, Jiří * Dr.	justice supply	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926 18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926	7 months	0	7	
1	1	Labaj, Eudovít Dr. (S) HSLS	unification	27.2.1929 - 8.10.1929	7 months	0	7	MP 1920-37
1	1	Říha, Jan * Dr.	railways	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926	7 months	0	7	
1	1	Roubík, Václav * Ing.	public works	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926	7 months	0	7	
1	1	Schieszl, Josef * Dr. ČND	social affairs health	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926 18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926	7 months 7 months	0	7	MP 1918-20, chief of presi- dential office from 1920
1	1	Syrový, Jan * general	defense	18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926	7 months	0	7	
1	1	Hůla, Josef Ing. (without party)	railways	9.4.1932 - 29.10.1932	6 months	0	6	
1	1	Johanis, Václav ČSD	supply	25.5.1920 - 15.9.1920	4 months	0	4	MP 1918-39
1	1	Průša, Leopold *	supply	15.9.1920 - 21.1.1921	4 months	0	4	
1	1	Dvořáček, Jan Ing. ČND	commerce	9.12.1925 - 18.3.1926	3 months	0	3	MP 1925-26
1	1	Horáček, Cyril Dr. Agr.	finance	8.7.1919 - 9.10.1919	3 months	0	3	MP 1918-25
1	1	Ježek, František ČND/NSj.	without portfolio	19.3.1938 - 10.5.1938	2 months	0	2	MP 1925-39, vice chairman 1933-38
1	1	Hanačík, Vladimír *	finance	21.3.1921 - 26.9.1921	6 months	0	1	

Sources: *Národní shromáždění republiky československé v prvním desetiletí*, (1928),  
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\* Members of two care-taker governments, under the premiership of Jan Černý (15.9.1920 - 26.9.1921 and 18.3.1926 - 12.10.1926). In addition to those marked, Edvard Beneš was a member of both these governments, and Jozef Kállay a member of the latter.

<sup>8</sup> In the first government, responsibility for the armed forces was divided between Štefánik (military – *vojenství*) and Klobáček (national defense – *národní obrany*). The former never took up position, as he was killed in a plane crash near Bratislava on his way home to Slovakia (4.5.1919).

# *Appendix B<sub>II</sub>*

## *Czechoslovak governments 1918–38*

Govt. no.	Prime minister	Period (from-to)	Names of ministers and resorts (abbreviated)
1	Kramář	14.11.1918 08.07.1919	K. Kramář (PM), E. Beneš (FA), A. Švehla (I), A. Rašín (F), G. Habrman (E), V. Klofáč (D), F. Soukup (J), A. Stránský (C), I. Zahradník (R), F. Staněk (PW), K. Prášek (A), L. Winter (SA), V. Šrobár (S, H), J. Stříbrný (PT), B. Vrbenský (Su), M.R. Štefánek (M), M. Hruban (W).
2	Tusar I	08.07.1919 16.07.1920	V. Tusar (PM), (D to 16.7.), E. Beneš (FA), A. Švehla (I), C. Horáček (F to 9.10.) K. Sonntág (F from 9.10.), (Su from 1.4.), G. Habrman (E), V. Klofáč (D), F. Veselý (J), F. Heidler (C), J. Stříbrný (R to 17.9.), E. Franke (R from 17.9.), A. Hampl (PW), K. Prášek (A), L. Winter (SA), V. Šrobár (S, H), F. Staněk (PT), M. Hodža (U from 6.12.), F. Houdek (Su to 1.4.).
3	Tusar II	16.07.1920 15.09.1920	V. Tusar (PM), E. Beneš (FA), A. Švehla (I), K. Engliš (F), G. Habrman (E), I. Markovič (D)(from 16.7.), A. Meissner (J), K. Sonntág (C), (A from 24.6), J. Stříbrný (R), B. Vrbenský (PW), K. Prášek (A to 24.6), L. Winter (SA), V. Šrobár (H, U), F. Staněk (PT), I. Dérer (S), V. Johanis (Su), R. Hotowetz (FT).
4	Černý I	15.09.1920 26.09.1921	J. Černý (PM, I), E. Beneš (FA), K. Engliš (F to 21.3.), V. Hanačík (F from 21.3), J. Šusta (E), O. Husák (D), A. Popelka (J), R. Hotowetz (C), V. Burger (R), F. Kovařík (PW from 21.9.1920), V. Brdlík (A) (Su 24.1.-25.4.), J. Gruber (SA), L. Procházka (H) (Su from 25.4.), M. Fatka (PT), V. Fajnor (U), M. Mičura (S), L. Průša (Su to 24.1.), R. Hotowetz (FT).
5	Beneš	26.09.1921 07.10.1922	E. Beneš (PM, FA), J. Černý (I), A. Novák (F), V. Šrobár (E), F. Udržal (D), J. Dolanský (J), L. Novák (C, FT), J. Šrámek (R), A. Tučný (PW), F. Staněk (A), G. Habrman (SA), B. Vrbenský (H), A. Srba (PT, Su), I. Dérer (U), M. Mičura (S).
6	Švehla I	07.10.1922 09.12.1925	A. Švehla (PM), E. Beneš (FA), J. Malypetr (I), A. Rašín (F to 18.2.1923), B. Bečka (F from 24.2.1923), R. Bechyně (E to 3.10.1924), F. Udržal (D), J. Dolanský (J), L. Novák (C), J. Stříbrný (R to 20.7.1925), A. Srba (PW), M. Hodža (A), G. Habrman (SA to 28.3.1925), L. Winter (SA from 28.3.1925), J. Šrámek (H), A. Tučný (PT), I. Markovič (U), (E from 3.10.1924), J. Kállay (S), E. Franke (Su), (R from 20.7.1925).

7	Švehla II	09.12.1925 18.03.1926	A. Švehla (PM), E. Beneš (FA), F. Nosek (I), K. Engliš (F), O. Srdínko (E), J. Stříbrný (D), K. Viškovský (J), J. Dvořáček (C), R. Bechyně (R), R. Mlčoch (PW), M. Hodža (A), L. Winter (SA), (U to 5.1.), A. Tučný (H), J. Šrámek (PT), I. Dérer (U from 5.1.), J. Kállay (S), J. Dolanský (Su).
8	Černý II	18.03.1926 12.10.1926	J. Černý (PM, I), E. Beneš (FA), K. Engliš (F), J. Krčmář (E), J. Syrový (D), J. Hausmann (J, Su), F. Peroutka (C), J. Říha (R), V. Roubík (PW), J. Slávik (A, U), J. Schieszl (SA, H), M. Fatka (PT), J. Kállay (S) .
9	Švehla III	12.10. 1926 01.02.1929	A. Švehla (PM), E. Beneš (FA), J. Černý (I, Su), K. Engliš (F to 25.11.1928), B. Vlasák (F from 26.11.1928), M. Hodža (E) (U to 15.1.1927), F. Udržal (D), R. Mayr-Harting (J), L. Novák (C), J.V. Najman (R), F. Spina (PW), O. Srdínko (A), J. Šrámek (SA) (H to 15.1.1927), J. Tiso (H from 15.1.1927), F. Nosek (PT), M. Gažík (U from 15.1.1927), J. Kállay (S to 28.6.1928).
10	Udržal I	01.02.1929 07.12.1929	F. Udržal (PM) (D to 16.9.), E. Beneš (FA), J. Černý (I, Su), B. Vlasák (F), M. Hodža (E to 20.2.), A. Štefánek (E from 20.2.) (U from 8.10), K. Viškovský (D from 16.9.), R. Mayr-Harting (J), L. Novák (C), J.V. Najman (R), F. Spina (PW), O. Srdínko (A), J. Šrámek (SA) (H from 8.10.), J. Tiso (H to 8.10.), F. Nosek (PT), M. Gažík (U to 27.2.), L. Labaj (U 27.2-8.10.).
11	Udržal II	07.12.1929 29.10.1932	F. Udržal (PM), E. Beneš (FA), J. Slávik (I), K. Engliš (F to 16.4.1931), K. Trapl (F from 16.4.1931), I. Dérer (E), K. Viškovský (D), A. Meissner (J), J. Matoušek (C), R. Mlčoch (R to 9.4.1932), J. Hůla (R from 9.4.1932), J. Dostálek (PW), B. Bradáč (A), L. Czech (SA), F. Spina (H), E. Franke (PT), J. Šrámek (U), R. Bechyně (Su).
12	Malypetr I	29.10.1932 14.02.1934	J. Malypetr (PM), E. Beneš (FA), J. Černý (I, Su), K. Trapl (F), I. Dérer (E), B. Bradáč (D), A. Meissner (J), J. Matoušek (C), R. Bechyně (R), J. Dostálek (PW), M. Hodža (A), L. Czech (SA), F. Spina (H), E. Franke (PT), J. Šrámek (U).
13	Malypetr II	14.02.1934 04.06.1935	J. Malypetr (PM), E. Beneš (FA), Jos. Černý (I), K. Trapl (F), J. Krčmář (E), B. Bradáč (D), I. Dérer (J), J. Dostálek (C), R. Bechyně (R), L. Czech (PW), M. Hodža (A), A. Meissner (SA), F. Spina (H), E. Franke (PT), J. Šrámek (U).
14	Malypetr III	04.06.1935 05.11.1935	J. Malypetr (PM), E. Beneš (FA), Jos. Černý (I), K. Trapl (F), J. Krčmář (E), F. Machník (D), I. Dérer (J), J.V. Najman (C), R. Bechyně (R), J. Dostálek (PW), M. Hodža (A), J. Nečas (SA), L. Czech (H), E. Franke (PT), J. Šrámek (U), F. Spina (W).

15	Hodža I	05.11.1935 18.12.1935	M. Hodža (PM), E. Beneš (FA), Jos. Černý (I), K. Trapl (F), J. Krčmář (E), F. Machník (D), I. Dérer (J), J.V. Najman (C), R. Bechyně (R), J. Dostálek (PW), J. Zadina (A), J. Nečas (SA), L. Czech (H), E. Franke (PT), J. Šrámek (U), F. Spina (W).
16	Hodža II	18.12.1935 21.07.1937	M. Hodža (PM) (FA to 29.2.1936), K. Krofta (FA from 29.2.1936), Jos. Černý (I), K. Trapl (F to 17.3.1936), J. Kalfus (F from 28.3.1936), J. Krčmář (E to 23.1.1936), E. Franke (PT to 23.1.1936) (E from 23.1.1936), F. Machník (D), I. Dérer (J), J.V. Najman (C), R. Bechyně (R), A. Tučný (PT from 23.1.1936), J. Dostálek (PW), J. Zadina (A), J. Nečas (SA), L. Czech (H), J. Šrámek (U), F. Spina (W), E. Zajiček (W from 2.7.1936).
17	Hodža III	21.07.1937 22.09.1938	M. Hodža (PM), K. Krofta (FA), Jos. Černý (I), Kalfus (F from 2.10.), E. Franke (E) (F to 2.10.), F. Machník (D), I. Dérer (J) (H 11.4-10.5), J.V. Najman (C to 4.12.), R. Mlčoch (C from 4.12.), R. Bechyně (R), A. Tučný (PT), J. Dostálek (PW), J. Zadina (A), J. Nečas (SA), L. Czech (H to 11.4), F. Ježek (W 19.3.-10.5.) (H from 10.5), J. Šrámek (U), H. Vavrečka (PR from 16.9. 1938), F. Spina, (W to 24.3.), E. Zajiček (W to 24.3).

*Sources: See Appendix B.*

***Abbreviations of resorts:***

A = Minister of Agriculture  
 C = Minister of Industry and Commerce  
 D = Minister of National Defense  
 E = Minister of Education and Enlightenment  
 F = Minister of Finance  
 FA = Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 FT = Minister of Foreign Trade  
 H = Minister of Health  
 I = Minister of Interior  
 J = Minister of Justice  
 M = Minister of the Armed Forces  
 PW = Minister of Public Works  
 PM = Prime Minister  
 PR = Minister of Propaganda  
 PT = Minister of Post and Telegraph  
 R = Minister of Railways  
 S = Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia  
 SA = Minister of Social Affairs  
 Su = Minister of Supply  
 U = Minister of Unification of the legislation  
 W = Minister without portfolio

# Appendix C<sub>I</sub>

## *Biographical data on central politicians*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Bartošek, Theodor</i> (1877–1954)	ČS, lawyer; deputy 1918–23. Communist after 1925.
<i>Bechyně, Rudolf</i> (1881–1948)	ČSD, journalist, editor; deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1911–18, deputy 1918–38, minister for 11 years (see appendix B).
<i>Bečko, Ján</i> (1889–1972)	ČSD, worker; deputy from Slovakia 1920–39.
<i>Bella, Metód Matej</i> (1869–1947)	SNS, Protestant priest, Doctor of Laws, deputy of the Hungarian Parliament 1906–10, deputy 1918–19. Official in charge of supply under Šrobár, signatory of the Martin declaration, župan 1918–28.
<i>Beneš, Edvard</i> (1884–1948)	ČS (1923–35), sociologist; co-founder of the state, elected deputy 1919–26 and 1929–35, served as minister of foreign affairs 1918–35, Prime Minister 1921–22, president 1935–38, a leading figure in the <i>Hrad</i> faction. (See also appendix B).
<i>Beran, Rudolf</i> (1887–1954)	Agr., chairman 1933–38, party functionary; deputy 1919–39, chairman of <i>Narodní jednota</i> 1938–39.
<i>Blaho, Pavol</i> (1867–1927)	Agr., publicist, physician; editor of <i>Hlas</i> (1898–1906) member of the Hungarian Parliament 1906–1918, chairman of the Slovak National and Agricultural party 1920–21, deputy 1918–27. Official in charge of Agriculture under Šrobár (minister of Slovakia).
<i>Bobok, Arnold</i> (1876–1924)	HSLŠ, theologian, cannon, deputy 1920–24.
<i>Bouček, Václav</i> (1869–1940)	Pokrok., ČS, lawyer, deputy 1918–20. One of the foremost activists of Masaryk's realist party.
<i>Brabec, Jaroslav</i> (1869–1930)	ČND (formerly Old Czech) lawyer, mayor, Doctor of Laws, member of <i>Národní výbor</i> , deputy 1918–20, senator 1920–29.
<i>Bradáč, Bohumír</i> (1881–1935)	Agr., peasant, deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1911–18, deputy 1918–35, minister of agriculture 1929–32, of defense 1932–35.
<i>Buday, Jozef</i> (1877–1939)	HSLŠ, Catholic priest, Doctor and professor of church law at Comenius university 1919–21; deputy 1919–29, senator 1929–39.
<i>Clementis, Vladimír</i> (Vlado) (1902–52)	KSČ, lawyer, publicist; deputy from Slovakia 1935–38.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Czech, Ludwig</i> (1870–1942)	DSA, lawyer, chairman 1923–38, deputy 1920–38, minister of social care 1929–34, minister of public works 1934–35, minister of health 1935–38.
<i>Černý, Jan</i> (1874–1959)	Bureaucrat, Prime Minister of the caretaker governments 1920–21 and 1926, minister of interior 1920–22, 1926–29, 1932–34, minister of supply 1926–29, president of Moravia 1928–39.
<i>Černý, Josef</i> (1885–1971)	REP, Doctor of Laws, lawyer, son-in-law of Švehla, deputy 1918–39, minister of interior 1934–38.
<i>Čuřík, Antonín</i> (1884–1953)	ČSL, general secretary of the Christian Workers' Union, deputy 1918–39. Originally a member of ČSL, he formed his own Christian-social party, which cooperated with HSLS in the 1929 election and then with the Agrarians in 1935.
<i>Dérer, Ivan</i> (1884–1973)	ČSD, lawyer; deputy 1918–39, minister for more than ten years (see appendix B). Official in charge of justice under Šrobár.
<i>Domin, Karel</i> (1882–1953)	NSj., professor of botany and later rector of Charles University; deputy 1935–39.
<i>Drobný, Ján</i> (1881–1948)	HSLS, judge, Doctor of Laws, president of Slovakia 1928–31.
<i>Dula, Matúš</i> (1846–1926)	SNS–ČND, chairman 1914–21, lawyer, bank manager; deputy 1918–20, senator 1920–25 for the Czechoslovak National Democrats. Among the men of the Martin declaration.
<i>Dvořáček, Jan</i> (1887–1956)	ČND, economist, central in the ministry of commerce 1920–22, then chairman of the economy section in the department of foreign affairs, director of Živnostenská banka 1926–38, then managing director, deputy 1925–26, minister of commerce three months in 1925–26.
<i>Dyk, Viktor</i> (1877–1931)	ČND, renowned poet (very nationally oriented), author, publicist; deputy 1918–25, senator 1925–31.
<i>Engliš, Karel</i> (1888–1961)	ČND, professor of national economy and law, deputy 1920–1925, minister of finance 1920–21, 1925–28, 1929–31.
<i>Fajnor, Vladimír</i> (1875–1952)	ČND, law professor at Comenius University, minister of unification 1920–21, minister of justice 1938, president of the supreme court 1930–39. (Brother of Protestant bishop Dušan F.)
<i>Fišer, Bohumil</i> (1882–??)	Pokrok., gymnasium teacher, owner of publishing house, deputy 1919–20, secretary of the club of senators of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party from 1924.
<i>Franke, Emil</i> (1880–1939)	ČS, vice chairman 1918–38, deputy 1918–39, minister for almost 12 years (see appendix B).

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Fritz, Gejza</i> (1880–1957)	HSLŠ, lawyer, estate owner, deputy 1925–35, senator 1935–39.
<i>Gažík, Marek</i> (1887–1947)	HSLŠ, Doctor of Laws, lawyer; minister of unification of the legislation 1927–29, deputy 1920–35.
<i>Gottwald, Klement</i> (1896–1953)	KSČ, general secretary from 1929; editor, party functionary in Slovakia 1921–26; deputy 1929–38. (Prime Minister 1946–48, first Communist president 1948–53).
<i>Grebáč-Orlov, Ignác</i> (1888–1957)	HSLŠ, theologian, writer, editor of <i>Slovák</i> ; deputy 1922–35.
<i>Habrman, Gustav</i> (1864–1932)	ČSD, editor, deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–18, member of <i>Národní výbor</i> , minister of education 1918–20, minister of social care 1921–25, deputy 1918–25, senator 1925–32.
<i>Hajn, Antonín</i> (1868–1949)	ČND, publicist, editor; chairman of the radical progressive party 1897–1908, and the state right progressive party 1908–12, deputy 1918–35.
<i>Haken, Josef</i> (1880–1949)	KSČ, chairman 1925–27, co-founder of the party, deputy 1920–29, senator 1929–36.
<i>Halla, Ján</i> (1885–1955)	Agr., Doctor of Laws, educated in Prague and Berlin, lawyer, publicist, employed at the ministry of Slovakia, deputy 1918–20, 1925–29. Member of the <i>Průdy</i> circle.
<i>Hampl, Antonín</i> (1875–1942)	ČSD, chairman 1924–38, worker; deputy 1918–39, minister of public works 1919–20.
<i>Hanáčík, Vladimír</i> (1861–1954)	Civil servant at the ministry of finance in Vienna, head of finance in Bohemia in 1918, minister of finance 1920–21.
<i>Hancko, Anton</i> (1883–1967)	HSLŠ, teacher; deputy 1920–29, senator 1929–39.
<i>Herben, Jan</i> (1857–1936)	ČND, journalist, writer and publicist; deputy 1918–20, senator 1920–25. One of Masaryk's strongest supporters.
<i>Hlinka, Andrej</i> (1864–1938)	HSLŠ, chairman (1913–38) and co-founder, Catholic priest; deputy 1918–19, 1920–38.
<i>Hnídek, František</i> (1876–1932)	REP, Doctor of Law, gymnasium teacher, member of the Bohemian Diet 1908–18, deputy 1918–32.
<i>Hodža, Milan</i> (1878–1944)	Agr., vice chairman 1922–38, Ph.D., journalist, editor; member of the Hungarian Parliament, deputy 1918–38, minister for almost 13 years (see appendix B), Prime Minister 1935–38, pre-war Hlasist.
<i>Hodáč, František</i> (1883–1943)	ČND, lawyer, national economist, professor; deputy 1929–35, co-founder of <i>Národní sjednocení</i> 1934.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Horák, František</i> (1865–1933)	ČSŽ, chairman 1919–30, factory owner, deputy 1920–33.
<i>Houdek, Fedor</i> (1877–1953)	Agr., businessman, publicist, minister of supply 1919–20, member of Parliament 1918–20, official in charge of defense under Šrobár (minister of Slovakia) 1918–19, pre-war Hlasist, member of Detvan, House-friend of Masaryk (Czech father).
<i>Hrušovský, Igor</i> (1872–1937)	ČS, bank clerk, bank director, employed at the Ministry of Unification of the legislation; deputy from Slovakia 1919–36. Hlasist.
<i>Ivanka, Milan</i> (1876–1950)	ČND, lawyer; member of the Hungarian Parliament 1907–9, deputy 1918–20, 1925–34. Official in charge of Interior under Šrobár (minister of Slovakia).
<i>Jaša, Václav</i> (1886–??).	ČSD, teacher, deputy 1920–25 (legionary representative), 1925–39.
<i>Ježek, František</i> (1890–1969)	ČND–Ns.j., vice chairman 1933–38, railway consultant, publicist, deputy 1925–39, minister of without portfolio, then health 1938.
<i>Juriga, Ferdinand</i> ( <i>Ferdiš</i> ) (1878–1950)	HSLŠ, theologian; member of the Hungarian Parliament 1906–18, deputy 1918–29. Excluded 1929, ran for office on his own ballot under the name Juriga's Slovak peoples party, but failed.
<i>Kállay, Jozef</i> (1881–1939)	Member of Agr., chairman of the Slovak branch 1937–38, but always served as "non-political administrator". (Protestant) lawyer, Doctor of Laws, studied in Cluj and Budapest; župan in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš 1918–20, head of administration in the Ministry of Slovakia 1920–22, Minister with full powers in Slovakia 1922–27, then public notary in Bratislava, from 1927 director of the regional bank.
<i>Klofáč, Václav Jaroslav</i> (1868–1942)	ČS, chairman 1918–38, journalist, editor; co-founder of the party in 1897, deputy of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1901–18, vice chairman of the <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, deputy of the Revolutionary Parliament and minister of defense 1918–20, senator 1920–39.
<i>Kmetko, Karol</i> (1875–1948)	HSLŠ, Catholic (arch)bishop; co-founder of the party, deputy 1918–23.
<i>Kovalík, Ján</i> (1861–1950)	HSLŠ, teacher, writer; deputy 1918–20, senator 1920–35.
<i>Kramář, Karel</i> (1860–1937)	ČND, chairman 1918–35, later of <i>Národní sjednocení</i> until his death; Doctor of Laws, economist, publicist, factory owner; deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> for the Young Czech party 1891–1915, chairman of the <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, Prime Minister 1918–19, deputy 1918–37, strong opponent of the Hrad faction, especially of Edvard Beneš.



<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Krčmář, Jan</i> (1877–1950)	Lawyer, professor at Charles university in Prague from 1907, helped codify citizenship rights under the ministry of justice, councilor for the ministers of finance and foreign affairs. Minister of education 1926 and 1934–36. No party affiliation.
<i>Krčméry, Karol</i> (1859–1949)	HSLŠ, theologian, linguist, teacher; senator 1925–39.
<i>Krofta, Kamil</i> (1876–1945)	Ph.D., Professor in history, diplomat 1920–27, next-in-command to Beneš in the department of foreign affairs 1927–36, Minister of foreign affairs 1936–38. No party affiliation.
<i>Labaj, Eudevít</i> (1886–1951)	HSLŠ, Doctor of Laws, lawyer; deputy 1920–35, senator 1935–37, minister of unification 1929.
<i>Lukáč, Emil Boleslav</i> (1900–1979)	ČS, Protestant priest, poet, translator; deputy from Slovakia 1936–39.
<i>Líška, Ján</i> (1895–1959)	ČSŽ, general secretary of the commercial and industrial chamber, deputy from Slovakia 1929–39.
<i>Macháček, Pavol</i> (1887–1969)	HSLŠ, Catholic priest, writer, editor of <i>Slovák</i> ; deputy 1920–31, then left the party (One of Juriga's companions).
<i>Malík, Rudolf</i> (1875–??)	Agr., peasant, deputy 1918–29.
<i>Malypetr, Jan</i> (1873–1947)	Agr., farmer; deputy 1918–39, minister of interior 1922–25, Prime Minister 1932–35.
<i>Markovič, Ivan</i> (1888–1944)	ČSD, lawyer, publicist; secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris 1918, deputy 1919–25 and 1929–39, minister of defense 1920, minister of unification of the legislation 1922–25. Died in the concentration camp Buchenwald.
<i>Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue</i> (1850–1937)	Pokrok., Ph.D., University professor, Member of the Realist faction of the Young Czech party, deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1891–3, 1907–14, the latter period for the Czech Progressive party. Founder of Czechoslovak republic, president 1918–35.
<i>Matoušek, Josef</i> (1876–1945)	ČND, lawyer; deputy 1919–35, senator 1935–39, minister of industry and commerce 1929–34.
<i>Mederly, Karol</i> (1887–1949)	HSLŠ, bureaucrat, attorney; deputy 1929–35, senator 1935–39.
<i>Medvecký, Eudevít</i> (1878–1954)	Agr., lawyer, Doctor of Laws, landowner, deputy 1918–25. Hlasist. Official in charge of Finance under Šrobár (minister of Slovakia).

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Medvecký, Karol Anton</i> (1875–1937)	SNS, Catholic Priest, Secretary of the Slovak National Council, signatory of the Martin declaration of Oct. 30th, 1918, official in charge of the Catholic church under Šrobár 1918–20, deputy 1918–20.
<i>Meissner, Alfréd</i> (1871–1950)	ČSD, lawyer, Doctor of Laws; deputy 1918–39, minister for five and a half years (see appendix B), among the authors of the Constitution of 1920.
<i>Mičura, Martin</i> (1883–1946)	ČSL, lawyer, president of the supreme court in Bratislava 1931–39; minister of <i>Slovakia</i> 1920–22, deputy 1925–39.
<i>Milota, Albert</i> (1877–1940)	ČS, Doctor of Laws, professor in law, later dean of the Comenius University, senator 1929–39. Czech representing Slovakia.
<i>MLčoch, Rudolf</i> (1880–1948)	ČSŽ, publicist; deputy 1918–39, minister of public works 1925–26, of railways 1929–32, of commerce 1937–38.
<i>Mojto, František</i> (1885–1971)	HSLŠ, teacher; deputy 1929–35.
<i>Myslivec, Václav</i> (1875–1934)	ČSL, editor, cofounder of the Christian Social Party 1894, member of the Reichsrat 1908–11, deputy 1919–29.
<i>Najman, Josef Václav</i> (1882–1937)	ČSŽ, chairman 1930–37, editor; deputy 1920–37.
<i>Nečas, Jaromír</i> (1888–1945)	ČSD, bureaucrat (e.g. at the presidential office 1920–24); deputy 1924–39, minister of social care 1935–38.
<i>Němec, Antonín</i> (1858–1926)	ČSD, chairman to 1924, editor; member of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–18, vice chairman of <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, deputy 1918–25.
<i>Onderčo, Štefan</i> (1884–1937)	HSLŠ, theologian; deputy 1920–37.
<i>Országh, Jozef</i> (1883–1949)	Agr., lawyer, župan 1919–28, vice president of Slovakia (krajina) 1928–31, president of Slovakia 1931–38.
<i>Ostrý, František</i> (1878–??)	ČSŽ, editor, secretary, deputy 1935–39.
<i>Osuský, Štefan</i> (1889–1973)	Diplomat, political writer, emigrated to the US in 1905, sent by the Slovak League to work with Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik in the exile movement during the war, ambassador thereafter.
<i>Patejdl, Josef</i> (1878–1940)	ČS, lawyer; deputy 1921–39.
<i>Polívka, Vladimír</i> (1893–1938)	ČS, publicist, teacher, deputy 1929–38. Milan R. Štefánik's brother-in-law. Czech by origin, but represented Slovakia.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Polyák, Štefan</i> (1882–1946)	HSLŠ, estate owner; deputy 1925–35, senator 1935–39
<i>Prokeš, Jan</i> (1873–1935)	ČSD, editor, mayor in Ostrava, Moravia; member of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–1918, deputy 1918–35.
<i>Rašín, Alois</i> (1867–1923)	ČND, lawyer, economist; leading member of the progressive movement, deputy of the <i>Reichsrat</i> (Young Czechs) 1911–18, sentenced to death 1916, member of <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, one of the "men of Oct. 28th" – formulated the law founding the Czechoslovak republic. Deputy 1918–23, minister of finance 1918–19 and 1922–23. Assassinated 5.1.1923, died 18.2.1923.
<i>Ravasz, Viktor</i> (1887–1957)	HSLŠ, lawyer; deputy 1925–35, senator 1935–39
<i>Rázus, Martin</i> (1888–1937)	SNS, chairman 1929–37, poet, writer, Protestant priest; deputy 1929–37.
<i>Richter, Ferdinand</i> (1885–??)	ČS, juridical advisor, deputy 1929–39.
<i>Sidor, Karol</i> (1901–53)	HSLŠ, journalist, editor-in-chief of <i>Slovák</i> 1930–39; deputy 1935–39.
<i>Sivák, Jozef</i> (1886–1959)	HSLŠ, editor of <i>Slovák</i> , writer, teacher; deputy 1919–20 and 1925–39.
<i>Sladký, Václav</i> (1879–1940)	ČS, gymnasium teacher, deputy 1918–35, senator 1935–39.
<i>Slaviček, Jan</i> (1875–1959)	ČS, shoemaker, secretary of trade union, member of the <i>Reichsrat</i> from 1911, deputy 1918–35, and 1935–39, the latter period for ČSŽ.
<i>Slávik, Juraj</i> (1890–1969)	Agr., lawyer; deputy 1918–20, 1929–35, minister of agriculture 1926, of interior 1929–32, župan 1922–28 in Orava and Košice, diplomat from 1936.
<i>Sokol, Martin</i> (1901–57)	HSLŠ, lawyer; general secretary 1927–38, deputy 1935–39.
<i>Sonntág, Kuneš</i> (1878–1931)	Agr., publicist, vice chairman 1922–31, deputy to the Moravian diet 1913–18, deputy 1918–22, minister of finance 1919–20, of supply 1920, of industry and commerce 1920.
<i>Soukup, František</i> (1871–1940)	ČSD, lawyer, editor; deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–18, secretary of <i>Národní výbor</i> in 1918, one of the "men of Oct. 28th", deputy 1918–20, senator 1920–39, minister of justice 1918–19.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Spina, Franz</i> (1868–1938)	BL, professor of language and literature at the German university of Prague, deputy 1920–38, minister of public works 1926–29, minister of health 1929–35, minister without portfolio 1935–38.
<i>Srba, Antonín</i> (1879–1943).	ČSD, journalist, civil servant, deputy 1918–39, minister of post and telegraph and minister of supply 1921–22, minister of public works 1922–25.
<i>Srdínko, Otakar</i> (1875–1930)	Agr., physician, professor at Charles University; deputy 1918–30, minister of education 1925–26, of agriculture 1926–29.
<i>Staněk, František</i> (1867–1936)	REP., farmer; member of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1901–18, chairman of <i>Český svaz</i> 1916–18, deputy 1918–36, minister of public works 1918–19, post and telegraph 1919–20, and agriculture 1921–22.
<i>Stašek, Bohumil</i> (1886–1948)	ČSL, Catholic priest, editor; deputy 1925–39.
<i>Stivín, Josef</i> (1879–1941)	ČSD, publicist, poet and translator; deputy 1918–39.
<i>Stodola, Emil</i> (1862–1945)	SNS, Doctor of Laws, chairman 1921–22. Brother of Kornel.
<i>Stodola, Kornel</i> (1866–1946)	REP., entrepreneur, national economist; deputy 1918–25, senator 1925–39. Brother of Emil. Official in charge of railways and post under Šrobár (minister of Slovakia).
<i>Stojan, Antonín Cyril</i> (1851–1923)	Doctor of theology, Catholic Priest, Moravian metropolitan, arch bishop of Olomouc from 1921, deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1897–1918 and to the Moravian Diet 1900–18, deputy 1918–20, senator 1920–23.
<i>Stránský, Jaroslav</i> (1884–1973)	ČND 1920–25, ČS from 1930, lawyer, publicist, professor at the Masaryk university; chairman of the National Party of Labor ( <i>Národní strana práce</i> ) 1925–30, deputy 1918–21 and 1929–38.
<i>Stříbrný, Jiří</i> (1880–1955)	ČS, (until 1926), vice chairman 1920–26, publicist; deputy of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1911–18, member of <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, minister for a total of 4 years and three months (see appendix B), deputy 1918–28 and 1929–35, the last period elected on the ballot of <i>League against obligatory candidate lists</i> , a strong opponent of the Hrad faction, especially Edvard Beneš.
<i>Surovjak, Štefan</i> (1892–1950)	HSLŠ, bureaucrat; deputy 1925–39.
<i>Světlik, František</i> (1875–1949)	ČSL, theologian, editor, deputy 1920–39.
<i>Šalát, Anton</i> (1892–1944)	HSLŠ, editor, Catholic priest; deputy 1929–39.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Široký, Viliam</i> (1902–71)	KSČ, party functionary from 1925, deputy from Slovakia 1935–38.
<i>Šmeral, Bohumír</i> (1880–1941)	ČSD/KSČ, lawyer, editor; deputy to the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1911–18, co-founder of the Communist party in 1921, deputy 1920–29, senator 1935–38.
<i>Špaček, Jaromír</i> (1879–??)	ČND, Nsj, lawyer, civil servant, deputy 1919–39, Civil servant.
<i>Špatný, Emil</i> (1883–1937)	ČS, editor, deputy 1918–35, senator 1935–37.
<i>Šrámek, Jan</i> (1870–1956)	ČSL, chairman 1919–38, Catholic priest, professor; deputy of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–18, elected deputy 1918–39, minister for more than 16 years (see appendix B), functioned as Prime Minister during Švehla's illness
<i>Šrobár, Vavro</i> (1867–1950)	Agr., Doctor of Medicine, professor at the <i>Comenius</i> university; co-founder of <i>Hlas</i> , member of <i>Národní výbor</i> from Oct. 28th, 1918, deputy 1918–25, senator 1925–35, minister of health and Slovakia 1918–20, unification 1920, education 1921–22.
<i>Štefánek, Anton</i> (1877–1964)	Agr., sociologist, publicist, Ph.D., professor at Comenius university; deputy 1918–20 and 1925–35, minister of education 1929, supporter of the <i>Hrad</i> faction, pre-war Hlasist, member of <i>Tatran</i> , the Slovak student fraternity in Vienna. Official in charge of Education under Šrobár (minister of Slovakia).
<i>Štefánek, Milan Rastislav</i> (1880–1919)	Astronomer, diplomat, brigadier general in the French army 1918, co-founder of the Czechoslovak republic, minister of the armed forces 1918–19 (on paper), member of Detvan, Hlasist.
<i>Šusta, Josef</i> (1874–1945)	Ph.D. Professor of general history at the Charles University from 1905, member of the Goll school, co-author of several textbooks in history, minister of education 1920–21, President of the Czech academy of sciences from 1939.
<i>Švehla, Antonín</i> (1873–1933)	Agr., chairman 1909–33, farmer; vice chairman of <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, deputy 1918–33, minister of interior 1918–20, Prime Minister 1922–29 (apart from a short interlude in 1926. Šrámek covered for him during his illness in 1928–29).
<i>Tausík, Heřman</i> (1878–1961)	ČSD/K, publicist, deputy 1920–25. Czech representing Slovakia.
<i>Teplanský, Pavol</i> (1886–1969)	Agr., peasant, wine maker, deputy from Slovakia 1929–39

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Tiso, Jozef</i> (1887–1947)	HSLŠ, chairman from 1938; Catholic priest, teacher, headmaster of a teacher seminary; deputy 1925–39, minister of public health and physical education 1927–29. (Prime Minister of the autonomous government 1938–9, president of the Slovak war time republic, executed for his war crimes).
<i>Tománek, Florián</i> (1879–1948)	HSLŠ (excluded 1929) editor, theologian; deputy 1919–29. Belonged to the anti-Tuka wing.
<i>Tomášek, František</i> (1871–1938)	ČSD, editor; member of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–18, deputy 1918–35, senator 1935–38, chairman of the Chamber of deputies 1920–25.
<i>Trapl, Karel</i> (1881–1940)	Doctor of Laws, director of the Post bank, national economy publicist, minister of finance 1931–36.
<i>Tučný, Alois</i> (1881–1940)	ČS, secretary of the Czechoslovak labor union, deputy 1918–39, minister of public works 1921–22, post and telegraph 1922–24 and 1936–38, minister of health 1925–26 (3 months)
<i>Tuka, Vojtech</i> (Béla) (1880–1946)	HSLŠ, lawyer; deputy 1925–29, convicted of espionage and treason 1929, sentenced to 15 years in prison. Released on presidential amnesty on June 3rd 1937.
<i>Tusar, Vlastimil</i> (1880–1924)	ČSD, editor, member of <i>Reichsrat</i> 1911–18, Prime Minister 1919–20, deputy 1918–21, ambassador in Germany from 1921.
<i>Udržal, František</i> (1866–1938)	Agr., farmer; deputy of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1897–1918, Young Czech party and (from 1906) the Agrarian party, member of the <i>Národní výbor</i> 1918, deputy 1918–35, senator 1935–37, minister of defense 1921–25, 1926–29, Prime Minister 1929–32.
<i>Ursíny, Ján</i> (1896–1972)	Agr., farmer, deputy from Slovakia 1935–39.
<i>Vahala, Antonín</i>	Agr., deputy 1920–25.
<i>Vančo, Ján S.</i> (1890–1975)	Agr., peasant, deputy from Slovakia 1929–39.
<i>Vaněk, Ludvík</i> (1860–1926)	ČND, Doctor of Laws, civil servant, deputy 1918–20.
<i>Viškovský, Karel</i> (1868–1932)	REP, lawyer; deputy of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1911–18, deputy 1918–19 and 1925–32, minister of justice 1925–26, of defense 1929–32.
<i>Vrbenský, Bohuslav</i> (1882–1944)	ČS, dentist; deputy 1919–1923, Minister of supply 1918–19, Minister of public works 1920, Minister of health 1921–22. Excluded from the National Socialist Party for voting against the law of protection of the republic. Chairman of the independent socialist workers' party 1924–25.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party, profession, positions</i>
<i>Weyr, František</i> (1879–1951)	ČND, Doctor of Laws, professor of Constitutional law at the Masaryk university in Brno, president of the statistical bureau, deputy 1918–20, one of the authors of the Constitution.
<i>Zahradník, Isidor</i> ( <i>Bohdan</i> ) (1864–1926)	REP, originally a Catholic priest, after 1918 he converted to the Czechoslovak church, member of the <i>Reichsrat</i> 1907–18, member of <i>Národní Výbor</i> , deputy 1918–20, Minister of Railways 1918–19, Bank director from 1924.
<i>Zápotocký, Antonín</i> (1884–1957)	KSČ, general secretary 1922–25, party functionary of the social democratic party 1907–14, editor; deputy 1925–38. (During Communism: Prime Minister 1948–53, president 1953–57).
<i>Zeminová, Františka</i> ( <i>Fraňa</i> ) (1882–1962)	ČS, chairman of the women's organization of the party, deputy 1918–39, a strong admirer of Masaryk.
<i>Zoch, Samuel</i> (1882 – 1928)	Agr., Doctor of Theology, Protestant priest from 1907, bishop from 1919, author of the Martin declaration, župan in Bratislava from 1918, Deputy 1918–19, and 1925–28.

*Sources:*

*Album representantů všech oborů veřejného života Československého*, (1927).

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# *Appendix C<sub>II</sub>*

## *Biographical data on scholars and textbook authors*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title, profession, position</i>
<i>Baxa, Bohumíl</i> (1874-1942)	Professor of Czech history of law at the Masaryk university of Brno from 1919.
<i>Bídlo, Jaroslav</i> (1868-1937)	Ph.D. Historian, belonging to the Goll school, professor at Charles University of Prague from 1905. Co-author of several school textbooks in history.
<i>Chaloupecký, Václav</i> (1882-1951)	Ph.D. Professor of Czechoslovak history at Comenius University of Bratislava from 1922, at Charles University of Prague from 1939. Belonged to the same school as Pekař, thematically as well as theoretically. Strongly Czechoslovakist.
<i>Dejmek, Petr</i> (1870-1945)	Teacher, rector in Prague, the author of a school textbook in history.
<i>Hlavinka, Karel</i> (1879-1950)	Gymnasium teacher in Hodonín, then rector in Košice and Prague, author of a school textbook in history.
<i>Ježo, Martin (s)</i> (1880-1946)	Teacher from Trenčín, Slovakized a school textbook.
<i>Koreň, Jozef (s)</i> (1887-1969)	Philosopher by education, middle school teacher in Slovakia, the author of a school textbook in history.
<i>Lameš, Jaroslav</i> (1884-1960)	Ph.D. Historian, gymnasium teacher, the co-author of a school textbook.
<i>Merhout, Cyril</i> (1881-1955)	Literature historian, teacher in Prague, the author of a school textbook.
<i>Nikolau, Stanislav</i> (1878-1950)	Ph.D., middle school teacher, the co-editor of a textbook.
<i>Ondruš, Michal (s)</i> (1889-1948)	Pedagogue, employed at the Ministry of education 1920-27, rector at a gymnasium in Slovakia 1927-38, active in the Union of Slovak gymnasium teachers (nationally Slovak oriented rather than Czechoslovakist). Slovakized a school textbook.
<i>Pekař, Josef</i> (1870-1937)	Ph.D. Historian of the Goll school, one of the most renown in the inter-war period. Professor at Charles University of Prague from 1905, rector 1931-32.
<i>Pešek, Josef</i> (1878-1958)	Ph.D. Historian, teacher at the academic gymnasium in Prague, the author of several school textbooks.



<i>Name</i>	<i>Title, profession, position</i>
<i>Pražák, Albert</i> (1880-1956)	Ph.D. Professor of Czech and Slovak literature history at Comenius University of Bratislava 1921-1933, afterwards at Charles University of Prague. Before that he also worked as a high school teacher 1906-14 and served as a literary critic. In charge of textbooks in the Slovak section of the Ministry of education from 1918. Strongly Czechoslovakist in orientation.
<i>Rapant, Daniel</i> (1897-1988)	Ph.D. Education from Charles University of Prague and Sorbonne in Paris. The most important Slovak historian of recent times. Professor in history from 1933. Slovak oriented, polemized against Chaloupecký and Pražák.
<i>Stocký, Jan</i> (1879-1959)	Ing. Economist, teaching at the technical school in Prague, co-author of textbook.
<i>Svacina, Bohumil</i> (1886-1964)	Rector at an elementary school in Holešov, the author of a school textbook in history.
<i>Škultéty, Jozef</i> (1853-1948)	Professor of Slovak literature at Comenius University of Bratislava from 1919, linguist and literature historian, editor of <i>Slovenský pohľad</i> 1881-1919, central in the national movement (the Martin circle) and in Matica Slovenská.
<i>Šusta, Josef</i> (1874-1945)	Ph.D. Professor of general history at Charles University from 1905, member of the Goll school, co-author of several textbooks in history, minister of education 1920-21, President of the Czech academy of sciences from 1939.
<i>Traub, Hugo</i> (1879-1942)	Historian, gymnasium teacher in Brno from 1903, docent at the technical school from 1930, author of a school textbook.
<i>Vážný, Václav</i> (1892-1966)	Czech linguist who taught at Comenius University in Bratislava from 1927 to 1939. Under his leadership, the first <i>Pravidla slovenského pravopisu</i> (rules of Slovak orthography) were created in 1931, which lead to strong reactions because of the Czech influence.
<i>Vlček, Jaroslav</i> (1860-1930) (s)	Ph.D. Slovak born (Banská Bystrica), studied philosophy at Charles University of Prague, professor of Czech literary history (including Slovak), administrative head of the Slovak department in the Ministry of education from 1919. Deputy 1918-20.
<i>Žibrita, Ludovít</i> (s) (1897-1981)	Ph.D. and Doctor of law. Education from Bratislava, secondary school teacher in Zvolen, then employed at the ministry of education. Slovakized a school textbook.
<i>Zpěvák, František</i> (1884-1952)	Geographer, gymnasium teacher in Prague, the author of a school textbook.

Sources: *Album representantů všech oborů veřejného života Československého* (1927), *Československý biografický slovník* (1992), *Kdy zemřeli...?* Sv. 1-3 (1962, 1966, 1970), *Slovenský biografický slovník* (1986).

# *Appendix D*

## *Basic economic data*

### 1. Unemployment by region 1925–1936 (percentages)

<b>Bohemia</b>	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
1925					1.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.7
1926	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.6	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.9	2.9
1927	3.3	3.3	3.0	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.2
1928	2.2	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.5
1929	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.4	0.7	1.5	2.1	1.5
1930	3.1	3.6	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.8	4.5	5.3	6.6	10.4	4.5
1931	13.5	15.0	14.7	12.6	10.5	9.2	8.8	8.9	9.4	10.4	13.8	19.0	12.2
1932	22.4	23.8	23.7	20.5	17.5	16.7	16.3	16.4	17.1	18.5	20.9	25.3	19.9
1933	29.5	31.0	29.2	26.0	23.7	21.9	17.6	16.9	16.5	16.7	18.2	20.8	22.3
1934	22.3	22.3	20.5	18.0	16.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.2	15.5	18.0	20.1	17.7
1935	19.7	19.9	19.1	17.4	15.8	14.6	13.9	13.8	14.4	15.1	16.8	19.2	16.7
1936	18.5	18.5	17.2	15.8	14.2	12.8	11.9	11.2	11.1	9.8	11.1	12.4	13.7

<b>Moravia</b>	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
1925					1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.0
1926	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.8	1.5
1927	2.3	2.3	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.3
1928	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.4	1.0
1929	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	1.3
1930	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.7	3.0	3.8	5.9	2.7
1931	7.9	8.6	8.7	8.0	6.5	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.7	8.7	12.9	7.7
1932	16.4	18.3	19.1	17.7	16.4	15.9	15.4	15.7	17.2	19.0	21.7	27.1	18.3
1933	31.6	33.3	32.6	30.3	27.7	26.2	22.4	22.5	22.6	22.6	24.3	26.4	26.9
1934	28.0	28.4	27.3	25.2	21.2	22.4	20.9	20.9	20.8	21.8	22.9	25.1	23.7
1935	24.5	24.9	24.2	22.3	20.9	19.5	18.4	17.8	18.0	18.7	20.6	23.6	21.1
1936	23.1	23.2	21.7	20.0	18.2	16.5	14.6	13.9	13.5	12.7	13.7	17.5	17.4

<b>Slovakia</b>	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
1925					0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
1926	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.8
1927	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7
1928	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6
1929	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5
1930	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.0
1931	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.8	3.7	5.3	9.6	3.4
1932	11.7	13.6	13.1	11.0	9.8	9.4	8.8	9.4	10.0	11.3	13.5	16.9	11.5
1933	20.2	21.7	20.7	18.9	17.3	15.8	12.2	12.1	12.7	13.4	15.8	18.4	16.6
1934	20.1	21.0	19.8	17.2	15.1	13.1	11.2	11.7	11.8	11.8	14.7	18.2	15.5
1935	20.3	21.6	20.9	18.9	15.9	12.6	10.1	10.1	10.4	11.3	14.4	19.6	15.5
1936	21.1	22.6	20.3	16.6	13.1	9.9	7.4	7.5	8.1	9.0	12.9	18.1	13.9

Source: *Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé*, r. 1925–1935; *Statistická ročenka republiky československé* (1938:216). The percentages for 1935 and 1936 are my compilations.

### 3. Average unemployment 1921–1938

	Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia	Total
1921	59,594	15,453	2,487	77,534
1922	141,531	44,896	7,348	193,775
1923	195,284	58,469	13,454	267,207
1924	80,451	22,691	8,039	111,181
1925	35,285	10,673	4,949	50,907
1926	50,136	12,370	4,026	66,532
1927	37,392	10,339	3,778	51,509
1928	26,036	8,318	3,013	37,367
1929	27,660	10,495	2,456	40,611
1930	78,006	21,387	4,916	104,309
1931	210,625	61,695	17,254	289,574
1932	345,563	146,937	58,634	551,133
1933	416,236	228,704	88,006	732,946
1934	366,613	217,133	87,017	670,763
1935	378,500	207,600	92,300	678,400
1936	342,700	183,700	87,700	614,100
1937	214,975	107,733	78,217	400,925
1938	138,600	60,600	52,300	251,500


Sources: See Appendix D2.

### 4. Average daily wages 1921–1936 (Kč)

	Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia	Total
1921	31.97	31.45	28.82	31.55
1922	32.24	30.59	28.4	31.41
1923	27.7	26.67	25.62	27.23
1924	26.99	26.01	23.32	26.42
1925	27.57	25.8	24.15	26.74
1926	27.83	26.1	24.06	26.98
1927	28.1	26.57	24.37	27.34
1928	28.9	27.77	24.6	28.04
1929	29.45	27.69	25.07	28.03
1930	29.57	27.87	25.39	28.67
1931	29.05	27.68	25.14	28.28
1932	28.53	26.61	24.83	27.64
1933	27.85	26.49	22.89	26.98
1934	27.17	26.3	22.47	26.46
1935	26.92	26.38	21.98	26.23
1936	26.88	25.43	22.15	25.94

Industrial workers. Source: *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:834).

### 5: Price index 1919–1938 (1914=100)



Sources: V. Lacina: *Formování československé ekonomiky 1918-1923* (1990:181); *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:836); *Statistická ročenka Protektorátu Čechy a Morava* (1941:212). The figures for 1919 to 1921 (taken from Lacina) may not be entirely comparable with the figures for 1922 to 1938, which are the figures of the Bureau of Statistics. Only the nine first months of 1938 are included. See also Appendix E.

## 6: Agricultural holdings according to size, 1921 and 1930

<i>Holdings in hectares</i>	Below 2	2 – 10	10 – 20	20 – 50	50 – 100	100 – 500	Total <sup>9</sup>
Czechoslovakia 1921	780,055	627,993	135,939	55,918	5967	6996	1,613,488
– in percent	48.3	38.9	8.4	3.5	0.4	0.4	99.9
Czechoslovakia 1930	688,391	696,424	147,317	58,871	7302	7065	1,607,138
– in percent	42.8	43.3	9.2	3.7	0.5	0.4	99.9

Source: *Přehled hospodářského vývoje Československa v letech 1918-1945* (1961:687).

## 7: Foreign trade 1924–1929

<i>Value in million Czechoslovak crowns (Kč)</i>		1924		1925		1926		1927		1928		1929 <sup>10</sup>	
		Kč	%	Kč	%	Kč	%	Kč	%	Kč	%	Kč	%
Live animals	import	830	5.2	771	4.4	606	4.0	725	4.0	719	3.8	951	4.8
	e.port	58	0.3	96	0.5	55	0.3	48	0.2	62	0.3	35	0.2
Food & drinks	import	3972	25.1	4069	23.1	3420	22.4	3751	20.9	3494	18.2	2919	14.6
	e.port	3179	18.7	3441	18.3	3340	18.7	2870	14.3	2901	13.6	2341	11.4
Raw materials	import	7626	48.1	8711	49.4	7204	47.1	8540	47.5	9151	47.6	9778	48.9
	e.port	3692	21.7	3562	18.9	3471	19.4	3954	19.6	3668	17.3	3433	16.7
Manufactured goods	import	3423	21.6	4051	23.0	4043	26.5	4932	27.5	5808	30.2	6234	31.2
	e.port	10047	59.0	11685	62.1	10884	61.0	13251	65.8	14554	68.6	14607	71.3
Precious metal & mints	import	4	–	16	0.1	4	–	14	0.1	36	0.2	46	0.2
	e.port	59	0.3	37	0.2	107	0.6	12	0.1	39	0.2	14	0.1
Czechoslovak total	import	15855	100	17618	100	15277	100	17962	100	19208	100	19988	98.7
	e.port	17035	100	18821	100	17857	100	20135	100	21224	100	20499	99.7
	balance	+1180	–	+1203	–	+2580	–	+2173	–	+2016	–	+511	–

Source: *Přehled hospodářského vývoje Československa v letech 1918-1945* (1961:212).

<sup>9</sup> The total also includes holdings over 500 hectares. 620 such holdings were registered in 1921, and 1768 in 1930. These figures are not directly comparable, because different methods were used in the collection of data.

<sup>10</sup> Returned goods (which started to be listed separately in 1929) are not included in the total.

## 2. Unemployment by region 1922–1938. Seasonal variations

Bohemia	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
1922	78503	99333	86780	83817	75802	70470	69141	99035	176791	242785	281925	333992	141531
1923	327362	300564	259982	217969	194664	177312	158508	147862	161504	130456	130117	137107	195284
1924	136896	138707	126439	96564	75478	61663	57353	59565	53894	51679	50274	56899	80451
1925	52156	51548	47374	32953	31495	28227	28871	32135	29746	27834	28837	32244	35285
1926	41901	41711	44425	47738	51188	53011	55809	62484	55259	50783	46604	50719	50136
1927	57629	57839	51162	44044	37627	33037	28781	30445	27494	25421	25955	29267	37392
1928	38468	36671	30542	26186	24562	22051	23142	25262	21775	20587	18979	24206	26036
1929	35147	37163	31559	27854	22908	21999	21143	24025	24095	24087	26128	35808	27660
1930	52900	62476	64961	58126	57319	54382	56283	64967	77619	91468	114831	180740	78006
1931	234631	259708	253782	218471	182345	159748	151728	154688	162900	180233	239451	329813	210625
1932	387888	412744	411082	356261	304084	289608	282937	284760	295748	320833	361931	438874	345563
1933	510574	536985	505637	450385	410868	380113	362381	348104	340910	344813	375567	428495	416236
1934	459663	459195	422989	371787	330837	309274	309270	309612	314388	327812	370645	413888	366613
1935	448600	451700	434800	396200	359600	331500	316700	314200	327100	343300	382500	436000	378517
1936	461500	461500	430100	395200	355700	320200	297700	280700	278600	244900	276900	309700	342725
1937	326500	323700	293600	242500	202000	172900	153800	142200	141700	150500	192600	237700	214975
1938	261600	255000	219700	191500	162400	145100	128200	108300	27700	40300	56600	66600	138583
Average	228145	233222	218451	191628	169780	155343	148347	148753	155595	161093	182703	217216	184190

2. Unemployment by region 1922–1938 (continued)

Moravia	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
1922	29649	36495	35386	35268	32133	29696	27834	35493	47201	62963	78244	88392	44896
1923	94403	92195	87841	74463	62807	54948	44213	38113	38728	34866	35696	43349	58469
1924	42873	42734	38737	30649	22259	16026	14409	12172	12300	12934	12019	15177	22691
1925	21006	17696	14700	8504	7825	6978	7385	7552	7999	8172	8962	11292	10673
1926	14338	14623	14137	13151	12716	11267	10653	10349	10607	10832	11398	14371	12370
1927	18162	18551	14118	11045	9934	7813	6408	6160	6272	6710	7773	11124	10339
1928	12410	12471	10419	8637	7571	6519	5710	5674	6266	5687	7452	11005	8318
1929	13290	13977	13452	10906	9647	9018	8689	8095	7931	8168	9374	13388	10495
1930	15755	18269	17674	16752	15478	14246	16111	18216	21557	24252	30756	47578	21387
1931	63402	68569	70040	63815	51926	48039	47839	48977	49987	54005	69985	103753	61695
1932	131749	146497	153332	142042	131235	127336	123263	126108	137833	152242	174162	217439	146937
1933	253065	266870	261691	243098	221881	210279	204991	205765	206499	206652	221988	241663	228704
1934	256219	259951	249393	230784	194030	204820	191033	191094	190184	199514	209168	229404	217133
1935	240600	244600	238200	219000	205700	191400	181100	174800	176500	183900	202600	232200	207550
1936	244300	244800	229600	211100	192000	174400	154700	147000	143100	133800	144300	185400	183708
1937	196200	199800	184700	142200	102300	73300	55700	49700	50000	50100	74500	114300	107733
1938	133600	132000	109200	86900	63500	45500	32700	29100	10400	17600	26500	40400	60617
Average	102964	106131	102089	91338	79965	74130	68752	67829	69560	72175	81149	98740	84569

2. Unemployment by region 1922–1938 (continued)

Slovakia	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
1922	3757	5435	5025	4540	5361	6588	6175	5696	7339	10516	14842	12899	7348
1923	16928	20092	19708	16362	14320	12899	12236	10428	8810	9583	10091	9995	13454
1924	11559	12424	12773	10953	8977	7329	5719	5325	5262	5939	2767	7441	8039
1925	8637	8657	7982	5438	4115	3536	3712	3895	3220	2865	3403	3932	4949
1926	4590	4820	4421	4142	4069	3585	3125	3171	3531	3731	4576	4554	4026
1927	5641	5612	5131	4121	3772	3032	2818	2787	2628	2584	3448	3765	3778
1928	4656	4383	4159	3543	3101	2449	2103	1962	1944	2153	2514	3183	3013
1929	3680	3154	3558	3432	2582	1991	1505	1537	1354	1771	2120	2793	2456
1930	3883	4442	4301	3932	3234	3515	3676	3830	4494	5840	8260	9587	4916
1931	13603	13512	14136	13398	14098	10328	9617	9908	14238	18853	26682	48677	17254
1932	59660	69304	66788	55706	49866	47618	44757	47603	50704	57200	68555	85851	58634
1933	102751	110171	104888	96088	88107	80449	68226	67609	71129	74902	88591	103162	88006
1934	115476	117603	110797	96363	84894	73674	62749	65731	66499	66236	82354	101825	87017
1935	120800	128900	124700	112500	94900	75200	60000	60000	61800	67200	85600	116600	92350
1936	133100	142600	128100	104600	82600	62700	46900	47200	51200	57000	81200	114600	87650
1937	134500	143700	139300	110600	73600	49200	29900	33400	31500	32700	60600	99600	78217
1938	114700	115000	95300	75200	53700	29600	20300	24600	21300	17600	20200	40500	52333
Average	46451	49676	47235	40357	33600	27756	22701	23130	24103	26192	34100	45529	35069

Sources: *Zprávy státního úřadu statistického republiky československé* , (ročník 1922-1935), *Statistická ročenka republiky československé* (1938:216-217), *Statistická ročenka Protektorátu Čechy a Morava* (1941:239).

# *Appendix E*

## *State budgets and financial accounts 1919–1937*

### 1. Real figures in million Czechoslovak crowns (Kč)

#### State budget

	Expenses	Revenue	Balance
1919	8,615	3,710	-4,905
1920	11,604	7,804	-3,800
1921	18,026	17,299	-727
1922	19,813	18,884	-929
1923	19,371	18,812	-559
1924	16,994	16,391	-603
1925	9,573	9,301	-272
1926	9,710	10,086	376
1927	9,704	9,724	20
1928	9,536	9,562	26
1929	9,534	9,570	36
1930	9,367	9,420	53
1931	9,839	9,844	5
1932	9,319	9,323	4
1933	8,633	8,634	1
1934	7,631	7,632	1
1935	7,983	7,985	2
1936	8,032	8,033	1
1937	8,454	8,456	2

#### Financial statement/account

	Expenses	Revenue	Balance
	7,195	4,376	-2,819
	13,538	12,736	-802
	18,157	20,258	2,101
	20,641	19,082	-1,559
	18,222	16,417	-1,805
	18,220	17,514	-706
	11,409	10,838	-571
	11,729	11,468	-261
	10,583	10,987	404
	11,019	10,907	-112
	10,275	10,540	265
	9,928	9,647	-281
	12,260	9,133	-3,127
	10,258	8,367	-1,891
	9,588	7,575	-2,013
	8,880	7,492	-1,388
	10,098	7,054	-3,044
	12,433	7,554	-4,879
	13,919	8,970	-4,949

#### Result: Account-Budget

	Expenses	Revenue	Balance
	-1,420	666	2,086
	1,934	4,932	2,998
	131	2,959	2,828
	828	198	-630
	-1,149	-2,395	-1,246
	1,226	1,123	-103
	1,836	1,537	-299
	2,019	1,382	-637
	879	1,263	384
	1,483	1,345	-138
	741	970	229
	561	227	-334
	2,421	-711	-3,132
	939	-956	-1,895
	955	-1,059	-2,014
	1,249	-140	-1,389
	2,115	-931	-3,046
	4,401	-479	-4,880
	5,465	514	-4,951

Source: *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (1985:831)



## 2. Index, in nominal prices and price adjusted (1929 = 100)

### State budget

	Expenses	adjusted	Revenue	adjusted
1919	90	93	39	40
1920	122	71	82	48
1921	189	101	181	97
1922	208	144	197	136
1923	203	192	197	186
1924	178	165	171	159
1925	100	92	97	89
1926	102	99	105	102
1927	102	96	102	96
1928	100	94	100	94
1929	100	100	100	100
1930	98	111	98	111
1931	103	128	103	128
1932	98	131	97	131
1933	91	125	90	125
1934	80	108	80	108
1935	84	108	83	108
1936	84	109	84	108
1937	89	108	88	108

### Financial statement/account

Expenses	adjusted	Revenue	adjusted	Price index
70	72	42	43	1.0
132	77	121	71	1.7
177	94	192	103	1.9
201	139	181	125	1.4
177	167	156	147	1.1
177	164	166	154	1.1
111	102	103	94	1.1
114	110	109	105	1.0
103	97	104	98	1.1
107	101	103	98	1.1
100	100	100	100	1.0
97	109	92	103	0.9
119	148	87	107	0.8
100	134	79	107	0.7
93	129	72	100	0.7
86	117	71	96	0.7
98	127	67	87	0.8
121	156	72	93	0.8
135	165	85	104	0.8

# *Appendix F*

## *Social composition of the Revolutionary Parliament*

Party	Agr.	ČS	ČSD	ČND	ČSL	Pokrok	Slovak	Total
Workers		1					2	3
Peasants <sup>1</sup>	28		2		4			34
Clergy A. Catholic	1				6		4	11
B. Protestant	1						3	4
Lawyers <sup>2</sup>	2	2	4	11	3	3	7	32
Physicians							3	4
Editors/journalists	3	5	16	5		1	5	35
Writers		2	1	6			1	10
University professors	3	1		6	1		1	12
Teachers	1	4		3	1	1	2	12
Managers	2	2	5		2			11
Private functionaries		1	8	1	1		1	12
Railway/postal workers	1		2			1		4
Bank managers	1			1	1		3	6
Civil servants	2	1	1	4				8
Party/union secretaries	5		3		1			9
Secretaries	2	6	7	1	1		2	19
Engineers/constructors				3			3	6
Industry, business, trade	1	2	2	6	1		3	15
Artisans			1	1	1			3
Other and unknown <sup>3</sup>	2	2	1	1	1		1	8
Total	55	29	53	49	24	6	41	257

Of these,

Total number with a degree	8	6	4	27	4	4	19	72
Doctor of law	2	2	4	11	3	3	6	31
Doctor of medicine							3	3
Other Doctor degrees	6	4		14	1	1	6	32
Degree in engineering				2			4	6

The table shows the social composition on January 31st 1918. *Source:* My own compilations based on the list of deputies in: *Seznám členů Národního shromáždění československého: dle stavu 31. prosincem 1918.*

<sup>1</sup> Including 3 landowners (statkáři) representing the Agrarian party.

<sup>2</sup> Including one judge representing ČND.

<sup>3</sup> This category includes 1 pensioner, 1 dramatic advisor, 1 university librarian, 1 ambassador and 1 dentist.

# *Appendix G*

## *Deputies from Slovakia 1918–38*

### **1918-20** (*Slovak Club*)

Bazovský, Ľudevít (Dr.) to January 1919  
 Botto, Ján (Ing.) from January 1919  
 Bella, Metód (Dr.) to October 1919  
 Mitrovčák, Ján from October 1919  
 Blaho, Pavel (Dr.)  
 Burjan, Ján (Ing.) to March 1920  
 Petrovič, Ján from March 1920  
 Čobrda, Vladimír  
 Daxner, Samo to January 1919  
 Brežný, Ján (Dr.) from January 1919  
 Dérer, Ivan (Dr.)  
 Devečka, Andrej  
 Dula, Matúš  
 Hálek, Ivan (Dr.)  
 Halla, Ján (Dr.)  
 Hlinka, Andrej (to October 1919)  
 Hodža, Milan (Dr.)  
 Horvát, Adolf to October 1919  
 Oktávec, Jozef from October 1919  
 Houdek, Fedor  
 Ivanka, Milan (Dr.)  
 Janoška, Juro  
 Kmeťko, Karol (Dr.)  
 Kolísek, Alois (Dr.) (č)  
 Lehocký, Emanuel  
 Makovický, Vladimír to January 1920  
 Kovalík, Ján (Dr.) from January 1920  
 Maršalko, Ján  
 Masaryková, Alice (Dr.) (č) to Sept. 1919  
 Medvecký, Karol A. (Dr.)  
 Medvecký, Ľudovít (Dr.)  
 Okánik, Ľudovít (Dr.) to January 1919  
 Markovič, Ivan (Dr.) from January 1919  
 Paulíny, Viliam  
 Pilát, Rudolf (č)

Rotnág, Josef (č)  
 Rumann, Ján (Dr.) to July 1919  
 Hrušovský, Igor from July 1919  
 Ružiak, Ján (Dr.)  
 Slávik, Juraj (Dr.)  
 Stodola Kornel  
 Šrobár, Vavro (Dr.)  
 Štefánek, Anton  
 Vlček, Jaroslav (Dr.)  
 Votruba, František to January 1920  
 Onderčo, Štefan from January 1920  
 Záruba-Pfeffermann, Josef (č) (Ing.)  
 Zoch, Samuel to January 1919  
 Vanovič, Ján (dr.) from January 1919  
 Žuffa, Milan to September 1919  
 Tománek, Florian from September 1919

### Appointed by law of March 11th 1919:

Benda, Ferdinand  
 Branecký, Josef  
 Duchaj, Ján  
 Hviezdoslav, Pavel Országh  
 Hvizdák, Andrej  
 Cholek, Josef (č)  
 Janček, Ján  
 Jehlička, František (Dr.) to October 1919  
 Buday, Jozef (Dr.) from October 1919  
 Kliešek, Ján  
 Kubál, Andrej  
 Parák, Imrich  
 Pocisk, Ján  
 Sivák, Jozef  
 Šopko, Juraj to July 1919  
 Beneš, Edvard (č) (Dr.) from July 1919

**1920-25<sup>4</sup>**Agrarians:

Blaho, Pavel (s)  
 Botto, Ján (s)  
 Branecký, Jozef (s)  
 Hálek, Ivan (s) to February 1923  
 Karlovský, Michal (s) from February 1923  
 Hodža, Milan (s)  
 Janček, Ján (s)

Klimo, Bohuslav (s)  
 Medvecký, Ľudevít (s)  
 Stodola, Kornel (s)  
 Šopko, Juraj (s)  
 Šrobár, Vavro (s)  
 Vanovič, Ján (s)

Czechoslovak Social Democrats

Surányi, Lajos (m) to January 1922  
 Barták, Václav (č) from January 1922  
 Bečko, Ján (s)  
 Borovszky, Géza (m) left March 1922  
 Čundrlík, Vincenc (s)  
 Daruľa, Štefan (s)  
 Dérer Ivan (s)  
 Ertl, Daniel (s)  
 Kovačič, Desider (s) to November 1922  
 Farbula, Robert (s) Nov. 1922 – Jan. 1924  
 Maxian Ján (s) from January 1924  
 Nagy, Gyula (m) Jan. 1921 – Des. 1923  
 Hvizdák, Andrej (s)  
 Krejčí Jiří (č)  
 (Borovszky became member of a Magyar party)

Kříž, Josef (č)  
 Kubál, Andrej (s)  
 Kunst, Robert (s)  
 Lehocký, Emanuel (s)  
 Markovič, Ivan (s)  
 Oktávec, Jozef (s)  
 Sychravová, Anna (č) to March 1925  
 Pajger, Jozef (s) from March 1925  
 Pocisk, Ján (s)  
 Zverec, Ján (s) to November 1922  
 Skotek, Jozef (s) from November 1922  
 Svetlík, Karol (s)  
 Tadránek, Štefan (s)  
 Tausik, Heřman (č)

Czechoslovak National Socialists

Hrušovský, Igor (s)

Slovak People's Party

Buday, Jozef Dr. *Priest*  
 Bobok, Arnold died Oct. 1924 *Cannon*  
 Sivák, Jozef from Nov. 1924 *Teacher*  
 Gažík, Marek *Doctor of Laws*  
 Hancko, Anton *Teacher*  
 Hlinka, Andrej *Priest*  
 Juriga, Ferdiš *Priest*  
 (All were Slovaks)

Kmet'ko, Karol to January 1922 *Bishop*  
 Kubiš, Robert from Jan. 1922 *Dr. of Laws*  
 Labaj, Ľudevít *Doctor of Laws*  
 Onderčo, Štefan *Priest*  
 Tománek, Florian *Priest*  
 Tomik, Michal  
 Vrabec, Jozef to October 1922

<sup>4</sup> Communist deputies are not included in this overview (this goes for the whole period 1920-1938).

**1925-29**Agrarians

Blaho, Pavel (s) dead November 1927  
 Zeman, Ján (s) from November 1927  
 Botto, Ján (s)  
 Branecký, Josef (s)  
 Halla, Ján (s)  
 Hodža, Milan (s)  
 Macek, Pavel (s)  
 Petrovič Ján (s)

Slávik, Michal (s)  
 Šoltys, Andrej (s)  
 Štefánek, Anton (s)  
 Zoch, Samuel (s) dead January 1928  
 Kocsis, Andrej (m) from January 1928  
 Zalobín, Jozef (s) dead January 1928  
 Tóth, Andrej (r) from January 1928

Hlinka's Slovak People's Party

Buday, Jozef (s) *Dr. Priest*  
 Čillik, Ján (s) *metal worker*  
 Fritz, Gejza (s) *Judge*  
 Gažík, Marek (s) *Doctor of Laws, lawyer*  
 Grebáč-Orlov, Ignác (s) *Priest*  
 Hancko, Anton (s) *Teacher*  
 Hlinka, Andrej (s) *Priest*  
 Hvozdič, Ján (s) *Secondary school teacher*  
 Juriga, Ferdiš (s) *Priest*  
 Kubiš, Robert (s) *Lawyer*  
 Labaj, Ľudevít (s) *Doctor of Laws, lawyer*  
 Macháček, Pavol (s) *Priest*

Matík, Ján (s) *Peasant*  
 Onderčo, Štefan (s) *Priest*  
 Pavlačka, Pavel (s) *Peasant*  
 Pázmán, Anton (s) *School director*  
 Polyák, Štefan (s) *land owner*  
 Ravasz, Viktor (s) *Lawyer*  
 Sivák, Jozef (s) *Teacher, editor*  
 Surovjak, Štefan (s) *bureaucrat*  
 Tiso, Jozef (s) *Priest*  
 Tománek, Florian (s) *Priest*  
 Tuka, Vojtech (s) *Lawyer*

Czechoslovak National Socialists

Hrušovský, Igor (s)

Czechoslovak People's Party

Mičura, Martin (s)

Czechoslovak Social Democrats

Bečko, Ján (s)  
 Dérer, Ivan (s)

Czechoslovak National Democrats

Rehák, Gejza (s)

**1929-35**Agrarians

Blažek, Štefan (s)

Dorič, Michal (s)

Hodža, Milan (s)

Janček, Ján (s) dead October 1933

Ruppelt, Fedor (s) from October 1933

Petrovič, Ján (s)

Kaliňák, Juraj (s)

Slávik, Juraj (s)

Stunda, Štefan (s)

Štefánek, Anton (s)

Teplanský, Pavel (s)

Vančo, Ján S. (s)

Zeman, Ján (s)

Hlinka's Slovak People's PartyDanihel, Štefan (s) *Peasant*Fritz, Gejza (s) *Judge*Gažík, Marek (s) *Doctor of Laws, lawyer*Grebáč-Orlov, Ignác (s) *Priest*Hlinka, Andrej (s) *Priest*Labaj, Ľudevít (s) *Doctor of Laws, lawyer*Macháček, Pavol (s) to January 1931 *Priest*

Galovič, Josef (s) from January 1931

Mederly, Karol (s) *bureaucrat*Mojto, František (s) *Teacher*Onderčo, Štefan (s) *Priest*Polyák, Štefan (s) *Land owner*Pružinský, Mikuláš (s) *Economist*Ravasz, Viktor (s) *Lawyer*Sivák, Jozef (s) *Teacher, editor*Slušný, Koloman (s) *bureaucrat*Surovjak, Štefan (s) *bureaucrat*Šalát, Anton (s) *Priest*Tiso, Jozef (s) *Priest*Czechoslovak Social Democrats

Bečko, Ján (s)

Benda, Ferdinand (s)

Dérér, Ivan (s)

Markovič, Ivan (s)

Czechoslovak National Democrats

Ivanka, Milan (s) gave up the mandate in September 1934.

Eisenhamr, Theodor (č) replaced him

Czechoslovak National Socialists

Hrušovský, Igor (s)

Polívka, Vladimír (č)

Czechoslovak People's Party

Mičura, Martin (s)

Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party

Líška, Ján (s)

Slovak National Party

Rázus, Martin

**1935-39**Agrarians

Csomor, Štefan (m)

Devečka, Ondrej (s)

Hodža, Milan (s)

Lichner, Ján (s)

Slávik, Juraj (s) to December 1935

Petrovič, Ján (s) from December 1935

Rybárik, Karol (s)

Stunda, Štefan (s)

Teplanský, Pavol (s)

Topoli, Jozef (s)

Ursíny, Ján (s)

Vančo, Ján S. (s)

Židovský, Petr (č)

Hlinka's Slovak People's PartyČavojský, Rudolf *Editor, party functionary*Danihel, Štefan *Peasant*Dembolský, Karol *Director of powerplant*Drobný, Jozef *Postal employee*Florek, Pavol *Secondary school teacher*Haščík, Štefan *Secretary*Hlinka, Andrej *Priest*Kendra, František *Peasant*Longa, Martin *Peasant*Onderčo, Štefan died March 1937 *Priest*Ivan Pješčak (r) of the Ruthenian  
autonomists replaced him April 1937Pružinský, Mikuláš *Economist*Sidor, Karol *Journalist/editor*Sivák, Jozef *Teacher/editor*Slušný, Koloman *Bureaucrat*Sokol, Martin *Lawyer, secretary general*Surovjak, Štefan *Bureaucrat*Šalát, Anton *Priest*Tiso, Jozef *Priest*Turček, Teodor *Peasant*

Schwarz, Rudolf from October 1937

*School director, replaced Martin Rázus*

(All were Slovaks except Pješčak)

Czechoslovak Social Democrats

Bečko, Ján (s)

Benda, Ferdinand (s)

Dérér, Ivan (s)

Kopasz, Jozef (s)

Markovič, Ivan (s)

Schulcz, Ignác (m)

Czechoslovak People's Party

Mičura, Martin (s)

Czechoslovak Small Traders' Party

Líška, Ján (s)

Czechoslovak National SocialistsIgor Hrušovský (s) gave up the mandate in October 1936. Emil Boleslav Lukáč (s) replaced him  
Vladimír Polívka (č) died in April 1938. František Klajban (s) replaced him.Slovak National Party

Martin Rázus (s) dead September 1937.

Abbreviations

(č) = Czech, (s) = Slovak, (m) = Magyar, (r) = Ruthene.

*Sources:* The list of the Slovak Club is based on *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928). The rest is based on *Index k těsnopiseckým zprávám o schůzích Poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky československé, I-IV volební období*, (1927, 1929, 1935, 1950), and *Národní shromáždění republiky československé* (1928, 1938).

# Appendix H

## *Election results, nationality and religion in Slovakia*

<i>(Percentages)</i>	<u>Nationality</u>			<u>Religion</u>		<u>Election results</u>			
	<i>Slovaks</i>	<i>Magyars</i>	<i>Germans</i>	<i>Catholics</i>	<i>Agr.</i>	<i>ČSD</i>	<i>HSL'S</i>	<i>KSČ</i>	<i>Total</i>
Nová Baňa	83.9	0.4	14.4	98.2	13.1	23.1	46.5	2.4	85.1
Bánovce	98.1	0.2	0.5	77.6	25.6	2.3	52.2	9.0	89.1
Bardejov	57.5	0.4	0.7	45.3	41.9	1.7	32.6	2.4	78.6
Bratislava mesto	51.3	16.1	28.1	70.6	2.7	17.0	13.4	10.6	43.7
Bratislava vonkov	79.0	6.8	13.3	88.0	9.2	24.0	22.8	14.0	70.0
Brezno nad Hronom	98.6	0.4	0.3	83.0	12.6	25.5	41.3	10.0	89.4
Banská Bystrica	95.7	1.1	1.4	54.0	17.9	16.3	27.3	15.2	76.7
Povážská Bystrica	99.7	0.1	0.1	96.7	11.4	3.5	51.3	4.0	70.2
Veľká Bytča	98.5	–	0.2	95.1	12.3	14.5	35.4	1.6	63.8
Čadca	99.6	–	0.1	98.1	6.7	14.3	55.7	2.6	79.3
Stará Ľala	27.6	70.1	0.3	80.2	13.2	4.2	6.0	21.0	44.4
Feleďince	14.0	77.4	0.1	65.0	9.0	1.7	3.4	19.6	33.7
Galanta	31.6	62.0	1.2	86.0	8.6	6.1	8.5	23.5	46.7
Gelnica	63.1	1.4	31.4	65.2	11.3	13.6	12.3	29.5	66.7
Giraltovce	85.5	0.4	0.3	48.0	46.1	0.7	33.3	1.0	81.1
Hlohovec	97.2	0.7	0.7	91.1	16.5	8.2	43.6	13.9	82.2
Humenné	91.7	0.5	0.6	71.1	37.3	1.8	39.7	4.4	83.2
Kráľovský Chlumec	10.5	78.9	0.2	32.3	26.3	5.9	2.3	20.6	55.1
Ilava	97.9	0.4	0.6	96.4	10.2	7.7	48.2	11.2	77.3
Modrý Kameň	66.9	31.5	0.1	60.0	45.0	1.3	11.8	5.2	63.3
Veľké Kapušany	36.8	55.7	–	36.4	28.1	1.2	4.8	5.7	39.8
Kežmarok	51.8	0.9	39.4	61.2	6.7	2.6	31.7	9.7	50.7
Komárno	12.3	82.9	1.7	68.0	10.5	8.2	2.1	29.3	50.1
Košice mesto	66.0	18.0	5.2	62.8	2.7	11.6	9.3	14.2	37.8
Košice vonkov	90.1	6.4	0.2	70.9	32.5	5.0	37.9	4.1	79.5
Kremnica	62.3	0.6	36.2	93.9	15.9	16.4	35.9	6.9	75.1
Krupina	61.0	36.4	0.6	75.2	29.8	4.6	24.4	5.4	64.2
Dolný Kubín	97.9	0.1	1.0	65.8	27.6	5.1	53.0	0.7	86.4
Levice	69.0	27.4	0.6	67.8	17.2	4.5	30.0	9.9	61.6
Levoča	85.4	1.4	4.6	79.4	21.8	3.8	45.5	5.6	76.7
Stará Ľubovňa	57.4	0.2	11.6	50.5	21.1	1.1	37.6	0.8	60.6
Lučenec	70.1	24.7	1.5	64.4	25.5	9.0	15.9	16.5	66.9
Malacky	97.5	0.5	1.3	96.3	15.6	26.0	37.2	4.0	82.8
Turčianský Svätý Martin	81.9	0.5	16.4	49.9	32.5	20.7	12.2	6.4	71.8
Medzilaborce	14.9	0.1	0.2	8.6	36.9	3.3	6.4	0.8	47.4
Kysucké Nové Mesto	99.5	–	–	99.2	9.1	5.9	62.4	4.8	82.2
Nové Mesto nad Váhom	96.7	0.3	0.5	59.4	21.1	8.8	39.3	11.2	80.4
Michalovce	85.8	5.9	0.7	40.5	42.1	3.2	20.9	5.8	72.0



<i>(continued)</i>	<u>Nationality</u>		<u>Religion</u>		<u>Election results</u>				
	<i>Slovaks</i>	<i>Magyars</i>	<i>Germans</i>	<i>Catholics</i>	<i>Agr.</i>	<i>ČSD</i>	<i>HSL'S</i>	<i>KSČ</i>	<i>Total</i>
Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš	97.3	0.3	1.0	35.1	30.5	12.2	23.1	7.0	72.8
Modra	87.2	2.7	9.0	75.2	23.0	11.9	38.1	7.7	80.7
Moldava nad Bodvou	26.7	56.3	12.0	71.5	18.7	3.6	5.9	15.7	43.9
Zlaté Moravce	89.1	9.9	0.2	97.0	23.1	7.4	42.3	4.6	77.4
Myjava	99.2	0.1	0.1	14.5	52.7	16.9	5.0	9.7	84.3
Námestovo	99.4	–	0.1	98.5	5.2	1.1	88.5	0.3	95.1
Nitra	83.2	13.8	1.2	89.7	15.6	9.5	26.6	15.2	66.9
Parkan	15.6	81.6	0.3	82.4	10.9	4.5	2.4	21.0	38.8
Piešťany	95.7	0.5	1.1	87.8	20.2	6.3	43.6	11.8	81.9
Poprad	75.4	1.6	19.8	65.3	24.3	7.5	30.4	8.8	71.0
Prešov	90.3	1.8	1.7	70.1	24.1	3.6	35.5	6.7	69.9
Prievidza	77.9	0.6	20.8	97.4	11.0	5.5	55.2	13.3	85.0
Púchov	97.8	0.1	0.7	79.0	19.8	13.7	50.4	1.7	85.6
Revúca	86.1	9.6	1.2	37.5	27.8	11.4	8.7	13.8	61.7
Rožňava	55.6	35.0	4.2	43.7	19.2	10.5	4.0	24.3	58.0
Ružomberok	95.6	0.2	2.9	88.6	9.6	7.6	64.4	7.6	89.2
Sabinov	78.2	0.6	0.6	64.9	31.5	3.1	38.1	1.6	74.3
Senica	97.8	0.1	0.4	63.0	34.9	12.5	34.1	4.7	86.2
Skalica	96.8	0.2	0.4	90.4	12.4	14.6	49.9	7.7	84.6
Snina	35.7	0.1	0.1	24.7	40.0	3.3	9.3	9.9	62.5
Rimavská Sobota	83.0	13.9	0.4	45.6	29.8	14.9	13.8	7.7	66.2
Sobrance	86.6	1.2	0.1	27.0	32.6	2.2	27.4	3.8	66.0
Dunajská Streda	4.9	88.2	0.4	77.9	10.0	1.6	3.0	16.1	30.7
Stropkov	33.0	0.2	0.1	23.7	51.1	0.9	14.6	2.4	69.0
Šaľa	40.5	55.5	0.2	81.1	12.1	3.3	11.2	21.5	48.1
Šamorín	11.4	76.9	9.1	89.8	11.0	5.7	3.9	9.6	30.2
Banská Štiavnica	96.1	1.5	1.0	81.3	9.1	29.6	34.4	3.5	76.6
Topoľčany	97.0	0.4	0.8	91.7	17.1	6.3	48.6	11.5	83.5
Tornaľa	12.3	83.1	0.8	44.9	9.3	2.3	1.4	15.6	28.6
Trebišov	85.5	7.8	0.2	42.2	33.4	5.3	24.2	7.0	69.9
Trenčín	96.2	0.6	1.4	79.5	15.3	11.4	47.6	7.0	81.3
Trnava	94.9	1.5	1.6	92.6	16.3	19.2	41.4	8.0	84.9
Trstená	99.3	–	0.1	97.2	11.2	3.3	74.7	0.3	89.5
Spišská Nová Ves	81.2	2.2	9.0	82.0	15.2	22.5	32.8	5.3	75.8
Spišská Stará Ves	80.5	0.3	1.8	68.0	11.7	1.6	67.9	0.4	81.6
Vráble	71.9	25.7	0.5	86.8	26.0	4.4	22.2	14.6	67.2
Vranov nad Topľou	90.1	0.4	0.7	49.2	43.9	2.9	33.4	7.9	88.1
Nové Zámky	63.9	31.6	0.6	90.4	11.6	11.2	22.0	13.9	58.7
Zvolen	98.4	0.6	0.3	63.7	27.0	12.3	38.2	8.8	86.3
Želiezovce	14.9	79.9	0.3	60.7	13.7	2.1	2.7	28.5	47.0
Žilina	95.1	0.6	2.4	92.2	7.1	13.3	50.0	7.4	77.8
Slovakia	72.1	17.6	4.5	71.6	19.5	9.5	28.3	10.7	68.0

Sources: *Štatistický lexikon obcí v republike československej, III. Krajina slovenská* (1936:XIX-XX. XVII-XVIII); *Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929* (1930:28-33).